IPv6 Working Group                                       John Loughney (ed)
Internet-Draft                                                        Nokia
                                                            August 25, 2003

Expires: February 25, 2004



                         IPv6 Node Requirements
                draft-ietf-ipv6-node-requirements-05.txt




Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Drafts.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document defines requirements for IPv6 nodes.  It is expected
   that IPv6 will be deployed in a wide range of devices and situations.
   Specifying the requirements for IPv6 nodes allows IPv6 to function
   well and interoperate in a large number of situations and
   deployments.





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Table of Contents

   1.   Introduction
   1.1  Scope of this Document
   1.2  Description of IPv6 Nodes & Conformance Groups
   2.   Abbreviations Used in This Document
   3.   Sub-IP Layer
   3.1  RFC2464 - Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks
   3.2  RFC2472 - IP version 6 over PPP
   3.3  RFC2492 - IPv6 over ATM Networks
   4.   IP Layer
   4.1  Internet Protocol Version 6 - RFC2460
   4.2  Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC2461
   4.3  Path MTU Discovery & Packet Size
   4.4  ICMP for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) - RFC2463
   4.5  Addressing
   4.6  Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6 - RFC2710
   5.   Transport and DNS
   5.1  Transport Layer
   5.2  DNS
   5.3  Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)
   6.   IPv4 Support and Transition
   6.1  Transition Mechanisms
   7.   Mobility
   7.1  Mobile IP
   7.2  Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification - RFC2473
   8.   Security
   8.1  Basic Architecture
   8.2  Security Protocols
   8.3  Transforms and Algorithms
   8.4  Key Management Methods
   9.   Router Functionality
   9.1  General
   10.  Network Management
   10.1 MIBs
   11.  Security Considerations
   12.  References
   12.1 Normative
   12.2 Non-Normative
   13.  Authors and Acknowledgements
   14.  Editor's Address
   Notices









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1. Introduction

   The goal of this document is to define the set of functionality
   required for an IPv6 node; the functionality common to both hosts and
   routers.  Many IPv6 nodes will implement optional or additional
   features, but all IPv6 nodes can be expected to implement the
   mandatory requirements listed in this document.

   This document tries to avoid discussion of protocol details, and
   references RFCs for this purpose.  In case of any conflicting text,
   this document takes less precedence than the normative RFCs, unless
   additional clarifying text is included in this document.

   Although the document points to different specifications, it should
   be noted that in most cases, the granularity of requirements are
   smaller than a single specification, as many specifications define
   multiple, independent pieces, some of which may not be mandatory.

   As it is not always possible for an implementer to know the exact
   usage of IPv6 in a node, an overriding requirement for IPv6 nodes is
   that they should adhere to John Postel's Robustness Principle:

      Be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from
      others. [RFC793].

1.1 Requirement Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC-2119].

1.2 Scope of this Document

   IPv6 covers many specifications.  It is intended that IPv6 will be
   deployed in many different situations and environments.  Therefore,
   it is important to develop the requirements for IPv6 nodes, in order
   to ensure interoperability.

   This document assumes that all IPv6 nodes meet the minimum
   requirements specified here.

1.2 Description of IPv6 Nodes

   From Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification [RFC-2460] we
   have the following definitions:

      Description of an IPv6 Node




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       - a device that implements IPv6

      Description of an IPv6 router

       - a node that forwards IPv6 packets not explicitly addressed to
         itself.

      Description of an IPv6 Host

       - any node that is not a router.

2. Abbreviations Used in This Document

   ATM   Asynchronous Transfer Mode

   AH    Authentication Header

   DAD   Duplicate Address Detection

   ESP   Encapsulating Security Payload

   ICMP  Internet Control Message Protocol

   IKE   Internet Key Exchange

   MIB   Management Information Base

   MLD   Multicast Listener Discovery

   MTU   Maximum Transfer Unit

   NA    Neighbor Advertisement

   NBMA  Non-Broadcast Multiple Access

   ND    Neighbor Discovery

   NS    Neighbor Solicitation

   NUD   Neighbor Unreachability Detection

   PPP   Point-to-Point Protocol

   PVC   Permanent Virtual Circuit

   SVC   Switched Virtual Circuit

   ULP   Upper Layer Protocol



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3. Sub-IP Layer

   An IPv6 node must follow the RFC related to the link-layer that is
   sending packets.  By definition, these specifications are required
   based upon what layer-2 is used.  In general, it is reasonable to be
   a conformant IPv6 node and NOT support some legacy interfaces.

