Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          C. Tjhai
Internet-Draft                                              M. Tomlinson
Updates: 7296 (if approved)                                 Post-Quantum
Intended status: Standards Track                             G. Bartlett
Expires: 15 December 2022                                 Quantum Secret
                                                              S. Fluhrer
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                            D. Van Geest
                                                       ISARA Corporation
                                                       O. Garcia-Morchon
                                                                 Philips
                                                              V. Smyslov
                                                              ELVIS-PLUS
                                                            13 June 2022


                    Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2
                draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-06

Abstract

   This document describes how to extend the Internet Key Exchange
   Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) to allow multiple key exchanges to take
   place while computing a shared secret during a Security Association
   (SA) setup.  The primary application of this feature in IKEv2 is the
   ability to perform one or more post-quantum key exchanges in
   conjunction with the classical (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman key
   exchange, so that the resulting shared key is resistant against
   quantum computer attacks.  Another possible application is the
   ability to combine several key exchanges in situations when no single
   key exchange algorithm is trusted by both initiator and responder.

   This document updates RFC7296 by renaming a transform type 4 from
   "Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H)" to "Key Exchange Method (KE)" and
   renaming a field in the Key Exchange Payload from "Diffie-Hellman
   Group Num" to "Key Exchange Method".  It also renames an IANA
   registry for this transform type from "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-
   Hellman Group Transform IDs" to "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange
   Method Transform IDs".  These changes generalize key exchange
   algorithms that can be used in IKEv2.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.






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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 December 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Proposed Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.4.  Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Design Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Multiple Key Exchanges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.1.  IKE_SA_INIT Round: Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.2.2.  IKE_INTERMEDIATE Round: Additional Key Exchanges  . .  14
       3.2.3.  IKE_AUTH Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.2.4.  CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.2.5.  Interaction with Childless IKE SA . . . . . . . . . .  19
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.1.  Additional Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22



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     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Appendix A.  Sample Multiple Key Exchanges  . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     A.1.  IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges Carrying Additional Key Exchange
           Payloads  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     A.2.  No Additional Key Exchange Used . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.3.  Additional Key Exchange in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
           only  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     A.4.  Not Matching Proposal for Additional Key Exchanges  . . .  28
   Appendix B.  Alternative Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Problem Description

   Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) as specified in [RFC7296] uses
   the Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
   algorithm, which we shall refer to as (EC)DH collectively, to
   establish a shared secret between an initiator and a responder.  The
   security of the (EC)DH algorithms relies on the difficulty to solve a
   discrete logarithm problem in multiplicative (and respectively
   elliptic curve) groups when the order of the group parameter is large
   enough.  While solving such a problem remains difficult with current
   computing power, it is believed that general purpose quantum
   computers will be able to solve this problem, implying that the
   security of IKEv2 is compromised.  There are, however, a number of
   cryptosystems that are conjectured to be resistant against quantum
   computer attack.  This family of cryptosystems is known as post-
   quantum cryptography (PQC).  It is sometimes also referred to as
   quantum-safe cryptography (QSC) or quantum-resistant cryptography
   (QRC).

1.2.  Proposed Extension

   This document describes a method to perform multiple successive key
   exchanges in IKEv2.  It allows integration of PQC in IKEv2, while
   maintaining backwards compatibility, to derive a set of IKE keys that
   is resistant to quantum computer attacks.  This extension allows the
   negotiation of one or more PQC algorithm to exchange data, in
   addition to the existing (EC)DH key exchange data.  We believe that
   the feature of using more than one post-quantum algorithms is
   important as many of these algorithms are relatively new and there
   may be a need to hedge the security risk with multiple key exchange
   data from several distinct PQC algorithms.

   The secrets established from each key exchange are combined in a way
   such that should the post-quantum secrets not be present, the derived
   shared secret is equivalent to that of the standard IKEv2; on the



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   other hand, a post-quantum shared secret is obtained if both
   classical and post-quantum key exchange data are present.  This
   extension also applies to key exchanges in IKE Security Associations
   (SAs) for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] or
   Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302], i.e. Child SAs, in order to
   provide a stronger guarantee of forward security.

   Some post-quantum key exchange payloads may have sizes larger than
   the standard maximum transmission unit (MTU) size, and therefore
   there could be issues with fragmentation at the IP layer.  In order
   to allow using those larger payload sizes, this mechanism relies on
   the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange as specified in [RFC9242].  With this
   mechanism, we do an initial key exchange, using a smaller, possibly
   classical primitive, such as (EC)DH.  Then, before we do the IKE_AUTH
   exchange, we perform one or more IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges, each of
   which contains an additional key exchange.  As the IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchange is encrypted, the IKE fragmentation protocol [RFC7383] can
   be used.  The IKE SK_* values are updated after each exchange, and so
   the final IKE SA keys depend on all the key exchanges, hence they are
   secure if any of the key exchanges are secure.

   Note that readers should consider the approach defined in this
   document as providing a long term solution in upgrading the IKEv2
   protocol to support post-quantum algorithms.  A short term solution
   to make IKEv2 key exchange quantum secure is to use post-quantum pre-
   shared keys as specified in [RFC8784].

   Note also that the proposed approach of performing multiple
   successive key exchanges in such a way that resulting session keys
   depend on all of them is not limited to addressing the threat of
   quantum computer only.  It can also be used when all of the performed
   key exchanges are classical (EC)DH primitives, where for some reasons
   (e.g. policy requirements) it is essential to perform multiple of
   them.

   This specification does not attempt to address key exchanges with KE
   payloads longer than 64k; the current IKE payload format does not
   allow such as possibility.  At the time of writing, it appears likely
   that there are a number of key exchanges available that would not
   require such a requirement.  However, if such a requirement is
   needed, [I-D.tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit] discusses approaches that
   should be taken to exchange huge payloads.

1.3.  Changes

   RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.

   Changes in this draft in each version iterations.



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   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-05

   *  Updated the reference to RFC9242.

   *  Editorial changes.

   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-04

   *  Introduction and initial sections are reorganized.

   *  More clarifications for error handling added.

   *  ASCII arts displaying SA payload are added.

   *  Clarification for handling multiple round trips key exchange
      methods added.

   *  DoS concerns added into Security Considerations section.

   *  Explicitly allow scenario when additional key exchanges are
      performed only after peers are authenticated.

   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-03

   *  More clarifications added.

   *  Figure illustrating initial exchange added.

   *  Minor editorial changes.

   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-02

   *  Added a reference on the handling of KE payloads larger than 64KB.

   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-01

   *  References are updated.

   draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-00

   *  Draft name changed as result of WG adoption and generalization of
      the approach.

   *  New exchange IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE is defined for additional key
      exchanges performed after CREATE_CHILD_SA.

   *  Nonces are removed from all additional key exchanges.




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   *  Clarification that IKE_INTERMEDIATE must be negotiated is added.

   draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-04

   *  Clarification about key derivation in case of multiple key
      exchanges in CREATE_CHILD_SA is added.

