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Versions: 00                                                            
Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (kink)                T. Kivinen
INTERNET-DRAFT                               SSH Communications Security
draft-ietf-kink-ike-over-kkmp-00.txt                    16 November 2000
Expires: 16 May 2001

          Running IKE Phase 2 over Artificial Kerberos IKE SA

Status of This memo

This document is a submission to the IETF Kerberized Internet
Negotiation of Keys (KINK) Working Group.  Comments are solicited and
should be addressed to the working group mailing list
(ietf-kink@vpnc.org) or to the editor.

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance
with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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This document defines how to create artificial IKE SA using kerberos
[RFC-1510]. It defines how to calculate SKEYID, cookies and IV needed by
the IKE SA from the Kerberos session key. After the artificial IKE SA is
created, it can be used to run normal IKE [RFC-2409] phase 2 negotia-
tions. Those negotiations include quick Mode (creating IPsec SA), new
group mode, delete notifications, and error notifications.

T. Kivinen                                                      [page 1]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                          16 November 2000

Table of Contents

1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
2.  Specification of Requirements   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
3.  SKEYID material Calculation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
4.  IV and Cookie Calculation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
5.  Transmitting the KRB_AP_* Messages Inside the IKE Payload   . . .  4
6.  Example Quick Mode Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
7.  Security Considerations   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
9.  Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6

1.  Introduction

After the IKE [RFC-2409] phase 1 finishes it produces following
information that is used to create the IKE SA:

    CKY-I and CKY-R
      cookies used to identify the IKE SA.

      a string derived from secret material known only to the active
      players in the exchange.

      keying material used by the IKE SA to protect its own messages.

      keying material used by the IKE SA to authenticate its own

      keying material used to derive keys for IPsec SAs.

      initialization vector used by the IKE SA for the phase 2 messages.

    IKE SA algorithms
      encryption, hash, and authentication algorithms.

The SKEYID material can easily be created from the kerberos session key
by just hashing it in the similar way they are created in the IKE
[RFC-2409]. Cookies are just random numbers, but as they should remain
constant over the negotiation between two parties, it would be desirable
to derive them from the session key so they remain constant as long as
the kerberos ticket is valid. Encryption, hash and authentication
algorithms can be fixed to be 3DES, SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1.

The IKE SA identities are not used after the phase 1, thus we do not
need them here.

T. Kivinen                                                      [page 2]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                          16 November 2000

The IKE SA is authenticated using the normal KRB_AP_REQ added to first
packets in each phase 2 negotiations. The mutual authentication is done
only if the phase 2 negotiation includes multiple packets, in which case
the second packet encrypted using session key authenticates the

Before this exchange can happen the initiator must first do normal
kerberos authentication to KDC and receive valid kerberos ticket for the

2.  Specification of Requirements

This document shall use the keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"OPTIONAL" to describe requirements. They are to be interpreted as
described in [RFC-2119] document.

3.  SKEYID material Calculation

>From the kerberos ticket we have the session key, which is just a shared
secret with the other host. We use that session key instead of the
Diffie-Hellman shared secret in the SKEYID calculation. Also there is no
point of including the cookies in the SKEYID calculation, as they are
generated from the session key. The SKEYID is calculated as follows:

SKEYID = kerberos_session_key
SKEYID_d = prf(SKEYID, kerberos_session_key | 0)
SKEYID_a = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_d | kerberos_session_key | 1)
SKEYID_e = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_a | kerberos_session_key | 2)

4.  IV and Cookie Calculation

To encrypt the Phase 2 messages the IKE SA needs a "last phase 1 CBC
output block". This is used to calculate the IV for the first Phase 2
message. Because we do not have last block of the phase 1, we calculate
the IV from the the KRB_AP_REQ message. The IV used for the first
encrypted block in the first phase 2 message is derived from a hash of a
concatenation of the KRB_AP_REQ and the phase 2 message id using the
fixed SHA-1 hash algorithm. Because the IV length for 3DES is 8 bytes,
we take first 8 bytes of the calculated hash. The IV is calculated like


Cookies for the IKE SA are generated from the kerberos session key, so
it will remain constant as long as the kerberos session key is valid.
Both the initiator and responder cookies are the first 16 bytes of the
SHA-1 hash of the kerberos_session_key concatenated with the number 42
encoded as one byte. The number 42 is selected arbitrarely, so that it
will not match anything we already use. Initiator CKY-I and Responder
CKY-R are calculated like this:

CKY-I = SHA-1(kerberos_session_key | 42)[0..15]

