Network Working Group G. Mirsky
Internet-Draft X. Min
Updates: 8762 (if approved) ZTE Corp.
Intended status: Standards Track H. Nydell
Expires: September 23, 2020 Accedian Networks
R. Foote
Nokia
A. Masputra
Apple Inc.
E. Ruffini
OutSys
March 22, 2020
Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol Optional Extensions
draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-option-tlv-04
Abstract
This document describes optional extensions to Simple Two-way Active
Measurement Protocol (STAMP) which enable measurement performance
metrics in addition to ones supported by the STAMP base
specification. The document also defines a STAMP Test Session
Identifier and thus updates RFC 8762.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. STAMP Test Session Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. TLV Extensions to STAMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Extra Padding TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Location TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Timestamp Information TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Class of Service TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Direct Measurement TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Access Report TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. Follow-up Telemetry TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.8. HMAC TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. STAMP TLV Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2. Synchronization Source Sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3. Timestamping Method Sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4. Access ID Sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.5. Return Code Sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction
Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP) [RFC8762] supports
the use of optional extensions that use Type-Length-Value (TLV)
encoding. Such extensions are to enhance the STAMP base functions,
such as measurement of one-way and round-trip delay, latency, packet
loss, as well as ability to detect packet duplication and out-of-
order delivery of the test packets. This specification provides
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
definitions of optional STAMP extensions, their formats, and theory
of operation. Also, a STAMP Test Session Identifier is defined for
as an update of the base STAMP specification [RFC8762].
2. Conventions used in this document
2.1. Terminology
STAMP - Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
DSCP - Differentiated Services Code Point
ECN - Explicit Congestion Notification
NTP - Network Time Protocol
PTP - Precision Time Protocol
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
TLV Type-Length-Value
BITS Building Integrated Timing Supply
SSU Synchronization Supply Unit
GPS Global Positioning System
GLONASS Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System
LORAN-C Long Range Navigation System Version C
MBZ Must Be Zeroed
CoS Class of Service
PMF Performance Measurement Function
SSID STAMP Session Identifier
2.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
3. STAMP Test Session Identifier
STAMP Session-Sender transmits test packets to STAMP Session-
Reflector. STAMP Session-Reflector receives Session-Sender's packet
and acts according to the configuration and optional control
information communicated in the Session-Sender's test packet. STAMP
defines two different test packet formats, one for packets
transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Sender and one for packets
transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Reflector. STAMP supports two
modes: unauthenticated and authenticated. Unauthenticated STAMP test
packets are compatible on the wire with unauthenticated TWAMP-Test
[RFC5357] packet formats.
By default, STAMP uses symmetrical packets, i.e., the size of the
packet transmitted by Session-Reflector equals the size of the packet
received by the Session-Reflector.
A STAMP Session is identified using 4-tuple (source and destination
IP addresses, source and destination UDP port numbers). A STAMP
Session-Sender MAY generate locally unique STAMP Session Identifier
(SSID). SSID is two octets long non-zero unsigned integer. A
Session-Sender MAY use SSID to identify a STAMP test session. If
SSID is used, it MUST be present in each test packet of the given
test session. In the unauthenticated mode, SSID is located, as
displayed in Figure 1.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Estimate | SSID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
| MBZ (28 octets) |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Value ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format with TLV in
unauthenticated mode
An implementation of STAMP Session-Reflector that supports this
specification SHOULD identify a STAMP Session using the SSID in
combination with elements of the usual 4-tuple. A conforming
implementation of STAMP Session-Reflector MUST copy the SSID value
from the received test packet and put it into the reflected packet as
displayed in Figure 2.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Estimate | SSID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Receive Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Error Estimate | MBZ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Ses-Sender TTL | MBZ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Value ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format with TLV in
unauthenticated mode
A STAMP Session-Reflector that does not support this specification,
will return the zeroed SSID field in the reflected STAMP test packet.
The Session-Sender MUST NOT stop the session if it receives a zeroed
SSID field.
