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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05                                             
Internet Engineering Task Force             R. Pereira, TimeStep Corp.
IP Security Working Group                    S. Anand, Microsoft Corp.
Internet Draft                                   B. Patel, Intel Corp.
Expires in six months
                                                     February 12, 1998



                   The ISAKMP Configuration Method
               <draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-02.txt>



Status of this Memo

   This document is a submission to the IETF Internet Protocol
   Security (IPSECond) Working Group. Comments are solicited and
   should be addressed to the working group mailing list
   (ipsec@tis.com) or to the editor.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts draft documents are valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
   progress."

   To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
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   ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This document describes a new ISAKMP method that allows information
   like configuration items to be exchanged securely by using both
   push/acknowledge or request/reply paradigms.









R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 1]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98



Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................2
     1.1. Specification of Requirements..............................2
   2. Configuration And Information Method...........................3
   3. Configuration Transaction......................................3
     3.1. Configuration NOTIFY Codes.................................4
     3.2. Configuration NOTIFY Data And Attributes...................5
     3.3. Retransmission.............................................6
   4. Examples.......................................................6
   5. Enterprise Management Considerations...........................8
   6. Security Considerations........................................8
   7. References.....................................................9
   8. Acknowledgments................................................9
   9. Editors' Addresses.............................................9



1.   Introduction

   ISAKMP provides a framework to negotiate and derive Security
   Associations, but since it is used within the IPSec framework it
   may also be used to configure or retrieve information from secure
   hosts.  This configuration may take place between a gateway, an
   end-host client, or a configuration manager.  For example, this can
   be used to configure multi-protocol IP tunnels securely.

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and
   concepts described in the "Security Architecture for the Internet
   Protocol" [Atkinso95] and "IP Security Document Roadmap" [Thayer97]
   documents.

   Readers are advised to be familiar with both [Harkins97] and
   [ISAKMP] because of the terminology used within this document and
   the fact that this document is an extension of both of those
   documents.


1.1. Specification of Requirements

   The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
   NOT", and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted
   as described in [Bradner97].








R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 2]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


2.   Configuration And Information Method

   The premise behind this method is to utilize the existing ISAKMP
   protocol as much as possible to build more functionality.  The
   Configuration and Information method described in this document
   uses the ISAKMP NOTIFY payload to transfer information between two
   hosts.  Within the ISAKMP NOTIFY payload are ISAKMP attributes that
   relay the actual information.

   Depending on the type of information relayed by the exchange, it
   MIGHT have to be secured.  For example, if password information
   were being exchanged, then the exchange would be REQUIRED to be
   secured (both encrypted and authenticated).

   The NOTIFY payload MAY be sent within an ISAKMP exchange (like Main
   Mode or Aggressive Mode) or by itself.  When sent by itself, it
   MUST be sent in an Info Mode exchange.

   If security is required for the attributes being exchanged, and the
   exchange is occurring in an Info Mode ISAKMP exchange, then
   security is exactly as defined in [Harkins97] under the section
   entitled "ISAKMP Information Exchanges".


3.   Configuration Transaction

   A "Configuration Transaction" is defined as two Configuration
   Method exchanges, the first being either a Set or a Request and the
   second being either a Acknowledge or a Reply respectively.  The SPI
   within the ISAKMP NOTIFY payload header identifies the
   configuration transaction.  A SPI length of 4 octets SHOULD be
   sufficient, but any length greater than zero MUST be supported and
   returned in the reply and acknowledgement.

   There are two paradigms to follow for this method.

   o "Set/Acknowledge" works on the push principle that allows a
     configuration manager (a host that wishes to send information to
     another) to start the configuration transaction.  This code
     sends attributes that it wants the peer to alter.  The
     Acknowledge code MUST return the zero length attributes that it
     accepted.  Those attributes that it did not accept will NOT be
     sent back in the acknowledgement.

       Initiator              Responder
       ---------------        -------------------
       NOTIFY(SET)      -->
                        <--   NOTIFY(ACKNOWLEDGE)




R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 3]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


   o "Request/Reply" allows a host to request information from an
     informed host (a configuration manager).  IF the attributes in
     the Request message are not empty, then these attributes are
     taken as suggestions for that attribute.  The Reply message MAY
     wish to choose those values, or return new values.  It MAY also
     add new attributes and not include some requested attributes.

       Initiator              Responder
       ---------------        --------------
       NOTIFY(REQUEST)  -->
                        <--   NOTIFY(REPLY)

   Transactions are completed once the Reply or Acknowledge code is
   received.  If one is not received, the implementation MAY wish to
   retransmit the original exchange.

   The initiator and responder MAY not be the same as the initiator
   and responder of the ISAKMP exchange.

