IDR and SIDR K. Sriram, Ed.
Internet-Draft USA NIST
Intended status: Standards Track A. Azimov, Ed.
Expires: January 3, 2019 Qrator Labs
July 2, 2018
Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-09
Abstract
Problem definition for route leaks and enumeration of types of route
leaks are provided in RFC 7908. This document specifies BGP
enhancements that significantly extend its route-leak detection and
mitigation capabilities. The solution involves each participating AS
setting a route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates. The RLP
fields are carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called BGP
RLP Attribute. The RLP Attribute helps with detection and mitigation
of route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS (in the path of
BGP update). This is an inter-AS (multi-hop) solution mechanism.
This solution complements the intra-AS (local AS) route-leak
avoidance solution that is described in ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy
draft.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Route-Leak Types that the Solution Must Address . . . . . . . 3
3. Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks . . . 5
3.1. Ascertaining Peering Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending
Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. BGP RLP Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Carrying RLP Field Values in the BGPsec Flags . . . . 9
3.3. Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection
and Mitigation of Route Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
RFC 7908 [RFC7908] provides a definition of the route leak problem,
and enumerates several types of route leaks. This document first
examines which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated
by the existing Origin Validation (OV) [RFC6811] method. OV
[RFC6811] and BGPsec path validation [RFC8205] together offer
mechanisms to protect against re-originations and hijacks of IP
prefixes as well as man-in-the-middle (MITM) AS path modifications.
Route leaks [RFC7908] are another type of vulnerability in the global
BGP routing system against which OV offers very limited protection.
BGPsec path validation provides cryptographic protection for some
aspects of BGP update messages, but in its current form BGPsec does
not offer any protection against route leaks.
For the types of route leaks enumerated in RFC 7908 [RFC7908], where
the OV method does not offer a solution, this document specifies BGP
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enhancements that significantly extend its route-leak detection and
mitigation capabilities. The solution involves each participating AS
setting a route-leak protection (RLP) field in BGP updates. The RLP
fields are carried in a new optional transitive attribute, called BGP
RLP Attribute. The RLP Attribute helps with detection and mitigation
of route leaks at ASes downstream from the leaking AS (in the path of
BGP update). This is an inter-AS (multi-hop) solution mechanism.
This solution complements the intra-AS (local AS) route-leak
avoidance solution that is described in
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].
The RLP mechanism is backward compatible with BGP routers that are
not upgraded to perform RLP. Early adopters would see significant
benefits. If a group of big ISPs deploy RLP, then they would be
helping each other by blocking route leaks originated within one's
customer cone from propagating into a peer's AS or their customer
cone.
The inter-AS RLP solution is meant to be initially implemented as an
enhancement of BGP without requiring BGPsec. However, when BGPsec is
deployed in the future, the solution should be incorporated in
BGPsec, enabling cryptographic protection for the RLP fields. That
is one way of securing the solution against malicious route leaks.
2. Route-Leak Types that the Solution Must Address
Referring to the enumeration of route leaks discussed in [RFC7908],
Table 1 summarizes the route-leak detection capability offered by OV
and BGPsec for different types of route leaks.
A detailed explanation of the contents of Table 1 is as follows. It
is readily observed that route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 are not
detected by OV or BGPsec in its current form. Clearly, Type 5 route
leak involves re-origination or hijacking, and hence can be detected
by OV. In the case of Type 5 route leak, there would be no existing
ROAs to validate a re-originated prefix or more specific prefix, but
instead a covering ROA would normally exist with the legitimate AS,
and hence the update will be considered Invalid by OV.
