Network Working Group K. Narayan
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track D. Nelson
Expires: June 5, 2010 Elbrys Networks, Inc.
R. Presuhn, Ed.
None
December 2, 2009
Extensions to View-based Access Control Model for use with RADIUS
draft-ietf-isms-radius-vacm-00.txt
Abstract
This memo describes a backward-compatible extension to the View-based
Access Control Model for SNMPv3 for use with RADIUS and other AAA
services to provide authorization of MIB database access. This
extension is intended to be used in conjunction with secure SNMP
Transport Models that facilitate RADIUS authentication, such as the
Secure Shell Transport Model.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 5, 2010.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the BSD License.
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. System Block Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Using RADIUS with SNMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Extended VACM for RADIUS Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. VACM Extension for RAIDUS Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Dynamic Update of VACM and Extended VACM MIB Module
Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Purging Volatile Entries in the Extended VACM MIB
Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Elements of Procedure for Extended VACM . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. MIB Module Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
1. Introduction
1.1. General
The Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 (SNMPv3) provides
message security services through the Security Subsystem. Transport
Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol [RFC5590]
defines a Transport Subsystem, Transport Security Model for SNMP
[RFC5591] a new Transport Security Model, Secure Shell Transport
Model for SNMP [RFC5592] a Secure Shell Transport Model and Remote
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) Usage for Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) Transport Models [RFC5608] a method for
authenticating SNMPv3 users via the Remote Authentication Dial-In
User Service (RADIUS).
It is now possible to authenticate SNMPv3 messages via a RADIUS when
those messages are sent over the SSH transport. This document builds
on that work and describes a means to centrally authorize a given
SNMP transaction using on-device, pre-existing authorization
configuration. In order to leverage a centralized RADIUS service to
its full extent, the access control decision in the Access Control
Subsystem needs to be based on authorization information received
from RADIUS as well. This document defines an extension to the View-
based Access Control Model to obtain authorization information for an
authenticated principal, from RADIUS.
Additional introductory material on the RADIUS operational model and
RADIUS usage with SNMP may be found in Sections 1.3 and 1.5 of
[RFC5608].
It is important to understand the SNMP architecture and the
terminology of the architecture to understand where the Extended
View-based Access Control Model described in this memo fits into the
architecture and interacts with other subsystems and models within
the architecture. It is expected that reader will have also read and
understood RFC3411 [RFC3411], RFC3412 [RFC3412], RFC3413 [RFC3413],
RFC3415 [RFC3415]and RFC3418 [RFC3418]. As this document describes
an extension to VACM, it relies on much of the material in RFC3415
[RFC3415].
1.2. System Block Diagram
A block diagram of the major system components referenced in this
document may be useful to understanding the text that follows.
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
+--------+
+......................... |RADIUS |....+
. |Server | .
Shared +--------+ .
User | .
Credentials RADIUS | Shared
. | RADIUS
. | Secret
. | .
+-------------+ +-----------------+
| Network | | RADIUS Client / |
| Management | SNMP | SNMP Engine / |
| Application |------------------| Network Device |
+-------------+ SSH +-----------------+
Block Diagram
This diagram illustrates that a network management application
communicates with a network device, the managed entity, using SNMP
over SSH. The network devices uses RADIUS to communicate with a
RADIUS Server to authenticate the network management application (or
the user whose credentials that application provides) and to obtain
authorization information related to access via SNMP for purpose of
device management. Other secure transport protocols might be used
instead of SSH.
1.3. Using RADIUS with SNMP
There are two use cases for RADIUS support of management access via
SNMP. These are (a) service authorization and (b) access control
authorization. RADIUS almost always involves user authentication as
prerequisite to authorization, and there is a user authentication
phase for each of these two use cases. The first use case is
discussed in detail in [RFC5608]. The second use case is the subject
of this document. This document describes how RADIUS attributes and
messages are applied to the specific application area of SNMP Access
Control Models, and VACM in particular.
