IPDVB Working Group H. Cruickshank
Internet-Draft University of Surrey, UK
Intended status: Informational P. Pillai
Expires: Feb 22, 2009 University of Bradford, UK
M. Noisternig
University of Salzburg, Austria
S. Iyengar
Logica, UK
23 August, 2008
Security requirements for the Unidirectional Lightweight
Encapsulation (ULE) protocol
draft-ietf-ipdvb-sec-req-09.txt
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Abstract
The MPEG-2 standard defined by ISO 13818-1 supports a range of
transmission methods for a range of services. This document
provides a threat analysis and derives the security requirements
when using the Transport Stream, TS, to support an Internet
network-layer using Unidirectional Lightweight Encapsulation
(ULE) defined in RFC4326. The document also provides the
motivation for link-layer security for a ULE Stream. A ULE Stream
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may be used to send IPv4 packets, IPv6 packets, and other
Protocol Data Units (PDUs) to an arbitrarily large number of
Receivers supporting unicast and/or multicast transmission.
The analysis also describes applicability to the Generic Stream
Encapsulation (GSE) defined by the Digital Video Broadcasting
(DVB) Project.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .............................................. 2
2. Requirements Notation ..................................... 4
3. Threat Analysis ........................................... 7
3.1. System Components .................................... 7
3.2. Threats .............................................. 9
3.3. Threat Cases ........................................ 10
4. Security Requirements for IP over MPEG-2 TS .............. 11
5. Design recommendations for ULE Security Extension Header . 14
6. Compatibility with Generic Stream Encapsulation .......... 15
7. Summary .................................................. 15
8. Security Considerations .................................. 15
9. IANA Considerations ...................................... 16
10. Acknowledgments ......................................... 16
11. References .............................................. 16
11.1. Normative References ............................... 16
11.2. Informative References ............................. 17
12. Author's Addresses ...................................... 18
13. Intellectual Property Statement ......................... 19
14. Full Copyright Statement ................................ 20
Appendix A: ULE Security Framework .......................... 20
Appendix B: Motivation for ULE link-layer security .......... 24
Document History ............................................ 28
1. Introduction
The MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS) has been widely accepted not
only for providing digital TV services, but also as a subnetwork
technology for building IP networks. RFC 4326 [RFC4326] describes
the Unidirectional Lightweight Encapsulation (ULE) mechanism for
the transport of IPv4 and IPv6 Datagrams and other network
protocol packets directly over the ISO MPEG-2 Transport Stream as
TS Private Data. ULE specifies a base encapsulation format and
supports an Extension Header format that allows it to carry
additional header information to assist in network/Receiver
processing. The encapsulation satisfies the design and
architectural requirement for a lightweight encapsulation defined
in RFC 4259 [RFC4259].
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Section 3.1 of RFC 4259 presents several topological scenarios
for MPEG-2 Transmission Networks. A summary of these scenarios
are presented below (see section 3.1 of RFC 4259):
A. Broadcast TV and Radio Delivery. This is not within the scope
of this document.
B. Broadcast Networks used as an ISP. This resembles scenario A,
but includes IP services to access the public Internet.
C. Unidirectional Star IP Scenario. This provides a data network
delivering a common bit stream to typically medium-sized
groups of Receivers.
D. Datacast Overlay. This employs MPEG-2 physical and link layers
to provide additional connectivity such as unidirectional
multicast to supplement an existing IP-based Internet service.
E. Point-to-Point Links. This connectivity may be provided using
a pair of transmit and receive interfaces.
F. Two-Way IP Networks.
RFC 4259 states that ULE must be robust to errors and security
threats. Security must also consider both unidirectional (A, B, C
and D) as well as bidirectional (E and F) links for the scenarios
mentioned above.
An initial analysis of the security requirements in MPEG-2
transmission networks is presented in the security considerations
section of RFC 4259. For example, when such networks are not
using a wireline network, the normal security issues relating to
the use of wireless links for transport of Internet traffic
should be considered [RFC3819].
The security considerations of RFC 4259 recommend that any new
encapsulation defined by the IETF should allow Transport Stream
encryption and should also support optional link-layer
authentication of the SNDU payload. In ULE [RFC4326], it is
suggested that this may be provided in a flexible way using
Extension Headers. This requires the definition of a mandatory
Extension Header, but has the advantage that it decouples
specification of the security functions from the encapsulation
functions.
This document extends the above analysis and derives in detail
the security requirements for ULE in MPEG-2 transmission
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networks.
A security framework for deployment of secure ULE networks
describing the different building blocks and the interface
definitions is presented in Appendix A.
2. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
RFC2119 [RFC2119].
Other terms used in this document are defined below:
ATSC: Advanced Television Systems Committee. A framework and a
set of associated standards for the transmission of video, audio,
and data using the ISO MPEG-2 standard.
DVB: Digital Video Broadcast. A framework and set of associated
standards published by the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) for the transmission of video, audio, and data
using the ISO MPEG-2 Standard [ISO-MPEG2].
Encapsulator: A network device that receives PDUs and formats
these into Payload Units (known here as SNDUs) for output as a
stream of TS Packets.
GCKS: Group Controller and Key Server. A server that
authenticates and provides the policy and keying material to
members of a secure group.
LLC: Logical Link Control [ISO-8802], [IEEE-802]. A link-layer
protocol defined by the IEEE 802 standard, which follows the
Ethernet Medium Access Control Header.
MAC: Message Authentication Code.