   *  Resolving rekey collisions in case of multiple key exchanges is
      clarified.

   draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-03

   *  Using multiple key exchanges CREATE_CHILD_SA is defined.

   draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-02

   *  Use new transform types to negotiate additional key exchanges,
      rather than using the KE payloads of IKE SA.

   draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-01

   *  Use IKE_INTERMEDIATE to perform multiple key exchanges in
      succession.

   *  Handle fragmentation by keeping the first key exchange (a standard
      IKE_SA_INIT with a few extra notifies) small, and encrypting the
      rest of the key exchanges.

   *  Simplify the negotiation of the 'extra' key exchanges.

   draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-00

   *  We added a feature to allow more than one post-quantum key
      exchange algorithms to be negotiated and used to exchange a post-
      quantum shared secret.

   *  Instead of relying on TCP encapsulation to deal with IP level
      fragmentation, we introduced a new key exchange payload that can
      be sent as multiple fragments within IKE_SA_INIT message.

1.4.  Document Organization

   The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  Section 2
   summarizes design criteria.  Section 3 describes how multiple key
   exchanges are performed between two IKE peers and how keying
   materials are derived for both SAs and Child SAs.  A summary of
   alternative approaches that have been considered, but later
   discarded, are described in Appendix B.  Section 4 discusses IANA



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   considerations for the namespaces introduced in this document, and
   lastly Section 5 discusses security considerations.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Design Criteria

   The design of the extension is driven by the following criteria:

   1)   Need for post-quantum cryptography in IPsec.  Quantum computers
        might become feasible in the near future.  If current Internet
        communications are monitored and recorded today (D), the
        communications could be decrypted as soon as a quantum- computer
        is available (e.g., year Q) if key negotiation only relies on
        non post-quantum primitives.  This is a high threat for any
        information that must remain confidential for a long period of
        time T > Q-D.  The need is obvious if we assume that Q is 2040,
        D is 2020, and T is 30 years.  Such a value of T is typical in
        classified or healthcare data.

   2)   Hybrid.  Currently, there does not exist a post-quantum key
        exchange that is trusted at the level that (EC)DH is trusted
        against conventional (non-quantum) adversaries.  A hybrid post-
        quantum algorithm to be introduced next to well-established
        primitives, since the overall security is at least as strong as
        each individual primitive.

   3)   Focus on post-quantum confidentiality.  A passive attacker can
        eavesdrop on IPsec communication today and decrypt it once a
        quantum computer is available in the future.  This is a very
        serious attack for which we do not have a solution.  An attacker
        can only perform active attacks such as impersonation of the
        communicating peers once a quantum computer is available,
        sometime in the future.  Thus, our design focuses on
        confidentiality due to the urgency of this problem.  This
        document does not address authentication since it is less urgent
        at this stage.

   4)   Limit amount of exchanged data.  The protocol design should be
        such that the amount of exchanged data, such as public-keys, is
        kept as small as possible even if initiator and responder need
        to agree on a hybrid group or multiple public-keys need to be
        exchanged.




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   5)   Future proof.  Any cryptographic algorithm could be potentially
        broken in the future by currently unknown or impractical
        attacks: quantum computers are merely the most concrete example
        of this.  The design does not categorize algorithms as "post-
        quantum" or "non post-quantum" nor does it create assumptions
        about the properties of the algorithms, meaning that if
        algorithms with different properties become necessary in the
        future, this extension can be used unchanged to facilitate
        migration to those algorithms.

   6)   Limited amount of changes.  A key goal is to limit the number of
        changes required when enabling a post-quantum handshake.  This
        ensures easier and quicker adoption in existing implementations.

   7)   Localized changes.  Another key requirement is that changes to
        the protocol are limited in scope, in particular, limiting
        changes in the exchanged messages and in the state machine, so
        that they can be easily implemented.

   8)   Deterministic operation.  This requirement means that the hybrid
        post-quantum exchange, and thus, the computed keys, will be
        based on algorithms that both client and server wish to support.

   9)   Fragmentation support.  Some PQC algorithms could be relatively
        bulky and they might require fragmentation.  Thus, a design goal
        is the adaptation and adoption of an existing fragmentation
        method or the design of a new method that allows for the
        fragmentation of the key shares.

   10)  Backwards compatibility and interoperability.  This is a
        fundamental requirement to ensure that hybrid post-quantum IKEv2
        and standard IKEv2 implementations as per [RFC7296]
        specification are interoperable.

   11)  Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) compliance.
        IPsec is widely used in Federal Information Systems and FIPS
        certification is an important requirement.  However, algorithms
        that are believed to be post-quantum are not FIPS compliant yet.
        Still, the goal is that the overall hybrid post-quantum IKEv2
        design can be FIPS compliant.

   12)  Ability to use this method with multiple classical (EC)DH key
        exchanges.  In some situations peers have no single mutually
        trusted key exchange algorithm (e.g., due to local policy
        restrictions).  The ability to combine two (or more) key
        exchange methods in such a way that the resulting shared key
        depends on all of them allows peers to communicate in this
        situation.



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3.  Multiple Key Exchanges

3.1.  Design Overview

   Most post-quantum key agreement algorithms are relatively new, and
   thus are not fully trusted.  There are also many proposed algorithms,
   with different trade-offs and relying on different hard problems.
   The concern is that some of these hard problems may turn out to be
   easier to solve than anticipated and thus the key agreement algorithm
   may not be as secure as expected.  A hybrid solution, when multiple
   key exchanges are performed and the calculated shared key depends on
   all of them, allows us to deal with this uncertainty by combining a
   classical key exchange with a post-quantum one, as well as leaving
   open the possibility of multiple post-quantum key exchanges.

   In order to be able to use IKE fragmentation [RFC7383] for those key
   exchanges that may have long public keys, this specification utilizes
   the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange defined in [RFC9242].  The initial
   IKE_INIT messages do not have any inherent fragmentation support
   within IKE; however that can include a relatively short KE payload.
   The additional key exchanges are performed using IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   messages; because these messages are encrypted, the standard IKE
   fragmentation mechanism is available.

   In order to minimize communication overhead, only the key shares that
   are agreed to be used are actually exchanged.  To negotiate
   additional key exchanges seven new Transform Types are defined.
   These transforms and Transform Type 4 share the same Transform IDs.

   We assume that new Transform Type 4 identifiers will be assigned
   later to the various post-quantum key exchanges.  We specifically do
   not make a distinction between classical (EC)DH and post-quantum key
   exchanges, nor post-quantum algorithms which are true key exchanges
   versus post-quantum algorithms that act as key transport mechanisms;
   all are treated equivalently by the protocol.  To be more specific,
   this document renames Transform Type 4 from "Diffie-Hellman Group
   (D-H)" to "Key Exchange Method (KE)" and renames a field in the Key
   Exchange Payload from "Diffie-Hellman Group Num" to "Key Exchange
   Method".  The corresponding IANA registry is also renamed from
   "Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs" to "Key Exchange Method
   Transform IDs".










