Routing Working Group M. Jethanandani
Internet-Draft Ciena Corporation
Intended status: Informational K. Patel
Expires: April 21, 2013 Cisco Systems, Inc
L. Zheng
Huawei Technologies
October 18, 2012
Analysis of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP Issues According to KARP Design
Guide
draft-ietf-karp-routing-tcp-analysis-05.txt
Abstract
This document analyzes Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271], Label
Distribution Protocol (LDP) [RFC5036], Path Computation Element
Protocol (PCEP) [RFC5440] and Multicast Source Distribution Protocol
(MSDP) [RFC3618] according to guidelines set forth in section 4.2 of
Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols Design Guidelines
[RFC6518].
Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2013.
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Current Assessment of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Transport layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Keying mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Spoofing attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2. Privacy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3. Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. PCEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5. MSDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Optimal State for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Gap Analysis for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. PCEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Transition and Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Introduction
In March 2006 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) in its "Unwanted
Internet Traffic" workshop documented in Report from the IAB workshop
on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006 [RFC4948] described an attack on
core routing infrastructure as an ideal attack with the most amount
of damage. Four main steps were identified for that tightening:
1. Create secure mechanisms and practices for operating routers.
2. Clean up the Internet Routing Registry [IRR] repository, and
securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used
for routing verifications.
3. Create specifications for cryptographic validation of routing
message content.
4. Secure the routing protocols' packets on the wire.
In order to secure the routing protocols this document performs an
initial analysis of the current state of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP
according to the requirements of KARP Design Guidelines [RFC6518].
Section 4.2 of the document uses the term "state" which will be
referred to as the "state of the security method". Thus a term like
"Define Optimal State" would be referred to as "Define Optimal State
of the Security Method". This document builds on several previous
analysis efforts into routing security. The OPSEC working group
published Issues with existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for
Routing Protocols [RFC6039] an analysis of cryptographic issues with
routing protocols and Analysis of OSPF Security According to KARP
Design Guide [draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-03].
Section 2 of this document looks at the current state of security
method for the four routing protocols, BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP.
Section 3 examines what the optimal state of the security method
would be for the four routing protocols according to KARP Design
Guidelines [RFC6518] and Section 4 does a analysis of the gap between
the existing state of the security method and the optimal state of
the security method for protocols and suggests some areas where
improvement is needed.
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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1.2. Abbreviations
AS - Autonomous Systems
BGP - Border Gateway Protocol
DoS - Denial of Service
GTSM - Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
KARP - Key and Authentication for Routing Protocols
KDF - Key Derivation Function
KEK - Key Encrypting Key
KMP - Key Management Protocol
LDP - Label Distribution Protocol
LSR - Label Switch Routers
MAC - Message Authentication Code
MKT - Master Key Tuple
MSDP - Multicast Source Distribution Protocol
MD5 - Message Digest algorithm 5
OSPF - OPen Shortest Path First
PCEP - Path Computation Element Protocol
TCP - Transmission Control Protocol
TTL - Time To Live
UDP - User Datagram Protocol
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2. Current Assessment of BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP
This section assesses the transport protocols for any authentication
or integrity mechanisms used by the protocol. It describes the
current security mechanisms if any used by BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP.
2.1. Transport layer
At a transport layer, routing protocols are subject to a variety of
DoS attacks as outlined in Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations
[RFC4732]. Such attacks can cause the routing protocol to become
congested with the result that routing updates are supplied too
slowly to be useful. In extreme cases, these attacks prevent routers
from converging after a change.
Routing protocols use several methods to protect themselves. Those
that use TCP as a transport protocol use access lists to accept
packets only from known sources. These access lists also help
protect edge routers from attacks originating from outside the
protected domain. In addition for edge routers running eBGP, TCP
LISTEN is run only on interfaces on which its peers have been
discovered or via which routing sessions are expected (as specified
in router configuration databases).
Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) [RFC5082] describes a
generalized Time to Live (TTL) security mechanism to protect a
protocol stack from CPU-utilization based attacks.TCP Robustness
[RFC5961] recommends some TCP level mitigations against spoofing
attacks targeted towards long-lived routing protocol sessions.
Even when BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP sessions use access lists they are
vulnerable to spoofing and man in the middle attacks. Authentication
and integrity checks allow the receiver of a routing protocol update
to know that the message genuinely comes from the node that purports
to have sent it, and to know whether the message has been modified.
Sometimes routers can be subjected to a large number of
authentication and integrity requests, exhausting connection
resources on the router in a way that deny genuine requests.
TCP MD5 [RFC2385] has been obsoleted by TCP-AO [RFC5925]. However it
is still widely used to authenticate TCP based routing protocols such
as BGP. It provides a way for carrying a MD5 digest in a TCP
segment. This digest acts like a signature for that segment,
computed using information known only to the connection end points.
The MD5 key used to compute the digest is stored locally on the
router. This option is used by routing protocols to provide for
session level protection against the introduction of spoofed TCP
segments into any existing TCP streams, in particular TCP Reset
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segments. TCP MD5 does not provide a generic mechanism to support
key roll-over.
The Message Authentication Codes (MACs) used by the TCP MD5 option is
considered too weak both because of the use of the hash function and
because of the way the secret key used by TCP MD5 is managed. TCP-AO
[RFC5925] and its companion document Crypto Algorithms for TCP-AO
[RFC5926] describe steps towards correcting both the MAC weakness and
the management of secret keys. For MAC it specifies two MAC
algorithms that MUST be supported. They are HMAC-SHA-1-96 as
specified in HMAC [RFC2104] and AES-128-CMAC-96 as specified in NIST-
SP800-38B [NIST-SP800-38B]. Cryptographic research suggests that
both these MAC algorithms defined are fairly secure. TCP-AO allows
additional MACs to be added in the future.
2.2. Keying mechanisms
For TCP-AO [RFC5925] there is no Key Management Protocol (KMP) used
to manage the keys that are employed to generate the Message
Authentication Code (MAC). TCP-AO allows for a master key to be
configured manually or for it to be managed via a out of band
mechanism.
It should be noted that most routers configured with static keys have
not seen the key changed ever. The common reason given for not
changing the key is the difficulty in coordinating the change between
pairs of routers when using TCP MD5. It is well known that the
longer the same key is used, the greater the chance that it can be
guessed or exposed e.g. when an administrator with knowledge of the
keys leaves the company.
For point-to-point key management IKEv2 [RFC5996] provides for
automated key exchange under a SA and can be used for a comprehensive
Key Management Protocol (KMP) solution.
2.3. LDP
Section 5 of LDP [RFC5036] states that LDP is subject to two
different types of attacks: spoofing, and denial of service attacks.
In addition, LDP distributes labels in the clear, enabling hackers to
see what labels are being distributed. The attacker can use that
information to spoof a connection and distribute a different set of
labels causing traffic to be dropped.
2.3.1. Spoofing attacks
A spoofing attack against LDP can occur both during the discovery
phase and during the session communication phase.
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2.3.1.1. Discovery exchanges using UDP
Label Switching Routers (LSRs) indicate their willingness to
establish and maintain LDP sessions by periodically sending Hello
messages. Receipt of a Hello message serves to create a new "Hello
adjacency", if one does not already exist, or to refresh an existing
one.
Unlike all other LDP messages, the Hello messages are sent using UDP.
This means that they cannot benefit from the security mechanisms
available with TCP. LDP [RFC5036] does not provide any security
mechanisms for use with Hello messages except for some configuration
which may help protect against bogus discovery events. These
configurations include directly connected links and interfaces.
Routers that do not use directly connected links have to use Extended
Hello messages.
Spoofing a Hello packet for an existing adjacency can cause the
adjacency to time out and result in termination of the associated
session. This can occur when the spoofed Hello message specifies a
small Hold Time, causing the receiver to expect Hello messages within
this interval, while the true neighbor continues sending Hello
messages at the lower, previously agreed to frequency.