This document assumes that Extended VACM will be used in conjunction
with an SNMP secure Transport Model and the SNMP Transport Security
Model. The rationale for this assumption is as follows. The RFC
3411 SNMP architecture maintains strong modularity and separation of
concerns, extending to separating user identity (authentication) from
user database access rights (authorization). The former is the
business of the Security Subsystem and the latter is the business of
the Access Control Subsystem. RADIUS, on the other hand, allows for
no such separation of authorization from authentication. In order to
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
use RADIUS with SNMP, binding of user authentication to user
authorization must be achieved, without violating the modularity of
the RFC 3411 SNMP architecture.
RADIUS does support a limited form of Authorize-Only operations. The
RADIUS "Authorize Only" Service-Type Attribute can be specified in an
Access-Request message, but only when accompanied by a RADIUS State
Attribute, which contains an implementation specific "cookie"
representing the successful outcome of a previous authentication
transaction. For that reason, it is not possible to completely
separate the use of RADIUS by the Access Control Subsystem from the
use of RADIUS by other subsystems. This suggests that the most
straightforward approach is to leverage the existing RADIUS usage, as
documented in [RFC5608], and the tmStateReference cache, as
documented in Section 5.2 of [RFC5590].
This document also assumes that the detailed access control rules are
pre-configued in the NAS. Dynamic user authorization for MIB
database access control, as defined herein, is limited to mapping the
authenticated user to a pre-existing group, which in turn is mapped
to the pre-existing rules. The operative use case assumption is that
roles within an organization (i.e. groups and rules) change
infrequently while the users assigned to those roles change much more
frequently. It is the user to role mapping that is outsourced to the
RADIUS server.
2. Extended VACM for RADIUS Authorization
This document will rely on implementation specific integration of the
RADIUS client for user authentication and authorization. Further, it
will rely on implementation specific caching of MIB database access
policy information, in the form of the RADIUS Management-Policy-Id
Attribute, such that it will be available to Extended VACM.
A NAS that is compliant to this specification, MUST treat any RADIUS
Access-Accept message that provisions a specific policy for MIB
database access control that cannot be provided as if an Access-
Reject message had been received instead.
The RADIUS Management-Policy-Id Attribute MUST be used in an Access-
Accept message to provision a user-specific access control policy for
use in conjunction with Extended VACM. The syntax and semantics of
the Management-Policy-Id attribute are described in Section 6.3 of
[RFC5607].
The intended use of the content of the Management-Policy-Id attribute
is to provision a mapping between the authenticated user, associated
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
with the secure transport session, and an access control group pre-
provisioned in the VACM MIB module. Details of this mapping are
described in following sections.
3. VACM Extension for RAIDUS Authorization
The extension to VACM [RFC3415] described in this document is a
method for one or more of its MIB module objects to be dynamically
provisioned based on information received from RADIUS, or some
similar AAA service. This extension requires no changes to the
Abstract Service Interface (ASI) for the Access Control Subsystem,
nor any changes in the Elements of Procedure (EOP) for VACM. A new
MIB module that augments the vacmSecurityToGroupTable is defined in
this document, as well as supplemental EOP for Extended VACM to
follow. It does require that a module of code somewhere in the NAS
be able to write to the VACM MIB module and Extended VACM MIB Module,
and that it reliably and consistently do so in immediate response to
access control policy information received from RADIUS.
3.1. Dynamic Update of VACM and Extended VACM MIB Module Objects
The imlementation dependent interface between the RADIUS Client
function in the NAS and the SNMP Engine in the NAS is responsible for
updating the vacmSecurityToGroupTable table within the VACM MIB
Module [RFC3415] and the corresponding rows of the
extendedVacmSecurityToGroupTable. These row objects are dynamically
updated from RADIUS authorization data. Specifically, the RADIUS
User-Name Attribute is used as the vacmSecurityName and the RADIUS
Management-Policy-Id Attribute is used as the vacmGroupName. The
vacmSecurityModel is the encoding for the Transport Security Model.
The vacmSecurityToGroupStorageType should be (2) volatile.
In creating a row entry in the vacmSecurityToGroupTable, there are
three cases to consider:
o No existing row has a matching vacmSecurityName.
o An existing row has a matching vacmSecurityName.
o No additional rows can be created, e.g. because of resource
constraints, etc.