MPE: Multiprotocol Encapsulation [ETSI-DAT]. A scheme that
encapsulates PDUs, forming a DSM-CC Table Section. Each Section
is sent in a series of TS Packets using a single TS Logical
Channel.
MPEG-2: A set of standards specified by the Motion Picture
Experts Group (MPEG) and standardized by the International
Standards Organisation (ISO/IEC 13818-1) [ISO-MPEG2], and ITU-T
(in H.222 [ITU-H222]).
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NPA: Network Point of Attachment. In this document, refers to a
6-byte destination address (resembling an IEEE Medium Access
Control address) within the MPEG-2 transmission network that is
used to identify individual Receivers or groups of Receivers.
PDU: Protocol Data Unit. Examples of a PDU include Ethernet
frames, IPv4 or IPv6 datagrams, and other network packets.
PID: Packet Identifier [ISO-MPEG2]. A 13-bit field carried in
the header of TS Packets. This is used to identify the TS
Logical Channel to which a TS Packet belongs [ISO-MPEG2]. The TS
Packets forming the parts of a Table Section, PES, or other
Payload Unit must all carry the same PID value. The all-zeros
PID 0x0000 as well as other PID values are reserved for specific
PSI/SI Tables [ISO-MPEG2]. The all-ones PID value 0x1FFF
indicates a Null TS Packet introduced to maintain a constant bit
rate of a TS Multiplex. There is no required relationship
between the PID values used for TS Logical Channels transmitted
using different TS Multiplexes.
Receiver: Equipment that processes the signal from a TS Multiplex
and performs filtering and forwarding of encapsulated PDUs to the
network-layer service (or bridging module when operating at the
link layer).
SI Table: Service Information Table [ISO-MPEG2]. In this
document, this term describes a table that is defined by another
standards body to convey information about the services carried
in a TS Multiplex. A Table may consist of one or more Table
Sections; however, all sections of a particular SI Table must be
carried over a single TS Logical Channel [ISO-MPEG2].
SNDU: SubNetwork Data Unit. An encapsulated PDU sent as an MPEG-2
Payload Unit.
TS: Transport Stream [ISO-MPEG2], a method of transmission at the
MPEG-2 layer using TS Packets; it represents layer 2 of the
ISO/OSI reference model. See also TS Logical Channel and TS
Multiplex.
TS Multiplex: In this document, this term defines a set of MPEG-2
TS Logical Channels sent over a single lower-layer connection.
This may be a common physical link (i.e., a transmission at a
specified symbol rate, FEC setting, and transmission frequency)
or an encapsulation provided by another protocol layer (e.g.,
Ethernet, or RTP over IP). The same TS Logical Channel may be
repeated over more than one TS Multiplex (possibly associated
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with a different PID value) [RFC4259]; for example, to
redistribute the same multicast content to two terrestrial TV
transmission cells.
TS Packet: A fixed-length 188B unit of data sent over a TS
Multiplex [ISO-MPEG2]. Each TS Packet carries a 4B header, plus
optional overhead including an Adaptation Field, encryption
details, and time stamp information to synchronise a set of
related TS Logical Channels.
ULE Stream: An MPEG-2 TS Logical Channel that carries only ULE
encapsulated PDUs. ULE Streams may be identified by definition of
a stream_type in SI/PSI [ISO-MPEG2].
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3. Threat Analysis
3.1. System Components
+------------+ +------------+
| IP | | IP |
| End Host | | End Host |
+-----+------+ +------------+
| ^
+------------>+---------------+ |
+ ULE | |
+-------------+ Encapsulator | |
SI-Data | +------+--------+ |
+-------+-------+ |MPEG-2 TS Logical Channel |
| MPEG-2 | | |
| SI Tables | | |
+-------+-------+ ->+------+--------+ |
| -->| MPEG-2 | . . .
+------------>+ Multiplexer | |
MPEG-2 TS +------+--------+ |
Logical Channel |MPEG-2 TS Mux |
| |
Other ->+------+--------+ |
MPEG-2 -->+ MPEG-2 | |
TS --->+ Multiplexer | |
---->+------+--------+ |
|MPEG-2 TS Mux |
| |
+------+--------+ +------+-----+
|Physical Layer | | MPEG-2 |
|Modulator +---------->+ Receiver |
+---------------+ MPEG-2 +------------+
TS Mux
Figure 1: An example configuration for a unidirectional service
for IP transport over MPEG-2 (adapted from [RFC4259]).
As shown in Figure 1 above (from section 3.3 of [RFC4259]), there
are several entities within the MPEG-2 transmission network
architecture. These include:
o ULE Encapsulation Gateways (the ULE Encapsulator)
o SI-Table signalling generator (input to the multiplexer)
o Receivers (the endpoints for ULE Streams)
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o TS multiplexers (including re-multiplexers)
o Modulators
The TS Packets are carried to the Receiver over a physical layer
that usually includes Forward Error Correction (FEC) coding that
interleaves the bytes of several consecutive, but unrelated, TS
Packets. FEC-coding and synchronisation processing makes
injection of single TS Packets very difficult. Replacement of a
sequence of packets is also difficult, but possible (see section
3.2).