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   The fact, that newly defined transforms share the same registry for
   possible Transform IDs with Transform Type 4, allows additional key
   exchanges to be of any type - either post-quantum or classical (EC)DH
   one.  This approach allows any combination of the defined key
   exchange methods to take place.  This also allows IKE peers to
   perform a single post-quantum key exchange in the IKE_SA_INIT without
   additional key exchanges, provided that the IP fragmentation is not
   an issue and that hybrid key exchange is not needed.

   The SA payload in the IKE_SA_INIT message includes one or more newly
   defined transforms which represent the extra key exchange policy
   required by the initiator.  The responder follows the usual IKEv2
   negotiation rules: it selects a single transform of each type, and
   returns all of them in the IKE_SA_INIT response message.

   Then, provided that additional key exchanges are negotiated, the
   initiator and the responder perform one or more IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchanges.  Following that, the IKE_AUTH exchange authenticates peers
   and completes IKE SA establishment.

   Initiator                             Responder
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   <-- IKE_SA_INIT (additional key exchanges negotiation) -->

   <-- {IKE_INTERMEDIATE (additional key exchange)} -->

                            ...

   <-- {IKE_INTERMEDIATE (additional key exchange)} -->

   <-- {IKE_AUTH} -->

   Note that this document assumes, that each key exchange method
   requires one round trip and consumes exactly one IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchange.  This assumption is valid for all classic key exchange
   methods defined so far and for all post-quantum methods currently
   known.  For hypothetical future key exchange methods requiring
   multiple round trips to complete, a separate document should define
   how such methods are splitted into several IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchanges.











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3.2.  Protocol Details

   In the simplest case, the initiator is happy with a single key
   exchange (and has no interest in supporting multiple), and it is not
   concerned with possible fragmentation of the IKE_SA_INIT messages
   (either because the key exchange it selects is small enough not to
   fragment, or the initiator is confident that fragmentation will be
   handled either by IP fragmentation, or transport via TCP).

   In this case, the initiator performs the IKE_SA_INIT as usual,
   inserting a preferred key exchange (which is possibly a post-quantum
   algorithm) as the listed Transform Type 4, and including the
   initiator KE payload.  If the responder accepts the policy, it
   responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response, and IKE continues as usual.

   If the initiator desires to negotiate multiple key exchanges, then
   the initiator uses the protocol listed below.

3.2.1.  IKE_SA_INIT Round: Negotiation

   Multiple key exchanges are negotiated using the standard IKEv2
   mechanism, via SA payload.  For this purpose seven new transform
   types, namely Additional Key Exchange 1 (<TBA by IANA>), Additional
   Key Exchange 2 (<TBA by IANA>), Additional Key Exchange 3 (<TBA by
   IANA>), Additional Key Exchange 4 (<TBA by IANA>), Additional Key
   Exchange 5 (<TBA by IANA>), Additional Key Exchange 6 (<TBA by IANA>)
   and Additional Key Exchange 7 (<TBA by IANA>) are defined.  They are
   collectively called Additional Key Exchange transforms in this
   document and have slightly different semantics than the existing
   IKEv2 transform types.  They are interpreted as an indication of
   additional key exchange methods that peers agree to perform in a
   series of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges following the IKE_SA_INIT
   exchange.  The allowed transform IDs for these transform types are
   the same as the IDs for Transform Type 4, so they all share a single
   IANA registry for transform IDs.

   Key exchange method negotiated via Transform Type 4 always takes
   place in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, as defined in [RFC7296].
   Additional key exchanges negotiated via newly defined transforms MUST
   take place in a series of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges following the
   IKE_SA_INIT exchange, performed in an order of the values of their
   transform types, so that key exchange negotiated using Additional Key
   Exchange i always precedes that of Additional Key Exchange i+1.  Each
   additional key exchange method MUST be fully completed before the
   next one is started.






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   Note that with this semantics, Additional Key Exchange transforms are
   not associated with any particular type of key exchange and do not
   have any specific per transform type transform IDs IANA registry.
   Instead they all share a single registry for transform IDs, namely
   "Key Exchange Method Transform IDs", which are also shared by
   Transform Type 4.  All key exchange algorithms (both classical or
   post-quantum) should be added to this registry.  This approach gives
   peers flexibility in defining the ways they want to combine different
   key exchange methods.

   When forming a proposal the initiator adds transforms for the
   IKE_SA_INIT exchange using Transform Type 4.  In most cases they will
   contain classical (EC)DH key exchange methods, however it is not a
   requirement.  Additional key exchange methods are proposed using
   Additional Key Exchange transform types.  All of these transform
   types are optional, the initiator is free to select any of them for
   proposing additional key exchange methods.  Consequently, if none of
   the Additional Key Exchange transforms is included in the proposal,
   then this proposal indicates performing standard IKEv2, as defined in
   [RFC7296].  On the other hand, if the initiator includes any
   Additional Key Exchange transform in the proposal, the responder MUST
   select one of the algorithms proposed using this type.  Note that
   this is not a new requirement, but this behaviour is already
   specified in Section 2.7 of [RFC7296].  A transform ID NONE MAY be
   added to those transform types which contain key exchange methods
   that the initiator believes is optional according to its local
   policy.

   The responder performs negotiation using the standard IKEv2 procedure
   described in Section 3.3 of [RFC7296].  However, for the Additional
   Key Exchange types, the responder's choice MUST NOT contain
   duplicated algorithms, except for the transform ID of NONE.  An
   algorithm is represented as a transform, in some cases the transform
   could include a set of associated attributes that define details of
   the algorithm.  In this case, two transforms can be the same, but the
   attributes must be different.  Additionally, the order of the
   attributes does not affect the equality of the algorithm, so two
   transforms (ID=alg1,ATTR1=attr1,ATTR2=attr2) and
   (ID=alg1,ATTR2=attr2,ATTR1=attr1) define the same algorithm.

   If the responder selects NONE for some Additional Key Exchange types
   (provided they are proposed by the initiator), then the corresponding
   IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges MUST NOT take place.  Therefore if the
   initiator includes NONE in all of the Additional Key Exchange
   transforms and the responder selects this value for all of them, then
   no IKE_INTERMEDIATE messages performing additional key exchanges will
   take place between the peers.  Note that the IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchanges may still take place for other purposes.



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   The initiator MAY propose non-consecutive Additional Key Exchange
   transforms, for example proposing Additional Key Exchange 2 and
   Additional Key Exchange 5 transforms only.  The responder MUST treat
   all of the omitted Additional Key Exchange transforms as if they are
   proposed with Transform ID NONE.

   Below is an example of the SA payload in the initiator's IKE_SA_INIT
   request message.  Here we use an abbreviation AKEi to denote the i-th
   Additional Key Exchange transform defined in this document, and an
   abbreviation KE for the Key Exchange transform, that this document
   renames from the Diffie-Hellman Group transform.  We also use some
   not-yet defined Transform IDs, namely PQ_KEM_1, PQ_KEM_2 and PQ_KEM_3
   to denote some popular post-quantum key exchange methods.

