Network Working Group D. Harrington
Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies (USA)
Intended status: Standards Track J. Salowey
Expires: September 10, 2009 Cisco Systems
W. Hardaker
Sparta, Inc.
March 9, 2009
Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP
draft-ietf-isms-secshell-15
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Abstract
This memo describes a Transport Model for the Simple Network
Management Protocol, using the Secure Shell protocol (SSH).
This memo also defines a portion of the Management Information Base
(MIB) for use with network management protocols in TCP/IP based
internets. In particular it defines objects for monitoring and
managing the Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. The Secure Shell Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. How SSHTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Security Capabilities of this Model . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.3. Authentication Protocol Support . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.4. SSH Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2. Security Parameter Passing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Notifications and Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Cached Information and References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Secure Shell Transport Model Cached Information . . . . . 13
4.1.1. tmSecurityName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.2. tmSessionID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.3. Session State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Elements of Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Procedures for an Incoming Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Procedures for sending an Outgoing Message . . . . . . . . 17
5.3. Establishing a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.4. Closing a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. MIB Module Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. Textual Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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6.3. Relationship to Other MIB Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3.1. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. MIB Module Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9.1. Skipping Public Key Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.2. Notification Authorizaton Considerations . . . . . . . . . 30
9.3. SSH User and Key Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.4. Conceptual Differences Between USM and SSHTM . . . . . . . 31
9.5. The 'none' MAC Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.6. Use with SNMPv1/v2c Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.7. MIB Module Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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1. Introduction
This memo describes a Transport Model for the Simple Network
Management Protocol, using the Secure Shell protocol (SSH) [RFC4251]
within a transport subsystem [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]. The transport
model specified in this memo is referred to as the Secure Shell
Transport Model (SSHTM).
This memo also defines a portion of the Management Information Base
(MIB) for use with network management protocols in TCP/IP based
internets. In particular it defines objects for monitoring and
managing the Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP.
It is important to understand the SNMP architecture [RFC3411] and the
terminology of the architecture to understand where the Transport
Model described in this memo fits into the architecture and interacts
with other subsystems within the architecture.
1.1. The Internet-Standard Management Framework
For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
RFC 3410 [RFC3410].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB
module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58,
RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580
[RFC2580].
1.2. Conventions
For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document
favors terminology as defined in STD62 rather than favoring
terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications. This is
consistent with the IESG decision to not require the SNMPv3
terminology be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP
specifications when SNMPv3 was advanced to Full Standard.
Authentication in this document typically refers to the English
meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of" the message, not
data source authentication or peer identity authentication.
The terms "manager" and "agent" are not used in this document,
because in the RFC 3411 architecture [RFC3411], all SNMP entities
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have the capability of acting in either manager or agent or in both
roles depending on the SNMP application types supported in the
implementation. Where distinction is required, the application names
of Command Generator, Command Responder, Notification Originator,
Notification Receiver, and Proxy Forwarder are used. See "SNMP
Applications" [RFC3413] for further information.
Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to
refer to the two ends of the SSH transport connection. The client
actively opens the SSH connection, and the server passively listens
for the incoming SSH connection. Either SNMP entity may act as
client or as server, as discussed further below.
The User-Based Security Model (USM) [RFC3414] is a mandatory-to-
implement Security Model in STD 62. While SSH and USM frequently
refer to a user, the terminology preferred in RFC3411 [RFC3411] and
in this memo is "principal". A principal is the "who" on whose
behalf services are provided or processing takes place. A principal
can be, among other things, an individual acting in a particular
role; a set of individuals, with each acting in a particular role; an
application or a set of applications, or a combination of these
within an administrative domain.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Sections requiring further editing are identified by [todo] markers
in the text. Points requiring further WG research and discussion are
identified by [discuss] markers in the text.
Note to RFC Editor - if the previous paragraph and this note have not
been removed, please send the document back to the editor to remove
this.
1.3. Modularity
The reader is expected to have read and understood the description of
the SNMP architecture, as defined in [RFC3411], and the Transport
Subsystem architecture extension specified in "Transport Subsystem
for the Simple Network Management Protocol" [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm].
This memo describes the Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP, a
specific SNMP transport model to be used within the SNMP transport
subsystem to provide authentication, encryption, and integrity
checking of SNMP messages.
In keeping with the RFC 3411 design decision to use self-contained
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documents, this document defines the elements of procedure and
associated MIB module objects which are needed for processing the
Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP.
This modularity of specification is not meant to be interpreted as
imposing any specific requirements on implementation.
1.4. Motivation
Version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3) added
security to the protocol. The User-based Security Model (USM)
[RFC3414] was designed to be independent of other existing security
infrastructures, to ensure it could function when third party
authentication services were not available, such as in a broken
network. As a result, USM utilizes a separate user and key
management infrastructure. Operators have reported that deploying
another user and key management infrastructure in order to use SNMPv3
is a reason for not deploying SNMPv3.
This memo describes a transport model that will make use of the
existing and commonly deployed Secure Shell security infrastructure.
This transport model is designed to meet the security and operational
needs of network administrators, maximize usability in operational
environments to achieve high deployment success and at the same time
minimize implementation and deployment costs to minimize deployment
time.
This document addresses the requirement for the SSH client to
authenticate the SSH server, for the SSH server to authenticate the
SSH client, and describes how SNMP can make use of the authenticated
identities in authorization policies for data access, in a manner
that is independent of any specific access control model.
This document addresses the requirement to utilize client
authentication and key exchange methods which support different
security infrastructures and provide different security properties.
This document describes how to use client authentication as described
in "SSH Authentication Protocol" [RFC4252]. The SSH Transport Model
should work with any of the ssh-userauth methods including the
"publickey", "password", "hostbased", "none", "keyboard-interactive",
"gssapi-with-mic", ."gssapi-keyex", "gssapi", and "external-keyx"
(see http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters). The use of the
"none" authentication method is NOT RECOMMENDED, as described in
Security Considerations. Local accounts may be supported through the
use of the publickey, hostbased or password methods. The password
method allows for integration with deployed password infrastructure
such as AAA servers using the RADIUS protocol [RFC2865]. The SSH
Transport Model SHOULD be able to take advantage of future defined
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ssh-userauth methods, such as those that might make use of X.509
certificate credentials.
It is desirable to use mechanisms that could unify the approach for
administrative security for SNMPv3 and Command Line interfaces (CLI)
and other management interfaces. The use of security services
provided by Secure Shell is the approach commonly used for the CLI,
and is the approach being adopted for use with NETCONF [RFC4742].
This memo describes a method for invoking and running the SNMP
protocol within a Secure Shell (SSH) session as an SSH subsystem.
This memo describes how SNMP can be used within a Secure Shell (SSH)
session, using the SSH connection protocol [RFC4254] over the SSH
transport protocol, using SSH user-auth [RFC4252] for authentication.