A Receiver in an MPEG-2 TS transmission network needs to identify
a TS Logical Channel (or MPEG-2 Elementary Stream) to reassemble
the fragments of PDUs sent by a L2 source [RFC4259]. In an MPEG-2
TS, this association is made via the Packet Identifier, PID [ISO-
MPEG2]. At the sender, each source associates a locally unique
set of PID values with each stream it originates. However, there
is no required relationship between the PID value used at the
sender and that received at the Receiver. Network devices may re-
number the PID values associated with one or more TS Logical
Channels (e.g. ULE Streams) to prevent clashes at a multiplexer
between input streams with the same PID carried on different
input multiplexes (updating entries in the PMT [ISO-MPEG2], and
other SI tables that reference the PID value). A device may also
modify and/or insert new SI data into the control plane (also
sent as TS Packets identified by their PID value). However, there
is only one valid source of data for each MPEG-2 Elementary
Stream, bound to a PID value. (This observation could simplify
the requirement for authentication of the source of a ULE
Stream.)
In an MPEG-2 network a set of signalling messages [RFC4947] may
need to be broadcast (e.g. by an Encapsulation Gateway or other
device) to form the L2 control plane. Examples of signalling
messages include the Program Association Table (PAT), Program Map
Table (PMT) and Network Information Table (NIT). In existing
MPEG-2 transmission networks, these messages are broadcast in the
clear (no encryption or integrity checks). The integrity as well
as authenticity of these messages is important for correct
working of the ULE network, i.e. supporting its security
objectives in the area of availability, in addition to
confidentiality and integrity. One method recently proposed
[RFC5163] encapsulates these messages using ULE. In such cases
all the security requirements of this document apply in securing
these signalling messages.
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ULE Stream security only concerns the security between the ULE
Encapsulation Gateway (ULE Encapsulator) and the Receiver. In
many deployment scenarios the user of a ULE Stream has to secure
communications beyond the link since other network links are
utilised in addition to the ULE link. Therefore, if
authentication of the end-points, i.e. the IP Sources is
required, or users are concerned about loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or authenticity of their communication data, they will
have to employ end-to-end network security mechanisms, e.g. IPsec
or Transport Layer Security (TLS). Governmental users may be
forced by regulations to employ specific approved implementations
of those mechanisms. Hence for such cases, the requirements for
confidentiality and integrity of the user data will be met by the
end-to-end security mechanism and the ULE security measures would
focus on either providing traffic flow confidentiality for user
data that has already been encrypted or for users who choose not
to implement end-to-end security mechanisms.
ULE links may also be used for communications where the two IP
end-points are not under central control (e.g., when browsing a
public web site). In these cases, it may be impossible to enforce
any end-to-end security mechanisms. Yet, a common objective is
that users may make the same security assumptions as for wired
links [RFC3819]. ULE security could achieve this by protecting
the vulnerable (in terms of passive attacks) ULE Stream.
In contrast to the above, a ULE Stream can be used to link
networks such as branch offices to a central office. ULE link-
layer security could be the sole provider of confidentiality and
integrity. In this scenario, users requiring high assurance of
security (e.g. government use) will need to employ approved
cryptographic equipment (e.g. at the network layer). An
implementation of ULE Link Security equipment could also be
certified for use by specific user communities.
3.2. Threats
The simplest type of network threat is a passive threat. This
includes eavesdropping or monitoring of transmissions, with a
goal to obtain information that is being transmitted. In
broadcast networks (especially those utilising widely available
low-cost physical layer interfaces, such as DVB) passive threats
are the major threats. One example is an intruder monitoring the
MPEG-2 transmission broadcast and then extracting the data
carried within the link. Another example is an intruder trying to
determine the identity of the communicating parties and the
volume of their traffic by sniffing (L2) addresses. This is a
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well-known issue in the security field; however it is more of a
problem in the case of broadcast networks such as MPEG-2
transmission networks because of the easy availability of
Receiver hardware and the wide geographical span of the networks.
Active threats (or attacks) are, in general, more difficult to
implement successfully than passive threats, and usually require
more sophisticated resources and may require access to the
transmitter. Within the context of MPEG-2 transmission networks,
examples of active attacks are:
o Masquerading: An entity pretends to be a different entity.
This includes masquerading other users and subnetwork control
plane messages.
o Modification of messages in an unauthorised manner.
o Replay attacks: When an intruder sends some old (authentic)
messages to the Receiver. In the case of a broadcast link,
access to previous broadcast data is easy.
o Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: When an entity fails to
perform its proper function or acts in a way that prevents
other entities from performing their proper functions.
The active threats mentioned above are major security concerns
for the Internet community [BELLOVIN]. Masquerading and
modification of IP packets are comparatively easy in an Internet
environment, whereas such attacks are in fact much harder for
MPEG-2 broadcast links. This could for instance motivate the
mandatory use of sequence numbers in IPsec, but not for
synchronous links. This is further reflected in the security
requirements for Case 2 and 3 in section 4 below.
As explained in section 3.1, the PID associated with an
Elementary Stream can be modified (e.g. in some systems by
reception of an updated SI table, or in other systems until the
next announcement/discovery data is received). An attacker that
is able to modify the content of the received multiplex (e.g.
replay data and/or control information) could inject data locally
into the received stream with an arbitrary PID value.