    SA Payload
       |
       +--- Proposal #1 ( Proto ID = IKE(1), SPI size = 8,
             |            9 transforms,      SPI = 0x35a1d6f22564f89d )
             |
             +-- Transform ENCR ( ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16 )
             |     +-- Attribute ( Key Length = 256 )
             |
             +-- Transform KE ( ID = 4096-bit MODP Group )
             |
             +-- Transform PRF ( ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE2 ( ID = PQ_KEM_1 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE2 ( ID = PQ_KEM_2 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE3 ( ID = PQ_KEM_1 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE3 ( ID = PQ_KEM_2 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE5 ( ID = PQ_KEM_3 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE5 ( ID = NONE )


   In this example, the initiator proposes to perform initial key
   exchange using 4096-bit MODP group followed by two mandatory
   additional key exchanges using PQ_KEM_1 and PQ_KEM_2 methods in any
   order, then followed by additional key exchange using PQ_KEM_3 method
   that may be omitted.

   The responder might return the following SA payload, indicating that
   it agrees to perform two additional key exchanges PQ_KEM_2 followed
   by PQ_KEM_1 and does not want to perform PQ_KEM_3 additionally.



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    SA Payload
       |
       +--- Proposal #1 ( Proto ID = IKE(1), SPI size = 8,
             |            6 transforms,      SPI = 0x8df52b331a196e7b )
             |
             +-- Transform ENCR ( ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16 )
             |     +-- Attribute ( Key Length = 256 )
             |
             +-- Transform KE ( ID = 4096-bit MODP Group )
             |
             +-- Transform PRF ( ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE2 ( ID = PQ_KEM_2 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE3 ( ID = PQ_KEM_1 )
             |
             +-- Transform AKE5 ( ID = NONE )


   If the initiator includes any Additional Key Exchange transform types
   into the SA payload in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange request message, then
   it MUST also negotiate the use of the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange as
   described in [RFC9242], by including INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED
   notification in the same message.  If the responder agrees to use
   additional key exchanges while establishing initial IKE SA, it MUST
   also return this notification in the IKE_SA_INIT response message,
   thus confirming that IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange is supported and will
   be used for transferring additional key exchange data.  If the
   IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange is not negotiated, then the peers MUST
   treat any Additional Key Exchange transforms in the IKE_SA_INIT
   exchange messages as unknown transform types and skip the proposals
   they appear in.  If no other proposals are present in the SA payload,
   the peers will proceed as if no proposal is chosen (i.e. the
   responder will send NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification).

   Initiator                          Responder
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SAi1(.. AKE*...), KEi, Ni,
   N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)    --->
                                      HDR, SAr1(.. AKE*...), KEr, Nr,
                                      [CERTREQ],
                              <---    N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)

3.2.2.  IKE_INTERMEDIATE Round: Additional Key Exchanges

   For each additional key exchange agreed to in the IKE_SA_INIT
   exchange, the initiator and the responder perform IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchange, as described in [RFC9242].



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   Initiator                          Responder
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK {KEi(n)}    -->
                               <--    HDR, SK {KEr(n)}

   The initiator sends key exchange data in the KEi(n) payload.  This
   message is protected with the current SK_ei/SK_ai keys.  The notation
   KEi(n) denotes the n-th IKE_INTERMEDIATE KE payload from the
   initiator and the integer n is sequential starting from 1.

   On receiving this, the responder sends back key exchange payload
   KEr(n), which denotes the n-th IKE_INTERMEDIATE KE payload from the
   responder.  As before, this message is protected with the current
   SK_er/SK_ar keys.

   The former "Diffie-Hellman Group Num" (now called "Key Exchange
   Method") field in the KEi(n) and KEr(n) payloads MUST match the n-th
   negotiated additional key exchange.

   Once this exchange is done, both sides compute an updated keying
   material:

               SKEYSEED(n) = prf(SK_d(n-1), SK(n) | Ni | Nr)

   where SK(n) is the resulting shared secret of this key exchange, Ni
   and Nr are nonces from the IKE_SA_INIT exchange and SK_d(n-1) is the
   last generated SK_d, (derived from the previous IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchange, or the IKE_SA_INIT if there have not already been any
   IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges).  The other keying materials SK_d, SK_ai,
   SK_ar, SK_ei, SK_er, SK_pi, SK_pr are updated as:

     {SK_d(n) | SK_ai(n) | SK_ar(n) | SK_ei(n) | SK_er(n) | SK_pi(n) |
      SK_pr(n)} = prf+ (SKEYSEED(n), Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)

   Both the initiator and the responder use these updated key values in
   the next exchange (IKE_INTERMEDIATE or IKE_AUTH).

3.2.3.  IKE_AUTH Exchange

   After all IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges have completed, the initiator
   and the responder perform an IKE_AUTH exchange.  This exchange is the
   standard IKE exchange, except that the initiator and responder signed
   octets are modified as described in [RFC9242].








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3.2.4.  CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is used in IKEv2 for the purposes of
   creating additional Child SAs, rekeying them and rekeying IKE SA
   itself.  When creating or rekeying Child SAs, the peers may
   optionally perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to add a fresh
   entropy into the session keys.  In case of IKE SA rekey, the key
   exchange is mandatory.  Peers supporting this specification may want
   to use multiple key exchanges in these situations.

   Using multiple key exchanges with CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is
   negotiated similarly as in the initial IKE exchange, see
   Section 3.2.1.  If the initiator includes any Additional Key Exchange
   transform in the SA payload (along with Transform Type 4) and the
   responder agrees to perform additional key exchanges, then the
   additional key exchanges are performed in a series of new
   IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges that follows the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.
   The IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange is introduced as a dedicated exchange
   for transferring data of additional key exchanges following the key
   exchange performed in the CREATE_CHILD_SA.  Its Exchange Type is <TBA
   by IANA>.

   Key exchange negotiated via Transform Type 4 always takes place in
   the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, as per IKEv2 specification.  Additional
   key exchanges are performed in an order of the values of their
   transform types, so that key exchange negotiated using Transform Type
   n always precedes key exchange negotiated using Transform Type n + 1.
   Each additional key exchange method MUST be fully completed before
   the next one is started.  Note, that this document assumes, that each
   key exchange method consumes exactly one IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange.
   For the methods requiring multiple round trips, a separate document
   should define how such methods are splitted into several
   IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges.

   Since after IKE SA is created the window size may be greater than one
   and multiple concurrent exchanges may be in progress, it is essential
   to link the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges together and with the
   corresponding CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.  A new status type
   notification ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE is used for this purpose.  Its
   Notify Message Type is <TBA by IANA>, Protocol ID and SPI Size are
   both set to 0.  The data associated with this notification is a blob
   meaningful only to the responder, so that the responder can correctly
   link successive exchanges.  For the initiator the content of this
   notification is an opaque blob.