There are a number of challenges to be addressed to map Secure Shell
authentication method parameters into the SNMP architecture so that
SNMP continues to work without any surprises. These are discussed in
detail below.
1.5. Constraints
The design of this SNMP Transport Model is influenced by the
following constraints:
1. In times of network stress, the transport protocol and its
underlying security mechanisms SHOULD NOT depend upon the ready
availability of other network services (e.g., Network Time
Protocol (NTP) or AAA protocols).
2. When the network is not under stress, the transport model and its
underlying security mechanisms MAY depend upon the ready
availability of other network services.
3. It may not be possible for the transport model to determine when
the network is under stress.
4. A transport model should require no changes to the SNMP
architecture.
5. A transport model should require no changes to the underlying
protocol.
2. The Secure Shell Protocol
SSH is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
services over an insecure network. It consists of three major
protocol components, and add-on methods for user authentication:
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o The Transport Layer Protocol [RFC4253] provides server
authentication, and message confidentiality and integrity. It may
optionally also provide compression. The transport layer will
typically be run over a TCP/IP connection, but might also be used
on top of any other reliable data stream.
o The User Authentication Protocol [RFC4252] authenticates the
client-side principal to the server. It runs over the transport
layer protocol.
o The Connection Protocol [RFC4254] multiplexes the encrypted tunnel
into several logical channels. It runs over the transport after
successfully authenticating the principal.
o Generic Message Exchange Authentication [RFC4256] is a general
purpose authentication method for the SSH protocol, suitable for
interactive authentications where the authentication data should
be entered via a keyboard
o Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
Authentication and Key Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol [RFC4462] describes methods for using the GSS-API for
authentication and key exchange in SSH. It defines an SSH user
authentication method that uses a specified GSS-API mechanism to
authenticate a user, and a family of SSH key exchange methods that
use GSS-API to authenticate a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
The client sends a service request once a secure transport layer
connection has been established. A second service request is sent
after client authentication is complete. This allows new protocols
to be defined and coexist with the protocols listed above.
The connection protocol provides channels that can be used for a wide
range of purposes. Standard methods are provided for setting up
secure interactive shell sessions and for forwarding ("tunneling")
arbitrary TCP/IP ports and X11 connections.
3. How SSHTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem
A transport model is a component of the Transport Subsystem
[I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] within the SNMP architecture. The SSH Transport
Model thus fits between the underlying SSH transport layer and the
message dispatcher [RFC3411].
The SSH Transport Model will establish a channel between itself and
the SSH Transport Model of another SNMP engine. The sending
transport model passes unencrypted messages from the dispatcher to
SSH to be encrypted, and the receiving transport model accepts
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decrypted incoming messages from SSH and passes them to the
dispatcher.
After an SSH Transport model channel is established, then SNMP
messages can conceptually be sent through the channel from one SNMP
message dispatcher to another SNMP message dispatcher. Multiple SNMP
messages MAY be passed through the same channel.
The SSH Transport Model of an SNMP engine will perform the
translation between SSH-specific security parameters and SNMP-
specific, model-independent parameters.
3.1. Security Capabilities of this Model
3.1.1. Threats
The Secure Shell Transport Model provides protection against the
threats identified by the RFC 3411 architecture [RFC3411]:
1. Modification of Information - SSH provides for verification that
the contents of each message has not been modified during its
transmission through the network, by digitally signing each SSH
packet.
2. Masquerade - SSH provides for verification of the identity of the
SSH server and the identity of the SSH client.
SSH provides for verification of the identity of the SSH server
through the SSH Transport Protocol server authentication
[RFC4253]. This allows an operator or management station to
ensure the authenticity of the SNMP engine that provides MIB
data.
SSH provides a number of mechanisms for verification of the
identity of the SSH client-side principal, using the Secure Shell
Authentication Protocol [RFC4252]. These include public key,
password and host-based mechanisms. This allows the SNMP access
control subsystem to ensure that only authorized principals have
access to potentially sensitive data.
Verification of client's principal identity is important for use
with the SNMP access control subsystem, to ensure that only
authorized principals have access to potentially sensitive data.
The SSH user identity is provided to the transport model, so it
can be used to map to an SNMP model-independent securityName for
use with SNMP access control and notification configuration.
(The identity may undergo various transforms before it maps to
the securityName.)
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3. Message Stream Modification - SSH protects against malicious re-
ordering or replaying of messages within a single SSH session by
using sequence numbers and integrity checks. SSH protects
against replay of messages across SSH sessions by ensuring that
the cryptographic keys used for encryption and integrity checks
are generated afresh for each session.
4. Disclosure - SSH provides protection against the disclosure of
information to unauthorized recipients or eavesdroppers by
allowing for encryption of all traffic between SNMP engines.
3.1.2. Message Authentication
The RFC 3411 architecture recognizes three levels of security:
- without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv)
- with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv)
- with authentication and with privacy (authPriv)
The Secure Shell protocol provides support for encryption and data
integrity. While it is technically possible to support no
authentication and no encryption in SSH it is NOT RECOMMENDED by
[RFC4253].
The SSH Transport Model determines from SSH the identity of the
authenticated principal, and the type and address associated with an
incoming message, and provides this information to SSH for an
outgoing message. The transport layer algorithms used to provide
authentication, data integrity and encryption SHOULD NOT be exposed
to the SSH Transport Model layer. The SNMPv3 WG deliberately avoided
this and settled for an assertion by the security model that the
requirements of securityLevel were met The SSH Transport Model has no
mechanisms by which it can test whether an underlying SSH connection
provides auth or priv, so the SSH Transport Model trusts that the
underlying SSH connection has been properly configured to support
authPriv security characteristics.
An SSH Transport Model-compliant implementation MUST use an SSH
connection that provides authentication, data integrity and
encryption that meets the highest level of SNMP security (authPriv).
Outgoing messages specified with a securityLevel of noAuthNoPriv or
authNoPriv, are actually sent by the SSH Transport Model with
authPriv-level protection.
The security protocols used in the Secure Shell Authentication
Protocol [RFC4252] and the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol
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[RFC4253] are considered acceptably secure at the time of writing.
However, the procedures allow for new authentication and privacy
methods to be specified at a future time if the need arises.
3.1.3. Authentication Protocol Support
The SSH Transport Model should support any server or client
authentication mechanism supported by SSH. This includes the three
authentication methods described in the SSH Authentication Protocol
document [RFC4252] - publickey, password, and host-based - and
keyboard interactive and others.
The password authentication mechanism allows for integration with
deployed password based infrastructure. It is possible to hand a
password to a service such as RADIUS [RFC2865] or Diameter [RFC3588]
for validation. The validation could be done using the user-name and
user-password attributes. It is also possible to use a different
password validation protocol such as CHAP [RFC1994] or digest
authentication [RFC5090] to integrate with RADIUS or Diameter. At
some point in the processing, these mechanisms require the password
be made available as clear text on the device that is authenticating
the password which might introduce threats to the authentication
infrastructure.