   As IPv6 is run over new layer 2 technologies, it is expected that new
   specifications will be issued.  This section highlights some major
   layer 2 technologies and is not intended to be complete.

3.1 Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks - RFC2464

   Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks [RFC-2464] MUST
   be supported for nodes supporting Ethernet interfaces.

3.2 IP version 6 over PPP - RFC2472

   IPv6 over PPP [RFC-2472] MUST be supported for nodes that use PPP.

3.3 IPv6 over ATM Networks - RFC2492

   IPv6 over ATM Networks [RFC2492] MUST be supported for nodes
   supporting ATM interfaces.  Additionally, the specification states:

      A minimally conforming IPv6/ATM driver SHALL support the PVC mode
      of operation. An IPv6/ATM driver that supports the full SVC mode
      SHALL also support PVC mode of operation.

4. IP Layer

4.1 Internet Protocol Version 6 - RFC2460

   The Internet Protocol Version 6 is specified in [RFC-2460]. This
   specification MUST be supported.

   Unrecognized options in Hop-by-Hop Options or Destination Options
   extensions MUST be processed as described in RFC 2460.

   The node MUST follow the packet transmission rules in RFC 2460.

   Nodes MUST always be able to receive fragment headers. However, if it
   does not implement path MTU discovery it may not need to send
   fragment headers.  However, nodes that do not implement transmission
   of fragment headers need to impose a limitation to the payload size
   of layer 4 protocols.

   The capability of being a final destination MUST be supported,



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   whereas the capability of being an intermediate destination MAY be
   supported (i.e. - host functionality vs. router functionality).

   RFC 2460 specifies extension headers and the processing for these
   headers.

      A full implementation of IPv6 includes implementation of the
      following extension headers: Hop-by-Hop Options, Routing (Type 0),
      Fragment, Destination Options, Authentication and Encapsulating
      Security Payload. [RFC2460]

   An IPv6 node MUST be able to process these headers.  It should be
   noted that there is some discussion about the use of Routing Headers
   and possible security threats [IPv6-RH] caused by them.

4.2 Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC2461

   Neighbor Discovery SHOULD be supported.  RFC 2461 states:

      "Unless specified otherwise (in a document that covers operating
      IP over a particular link type) this document applies to all link
      types. However, because ND uses link-layer multicast for some of
      its services, it is possible that on some link types (e.g., NBMA
      links) alternative protocols or mechanisms to implement those
      services will be specified (in the appropriate document covering
      the operation of IP over a particular link type).  The services
      described in this document that are not directly dependent on
      multicast, such as Redirects, Next-hop determination, Neighbor
      Unreachability Detection, etc., are expected to be provided as
      specified in this document.  The details of how one uses ND on
      NBMA links is an area for further study."

   Some detailed analysis of Neighbor Discovery follows:

   Router Discovery is how hosts locate routers that reside on an
   attached link. Router Discovery MUST be supported for
   implementations. However, an implementation MAY support disabling
   this function.

   Prefix Discovery is how hosts discover the set of address prefixes
   that define which destinations are on-link for an attached link.
   Prefix discovery MUST be supported for implementations. However, the
   implementation MAY support the option of disabling this function.

   Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) MUST be supported for all
   paths between hosts and neighboring nodes. It is not required for
   paths between routers.  However, when a node receives a unicast
   Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message (that may be a NUD's NS), the node



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   MUST respond to it (i.e. send a unicast Neighbor Advertisement).

   Duplicate Address Detection MUST be supported (RFC2462 section 5.4
   specifies DAD MUST take place on all unicast addresses).

   A host implementation MUST support sending Router Solicitations, but
   it MAY support a configuration option to disable this functionality.

   Receiving and processing Router Advertisements MUST be supported for
   host implementations. However, the implementation MAY support the
   option of disabling this function. The ability to understand specific
   Router Advertisement optionss is dependent on supporting the
   specification where the RA is specified.

