Network Working Group Yuri Demchenko
INTERNET DRAFT TERENA
Category: Informational
Expires April 2003
October, 2002
Incident Object Description and Exchange Format
Requirements
<draft-ietf-inch-iodef-rfc3067bis-requirements-00.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
1. Abstracts
The purpose of the Incident Object Description and Exchange Format is
to define a common data format for describing and exchanging incident
information between collaborating Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs). The specific goals and requirements of the IODEF are
described in [2]. One of the design principles in the IODEF is
compatibility with the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format
(IDMEF) [3] developed for intrusion detection systems. For this
reason, IODEF is heavily based on the IDMEF and provides upward
compatibility with it.
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The purpose of the Incident Object Description and Exchange Format is
to define a common data format for the description, archiving and
exchange of information about incidents between CSIRTs (Computer
Security Incident Response Teams) (including alert, incident in
investigation, archiving, statistics, reporting, etc.). This
document describes the high-level requirements for such a description
and exchange format, including the reasons for those requirements.
Examples are used to illustrate the requirements where necessary.
1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
2. Introduction
This document is a revision of RFC 3067 [2] which defined
requirements for the initial development of the Incident Object
Description and Exchange Format (IODEF) by TERENA IODEF WG [3] which
since IETF53 transferred further development of the IODEF to IETF
INCH Working Group [4].
This document itself defines requirements for the IODEF. IODEF is
intended to be a standard format which allows Computer Security
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) to exchange operational and
statistical information; it may also provide a basis for the
development of compatible and inter-operable tools for Incident
recording, tracking and exchange.
Most of revisions of RFC3067 are compliant to currently published
IODEF Data Model and XML Data Type Description Internet-draft [5].
This document also has intention to provide requirement document that
is open for discussion in IETF INCH WG and will evolve together with
ongoing IODEF development and implementation.
Further discussion of this document will take place on the INCH WG
mailing lists < inch@nic.surfnet.nl>, archive is available at
http://listserv.surfnet.nl/archives/inch.html
2.1. Rationale
Computer Incidents are becoming distributed and International and
involve many CSIRTs across borders, languages and cultures. Post-
Incident information and statistics exchange is important for future
Incident prevention and Internet security improvement. The key
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element for information exchange in all these cases is a common
format for Incident (Object) description.
It is probable that in further development or implementation the
IODEF might be used for forensic purposes, and this means that
Incident description must be unambiguous and allow for future custody
(archiving/documentation) features.
Another issue that is targeted by developing IODEF is a need to have
higher level Incident description and exchange format than will be
provided by IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) and the proposed IDMEF
(Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format). Compatibility with
IDMEF and other related standards will be satisfied by the IODEF
requirement on modularity and extensibility. IODEF should vertically
be compatible with IDMEF, IODEF might be able to include or reference
IDMEF Alert message as initial information about Incident.
2.2. Incident Description Terms
A definition of the main terms used in the rest of document is given
for clarity.
Where possible, existing definitions will be used; some definitions
will need additional detail and further consideration.
Currently proposed definitions are based on the Taxonomy of the
Computer Security Incident related terminology made by TERENA's IODEF
WG [2] and presented in [6], other documents used include [7, 8].
2.2.1. Attack
An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent
threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt
(especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security
services and violate the security policy of a system.
Attack can be active or passive, by insider or by outsider, or via
attack mediator.
2.2.2. Attacker
Attacker is individual who attempts one or more attacks in order to
achieve an objective(s).
For the purpose of IODEF attacker is described by its network ID,
organisation which network/computer attack was originated and
physical location information (optional).
2.2.3. CSIRT
CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team) is used in IODEF to
refer to the authority handling the Incident and creating Incident
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Object Description. The CSIRT is also likely to be involved in
evidence collection and custody, incident remedy, etc.
In IODEF CSIRT represented by its ID, constituency, public key, etc.
