INTERNET-DRAFT                                               R. Housley
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                   Vigil Security
Intended Status: Standards Track                                T. Polk
                                                             S. Hartman
                                                      Painless Security
                                                               D. Zhang
Expires: 22 April 2013                                  22 October 2012

          Database of Long-Lived Symmetric Cryptographic Keys

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   This document specifies the information contained in a conceptual
   database of long-lived cryptographic keys used by many different
   security protocols.  The database is designed to support both manual
   and automated key management.  In addition to describing the schema
   for the database, this document describes the operations that can be
   performed on the database as well as the requirements for the
   security protocols that wish to use the database.  In many typical
   scenarios, the security protocols do not directly use the long-lived
   key, but rather a key derivation function is used to derive a short-
   lived key from a long-lived key.

1. Introduction

   This document specifies the information that needs to be included in
   a database of long-lived cryptographic keys in order to key the
   authentication of security protocols such as cryptographic
   authentication for routing protocols.  This conceptual database is
   designed to separate protocol-specific aspects from both manual and
   automated key management.  The intent is to allow many different
   implementation approaches to the specified cryptographic key
   database, while simplifying specification and heterogeneous
   deployments.  This conceptual database avoids the need to build
   knowledge of any security protocol into key management protocols. It
   minimizes protocol-specific knowledge in operational/management
   interfaces, but it constrains  where that knowledge can appear.
   Textual conventions are provided for the representation of keys and
   other identifiers. These conventions should be used when presenting
   keys and identifiers to operational/management interfaces or reading
   keys/identifiers from these interfaces. It is an operational
   requirement that all implementations represent the keys and key
   identifiers in the same way so that cross-vendor configuration
   instructions can be provided.

   Security protocols such as TCP-AO [RFC5925] are expected to use per-
   connection state.  Implementations may need to supply keys to the
   protocol-specific databases as the associated entries in the
   conceptual database are manipulated. In many instances, the long-
   lived keys are not used directly in security protocols, but rather a
   key derivation function is used to derive short-lived key from the
   long-lived keys in the database.  In other instances, security
   protocols will directly use the long-lived key from the database.
   The database design supports both use cases.

2. Conceptual Database Structure

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      The database is characterized as a table, where each row
   represents a
      single long-lived symmetric cryptographic key.  Normally, each key
      should only have one row. Only in the (hopefully) very rare cases
      where a key is used for more than one purpose, or where the same
      is used with multiple key derivation functions (KDFs) will
      rows will contain the same key value.  The columns in the table
      represent the key value and attributes of the key.

   To accommodate manual key management, the format of the fields has
   been purposefully chosen to allow updates with a plain text editor
   and to provide equivalent display on multiple systems.

   The columns that the table consists of are listed as follows:

         LocalKeyName is a string identifying the key when it is
         received in a packet.  A protocol may restrict the form of a
         key name. For example, many routing protocols will restrict key
         names to integers that can be represented in 16 or 32 bits.

         For unicast communication, PeerKeyName on one system matches
         LocalKeyName on the other system. Similar to LocalKeyName, the
         protocol may restrict the form of this identifier and will
         often restrict it to be an integer. For group keys, the
         protocol will typically require this field be an empty string
         as the sending and the receiving key names need to be the same.

         Typically for unicast keys, this field lists the peer systems
         that have this key in their database. For group keys this field
         names the groups for which the key is appropriate. For example,
         this might name a routing area for a multicast routing
         protocol. Formally, this field provides a protocol-specific set
         of restrictions on the scope in which the key is appropriate.
         The form of the identifiers in the Peers field is specified by
         the protocol.