   The responder MUST include this notification in a CREATE_CHILD_SA or
   IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE response message in case the next IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE
   exchange is expected, filling it with some data that would allow



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   linking current exchange to the next one.  The initiator MUST send
   back this notification intact in the request message of the next
   IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange.

   Below is an example of CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange followed by three
   additional key exchanges.

   Initiator                             Responder
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK {SA, Ni, KEi} -->
                             <--  HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK {SA, Nr, KEr,
                                      N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1)}

   HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEi(1),
    N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1)} -->
                                  <--  HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEr(1),
                                      N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2)}

   HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEi(2),
    N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2)} -->
                                  <--  HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEr(2),
                                      N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link3)}

   HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEi(3),
    N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link3)} -->
                                  <--  HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEr(3)}

   The former "Diffie-Hellman Group Num" (now called "Key Exchange
   Method") field in the KEi(n) and KEr(n) payloads MUST match the n-th
   negotiated additional key exchange.

   It is possible that due to some unexpected events (e.g. reboot) the
   initiator may lose its state and forget that it is in the process of
   performing additional key exchanges and thus never start the
   remaining IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges.  The responder MUST handle this
   situation gracefully and delete the associated state if it does not
   receive the next expected IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE request after some
   reasonable period of time.

   If responder receives IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE request containing
   ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE notification and the content of this notify
   does not correspond to any active key exchange state the responder
   has, it MUST send back a new error type notification STATE_NOT_FOUND.
   This is a non-fatal error notification, its Notify Message Type is
   <TBA by IANA>, Protocol ID and SPI Size are both set to 0 and the
   data is empty.  If the initiator receives this notification in
   response to IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange performing additional key
   exchange, it MUST cancel this exchange and MUST treat the whole



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   series of exchanges started from the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange as
   failed.  In most cases, the receipt of this notification is caused by
   premature deletion of the corresponding state on the responder (the
   time period between IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges appeared too long from
   the responder's point of view, e.g. due to a temporary network
   failure).  After receiving this notification the initiator MAY start
   a new CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange which may eventually be followed by
   the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges, to retry the failed attempt.  If the
   initiator continues to receive STATE_NOT_FOUND notifications after
   several retries, it MUST treat this situation as a fatal error and
   delete IKE SA by sending a DELETE payload.

   When rekeying IKE SA or Child SA, it is possible that the peers start
   doing this at the same time, which is called simultaneous rekeying.
   Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 of [RFC7296] describe how IKEv2 handles this
   situation.  In a nutshell IKEv2 follows the rule that if in case of
   simultaneous rekeying, two identical new IKE SAs (or two pairs of
   Child SAs) are created, then one of them should be deleted.  Which
   one is to be deleted is determined by comparing the values of four
   nonces that are used in the colliding CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges.  The
   IKE SA (or pair of Child SAs) that is created by the exchange in
   which the smallest nonce is used should be deleted by the initiator
   of this exchange.

   With multiple key exchanges, the SAs are not yet created when the
   CREATE_CHILD_SA is completed, they would be created only after the
   series of IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges is finished.  For this reason, if
   additional key exchanges are negotiated in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange in which the smallest nonce is used, then because there is
   nothing to delete yet, the initiator of this exchange just stops the
   rekeying process and it MUST NOT initiate the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE
   exchange.

   In most cases, rekey collisions are resolved in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange.  However, a situation may occur when due to packet loss,
   one of the peers receives the CREATE_CHILD_SA message requesting
   rekey of SA that is already being rekeyed by this peer (i.e. the
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange initiated by this peer has been already
   completed and the series of IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges is in
   progress).  In this case, a TEMPORARY_FAILURE notification MUST be
   sent in response to such a request.

   If multiple key exchanges are negotiated in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange, then the resulting keys are computed as follows.

   In case of IKE SA rekey:

         SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d, SK(0) | Ni | Nr | SK(1) | ... SK(n))



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   In case of Child SA creation or rekey:

        KEYMAT = prf+ (SK_d, SK(0) | Ni | Nr | SK(1) |  ... SK(n))

   In both cases, SK_d is from the existing IKE SA; SK(0), Ni, Nr are
   the shared key and nonces from the CREATE_CHILD_SA respectively;
   SK(1)...SK(n) are the shared keys from additional key exchanges.

3.2.5.  Interaction with Childless IKE SA

   It is also possible to establish a fully post-quantum secure IKE SAs
   from additional key exchanges without using IKE_INTERMEDIATE
   exchanges.  In this case, the IKE SA created from IKE_SA_INIT
   exchange can be immediately rekeyed with CREATE_CHILD_SA using
   additional key exchanges where IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE messages are used to
   carry the key exchange payload.  If classical key exchange method is
   used in the IKE_SA_INIT message, the very first Child SA created in
   IKE_AUTH will offer no resistance against the quantum threats.
   Consequently, if the peers' local policy requires that all Child SAs
   should be fully-protected, then the peers can avoid creating the very
   first Child SA by adopting [RFC6023].  In this case, the peers
   exchange CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED notification in the IKE_SA_INIT
   exchange and a fully-protected Child SA can be created with
   CREATE_CHILD_SA using additional key exchanges.

   Note that if the initial IKE SA is used to transfer sensitive
   information, then this information will not be protected using the
   additional key exchanges, which may use post-quantum algorithms.
   Consider G-IKEv2 protocol [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2] where the
   cryptographic materials are sent from the group controller to the
   group members when the initial IKE SA is created.  In this
   arrangement, the peers will have to use post-quantum algorithm in
   Transform Type 4 in order to mitigate the risk of quantum attack.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document adds new exchange type into the "IKEv2 Exchange Types"
   registry:

   <TBA>       IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE

   This document renames Transform Type 4 defined in "Transform Type
   Values" registry from "Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H)" to "Key Exchange
   Method (KE)".

   This document renames IKEv2 registry "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-
   Hellman Group Transform IDs" to "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange
   Method Transform IDs".



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   This document adds the following Transform Types to the "Transform
   Type Values" registry:

   Type     Description                   Used In
   -----------------------------------------------------------------
   <TBA>    Additional Key Exchange 1     (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
   <TBA>    Additional Key Exchange 2     (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
   <TBA>    Additional Key Exchange 3     (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
   <TBA>    Additional Key Exchange 4     (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
   <TBA>    Additional Key Exchange 5     (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
   <TBA>    Additional Key Exchange 6     (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
   <TBA>    Additional Key Exchange 7     (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)

   This document defines a new Notify Message Type in the "Notify
   Message Types - Status Types" registry:

   <TBA>       ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE

   and a new Notify Message Type in the "Notify Message Types - Error
   Types" registry:

   <TBA>       STATE_NOT_FOUND

4.1.  Additional Changes

   RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.

   It is assumed that RFCXXXX refers to this specification.

   *  Add a reference to RFCXXXX in the "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-
      Hellman Group Transform IDs" registry.

