intarea P. Pfister
Internet-Draft E. Vyncke, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: May 3, 2018 T. Pauly
D. Schinazi
Apple
M. Keane
Microsoft
October 30, 2017
Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data
draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-00
Abstract
An increasing number of hosts and networks are connected to the
Internet through multiple interfaces, some of which may provide
multiple ways to access the internet by means of multiple IPv6 prefix
configurations.
This document describes a way for hosts to retrieve additional
information about their network access characteristics. The set of
configuration items required to access the Internet is called a
Provisioning Domain (PvD). The PvD is identified by a Fully
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). This identifier, retrieved using a new
Router Advertisement (RA) option, is associated with the set of
information included within the RA and may later be used to retrieve
additional information associated with the PvD by way of an HTTP-
over-TLS request.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router
Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Providing the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.1. Connectivity Characteristics Information . . . . . . 10
4.3.2. Private Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Contributor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.2. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.3. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.4. WG Document version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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Appendix B. Connection monetary cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.1. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.2. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
It has become very common in modern networks for hosts to access the
network through different network interfaces, tunnels, or next-hop
routers. To describe the set of network configurations associated
with %% each access method, the concept of Provisioning Domain (PvD)
was defined in [RFC7556].
This specification provides a way to identify explicit PvDs with
Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN). The FQDN is thus called PvD ID
in this document. The PvD IDs is included in a Router Advertisement
[RFC4861] option. This new option, when present, associates the set
of configurations with the PvD ID in the same RA message. It is
worth noting that multiple PvDs (with different PvD IDs) could be
provisioned on any host interface, as well as noting that the same
PvD ID could be used on different interfaces in order to inform the
host that all PvDs with the same PvD ID, on different interfaces,
ultimately provide identical services.
This document also introduces a way for hosts to retrieve additional
information related to a specific PvD by the mean of an HTTP-over-TLS
query using an URI derived from the PvD ID. The retrieved JSON
object contains additional network information that would typically
be considered unfit, or too large, to be directly included in the
Router Advertisements. This information can be used by the
networking stack, the applications, or even be partially displayed to
the users (e.g., by displaying a localized network service name).
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
In addition, this document uses the following terminology:
PvD: A Provisioning Domain, a set of network configuration
information; for more information, see [RFC7556].
PvD ID: A Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) used to identify a
PvD.
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Explicit PvD: A PvD uniquely identified with a PvD ID. for more
information, see [RFC7556].
Implicit PvD: A PvD associated with a set of configuration
information that, in the absence of a PvD ID, is associated with
the advertising router.
3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router Advertisements
Each provisioning domain is identified by a PvD ID. The PvD ID is a
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) which MUST belong to the network
operator in order to avoid ambiguity. The same PvD ID MAY be used in
several access networks when the set of configuration information is
identical (e.g. in all home networks subscribed to the same service).
3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements
This document introduces a Router Advertisement (RA) option called
the PvD ID Router Advertisement Option, used to convey the FQDN
identifying a given PvD.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |H|L| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence | ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ...
... PvD ID FQDN ...
... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
... | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PvD ID Router Advertisements Option format
Type : (8 bits) To be defined by IANA. Current
experimentation uses the value of 253.
Length : (8 bits) The length of the option (including the Type
and Length fields) in units of 8 octets.
H-flag : (1 bit) Whether some PvD Additional Information is
made available through HTTP over TLS, as described in Section 4.
L-flag : (1 bit) Whether the router is also providing IPv4
information using DHCPv4 (see Section 3.3.2).
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Reserved : (14 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to
zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.
Sequence : (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional
Information, as described in Section 4.
PvD ID FQDN : The FQDN used as PvD ID encoded as described in
Section 3.1 of RFC1035 [RFC1035]. Note that for simple decoding,
the domain names MUST NOT be encoded in the compressed form
described in Section 4.1.4 of RFC1035 [RFC1035]. This encoding is
the same as the one used in RFC8106 [RFC8106]. The encoding MUST
end with a null (zero-length) label.
Padding : Zero or more padding octets such as to set the option
length (Type and Length fields included) to eight times the value
of the Length field. It MUST be set to zero by the sender and
ignored by the receiver.
Routers MUST NOT include more than one PvD ID Router Advertisement
Option in each RA. In case multiple PvD ID options are found in a
given RA, hosts MUST ignore all but the first PvD ID option.
