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Versions: 00                                                            
Network Working Group                                   S. Chang (NIST)
                                                        R. Glenn (NIST)
                                                        March 20, 1997
Internet Draft


         HMAC-SHA-1-96 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention
               <draft-ietf-ipsec-ah-hmac-sha-1-96-00.txt>


Status of This Memo

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas,
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Abstract

   This document describes a keyed-SHA transform to be used in
   conjunction with the IP Authentication Header [RFC-1826]. The
   particular transform is based on [RFC-2104].  A replay prevention
   field is also specified.










Chang, Glenn                                                    [Page 1]


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Contents

   1.  Introduction...................................................3
   1.1    Terminology.................................................3
   1.2    Keys........................................................4
   1.3    Data Size...................................................4
   2   Packet Format..................................................5
   2.1    Replay Prevention...........................................5
   2.2    Authentication Data Calculation.............................6
   3.  Security Considerations........................................7
   Acknowledgments....................................................7
   References.........................................................8
   Authors' Addresses.................................................8






































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1. Introduction

   The IP Authentication Header (AH) provides integrity and
   authentication for IP datagrams [RFC-1826]. The transform specified
   in this document uses a keyed-SHA mechanism based on [RFC-2104].  The
   mechanism uses the (key-less) SHA hash function [FIPS-180-1] which
   produces a message digest. When combined with an AH Key,
   Authentication Data is produced. This value is placed in the
   Authentication Data field of the AH [RFC-1826]. This value is also
   the basis for the data integrity service offered by the AH protocol.

   To provide protection against replay attacks, a Replay Prevention
   field is specified as a transform option.  This field is used to help
   prevent attacks in which a message is stored and re-used later,
   replacing or repeating the original.  The Security Parameters Index
   (SPI) [RFC-1825] is used to determine whether this option is included
   in the AH.

   Familiarity with the following documents is assumed: "Security
   Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [RFC-1825], "IP
   Authentication Header" [RFC-1826], and "HMAC: Keyed Hashing for
   Message Authentication" [RFC-2104].

   All implementations that claim conformance or compliance with the IP
   Authentication Header specification [RFC-1826] SHOULD implement this
   HMAC-SHA-1-96 transform.

1.1 Terminology

   In  this  document,  the  words  that  are  used  to   define   the
   significance  of each particular requirement are usually capitalized.
   These words are:

   - MUST

   This word or the adjective "REQUIRED" means that  the  item  is  an
   absolute requirement of the specification.

   - SHOULD

   This word or the adjective "RECOMMENDED"  means  that  there  might
   exist  valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this item,
   but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully
   weighed before taking a different course.

   - MAY

   This word or the adjective "OPTIONAL" means that this item is truly



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   optional.  One vendor might choose to include the item because a
   particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the product,
   for example; another vendor may omit the same item.

   For the purpose of this specification, the terms conformance and
   compliance are synonymous.

1.2 Keys

   The "AH Key" is used as a shared secret between two communicating
   parties.  The Key is not a "cryptographic key" as used in a
   traditional sense. Instead, the AH key (shared secret) is hashed with
   the transmitted data and thus, assures that an intervening party
   cannot duplicate the Authentication Data.

   Even though an AH key is not a cryptographic key, the rudimentary
   concerns of cryptographic keys still apply. Consider that the
   algorithm and most of the data used to produce the output is known.
   The strength of the transform lies in the singular mapping of the key
   (which needs to be strong) and the IP datagram (which is known) to
   the Authentication Data.  Thus, implementations should, and as
   frequently as possible, change the AH key. Keys need to be chosen at
   random, or generated using a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
   generator seeded with a random seed. [RFC-2104]

   All conforming and compliant implementations MUST support a key
   length of 160 bits or less.  Implementations SHOULD support longer
   key lengths as well.  It is advised that the key length be chosen to
   be the length of the hash algorithm output, which is 160 bits for
   SHA.  For other key lengths the following concerns MUST be
   considered.

   A key length of zero is prohibited and implementations MUST prevent
   key lengths of zero from being used with this transform, since no
   effective authentication could be provided by a zero-length key.  SHA
   operates on 64-byte blocks.  Keys longer than 64-bytes are first
   hashed using SHA.  The resulting hash is then used to calculate the
   Authentication Data.

1.3 Data Size

   HMAC-SHA-1 generates a message digest of 160 bits. HMAC-SHA-1-96 uses
   the first or left most 96 bits as the Authentication Data.   This
   procedure is known as truncation.  In the case of this transform,
   truncation is used to help maintain 64-bit packet header alignment,
   eliminate unnecessary overhead, and potentially provided stronger
   authentication.  [RFC-2104] provides more information on the
   advantages and disadvantages of truncation.



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2. Packet Format

        +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
        | Next Header   | Length        |           RESERVED            |
        +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
        |                              SPI                              |
        +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
        |                     Replay Prevention                         |
        +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
        |                                                               |
        +                                                               +
        |                     Authentication Data                       |
        +                                                               +
        |                                                               |
        +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
         1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

   The Next Header, RESERVED, and SPI fields are specified in [RFC-
   1826]. The Length field is the length of the Replay Prevention field
   and the Authentication Data in 32-bit words.  The Length field will
   always be set to 4 (128 bits) for HMAC-SHA-1-96.