In the authenticated mode, location of SSID field is shown in
Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| MBZ (12 octets) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Estimate | SSID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ~
| MBZ (68 octets) |
~ ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| HMAC (16 octets) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in authenticated
mode
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MBZ (12 octets) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Estimate | SSID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MBZ (4 octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Receive Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MBZ (8 octets) |
| |
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MBZ (12 octets) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Error Estimate | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| MBZ (6 octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Ses-Sender TTL | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| |
| MBZ (15 octets) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HMAC (16 octets) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in authenticated
mode
4. TLV Extensions to STAMP
Type-Length-Value (TLV) encoding scheme provides flexible extension
mechanism for optional informational elements. TLV is an optional
field in the STAMP test packet. TLVs have the two octets long Type
field, two octets long Length field that is the length of the Value
field in octets. Type values, see Section 5.1, less than 32768
identify mandatory TLVs that MUST be supported by an implementation.
Type values greater than or equal to 32768 identify optional TLVs
that SHOULD be ignored if the implementation does not understand or
support them. If a Type value for TLV or sub-TLV is in the range for
Vendor Private Use, the Length MUST be at least 4, and the first four
octets MUST be that vendor's the Structure of Management Information
(SMI) Private Enterprise Number, in network octet order. The rest of
the Value field is private to the vendor. Following sections
describe the use of TLVs for STAMP that extend STAMP capability
beyond its base specification.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
A STAMP node, whether Session-Sender or Session-Reflector, receiving
a test packet MUST determine whether the packet is a base STAMP
packet or includes one or more TLVs. The node MUST compare the value
in the Length field of the UDP header and the length of the base
STAMP test packet in the mode, unauthenticated or authenticated based
on the configuration of the particular STAMP test session. If the
difference between the two values is larger than the length of UDP
header, then the test packet includes one or more STAMP TLVs that
immediately follow the base STAMP test packet.
A system that has received a STAMP test packet with extension TLVs
MUST validate each fixed-size TLV by verifying that the value in the
Length field equals the value defined for the particular type. If
the values are not equal, the processing of extension TLVs MUST be
stopped and the event logged (logging SHOULD be throttled). Also, if
the system is the Session-Reflector in that test, it MUST send
(transmission of ICMP Error messages SHOULD be throttled) the ICMP
Parameter Problem message with Code set to 0 and the Pointer
referring to the Length field of the TLV.
4.1. Extra Padding TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extra Padding Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Extra Padding ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Extra Padding TLV
where fields are defined as the following:
o Extra Padding Type - TBA1 allocated by IANA Section 5.1
o Length - two octets long field equals length on the Extra Padding
field in octets.
o Extra Padding - a pseudo-random sequence of numbers. The field
MAY be filled with all zeroes.
The Extra Padding TLV is similar to the Packet Padding field in
TWAMP-Test packet [RFC5357]. The Extra Padding TLV MUST be used to
create STAMP test packets of larger size. The Extra Padding TLV MUST
be the last TLV in a STAMP test packet.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
4.2. Location TLV
STAMP session-sender MAY include the Location TLV to request
information from the session-reflector. The session-sender SHOULD
NOT fill any information fields except for Type and Length. The
session-reflector MUST validate the Length value against the address
family of the transport encapsulating the STAMP test packet. If the
value of the Length field is invalid, the session-reflector MUST zero
all fields and MUST NOT return any information to the session-sender.
The session-reflector MUST ignore all other fields of the received
Location TLV.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Location Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source MAC |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Destination IP Address ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Source IP Address ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Port | Source Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Session-Reflector Location TLV
where fields are defined as the following:
o Location Type - TBA2 allocated by IANA Section 5.1
o Length - two octets long field equals length on the Value field in
octets. Length field value MUST be 20 octets for the IPv4 address
family. For the IPv6 address family value of the Length field
MUST be 44 octets. All other values are invalid.
o Source MAC - 6 octets 48 bits long field. The session-reflector
MUST copy Source MAC of received STAMP packet into this field.
o Reserved - two octets long field. MUST be zeroed on transmission
and ignored on reception.
o Destination IP Address - IPv4 or IPv6 destination address of the
received by the session-reflector STAMP packet.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
o Source IP Address - IPv4 or IPv6 source address of the received by
the session-reflector STAMP packet.
o Destination Port - two octets long UDP destination port number of
the received STAMP packet.
o Source Port - two octets long UDP source port number of the
received STAMP packet.