2.2.4. Damage
An intended or unintended consequence of an attack which affects the
normal operation of the targeted system or service. Description of
damage may include free text description of actual result of attack,
and, where possible, structured information about the particular
damaged system, subsystem or service.
2.2.5. Event
An action directed at a target which is intended to result in a
change of state (status) of the target. From the point of view of
event origination, it can be defined as any observable occurrence in
a system or network which resulted in an alert being generated. For
example, three failed logins in 10 seconds might indicate a brute-
force login attack.
2.2.6. Evidence
Evidence is information relating to an event that proves or supports
a conclusion about the event. With respect to security incidents (the
events), it may include but is not limited to: data dump created by
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), data from syslog file, kernel
statistics, cache, memory, temporary file system, or other data that
caused the alert or were collected after the incident happened.
Special rules and care must be taken when storing and archiving
evidence, particularly to preserve its integrity. When necessary
evidence should be stored encrypted.
According to the Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
(Evidence) evidence must be strictly secured. The chain of evidence
custody needs to be clearly documented.
It is essential that evidence should be collected, archived and
preserved according to local legislation.
2.2.7. Incident
An Incident is a security event that involves a security violation.
An incident can be defined as a single attack or a group of attacks
that can be distinguished from other attacks by the method of attack,
identity of attackers, victims, sites, objectives or timing, etc.
An incident is a root element of the IODEF. In the context of IODEF,
the term Incident is used to mean a Computer Security Incident or an
IT Security Incident.
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However we should distinguish between the generic definition of
'Incident' which is an event that might lead to damage or damage
which is not too serious, and 'Security Incident' and 'IT Security
Incident' which are defined below:
a) Security incident is an event that involves a security violation.
This may be an event that violates a security policy, UAP, laws and
jurisdictions, etc. A security incident may also be an incident that
has been escalated to a security incident.
A security incident is worse than an incident as it affects the
security of or in the organisation. A security incident may be
logical, physical or organisational, for example a computer
intrusion, loss of secrecy, information theft, fire or an alarm that
doesn't work properly. A security incident may be caused on purpose
or by accident. The latter may be if somebody forgets to lock a door
or forgets to activate an access list in a router.
b) An IT security incident is defined according to [9] as any real or
suspected adverse event in relation to the security of a computer or
computer network. Typical security incidents within the IT area are:
a computer intrusion, a denial-of-service attack, information theft
or data manipulation, etc.
2.2.8. Impact
Impact describes result of attack expressed in terms of user
community, for example the cost in terms of financial or other
disruption
2.2.9. Target
A computer or network logical entity (account, process or data) or
physical entity (component, computer, network or internetwork).
2.2.10. Victim
Victim is individual or organisation which suffered the attack which
is described in incident report.
For the purpose of IODEF victim is described by its network ID,
organisation and location information.
2.2.11. Vulnerability
A flaw or weakness in a system's design, implementation, or operation
and management that could be exploited to violate the system's
security policy.
Most systems have vulnerabilities of some sort, but this does not
mean that the systems are too flawed to use. Not every threat
results in an attack, and not every attack succeeds. Success depends
on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of attacks, and the
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effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If the attacks needed
to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult to carry out, then the
vulnerability may be tolerable. If the perceived benefit to an
attacker is small, then even an easily exploited vulnerability may be
tolerable. However, if the attacks are well understood and easily
made, and if the vulnerable system is employed by a wide range of
users, then it is likely that there will be enough benefit for
someone to make an attack.
2.2.12. Other terms
Other terms used: alert, activity, IDS, Security Policy, etc., - are
defined in related I-Ds, RFCs and standards [7 - 12].
3. General Requirements
3.1. The IODEF shall reference and use previously published RFCs
where possible.
Comment: The IETF has already developed a number of standards in the
areas of networks and security that are actually deployed in present
Internet. Current standards provide framework for compatibility of
IODEF with other related technologies necessary to operate /implement
IODEF in practice. Another issue of compatibility for the IODEF is
its general compatibility with IDMEF developed by IETF IDWG. In the
interest of time and compatibility, defined and accepted standards
should be used wherever possible.
