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Versions: 00 01 rfc3664                                  Standards Track
Internet Draft                                           Paul Hoffman
draft-ietf-ipsec-aes-xcbc-prf-01.txt                   VPN Consortium
October 7, 2003
Expires in six months

                 The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 algorithm for IKE

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups
may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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Abstract

Some implementations of IPsec may want to use a pseudo-random function
derived from AES. This document describes such an algorithm, called
AES-XCBC-PRF-128.


1. Introduction

[AES-XCBC-MAC] describes a method to use AES (the Advanced Encryption
Standard) as a message authentication code (MAC) whose output is 96 bits
long. While 96 bits is considered appropriate for a MAC, it is
too short to be useful as a long-lived pseudo-random  (PRF) in either
IKE version 1 or version 2. Both versions of IKE use the PRF to create
keys in a fashion that is dependent on the length of the output of the
PRF. Using a PRF that has 96 bits of output creates keys that are easier
to attack with brute force than a PRF that uses 128 bits of output.

Fortunately, there is a very simple method to use much of [AES-XCBC-MAC]
as a PRF whose output is 128 bits: omit the step that truncates the
128-bit value to 96 bits.


2. The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 algorithm

The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 algorithm is identical to [AES-XCBC-MAC] except
that the truncation step in section 4.3 of [AES-XCBC-MAC]  is *not*
performed. That is, there is no processing after section 4.2 of
[AES-XCBC-MAC].

The test vectors in section 4.6 can be used for AES-XCBC-PRF-128,
but only those listed as "AES-XCBC-MAC", not "AES-XCBC-MAC-96".


3. Security considerations

The security provided by AES-XCBC-MAC-PRF is based upon the strength of
AES.  At the time of this writing, there are no known practical
cryptographic attacks against AES or AES-XCBC-MAC-PRF.

As is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its strength lies
in the security of the key management mechanism, the strength of the
associated secret key, and upon the correctness of the implementations
in all of the participating systems. [AES-XCBC-MAC] contains test
vectors to assist in verifying the correctness of AES-XCBC-MAC-PRF code.
The test vectors all show the full MAC value before it is truncated to
96 bits.  The PRF makes use of the full MAC value, not the truncated
one.


4. References

4.1 Normative references

[AES-XCBC-MAC] "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec",
RFC 3566.

5. Author's address

Paul Hoffman
VPN Consortium
127 Segre Place
Santa Cruz, CA  95060  USA
paul.hoffman@vpnc.org