2.1 Replay Prevention

   The Replay Prevention field is a 32-bit value used to guarantee that
   each packet exchanged between two parties is different. Each IPsec
   Security Association specifies whether Replay Prevention is used for
   that Security Association.  The Replay Prevention field is always
   included in the calculation of the Authentication Data.  If Replay
   Prevention is NOT in use, the 32-bit value is set to 0, included in
   the calculation of the Authentication Data, and ignored upon receipt
   with regard to checking for replay.  This field is used to help
   prevent attacks in which a message is stored and re-used later,
   replacing or repeating the original.  Replay Prevention SHOULD be
   implemented.

   Replay Prevention SHOULD be implemented.  If Replay Prevention is not
   implemented, the 32-bit field remains are part of the AH and is
   treated as if Replay Prevention is NOT in use (i.e. the 32-bit value
   is set to 0, included in the calculation of the Authentication Data,
   and ignored upon receipt with regard to checking for replay.

   The 32-bit field is an up counter starting at a value of 1.

   The secret shared key MUST NOT be used for a period of time that
   allows the counter to wrap, that is, to transmit more than 2^32
   packets using a single key.




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   Upon receipt, the replay value is assured to be increasing.  An
   implementation MAY accept out of order packets.  If an "out of order
   window" is supported, an implementation MUST guarantee that any and
   all packets accepted out of order have not arrived before. That is,
   an implementation MUST accept any packet, at most, once.  The size of
   the window is a negotiated value specified by the IPsec Security
   Association.

   [ESP-DES-MD5] provides more information on negotiated windows sizes,
   example code that implements a 32 packet replay window, and a test
   routine to show how it could be implemented.

   When the destination address is a multicast address and more than one
   sender is sharing the same IPsec Security Association to that
   multicast destination address, then Replay Prevention SHOULD NOT be
   enabled.  When Replay Prevention is desired for a multicast session
   having multiple senders to the same multicast destination address,
   each sender SHOULD have its own IPsec Security Association.

2.2 Authentication Data Calculation

   The Authentication Data is the output of the SHA authentication
   algorithm as described in [FIPS-180-1].  The digest is calculated
   over the entire IP datagram. Fields within the datagram that are
   variant during transit and the Authentication Data field itself must
   contain all zeros prior to the computation [RFC-1826]. The Replay
   Prevention field, used or not, is included in the calculation.

   To compute HMAC-SHA-1 over the data 'text', the following is
   calculated:

       SHA (K XOR opad, SHA (K XOR ipad, text))

   The result of which is truncated to 96 bits (retaining the left most
   bits) to produce HMAC-SHA-1-96.

   K denotes the secret key shared by the parties. If K is longer than
   64-bytes, it MUST first be hashed using SHA. In this case, K is the
   resulting hash.  The variables 'ipad', 'opad' denote fixed strings
   for inner and outer padding respectively. The two strings are:

       ipad = the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times,
       opad = the byte 0x5C repeated 64 times.








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   The calculation of the Authentication Data consists of the following
   steps:

   (1) append zeros to the end of K to create a 64 byte string (e.g., if K
       is of length 16 bytes it will be appended with 48 zero bytes 0x00)
   (2) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the 64 byte string computed in step (1)
       with ipad
   (3) concatenate to the 64 byte string resulting from step (2) the data
       stream 'text'
   (4) apply SHA to the stream generated in step (3)
   (5) XOR the 64 byte string computed in step (1) with opad
   (6) concatenate to the 64 byte string resulting from step (5) the SHA
       result of step (4)
   (7) apply SHA to the stream generated in step (6)
   (8) use the left most 96 bits of the result obtained in (7) as the final
       result

   A similar computation is described in more detail, along with example
   code and performance improvements, in [RFC-2104].  Implementers
   should consult [RFC-2104] for more information on the HMAC technique
   for keying a cryptographic hash function.

3. Security Considerations

   The security provided by this transform is based on the strength of
   SHA, the correctness of the algorithm's implementation, the security
   of the key management mechanism and its implementation, the strength
   of the associated secret key, and upon the correctness of the
   implementations in all of the participating systems.  [RFC-2104]
   contains a detailed discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of
   HMAC algorithms.  [HMAC-TESTS] contains test vectors and example code
   to assist in verifying the correctness of HMAC-SHA-1 code.

Acknowledgments

This document is largely based on text written by Hugo Krawczyk.  The
format used was derived from work by William Simpson and Perry Metzger.
The text on replay prevention is derived from work by Jim Hughes.













Chang, Glenn                                                    [Page 7]


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References


   [RFC-1825]    R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol",
                 RFC-1825, August 1995.
   [RFC-1826]    R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
                 RFC-1826, August 1995.
   [RFC-1828]    P. Metzger, W. A. Simpson, "IP Authentication using Keyed MD5",
                 RFC-1828, August 1995.
   [RFC-2104]    H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed Hashing
                 for Message Authentication", RFC-2104, February, 1997.
   [FIPS-180-1]  NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April 1995.
                 [URL] http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.txt (ascii)
                 [URL] http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.ps  (postscript)
   [ESP-DES-MD5] J. Hughes, "Combined DES-CBC, MD5, and Replay Prevention
                 Security Transform", Internet Draft, September 1996.
   [HMAC-TESTS]  P. Cheng, R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1",
                 Internet Draft, March 1997.

Authors' Addresses

   Shu-jen Chang
   NIST
   Building 820, Room 456
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899

   shu-jen.chang@nist.gov

   Robert Glenn
   NIST
   Building 820, Room 455
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899

   rob.glenn@nist.gov

















Chang, Glenn                                                    [Page 8]