3.3. Threat Cases
Analysing the topological scenarios for MPEG-2 Transmission
Networks in section 1, the security threats can be abstracted
into three cases:
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o Case 1: Monitoring (passive threat). Here the intruder
monitors the ULE broadcasts to gain information about the ULE
data and/or tracking the communicating parties identities (by
monitoring the destination NPA address). In this scenario,
measures must be taken to protect the ULE payload data and the
identity of ULE Receivers.
o Case 2: Locally conduct active attacks on the MPEG-TS
multiplex. Here an intruder is assumed to be sufficiently
sophisticated to over-ride the original transmission from the
ULE Encapsulation Gateway and deliver a modified version of
the MPEG-TS transmission to a single ULE Receiver or a small
group of Receivers (e.g. in a single company site). The MPEG-2
transmission network operator might not be aware of such
attacks. Measures must be taken to ensure ULE data integrity
and authenticity and preventing replay of old messages.
o Case 3: Globally conduct active attacks on the MPEG-TS
multiplex. This assumes a sophisticated intruder able to over-
ride the whole MPEG-2 transmission multiplex. The requirements
are similar to scenario 2. The MPEG-2 transmission network
operator can usually identify such attacks and provide
corrective action to restore the original transmission.
For both Cases 2 and 3, there can be two sub-cases:
o Insider attacks, i.e. active attacks from adversaries within
the network with knowledge of the secret material.
o Outsider attacks, i.e. active attacks from adversaries without
knowledge of the secret material.
In terms of priority, Case 1 is considered the major threat in
MPEG-2 transmission systems. Case 2 is considered a lesser
threat, appropriate to specific network configurations,
especially when vulnerable to insider attacks. Case 3 is less
likely to be found in an operational network, and is expected to
be noticed by the MPEG-2 transmission operator. It will require
restoration of the original transmission. The assumption being
that physical access to the network components (multiplexers,
etc.) and/or connecting physical media is secure. Therefore Case
3 is not considered further in this document.
4. Security Requirements for IP over MPEG-2 TS
From the threat analysis in section 3, the following security
requirements can be derived:
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Req 1. Data confidentiality MUST be provided by a link that
supports ULE Stream Security to prevent passive attacks and
reduce the risk of active threats.
Req 2. Protection of L2 NPA address is OPTIONAL. In broadcast
networks this protection can be used to prevent an intruder
tracking the identity of ULE Receivers and the volume of their
traffic.
Req 3. Integrity protection and source authentication of ULE
Stream data are OPTIONAL. These can be used to prevent active
attacks described in section 3.2.
Req 4. Protection against replay attacks is OPTIONAL. This is
used to counter active attacks described in section 3.2.
Req 5. L2 ULE Source and Receiver authentication is OPTIONAL.
This can be performed during the initial key exchange and
authentication phase, before the ULE Receiver can join a
secure session with the ULE Encapsulator (ULE source). This
could be either unidirectional or bidirectional authentication
based on the underlying key management protocol.
Other general requirements for all threat cases for link-layer
security are:
GReq (a) ULE key management functions MUST be decoupled from ULE
security services such as encryption and source authentication.
This allows the independent development of both systems.
GReq (b) Support SHOULD be provided for automated as well as
manual insertion of keys and policy into the relevant
databases.
GReq (c) Algorithm agility MUST be supported. It should be
possible to update the crypto algorithms and hashes when they
become obsolete without affecting the overall security of the
system.
GReq (d) The security extension header MUST be compatible with
other ULE extension headers. The method must allow other
extension headers (either mandatory or optional) to be used in
combination with a security extension. It is RECOMMENDED that
these are placed after the security extension header. This
permits full protection for all headers. It also avoids
situations where the SNDU has to be discarded on processing the
security extension header, while preceding headers have already
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been evaluated. One exception is the Timestamp extension which
SHOULD precede the security extension header [RFC5163]. In this
case, the timestamp will be unaffected by security services
such as data confidentiality and can be decoded without the
need for key material.
Examining the threat cases in section 3.3, the security
requirements for each case can be summarised as:
o Case 1: Data confidentiality (Req 1) MUST be provided to
prevent monitoring of the ULE data (such as user information
and IP addresses). Protection of NPA addresses (Req 2) MAY be
provided to prevent tracking ULE Receivers and their
communications.
o Case 2: In addition to Case 1 requirements, new measures MAY
be implemented such as authentication schemes using Message
Authentication Codes, digital signatures, or TESLA [RFC4082]
in order to provide integrity protection and source
authentication (Req 3 and Req 5). In addition, sequence
numbers (Req 4) MAY be used to protect against replay attacks.
In terms of outsider attacks, group authentication using
Message Authentication Codes can provide the required level of
security (Req 3 and 5). This will significantly reduce the
ability of intruders to successfully inject their own data
into the MPEG-TS stream. However, scenario 2 threats apply
only in specific service cases, and therefore authentication
and protection against replay attacks are OPTIONAL. Such
measures incur additional transmission as well as processing
overheads. Moreover, intrusion detection systems may also be
needed by the MPEG-2 network operator. These should best be
coupled with perimeter security policy to monitor common DoS
attacks.
o Case 3: As stated in section 3.3, the requirements here are
similar to Case 2, but since the MPEG-2 transmission network
operator can usually identify such attacks, the constraints on
intrusion detections are less than in Case 2.
Table 1 below shows the threats that are applicable to ULE
networks, and the relevant security mechanisms to mitigate those
threats.
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Security Mechanism
-----------------------------------------------
|Data |Data |Source |Data |Intru |Iden |
|Privacy |fresh |Authent|Integ |sion |tity |
| |ness |ication|rity |Dete |Prote |
| | | | |ction |ction |
Threat | | | | | | |
---------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| Monitoring | X | - | - | - | - | X |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Masquerading | X | - | X | X | - | X |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Replay Attacks| - | X | X | X | X | - |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| DoS Attacks | - | X | X | X | X | - |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Modification | - | - | X | X | X | - |
| of Messages | | | | | | |
---------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1: Security techniques to mitigate network threats
in ULE Networks.