Spoofing a Hello packet can also cause the LDP session to be
terminated. This can occur when the spoofed Hello specifies a
different Transport Address from the previously agreed one between
neighbors. Spoofed Hello messages are observed and reported as real
problem in production networks.
2.3.1.2. Session communication using TCP
LDP like other TCP based routing protocols specifies use of the TCP
MD5 Signature Option to provide for the authenticity and integrity of
session messages. As stated above, MD5 authentication is considered
too weak for this application. A stronger hashing algorithm e.g
SHA1, which is supported by TCP-AO [RFC5925] could be deployed to
take care of the weakness.
Alternatively, one could move to using TCP-AO which provides for
stronger MACs, makes it easier to setup manual keys and protects
against replays.
2.3.2. Privacy Issues
LDP provides no mechanism for protecting the privacy of label
distribution. The security requirements of label distribution are
similar to other routing protocols that need to distribute routing
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information.
2.3.3. Denial of Service Attacks
LDP is subject to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks both in its
discovery mode and in session mode. These are documented in Section
5.3 of LDP [RFC5036].
2.4. PCEP
Attacks on PCEP [RFC5440] may result in damage to active networks.
These include computation responses, which if changed can cause
protocols like LDP to setup sub-optimal or inappropriate LSPs. In
addition, PCE itself can be attacked by a variety of DoS attacks.
Such attacks can cause path computations to be supplied too slowly to
be of any value particularly as it relates to recovery or
establishment of LSPs.
As RFC 5440 states, PCEP could be the target of the following
attacks.
o Spoofing (PCC or PCE implementation)
o Snooping (message interception)
o Falsification
o Denial of Service
In inter-Autonomous Systems (AS) scenarios where PCE-to-PCE
communication is required, attacks may be particularly significant
with commercial as well as service-level agreement implications.
Additionally, snooping of PCEP requests and responses may give an
attacker information about the operation of the network. By viewing
the PCEP messages an attacker can determine the pattern of service
establishment in the network and can know where traffic is being
routed, thereby making the network susceptible to targeted attacks
and the data within specific LSPs vulnerable.
Ensuring PCEP communication privacy is of key importance, especially
in an inter-AS context, where PCEP communication end-points do not
reside in the same AS. An attacker that intercepts a PCE message
could obtain sensitive information related to computed paths and
resources.
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2.5. MSDP
Similar to BGP and LDP, Multicast Source Distribution Protocol (MSDP)
uses TCP MD5 [RFC2385] to protect TCP sessions via the TCP MD5
option. But with a weak MD5 authentication, TCP MD5 is not
considered strong enough for this application.
MSDP also advocates imposing a limit on number of source address and
group addresses (S,G) that can be cached within the protocol and
thereby mitigate state explosion due to any denial of service and
other attacks.
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3. Optimal State for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP
The ideal state of the security method for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP
protocols are when they can withstand any of the known types of
attacks.
Additionally, Key Management Protocol (KMP) for the routing sessions
should help negotiate unique, pair wise random keys without
administrator involvement. It should also negotiate Security
Association (SA) parameter required for the session connection,
including key life times. It should keep track of those lifetimes
and negotiate new keys and parameters before they expire and do so
without administrator involvement. In the event of a breach,
including when an administrator with knowledge of the keys leaves the
company, the keys should be changed immediately.
The DoS attacks for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP are attacks to the
transport protocol, TCP for the most part and UDP in case of
discovery phase of LDP. TCP and UDP should be able to withstand any
of DoS scenarios by dropping packets that are attack packets in a way
that does not impact legitimate packets.
The routing protocols should provide a mechanism to authenticate the
routing information carried within the payload.
3.1. LDP
To harden LDP against its current vulnerability to spoofing attacks,
LDP needs to be upgraded such that an implementation is able to
determine the authenticity of the neighbors sending the Hello
message.