T. Kivinen                                                      [page 3]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                          16 November 2000

CKY-R = SHA-1(kerberos_session_key | 42)[0..15]

5.  Transmitting the KRB_AP_* Messages Inside the IKE Payload

The KRB_AP_REQ and KRB_AP_REP must be delivered from one machine to
another and back inside the IKE payloads, and they cannot be encrypted,
as the receiver of the packet does not yet know how to create the
encryption key because it has not yet seen the KRB_AP_REQ message.
Because of this we need to add a new payload to the beginning of first
phase 2 payload in both direction and that must be transmitted without
encryption. Because the rest of the payload is still encrypted the
encryption bit in the ISAKMP header is set.

This means that we need to define new payload type for that kerberos
message and if the next payload field in the generic header is that then
the first payload is in clear, and encryption starts only after that
payload. The whole packet is still authenticated as defined in [REVISED-

The phase 2 payload will look like this:

                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    !                          Initiator                            !
    !                            Cookie                             !
    !                          Responder                            !
    !                            Cookie                             !
    !  NP = XXX     ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type !     Flags     !
    !                          Message ID                           !
    !                            Length                             !
    ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
    !                     Kerberos AP message                       !
    | Encrypted phase 2 payload starts here                         |

The KRB_AP_REQ payload is only added to first phase 2 payload sent out
in one negotiation, i.e it is always in the first quick mode packet
going out, and it is always in all notifications and delete

The KRB_AP_REP payload can only added to the first phase 2 payload sent
by the responder, i.e it is always in the second quick mode packet. It
is only added there if requested so. In case of kerberos error the
responder sends back an message containing the KRB_ERROR message in the
kerberos message payload, and optional IKE notification payload and

T. Kivinen                                                      [page 4]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                          16 November 2000

authentication hash payload in the body.

Note, that if the responder was not able to get the kerberos session key
from the KRB_AP_REQ, it cannot decrypt and authenticate the original
first message. In that case it also cannot encrypt and authenticate the
error message. In that case the notification and hash payloads are not
sent, and the encryption bit in the ISAKMP header is not set.

The initiator can authenticate the responder by verifying the hash
payload in the second quick mode packet. Only the responder can create
it because it knows the session key used to create authentication MAC.
This means that KRB_AP_REP message is not usually needed.

Also because this quick mode is normally used without PFS the responder
can immediately after receiving first packet instantiate inbound SA and
then send reply back to initiator. This means that when the initiator
receives the reply from responder it can also immediately start using
the SA without need to wait for the third message to reach the

The third message only gives protection against replay attacks and
because IPsec keys are derived also from the nonces inside the first and
second packet, any valid IPsec packet will also give proof of
liveliness. Thus responder can instantiate outbound SA immediately when
it receives the third quick mode message, or when it receives valid
authenticated IPsec packet for the inbound SA.This removes need for
commit bit and reduces number of round trips from 1.5 to 1 (the last
half round trip is already interleaved with the normal IPsec traffic).
This optimization should NOT be used if PFS is used, because in that
case instantiating the IPsec SA requires costly Diffie-Hellman
operation, which should be postponed to the point where replay attacks
are not possible.

6.  Example Quick Mode Negotiation

Here is an example of quick mode negotiation between host A and host B.

Host A                                                  Host B
------                                                  ------
HDR, KRB_AP_REQ, *HASH(1), SA, Ni, ... --->
        <--- HDR, [KRB_AP_REQ], *HASH(2), SA, Nr, ...
HDR*, HASH(3) --->

Where the '*' marks where the encryption begins.

7.  Security Considerations

This document assumes that the session key generated by the kerberos is
safe and the whole security of the IKE SA is derived from that. The
IPsec SAs created using the Quick Mode negotiation over that IKE SA
derive entropy also from the nonces passed in the negotiation, and also
from the Diffie-Hellman if PFS is used in the quick mode.

T. Kivinen                                                      [page 5]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                          16 November 2000

8.  References

[REVISED-HASH] Kivinen T., "Fixing IKE Phase 1 Authentication HASH",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-hash-revised-01.txt (WORK IN PROGRESS)

[RFC-2409] Harkins D., Carrel D., "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
November 1998

[RFC-2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997

[RFC-1510] Kohl, J., "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)",
September 1993

9.  Authors' Addresses

    Tero Kivinen
    SSH Communications Security Corp
    Fredrikinkatu 42
    FIN-00100 HELSINKI
    E-mail: kivinen@ssh.fi

T. Kivinen                                                      [page 6]