In particularly, IODEF specification proposals SHOULD rely heavily on
existing communications, encryption and language standards, where
possible.
4. Description Format
4.1. IODEF shall support full internationalization and localization.
Comment: Since some Incidents need involvement of CSIRTs from
different countries, cultural and geographic regions, the IODEF
description must be formatted such that they can be presented to an
operator in a local language and adhering to local presentation
formats.
Although metalanguage for IODEF identifiers and labels is considered
to be English, a local IODEF implementation might be capable to
translate metalanguage identifiers and labels into local language and
presentations if necessary.
Localized presentation of dates, time and names may also be required.
In cases where the messages contain text strings and names that need
characters other than Latin-1 (or ISO 8859-1), the information
preferably should be represented using the ISO/IEC IS 10646-1
character set and encoded using the UTF-8 transformation format, and
optionally using local character sets and encodings.
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4.2. The IODEF must support modularity in Incident description to
allow aggregation and filtering of data.
Comment: It is suggested that Incident description with IODEF might
include external information, e.g., from IDS, or reference externally
stored evidence custody data, or such information might be removed
from current IODEF description, e.g., in purposes of privacy or
security. Another practical/real life motivation for this requirement
is to give possibility for some CSIRTs/managers to perform filtering
and/or data aggregation functions on IODEF descriptions for the
purposes of statistics, reporting and high level Incident information
exchange between CSIRTs and/or their constituency and sponsors.
Therefore the IODEF descriptions MUST be structured to facilitate
these operations. This also implies to strong IODEF semantics.
4.3. IODEF must support the application of an access restriction
policy to individual components and to individual accessing entities.
Comment: IODEF Incident descriptions potentially contain sensitive or
private information (such as passwords, persons/organisations
identifiers or forensic information (evidence data)) and in some
cases may be exposed to non-authorised persons. Such situations may
arise particularly in case of Incident information exchange between
CSIRTs or other involved bodies. Technical realization may included
using special restriction attributes or general external technology
available with implementation format (like XSLT for XML based IODEF
implementation), which can be applied by Incident Handling System.
Some cases may be addressed by encrypting IODEF elements, however
this will not always be possible.
Therefore, to prevent accidental disclosure of sensitive data, parts
of the IODEF object must be marked with access restriction
attributes. These markings will be particularly useful when used
with automated processing systems.
5. Communications Mechanisms Requirements
5.1. IODEF exchange will normally be initiated by humans using
standard communication protocols, for example, e-mail, HTTP, XML Web
Services (based on SOAP XML Protocol).
Comment: IODEF description is normally created by a human using
special or standard text editors. The IODEF is targeted to be
processed by automated Incident handling systems but still must be
human readable, able to be viewed and browsed with standard tools
(e.g., browsers or electronic table processors or database tools like
MS Excel or Access). Incident information exchange will normally
require authorisation by an operator or CSIRT manager so is not
expected to be initiated automatically. The role of Incident
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handling system is to provide assistance and tools for performing the
exchange.
It is important to distinguish the purposes of the machine readable
and exchangeable IDEF Intrusion message format and the human oriented
and created IODEF Incident description.
Communications security requirements will be applied separately
according to local policy so are not defined by this document.
6. Message Contents
6.1. The root element of the IO description should contain a unique
identification number (or identifier), IO purpose and default
permission level
Comment: Unique identification number (or identifier) is necessary to
distinguish one Incident from another. It is suggested that unique
identification number will contain information at least about IO
creator, i.e. CSIRT or related body. The classification of the
Incident may also be used to form a unique identification number. IO
purpose will actually control which elements are included in the
IODEF object Purposes may include incident alert/registration,
handling, archiving, reporting or statistics. The purpose, incident
type or status of Incident investigation may require different levels
of access permission for the Incident information.