   *  Replace the note on "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group
      Transform IDs" registry with: This registry was originally named
      "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs" and was
      renamed to its current name by [RFCXXXX].  It has been referenced
      in its original name in a number of RFCs prior to [RFCXXXX].  To
      find out requirement levels for Key Exchange Methods for IKEv2,
      see [RFC8247].

   *  Add this note to "Transform Type Values" registry: Transform Type
      "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method Transform IDs" was
      originally named "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group
      Transform IDs" and was renamed to its current name by [RFCXXXX].
      It has been referenced in its original name in a number of RFCs
      prior to [RFCXXXX].  All "Additional Key Exchange" entries use the
      same "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method Transform IDs" as the
      "Key Exchange Method (KE)".



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   *  Append this note to "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group
      Transform IDs" registry: All "Additional Key Exchange" entries use
      these values as the "Key Exchange Method (KE)".

5.  Security Considerations

   The key length of the Encryption Algorithm (Transform Type 1), the
   Pseudorandom Function (Transform Type 2) and the Integrity Algorithm
   (Transform Type 3), all have to be of sufficient length to prevent
   attacks using Grover's algorithm [GROVER].  In order to use the
   extension proposed in this document, the key lengths of these
   transforms MUST be at least 256 bits long in order to provide
   sufficient resistance to quantum attacks.  Accordingly the post-
   quantum security level achieved is at least 128 bits.

   SKEYSEED is calculated from shared SK(x) using an algorithm defined
   in Transform Type 2.  While a quantum attacker may learn the value of
   SK(x), if this value is obtained by means of a classical key
   exchange, other SK(x) values generated by means of a quantum-
   resistant algorithm ensure that the final SKEYSEED is not
   compromised.  This assumes that the algorithm defined in the
   Transform Type 2 is post-quantum.

   The main focus of this document is to prevent a passive attacker
   performing a "harvest and decrypt" attack.  In other words, an
   attacker that records messages exchanged today and proceeds to
   decrypt them once he owns a quantum computer.  This attack is
   prevented due to the hybrid nature of the key exchange.  Other
   attacks involving an active attacker using a quantum-computer are not
   completely solved by this document.  This is for two reasons.

   The first reason is because the authentication step remains
   classical.  In particular, the authenticity of the SAs established
   under IKEv2 is protected using a pre-shared key, RSA, DSA, or ECDSA
   algorithms.  Whilst the pre-shared key option, provided the key is
   long enough, is post-quantum secure, the other algorithms are not.
   Moreover, in implementations where scalability is a requirement, the
   pre-shared key method may not be suitable.  Post-quantum authenticity
   may be provided by using a post-quantum digital signature and several
   of them have been being explored by IETF.  For example, if the
   implementation is able to reliably track state, the hash based
   method, XMSS has the status of an RFC, see [RFC8391].  Currently,
   post-quantum authentication methods are not specified in this
   document, but are planned to be incorporated in due course.

   Secondly, it should be noted that the purpose of post-quantum
   algorithms is to provide resistance to attacks mounted in the future.
   The current threat is that encrypted sessions are subject to



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   eavesdropping and archived with decryption by quantum computers
   taking place at some point in the future.  Until quantum computers
   become available there is no point in attacking the authenticity of a
   connection because there are no possibilities for exploitation.
   These only occur at the time of the connection, for example by
   mounting a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack.  Consequently there is
   less urgency for post-quantum authenticity compared to post-quantum
   confidentiality.

   Performing multiple key exchanges while establishing IKEv2 SA
   increases the responder's susceptibility to DoS attacks, because of
   an increased amount of resources needed before the initiator is
   authenticated.  This is especially true for post-quantum key exchange
   methods, where many of them are more memory and/or CPU intensive than
   the classical counterparts.

   Responders may consider recommendations from [RFC8019] to deal with
   increased DoS attack susceptibility.  It is also possible that the
   responder only agrees to create initial IKE SA without performing
   additional key exchanges, provided the initiator includes such an
   option in its proposals.  Then peers immediately rekey the initial
   IKE SA with the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange and additional key exchanges
   performed via the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges.  In this case, at the
   point when resource-intensive operations are required, the peers have
   already authenticated each other.  However, in the context of hybrid
   post-quantum key exchange this scenario would leave the initial IKE
   SA (and initial Child SA if it is created) unprotected against
   quantum computers.  Nevertheless the rekeyed IKE SA (and Child SAs
   that will be created over it) will have a full protection.  This is
   similar to the scenario described in [RFC8784].  Depending on peers'
   policy, this scenario may or may not be appropriate.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Frederic Detienne and Olivier Pelerin
   for their comments and suggestions, including the idea to negotiate
   the post-quantum algorithms using the existing KE payload.  The
   authors are also grateful to Tobias Heider and Tobias Guggemos for
   valuable comments.  Thanks to Paul Wouters for reviewing the
   document.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References







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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9242]  Smyslov, V., "Intermediate Exchange in the Internet Key
              Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9242,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9242, May 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9242>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [GROVER]   Grover, L., "A Fast Quantum Mechanical Algorithm for
              Database Search", Proc. of the Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM
              Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC 1996), 1996.

   [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2]
              Smyslov, V. and B. Weis, "Group Key Management using
              IKEv2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              ipsecme-g-ikev2-06, 6 April 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/
              internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2-06.txt>.

   [I-D.tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit]
              Tjhai, C., Heider, T., and V. Smyslov, "Beyond 64KB Limit
              of IKEv2 Payloads", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit-02, 28 January 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-
              64k-limit-02.txt>.

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.






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   [RFC6023]  Nir, Y., Tschofenig, H., Deng, H., and R. Singh, "A
              Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version
              2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6023, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6023>.

   [RFC7383]  Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7383, November 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7383>.

   [RFC8019]  Nir, Y. and V. Smyslov, "Protecting Internet Key Exchange
              Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Implementations from
              Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks", RFC 8019,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8019, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8019>.

   [RFC8391]  Huelsing, A., Butin, D., Gazdag, S., Rijneveld, J., and A.
              Mohaisen, "XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme",
              RFC 8391, DOI 10.17487/RFC8391, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8391>.

   [RFC8784]  Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., McGrew, D., and V. Smyslov,
              "Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange
              Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security",
              RFC 8784, DOI 10.17487/RFC8784, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8784>.

Appendix A.  Sample Multiple Key Exchanges

   This appendix shows some examples of multiple key exchanges.  These
   examples are purely for information purposes and they describe some
   message flow scenarios that may occur in establishing an IKE or CHILD
   SA.  Note that some payloads that are not relevant to multiple key
   exchanges may be omitted for brevity.

A.1.  IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges Carrying Additional Key Exchange
      Payloads

   The exchanges below show that the initiator proposes the use of
   additional key exchanges to establish an IKE SA.  The initiator
   proposes three sets of additional key exchanges and all of which are
   optional.  So the responder can choose NONE for some or all of the
   additional exchanges if the proposed key exchange methods are not
   supported or for whatever reasons the responder decides not to
   perform the additional key exchange.