The Location TLV MAY be used to determine the last-hop addressing for
STAMP packets including source and destination IP addresses as well
as the MAC address of the last-hop router. Last-hop MAC address MAY
be monitored by the Session-Sender whether there has been a path
switch on the last hop, closest to the Session-Reflector. The IP
addresses and UDP port will indicate if there is a NAT router on the
path, and allows the Session-Sender to identify the IP address of the
Session-Reflector behind the NAT, detect changes in the NAT mapping
that could cause sending the STAMP packets to the wrong Session-
Reflector.
4.3. Timestamp Information TLV
STAMP session-sender MAY include the Timestamp Information TLV to
request information from the session-reflector. The session-sender
SHOULD NOT fill any information fields except for Type and Length.
The session-reflector MUST validate the Length value of the STAMP
test packet. If the value of the Length field is invalid, the
session-reflector MUST zero all fields and MUST NOT return any
information to the session-sender.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp Information Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sync. Src In | Timestamp In | Sync. Src Out | Timestamp Out |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: Timestamp Information TLV
where fields are defined as the following:
o Timestamp Information Type - TBA3 allocated by IANA Section 5.1
o Length - two octets long field, equals four octets.
o Sync Src In - one octet long field that characterizes the source
of clock synchronization at the ingress of Session-Reflector.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
There are several of methods to synchronize the clock, e.g.,
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905], Precision Time Protocol
(PTP) [IEEE.1588.2008], Synchronization Supply Unit (SSU) or
Building Integrated Timing Supply (BITS), or Global Positioning
System (GPS), Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System
(GLONASS) and Long Range Navigation System Version C (LORAN-C).
The value is one of the listed in Table 4.
o Timestamp In - one octet long field that characterizes the method
by which the ingress of Session-Reflector obtained the timestamp
T2. A timestamp may be obtained with hardware assist, via
software API from a local wall clock, or from a remote clock (the
latter referred to as "control plane"). The value is one of the
listed in Table 6.
o Sync Src Out - one octet long field that characterizes the source
of clock synchronization at the egress of Session-Reflector. The
value is one of the listed in Table 4.
o Timestamp Out - one octet long field that characterizes the method
by which the egress of Session-Reflector obtained the timestamp
T3. The value is one of the listed in Table 6.
4.4. Class of Service TLV
The STAMP session-sender MAY include Class of Service (CoS) TLV in
the STAMP test packet. If the CoS TLV is present in the STAMP test
packet and the value of the DSCP1 field is zero, then the STAMP
session-reflector MUST copy the values of Differentiated Services
Code Point (DSCP) ECN fields from the received STAMP test packet into
DSCP2 and ECN fields respectively of the CoS TLV of the reflected
STAMP test packet. If the value of the DSCP1 field is non-zero, then
the STAMP session-reflector MUST use DSCP1 value from the CoS TLV in
the received STAMP test packet as DSCP value of STAMP reflected test
packet and MUST copy DSCP and ECN values of the received STAMP test
packet into DSCP2 and ECN fields of Class of Service TLV in the STAMP
reflected a packet. The Session-Sender, upon receiving the reflected
packet, will save the DSCP and ECN values for analysis of the CoS in
the reverse direction.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Class of Service Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DSCP1 | DSCP2 |ECN| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: Class of Service TLV
where fields are defined as the following:
o Class of Service Type - TBA4 allocated by IANA Section 5.1
o Length - two octets long field, equals four octets.
o DSCP1 - The Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) intended by
the Session-Sender. To be used as the return DSCP from the
Session-Reflector.
o DSCP2 - The received value in the DSCP field at the Session-
Reflector in the forward direction.
o ECN - The received value in the ECN field at the Session-Reflector
in the forward direction.
o Reserved - 18 bits long field, must be zeroed in transmission and
ignored on receipt.