It is considered that root element of the IODEF will be <INCIDENT>
and additional information will be treated as attributes of the root
element.
6.2. The content of the IODEF description should contain the type of
the attack if it is known.
It is expected that this type will be drawn from a standardized list
of events; a new type of event may use a temporary implementation-
specific type if the event type has not yet been standardized.
Comment: Incident handling may involve many different staff members
and teams. It is therefore essential that common terms are used to
describe incidents.
If the event type has not yet been standardized, temporary type
definition might be given by team created IO. It is expected that
new type name will be self-explanatory and derived from a similar,
existing type definition.
6.3. The IODEF description must be structured such that any relevant
advisories, such as those from CERT/CC, CVE, can be referenced.
Comment: Using standard Advisories and lists of known Attacks and
Vulnerabilities will allow the use of their recommendations on
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Incident handling/prevention. Such information might be included as
an attribute to the attack or vulnerability type definition.
6.4. IODEF may include a detailed description of the attack that
caused the current Incident.
Comment: Description of attack includes information about attacker
and victim, the appearance of the attack and possible impact. At the
early stage of Intrusion alert and Incident handling there is likely
to be minimal information, during handling of the Incident this will
grow to be sufficient for Incident investigation and remedy. Element
<ATTACK> should be one of the main elements of Incident description.
6.5. The IODEF description must include or be able to reference
additional detailed data related to this specific underlying
event(s)/activity, often referred as evidence.
Comment: For many purposes Incident description does not need many
details on specific event(s)/activity that caused the Incident; this
information may be referenced as external information (by means of
URL). In some cases it might be convenient to store separately
evidence that has different access permissions. It is foreseen that
another standard will be proposed for evidence custody [5].
6.6. The IODEF description MUST contain the description of the
attacker and victim.
Comment: This information is necessary to identify the source and
target of the attack. The minimum information about attacker and
victim is their IP or Internet addresses, extended information will
identify their organisations allowing CSIRTs to take appropriate
measures for their particular constituency.
6.7. The IODEF description must support the representation of
different types of device addresses, e.g., IP address (version 4 or
6) and Internet name.
Comment: The sites from which attack is launched might have addresses
in various levels of the network protocol hierarchy (e.g., Data layer
2 MAC addresses or Network layer 3 IP addresses). Additionally, the
devices involved in an intrusion event might use addresses that are
not IP-centric, e.g., ATM-addresses. It is also understood that
information about the source and target of the attack might be
obtained from IDS and include the IP address, MAC address or both.
6.8. IODEF must include the Identity of the creator (or current
owner) of the Incident Object (CSIRT or other authority). This may
be the sender in an information exchange or the team currently
handling the incident.
Comment: The identity of Incident description creator is often
valuable information for Incident response. In one possible scenario
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the attack may progress through the network, comparison of
corresponding incidents reported by different authorities might
provide some additional information about the origin of the attack.
This is also useful information at post-incident information
handling/exchange stage.
Experience based on initial IODEF development also uses working
concept of Incident Object ownership for resolving technical problems
with identifying and tracking Incident reports.
6.9. The IODEF description must contain an indication of the
possible impact of this event on the target. The value of this
field should be drawn from a standardized list of values if the
attack is recognized as known, or expressed in a free language by
responsible CSIRT team member.
Comment: Information concerning the possible impact of the event on
the target system provides an indication of what the attacker is
attempting to do and is critical data for the CSIRTs to take actions
and perform damage assessment. If no reference information
(Advisories) is available, this field may be filled in based on CSIRT
team experience.
It is expected that most CSIRTs will develop Incident handling
support systems, based on existing Advisories (such as those from
CERT/CC, CVE, etc.) that usually contain list of possible impacts for
identified attacks.
This also relates to the development of IDEF which will be
implemented in intelligent IDS, able to retrieve information from
standard databases of attacks and vulnerabilities.