3.2. Router Behavior
A router MAY insert only one PvD ID Option in an RA. The included
PvD ID is associated with all the other options included in the same
RA (for example, and not limited to: Prefix Information [RFC4861],
Recursive DNS Server [RFC8106], Routing Information [RFC4191]
options).
In order to provide multiple independent PvDs, a router MUST send
multiple RAs using different source link-local addresses (LLA) (as
proposed in [I-D.bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming]), each of
which MAY include a PvD ID option. In such cases, routers MAY
originate the different RAs using the same datalink layer address.
If the router is actually a VRRP instance [RFC5798], then the
procedure is identical except that the virtual datalink layer address
is used as well as the virtual IPv6 LLA.
3.3. Host Behavior
RAs provide configuration information for IPv6 hosts. When a host
receives an RA message including a PvD ID Option, it MUST associate
all the configuration objects which are updated by the received RA
(the same types as in Section 3.3) with the PvD identified by the PvD
ID Option, even if some objects are already associated with a
different explicit or implicit PvD. PvD ID are compared in a case-
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insensitive manner (i.e., A=a), assuming ASCII with zero parity.
Non-alphabetic codes must match exactly (see also Section 3.1 of
[RFC1035]).
If the received RA does not include a PvD ID Option, the host MUST
associate the configuration objects which are updated by the received
RA with an implicit PvD, even if some objects were already associated
with a different explicit or implicit PvD. This implicit PvD MUST be
identified by the LLA of the router sending the RA and the interface
on which the RA was received.
This document does not update the way Router Advertisement options
are processed. But in addition to the option processing defined in
other documents, hosts implementing this specification MUST associate
each created or updated object (e.g. address, default route, more
specific route, DNS server list) with the PvD associated with the
received RA.
While resolving names, executing the default address selection
algorithm [RFC6724] or executing the default router selection
algorithm ([RFC2461], [RFC4191] and [RFC8028]), hosts MAY consider
only the configuration associated with an arbitrary set of PvDs.
For example, a host MAY associate a given process with a specific
PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating another process
with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also be able to
select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be used for a
given connection. In particular, constrained devices such as small
battery operated devices (e.g. IoT), or devices with limited CPU or
memory resources may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring
some received RAs containing different PvD IDs.
The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a
set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the
scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations
can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs].
3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association
When a host retrieves configuration elements using DHCPv6, they MUST
be associated with the explicit or implicit PvD of the RA received on
the same interface, sent from the same LLA, and with the O-flag set
[RFC4861]. If no such PvD is found, or whenever multiple different
PvDs are found, the host behavior is unspecified.
This process requires hosts to keep track of received RAs, associated
PvD IDs, and routers LLA; it also assumes that the router either acts
as a DHCPv6 server or relay and uses the same LLA for DHCPv6 and RA
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traffic (which may not be the case when the router uses VRRP to send
its RA).
3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association
When a host retrieves configuration elements from DHCPv4, they MUST
be associated with the explicit PvD received on the same interface,
whose PVD ID Options L-flag is set and, in the case of a non point-
to-point link, using the same datalink address. If no such PvD is
found, or whenever multiple different PvDs are found, the
configuration elements coming from DHCPv4 MUST be associated with an
IPv4-only implicit PvD identified by the interface on which the
DHCPv4 transaction happened. The case of multiple explicit PvD for
an IPv4 interface is undefined.
3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host
The situation when a node receives RA on one interface (e.g.
cellular) and shares this connectivity by also acting as a router by
transmitting RA on another interface (e.g. WiFi) is known as
'tethering'. It can be done as ND proxy. The exact behavior is TBD
but it is expected that the one or several PvD associated to the
shared interface (e.g. cellular) will also be advertised to the
clients on the other interface (e.g. WiFi).
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information
Once a new PvD ID is discovered, it may be used to retrieve
additional information about the characteristics of the provided
connectivity. This set of information is called PvD Additional
Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [RFC7159].
The purpose of this additional set of information is to securely
provide additional information to hosts about the connectivity that
is provided using a given interface and source address pair. It
typically includes data that would be considered too large, or not
critical enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information
contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network
libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of
PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in
Section 3.3.