   Sending and Receiving Neighbor Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor
   Advertisement (NA) MUST be supported. NS and NA messages are required
   for Duplicate Address Detection (DAD).

   Redirect functionionality SHOULD be supported. If the node is a
   router, Redirect functionionality MUST be supported.

4.3 Path MTU Discovery & Packet Size

4.3.1 Path MTU Discovery - RFC1981

   Path MTU Discovery [RFC-1981] MAY be supported.  It is expected that
   most implementations will indeed support this, although the possible
   exception cases are sufficient that the used of "SHOULD" is not
   justified.  The rules in RFC 2460 MUST be followed for packet
   fragmentation and reassembly.

4.3.2 IPv6 Jumbograms - RFC2675

   IPv6 Jumbograms [RFC2675] MAY be supported.

4.4  ICMP for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) - RFC2463

   ICMPv6 [RFC-2463] MUST be supported.

4.5 Addressing

   Currently, there is discussion on support for site-local addressing.

4.5.1 IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture - RFC3513

   The IPv6 Addressing Architecture [RFC-3513] MUST be supported.

4.5.2 IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration - RFC2462



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   IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration is defined in [RFC-2462].
   This specification MUST be supported for nodes that are hosts.

   Nodes that are routers MUST be able to generate link local addresses
   as described in this specification.

   From 2462:

      The autoconfiguration process specified in this document applies
      only to hosts and not routers. Since host autoconfiguration uses
      information advertised by routers, routers will need to be
      configured by some other means. However, it is expected that
      routers will generate link-local addresses using the mechanism
      described in this document. In addition, routers are expected to
      successfully pass the Duplicate Address Detection procedure
      described in this document on all addresses prior to assigning
      them to an interface.

   Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) MUST be supported.

4.5.3 Privacy Extensions for Address Configuration in IPv6 - RFC3041

   Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration [RFC-3041]
   SHOULD be supported.  It is recommended that this behavior be
   configurable on a connection basis within each application when
   available.  It is noted that a number of applications do not work
   with addresses generated with this method, while other applications
   work quite well with them.

4.5.4 Default Address Selection for IPv6 - RFC3484

   Default Address Selection for IPv6 [RFC-3484] SHOULD be supported, if
   a node has more than one IPv6 address per interface or a node has
   more that one IPv6 interface (physical or logical) configured.

   If supported, the rules specified in the document MUST be
   implemented. A node needs to belong to one site, however there is no
   requirement that a node be able to belong to more than one site.

4.5.5 Stateful Address Autoconfiguration

   Stateful Address Autoconfiguration MAY be supported. DHCP [RFC-3315]
   is the standard stateful address configuration protocol, see section
   5.3 for DHCPv6 support.

   For nodes which do not support Stateful Address Autoconfiguration,
   the node may be unable to obtain any IPv6 addresses aside from link-
   local addresses when it receives a router advertisement with the 'M'



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   flag (Managed address configuration) set and which contains no
   prefixes advertised for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (see
   section 4.5.2).

4.6 Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6 - RFC2710

   If an application is going join any-source multicast, it SHOULD
   support MLDv1.  If it is going to support Source-Specific Multicast,
   it MUST support MLDv2 [MLDv2] and conform to the Source-Specific
   Multicast overview document [RFC3569]; refer to Source-Specific
   Multicast architecture document for details [SSMARCH].

5. Transport Layer and DNS

5.1 Transport Layer

5.1.1 TCP and UDP over IPv6 Jumbograms - RFC2147

   This specification MUST be supported if jumbograms are implemented
   [RFC-2675].  One open issue is if this document needs to be updated,
   as it refers to an obsoleted document.

5.2 DNS

   DNS, as described in [RFC-1034], [RFC-1035], [RFC-1886], [RFC-3152]
   and [RFC-3363] MAY be supported.  Not all nodes will need to resolve
   names.  Note that RFC 1886 is currently being updated [RFC-1886-BIS].

5.2.2 Format for Literal IPv6 Addresses in URL's - RFC2732

   RFC 2732 MUST be supported if applications on the node use URL's.