6.10. The IODEF must be able to state the degree of confidence in
the report information.
Comment: Including this information is essential at the stage of
Incident creation, particularly in cases when intelligent automatic
IDS or expert systems are used. These normally use statistical
engines to estimate the event probability.
6.11. The IODEF description must provide information about the
actions taken in the course of this incident by previous CSIRTs.
Comment: The IODEF describes an Incident throughout its life-time
from Alert to closing and archiving. It is essential to track all
actions taken by all involved parties. This will help determine what
further action needs to be taken, if any. This is especially
important in case of Incident information exchange between CSIRTs in
process of investigation.
6.12. The IODEF must support reporting of the time of all stages
along Incident life-time.
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Comment: Time is important from both a reporting and correlation
point of view. Time is one of main components that can identify the
same Incident or attack if launched from many sites or distributed
over the network. Time is also essential to be able to track the
life of an Incident including Incident exchange between CSIRTs in
process of investigating.
6.13. Time shall be reported as the local time and time zone offset
from UTC. (Note: See RFC 1902 for guidelines on reporting time.)
Comment: For event correlation purposes, it is important that the
manager be able to normalize the time information reported in the
IODEF descriptions.
6.14. The format for reporting the date must be compliant with all
current standards for Year 2000 rollover, and it must have
sufficient capability to continue reporting date values past the
year 2038.
Comment: It is stated in the purposes of the IODEF that the IODEF
shall describe the Incident throughout its life-time. In the case of
archiving this duration might be unlimited. Therefore,
implementations that limit expression of time value (such as 2038
date representation limitation in "Unix time") MUST be avoided.
6.15. Time granularity in IO time parameters shall not be specified
by the IODEF.
Comment: The time data may be included into IODEF description by
existing information systems, retrieved from incident reporting
messages or taken from IDS data or other event registration tools.
Each of these cases may have its own different time granularity. For
the purposes of implementation, it should be possible to handle time
at different stages according to the local system capabilities.
6.16. The IODEF should provide the possibility to secure the
confidentiality of the description content.
The selected design should be capable of supporting a variety of
encryption algorithms and must be adaptable to a wide variety of
environments. However, to simplify technical implementations,
implementers may choose to use confidentiality preserving methods and
solutions external to Incident Object itself.
Comment: IODEF Incident descriptions potentially contain sensitive or
private information (such as forensic data (evidence data),
passwords, or person/organisation identifiers) which would be of
great interest to an attacker or malefactor. Incident information
normally will be stored on a networked computer, which potentially
may be exposed to attacks (or compromised). Incident information may
be transmitted across uncontrolled network segments. Therefore, it
is important that the content be protected from unauthorised access
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and modification. Furthermore, since the legal environment for
privacy and encryption technologies are varied from regions and
countries and change often, it is important that the design selected
be capable of supporting a number of different encryption options and
be adaptable by the user to a variety of environments. Additional
measures may be undertaken for securing the Incident during
communication but this issue is outside of IODEF scope as it implies
more strict rules for IO archiving and storing in general.
6.17. The IODEF should ensure the integrity of the description
content.
The selected design should be capable of supporting a variety of
integrity mechanisms and must be adaptable to a wide variety of
environments.
Comment: Special measures should be undertaken to prevent malicious
IO changes.
Additional measures may be undertaken for securing the Incident
during communication but this issue is outside of IODEF scope.
6.18. The IODEF should ensure the authenticity of the Incident
description content.
Authenticity ensuring method should be also capable to provide non-
repudiation of Incident report exchanged between communicating
CSIRTs.
Comment: Authenticity and accountability is needed by many teams,
especially given the desire to automatically handle IOs, therefore it
MUST be included in the IODEF. Because of the importance of IO
authenticity and non-repudiation to many teams and especially in case
of communication between them, the implementation of these
requirements is strongly RECOMMENDED.