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information
When the H-flag of the PvD ID Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to
retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD
by performing an HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] GET query to https://<PvD-
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ID>/.well-known/pvd [RFC5785]. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so
whenever the H-flag is not set.
Note that the DNS name resolution of <PvD-ID> as well as the actual
query MUST be performed using the PvD associated with the PvD ID. In
other words, the name resolution, source address selection, as well
as the next-hop router selection MUST be performed while using
exclusively the set of configuration information attached with the
PvD, as defined in Section 3.3. In some cases, it may therefore be
necessary to wait for an address to be available for use (e.g., once
the Duplicate Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are complete)
before initiating the HTTP over TLS query. If the PvD allows for
temporary address per [RFC4941], then host SHOULD use a temporary
address to fetch the PvD Additional Information and SHOULD deprecate
the used temporary address and generate a new temporary address.
If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the
host MUST abandon and consider that there is no additional PvD
information. If the HTTP status of the answer is between 300 and
399, inclusive, it MUST follow the redirection(s). If the HTTP
status of the answer is between 200 and 299, inclusive, the host MAY
get a file containing a single JSON object. When a JSON object could
not be retrieved, an error message SHOULD be logged and/or displayed
in a rate-limited fashion.
After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST watch
the PvD ID Sequence field for change. In case a different value than
the one in the RA Sequence field is observed, or whenever the
validity time included in the PVD Additional Information JSON object
is expired, hosts MUST either perform a new query and retrieve a new
version of the object, or, failing that, deprecate the object and
stop using it.
Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check
for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields Section 4.3. A
retrieved object including an outdated expiration time or missing a
mandatory element MUST be ignored. In order to avoid traffic spikes
toward the server hosting the PvD Additional Information when an
object expires, a host which last retrieved an object at a time A,
including a validity time B, SHOULD renew the object at a uniformly
random time in the interval [(B-A)/2,A].
The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes
(under the key "prefixes") which MUST be checked against all the
Prefix Information Options advertised in the RA. If any of the
prefixes included in the PIO is not covered by at least one of the
listed prefixes, the PvD associated with the tested prefix MUST be
considered unsafe and MUST NOT be used. While this does not prevent
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a malicious network provider, it does complicate some attack
scenarios, and may help detecting misconfiguration.
The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the
client address is part of the prefixes listed into the additional
information and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no
match. The server MAY also use the client address to select the
right JSON object to be returned.
4.2. Providing the PvD Additional Information
Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD RA Option, a valid PvD
Additional Information object MUST be made available to all hosts
receiving the RA by the network operator. In particular, when a
captive portal is present, hosts MUST still be allowed to access the
object, even before logging into the captive portal.
Routers MAY increment the PVD ID Sequence number in order to inform
host that a new PvD Additional Information object is available and
should be retrieved.
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format
The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object.
The following array presents the mandatory keys which MUST be
included in the object:
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
| name | Human-readable | UTF-8 | "Awesome Wifi" |
| | service name | string | |
| | | [RFC3629] | |
| expires | Date after | [RFC3339] | "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z" |
| | which this | | |
| | object is not | | |
| | valid | | |
| prefixes | Array of IPv6 | Array of | ["2001:db8:1::/48", |
| | prefixes valid | strings | "2001:db8:4::/48"] |
| | for this PVD | | |
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
A retrieved object which does not include a valid string associated
with the "name" key at the root of the object, or a valid date
associated with the "expires" key, also at the root of the object,
MUST be ignored. In such cases, an error message SHOULD be logged
and/or displayed in a rate-limited fashion. If the PIO of the
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received RA is not included in the "prefixes" key, the retrieved
object SHOULD be ignored.
The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included
in the object.
+-----------------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+-----------------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+
| localizedName | Localized user- | UTF-8 | "Wifi Genial" |
| | visible service | string | |
| | name, language | | |
| | can be selected | | |
| | based on the | | |
| | HTTP Accept- | | |
| | Language header | | |
| | in the request. | | |
| dnsZones | DNS zones | array | ["example.com","sub |
| | searchable and | of DNS | .example.org"] |
| | accessible | zones | |
| noInternet | No Internet, | boolean | true |
| | set when the | | |
| | PvD only | | |
| | provides | | |
| | restricted | | |
| | access to a set | | |
| | of services | | |
| characteristics | Connectivity | JSON | See Section 4.3.1 |
| | characteristics | object | |
| metered | metered, when | boolean | false |
| | the access | | |
| | volume is | | |
| | limited | | |
+-----------------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+
It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions.
Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with
its associated elements.
4.3.1. Connectivity Characteristics Information
The following set of keys can be used to signal certain
characteristics of the connection towards the PvD.
They should reflect characteristics of the overall access technology
which is not limited to the link the host is connected to, but rather
a combination of the link technology, CPE upstream connectivity, and
further quality of service considerations.
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+---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+
| maxThroughput | Maximum | object({down(int), | {"down": |
| | achievable | up(int)}) in kbit/s | 10000, "up": |
| | throughput | | 5000} |
| minLatency | Minimum | object({down(int), | {"down": 10, |
| | achievable | up(int)}) in msec | "up": 20} |
| | latency | | |
| rl | Maximum | object({down(int), | {"down": |
| | achievable | up(int)}) in losses | 0.1, "up": |
| | reliability | every 1000 packets | 1} |
+---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+
4.3.2. Private Extensions
JSON keys starting with "x-" are reserved for private use and can be
utilized to provide information that is specific to vendor, user or
enterprise. It is RECOMMENDED to use one of the patterns "x-FQDN-
KEY" or "x-PEN-KEY" where FQDN is a fully qualified domain name or
PEN is a private enterprise number [PEN] under control of the author
of the extension to avoid collisions.
4.3.3. Example
Here are two examples based on the keys defined in this section.
{
"name": "Foo Wireless",
"localizedName": "Foo-France Wifi",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes" : ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
"characteristics": {
"maxThroughput": { "down":200000, "up": 50000 },
"minLatency": { "down": 0.1, "up": 1 }
}
}
{
"name": "Bar 4G",
"localizedName": "Bar US 4G",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
"metered": true,
"characteristics": {
"maxThroughput": { "down":80000, "up": 20000 }
}
}
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4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse
Although some solutions such as IPsec or SEND [RFC3971] can be used
in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, actual
deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer security
mechanisms (e.g. 802.1x [IEEE8021X]) in conjunction with RA Guard
[RFC6105].
This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
security model, but extends the purely link-local configuration
retrieval mechanisms with HTTP-over-TLS communications and some
checks to detect misconfiguration and some misuses.
When a host retrieves the PvD Additional Information, it MUST verify
that the HTTPS server certificate is valid and that the Subject Name
is equal to the PvD ID expressed as an FQDN. This authentication
creates a secure binding between the information provided by the
trusted Router Advertisement, and the HTTPS server. But this does
not mean the Advertising Router and the PvD server belong to the same
entity.
When the "prefixes" key is included in the PvD Additional
Information, then host MUST verify that all prefixes in the RA PIO
are covered by a prefixes from the PvD Additional Informaion. An
adversarial router willing to fake the use of a given explicit PvD,
without any access to the actual PvD Additional Information, would
need to perform NAT66 in order to circumvent this check.
It is also RECOMMENDED that the HTTPS server checks the source
addresses of incoming connections (see Section 4.1). This checks
give reasonable assurance that NAT66 was not used and also restrict
the information to the valid network users.
5. Security Considerations
It must be noted that the Section 4.4 of this document only provides
reasonable assurance against misconfiguration but does not prevent an
hostile network access provider to wrong information that could lead
applications or hosts to select an hostile PvD. Users should always
apply caution when connecting to an unknown network.
6. Privacy Considerations
When a host retrieves via HTTPS the additional information, all nodes
on the path (including the HTTPS server) can detect that the node is
active.
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As it can be expected that the HTTPS server is located in the same
management domain as the client (usually, it will be within an
enterprise network, WiFi hotspot, or Service Provider network), the
network operator as usually other means to also detect the new active
node (DHCP, Neighbor Discovery Protocol cache inspection or DNS
request logging). In this case, privacy is not worsened by using
PvD.
It must also be noted that most operating systems implement a system
to detect the presence of a captive portal and also connect to a
well-known web site over the Internet, for example to
http://captive.example.com/hotspot-detect.html. This detection
mechanism is exposing the activity of the detecting node not only
within the management domain but also to all nodes outside this
domain on the path to the captive.example.com server. As PvD can
also be used to detect captive portal, then the PvD actually
preserves privacy.