GSSKeyex [RFC4462] provides a framework for the addition of client
authentication mechanisms which support different security
infrastructures and provide different security properties.
Additional authentication mechanisms, such as one that supports X.509
certificates, may be added to SSH in the future.
3.1.4. SSH Subsystem
This document describes the use of an SSH subsystem for SNMP to make
SNMP usage distinct from other usages.
An SSH subsystem of type "snmp" is opened by the SSH Transport Model
during the elements of procedure for an outgoing SNMP message. Since
the sender of a message initiates the creation of an SSH session if
needed, the SSH session will already exist for an incoming message or
the incoming message would never reach the SSH Transport Model.
Implementations MAY choose to instantiate SSH sessions in
anticipation of outgoing messages. This approach might be useful to
ensure that an SSH session to a given target can be established
before it becomes important to send a message over the SSH session.
Of course, there is no guarantee that a pre-established session will
still be valid when needed.
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SSH sessions are uniquely identified within the SSH Transport Model
by the combination of tmTransportAddress and tmSecurityName
associated with each session.
Because naming policies might differ between administrative domains,
many SSH client software packages support a user@hostname:port
addressing syntax that operators can use to align non-equivalent
account names. The SnmpSSHAddress Textual Convention echos this
common SSH notation.
When this notation is used in an SnmpSSHAddress, the SSH connection
should be established with a SSH user name matching the "user"
portion of the notation when establishing a session with the remote
SSH server. The "user" portion may or may not match the
tmSecurityName parameter passed from the security model. If no
"user@" portion is specified in the SnmpSSHAddress, then the SSH
connection should be established using the tmSecurityName as the SSH
user name when establishing a session with the remote SSH server.
The SnmpSSHAddress and tmSecurityName associated with an SSH session
MUST remain constant during the life of the session. Different
SnmpSSHAddress values (with different hostnames, "user@" prefix names
and/or port numbers) will each result in individual SSH sessions.
3.2. Security Parameter Passing
For incoming messages, SSH-specific security parameters are
translated by the transport model into security parameters
independent of the transport and security models. The transport
model accepts messages from the SSH subsystem, and records the
transport-related and SSH-security-related information, including the
authenticated identity, in a cache referenced by tmStateReference,
and passes the WholeMsg and the tmStateReference to the dispatcher
using the receiveMessage() ASI (Application Service Interface).
For outgoing messages, the transport model takes input provided by
the dispatcher in the sendMessage() ASI. The SSH Transport Model
converts that information into suitable security parameters for SSH,
establishes sessions as needed, and passes messages to the SSH
subsystem for sending.
3.3. Notifications and Proxy
SSH connections may be initiated by command generators or by
notification originators. Command generators are frequently operated
by a human, but notification originators are usually unmanned
automated processes. As a result, it may be necessary to provision
authentication credentials on the SNMP engine containing the
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notification originator, or use a third party key provider such as
Kerberos, so the engine can successfully authenticate to an engine
containing a notification receiver.
The targets to whom notifications or proxy requests should be sent is
typically determined and configured by a network administrator. The
SNMP-NOTIFICATION-MIB contains a list of targets to which
notifications should be sent. The SNMP-TARGET-MIB module [RFC3413]
contains objects for defining these management targets, including
transport domains and addresses and security parameters, for
applications such as notification generators and proxy forwarders.
For the SSH Transport Model, transport type and address are
configured in the snmpTargetAddrTable, and the securityName, and
securityLevel parameters are configured in the snmpTargetParamsTable.
The default approach is for an administrator to statically
preconfigure this information to identify the targets authorized to
receive notifications or received proxied messages. Local access
control processing needs to be performed before notifications are
actually sent and this processing is done using the configured
securityName. An important characteristic of this is that
authorization is done prior to determining if the connection can
succeed. Thus the locally configured securityName is entirely
trusted within the Notification Originator.
The SNMP-TARGET-MIB and NOTIFICATION-MIB MIB modules may be
configured using SNMP or other implementation-dependent mechanisms,
such as CLI scripting or loading a configuration file. It may be
necessary to provide additional implementation-specific configuration
of SSH parameters.
4. Cached Information and References
When performing SNMP processing, there are two levels of state
information that may need to be retained: the immediate state linking
a request-response pair, and potentially longer-term state relating
to transport and security. "Transport Subsystem for the Simple
Network Management Protocol" [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] defines general
requirements for caches and references.
This document defines additional cache requirements related to the
Secure Shell Transport Model.
4.1. Secure Shell Transport Model Cached Information
The Secure Shell Transport Model has specific responsibilities
regarding the cached information. See the Elements of Procedure in
Section 5 for detailed processing instructions on the use of the
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tmStateReference fields by the SSH Transport Model.
4.1.1. tmSecurityName
The tmSecurityName MUST be a human-readable name (in snmpAdminString
format) representing the identity that has been set according to the
procedures in Section 5. The tmSecurityName MUST be constant for all
traffic passing through an SSHTM session. Messages MUST NOT be sent
through an existing SSH session that was established using a
different tmSecurityName.
On the SSH server side of a connection:
The tmSecurityName SHOULD be the SSH user name. How the SSH user
name is extracted from the SSH layer is implementation-dependent.
The SSH protocol is not always clear on whether the user name
field must be filled in, so for some implementations, such as
those using GSSAPI authentication, it may be necessary to use a
mapping algorithm to transform an SSH identity to a
tmSecurityName, or to transform a tmSecurityName to an SSH
identity.
In other cases the user name may not be verified by the server, so
for these implementations, it may be necessary to obtain the user
name from other credentials exchanged during the SSH exchange.
On the SSH client side of a connection:
The tmSecurityName is presented to the SSH Transport Model by the
application (possibly because of configuration specified in the
SNMP-TARGET-MIB).
The securityName MAY be derived from the tmSecurityName by a security
model, and MAY be used to configure notifications and access
controls. Transport models SHOULD generate a predictable
tmSecurityName.
4.1.2. tmSessionID
The tmSessionID MUST be recorded per message at the time of receipt.
When tmSameSecurity is set, the recorded tmSessionID can be used to
determine whether the SSH session available for sending a
corresponding outgoing message is the same SSH session as was used
when receiving the incoming message (e.g., a response to a request).
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4.1.3. Session State
The per-session state that is referenced by tmStateReference may be
saved across multiple messages in a Local Configuration Datastore.
Additional session/connection state information might also be stored
in a Local Configuration Datastore.
5. Elements of Procedure
Abstract service interfaces have been defined by [RFC3411] and
further augmented by [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] to describe the conceptual
data flows between the various subsystems within an SNMP entity. The
Secure Shell Transport Model uses some of these conceptual data flows
when communicating between subsystems.