5. Design recommendations for ULE Security Extension Header
Table 1 may assist in selecting fields within a ULE Security
Extension Header framework.
Security services may be grouped into profiles based on security
requirements, e.g. a base profile (with payload encryption and
identity protection), and a second profile that extends this to
also provide source authentication and protection against replay
attacks.
A modular design of ULE security may allow it to use and benefit
from existing key management protocols, such as GSAKMP [RFC4535]
and GDOI [RFC3547] defined by the IETF Multicast Security (MSEC)
working group. This does not preclude the use of other key
management methods in scenarios where this is more appropriate.
IPsec [RFC4301] and TLS [RFC4346] also provide a proven security
architecture defining key exchange mechanisms and the ability to
use a range of cryptographic algorithms. ULE security can make
use of these established mechanisms and algorithms. See appendix
A for more details.
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6. Compatibility with Generic Stream Encapsulation
RFC 5163 [RFC5163] describes three new Extension Headers that may
be used with Unidirectional Link Encapsulation, ULE, [RFC4326]
and the Generic Stream Encapsulation (GSE) that has been designed
for the Generic Mode (also known as the Generic Stream (GS)),
offered by second-generation DVB physical layers [GSE].
The security threats and requirements presented in this document
are applicable to ULE and GSE encapsulations.
7. Summary
This document analyses a set of threats and security
requirements. It defines the requirements for ULE security and
states the motivation for link security as a part of the
Encapsulation layer.
ULE security must provide link-layer encryption and ULE Receiver
identity protection. The framework must support the optional
ability to provide for link-layer authentication and integrity
assurance, as well as protection against insertion of old
(duplicated) data into the ULE Stream (i.e. replay protection).
This set of features is optional to reduce encapsulation overhead
when not required.
ULE Stream security between a ULE Encapsulation Gateway and the
corresponding Receiver(s) is considered an additional security
mechanism to IPsec, TLS, and application layer end-to-end
security, and not as a replacement. It allows a network operator
to provide similar functions to that of IPsec, but in addition
provides MPEG-2 transmission link confidentiality and protection
of ULE Receiver identity (NPA address).
Appendix A describes a set of building blocks that may be used to
realise a framework that provides ULE security functions.
8. Security Considerations
Link-layer (L2) encryption of IP traffic is commonly used in
broadcast/radio links to supplement end-to-end security (e.g.
provided by TLS [RFC4346], SSH [RFC4251], IPsec [RFC4301]).
A common objective is to provide the same level of privacy as
wired links. It is recommended that an ISP or user provide end-
to-end security services based on well known mechanisms such as
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IPsec or TLS.
This document provides a threat analysis and derives the security
requirements to provide link encryption and optional link-layer
integrity / authentication of the SNDU payload.
There are some security issues that were raised in RFC 4326
[RFC4326] that are not addressed in this document (i.e. are out
of scope), e.g.:
o The security issue with un-initialised stuffing bytes. In ULE,
these bytes are set to 0xFF (normal practice in MPEG-2).
o Integrity issues related to the removal of the LAN FCS in a
bridged networking environment. The removal for bridged frames
exposes the traffic to potentially undetected corruption while
being processed by the Encapsulator and/or Receiver.
o There is a potential security issue when a Receiver receives a
PDU with two Length fields: The Receiver would need to
validate the actual length and the Length field and ensure
that inconsistent values are not propagated by the network.
9. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA actions defined in this document.
10. Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the help and advice from Gorry Fairhurst
(University of Aberdeen). The authors also acknowledge
contributions from Laurence Duquerroy and Stephane Coombes (ESA),
and Yim Fun Hu (University of Bradford).
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[ISO-MPEG2] "Information technology -- generic coding of moving
pictures and associated audio information systems,
Part I", ISO 13818-1, International Standards
Organisation (ISO), 2000.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 1997.
[RFC4326] Fairhurst, G. and B. Collini-Nocker, "Unidirectional
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Lightweight Encapsulation (ULE) for Transmission of
IP Datagrams over an MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS)",
IETF RFC 4326, December 2005.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC4947] G. Fairhurst, M.-J. Montpetit, "Address Resolution
Mechanisms for IP Datagrams over MPEG-2 Networks",
IETF RFC 4947, July 2007.
[RFC5163] G. Fairhurst and B. Collini-Nocker, "Extension Header
formats for Unidirectional Lightweight Encapsulation
(ULE) and the Generic Stream Encapsulation (GSE)",
IETF RFC 5163, April 2008.
[IEEE-802] "Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific
requirements Part 2: Logical Link Control", IEEE
802.2, IEEE Computer Society, (also ISO/IEC 8802-2),
1998.
[ISO-8802] ISO/IEC 8802.2, "Logical Link Control", International
Standards Organisation (ISO), 1998.
[ITU-H222] H.222.0, "Information technology, Generic coding of
moving pictures and associated audio information
Systems", International Telecommunication Union,
(ITU-T), 1995.
[RFC4259] M.-J. Montpetit, G. Fairhurst, H. Clausen, B.
Collini-Nocker, and H. Linder, "A Framework for
Transmission of IP Datagrams over MPEG-2 Networks",
IETF RFC 4259, November 2005.
[ETSI-DAT] EN 301 192, "Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB); DVB
Specifications for Data Broadcasting", European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
[BELLOVIN] S. Bellovin, "Problem Area for the IP Security
protocols", Computer Communications Review 2:19, pp.