5.3 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) - RFC3315

5.3.1 Managed Address Configuration

   An IPv6 node that does not include an implementation of DHCP will be
   unable to obtain any IPv6 addresses aside from link-local addresses
   when it is connected to a link over which it receives a router
   advertisement with the 'M' flag (Managed address configuration) set
   and which contains no prefixes advertised for Stateless Address
   Autoconfiguration (see section 4.5.2). In this situation, the IPv6
   Node will be unable to communicate with other off-link nodes unless a
   global or site-local IPv6 address is manually configured.


   An IPv6 node that receives a router advertisement with the 'M' flag
   set and that contains advertised prefixes will configure interfaces



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   with both stateless autoconfiguration addresses and addresses
   obtained through DHCP.

   For those IPv6 nodes that implement DHCP, those nodes MUST use DHCP
   upon the receipt of a Router Advertisement with the 'M' flag set (see
   section 5.5.3 of RFC2462).  In addition, in the absence of a router,
   IPv6 Nodes that implement DHCP MUST attempt to use DHCP.

5.3.2 Other stateful configuration

   DHCP provides the ability to provide other configuration information
   to the node. An IPv6 node that does not include an implementation of
   DHCP will be unable to obtain other configuration information such as
   the addresses of DNS servers when it is connected to a link over
   which the node receives a router advertisement in which the 'O' flag
   ("Other stateful configuration") is set.

   For those IPv6 Nodes that implement DHCP, those nodes MUST use DHCP
   upon the receipt of a Router Advertisement with the 'O' flag set (see
   section 5.5.3 of RFC2462).  In addition, in the absence of a router,
   hosts that implement DHCP MUST attempt to use DHCP. For IPv6 Nodes
   that do not implement DHCP, the 'O' flag of a Router Advertisement
   can be ignored.  Furthermore, in the absence of a router, this type
   of node is not required to initiate DHCP.

   Stateless DHCPv6 [DHCPv6-SL], a subset of DHCPv6, can be used to
   obtain configuration information. A node that uses stateless DHCP
   must have obtained its IPv6 addresses through some other mechanism,
   typically stateless address autoconfiguration.

6. IPv4 Support and Transition

   IPv6 nodes MAY support IPv4.

6.1 Transition Mechanisms

   IPv6 nodes SHOULD use native addressing instead of transition-based
   addressing (according to the algorithms defined in RFC 3484).

6.1.1 Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers - RFC2893

   If an IPv6 node implements dual stack and/or tunneling, then RFC2893
   MUST be supported.

   This document is currently being updated.

7. Mobility




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7.1 Mobile IP

   The Mobile IPv6 [MIPv6] specification defines requirements for the
   following types of nodes:

   - mobile nodes
   - correspondent nodes with support for route optimization
   - home agents
   - all IPv6 routers

   Hosts MAY support mobile node functionality.

   Hosts SHOULD support route optimization requirements for
   correspondent nodes.

   Routers do not need to support route optimization or home agent
   functionality.

   Routers SHOULD support the generic mobile IP requirements.

7.2 Securing Signaling between Mobile Nodes and Home Agents

   The security mechanisms described in [MIPv6-HASEC] MUST be supported
   by nodes implementing mobile node or home agent functionality
   specified in Mobile IP [MIPv6].

   7.3 Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification - RFC2473

   Generic Packet Tunneling [RFC-2473] MUST be supported for nodes
   implementing mobile node functionality or Home Agent functionality of
   Mobile IP [MIPv6].

8. Security

   This section describes the specification of IPsec for the IPv6 node.
   Other issues that IPsec cannot resolve are described in the security
   considerations.

8.1 Basic Architecture

   Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC-2401] MUST be
   supported.

8.2 Security Protocols

   ESP [RFC-2406] MUST be supported. AH [RFC-2402] MUST be supported.

8.3 Transforms and Algorithms



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   Current IPsec RFCs specify the support of certain transforms and
   algorithms, NULL encryption, DES-CBC, HMAC-SHA-1-96, and HMAC-MD5-96.
   The requirements for these are discussed first, and then additional
   algorithms 3DES-CBC, AES-128-CBC, and HMAC-SHA-256-96 are discussed.