To simplify the elements of procedure, the release of state
information is not always explicitly specified. As a general rule,
if state information is available when a message gets discarded, the
message-state information should also be released, and if state
information is available when a session is closed, the session state
information should also be released.
An error indication in statusInformation will typically include the
OID and value for an incremented error counter. This may be
accompanied by the requested securityLevel, and the tmStateReference.
Per-message context information is not accessible to Transport
Models, so for the returned counter OID and value, contextEngine
would be set to the local value of snmpEngineID, and contextName to
the default context for error counters.
5.1. Procedures for an Incoming Message
1. The SSH Transport Model queries the SSH engine, in an
implementation-dependent manner, to determine the address the
message originated from, the user name authenticated by SSH, and
a session identifier. The transportAddress must be constant
during the life of a SSH session.
2. Determine the tmTransportAddress to be associated with the
incoming message:
A. If this is a client-side SSH session, then the
tmTransportAddress is set to the tmTransportAddress used to
establish the session. It MUST exactly include any "user@"
prefix associated with the address provided to the
openSession() ASI.
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B. If this is a server-side SSH session and this is the first
message received over the session, then the
tmTransportAddress is set to the address the message
originated from, determined in an implementation-dependent
way. This value MUST be constant for the entire SSH session
and future messages received MUST result in the
tmTransportAddress being set to the same value.
C. If this is a server-side SSH session and this is not the
first message received over the session, then the
tmTransportAddress is set to the previously established
tmTransportAddress for the session (e.g. the value from step
B. determined from a previous incoming message).
3. Determine the tmSecurityName to be associated with the incoming
message:
A. If this is a client-side SSH session, then the tmSecurityName
MUST be set to the tmSecurityName used to establish the
session.
B. If this is a server-side SSH session and this is the first
message received over the session, then the tmSecurityName is
set to the SSH user name. How the SSH user name is extracted
from the SSH layer is implementation-dependent. This value
MUST be constant for the entire SSH session and future
messages received MUST result in the tmSecurityName being set
to the same value.
C. If this is a server-side SSH session and this is not the
first message received over the session, then the
tmSecurityName is set to the previously established
tmSecurityName for the session (e.g. the value from step B.
determined from a previous incoming message).
4. Create a tmStateReference cache for subsequent reference to the
information.
tmTransportDomain = snmpSSHDomain
tmTransportAddress = the derived tmTransportAddress from step
3.
tmSecurityName = The derived tmSecurityName from step 2.
tmTransportSecurityLevel = "authPriv" (authentication and
confidentiality MUST be used to comply with this transport
model.)
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tmSessionID = an implementation-dependent value that can be
used to detect when a session has closed and been replaced by
another session. The value in tmStateReference MUST uniquely
identify the session over which the message was received.
This session identifier MUST NOT be reused until there are no
references to it remaining.
Then the Transport model passes the message to the Dispatcher using
the following ASI:
statusInformation =
receiveMessage(
IN transportDomain -- snmpSSHDomain
IN transportAddress -- The tmTransportAddress for the message
IN wholeMessage -- the whole SNMP message from SSH
IN wholeMessageLength -- the length of the SNMP message
IN tmStateReference -- (NEW) transport info
)
5.2. Procedures for sending an Outgoing Message
The Dispatcher passes the information to the Transport Model using
the ASI defined in the transport subsystem:
statusInformation =
sendMessage(
IN destTransportDomain -- transport domain to be used
IN destTransportAddress -- transport address to be used
IN outgoingMessage -- the message to send
IN outgoingMessageLength -- its length
IN tmStateReference -- (NEW) transport info
)
The SSH Transport Model performs the following tasks.
1. If tmStateReference does not refer to a cache containing values
for tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName,
tmRequestedSecurityLevel, and tmSameSecurity, then increment the
sshtmSessionInvalidCaches counter, discard the message and return
the error indication in the statusInformation. Processing of
this message stops.
2. Extract the tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress,
tmSecurityName, tmRequestedSecurityLevel, tmSameSecurity, and
tmSessionID from the tmStateReference.
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3. Identify an SSH session to send the messages over:
A. If tmSameSecurity is true and there is no existing session
with a matching sessionID, tmSecurityName and
tmTransportAddress, then increment the
sshtmSessionNoAvailableSessions counter, discard the message
and return the error indication in the statusInformation.
Processing of this message stops.
B. If there is a session with a matching sessionID,
tmTransportAddress and tmSecurityName, then select that
session.
C. If there is a session that matches the tmTransportAddress and
tmSecurityName, then select that session.
D. If the above steps failed to select a session to use, then
call openSession() with the tmStateReference as a parameter.
+ If openSession fails, then discard the message, release
tmStateReference and pass the error indication returned by
openSession back to the calling module. Processing stops
for this message.
+ If openSession succeeds, then record the
destTransportDomain, destTransportAddress, tmSecurityname
and tmSessionID in an implementation-dependent manner.
This will be needed when processing an incoming message.
4. Pass the wholeMessage to SSH for encapsulation as data in an SSH
message over the identified SSH session. Any necessary
additional SSH-specific parameters should be provided in an
implementation-dependent manner.
5.3. Establishing a Session
The Secure Shell Transport Model provides the following abstract
service interface (ASI) to describe the data passed between the SSH
Transport Model and the SSH service. It is an implementation
decision how such data is passed.
statusInformation =
openSession(
IN tmStateReference -- transport information to be used
OUT tmStateReference -- transport information to be used
IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity
)
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The following describes the procedure to follow to establish a
session between a client and server to run SNMP over SSH. This
process is used by any SNMP engine establishing a session for
subsequent use.
This will be done automatically for an SNMP application that
initiates a transaction, such as a Command Generator or a
Notification Originator or a Proxy Forwarder.
1. Increment the sshtmSessionOpens counter.
2. Using tmTransportAddress, the client will establish an SSH
transport connection using the SSH transport protocol,
authenticate the server, and exchange keys for message integrity
and encryption. The transportAddress associated with a session
MUST remain constant during the lifetime of the SSH session.
Implementations may need to cache the transportAddress passed to
the openSession API for later use when performing incoming
message processing (see section Section 5.1).
1. To authenticate the server, the client usually stores
(tmTransportAddress, server host public key) pairs in an
implementation-dependent manner.
2. The other parameters of the transport connection are provided
in an implementation-dependent manner.
3. If the attempt to establish a connection is unsuccessful, or
server authentication fails, then sshtmSessionOpenErrors is
incremented, an openSession error indication is returned, and
openSession processing stops.
3. The client will then invoke an SSH authentication service to
authenticate the principal, such as that described in the SSH
authentication protocol [RFC4252].