   If a badly formatted exchange is received, the message SHOULD be
   silently discarded and perhaps logged locally, as per local policy.
   Badly formatted exchanges MIGHT also include those with unknown
   codes or unknown attributes within the Configuration Method.


3.1. Configuration NOTIFY Codes

    Code                       Value
   ========================== ===========
    ISKAMP_CFG_REQUEST         101
    ISKAMP_CFG_REPLY           102
    ISKAMP_CFG_SET             103
    ISKAMP_CFG_ACK             104

   Since the Configuration Method uses NOTIFY codes for information
   exchange, if the peer does not support this functionality, it will
   quietly discard the message without breaking.














R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 4]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


3.2. Configuration NOTIFY Data And Attributes

   Zero or more ISAKMP attributes [ISAKMP] make up the NOTIFY
   payloadÂ’s data.  The following attributes are defined to be valid
   within the payload:

    Attribute              Value   Type             Length
   ====================== ======= ================ ===================
    INTERNAL_ADDRESS         1     Variable         0 or 4 octets
    INTERNAL_NETMASK         2     Variable         0 or 4 octets
    INTERNAL_DNS             3     Variable         0 or 4 octets
    INTERNAL_NBNS            4     Variable         0 or 4 octets
    INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY  5     Basic/Variable   0 or 2 or 4 octets
    INTERNAL_DHCP            6     Variable         0 or 4 octets
    APPLICATION_VERSION      7     Variable         variable

    Reserved for future use    8-16383
    Private use                16384-32767

   o INTERNAL_ADDRESS - Specifies an IPv4 address within the internal
     network.  This address is sometimes called a red node address or
     a private address and MAY be an illegal address on the Internet.
     Multiple internal addresses MAY be requested.  The responder MAY
     only send up to the number of addresses requested.

     The requested address is valid until the expiry time, or until
     the ISAKMP SA that was used to secure the request, expires.  If
     no ISAKMP SA was used to secure the request, then the response
     MUST include an expiry.

   o INTERNAL_NETMASK - The internal network's netmask. Only one
     netmask is allowed in the request and reply messages. (eg.
     255.255.255.0)

   o INTERNAL_DNS - Specifies an IPv4 address of a DNS server within
     the network.  Multiple DNS servers MAY be requested.  The
     responder MAY respond with any number of DNS server attributes.

   o INTERNAL_NBNS - Specifies an IPv4 address of a NetBios Name
     Server (WINS) within the network.  Multiple NBNS servers MAY be
     requested.  The responder MAY respond with any number of NBNS
     server attributes.

   o INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY - Specifies the number of seconds that
     the host can use the internal IP address.  The host MUST renew
     the IP address before this expiry time.  Only one attribute MAY
     be present in the reply.




R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 5]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


   o INTERNAL_DHCP - Instructs the host to send any internal DHCP
     requests to the address contained within the attribute.
     Multiple DHCP servers MAY be requested.  The responder MAY
     respond with any number of DHCP server attributes.

   o APPLICATION_VERSION - The version or application information of
     the IPSec host.  This is a string of printable ASCII characters
     that MIGHT NOT be null delimited.  This attributed does NOT need
     to be secured.

   It is hoped that more attribute types will be defined in the
   future.  Some suggestions would be to distribute local policy, or
   even authenticate certificates.  Also, note that no recommendations
   are made to how an implementation actually figures out what
   information to send.  i.e. we do not recommend any specific method
   of (a gateway) determining which DNS server should be returned to a
   requesting host.


3.3. Retransmission

   Retransmission of Configuration messages SHOULD follow the same
   retransmission rules used with standard ISAKMP messages.

   While a response does not have to be sent in the next ISAKMP
   message, it SHOULD be made within a time period.  If a response is
   not received within that time period, the initiator MIGHT
   retransmit the same request.


4.   Examples

   Some examples of positioning this configuration method follow.
   These are meant only as examples and should not be thought of as
   the only possibilities for this protocol.

   Example 1: Initiator requesting his internal IP address during the
   last exchange in Main Mode using the shared secret authentication
   method.

   Initiator                           Responder
   -----------------------------      --------------------------------
   HDR(Main), SA                  -->
                                  <-- HDR(Main), SA
   HDR(Main), KEY, Ni             -->
                                  <-- HDR(Main), KEY, Nr
   HDR(Main)*,ID,HASH,NOTIFY(REQUEST) -->
                                  <-- HDR(Main)*,ID,HASH,NOTIFY(REPLY)




R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 6]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


   REQUEST =
     INTERNAL_ADDRESS(0.0.0.0),
     INTERNAL_NETMASK(0.0.0.0),
     INTERNAL_DNS(0.0.0.0)
   REPLY =
     INTERNAL_ADDRESS(192.168.219.202),
     INTERNAL_NETMASK(255.255.255.0),
     INTERNAL_DNS(291.168.219.4)

   Please note that the responder MAY have sent the reply within the
   Main Mode exchange as well as sending the reply by itself using
   InfoMode;

   HDR(Main)*,ID,HASH,NOTIFY(REQUEST) -->
                                  <-- HDR(Main)*, ID, HASH
                                  <-- HDR(Info)*, NOTIFY(REPLY)

   Or the initiator could have sent the request in an InfoMode message
   after MainMode completed.