A STAMP Session-Sender that includes the CoS TLV sets the value of
the DSCP1 field and zeroes the value of the DSCP2 field. A STAMP
Session-Reflector that received the test packet with the CoS TLV MUST
include the CoS TLV in the reflected test packet. Also, the Session-
Reflector MUST copy the value of the DSCP field of the IP header of
the received STAMP test packet into the DSCP2 field in the reflected
test packet. And, at last, the Session-Reflector MUST set the value
of the DSCP field in the IP header of the reflected test packet equal
to the value of the DSCP1 field of the test packet it has received.
Re-mapping of CoS in some use cases, for example, in mobile backhaul
networks is used to provide multiple services, i.e., 2G, 3G, LTE,
over the same network. But if it is misconfigured, then it is often
difficult to diagnose the root cause of the problem that is viewed as
an excessive packet drop of higher level service while packet drop
for lower service packets is at a normal level. Using CoS TLV in
STAMP test helps to troubleshoot the existing problem and also verify
whether DiffServ policies are processing CoS as required by the
configuration.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
4.5. Direct Measurement TLV
The Direct Measurement TLV enables collection of "in profile" IP
packets that had been transmitted and received by the Session-Sender
and Session-Reflector respectfully. The definition of "in-profile
packet" is outside the scope of this document.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Direct Measurement Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Sender Tx counter (S_TxC) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Reflector Rx counter (R_RxC) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session-Reflector Tx counter (R_TxC) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Direct Measurement TLV
where fields are defined as the following:
o Direct Measurement Type - TBA5 allocated by IANA Section 5.1
o Length - two octets long field equals length on the Value field in
octets. Length field value MUST be 12 octets.
o Session-Sender Tx counter (S_TxC) is four octets long field.
o Session-Reflector Rx counter (R_RxC) is four octets long field.
MUST be zeroed by the Session-Sender and filled by the Session-
Reflector.
o Session-Reflector Tx counter (R_TxC) is four octets long field.
MUST be zeroed by the Session-Sender and filled by the Session-
Reflector.
4.6. Access Report TLV
A STAMP Session-Sender MAY include Access Report TLV (Figure 10) to
indicate changes to the access network status to the Session-
Reflector. The definition of an access network is outside the scope
of this document.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Access Report Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Access ID | Return Code | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 10: Access Report TLV
where fields are defined as follows:
o Access Report Type - TBA6 allocated by IANA Section 5.1.
o Length - two octets long field, equals four octets.
o Access ID - one octet long field that identifies the access
network, e.g., 3GPP (Radio Access Technologies specified by 3GPP)
or Non-3GPP (accesses that are not specified by 3GPP) [TS23501].
The value is one of Section 5.4.
o Return Code - one octet long field that identifies the report
signal, e.g., available, unavailable. The value is one of
Section 5.5.
o Reserved - two octets long field, must be zeroed on transmission
and ignored on receipt.
The STAMP Session-Sender that includes the Access Report TLV sets the
value of the Access ID field according to the type of access network
it reports on. Also, the Session-Sender sets the value of the Return
Code field to reflect the operational state of the access network.
The mechanism to determine the state of the access network is outside
the scope of this specification. A STAMP Session-Reflector that
received the test packet with the Access Report TLV MUST include the
Access Report TLV in the reflected test packet. The Session-
Reflector MUST set the value of the Access ID and Return Code fields
equal to the values of the corresponding fields from the test packet
it has received.