   NULL encryption algorithm [RFC-2410] MUST be supported for providing
   integrity service and also for debugging use.

   The "ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV" [RFC-2405] SHOULD
   NOT be supported. Security issues related to the use of DES are
   discussed in [DESDIFF], [DESINT], [DESCRACK]. It is still listed as
   required by the existing IPsec RFCs, but as it is currently viewed as
   an inherently weak algorithm, and no longer fulfills its intended
   role.

   The NULL authentication algorithm [RFC-2406] MUST be supported within
   ESP. The use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within AH and ESP, described in [RFC-
   2404] MUST be supported. The use of HMAC-MD5-96 within AH and ESP,
   described in [RFC-2403] MUST be supported. An implementer MUST refer
   to Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication [RFC-2104].

   3DES-CBC does not suffer from the issues related to DES-CBC. 3DES-CBC
   and ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms [RFC2451] MAY be supported. AES-
   128-CBC [ipsec-ciph-aes-cbc] MUST be supported, as it is expected to
   be a widely available, secure algorithm that is required for
   interoperability. It is not required by the current IPsec RFCs,
   however.

   The "HMAC-SHA-256-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec" [ipsec-ciph-
   sha-256] MAY be supported.

8.4 Key Management Methods

   Manual keying MUST be supported.

   IKE [RFC-2407] [RFC-2408] [RFC-2409] MAY be supported for unicast
   traffic. Where key refresh, anti-replay features of AH and ESP, or
   on-demand creation of Security Associations (SAs) is required,
   automated keying MUST be supported. Note that the IPsec WG is working
   on the successor to IKE [SOI]. Key management methods for multicast
   traffic are also being worked on by the MSEC WG.


9. Router-Specific Functionality

   This section defines general host considerations for IPv6 nodes that
   act as routers.  Currently, this section does not discuss routin-
   specific requirements.



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9.1 General

9.1.1 IPv6 Router Alert Option - RFC2711

   The Router Alert Option [RFC-2711] MUST be supported by nodes that
   perform packet forwarding at the IP layer (i.e. - the node is a
   router).

9.1.2 Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC2461

   Sending Router Advertisements and processing Router Solicitation MUST
   be supported.

10. Network Management

   Network Management MAY be supported by IPv6 nodes.  However, for IPv6
   nodes that are embedded devices, network management may be the only
   possibility to control these hosts.

10.1 Management Information Base Modules (MIBs)

   At least the following two MIBs SHOULD be supported MIBs SHOULD be
   supported by nodes that support an SNMP agent.

10.1.1  IP Forwarding Table MIB

   Support for this MIB does not imply that IPv4 or IPv4 specific
   portions of this MIB be supported.

10.1.2 Management Information Base for the Internet Protocol (IP)

   Support for this MIB does not imply that IPv4 or IPv4 specific
   portions of this MIB be supported.

11. Security Considerations

   This draft does not affect the security of the Internet, but
   implementations of IPv6 are expected to support a minimum set of
   security features to ensure security on the Internet.  "IP Security
   Document Roadmap" [RFC-2411] is important for everyone to read.

   The security considerations in RFC2460 describe the following:

      The security features of IPv6 are described in the Security
      Architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC-2401].

   For example, specific protocol documents and applications may require
   the use of additional security mechanisms.



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   The use of ICMPv6 without IPsec can expose the nodes in question to
   various kind of attacks including Denial-of-Service, Impersonation,
   Man-in-the-Middle, and others.  Note that only manually keyed IPsec
   can protect some of the ICMPv6 messages that are related to
   establishing communications. This is due to chicken-and-egg problems
   on running automated key management protocols on top of IP. However,
   manually keyed IPsec may require a large number of SAs in order to
   run on a large network due to the use of many addresses during ICMPv6
   Neighbor Discovery.

   The use of wide-area multicast communications has an increased risk
   from specific security threats, compared with the same threats in
   unicast [MC-THREAT].

   An implementer should also consider the analysis of anycast
   [ANYCAST].

12. References

12.1 Normative

   [DHCPv6-SL]    R. Droms, "A Guide to Implementing Stateless DHCPv6
                  Service", Work in Progress.