32-48, April 989. http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/
[GSE] TS 102 606, "Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB);
Generic Stream Encapsulation (GSE) Protocol,
"European Telecommunication Standards, Institute
(ETSI), 2007.
[RFC4082] A. Perrig, D. Song, "Timed Efficient Stream Loss-
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Tolerant Authentication (TESLA): Multicast Source
Authentication Transform Introduction", IETF RFC
4082, June 2005.
[RFC4535] H. Harney, et al, "GSAKMP: Group Secure Association
Group Management Protocol", IETF RFc 4535, June 2006.
[RFC3547] M. Baugher, et al, "GDOI: The Group Domain of
Interpretation", IETF RFC 3547.
[WEIS08] B. Weis, et al, "Multicast Extensions to the Security
Architecture for the Internet", <draft-ietf-msec-
ipsec-extensions-09.txt>, June 2008, IETF Work in
Progress.
[RFC3715] B. Aboba, W. Dixson, "IPsec-Network Address
Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements" IETF
RFC 3715, March 2004.
[RFC4346] T. Dierks, E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", IETF RFC 4346, April
2006.
[RFC3135] J. Border, M. Kojo, eyt. al., "Performance Enhancing
Proxies Intended to Mitigate Link-Related
Degradations", IETF RFC 3135, June 2001.
[RFC4301] S. Kent, K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", IETF RFC 4301, December 2006.
[RFC3819] P. Karn, C. Bormann, G. Fairhurst, D. Grossman, R.
Ludwig, J. Mahdavi, G. Montenegro, J. Touch, and L.
Wood, "Advice for Internet Subnetwork Designers", BCP
89, IETF RFC 3819, July 2004.
[RFC4251] T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", IETF RFC 4251, January 2006.
12. Author's Addresses
Haitham Cruickshank
Centre for Communications System Research (CCSR)
University of Surrey
Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH
UK
Email: h.cruickshank@surrey.ac.uk
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Prashant Pillai
Mobile and Satellite Communications Research Centre (MSCRC)
School of Engineering, Design and Technology
University of Bradford
Richmond Road, Bradford BD7 1DP
UK
Email: p.pillai@bradford.ac.uk
Michael Noisternig
Multimedia Comm. Group, Dpt. of Computer Sciences
University of Salzburg
Jakob-Haringer-Str. 2
5020 Salzburg
Austria
Email: mnoist@cosy.sbg.ac.at
Sunil Iyengar
Space & Defence
Logica
Springfield Drive
Leatherhead
Surrey KT22 7LP
UK
Email: sunil.iyengar@logica.com
13. Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be
claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology
described in this document or the extent to which any license
under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it
represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any
such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to
rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the
use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR
repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required
to implement this standard. Please address the information to
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the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
14. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided
on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Appendix A: ULE Security Framework
This section describes a security framework for the deployment of
secure ULE networks.
A.1 Building Blocks
This ULE Security framework describes the following building
blocks as shown in figure 2 below:
o The Key Management Block
o The ULE Security Extension Header Block
o The ULE Databases Block
Within the Key Management Block the communication between the
Group Member entity and the Group Server entity happens in the
control plane. The ULE Security Header Block applies security to
the ULE SNDU and this happens in the ULE data plane. The ULE
Security Databases Block acts as the interface between the Key
Management Block (control plane) and the ULE Security Header
Block (ULE data plane) as shown in figure 2. The Security
Databases Block exists in both the group member and server sides.
However, it has been omitted from figure 2 just for clarity.
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-----
+------+----------+ +----------------+ / \
| Key Management |/---------\| Key Management | |
| Group Member |\---------/| Group Server | |
| Block | | Block | Control
+------+----------+ +----------------+ Plane
| | |
| | |
| | \ /
----------- Key management <-> ULE Security databases -----
| |
\ /
+------+----------+
| ULE |
| SAD / SPD |
| Databases |
| Block |
+------+-+--------+
/ \
| |
----------- ULE Security databases <-> ULE Security Header ----
| | / \
| | |
| | |
+------+-+--------+ ULE Data
| ULE Security | Plane
| Extension Header| |
| Block | |
+-----------------+ \ /
-----
Figure 2: Secure ULE Framework Building Blocks
A.1.1 Key Management Block
A key management framework is required to provide security at the
ULE level using extension headers. This key management framework
is responsible for user authentication, access control, and
Security Association negotiation (which include the negotiations
of the security algorithms to be used and the generation of the
different session keys as well as policy material). The key
management framework can be either automated or manual. Hence
this key management client entity (shown as the Key Management
Group Member Block in figure 2) will be present in all ULE
Receivers as well as at the ULE Encapsulators. The ULE
Encapsulator could also be the Key Management Group Server Entity
(shown as the Key Management Group Server Block in figure 2).
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This happens when the ULE Encapsulator also acts as the Key
Management Group Server. Deployment may use either automated key
management protocols (e.g. GSAKMP [RFC4535]) or manual insertion
of keying material.
A.1.2 ULE Security Databases Block
There needs to be two databases, i.e. similar to the IPsec
databases.
o ULE-SAD: ULE Security Association Database contains all the
Security Associations that are currently established with
different ULE peers.
o ULE-SPD: ULE Security Policy Database contains the policies as
described by the system manager. These policies describe the
security services that must be enforced.
The design of these two databases may be based on IPsec databases
as defined in RFC4301 [RFC4301].