1. If the tmTransportAddress field contains a user-name followed
by an '@' character (ASCII 0x40), that user-name string that
should be presented to the ssh server as the "user name" for
user authentication purposes. If there is no user-name in
the tmTransportAddress then the tmSecurityName should be used
as the user-name.
2. The credentials used to authenticate the SSH principal are
determined in an implementation-dependent manner.
3. In an implementation-specific manner, invoke the SSH user
authentication service using the calculated user-name.
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4. If the user authentication is unsuccessful, then the
transport connection is closed, the
sshtmSessionUserAuthFailures counter is incremented, an error
indication is returned to the calling module, and processing
stops for this message.
4. The client should invoke the "ssh-connection" service (also known
as the SSH connection protocol [RFC4254]), and request a channel
of type "session". If unsuccessful, the transport connection is
closed, the sshtmSessionChannelOpenFailures counter is
incremented, an error indication is returned to the calling
module, and processing stops for this message.
5. The client invokes "snmp" as an SSH subsystem, as indicated in
the "subsystem" parameter. If unsuccessful, the transport
connection is closed, the sshtmSessionUnavailableSubsystems
counter is incremented, an error indication is returned to the
calling module, and processing stops for this message.
In order to allow SNMP traffic to be easily identified and
filtered by firewalls and other network devices, servers
associated with SNMP entities using the Secure Shell Transport
Model MUST default to providing access to the "snmp" SSH
subsystem if the SSH session is established using the IANA-
assigned TCP ports (YYY and ZZZ). Servers SHOULD be configurable
to allow access to the SNMP SSH subsystem over other ports.
6. Set tmSessionID in the tmStateReference cache to an
implementation-dependent value to identify the session.
7. The tmSecurityName used to establish the SSH session must be the
only tmSecurityName used with the session. Incoming messages for
the session MUST be associated with this tmSecurityName value.
How this is accomplished is implementation-dependent.
5.4. Closing a Session
The Secure Shell Transport Model provides the following ASI to close
a session:
statusInformation =
closeSession(
IN tmSessionID -- transport address to be used
)
The following describes the procedure to follow to close a session
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between a client and server . This process is followed by any SNMP
engine to close an SSH session. It is implementation-dependent when
a session should be closed. The calling code should release the
associated tmStateReference.
1. Increment the sshtmSessionCloses counter.
2. If there is no session corresponding to tmSessionID, then
closeSession processing is completed.
3. Have SSH close the session associated with tmSessionID.
6. MIB Module Overview
This MIB module provides management of the Secure Shell Transport
Model. It defines an OID to identify the SNMP-over-SSH transport
domain, a textual convention for SSH Addresses and several statistics
counters.
6.1. Structure of the MIB Module
Objects in this MIB module are arranged into subtrees. Each subtree
is organized as a set of related objects. The overall structure and
assignment of objects to their subtrees, and the intended purpose of
each subtree, is shown below.
6.2. Textual Conventions
Generic and Common Textual Conventions used in this document can be
found summarized at http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-common-tcs.html
6.3. Relationship to Other MIB Modules
Some management objects defined in other MIB modules are applicable
to an entity implementing the SSH Transport Model. In particular, it
is assumed that an entity implementing the SSHTM-MIB will implement
the SNMPv2-MIB [RFC3418], and the SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [RFC3411]. It
is expected that an entity implementing this MIB will also support
the Transport Security Model
[I-D.ietf-isms-transport-security-model], and therefore implement the
SNMP-TSM-MIB.
This MIB module is for monitoring SSH Transport Model information.
6.3.1. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS
The following MIB module imports items from [RFC2578], [RFC2579],
[RFC2580].
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This MIB module also references [RFC3490] and [RFC3986]
7. MIB Module Definition
SSHTM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains,
Counter32
FROM SNMPv2-SMI
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
FROM SNMPv2-TC
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP
FROM SNMPv2-CONF
;
sshtmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "200903090000Z"
ORGANIZATION "ISMS Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail: isms@lists.ietf.org
Subscribe: isms-request@lists.ietf.org
Chairs:
Juergen Quittek
NEC Europe Ltd.
Network Laboratories
Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
69115 Heidelberg
Germany
+49 6221 90511-15
quittek@netlab.nec.de
Juergen Schoenwaelder
Jacobs University Bremen
Campus Ring 1
28725 Bremen
Germany
+49 421 200-3587
j.schoenwaelder@iu-bremen.de
Co-editors:
David Harrington
Huawei Technologies USA
1700 Alma Drive
Plano Texas 75075
USA
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+1 603-436-8634
ietfdbh@comcast.net
Joseph Salowey
Cisco Systems
2901 3rd Ave
Seattle, WA 98121
USA
jsalowey@cisco.com
Wes Hardaker
Sparta, Inc.
P.O. Box 382
Davis, CA 95617
USA
+1 530 792 1913
ietf@hardakers.net
"
DESCRIPTION "The Secure Shell Transport Model MIB
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2009). This
version of this MIB module is part of RFC XXXX;
see the RFC itself for full legal notices.
-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace XXXX with actual RFC number
-- for this document and remove this note
"
REVISION "200903090000Z"
DESCRIPTION "The initial version, published in RFC XXXX.
-- NOTE to RFC editor: replace XXXX with actual RFC number
-- for this document and remove this note
"
::= { mib-2 xxxx }
-- RFC Ed.: replace xxxx with IANA-assigned number and
-- remove this note
-- ---------------------------------------------------------- --
-- subtrees in the SNMP-SSH-TM-MIB
-- ---------------------------------------------------------- --
sshtmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmMIB 0 }
sshtmObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmMIB 1 }
sshtmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmMIB 2 }
-- -------------------------------------------------------------
-- Objects
-- -------------------------------------------------------------
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snmpSSHDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The SNMP over SSH transport domain. The corresponding transport
address is of type SnmpSSHAddress.
When an SNMP entity uses the snmpSSHDomain transport
model, it must be capable of accepting messages up to
and including 8192 octets in size. Implementation of
larger values is encouraged whenever possible.
The securityName prefix to be associated with the
snmpSSHDomain is 'ssh'. This prefix may be used by security
models or other components to identify what secure transport
infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
::= { snmpDomains yy }
-- RFC Ed.: Please replace the I-D reference with a proper one once it
-- has been published.
-- RFC Ed.: replace yy with IANA-assigned number and
-- remove this note
-- RFC Ed.: replace 'ssh' with the actual IANA assigned prefix string
-- if 'ssh' is not assigned to this document.
SnmpSSHAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "1a"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents either a hostname or IP address, along with a port
number and an optional username.
The beginning of the address specification may contain a
username followed by an '@' (ASCII character 0x40). This
portion of the address will indicate the user name that should
be used when authenticating to an SSH server. If missing, the
SNMP securityName should be used. After the optional user name
field and '@' character comes the hostname or IP address.