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+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| Type of Route Leak | Current State of Detection |
| | Coverage |
+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| Type 1: Hairpin Turn with Full | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its |
| Prefix | current form) detects Type 1. |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| Type 2: Lateral ISP-ISP-ISP | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its |
| Leak | current form) detects Type 2. |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| Type 3: Leak of Transit- | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its |
| Provider Prefixes to Peer | current form) detects Type 3. |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| Type 4: Leak of Peer Prefixes | Neither OV nor BGPsec (in its |
| to Transit Provider | current form) detects Type 4. |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| Type 5: Prefix Re-Origination | OV detects Type 5. |
| with Data Path to Legitimate | |
| Origin | |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| Type 6: Accidental Leak of | For internal prefixes never |
| Internal Prefixes and More | meant to be routed on the |
| Specific Prefixes | Internet, OV helps detect their |
| | leak; they might either have no |
| | covering ROA or have an AS0-ROA |
| | to always filter them. In the |
| | case of accidental leak of more |
| | specific prefixes, OV may offer |
| | some detection due to ROA |
| | maxLength. |
+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
Table 1: Examination of Route-Leak Detection Capability of Origin
Validation and Current BGPsec Path Validation
In the case of Type 6 leaks involving internal prefixes that are not
meant to be routed in the Internet, they are likely to be detected by
OV. That is because such prefixes might either have no covering ROA
or have an AS0-ROA to always filter them. In the case of Type 6
leaks that are due to accidental leak of more specific prefixes, they
may be detected due to violation of ROA maxLength. BGPsec (i.e.,
path validation) in its current form does not detect Type 6.
However, route leaks of Type 6 are least problematic due to the
following reasons. In the case of leak of more specific prefixes,
the offending AS is itself the legitimate destination of the leaked
more-specific prefixes. Hence, in most cases of this type, the data
traffic is not misrouted. Also, leaked announcements of Type 6 are
short-lived and typically withdrawn quickly following the
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announcements. Further, the MaxPrefix limit may kick-in in some
receiving routers and that helps limit the propagation of sometimes
large number of leaked routes of Type 6.
Realistically, BGPsec may take a much longer time being deployed than
OV. Hence, solution proposals for route leaks should consider both
scenarios: (A) OV only (without BGPsec) and (B) OV plus BGPsec.
Assuming an initial scenario A, and based on the above discussion and
Table 1, it is evident that the solution method should focus
primarily on route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4.
3. Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks
There are two considerations for route leaks: (1) Prevention of route
leaks from a local AS [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy], and (2)
Detection and mitigation of route leaks in ASes that are downstream
from the leaking AS (in the path of BGP update). This document
specifies the latter.
3.1. Ascertaining Peering Relationship
There are four possible peering relationships (i.e., roles) an AS can
have with a neighbor AS: (1) Provider: transit-provider for all
prefixes exchanged, (2) Customer: customer for all prefixes
exchanged, (3) Lateral Peer: lateral peer (i.e., non-transit) for all
prefixes exchanged, and (4) Complex: different relationships for
different sets of prefixes [Luckie]. For the complex case, the
peering role types provider, customer, or lateral peer apply for
different non-overlapping sets of prefixes.
Operators rely on some form of out-of-band (OOB) (i.e., external to
BGP) communication to exchange information about their peering
relationship, AS number, interface IP address, etc. If the
relationship is complex, the OOB communication also includes the sets
of prefixes for which they have different roles.
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] introduces a method of re-confirming
the BGP Role during BGP OPEN messaging (except when the role is
complex). It defines a new BGP Role capability, which helps in re-
confirming the relationship when it is provider, customer, or lateral
peer. BGP Role does not replace the OOB communication since it
relies on the OOB communication to set the role type in the BGP OPEN
message. However, BGP Role provides a means to double check, and if
there is a contradiction detected via the BGP Role messages, then a
Role Mismatch Notification is sent [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].
When the BGP relationship information has been correctly exchanged
(i.e., free of contradictions) including the sets of prefixes with
different roles (if complex), then this information SHOULD be used to
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automatically set the role per-prefix with each peer. For example,
if the local AS's role is Provider with a neighbor AS, then the per-
prefix role is set to 'Provider' for all prefixes sent to the
neighbor, and set to 'Customer' for all prefixes received from the
neighbor.