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Initiator                     Responder
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1(.. AKE*...), --->
KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
    Proposal #1
    Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
                    256-bit key)
    Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
    Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
    Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
    Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
    Transform AKE1 (ID = NONE)
    Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_3)
    Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_4)
    Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
    Transform AKE3 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)
    Transform AKE3 (ID = PQ_KEM_6)
    Transform AKE3 (ID = NONE)
                   <--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1(.. AKE*...),
                        KEr(Curve25519), Nr, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
                        N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
                        Proposal #1
                          Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
                                         256-bit key)
                          Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
                          Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
                          Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
                          Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
                          Transform AKE3 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)

HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(1)(PQ_KEM_2)} -->
                   <--- HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(1)(PQ_KEM_2)}
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(2)(PQ_KEM_5)} -->
                   <--- HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(2)(PQ_KEM_5)}

HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDi, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr } --->
                      <--- HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDr, AUTH, SAr2,
                           TSi, TSr }












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   In this particular example, the responder chooses to perform two
   additional key exchanges.  It selects PQ_KEM_2, NONE and PQ_KEM_5 for
   the first, second and third additional key exchanges respectively.
   As per [RFC7296] specification, a set of keying materials are
   derived, in particular SK_d, SK_a[i/r], SK_e[i/r].  Both peers then
   perform an IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange carrying PQ_KEM_2 payload which
   is protected with SK_e[i/r] and SK_a[i/r] keys.  After the completion
   of this IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, the SKEYSEED is updated using
   SK(1), which is the PQ_KEM_2 shared secret, as follows

   SKEYSEED(1) = prf(SK_d, SK(1) | Ni | Nr).

   The updated SKEYSEED value is then used to derive the following
   keying materials

   {SK_d(1) | SK_ai(1) | SK_ar(1) | SK_ei(1) | SK_er(1) | SK_pi(1) |
    SK_pr(1)} = prf+ (SKEYSEED(1), Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr).

   As per [RFC9242] specification, both peers compute IntAuth_i1 and
   IntAuth_r1 using the SK_pi(1) and SK_pr(1) keys respectively.  These
   values are required in the IKE_AUTH phase of the exchange.

   In the next IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, the peers use SK_e[i/r](1) and
   SK_a[i/r](1) keys to protect the PQ_KEM_5 payload.  After completing
   this exchange, keying materials are updated as below

   SKEYSEED(2) = prf(SK_d(1), SK(2) | Ni | Nr)
   {SK_d(2) | SK_ai(2) | SK_ar(2) | SK_ei(2) | SK_er(2) | SK_pi(2) |
       SK_pr(2)} = prf+ (SKEYSEED(2), Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)

   where SK(2) is the shared secret from the third additional key
   exchange, i.e. PQ_KEM_5.  Both peers then computes the values of
   IntAuth_[i/r]2 using the SK_p[i/r](2) keys.

   After the completion of the second IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, both
   peers continue to the IKE_AUTH exchange phase.  As defined in
   [RFC9242], the values IntAuth_[i/r]2 are used to compute IntAuth
   which in turn is used to calculate the payload to be signed or MACed,
   i.e. InitiatorSignedOctets and ResponderSignedOctets.

A.2.  No Additional Key Exchange Used

   The initiator proposes two sets of optional additional key exchanges,
   but the responder does not support any of them.  The responder
   chooses NONE for each set and consequently, IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange
   does not takes place and the exchange proceeds to IKE_AUTH phase.
   The resulting keying materials are the same as those derived with
   [RFC7296].



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 Initiator                     Responder
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1(.. AKE*...), --->
 KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
 N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
   Proposal #1
     Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
                    256-bit key)
     Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
     Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
     Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
     Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
     Transform AKE1 (ID = NONE)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_3)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_4)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
                     <--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1(.. AKE*...),
                          KEr(Curve25519), Nr, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
                          N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
                            Proposal #1
                              Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
                                             256-bit key)
                              Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
                              Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
                              Transform AKE1 (ID = NONE)
                              Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)

 HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDi, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr } --->
                        <--- HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDr, AUTH, SAr2,
                             TSi, TSr }

A.3.  Additional Key Exchange in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange only

   The exchanges below show that the initiator does not propose the use
   of additional key exchanges to establish an IKE SA, but they are
   required in order to establish a Child SA.  In order to establish a
   fully quantum-resistant IPsec SA, both peers include
   CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED notification in their exchange so that the
   first Child SA is not created in IKE_AUTH, but instead the IKE SA is
   immediately rekeyed using CREATED_CHILD_SA.  Any Child SA will have
   to be created via subsequent CREATED_CHILD_SA exchange.










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 Initiator                     Responder
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1, --->
 KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
 N(CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED)
                      <--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1,
                           KEr(Curve25519), Nr, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
                           N(CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED)
 HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDi, AUTH  } --->
                        <--- HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDr, AUTH }
 HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK{ SAi(.. AKE*...), Ni, KEi(Curve25519) } --->
   Proposal #1
     Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
                    256-bit key)
     Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
     Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
     Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
     Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_6)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
                        <--- HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK{ SAr(.. AKE*...),
                             Nr, KEr(Curve25519),
                             N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1) }
                               Proposal #1
                                 Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
                                                256-bit key)
                                 Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
                                 Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
                                 Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
                                 Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)

 HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEi(1)(PQ_KEM_2), --->
 N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1) }
                       <--- HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEr(1)(PQ_KEM_2),
                             N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2) }
 HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEi(2)(PQ_KEM_5), --->
 N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2) }
                       <--- HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEr(2)(PQ_KEM_5) }

A.4.  Not Matching Proposal for Additional Key Exchanges

   The initiator proposes the combination of PQ_KEM_1, PQ_KEM_2,
   PQ_KEM_3, and PQ_KEM_4 as the additional key exchanges.  The
   initiator indicates that either PQ_KEM_1 or PQ_KEM_2 must be used to
   establish a security association, but Additional Key Exchange 2 is
   optional so the responder can either select PQ_KEM_3 or PQ_KEM_4 or
   omit this key exchange by selecting NONE.  The responder, although



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   supports the optional PQ_KEM_3 and PQ_KEM_4 methods, does not support
   either PQ_KEM_1 or PQ_KEM_2 mandatory method and therefore responds
   with NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification.

 Initiator                     Responder
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
 HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1(.. AKE*...), --->
 KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
 N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
   Proposal #1
     Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
                    256-bit key)
     Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
     Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
     Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
     Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_3)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_4)
     Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
                          <--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN)

Appendix B.  Alternative Design

   This section gives an overview on a number of alternative approaches
   that we have considered, but later discarded.  These approaches are:

   *  Sending the classical and post-quantum key exchanges as a single
      transform

      We considered combining the various key exchanges into a single
      large KE payload; this effort is documented in a previous version
      of this draft (draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-01).  This
      does allow us to cleanly apply hybrid key exchanges during the
      child SA; however it does add considerable complexity, and
      requires an independent fragmentation solution.