Finally, the fetching of additional information is an option and
could be disabled by the host.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign the value TBD from the IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery Option Formats registry for the PvD ID Router Advertisement
option.
IANA is asked to assign the value "pvd" from the Well-Known URIs
registry.
IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled
"Additional Information PvD Keys" containing ASCII strings. The
initial content of this registry are given below; future assignements
are to be made through Expert Review [BCP36].
8. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work:
[I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns].
Thanks also to Mikael Abrahamson, Ray Bellis, Lorenzo Colitti,
Thierry Danis, Bob Hinden, Tatuya Jinmei, Erik Kline, Ted Lemon, Jen
Lenkova, Mark Townsley, James Woodyatt for useful and interesting
discussions.
Finally, many thanks to Thierry Danis for his implementation work
([github]), Tom Jones for his integration effort into the Neat
project and Rigil Salim for his implementation work.
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9. Contributor
Basile Bruneau was a co-author of this document while he was studying
at the Polytechnique Paris.
10. References
10.1. Normative references
[I-D.bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming]
Baker, F., Bowers, C., and J. Linkova, "Enterprise
Multihoming using Provider-Assigned Addresses without
Network Prefix Translation: Requirements and Solution",
draft-bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming-01 (work
in progress), October 2016.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2461, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2461>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
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[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
10.2. Informative references
[github] Cisco, "IPv6-mPvD github repository",
<https://github.com/IPv6-mPvD>.
[I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs]
Kline, E., "Multiple Provisioning Domains API
Requirements", draft-kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs-00 (work in
progress), November 2015.
[I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns]
Stenberg, M. and S. Barth, "Multiple Provisioning Domains
using Domain Name System", draft-stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns-00
(work in progress), October 2015.
[IEEE8021X]
IEEE, "IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks: Port based Network Access Control, IEEE Std".
[PEN] IANA, "Private Enterprise Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191,
November 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>.
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
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[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC5798] Nadas, S., Ed., "Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP)
Version 3 for IPv4 and IPv6", RFC 5798,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5798, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5798>.
[RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
[RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain
Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.
[RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by
Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>.
[RFC8106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.
Appendix A. Changelog
Note to RFC Editors: Remove this section before publication.
A.1. Version 00
Initial version of the draft. Edited by Basile Bruneau + Eric Vyncke
and based on Basile's work.
A.2. Version 01
Major rewrite intended to focus on the the retained solution based on
corridors, online, and WG discussions. Edited by Pierre Pfister.
The following list only includes major changes.
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PvD ID is an FQDN retrieved using a single RA option. This option
contains a sequence number for push-based updates, a new H-flag,
and a L-flag in order to link the PvD with the IPv4 DHCP server.
A lifetime is included in the PvD ID option.
Detailed Hosts and Routers specifications.
Additional Information is retrieved using HTTP-over-TLS when the
PvD ID Option H-flag is set. Retrieving the object is optional.
The PvD Additional Information object includes a validity date.
DNS-based approach is removed as well as the DNS-based encoding of
the PvD Additional Information.
Major cut in the list of proposed JSON keys. This document may be
extended later if need be.
Monetary discussion is moved to the appendix.
Clarification about the 'prefixes' contained in the additional
information.
Clarification about the processing of DHCPv6.
A.3. Version 02
The FQDN is now encoded with ASCII format (instead of DNS binary)
in the RA option.
The PvD ID option lifetime is removed from the object.
Use well known URI "https://<PvD-ID>/.well-known/pvd"
Reference RFC3339 for JSON timestamp format.
The PvD ID Sequence field has been extended to 16 bits.
Modified host behavior for DHCPv4 and DHCPv6.
Removed IKEv2 section.
Removed mention of RFC7710 Captive Portal option. A new I.D.
will be proposed to address the captive portal use case.
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A.4. WG Document version 00
Document has been accepted as INTAREA working group document
IANA considerations follow RFC8126 [RFC8126]
PvD ID FQDN is encoded as per RFC 1035 [RFC1035]
PvD ID FQDN is prepended by a one-byte length field
Marcus Keane added as co-author
dnsZones key is added back
draft of a privacy consideration section and added that a
temporary address should be used to retrieve the PvD additional
information
per Bob Hinden's request: the document is now aiming at standard
track and security considerations have been moved to the main
section
Appendix B. Connection monetary cost
NOTE: This section is included as a request for comment on the
potential use and syntax.