The second and third cases require special consideration. The second
case may represent a conflict between dynamic access control
authorization from RADIUS and local access control configuration by a
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
security administrator, e.g. via remote or local SNMP MIB module
updates. If one assumes that the security administrator
intentionally configured a table entry for the "conflicting"
vacmSecurityName, with full knowledge that it might over-ride dynamic
authorization information from RADIUS, the right thing to do would be
nothing. That is to say, do not update the table based on RADIUS
authorization information. On the other hand, it is possible that
the "name collision" is the result of a mistake, or the result of
stale configuration information.
The behavior specified for Extended VACM is to make not update to the
vacmSecurityToGroupTable, and to increment the
extVacmSecurityNameConflict counter.
The third case is likely to be rare, and SHOULD result in a
notification of some sort being logged for action by the system
administrator.
It is expected that the value of the RADIUS Management-Policy-Id
Attribute match an existing vacmGroupName that cab be sucessfully
used as an index to the vacmAccessTable. If no matching
vacmGroupName exists, then the access control defaults to this will
result in the default access rights of "no access", which is the
desired result. The NAS should increment the extVacmMissingGroupName
counter, for troubleshooting purposes, as this most likely indicates
an administrative misconfiguration.
In addition to creating a new row in the vacmSecurityToGroupTable,
the NAS creates a corresponding new row in the
extVacmSecurityToGroupTable, using the same values for index as were
used to create the row in the vacmSecurityToGroupTable. The value of
the rowCreatedBy object is set to RADIUS (1), and the value of
rowLifetime is set to the value of the RADIUS Session-Timeout
Attribute, if one was received by the RADIUS Client for this session,
or to zero (0) otherwise.
3.2. Purging Volatile Entries in the Extended VACM MIB Module
When the secture transport session is torn down, disconnected or
times out, any volatile table rows created in the vacmSecurityToGroup
table by the Extended VACM function MUST be removed. The mechanism
to accomplish this task is implementation specific.
4. Elements of Procedure for Extended VACM
This section describes the Elements of Procedure for Extended VACM.
The function of the VACM extension is to manage the creation and
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
deletion of rows in the vacmSecurityToGroupTable, basedon the outcome
of RADIUS authorization. All access control decision functions are
taken by VACM, as defined in [RFC3415]. The EOP for VACM remains as
listed in Section 3 of that document.
When a RADIUS (or other AAA service) authorizes SNMP data access
control for a user-authenticaed secure transport session, the NAS
causes the RADIUS provisioning information to be made available to
the Extended VACM facility, which populates the
vacmSecurityToGroupTable, as follows:
1. If the the RADIUS Management-Policy-Id Attribute is not
available, increment the extVacmNoPolicy counter. Do not create
a table row.
2. If the the RADIUS Management-Policy-Id Attribute is available,
and if no existing row has a vacmSecurityName matching the RADIUS
User-Name Attribute, create a new row with the columns populated
as follows:
A. vacmSecurityModel = (x) secureTransportSecurityModel
B. vacmSecurityName = RADIUS User-Name Attribute
C. vacmGroupName = RADIUS Management-Policy-Id Attribute
D. vacmSecurityToGroupStorageType = (2)
E. volatilevacmSecurityToGroupStatus = createAndGo ???
F. extVacmRowCreatedBy = (1)
G. radiusextVacmRowLifetime = RADIUS Session-Timeout Attribute |
zero (0)
H. extVacmTransportSessionID = ID provided by the Secure
Transport Model
3. If an existing table row has a matching vacmSecurityName,
increment the extVacmSecurityNameConflict counter. Do not create
a table row.If no additional table rows can be created, e.g.
because of resource constraints, incerment the
extVacmResourceError counter.
When a RADIUS-authenticated secure transport session is disconnected
by the remote peer, the NAS casues the Extended VACM to remove the
corresponding table row from the vacmSecurityToGroupTable. The NAS
provides an implementation dependent identifier of the session in
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
question to Extended VACM.
1. Search for a rwo with a matching extVacmTransportSessionID.
2. If found, check to see that the extVacmRowCreateby value is (1)
radius. If not, ignore the request.