6.19. The IODEF description must support an extension mechanism
which may be used by implementers. This allows future
implementation-specific or experimental data. The implementer
MUST indicate how to interpret any included extensions.
Comment: Implementers might wish to supply extra data such as
information for internal purposes or necessary for the particular
implementation of their Incident handling system. These data may be
removed or not in external communications but it is essential to mark
them as additional to prevent wrong interpretation by different
systems.
6.20. The semantics of the IODEF description must be well defined.
Comment: IODEF is a human oriented format for Incident description,
and IODEF description should be capable of being read by humans. The
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use of automatic parsing tools is foreseen but should not be
critically necessary. Therefore, IODEF must provide good semantics,
which will be key to understanding what the description contains.
In some cases the IODEF description will be used for automatic
decision making, so it is important that the description be
interpreted correctly. This is an argument for using language-based
semantics. The metalanguage for IODEF identifiers and labels is
proposed to be English, a local IODEF implementation might be able to
translate metalanguage identifiers and labels into local language and
presentations if necessary.
7. IODEF extensibility
7.1. The IODEF itself MUST be extensible. It is essential that when
the use of new technologies and development of automated Incident
handling system demands extension of IODEF, the IODEF will be
capable to include new information.
Comment: In addition to the need to extend IODEF to support new
Incident handling tools, it is also suggested that IODEF will
incorporate new developments from related standardisation areas such
as IDEF for IDS or the development of special format for evidence
custody. The procedure for extension should be based on CSIRT/IODEF
community acceptance/approval.
8. Security Considerations
This memo describes requirements to an Incident Object Description
and Exchange Format, which intends to define a common data format for
the description, archiving and exchange of information about
incidents between CSIRTs (including alert, incident in investigation,
archiving, statistics, reporting, etc.). In that respect the
implementation of the IODEF is a subject to security considerations.
Particular security requirement to access restriction indication is
discussed in section 4.3, requirements to Incident description
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation are
described in sections 6.16, 6.17, 6.18.
9. Acknowledgements
This document is a revision of RFC 3067 and provided for further open
discussion of IODEF requirements that evolves in the process of IODEF
design.
All credits are given to initial authors of RFC3067 and past
discussion in TERENA IODEF WG.
10. References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
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[2] Arvidsson, J., Cormack, A., Demchenko, Y., Meijer J. "TERENA's
Incident Object Description and Exchange Format Requirements", RFC
3067, February 2001
[3] TERENA IODEF WG - http://www.terena.nl/tech/task-forces/tf-
csirt/iodef/
[4] IETF INCH WG - http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/inch-
charter.html
[5] Incident Object Description and Exchange Format Data Model and
Extensible Markup Language (XML) Document Type Definition û October
2002. Work in progress.
[6] Taxonomy of the Computer Security Incident related terminology
- http://www.terena.nl/task-forces/tf-csirt/iiodef/docs/i-
taxonomy_terms.html
[7] Intrusion Detection Exchange Format Requirements by Wood, M.,
Erlinger, M. - October 2002, Work in Progress.
[8] Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving by Dominique
Brezinski, Tom Killalea - July 2000, Work in Progress.
[9] Brownlee, N. and E. Guttman, "Expectations for Computer Security
Incident Response", BCP 21, RFC 2350, June 1998.
[10] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", FYI 36, RFC 2828, May
2000.
[11] Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response Teams
(CSIRTs), Moira J. West-Brown, Don Stikvoort, Klaus-Peter
Kossakowski. - CMU/SEI-98-HB-001. - Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon
University, 1998.
[12] A Common Language for Computer Security Incidents by John D.
Howard and Thomas A. Longstaff. - Sandia Report: SAND98-8667, Sandia
National Laboratories -
http://www.cert.org/research/taxonomy_988667.pdf
13. AuthorsÆ Addresses:
Yuri Demchenko
TERENA
Email: demch@chello.nl
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Demchenko Expires April 2003 [Page 15]