The Session-Sender MUST also arm a retransmission timer after sending
a test packet that includes the Access Report TLV. This timer MUST
be disarmed upon the reception of the reflected STAMP test packet
that includes Access Report TLV. In the event the timer expires
before such a packet is received, the Session-Sender MUST retransmit
the STAMP test packet that contains the Access Report TLV. This
retransmission SHOULD be repeated up to four times before the
procedure is aborted. Setting the value for the retransmission timer
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
is based on local policies, network environment. The default value
of the retransmission timer for Access Report TLV SHOULD be three
seconds. An implementation MUST provide control of the
retransmission timer value and the number of retransmissions.
The Access Report TLV is used by the Performance Measurement Function
(PMF) components of the Access Steering, Switching and Splitting
feature for 5G networks [TS23501]. The PMF component in the User
Equipment acts as the STAMP Session-Sender, and the PMF component in
the User Plane Function acts as the STAMP Session-Reflector.
4.7. Follow-up Telemetry TLV
A Session-Reflector might be able to put in the Timestamp field only
a "SW Local" (see Table 6) timestamp. But the hosting system might
provide the timestamp closer to the start of actual packet
transmission even though when it is not possible to deliver the
information to the Session-Sender in the packet itself. This
timestamp might nevertheless be important for the Session-Sender, as
it helps in to improve the accuracy of measuring network delay by
minimizing the impact of egress queuing delays on the measurement.
A STAMP Session-Sender MAY include the Follow-up Telemetry TLV to
request information from the Session-Reflector. The Session-Sender
MUST set the Follow-up Telemetry Type and Length fields to their
appropriate values. Sequence Number and Timestamp fields MUST be
zeroed on transmission by the Session-Sender and ignored by the
Session-Reflector upon receipt of the STAMP test packet that includes
the Follow-up Telemetry TLV. The Session-Reflector MUST validate the
Length value of the STAMP test packet. If the value of the Length
field is invalid, the Session-Reflector MUST zero Sequence Number and
Timestamp fields. If the Session-Reflector is in stateless mode
(defined in Section 4.2 [RFC8762]), it MUST zero Sequence Number and
Timestamp fields.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Follow-up Telemetry Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Follow-up Timestamp |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp M | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 11: Follow-up Telemetry TLV
where fields are defined as follows:
o Follow-up Telemetry Type - TBA7 allocated by IANA Section 5.1.
o Length - two octets long field, equals 16 octets.
o Sequence Number - four octets long field indicating the sequence
number of the last packet reflected in the same STAMP-test
session. Since the Session-Reflector runs in the stateful mode
(defined in Section 4.2 [RFC8762]), it is the Session-Reflector's
Sequence Number of the previous reflected packet.
o Follow-up Timestamp - eight octets long field, with the format
indicated by the Z flag of the Error Estimate field of the packet
transmitted by a Session-Reflector, as described in Section 4.1
[RFC8762]. It carries the timestamp when the reflected packet
with the specified sequence number was sent..
o Timestamp M(ode) - one octet long field that characterizes the
method by which the entity that transmits a reflected STAMP packet
obtained the Follow-up Timestamp. The value is one of the listed
in Table 6.
o Reserved - the three octest-long field. Its value MUST be zeroed
on transmission and ignored on receipt.
4.8. HMAC TLV
The STAMP authenticated mode protects the integrity of data collected
in STAMP base packet. STAMP extensions are designed to provide
valuable information about the condition of a network, and protecting
the integrity of that data is also essential. The keyed Hashed
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) TLV MUST be included in a STAMP
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
test packet in the authenticated mode, excluding when the only TLV
present is Extra Padding TLV. The HMAC TLV MUST follow all TLVs
included in a STAMP test packet, except for the Extra Padding TLV.
The HMAC TLV MAY be used to protect the integrity of STAMP extensions
in STAMP unauthenticated mode.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HMAC Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| HMAC |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 12: HMAC TLV
where fields are defined as follows:
o HMAC Type - is two octets long field, value TBA8 allocated by IANA
Section 5.1.
o Length - two octets long field, equals 16 octets.
o HMAC - is 16 octets long field that carries HMAC digest of the
text of all preceding TLVs.