There is currently no requirement to protect the privacy of label
distribution as labels are carried in the clear like other routing
information.
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4. Gap Analysis for BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP
This section outlines the differences between the current state of
the security methods for routing protocols and the desired state of
the security methods as outlined in section 4.2 of KARP Design
Guidelines [RFC6518]. As that document states, these routing
protocols fall into the category of one-to-one peering messages and
will use peer keying protocol. It covers issues that are common to
the four protocols in this section, leaving protocol specific issues
to sub-sections.
At a transport level these routing protocols are subject to some of
the same attacks that TCP applications are subject to. These include
DoS and spoofing attacks. Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations
[RFC4732] outlines some solutions. Defending TCP Against Spoofing
Attacks [RFC4953] recommends ways to prevent spoofing attacks. In
addition Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks.
[RFC5961] should also be followed and implemented to strengthen TCP.
Routers lack comprehensive key management and keys derived from it
that they can use to authenticate data. As an example TCP-AO
[RFC5925], talks about coordinating keys derived from Master Key
Table (MKT) between endpoints, but the MKT itself has to be
configured manually or through an out of band mechanism. Also TCP-AO
does not address the issue of connectionless reset, as it applies to
routers that do not store MKT across reboots.
Authentication, tamper protection, and encryption all require the use
of keys by sender and receiver. An automated KMP therefore has to
include a way to distribute MKT between two end points with little or
no administration overhead. It has to cover automatic key rollover.
It is expected that authentication will cover the packet, i.e. the
payload and the TCP header and will not cover the frame i.e. the link
layer 2 header.
There are two methods of automatic key rollover. Implicit key
rollover can be initiated after certain volume of data gets exchanged
or when a certain time has elapsed. This does not require explicit
signaling nor should it result in a reset of the TCP connection in a
way that the links/adjacencies are affected. On the other hand,
explicit key rollover requires an out of band key signaling
mechanism. It can be triggered by either side and can be done
anytime a security parameter changes e.g. an attack has happened, or
a system administrator with access to the keys has left the company.
An example of this is IKEv2 [RFC5996] but it could be any other new
mechanisms also.
As stated earlier TCP-AO [RFC5925] and its accompanying document
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Crypto Algorithms for TCP-AO [RFC5926] suggest that two MAC
algorithms that MUST be supported are HMAC-SHA-1-96 as specified in
HMAC [RFC2104] and AES-128-CMAC-96 as specified in NIST-SP800-38B
[NIST-SP800-38B].
There is a need to protect authenticity and validity of the routing/
label information that is carried in the payload of the sessions.
However, that is outside the scope of this document and is being
addressed by SIDR WG. Similar mechanisms could be used for intra-
domain protocols.
4.1. LDP
As described in LDP [RFC5036], the threat of spoofed Basic Hellos can
be reduced by only accepting Basic Hellos on interfaces that LSRs
trust, employing GTSM [RFC5082] and ignoring Basic Hellos not
addressed to the "all routers on this subnet" multicast group.
Spoofing attacks via Targeted Hellos are potentially a more serious
threat. An LSR can reduce the threat of spoofed Extended Hellos by
filtering them and accepting Hellos from sources permitted by an
access lists. However, performing the filtering using access lists
requires LSR resource, and the LSR is still vulnerable to the IP
source address spoofing. Spoofing attacks can be solved by being
able to authenticate the Hello messages, and an LSR can be configured
to only accept Hello messages from specific peers when authentication
is in use.
LDP Hello Cryptographic Authentication
[draft-zheng-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-04] suggest a new
Cryptographic Authentication TLV that can be used as an
authentication mechanism to secure Hello messages.
4.2. PCEP
Path Computation Element (PCE) discovery according to its RFC
[RFC5440] is a significant feature for the successful deployment of
PCEP in large networks. This mechanism allows a Path Computation
Client (PCC) to discover the existence of suitable PCEs within the
network without the necessity of configuration. It should be obvious
that, where PCEs are discovered and not configured, the PCC cannot
know the correct key to use. There are different approaches to
retain some aspect of security, but all of them require use of a keys
and a keying mechanism, the need for which has been discussed above.