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         The Interfaces field identifies the set of physical and/or
         virtual interfaces for which it is appropriate to use this key.
         When the long-lived value in the Key field is intended for use
         on any interface, this field is set to "all".  The interfaces
         field consists of a set of strings; the form of these strings
         is specified by the implementation and is independent of the
         protocol in question. Protocols may require support for the
         interfaces field or may indicate that support for constraining
         keys based on interface is not required.  As an example, TCP-AO
         implementations are unlikely to make the decision of what
         interface to use prior to key selection. In this case, the
         implementations are expected to use the same keying material
         across all of the interfaces and then require the "all"

         The Protocol field identifies a single security protocol where
         this key may be used to provide cryptographic protection. This
         specification establishes a registry for this field; the
         registry also specifies the format of the following field,
         ProtocolSpecificInfo, for each registered protocol.

         This field contains the protocol-specified information which
         may be useful for a protocol to apply the key correctly. Note
         that such information must not be required for a protocol to
         locate an appropriate key.  When a protocol does not need the
         information in ProtocolSpecificInfo, it will require this field
         be empty.

         The KDF field indicates which key derivation function is used
         to generate short-lived keys from the long-lived value in the
         Key field.  When the long-lived value in the Key field is
         intended for direct use, the KDF field is set to "none".  This
         document establishes an IANA registry for the values in the KDF
         field to simplify references in future specifications. The
         protocol indicates what (if any) KDFs are valid.

         The AlgID field indicates the cryptographic algorithm used with
         the security protocol for the specified peer.  The algorithm
         may be an encryption algorithm and mode (such as AES-128-CBC),
         an authentication algorithm (such as HMAC-SHA1-96 or
         AES-128-CMAC), or any other symmetric cryptographic algorithm
         needed by a security protocol.  If the KDF field contains
         "none", then the long-lived key is used directly with this

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         algorithm, otherwise the derived short-lived key is used with
         this algorithm.  When the long-lived key is used to generate a
         set of short-lived keys for use with the security protocol, the
         AlgID field identifies a ciphersuite rather than a single
         cryptographic algorithm.  This document establishes an IANA
         registry for the values in the AlgID field to simplify
         references in future specifications.  Protocols indicate which
         algorithms are appropriate.

         The Key field contains a long-lived symmetric cryptographic key
         in the format of a lower-case hexadecimal string.  The size of
         the Key depends on the KDF and the AlgID.  For instance, a
         KDF=none and AlgID=AES128 requires a 128-bit key, which is
         represented by 32 hexadecimal digits.

         The Direction field indicates whether this key may be used for
         inbound traffic, outbound traffic,  both, or whether the key
         has been disabled and may not currently be used at all.  The
         supported values are "in", "out", "both", and "disabled",
         respectively.  The Protocol field will determine which of these
         values are valid.

         The NotBefore field specifies the earliest date and time in
         Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) at which this key should be
         considered for use when sending traffic.  The format is
         YYYYMMDDHHSSZ, where four digits specify the year, two digits
         specify the month, two digits specify the day, two digits
         specify the hour,  two digits specify the minute, and two
         digits specify the second.  The "Z" is included as a clear
         indication that the time is in UTC.

         The SendNotAfter field specifies the latest date and time at
         which this key should be considered for use when sending
         traffic.  The format is the same as the SendNotBefore field.

         The RcvNotBefore field specifies the earliest date and time in
         Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) at which this key should be
         considered for use when processing received traffic.  The
         format is YYYYMMDDHHSSZ, where four digits specify the year,
         two digits specify the month, two digits specify the day, two
         digits specify the hour, two digits specify the minute, and two
         digits specify the second.  The "Z" is included as a clear
         indication that the time is in UTC.

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         The RcvNotAfter field specifies the latest date and time at
         which this key should be considered for use when processing
         received traffic.  The format of this field is identical to the
         format of NotBefore.

3. Key Selection and Rollover

         A protocol may directly consult the key table to find the key
         to use on an outgoing packet. The protocol provides a protocol
         (P) and a peer identifier (H) into the key selection function.
         Optionally, an interface identifier (I) may also need to be
         provided. Any key that satisfies the following conditions may
         be selected:

      (1)  the Peers field includes H;

      (2)  the Protocol field matches P;

      (3)  If an interface is specified, the Interfaces field includes I
      or "all";

      (4)  the Direction field is either "out" or "both"; and

      (5)  SendNotBefore <= current time <= SendNotAfter.