Once the per-prefix roles are set, this information is used in the
RLP solution mechanism that is described in Section 3.2 and
Section 3.3.
3.2. Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending Router
The key principle is that, in the event of a route leak, a receiving
router in a transit-provider AS (e.g., referring to Figure 1, ISP2
(AS2) router) should be able to detect from the update message that
its customer AS (e.g., AS3 in Figure 1) should not have forwarded the
update (towards the transit-provider AS). This means that at least
one of the ASes in the AS path of the update signaled that it sent
the update to its customer or lateral peer, but forbade any
subsequent 'Up' (customer to provider) or 'Lateral' (peer to peer)
forwarding. This signaling is achieved by a Route-Leak Protection
(RLP) field as described below.
/\ /\
\ route-leak(P)/
\ propagated /
\ /
+------------+ peer +------------+
______| ISP1 (AS1) |----------->| ISP2 (AS2)|---------->
/ ------------+ prefix(P) +------------+ route-leak(P)
| prefix | \ update /\ \ propagated
\ (P) / \ / \
------- prefix(P) \ / \
update \ / \
\ /route-leak(P) \/
\/ /
+---------------+
| customer(AS3) |
+---------------+
Figure 1: Illustration of the basic notion of a route leak.
* Design A:
For route-leak detection and mitigation, the Route Leak Protection
(RLP) field value MUST be set as follows:
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o Insert the public registered local AS number and RLP = 0 when BGP
UPDATE is forwarded to a transit provider,
o Insert the public registered local AS number and RLP = 1 when BGP
UPDATE is forwarded to a customer or lateral peer.
* Design B:
For route-leak detection and mitigation, the Route Leak Protection
(RLP) field value MUST be set as follows:
o Do not insert anything when BGP UPDATE is forwarded to a transit
provider,
o Insert the public registered local AS number when BGP UPDATE is
forwarded to a customer or lateral peer.
Note: Design A requires all participating ASes in the path to
indicate the direction in which the BGP UPDATE is sent. On the other
hand, Design B requires participating ASes to insert their AS number
only when the BGP UPDATE is sent to a customer or lateral peer.
After discussion in the WG, one of the designs will be finalized. It
will be discussed if the extra information provided in Design A adds
value for route leak detection and mitigation.
Note: In the rest of this document, by "RLP is set" it is meant that
RLP = 1 for one or more ASes in the AS path (in Design A), or, that
the RLP Attribute (with one or more AS numbers in it) is present (in
Design B). Further, in the context of either design, "RLP includes
AS X" means that "RLP is set" by AS X which is in the path. The
intent of setting RLP is that the neighbor AS or any receiving AS
along the subsequent AS path SHOULD NOT forward the UPDATE 'Up'
towards its transit-provider AS or laterally towards its peer AS.
The RLP fields are set on a per prefix basis. This is because some
peering relations between neighbors can be complex (see Section 3.1).
Either Design A or B (described above) works for detection and
mitigation of route leaks of Types 1, 2, 3, and 4 which are the focus
here (see Section 3.3).
An AS MUST NOT rewrite/reset the values set by any preceding ASes in
their respective RLP fields.
The RLP encoding MUST be carried in BGP-4 [RFC4271] updates in a new
BGP optional transitive attribute (see Section 3.2.1). In BGPsec, it
must be carried in the Flags field (see Section 3.2.2).
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In partial deployment, there may be eBGP routers in the AS path that
are not upgraded and hence do not participate in RLP. However, the
RLP mechanism is backward compatible. Participating ASes can detect
and mitigate route leaks while ASes not upgraded might remain
vulnerable. If big ISPs deploy RLP, then they would be helping each
other by not allowing route leaks originated within one's customer
cone to propagate into another's AS or their customer cone. This
accords significant benefit to early adopters.
3.2.1. BGP RLP Attribute
The BGP RLP Attribute is a new BGP optional transitive attribute.