   *  Sending post-quantum proposals and policies in KE payload only

      With the objective of not introducing unnecessary notify payloads,
      we considered communicating the hybrid post-quantum proposal in
      the KE payload during the first pass of the protocol exchange.
      Unfortunately, this design is susceptible to the following
      downgrade attack.  Consider the scenario where there is an MitM
      attacker sitting between an initiator and a responder.  The
      initiator proposes, through SAi payload, to use a hybrid post-
      quantum group and as a backup a Diffie-Hellman group, and through
      KEi payload, the initiator proposes a list of hybrid post-quantum
      proposals and policies.  The MitM attacker intercepts this traffic



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      and replies with N(INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD) suggesting to downgrade to
      the backup Diffie-Hellman group instead.  The initiator then
      resends the same SAi payload and the KEi payload containing the
      public value of the backup Diffie-Hellman group.  Note that the
      attacker may forward the second IKE_SA_INIT message only to the
      responder, and therefore at this point in time, the responder will
      not have the information that the initiator prefers the hybrid
      group.  Of course, it is possible for the responder to have a
      policy to reject an IKE_SA_INIT message that (a) offers a hybrid
      group but not offering the corresponding public value in the KEi
      payload; and (b) the responder has not specifically acknowledged
      that it does not supported the requested hybrid group.  However,
      the checking of this policy introduces unnecessary protocol
      complexity.  Therefore, in order to fully prevent any downgrade
      attacks, using KE payload alone is not sufficient and that the
      initiator MUST always indicate its preferred post-quantum
      proposals and policies in a notify payload in the subsequent
      IKE_SA_INIT messages following a N(INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD) response.

   *  New payload types to negotiate hybrid proposal and to carry post-
      quantum public values

      Semantically, it makes sense to use a new payload type, which
      mimics the SA payload, to carry a hybrid proposal.  Likewise,
      another new payload type that mimics the KE payload, could be used
      to transport hybrid public value.  Although, in theory a new
      payload type could be made backwards compatible by not setting its
      critical flag as per Section 2.5 of RFC7296, we believe that it
      may not be that simple in practice.  Since the original release of
      IKEv2 in RFC4306, no new payload type has ever been proposed and
      therefore, this creates a potential risk of having a backward
      compatibility issue from non-conforming RFC IKEv2 implementations.
      Since we could not see any other compelling advantages apart from
      a semantic one, we use the existing transform type and notify
      payloads instead.

   *  Hybrid public value payload

      One way to transport the negotiated hybrid public payload, which
      contains one classical Diffie-Hellman public value and one or more
      post-quantum public values, is to bundle these into a single KE
      payload.  Alternatively, these could also be transported in a
      single new hybrid public value payload, but following the same
      reasoning as above, this may not be a good idea from a backward
      compatibility perspective.  Using a single KE payload would
      require an encoding or formatting to be defined so that both peers
      are able to compose and extract the individual public values.
      However, we believe that it is cleaner to send the hybrid public



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      values in multiple KE payloads--one for each group or algorithm.
      Furthermore, at this point in the protocol exchange, both peers
      should have indicated support of handling multiple KE payloads.

   *  Fragmentation

      Handling of large IKE_SA_INIT messages has been one of the most
      challenging tasks.  A number of approaches have been considered
      and the two prominent ones that we have discarded are outlined as
      follows.

      The first approach was to treat the entire IKE_SA_INIT message as
      a stream of bytes, which we then split it into a number of
      fragments, each of which is wrapped onto a payload that would fit
      into the size of the network MTU.  The payload that wraps each
      fragment is a new payload type and it was envisaged that this new
      payload type will not cause a backward compatibility issue because
      at this stage of the protocol, both peers should have indicated
      support of fragmentation in the first pass of the IKE_SA_INIT
      exchange.  The negotiation of fragmentation is performed using a
      notify payload, which also defines supporting parameters such as
      the size of fragment in octets and the fragment identifier.  The
      new payload that wraps each fragment of the messages in this
      exchange is assigned the same fragment identifier.  Furthermore,
      it also has other parameters such as a fragment index and total
      number of fragments.  We decided to discard this approach due to
      its blanket approach to fragmentation.  In cases where only a few
      payloads need to be fragmented, we felt that this approach is
      overly complicated.

      Another idea that was discarded was fragmenting an individual
      payload without introducing a new payload type.  The idea was to
      use the 9-th bit (the bit after the critical flag in the RESERVED
      field) in the generic payload header as a flag to mark that this
      payload is fragmented.  As an example, if a KE payload is to be
      fragmented, it may look as follows.















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                      1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Next Payload  |C|F| RESERVED  |         Payload Length        |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Diffie-Hellman Group Number  |     Fragment Identifier       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |         Fragment Index        |        Total Fragments        |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                  Total KE Payload Data Length                 |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     ~                       Fragmented KE Payload                   ~
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      When the flag F is set, this means the current KE payload is a
      fragment of a larger KE payload.  The Payload Length field denotes
      the size of this payload fragment in octets--including the size of
      the generic payload header.  The two-octet RESERVED field
      following Diffie-Hellman Group Number was to be used as a fragment
      identifier to help assembly and disassembly of fragments.  The
      Fragment Index and Total Fragments fields are self-explanatory.
      The Total KE Payload Data Length indicates the size of the
      assembled KE payload data in octets.  Finally, the actual fragment
      is carried in Fragment KE Payload field.

      We discarded this approach because we believe that the working
      group may not be happy using the RESERVED field to change the
      format of a packet and that implementers may not like the
      complexity added from checking the fragmentation flag in each
      received payload.  More importantly, fragmenting the messages in
      this way may leave the system to be more prone to denial of
      service (DoS) attacks.  By using IKE_INTERMEDIATE to transport the
      large post-quantum key exchange payloads, and using the generic
      IKEv2 fragmentation protocol [RFC7383] solve the issue.

   *  Group sub-identifier













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      As discussed before, each group identifier is used to distinguish
      a post-quantum algorithm.  Further classification could be made on
      a particular post-quantum algorithm by assigning additional value
      alongside the group identifier.  This sub- identifier value may be
      used to assign different security parameter sets to a given post-
      quantum algorithm.  However, this level of details does not fit
      the principles of the document where it should deal with generic
      hybrid key exchange protocol, not a specific ciphersuite.
      Furthermore, there are enough Diffie- Hellman group identifiers
      should this be required in the future.

Authors' Addresses

   C. Tjhai
   Post-Quantum
   Email: cjt@post-quantum.com


   M. Tomlinson
   Post-Quantum
   Email: mt@post-quantum.com


   G. Bartlett
   Quantum Secret
   Email: graham.ietf@gmail.com


   S. Fluhrer
   Cisco Systems
   Email: sfluhrer@cisco.com


   D. Van Geest
   ISARA Corporation
   Email: daniel.vangeest@isara.com


   O. Garcia-Morchon
   Philips
   Email: oscar.garcia-morchon@philips.com


   Valery Smyslov
   ELVIS-PLUS
   Email: svan@elvis.ru





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