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5. Transition and Deployment Considerations
As stated in KARP Design Guidelines [RFC6518] it is imperative that
the new authentication and security mechanisms defined support
incremental deployment, as it is not feasible to deploy the new
routing protocol authentication mechanism overnight.
Typically authentication and security in a peer-to-peer protocol
requires that both parties agree to the mechanisms that will be used.
If an agreement is not reached the setup of the new mechanism will
fail or will be deferred. Upon failure, the routing protocols can
fallback to the mechanisms that were already in place e.g. use static
keys if that was the mechanism in place. It is usually not possible
for one end to use the new mechanism while the other end uses the
old. Policies can be put in place to retry upgrading after a said
period of time, so a manual coordination is not required.
If the automatic KMP requires use of public/private keys to exchange
key material, the required CA root certificates may need to be
installed to verify authenticity of requests initiated by a peer.
Such a step does not require coordination with the peer except to
decide what CA authority will be used.
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6. Security Considerations
This section describes security considerations that BGP, LDP, PCEP
and MSDP should try to meet.
As with all routing protocols, they need protection from both on-path
and off-path blind attacks. A better way to protect them would be
with per-packet protection using a cryptographic MAC. In order to
provide for the MAC, keys are needed.
Once keys are used, mechanisms are required to support key rollover.
This should cover both manual and automatic key rollover. Multiple
approaches could be used. However since the existing mechanisms
provide a protocol field to identify the key as well as management
mechanisms to introduce and retire new keys, focusing on the existing
mechanism as a starting point is prudent.
Finally, replay protection is required. The replay mechanism needs
to be sufficient to prevent an attacker from creating a denial of
service or disrupting the integrity of the routing protocol by
replaying packets. It is important that an attacker not be able to
disrupt service by capturing packets and waiting for replay state to
be lost.
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7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Brian Weis for encouraging us to write this
draft and to Anantha Ramaiah and Mach Chen for providing comments on
it.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
[RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
June 2010.
[RFC6518] Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", RFC 6518,
February 2012.
[draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs]
Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "KARP Threats and
Requirements", March 2012.
8.2. Informative References
[NIST-SP800-38B]
Dworking, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", May 2005.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.
[RFC3618] Fenner, B. and D. Meyer, "Multicast Source Discovery
Protocol (MSDP)", RFC 3618, October 2003.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
[RFC4948] Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
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IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",
RFC 4948, August 2007.
[RFC4953] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
RFC 4953, July 2007.
[RFC5036] Andersson, L., Minei, I., and B. Thomas, "LDP
Specification", RFC 5036, October 2007.
[RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., and C.
Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
(GTSM)", RFC 5082, October 2007.
[RFC5440] Vasseur, JP. and JL. Le Roux, "Path Computation Element
(PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440,
March 2009.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
[RFC5961] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
August 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010.
[RFC6039] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues
with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing
Protocols", RFC 6039, October 2010.
[draft-ietf-karp-ospf-analysis-03]
Hartman, S., "Analysis of OSPF Security According to KARP
Design Guide", March 2012.
[draft-zheng-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-04]
Zheng, "LDP Hello Cryptographic Authentication", May 2012.
Jethanandani, et al. Expires April 21, 2013 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft BGP, LDP, PCEP and MSDP Analysis October 2012
Authors' Addresses
Mahesh Jethanandani
Ciena Corporation
1741 Technology Drive
San Jose, CA 95110
USA
Phone: + (408) 436-3313
Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com
Keyur Patel
Cisco Systems, Inc
170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Phone: +1 (408) 526-7183
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
Lianshu Zheng
Huawei Technologies
China
Phone: +86 (10) 82882008
Fax:
Email: vero.zheng@huawei.com
URI:
Jethanandani, et al. Expires April 21, 2013 [Page 18]