The hostname must be encoded in ASCII, as specified in
RFC3490 (Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications)
followed by a colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A) and a
decimal port number in ASCII. The name SHOULD be fully
qualified whenever possible.
An IPv4 address must be in dotted decimal format followed
by a colon ':' (ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port
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number in ASCII.
An IPv6 address must be in colon separated format, surrounded
by square brackets ('[' ASCII character 0x5B and ']' ASCII
character 0x5D), followed by a colon ':' (ASCII character
0x3A) and a decimal port number in ASCII.
Values of this textual convention might not be directly useable
as transport-layer addressing information, and may require
runtime resolution. As such, applications that write them
must be prepared for handling errors if such values are
not supported, or cannot be resolved (if resolution occurs
at the time of the management operation).
The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that may
have snmpSSHAddress values must fully describe how (and
when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses and vice
versa.
This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in
object definitions since it restricts addresses to a
specific format. However, if it is used, it MAY be used
either on its own or in conjunction with
TransportAddressType or TransportDomain as a pair.
When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an
index object, there may be issues with the limit of 128
sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2, STD 58. It is
RECOMMENDED that all MIB documents using this textual
convention make explicit any limitations on index
component lengths that management software must observe.
This may be done either by including SIZE constraints on
the index components or by specifying applicable
constraints in the conceptual row DESCRIPTION clause or
in the surrounding documentation.
"
REFERENCE
"RFC3986, Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax"
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255))
-- The sshtmSession Group
sshtmSession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmObjects 1 }
sshtmSessionOpens OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
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STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request has been
executed as an SSH client, whether it succeeded or
failed.
"
::= { sshtmSession 1 }
sshtmSessionCloses OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of times a closeSession() request has been
executed as an SSH client, whether it succeeded or
failed.
"
::= { sshtmSession 2 }
sshtmSessionOpenErrors OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request
failed to open a transport connection, or failed to
authenticate the server.
"
::= { sshtmSession 3 }
sshtmSessionUserAuthFailures OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request
failed to open a session as a SSH client due to user
authentication failures.
"
::= { sshtmSession 4 }
sshtmSessionChannelOpenFailures OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request
failed to open a session as a SSH client due to
channel open failures.
"
::= { sshtmSession 5 }
sshtmSessionUnavailableSubsystems OBJECT-TYPE
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SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of times an openSession() request
failed to open a session as a SSH client due to
inability to connect to the requested subsystem.
"
::= { sshtmSession 6 }
sshtmSessionNoAvailableSessions OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of times an outgoing message
was dropped because the same
session was no longer available.
"
::= { sshtmSession 7 }
sshtmSessionInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The number of outgoing messages dropped because the
tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache.
"
::= { sshtmSession 8 }
-- ************************************************
-- sshtmMIB - Conformance Information
-- ************************************************
sshtmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmConformance 1 }
sshtmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { sshtmConformance 2 }
-- ************************************************
-- Compliance statements
-- ************************************************
sshtmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "The compliance statement for SNMP engines that
support the SNMP-SSH-TM-MIB"
MODULE
MANDATORY-GROUPS { sshtmGroup }
::= { sshtmCompliances 1 }
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-- ************************************************
-- Units of conformance
-- ************************************************
sshtmGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
sshtmSessionOpens,
sshtmSessionCloses,
sshtmSessionOpenErrors,
sshtmSessionUserAuthFailures,
sshtmSessionChannelOpenFailures,
sshtmSessionUnavailableSubsystems,
sshtmSessionNoAvailableSessions,
sshtmSessionInvalidCaches
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "A collection of objects for maintaining
information of an SNMP engine which implements the
SNMP Secure Shell Transport Model.
"
::= { sshtmGroups 2 }
END
8. Operational Considerations
The SSH Transport Model will likely not work in conditions where
access to the CLI has stopped working. In situations where SNMP
access has to work when the CLI has stopped working, a UDP transport
model should be considered instead of the SSH Transport Model.
If the SSH Transport Model is configured to utilize AAA services,
operators should consider configuring support for local
authentication mechanisms, such as local passwords, so SNMP can
continue operating during times of network stress.
The SSH protocol has its own window mechanism, defined in RFC 4254.
The SSH specifications leave it open when window adjustments messages
should be created, and some implementations send these whenever
received data has been passed to the application. There are
noticeable bandwidth and processing overheads to handling such window
adjustment messages, which can be avoided by sending them less
frequently.
The SSH protocol requires the execution of CPU intensive calculations
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to establish a session key during session establishment. This means
that short lived sessions become computationally expensive compared
to USM, which does not have a notion of a session key. Other
transport security protocols such as TLS support a session resumption
feature that allows reusing a cached session key. Such a mechanism
does not exist for SSH and thus SNMP applications should keep SSH
sessions for longer time periods.
To initiate SSH connections, an entity must be configured with SSH
client credentials plus information to authenticate the server.
While hosts are often configured to be SSH clients, most
internetworking devices are not. To send notifications over SSHTM,
the internetworking device will need to be configured as an SSH
client. How this credential configuration is done is implementation
and deployment specific.
9. Security Considerations
This document describes a transport model that permits SNMP to
utilize SSH security services. The security threats and how the SSH
Transport Model mitigates those threats is covered in detail
throughout this memo.
The SSH Transport Model relies on SSH mutual authentication, binding
of keys, confidentiality and integrity. Any authentication method
that meets the requirements of the SSH architecture will provide the
properties of mutual authentication and binding of keys.
SSHv2 provides Perfect Forward Security (PFS) for encryption keys.
PFS is a major design goal of SSH, and any well-designed keyex
algorithm will provide it.
The security implications of using SSH are covered in [RFC4251].
The SSH Transport Model has no way to verify that server
authentication was performed, to learn the host's public key in
advance, or verify that the correct key is being used. The SSH
Transport Model simply trusts that these are properly configured by
the implementer and deployer.
SSH provides the "none" userauth method. The SSH Transport Model
MUST NOT be used with an SSH connection with the "none" userauth
method. While SSH does support turning off confidentiality and
integrity, they MUST NOT be turned off when used with the SSH
Transport Model.
The SSH protocol is not always clear on whether the user name field
must be filled in, so for some implementations, such as those using
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GSSAPI authentication, it may be necessary to use a mapping algorithm
to transform an SSH identity to a tmSecurityName, or to transform a
tmSecurityName to an SSH identity.
In other cases the user name may not be verified by the server, so
for these implementations, it may be necessary to obtain the user
name from other credentials exchanged during the SSH exchange.
9.1. Skipping Public Key Verification
Most key exchange algorithms are able to authenticate the SSH
server's identity to the client. However, for the common case of DH
signed by public keys, this requires the client to know the host's
public key a priori and to verify that the correct key is being used.