The attribute type code for the RLP Attribute is to be assigned by
IANA. The length field of this attribute is 2 octets.
* RLP Attribute for Design A:
The value field of the RLP Attribute is defined as a set of one or
more pairs of ASN (4 octets) and RLP (one octet) fields as described
below (Figure 2).
+-----------------------+ -\
| ASN: N | |
+-----------------------+ > (Most recently added)
| RLP: N | |
+-----------------------+ -/
...........
+-----------------------+ -\
| ASN: 1 | |
+-----------------------+ > (Least recently added)
| RLP: 1 | |
+-----------------------+ -/
Figure 2: BGP RLP Attribute format.
The RLP Attribute value is a sequence of these two components (see
Figure 2):
ASN: Four octets encoding the public registered AS number of a BGP
speaker.
RLP Field: One octet encoding the RLP Field bits. The value of the
RLP Field octet can be 0 (decimal) or 1 (decimal) as described above
in Section 3.2.1. Its usage will be further discussed in subsequent
sections.
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If all ASes in the AS_PATH of a route are upgraded to participate in
RLP, then the ASNs in the RLP TLV in Figure 2 will correspond one-to-
one with sequence of ASes in the AS_PATH (excluding prepends). If
some ASes do not participate, then one or more {ASN, RLP} tuples may
be missing in the RLP Attribute relative to the AS_PATH.
* RLP Attribute for Design B:
The value field of the RLP Attribute is defined as a sequence of one
or more ASN (4 octets) fields as described below (Figure 3).
+-----------------------+
| ASN: N | (Most recently added)
+-----------------------+
| ASN: N-1 |
+-----------------------+
...........
+-----------------------+
| ASN: 2 |
+-----------------------+
| ASN: 1 | (Least recently added)
+-----------------------+
Figure 3: BGP RLP Attribute format.
Thus, the RLP Attribute value is a sequence public registered AS
numbers (see Figure 3). The ASNs of only the participating
(upgraded) ASes that sent the BGP UPDATE to a customer or lateral
peer appear in the RLP Attribute.
3.2.2. Carrying RLP Field Values in the BGPsec Flags
In BGPsec-enabled routers that are also performing RLP, the RLP
encoding MUST be accommodated in the existing Flags field in BGPsec
updates. The Flags field is part of the Secure_Path Segment in
BGPsec updates [RFC8205]. One Flags field (one octet in size) is
available for each AS hop, and currently only the first bit is used
in BGPsec. So, there are 7 bits that are currently unused in the
Flags field. One of these bits can be designated for the RLP field
value (see Section 3.2.1). This bit is set to 0 when the RLP Field
value is 0 and set to 1 when the RLP Field value is 1. Since the
BGPsec protocol specification requires a sending AS to include the
Flags field in the data that are signed over, the RLP field for each
hop (since it would be part of the Flags field as described) will be
protected under the sending AS's signature.
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3.3. Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection and
Mitigation of Route Leaks
Route Leak Detection:
When a customer route has at least one or more RLP fields set (to
indicate 'do not propagate to provider or peer') by any AS(es)
preceding the customer AS, then the route MUST be marked as route
leak. The same applies in the case of a peer route also.
Route Leak Mitigation:
For the most part, route leak mitigation policy can be set locally by
a network operator. However, the following rules MUST be included in
any route leak mitigation policy. These rules ensure stable route
convergence and avoid the possibility of persistent route
oscillations (see Section 3.1 in the route leak solution discussion
document [RLP-Discussion] for an explanation).
o Rule 1: If ISP A receives a route r1 from customer AS C and
another route r2 from provider (or peer) AS B (for the same
prefix), and both routes r1 and r2 contain AS C and AS X (any X
not equal to C) in the path and also contain [X] in their RLP
Attributes, then prioritize the customer (AS C) route over the
provider (or peer) route.
o Rule 2: If ISP A receives a route r1 from peer AS C and another
route r2 from provider AS B (for the same prefix), and both routes
r1 and r2 contain AS C and AS X (any X not equal to C) in the path
and also contain [X] in their RLP Attributes, then prioritize the
peer (AS C) route over the provider (AS B) route.