The billing of a connection can be done in a lot of different ways.
The user can have a global traffic threshold per month, after which
his throughput is limited, or after which he/she pays each megabyte.
He/she can also have an unlimited access to some websites, or an
unlimited access during the weekends.
An option is to split the bill in elementary billings, which have
conditions (a start date, an end date, a destination IP address...).
The global billing is an ordered list of elementary billings. To
know the cost of a transmission, the host goes through the list, and
the first elementary billing whose the conditions are fulfilled gives
the cost. If no elementary billing conditions match the request, the
host MUST make no assumption about the cost.
B.1. Conditions
Here are the potential conditions for an elementary billing. All
conditions MUST be fulfill.
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+-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+
| Key | Description | Type | JSON Example |
+-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+
| beginDate | Date before | ISO 8601 | "1977-04-22T06:00:00Z" |
| | which the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | not valid | | |
| endDate | Date after | ISO 8601 | "1977-04-22T06:00:00Z" |
| | which the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | not valid | | |
| domains | FQDNs whose | array(string) | ["deezer.com","spotify. |
| | the billing | | com"] |
| | is limited | | |
| prefixes4 | IPv4 | array(string) | ["78.40.123.182/32","78 |
| | prefixes | | .40.123.183/32"] |
| | whose the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | limited | | |
| prefixes6 | IPv6 | array(string) | ["2a00:1450:4007:80e::2 |
| | prefixes | | 00e/64"] |
| | whose the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | limited | | |
+-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+
B.2. Price
Here are the different possibilities for the cost of an elementary
billing. A missing key means "all/unlimited/unrestricted". If the
elementary billing selected has a trafficRemaining of 0 kb, then it
means that the user has no access to the network. Actually, if the
last elementary billing has a trafficRemaining parameter, it means
that when the user will reach the threshold, he/she will not have
access to the network anymore.
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+------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| Key | Description | Type | JSON Example |
+------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| pricePerGb | The price per | float | 2 |
| | Gigabit | (currency | |
| | | per Gb) | |
| currency | The currency | ISO 4217 | "EUR" |
| | used | | |
| throughputMax | The maximum | float (kb/s) | 100000 |
| | achievable | | |
| | throughput | | |
| trafficRemaining | The traffic | float (kB) | 12000000 |
| | remaining | | |
+------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+
B.3. Examples
Example for a user with 20 GB per month for 40 EUR, then reach a
threshold, and with unlimited data during weekends and to
example.com:
[
{
"domains": ["example.com"]
},
{
"prefixes4": ["78.40.123.182/32","78.40.123.183/32"]
},
{
"beginDate": "2016-07-16T00:00:00Z",
"endDate": "2016-07-17T23:59:59Z",
},
{
"beginDate": "2016-06-20T00:00:00Z",
"endDate": "2016-07-19T23:59:59Z",
"trafficRemaining": 12000000
},
{
"throughputMax": 100000
}
]
If the host tries to download data from example.com, the conditions
of the first elementary billing are fulfilled, so the host takes this
elementary billing, finds no cost indication in it and so deduces
that it is totally free. If the host tries to exchange data with
foobar.com and the date is 2016-07-14T19:00:00Z, the conditions of
the first, second and third elementary billing are not fulfilled.
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But the conditions of the fourth are. So the host takes this
elementary billing and sees that there is a threshold, 12 GB are
remaining.
Another example for a user abroad, who has 3 GB per year abroad, and
then pay each MB:
[
{
"beginDate": "2016-02-10T00:00:00Z",
"endDate": "2017-02-09T23:59:59Z",
"trafficRemaining": 3000000
},
{
"pricePerGb": 30,
"currency": "EUR"
}
]
Authors' Addresses
Pierre Pfister
Cisco
11 Rue Camille Desmoulins
Issy-les-Moulineaux 92130
France
Email: ppfister@cisco.com
Eric Vyncke (editor)
Cisco
De Kleetlaan, 6
Diegem 1831
Belgium
Email: evyncke@cisco.com
Tommy Pauly
Apple
Email: tpauly@apple.com
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David Schinazi
Apple
Email: dschinazi@apple.com
Marcus Keane
Microsoft
Sandyford Industrial Estate
Dublin 18
Ireland
Email: Marcus.Keane@microsoft.com
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