If this step is skipped, then authentication of the SSH server to the
SSH client is not done. Data confidentiality and data integrity
protection to the server still exist, but these are of dubious value
when an attacker can insert himself between the client and the real
SSH server. Note that some userauth methods may defend against this
situation, but many of the common ones (including password and
keyboard-interactive) do not, and in fact depend on the fact that the
server's identity has been verified (so passwords are not disclosed
to an attacker).
SSH MUST NOT be configured to skip public key verification for use
with the SSH Transport Model.
9.2. Notification Authorizaton Considerations
SNMP Notifications are authorized to be sent to a receiver based on
the securityName used by the notification originator's SNMP engine.
This authorization is performed before the message is actually sent
and before the credentials of the remote receiver have been verified.
It is thus critical that the credentials presented by a notification
receiver MUST match the expected value(s) for a given transport
address and that ownership of the credentials MUST be properly
cryptographically verified.
9.3. SSH User and Key Selection
If a "user@" prefix is used within a SnmpSSHAddress value to specify
a SSH user name to use for authentication then the key presented to
the remote entity MUST be the key expected by the server for the
"user". This may be different than a locally cached key identified
by the securityName value.
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9.4. Conceptual Differences Between USM and SSHTM
The User Based Security Model [RFC3414] employed symmetric
cryptography and naming user conventions. SSH employs an asymmetric
cryptographic and naming model. Unlike USM, cryptographic keys will
be different on both sides of the SSH connection. Both sides are
responsible for verifying that the remote entity presents the right
key. The optional "user@" prefix component of the SnmpSSHAddress
Textual Convention allows the client SNMP stack to associate the
connection with a securityName that may be different than the SSH
user name presented to the SSH server.
9.5. The 'none' MAC Algorithm
SSH provides the "none" MAC algorithm, which would allow you to turn
off data integrity while maintaining confidentiality. However, if
you do this, then an attacker may be able to modify the data in
flight, which means you effectively have no authentication.
SSH MUST NOT be configured using the "none" MAC algorithm for use
with the SSH Transport Model.
9.6. Use with SNMPv1/v2c Messages
The SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c message processing described in RFC3584 (BCP
74) [RFC3584] always select the SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c Security Models
respectively. Both of these, and the User-based Security Model
typically used with SNMPv3, derive the securityName and securityLevel
from the SNMP message received, even when the message was received
over a secure transport. Access control decisions are therefore made
based on the contents of the SNMP message, rather than using the
authenticated identity and securityLevel provided by the SSH
Transport Model.
9.7. MIB Module Security
There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have
a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this
MIB module is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an
intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB
module via direct SNMP SET operations.
Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to
control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
the network via SNMP. These are the tables and objects and their
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sensitivity/vulnerability:
o The readable objects in this MIB module are not sensitive.
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec or
SSH), even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network
is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the
objects in this MIB module.
It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as
provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410] section 8), including
full support for the USM and the SSH Transport Model cryptographic
mechanisms (for authentication and privacy).
Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator
responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.
10. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign:
1. two TCP registered port numbers in the
http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers registry which will
be the default ports for SNMP over an SSH Transport Model (SSHTM)
as defined in this document, and SNMP over an SSH Transport Model
for notifications (SSHTM-TRAP) as defined in this document. It
would be good if the assigned numbers were x161 and x162.
2. an SMI number under mib-2, for the MIB module in this document,
3. an SMI number under snmpDomains, for the snmpSSHDomain,
4. "ssh" as the corresponding prefix for the snmpSSHDomain in the
SNMP Transport Model registry; defined in [I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm]
5. "snmp" as an SSH Subsystem Name in the
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters registry.
-- note to RFC editor -- Please replace YYY and ZZZ in this document
with the assigned port numbers and remove this note.
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11. Acknowledgements
The editors would like to thank Jeffrey Hutzelman for sharing his SSH
insights, and Dave Shield for an outstanding job wordsmithing the
existing document to improve organization and clarity.
Additionally, helpful document reviews were received from: Juergen
Schoenwaelder.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for
use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels",
BCP 14, RFC 2119,
March 1997.
[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Ed.,
Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed.,
"Structure of Management
Information Version 2
(SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578,
April 1999.
[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Ed.,
Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed.,
"Textual Conventions for
SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579,
April 1999.
[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Perkins,
D., and J. Schoenwaelder,
"Conformance Statements for
SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580,
April 1999.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S.,
Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn,
R., and B. Wijnen, "An
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Architecture for Describing
Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management
Frameworks", STD 62,
RFC 3411, December 2002.
[RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B.
Stewart, "Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)
Applications", STD 62,
RFC 3413, December 2002.
[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B.
Wijnen, "User-based
Security Model (USM) for
version 3 of the Simple
Network Management Protocol
(SNMPv3)", STD 62,
RFC 3414, December 2002.
[RFC3418] Presuhn, R., "Management
Information Base (MIB) for
the Simple Network
Management Protocol
(SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3418,
December 2002.
[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P.,
and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain
Names in Applications
(IDNA)", RFC 3490,
March 2003.
[RFC3584] Frye, R., Levi, D.,
Routhier, S., and B.
Wijnen, "Coexistence
between Version 1, Version
2, and Version 3 of the
Internet-standard Network
Management Framework",
BCP 74, RFC 3584,
August 2003.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick,
"The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture",
RFC 4251, January 2006.
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[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick,
"The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol",
RFC 4252, January 2006.
[RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick,
"The Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol",
RFC 4253, January 2006.
[RFC4254] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick,
"The Secure Shell (SSH)
Connection Protocol",
RFC 4254, January 2006.
[I-D.ietf-isms-tmsm] Harrington, D. and J.
Schoenwaelder, "Transport
Subsystem for the Simple
Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)",
draft-ietf-isms-tmsm-16
(work in progress),
February 2009.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge
Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994,
August 1996.
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R.,
Partain, D., and B.
Stewart, "Introduction and
Applicability Statements
for Internet-Standard
Management Framework",
RFC 3410, December 2002.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J.,
Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and
J. Arkko, "Diameter Base
Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding,
R., and L. Masinter,
"Uniform Resource
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Identifier (URI): Generic
Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986,
January 2005.
[RFC4256] Cusack, F. and M. Forssen,
"Generic Message Exchange
Authentication for the
Secure Shell Protocol
(SSH)", RFC 4256,
January 2006.
[RFC4462] Hutzelman, J., Salowey, J.,
Galbraith, J., and V.
Welch, "Generic Security
Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API)
Authentication and Key
Exchange for the Secure
Shell (SSH) Protocol",
RFC 4462, May 2006.
[RFC5090] Sterman, B., Sadolevsky,
D., Schwartz, D., Williams,
D., and W. Beck, "RADIUS
Extension for Digest
Authentication", RFC 5090,
February 2008.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T.
Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over
Secure SHell (SSH)",
RFC 4742, December 2006.