3. If a table row exists with a matching value of
extVACMTransportSessionID, that row is deleted.
5. MIB Module Definition
This MIB module employs the notation of [RFC2578], [RFC2579] and
[RFC2580]. It uses textual conventions from [RFC2579] and [RFC3411].
SNMP-EXT-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP FROM SNMPv2-CONF
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
snmpModules,
Unsigned32,
Counter32 FROM SNMPv2-SMI
RowStatus, StorageType FROM SNMPv2-TC
SnmpAdminString,
SnmpSecurityModel FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB;
snmpExtVacmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "200912010000Z" -- 1 Dec. 2009, midnight
ORGANIZATION "ISMS Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO "WG-email: isms@ietf.org"
DESCRIPTION "The management and local datstore information
definitions for the Extended View-based Access
Control Model for SNMP.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2009)."
REVISION "200912010000Z"
DESCRIPTION "Initial version,published as RFCXXXX."
::= { snmpModules XXXX }
extVacmMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpExtVacmMIB 1 }
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
extVacmMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {snmpExtVacmMIB 2 }
extVacmCounters OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { extVacmMIBObjects 1 }
extVacmResourceError OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "lost rows"
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of VACM Security Name to Security
Group table rows that could not be created by
Extended VACM because of insufficient resources."
::= { extVacmCounters 1 }
extVacmNoPolicy OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "lost rows"
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of VACM Security Name to Security
Group table rows that could not be created by
Extended VACM because the AAA-provisioned
group policy did not match an existing row in
the VACM access table."
::= { extVacmCounters 2 }
extVacmSecurityNameConflict OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
UNITS "lost rows"
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of VACM Security Name to Security
Group table rows that could not be created by
Extended VACM because the AAA-provisioned
security name (user name) conflicted with an
existing row in the table."
::= { extVacmCounters 3 }
extVacmSecurityToGroupTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF ExtVacmSecurityToGroupEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "This table maps a combination of securityModel and
securityName into a groupName which is used to define
an access control policy for a group of principals."
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
::= { extVacmMIBObjects 2 }
extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX ExtVacmSecurityToGroupEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry in this table maps the combination of a
securityModel and securityName into a groupName."
INDEX {
extVacmSecurityModel,
extVacmSecurityName
}
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupTable 1 }
ExtVacmSecurityToGroupEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
extVacmSecurityModel SnmpSecurityModel,
extVacmSecurityName SnmpAdminString,
extVacmGroupName SnmpAdminString,
extVacmSecurityToGroupStorageType StorageType,
extVacmSecurityToGroupStatus RowStatus,
extVacmRowCreatedBy INTEGER,
extVacmRowLifetime Unsigned32,
extVacmTransportSessionID Unsigned32
}
extVacmSecurityModel OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpSecurityModel(1..2147483647)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The Security Model, by which the vacmSecurityName
referenced by this entry is provided.
Note, this object may not take the 'any' (0) value."
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 1 }
extVacmSecurityName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..32))
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The securityName for the principal, represented in a
Security Model independent format, which is mapped by
this entry to a groupName."
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 2 }
extVacmGroupName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString (SIZE(1..32))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
DESCRIPTION "The name of the group to which this entry (e.g., the
combination of securityModel and securityName)
belongs.
This groupName is used as index into the
vacmAccessTable to select an access control policy.
A value in this table does not imply that an instance
with the value exists in table vacmAccesTable."
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 3 }
extVacmSecurityToGroupStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The storage type for this conceptual row.
Conceptual rows having the value 'permanent' need not
allow write-access to any columnar objects in the row."
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 4 }
extVacmSecurityToGroupStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The status of this conceptual row.
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the
corresponding instance of the vacmSecurityToGroupStatus
column is 'notReady'.
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made
active until a value has been set for vacmGroupName.
The RowStatus TC [RFC2579] requires that this
DESCRIPTION clause states under which circumstances
other objects in this row can be modified:
The value of this object has no effect on whether
other objects in this conceptual row can be modified."
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 5 }
extVacmRowCreatedBy OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER
{ radius (1), -- Row created by Extended VACM
other (2) -- ???