   [MIPv6]        D. Johnson and C. Perkins, "Mobility Support in IPv6",
                  Work in progress.

   [MIPv6-HASEC]  J. Arkko, V. Devarapalli, F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to
                  Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling between Mobile Nodes and
                  Home Agents", Work in Progress.

   [MLDv2]        Vida, R. et al., "Multicast Listener Discovery Version
                  2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", Work in Progress.

   [RFC-1035]     Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
                  specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC-1886]     Thomson, S. et al.and Huitema, C., "DNS Extensions to
                  support IP version 6", RFC 1886, December 1995.

   [RFC-1886-BIS] Thomson, S., et al., "DNS Extensions to support IP
                  version 6", Work In Progress.

   [RFC-1981]     McCann, J., Mogul, J. and Deering, S., "Path MTU
                  Discovery for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.

   [RFC-2096-BIS] Wasserman, M. (ed), "IP Forwarding Table MIB", Work in
                  Progress.



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   [RFC-2011-BIS] Routhier, S (ed), "Management Information Base for the
                  Internet Protocol (IP)", Work in progress.

   [RFC-2104]     Krawczyk, K., Bellare, M., and Canetti, R., "HMAC:
                  Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
                  February 1997.

   [RFC-2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                  Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC-2401]     Kent, S. and Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for
                  the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC-2402]     Kent, S. and Atkinson, R.,  "IP Authentication
                  Header", RFC 2402, November 1998.

   [RFC-2403]     Madson, C., and Glenn, R., "The Use of HMAC-MD5 within
                  ESP and AH", RFC 2403, November 1998.

   [RFC-2404]     Madson, C., and Glenn, R., "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1
                  within ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

   [RFC-2405]     Madson, C. and Doraswamy, N., "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher
                  Algorithm With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, November 1998.

   [RFC-2406]     Kent, S. and Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security
                  Protocol (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [RFC-2407]     Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
                  Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.

   [RFC-2408]     Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and Turner,
                  J., "Internet Security Association and Key Management
                  Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998.

   [RFC-2409]     Harkins, D., and Carrel, D., "The Internet Key
                  Exchange (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC-2410]     Glenn, R. and Kent, S., "The NULL Encryption Algorithm
                  and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.

   [RFC-2451]     Pereira, R. and Adams, R., "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
                  Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.

   [RFC-2460]     Deering, S. and Hinden, R., "Internet Protocol, Ver-
                  sion 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC-2461]     Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and Simpson, W., "Neighbor



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                  Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December
                  1998.

   [RFC-2462]     Thomson, S. and Narten, T., "IPv6 Stateless Address
                  Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462.

   [RFC-2463]     Conta, A. and Deering, S., "ICMP for the Internet Pro-
                  tocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2463, December 1998.

   [RFC-2472]     Haskin, D. and Allen, E., "IP version 6 over PPP", RFC
                  2472, December 1998.

   [RFC-2473]     Conta, A. and Deering, S., "Generic Packet Tunneling
                  in IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, December 1998.

   [RFC-2710]     Deering, S., Fenner, W. and Haberman, B., "Multicast
                  Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October
                  1999.

   [RFC-2711]     Partridge, C. and Jackson, A., "IPv6 Router Alert
                  Option", RFC 2711, October 1999.

   [RFC-3041]     Narten, T. and Draves, R., "Privacy Extensions for
                  Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC
                  3041, January 2001.

   [RFC-3152]     Bush, R., "Delegation of IP6.ARPA", RFC 3152, August
                  2001.

   [RFC-3315]     Bound, J. et al., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
                  for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [RFC-3363]     Bush, R., et al., "Representing Internet Protocol ver-
                  sion 6 (IPv6) Addresses in the Domain Name System
                  (DNS)", RFC 3363, August 2002.

   [RFC-3484]     Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for IPv6", RFC
                  3484, February 2003.

   [RFC-3513]     Hinden, R. and Deering, S. "IP Version 6 Addressing
                  Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.

12.2 Non-Normative

   [ANYCAST]      Hagino, J and Ettikan K., "An Analysis of IPv6 Anycast"
                  Work in Progress.