As defined in [RFC8762], STAMP uses HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 128
bits ([RFC4868]). All considerations regarding using the key and key
distribution and management listed in Section 4.4 of [RFC8762] are
fully applicable to the use of the HMAC TLV. HMAC is calculated as
defined in [RFC2104] over text as the concatenation of all preceding
TLVs. The digest then MUST be truncated to 128 bits and written into
the HMAC field. In the authenticated mode, HMAC MUST be verified
before using any data in the included STAMP TLVs. If HMAC
verification by the Session-Reflector fails, then an ICMP Parameter
Problem message MUST be generated (with consideration of limiting the
rate of error messages). The Code value MUST be set to 0 and the
Pointer identifying HMAC Type. Also, both Session-Sender and
Session-Reflector SHOULD log the notification that HMAC verification
of STAMP TLVs failed. The packet that failed HMAC verification MUST
be dropped.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. STAMP TLV Registry
IANA is requested to create the STAMP TLV Type registry. All code
points in the range 1 through 32759 in this registry shall be
allocated according to the "IETF Review" procedure as specified in
[RFC8126]. Code points in the range 32760 through 65279 in this
registry shall be allocated according to the "First Come First
Served" procedure as specified in [RFC8126]. Remaining code points
are allocated according to Table 1:
+---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | This document |
| 1- 32767 | Mandatory TLV, | IETF Review |
| | unassigned | |
| 32768 - 65279 | Optional TLV, | First Come First Served |
| | unassigned | |
| 65280 - 65519 | Experimental | This document |
| 65520 - 65534 | Private Use | This document |
| 65535 | Reserved | This document |
+---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+
Table 1: STAMP TLV Type Registry
This document defines the following new values in the STAMP TLV Type
registry:
+-------+-----------------------+---------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-------+-----------------------+---------------+
| TBA1 | Extra Padding | This document |
| TBA2 | Location | This document |
| TBA3 | Timestamp Information | This document |
| TBA4 | Class of Service | This document |
| TBA5 | Direct Measurement | This document |
| TBA6 | Access Report | This document |
| TBA7 | Follow-up Telemetry | This document |
| TBA8 | HMAC | This document |
+-------+-----------------------+---------------+
Table 2: STAMP Types
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
5.2. Synchronization Source Sub-registry
IANA is requested to create Synchronization Source sub-registry as
part of STAMP TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1
through 127 in this registry shall be allocated according to the
"IETF Review" procedure as specified in [RFC8126]. Code points in
the range 128 through 239 in this registry shall be allocated
according to the "First Come First Served" procedure as specified in
[RFC8126]. Remaining code points are allocated according to Table 1:
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | This document |
| 1- 127 | Unassigned | IETF Review |
| 128 - 239 | Unassigned | First Come First Served |
| 240 - 249 | Experimental | This document |
| 250 - 254 | Private Use | This document |
| 255 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
Table 3: Synchronization Source Sub-registry
This document defines the following new values in the Synchronization
Source sub-registry:
+-------+---------------------+---------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-------+---------------------+---------------+
| 1 | NTP | This document |
| 2 | PTP | This document |
| 3 | SSU/BITS | This document |
| 4 | GPS/GLONASS/LORAN-C | This document |
| 5 | Local free-running | This document |
+-------+---------------------+---------------+
Table 4: Synchronization Sources
5.3. Timestamping Method Sub-registry
IANA is requested to create Timestamping Method sub-registry as part
of STAMP TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through
127 in this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF
Review" procedure as specified in [RFC8126]. Code points in the
range 128 through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according
to the "First Come First Served" procedure as specified in [RFC8126].