Including the rules stated above, the RECOMMENDED route leak
mitigation policy is as follows:
1. Given a choice between a customer route versus a provider (or
peer) route,
* if no route leak is detected in the customer route, then
prioritize the customer over the provider (or peer);
* else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the customer route)
and the conditions of Rule 1 apply, then too prioritize the
customer over the provider (or peer);
* else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the customer route
and the conditions of Rule 1 DO NOT apply), then prioritize
the provider (or peer) over the customer.
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2. Given a choice between a peer route versus a provider route,
* if no route leak is detected in the peer route, then
prioritize the peer over the provider;
* else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the peer route) and
the conditions of Rule 2 apply, then too prioritize the peer
over the provider;
* else (i.e., when route leak is detected in the peer route and
the conditions of Rule 2 DO NOT apply), then prioritize the
provider over the peer.
In the case of choosing between a peer route and a provider route,
network operators MAY apply a policy (different from the above) that
they deem appropriate in their operating environment.
4. Security Considerations
The Route-Leak Protection (RLP) field requires cryptographic
protection to prevent malicious route leaks. In the future, in
conjunction with BGPsec deployment, the RLP field will be included in
the Flags field in the Secure_Path Segment in BGPsec updates. So,
the cryptographic security mechanisms in BGPsec will also apply to
the RLP field. The reader is therefore directed to the security
considerations provided in [RFC8205].
5. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to register a new optional, transitive attribute,
named "Route Leak Protection (RLP) Attribute" in the BGP Path
Attributes registry. The attribute type code is TBD. The reference
for this new attribute is this document (i.e., the RFC that replaces
this draft). The length field of this attribute is 2 octets, and the
length of the value field of this attribute is variable (see
Figure 2) in Section 3.2.1 of this document).
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
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6.2. Informative References
[draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns]
Dickson, B., "Route Leaks -- Proposed Solutions", IETF
Internet Draft (expired), March 2012,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-dickson-sidr-route-leak-solns-01>.
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K.
Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and
Open messages", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03 (work in
progress), June 2018.
[Luckie] Luckie, M., Huffaker, B., Dhamdhere, A., Giotsas, V., and
kc. claffy, "AS Relationships, Customer Cones, and
Validation", IMC 2013, October 2013,
<http://www.caida.org/~amogh/papers/asrank-IMC13.pdf>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RLP-Discussion]
Sriram (Ed.), K., "Design Discussion of Route Leaks
Solution Methods", Work in Progress, draft-sriram-idr-
route-leak-solution-design-discussion-00, July 2018.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Jared Mauch, Jeff Haas, Job Snijders,
Warren Kumari, Amogh Dhamdhere, Jakob Heitz, Geoff Huston, Randy
Bush, Alexander Azimov, Ruediger Volk, Sue Hares, Wes George, Job
Snijders, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Danny McPherson, and Eric
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Osterweil for comments, suggestions, and critique. The authors are
thankful to Padma Krishnaswamy, Oliver Borchert, and Okhee Kim for
their review and comments.
Contributors
The following people made significant contributions to this document
and should be considered co-authors:
Brian Dickson
Independent
Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com
Doug Montgomery
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
Email: dougm@nist.gov
Keyur Patel
Arrcus
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Andrei Robachevsky
Internet Society
Email: robachevsky@isoc.org
Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs
Email: eb@qrator.net
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
Email: randy@psg.com
Authors' Addresses
Kotikalapudi Sriram (editor)
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Email: ksriram@nist.gov
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Alexander Azimov (editor)
Qrator Labs
1-Y Magistral'nyy Tupik
Moskva, XYZ 123007
Russia
Email: aa@qrator.net
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