[I-D.ietf-isms-transport-security-model] Harrington, D. and W.
Hardaker, "Transport
Security Model for SNMP", d
raft-ietf-isms-transport-
security-model-11 (work in
progress), February 2009.
Appendix A. Change Log
From -14 to -15
Updated the elements of procedure to better reflect the working
group consensus that a given session must always have identical
sessionIDs, addresses and names to match the ASI parameters.
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Discuss that the tmSessionID, tmSecurityName and
tmTransportAddress need to be constant for the life of the
session.
Minor wording edits
Added earlier text to introduce the concept of the user@ portion
of the SSH transport address convention.
Discussed notification authorization more extensively in the
security considerations.
Changed "ssh principal" to "ssh user name" where appropriate.
Removed the sshtmSessionInvalidCaches object from the MIB
conformance section.
From -13 to -14
Removed duplicated text on Caches and References, and reference
tmsm document
Simplified securityStateReference
Simplified EOP to use tmStateReference rather than ASI parameters
Simplified openSession and closeSession
Seperated steps in openSession
Clarified conditions in the openSession error counter descriptions
Reworded text to clarify short versus long term information
Added more warnings about the unreliability of SSH user name
removed any references to LCD
From -12 to -13
Removed redundant sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 on privacy and replay/
delay/etc protection.
From -11- to -12
Updated "Cached Information and References" to match other ISMS
documents.
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Added separate subsection on Secure Shell Transport Model Cached
Information.
Added IANA considerations to add snmpSSHDomain and "ssh" to a
registry for domains and corresponding prefixes, defined in TMSM.
Added support for user@ prefixing in the SSH Transport Address
definition and EOP.
Added support for the "ssh" prefix to the transport address
definition and IANA considerations section.
Removed the LCD tables and related configuration since the user@
transport address prefixing and the TSM user prefix changes change
makes it no longer needed.
From -10- to -11
Changed LCD to sshtmLCDTable so it would not be confused with the
snmpTsmLCD.
Removed the text that said the format and content of the LCD is
implementation-specific, since we now have a MIB module to
standardize the format and content.
Designed sshtmLCDTable to reflect there is only one
transportDomain and one securityLevel supported by this transport
model.
Used sshtmLCDTmSecurityName to reflect that the values in this
table and the values in the tmStateReference are usually the same
for some fields.
Added operational considerations about SSH client credential
distribution.
Modified EOP to use sshtmLCDTable
Resolved Issue #8: Should we allow transport models to select the
corresponding security model by providing an additional parameter
- the securityModel parameter - to tmStateReference, which would
override the securityModel parameter extracted from a message
header? Doing this would resolve Issue #5, and would allow the
transport security model to be used with all SNMP message
versions. - The consensus is that we will not allow the transport
model to specify the security model.
From -09- to -10
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Issue #1: Made release of cached session info an implementation
requirement on session close.
Issue #4: UTF-8 syntax of userauth user name matches syntax of
SnmpAdminString.
Issue #7: Resolved to not describe how an SSH session is closed.
From -08- to -09
Updated MIB assignment to by rfc4181 compatible
update MIB security considerations with coexistence issues
update sameSession and tmSessionID support
Fixed note about terminology, for consistency with SNMPv3.
From -07- to -08
Updated MIB
update MIB security considerations
develop sameSession and tmSessionID support
Added a note about terminology, for consistency with SNMPv3 rather
than with RFC2828.
Removed reference to mappings other than the identity function.
From -06- to -07
removed section on SSH to EngineID mappings, since engineIDs are
not exposed to the transport model
removed references to engineIDs and discovery
removed references to securityModel.
added security considerations warning about using with SNMPv1/v2c
messages.
added keyboard interactive discussion
noted some implementation-dependent points
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removed references to transportModel; we use the transport domain
as a model identifier.
cleaned up ASIs
modified MIB to be under snmpModules
changed transportAddressSSH to snmpSSHDomain style addressing
From -05- to -06
replaced transportDomainSSH with RFC3417-style snmpSSHDomain
replaced transportAddressSSH with RFC3417-style snmpSSHAddress
Changed recvMessage to receiveMessage, and modified OUT to IN to
match TMSM.
From -04- to -05
added sshtmUserTable
moved session table into the transport model MIB from the
transport subsystem MIB
added and then removed Appendix A - Notification Tables
Configuration (see Transport Security Model)
made this document a specification of a transport model, rather
than a security model in two parts. Eliminated TMSP and MPSP and
replaced them with "transport model" and "security model".
Removed security-model-specific processing from this document.
Removed discussion of snmpv3/v1/v2c message format co-existence
changed tmSessionReference back to tmStateReference
"From -03- to -04-"
changed tmStateReference to tmSessionReference
"From -02- to -03-"
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rewrote almost all sections
merged ASI section and Elements of Procedure sections
removed references to the SSH user, in preference to SSH client
updated references
created a conventions section to identify common terminology.
rewrote sections on how SSH addresses threats
rewrote mapping SSH to engineID
eliminated discovery section
detailed the Elements of Procedure
eliminated sections on msgFlags, transport parameters
resolved issues of opening notifications
eliminated sessionID (TMSM needs to be updated to match)
eliminated use of tmsSessiontable except as an example
updated Security Considerations
"From -01- to -02-"
Added TransportDomainSSH and Address
Removed implementation considerations
Changed all "user auth" to "client auth"
Removed unnecessary MIB module objects
updated references
improved consistency of references to TMSM as architectural
extension
updated conventions
updated threats to be more consistent with RFC3552
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discussion of specific SSH mechanism configurations moved to
security considerations
modified session discussions to reference TMSM sessions
expanded discussion of engineIDs
wrote text to clarify the roles of MPSP and TMSP
clarified how snmpv3 message parts are ised by SSHSM
modified nesting of subsections as needed
securityLevel used by the SSH Transport Model always equals
authPriv
removed discussion of using SSHSM with SNMPv1/v2c
started updating Elements of Procedure, but realized missing info
needs discussion.
updated MIB module relationship to other MIB modules
"From -00- to -01-"
-00- initial draft as ISMS work product:
updated references to secshell RFCs
Modified text related to issues# 1, 2, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19,
20, 29, 30, and 32.
updated security considerations
removed Juergen Schoenwaelder from authors, at his request
ran the mib module through smilint
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Authors' Addresses
David Harrington
Huawei Technologies (USA)
1700 Alma Dr. Suite 100
Plano, TX 75075
USA
Phone: +1 603 436 8634
EMail: dharrington@huawei.com
Joseph Salowey
Cisco Systems
2901 3rd Ave
Seattle, WA 98121
USA
EMail: jsalowey@cisco.com
Wes Hardaker
Sparta, Inc.
P.O. Box 382
Davis, CA 95617
US
Phone: +1 530 792 1913
EMail: ietf@hardakers.net
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