Remaining code points are allocated according to Table 1:
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | This document |
| 1- 127 | Unassigned | IETF Review |
| 128 - 239 | Unassigned | First Come First Served |
| 240 - 249 | Experimental | This document |
| 250 - 254 | Private Use | This document |
| 255 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
Table 5: Timestamping Method Sub-registry
This document defines the following new values in the Timestamping
Methods sub-registry:
+-------+---------------+---------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-------+---------------+---------------+
| 1 | HW Assist | This document |
| 2 | SW local | This document |
| 3 | Control plane | This document |
+-------+---------------+---------------+
Table 6: Timestamping Methods
5.4. Access ID Sub-registry
IANA is requested to create Access ID sub-registry as part of STAMP
TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through 127 in
this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF Review"
procedure as specified in [RFC8126]. Code points in the range 128
through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the
"First Come First Served" procedure as specified in [RFC8126].
Remaining code points are allocated according to Table 7:
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | This document |
| 1- 127 | Unassigned | IETF Review |
| 128 - 239 | Unassigned | First Come First Served |
| 240 - 249 | Experimental | This document |
| 250 - 254 | Private Use | This document |
| 255 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
Table 7: Access ID Sub-registry
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
This document defines the following new values in the Access ID sub-
registry:
+-------+-------------+---------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-------+-------------+---------------+
| 1 | 3GPP | This document |
| 2 | Non-3GPP | This document |
+-------+-------------+---------------+
Table 8: Access IDs
5.5. Return Code Sub-registry
IANA is requested to create Return Code sub-registry as part of STAMP
TLV Type registry. All code points in the range 1 through 127 in
this registry shall be allocated according to the "IETF Review"
procedure as specified in [RFC8126]. Code points in the range 128
through 239 in this registry shall be allocated according to the
"First Come First Served" procedure as specified in [RFC8126].
Remaining code points are allocated according to Table 7:
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | This document |
| 1- 127 | Unassigned | IETF Review |
| 128 - 239 | Unassigned | First Come First Served |
| 240 - 249 | Experimental | This document |
| 250 - 254 | Private Use | This document |
| 255 | Reserved | This document |
+-----------+--------------+-------------------------+
Table 9: Return Code Sub-registry
This document defines the following new values in the Return Code
sub-registry:
+-------+---------------------+---------------+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+-------+---------------------+---------------+
| 1 | Network available | This document |
| 2 | Network unavailable | This document |
+-------+---------------------+---------------+
Table 10: Return Codes
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
6. Security Considerations
Use of HMAC in authenticated mode may be used to simultaneously
verify both the data integrity and the authentication of the STAMP
test packets.
7. Acknowledgments
Authors much appreciate the thorough review and thoughful comments
received from Tianran Zhou.
8. Contributors
The following people contributed text to this document:
Guo Jun
ZTE Corporation
68# Zijinghua Road
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
P.R.China
Phone: +86 18105183663
Email: guo.jun2@zte.com.cn
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5357] Hedayat, K., Krzanowski, R., Morton, A., Yum, K., and J.
Babiarz, "A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)",
RFC 5357, DOI 10.17487/RFC5357, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5357>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
[RFC8762] Mirsky, G., Jun, G., Nydell, H., and R. Foote, "Simple
Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol", RFC 8762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8762, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8762>.
9.2. Informative References
[IEEE.1588.2008]
"Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol
for Networked Measurement and Control Systems",
IEEE Standard 1588, March 2008.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[TS23501] 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), "Technical
Specification Group Services and System Aspects; System
Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2 (Release 16)",
3GPP TS23501, 2019.
Authors' Addresses
Greg Mirsky
ZTE Corp.
Email: gregimirsky@gmail.com
Xiao Min
ZTE Corp.
Email: xiao.min2@zte.com.cn
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft STAMP Extensions March 2020
Henrik Nydell
Accedian Networks
Email: hnydell@accedian.com
Richard Foote
Nokia
Email: footer.foote@nokia.com
Adi Masputra
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, CA 95014
USA
Email: adi@apple.com
Ernesto Ruffini
OutSys
via Caracciolo, 65
Milano 20155
Italy
Email: eruffini@outsys.org
Mirsky, et al. Expires September 23, 2020 [Page 25]