The exact details of the header patterns that the SPD and SAD
will have to support for all use cases will be described in a
separate document. This document only highlights the need for
such interfaces between the ULE data plane and the Key Management
control plane.
A.1.3 ULE Extension Header Block
A new security extension header for the ULE protocol is required
to provide the security features of data confidentiality,
identity protection, data integrity, data authentication, and
mechanisms to prevent replay attacks. Security keying material
will be used for the different security algorithms (for
encryption/decryption, MAC generation, etc.), which are used to
meet the security requirements, described in detail in Section 4
of this document.
This block will use the keying material and policy information
from the ULE Security Database Block on the ULE payload to
generate the secure ULE Extension Header or to decipher the
secure ULE extension header to get the ULE payload. An example
overview of the ULE Security extension header format along with
the ULE header and payload is shown in figure 3 below.
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+-------+------+-------------------------------+------+
| ULE |SEC | Protocol Data Unit | |
|Header |Header| |CRC-32|
+-------+------+-------------------------------+------+
Figure 3: ULE Security Extension Header Placement
A.2 Interface definition
Two new interfaces have to be defined between the blocks as shown
in Figure 2 above. These interfaces are:
o Key Management Block <-> ULE Security Databases Block
o ULE Security Databases Block <-> ULE Security Header Block
While the first interface is used by the Key Management Block to
insert keys, security associations and policies into the ULE
Database Block, the second interface is used by the ULE Security
Extension Header Block to get the keys and policy material for
generation of the security extension header.
A.2.1 Key Management <-> ULE Security databases
This interface is between the Key Management Block of a group
member (GM client) and the ULE Security Database Block (shown in
figure 2). The Key Management GM entity will communicate with the
GCKS and then get the relevant security information (keys, cipher
mode, security service, ULE_Security_ID and other relevant keying
material as well as policy) and insert this data into the ULE
Security Database Block. The Key Management could be either
automated (e.g. GSAKMP [RFC4535] or GDOI [RFC3547]), or security
information could be manually inserted using this interface.
Examples of interface functions are:
o Insert_record_database (char * Database, char * record, char *
Unique_ID);
o Update_record_database (char * Database, char * record, char *
Unique_ID);
o Delete_record_database (char * Database, char * Unique_ID);
The definitions of the variables are as follows:
o Database - This is a pointer to the ULE Security databases
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o record - This is the rows of security attributes to be entered
or modified in the above databases
o Unique_ID - This is the primary key to lookup records (rows of
security attributes) in the above databases
A.2.2 ULE Security Databases <-> ULE Security Header
This interface is between the ULE Security Database and the ULE
Security Extension Header Block as shown in figure 2. When
sending traffic, the ULE encapsulator uses the Destination
Address, the PID, and possibly other information such as L3
source and destination addresses to locate the relevant security
record within the ULE Security Database. It then uses the data in
the record to create the ULE security extension header. For
received traffic, the ULE decapsulator on receiving the ULE SNDU
will use the Destination Address, the PID, and a ULE Security ID
inserted by the ULE encapsulator into the security extension to
retrieve the relevant record from the Security Database. It then
uses this information to decrypt the ULE extension header. For
both cases (either send or receive traffic) only one interface is
needed since the main difference between the sender and receiver
is the direction of the flow of traffic. An example of such
interface is as follows:
o Get_record_database (char * Database, char * record, char *
Unique_ID);
Appendix B: Motivation for ULE link-layer security
Examination of the threat analysis and security requirements in
sections 3 and 4 has shown that there is a need to provide
security in MPEG-2 transmission networks employing ULE. This
section compares the placement of security functionalities in
different layers.
B.1 Security at the IP layer (using IPsec)
The security architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC4301]
describes security services for traffic at the IP layer. This
architecture primarily defines services for the Internet Protocol
(IP) unicast packets, as well as manually configured IP multicast
packets.
It is possible to use IPsec to secure ULE Streams. The major
advantage of IPsec is its wide implementation in IP routers and
hosts. IPsec in transport mode can be used for end-to-end
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security transparently over MPEG-2 transmission links with little
impact.
In the context of MPEG-2 transmission links, if IPsec is used to
secure a ULE Stream, then the ULE Encapsulator and Receivers are
equivalent to the security gateways in IPsec terminology. A
security gateway implementation of IPsec uses tunnel mode. Such
usage has the following disadvantages:
o There is an extra transmission overhead associated with using
IPsec in tunnel mode, i.e. the extra IP header (IPv4 or IPv6).
o There is a need to protect the identity (NPA address) of ULE
Receivers over the ULE broadcast medium; IPsec is not suitable
for providing this service. In addition, the interfaces of
these devices do not necessarily have IP addresses (they can
be L2 devices).
o Multicast is considered a major service over ULE links. The
current IPsec specifications [RFC4301] only define a pairwise
tunnel between two IPsec devices with manual keying. Work is
in progress in defining the extra detail needed for multicast
and to use the tunnel mode with address preservation to allow
efficient multicasting. For further details refer to [WEIS08].
B.2 Link security below the encapsulation layer
Link layer security can be provided at the MPEG-2 TS layer (below
ULE). MPEG-2 TS encryption encrypts all TS Packets sent with a
specific PID value. However, an MPEG-2 TS may typically multiplex
several IP flows, belonging to different users, using a common
PID. Therefore all multiplexed traffic will share the same
security keys.