   During algorithm transition, multiple entries may simultaneously
   exist associated with different cryptographic algorithms or
   ciphersuites.  Systems should support selection of keys based on
   algorithm preference.

   In addition, multiple entries with overlapping valid periods are
   expected to be employed to provide orderly key rollover.  In these
   cases, the expectation is that systems will transition to the newest
   key available.  To meet this requirement, this specification
   recommends supplementing the key selection algorithm with the
   following differentiation: select the long-lived key specifying the
   most recent time in the SendNotBefore field.

   In order to look up a key for verifying an incoming packet, the
   protocol provides its protocol (P), the peer identifier (H), the key
   identifier (L), and optionally the interface (I).  If one key matches
   the following conditions it is selected:

      (1)  the Peer field includes H;

      (2)  the Protocol field matches P;

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      (3)  if the Interface field is provided, it includes I or is

      (4)  the Direction field is either "in" or "both";

      (5)  the LocalKeyName is L; and

      (5)  RcvNotBefore <= current time <= RcvNotAfter.

   Note that the key usage is loosely bound by the times specified in
   the RcvNotBefore and RcvNotAfter fields.  New security associations
   should not be established except within the period of use specified
   by these fields, while allowing some grace time for clock skew.
   However, if a security association has already been established based
   on a particular long-lived key, exceeding the lifetime does not have
   any direct impact.  The implementations of security protocols that
   involve long-lived security association should be designed to
   periodically interrogate the database and rollover to new keys
   without tearing down the security association.

   Rather than consulting the conceptual database, a security protocol
   such as TCP-AO may update its own tables as keys are added and
   removed. In this case, the protocol needs to maintain its own key

4. Application of the Database in a Security Protocol

   In order to use the key table database in a protocol specification, a
   protocol needs to specify certain information.  This section
   enumerates items that a protocol must specify.

      (1)  The ways of mapping the information in a key table row to the
      information needed to produce an outgoing packet; specified
      either as an explanation of how to fill in authentication-related
      fields in a packet based on key table information, or for
      protocols such as TCP-AO how to construct Master Key Tuples (MKTs)
      or other protocol-specific structures from a key table row

      (2)  The ways of locating the peer identifier (a member of the
      Peers set) and the LocalKeyName inside an incoming packet

      (3)  The methods of verifying a packet given a key table row; this
      may be stated directly or in terms of protocol-specific structures
      such as MKTs

      (4)  The form and validation rules for LocalKeyName and
      PeerKeyName; if either of these is an integer, the conventions in
      Section 5.1 are used as a vendor-independent format

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      (5)  The form and validation rules for members of the Peers set

      (6)  The algorithms and KDFs supported

      (7)  The form of the ProtocolSpecifics field

      (8)  The rules for canonicalizing LocalKeyName, PeerKeyName,
      entries in the Peers set, or ProtocolSpecifics; this may include
      normalizations such as lower-casing hexadecimal strings

      (9)  The Indication whether the support for Interfaces is required
      by this protocol

5. Textual Conventions

5.1 Key Names

   When a key for a given protocol is identified by an integer key
   identifier, the associated key name will be represented as lower case
   hexadecimal integers with the most significant octet first.  This
   integer is padded with leading 0's until the width of the key
   identifier field in the protocol is reached.

5.2 Keys

   A key is represented as a lower-case hexadecimal string with the most
   significant octet of the key first. As discussed in Section 2, the
   length of this string depends on the associated algorithm and KDF.

6. Operational Considerations

   If the valid periods for long-lived keys do not overlap or the system
   clocks are inconsistent, it is possible to construct scenarios where
   systems cannot agree upon a long-lived key.  When installing a series
   of keys to be used one after another (sometimes called a key chain),
   operators should configure the SendNotBefore field of the key to be
   several days after the RcvNotBefore field of the key to address the
   clock skew issue and guarantee there is some overlap.