   [DESDIFF]      Biham, E., Shamir, A., "Differential Cryptanalysis of



Loughney (editor)           August 25, 2003                    [Page 16]


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                  DES-like cryptosystems", Journal of Cryptology Vol 4, Jan
                  1991.

   [DESCRACK]     Cracking DES, O'Reilly & Associates, Sebastapol, CA 2000.

   [DESINT]       Bellovin, S., "An Issue With DES-CBC When Used Without
                  Strong Integrity", Proceedings of the 32nd IETF, Danvers,
                  MA, April 1995.

   [MC-THREAT]    Ballardie A. and Crowcroft, J.; Multicast-Specific Secu-
                  rity Threats and Counter-Measures; In Proceedings "Sympo-
                  sium on Network and Distributed System Security", Febru-
                  ary 1995, pp.2-16.

   [SOI]          C. Madson, "Son-of-IKE Requirements", Work in Progress.

   [RFC-793]      Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", RFC 793,
                  August 1980.

   [RFC-1034]     Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facili-
                  ties", RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC-2147]     Borman, D., "TCP and UDP over IPv6 Jumbograms", RFC 2147,
                  May 1997.

   [RFC-2464]     Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet
                  Networks", RFC 2462, December 1998.

   [RFC-2492]     G. Armitage, M. Jork, P. Schulter, G. Harter, IPv6 over
                  ATM Networks", RFC 2492, January 1999.

   [RFC-2675]     Borman, D., Deering, S. and Hinden, B., "IPv6 Jumbo-
                  grams", RFC 2675, August 1999.

   [RFC-2732]     R. Hinden, B. Carpenter, L. Masinter, "Format for Literal
                  IPv6 Addresses in URL's", RFC 2732, December 1999.

   [RFC-2851]     M. Daniele, B. Haberman, S. Routhier, J. Schoenwaelder,
                  "Textual Conventions for Internet Network Addresses",
                  RFC2851, June 2000.

   [RFC-2893]     Gilligan, R. and Nordmark, E., "Transition Mechanisms for
                  IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 2893, August 2000.

   [RFC-3569]     S. Bhattacharyya, Ed., "An Overview of Source-Specific
                  Multicast (SSM)", RFC 3569, July 2003.

   [IPv6-RH]      P. Savola, "Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home



Loughney (editor)           August 25, 2003                    [Page 17]


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                  Address Options", Work in Progress, March 2002.

   [SSM-ARCH]     H. Holbrook, B. Cain, "SSM Architecture", Work in Pro-
                  gress.

13. Authors and Acknowledgements

   This document was written by the IPv6 Node Requirements design team:

      Jari Arkko
      [jari.arkko@ericsson.com]

      Marc Blanchet
      [marc.blanchet@viagenie.qc.ca]

      Samita Chakrabarti
      [samita.chakrabarti@eng.sun.com]

      Alain Durand
      [alain.durand@sun.com]

      Gerard Gastaud
      [gerard.gastaud@alcatel.fr]

      Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
      [itojun@iijlab.net]

      Atsushi Inoue
      [inoue@isl.rdc.toshiba.co.jp]

      Masahiro Ishiyama
      [masahiro@isl.rdc.toshiba.co.jp]

      John Loughney
      [john.loughney@nokia.com]

      Rajiv Raghunarayan
      [raraghun@cisco.com]

      Shoichi Sakane
      [shouichi.sakane@jp.yokogawa.com]

      Dave Thaler
      [dthaler@windows.microsoft.com]




Loughney (editor)           August 25, 2003                    [Page 18]


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      Juha Wiljakka
      [juha.wiljakka@Nokia.com]

   The authors would like to thank Ran Atkinson, Jim Bound, Brian Car-
   penter, Ralph Droms, Christian Huitema, Adam Machalek, Thomas Narten,
   Juha Ollila and Pekka Savola for their comments.

14. Editor's Contact Information

   Comments or questions regarding this document should be sent to the
   IPv6 Working Group mailing list (ipng@sunroof.eng.sun.com) or to:

      John Loughney
      Nokia Research Center
      Itamerenkatu 11-13
      00180 Helsinki
      Finland

      Phone: +358 50 483 6242
      Email: John.Loughney@Nokia.com

Notices

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   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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