This has the following advantages:
o The bit stream sent on the broadcast network does not expose
any L2 or L3 headers, specifically all addresses, type fields,
and length fields are encrypted prior to transmission.
o This method does not preclude the use of IPsec, TLS, or any
other form of higher-layer security.
However it has the following disadvantages:
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o When a PID is shared between several users, each ULE Receiver
needs to decrypt all MPEG-2 TS Packets with a matching PID,
possibly including those that are not required to be
forwarded. Therefore it does not have the flexibility to
separately secure individual IP flows.
o When a PID is shared between several users, the ULE Receivers
will have access to private traffic destined to other ULE
Receivers, since they share a common PID and key.
o IETF-based key management that is very flexible and secure is
not used in existing MPEG-2 based systems. Existing access
control mechanisms in such systems have limited flexibility in
terms of controlling the use of key and rekeying. Therefore if
the key is compromised, then this will impact several ULE
Receivers.
Currently there are few deployed L2 security systems for MPEG-2
transmission networks. Conditional access for digital TV
broadcasting is one example. However, this approach is optimised
for TV services and is not well-suited to IP packet transmission.
Some other systems are specified in standards such as MPE [ETSI-
DAT], but there are currently no known implementations and these
methods are not applicable to GSE.
B.3 Link security as a part of the encapsulation layer
Examining the threat analysis in section 3 has shown that
protection of ULE Stream from eavesdropping and ULE Receiver
identity are major requirements.
There are several advantages in using ULE link layer security:
o The protection of the complete ULE Protocol Data Unit (PDU)
including IP addresses. The protection can be applied either
per IP flow or per Receiver NPA address.
o Ability to protect the identity of the Receiver within the
MPEG-2 transmission network at the IP layer and also at L2.
o Efficient protection of IP multicast over ULE links.
o Transparency to the use of Network Address Translation (NATs)
[RFC3715] and TCP Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEP)
[RFC3135], which require the ability to inspect and modify the
packets sent over the ULE link.
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This method does not preclude the use of IPsec at L3 (or TLS
[RFC4346] at L4). IPsec and TLS provide strong authentication of
the end-points in the communication.
L3 end-to-end security would partially deny the advantage listed
above (use of PEP, compression, etc.), since those techniques
could only be applied to TCP packets bearing a TCP-encapsulated
IPsec packet exchange, but not the TCP packets of the original
applications, which in particular inhibits compression.
End-to-end security (IPsec, TLS, etc.) may be used independently
to provide strong authentication of the end-points in the
communication. This authentication is desirable in many scenarios
to ensure that the correct information is being exchanged between
the trusted parties, whereas Layer 2 methods cannot provide this
guarantee.
>>> NOTE to RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix prior to
publication]
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Document History
Working Group Draft 00
o Fixed editorial mistakes and ID style for WG adoption.
Working Group Draft 01
o Fixed editorial mistakes and added an appendix which shows the
preliminary framework for securing the ULE network.
Working Group Draft 02
o Fixed editorial mistakes and added some important changes as
pointed out by Knut Eckstein (ESA), Gorry Fairhurst and
UNISAL.
o Added section 4.1 on GSE. Extended the security considerations
section.
o Extended the appendix to show the extension header placement.
o The definition of the header patterns for the ULE Security
databases will be defined in a separate draft.
o Need to include some words on key management transport over
air interfaces, actually key management bootstrapping.
Working Group Draft 03
o Fixed editorial mistakes and added some important changes as
pointed out by Gorry Fairhurst.
o Table 1 added in Section 6.2 to list the different security
techniques to mitigate the various possible network threats.
o Figure 2 modified to clearly explain the different interfaces
present in the framework.
o New Section 7 has been added.
o New Section 6 has been added.
o The previous sections 5 and 6 have been combined to section 5.
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o Sections 3, 8 and 9 have been rearranged and updated with
comments and suggestions from Michael Noisternig from
University of Salzburg.
o The Authors and the Acknowledgments section have been updated.
Working Group Draft 04
o Fixed editorial mistakes and added some important changes as
pointed out by DVB-GBS group, Gorry Fairhurst and Laurence
Duquerroy.
o Table 1 modified to have consistent use of Security Services.
o Text modified to be consistent with the draft-ietf-ipdvb-ule-
ext-04.txt
Working Group Draft 06
o Fixed editorial mistakes and added some important changes as
pointed out by Pat Cain and Gorry Fairhurst.
o Figure 1 modified to have consistent use of Security Services.
o Text modified in Section 4 to clearly state the requirements.
o Moved Section 5 to the Appendix B
o Updated IANA consideration section
o Numbered the different requirements and cross referenced them
within the text.
Working Group Draft 07
o Rephrased some sentences throughout the document to add more
clarity, mainly due to suggestions by Gorry Fairhurst.
o Updated section 4 to more clearly specify requirements,
choosing more appropriate RFC 2119 keywords, and removed some
overly general requirements.
o Moved security header placement recommendation from appendix
to list of general requirements in section 4, as suggested by
Gorry Fairhurst.
o Modified text in appendix section A.2.2 to correctly specify
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which information sender and receiver use to look up security
information within the database.
o Fixed some editorial mistakes and updated the reference list.
Working Group Draft 08
o Rephrased some sentences to add more clarity.
o Fixed some editorial mistakes pointed out by Gorry Fairhurst.
o Described the interface definitions in section A.2 as examples
rather than requirements.
Working Group Draft 09
o Clarified some sentences and fixed some editorial
inconsistencies and mistakes due to comments by Rupert
Goodings and Laurence Duquerroy.
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