   If another tunneled SA is negotiated with this ISAKMP SA and an
   internal IP address is required, then the initiator would perform
   the request through a InfoMode request before the QuickMode
   negotiation.

   Initiator                           Responder
   -----------------------------      --------------------------
   HDR(Info)*, NOTIFY(REQUEST)    -->
                                  <--  HDR(Info)*, NOTIFY(REPLY)


   Example 2: A central configuration manager application sends out
   some information to an IPSec host.

   Initiator                           Responder
   -----------------------------      --------------------------
   HDR(Info)*, NOTIFY(SET)        -->
                                  <--  HDR(Info)*, NOTIFY(ACK)












R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 7]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


   Example 3: An IPSec host inquires about the peer's version
   information (without security).

   Initiator                           Responder
   -----------------------------      --------------------------
   HDR(Info), NOTIFY(REQUEST)     -->
                                  <--  HDR(Info), NOTIFY(REPLY)

   REQUEST = APPLICATION_VERSION("")
   REPLY = APPLICATION_VERSION("foobar v1.3beta, (c) Foo Bar Inc.")


   Example 4: Same as Example 1, but using Aggressive Mode (Aggr).
   Notice how the replay comes back secured since Aggressive Mode has
   completed and created an ISAKMP SA.

   Initiator                            Responder
   -------------------------------      --------------------------
   HDR(Aggr), SA, KE, N, ID         -->
                                    <-- HDR(Aggr), SA, KE, N, ID, HASH
   HDR(Aggr), HASH, NOTIFY(REQUEST) -->
                                    <-- HDR(Info)*, NOTIFY(REPLY)


5.   Enterprise Management Considerations

   The method defined in this document SHOULD NOT be used for wide
   scale management.  Its main intent is to provide a bootstrap
   mechanism to exchange information within IPSec.  While it MAY be
   useful to use such a method of exchange information to some
   outlying IPSec hosts or small networks, existing management
   protocols such as DHCP [Droms97], RADIUS [Radius], SNMP or LDAP
   [Ldap97] should be considered for enterprise management as well as
   subsequent information exchanges.


6.   Security Considerations

  This entire draft discusses a new ISAKMP configuration method to
  allow IPSec-enabled entities to acquire and share configuration
  information.

  The draft mandates that this exchange should normally occur after
  the Phase I Security Association has been set up and that the
  entire exchange be protected by that Phase I SA.  Thus the exchange
  is as secure as any Phase II SA negotiation.

  This exchange MAY be secured (encrypted and authenticated) by other
  means as well, such as pre-configured ESP or data-link security.



R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 8]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


7.   References

   [Atkinso95] R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet
               Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-arch-sec-01

   [Bradner97] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to indicate
               Requirement Levels", RFC2119

   [ISAKMP]    D. Maughan, M. Schertler, M. Schneider, J. Turner,
               "Internet Security Association and Key Management
               Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-08

   [Harkins97] D. Harkins, "The Resolution of ISAKMP and Oakley",
               draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-05

   [Droms97]   R. Droms, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
               RFC2131

   [Radius97]  C. Rigney, A. Rubens, W. Simpson, S. Willens, "Remote
               Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC2138

   [Ldap97]    M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille., "Lightweight Directory
               Access Protocol (v3)", RFC2251


8.   Acknowledgments

   The editors would like to thank Tim Jenkins, Peter Ford, Bob
   Moskowitz and Shawn Mamros.


9.   Editors' Addresses

     Roy Pereira
     rpereira@timestep.com
     TimeStep Corporation
     +1 (613) 599-3610 x 4808

     Sanjay Anand
     sanjayan@microsoft.com
     Microsoft Corporation
     +1 (206) 936-6367

     Baiju V. Patel
     baiju@mailbox.jf.intel.com
     Intel Corporation
     +1 (503) 264 2422






R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                                [Page 9]


Internet Draft     The ISAKMP Configuration Method       February, 98


   The IPSec working group can be contacted via the IPSec working
   group's mailing list (ipsec@tis.com) or through its chairs:

     Robert Moskowitz
     rgm@icsa.net
     International Computer Security Association

     Theodore Y. Ts'o
     tytso@mit.edu
     Massachusetts Institute of Technology








































R. Pereira, S. Anand, B. Patel                               [Page 10]