7. Security Considerations

   Management of encryption and authentication keys has been a
   significant operational problem, both in terms of key synchronization
   and key selection.  For instance, the current guidance [RFC3562]
   warns against sharing TCP MD5 keying material between systems, and
   recommends changing keys according to a schedule.  The same general
   operational issues are relevant for the management of other
   cryptographic keys.

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   It has been recognized in [RFC4107] that automated key management is
   not viable in multiple scenarios.  The conceptual database specified
   in this document is designed to accommodate both manual key
   management and automated key management.  A future specification to
   automatically populate rows in the database is envisioned.

   Designers should recognize the warning provided in [RFC4107]:

      Automated key management and manual key management provide very
      different features.  In particular, the protocol associated with
      an automated key management technique will confirm the liveness of
      the peer, protect against replay, authenticate the source of the
      short-term session key, associate protocol state information with
      the short-term session key, and ensure that a fresh short-term
      session key is generated.  Moreover, an automated key management
      protocol can improve the interoperability by including negotiation
      mechanisms for cryptographic algorithms.  These valuable features
      are impossible or extremely cumbersome to accomplish with manual
      key management.

8. IANA Considerations

   This specification defines three registries.

8.1. KeyTable Protocols

   This document requests establishment of a registry called "KeyTable
   Protocols".  The following subsection describes the registry; the
   second subsection provides initial values for IEEE 802.1X CAK.

8.1.1. KeyTable Protocols Registry Definition

   All assignments to the KeyTable Protocols registry are made on a
   specification required basis per Section 4.1 of [RFC5226].

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   Each registration entry must contain the three fields:

      - Protocol Name (unique within the registry);
      - Specification; and
      - Protocol Specific Values.

   The specification needs to describe parameters required for using the
   conceptual database as outlined in Section 4.  For existing
   protocols, this typically means that the specification will focus
   more on the application of the protocol with the key tables rather
   than being a general specification of the security protocol. New
   protocols may of course combine information on how to use the key
   tables database with the protocol specification.

8.1.2. KeyTable Protocols Registry Initial Values

   Protocol Name: IEEE 802.1X CAK

   Specification: IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, "IEEE Standard for Local
      and Metropolitan Area Networks -- Port-Based Network Access

   Protocol Specific Values: there are two:

      - A Key Management Domain (KMD).
        A string of up to 253 UTF-8 characters that names the
        transmitting authenticator's key management domain.

      - A Network Identifier (NID).
        A string of up to 100 UTF-8 characters that identifies
        a network service. The NID can also be null, indicating
        the key is associated with a default service.

8.2. KeyTable KDFs

   This document requests the establishment of a registry called
   "KeyTable KDFs".  The remainder of this section describes the

   All assignments to the KeyTable KDFs registry are made on a First
   Come First Served basis per Section 4.1 of RFC 5226.

8.3. KeyTable AlgIDs

   This document requests establishment of a registry called "KeyTable
   AlgIDs".  The remainder of this section describes the registry.

   All assignments to the KeyTable KDFs registry are made on a First

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   Come First Served basis per Section 4.1 of RFC 5226.

9. Acknowledgments

   This document reflects many discussions with many different people
   over many years.  In particular, the authors thank Jari Arkko, Ran
   Atkinson, Ron Bonica, Ross Callon, Lars Eggert, Pasi Eronen, Adrian
   Farrel, Sam Hartman, Gregory Lebovitz, Sandy Murphy, Eric Rescorla,
   Mike Shand, Dave Ward, and Brian Weis for their insights.

10. Informational References

   [RFC3562]  Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
              Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003.

   [RFC4107]  Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
              Key Management", RFC 4107, BCP 107, June 2005.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.

Authors' Addresses

   Russell Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA 20170

   Tim Polk
   National Institute of Standards and Technology
   100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

   Sam Hartman
   Painless Security, LLC

   Dacheng Zhang

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