}
MAX-ACCESS read-create
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The source of the infromation in this row
is indicated by the value of this object.
In the case of VACM this column probably won't
exist."
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 6 }
extVacmRowLifetime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of seconds for which this row
is valid. Extended VACM SHOULD delete the
row after this lifetime exprires."
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 7 }
extVacmTransportSessionID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An identifier of the secure transport
model's session associated with this
authenticated user. The identifier
MUST be unique within the scope of the NAS.
It's content is implementation dependant
and it SHOULD be used merely as an index."
::= { extVacmSecurityToGroupEntry 8 }
-- Conformance information ******************************************
extVacmMIBCompliances
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {extVacmMIBConformance 1}
extVacmMIBGroups
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {extVacmMIBConformance 2}
-- compliance statements
extVacmMIBBasicCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP engines which
implement the Extensions to the View-based Access
Control Model for use with RADIUS.
"
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { extVacmGroup }
::= { extVacmMIBCompliances 1 }
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
-- units of conformance
extVacmGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
extVacmResourceError,
extVacmNoPolicy,
extVacmSecurityNameConflict,
extVacmGroupName,
extVacmSecurityToGroupStorageType,
extVacmSecurityToGroupStatus,
extVacmRowCreatedBy,
extVacmRowLifetime,
extVacmTransportSessionID
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A collection of objects for supporting the use
of RADIUS to provide user / group mappings for VACM.
"
::= { extVacmMIBGroups 1 }
END
6. IANA Considerations
TO DO.
7. Security Considerations
TO DO.
8. Open Issues
This section identifies questions and issues that have not been
addressed in this version of this document. This section will
probably be removed prior to publication, since there will be no
questions left to address.
1. Is this document an amendment or update to RFC 3514? Or is it
simply a standalone document that describes how to provision
certain MIB Objects defined in RFC 3514, along with an extended
set of augmenting table columns?
2. Does this document need to make any reference to the Elements of
Procedure in RFC 3514, or does is simply need its own Elements of
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
Procedure for updating the group mapping table?
3. Where should the MIB Module defined in this document be rooted?
(under snmpModules or mib-2?)
4. Dave Harrington had issued a summary email after IETF75
containing apparently contradictory statements about whether the
additional columns should be in the *same* table that VACM uses
or in another, separate table that augments the VACM table.
Basically, we need some help in actually structuring the new MIB
Module.
5. The Groups and Conformance sections of the MIB Module need to be
checked and kept in alignment with the definitions.
6. Make sure that the new Elements of Procedure make sense and cover
all the corner cases correctly.
7. Generally make the document look like an "SNMP document". :-)
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999.
[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.
[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder,
"Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580,
April 1999.
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
December 2002.
[RFC3415] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based
Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415,
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
December 2002.
[RFC5590] Harrington, D. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Transport Subsystem
for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
RFC 5590, June 2009.
[RFC5591] Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
RFC 5591, June 2009.
[RFC5607] Nelson, D. and G. Weber, "Remote Authentication Dial-In
User Service (RADIUS) Authorization for Network Access
Server (NAS) Management", RFC 5607, July 2009.
[RFC5608] Narayan, K. and D. Nelson, "Remote Authentication Dial-In
User Service (RADIUS) Usage for Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Transport Models", RFC 5608, August 2009.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3412] Case, J., Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen,
"Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3412,
December 2002.
[RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
RFC 3413, December 2002.
[RFC3418] Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base (MIB) for the
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
RFC 3418, December 2002.
[RFC5592] Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5592, June 2009.
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft RADIUS Enabled VACM December 2009
Authors' Addresses
Kaushik Narayan
Cisco Systems, Inc.
10 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Phone: +1.408.526.8168
Email: kaushik_narayan@yahoo.com
David Nelson
Elbrys Networks, Inc.
282 Corporate Drive, Unit #1,
Portsmouth, NH 03801
USA
Phone: +1.603.570.2636
Email: d.b.nelson@comcast.net
Randy Presuhn (editor)
None
Email: randy_presuhn@mindspring.com
Narayan, et al. Expires June 5, 2010 [Page 18]