Network Working Group J. Uttaro
Internet-Draft AT&T
Intended status: Standards Track P. Mohapatra
Expires: July 25, 2013 D. Smith
Cisco Systems
R. Raszuk
NTT MCL Inc.
J. Scudder
Juniper Networks
January 21, 2013
BGP ACCEPT_OWN Community Attribute
draft-ietf-l3vpn-acceptown-community-06.txt
Abstract
Under certain conditions it is desirable for a BGP route reflector to
be able to modify the Route Target list of a VPN route that is
distributed by the route reflector, enabling the route reflector to
control how a route originated within one VRF is imported into other
VRFs. This technique works effectively as long as the VRF that
exports the route is not on the same PE as the VRF(s) that import the
route. However, due to the constraints of the BGP protocol, it does
not work if the two are on the same PE. This document describes a
modification to the BGP protocol allowing this technique to work when
the VRFs are on the same PE, allowing the technique to be used in a
standard manner throughout an autonomous system.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2013.
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. ACCEPT_OWN Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Route Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Propagating ACCEPT_OWN Between Address Families . . . . . . 5
2.3. Configuration Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Other Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Local Extranet Application (non-informative) . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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1. Introduction
In certain scenarios, a BGP speaker may maintain multiple "VPN
Routing and Forwarding tables", or VRFs [RFC4364]. Under certain
conditions, it is desirable for a route reflector to be able to
modify the Route Target (RT) list of a VPN route that is distributed
by the route reflector, enabling the route reflector to control how a
route originated within one VRF is imported into other VRFs. Though
it is possible to perform such policy control directly on the
originator, it may be operationally cumbersome in an autonomous
system with a large number of border routers having complex BGP
policies.
The technique of the route reflector modifying the RT list works
effectively as long as the VRF that exports the route is not on the
same PE as the VRF(s) that import the route. However, due to the
constraints of the BGP protocol, it does not work if the two are on
the same PE. This is because per the BGP specification [RFC4271], a
BGP speaker rejects prefix advertisements received that were
originated by itself. In an autonomous system with route reflectors,
the route reflector attaches the ORIGINATOR_ID attribute to the
UPDATE messages so that if such prefix advertisements reach the
originator, the originator can reject them by simply checking the
ORIGINATOR_ID attribute. The BGP specification also mandates that a
route should not be accepted from a peer when the NEXT_HOP attribute
matches the receiver's own "IP address".
This document proposes a modification to BGP's behavior by defining a
new community [RFC1997] value, in order to allow the technique of RT
list modification by the route reflector to be used in a standard
manner throughout an autonomous system, irrespective of whether the
VRFs are on the same, or different PEs.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. ACCEPT_OWN Community
This memo defines a new BGP community, ACCEPT_OWN, whose value as
assigned by IANA is 0xFFFF0001. Processing of the ACCEPT_OWN
community SHOULD be controlled by configuration. The functionality
SHOULD default to being disabled, as further specified in
Section 2.3.
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2.1. Route Acceptance
A router MAY accept a route whose ORIGINATOR_ID or NEXT_HOP value
matches that of the receiving speaker if all of the following are
true:
o Processing of the ACCEPT_OWN community is enabled by
configuration.
o The route in question carries the ACCEPT_OWN community.
o The route in question was originated from a source VRF on the
router (as determined by inspecting the Route Distinguisher).
o The route in question is targeted to one or more destination VRFs
on the router (as determined by inspecting the Route Target(s)).
o At least one destination VRF is different from the source VRF.
A route MUST never be accepted back into its source VRF, even if it
carries one or more Route Targets (RTs) which match that VRF.
2.2. Propagating ACCEPT_OWN Between Address Families
The ACCEPT_OWN community controls propagation of routes which can be
associated with a source VRF by inspection of their Route
Distinguisher and with a target VRF by inspection of their Route
Target list (for example VPN routes with a SAFI of 128). As such, it
SHOULD NOT be attached to any routes which cannot be associated with
a source VRF. This implies that when propagating routes into a VRF,
the ACCEPT_OWN community should not be propagated. Likewise, if a
route carrying the ACCEPT_OWN community is received in an address
family which does not allow the source VRF to be looked up, the
ACCEPT_OWN community MUST be discarded. An OPTIONAL message may be
logged in this case.
2.3. Configuration Control
ACCEPT_OWN handling SHOULD be controlled by configuration, and SHOULD
default to being disabled. When ACCEPT_OWN is disabled by
configuration (either explicitly or by default), the router MUST NOT
apply the special route acceptance rules detailed in Section 2.1.
The router SHOULD still apply the propagation rules detailed in
Section 2.2.
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3. Decision Process
If a BGP speaker supports ACCEPT_OWN and is configured for the
extensions defined in this document, the following step is inserted
after the LOCAL_PREF comparison step in BGP decision process:
When comparing a pair of routes for a BGP destination, the route
attached with ACCEPT_OWN community is preferred over the route
that does not have the community.
In all other respects, the decision process remains unchanged. This
extra step MUST only be invoked during the best path selection
process of VPN-IP routes [RFC4364] (i.e. it MUST NOT be invoked for
the best path selection of "imported" IP routes in a VRF). The
purpose of the extra step is to allow the paths advertised by the
route reflector with ACCEPT_OWN community to be selected as best over
other paths that the BGP speaker may have received, hence enabling
the applications ACCEPT_OWN is designed for.
4. Deployment Considerations
The ACCEPT_OWN community as described in this document is useful
within a single autonomous system which uses a single layer of route
reflectors. Its use with hierarchical route reflectors would require
further specification and is out of scope for this document.
Likewise, its use across multiple autonomous systems is out of scope
for this document.
5. Other Applications
This approach may also be relevant to other scenarios where a BGP
speaker maintains multiple routing contexts using an approach
different from that of [RFC4364], as long as the specific approach in
use has the property that the BGP speaker originates and receives
routes within a particular context. In such a case, "VRF" in this
document should be understood to mean whatever construct provides a
routing context in the specific technology under consideration.
Likewise, "Route Distinguisher" should be understood to mean whatever
construct allows a route's originator to associate that route with
its source context, and "Route Target" should be understood to mean
whatever construct allows a route to be targeted for import into a
context other than its source.
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6. Security Considerations
ACCEPT_OWN as described above permits a router's own route prefix to
be advertised to a different VRF on that router. In this respect,
such a route is similar to any other BGP route and shares the same
set of security vulnerabilities and concerns. No new fundamental
security issues are introduced by ACCEPT_OWN.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the value 0xFFFF0001 from BGP well-known
communities registry for ACCEPT_OWN community. No additional IANA
action is required.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Yakov Rekhter, Jim Guichard, Clarence
Filsfils, John Mullooly, Jeff Haas, Pranav Mehta, and Tamas Mondal
for their valuable comments and suggestions. The decision process
changes were suggested by Pranav Mehta to solve the remote extranet
problem.
9. Normative References
[RFC1997] Chandrasekeran, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP
Communities Attribute", RFC 1997, August 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, February 2006.
Appendix A. Local Extranet Application (non-informative)
One of the applications for this behavior is auto-configuration of
extranets within MPLS VPN networks. Consider the following topology:
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CE1 --------+
|
(VRF 1, RD 1, RT 1)
PE1 ................... RR
(VRF 2, RD 2, RT 2)
|
CE2 --------+
Figure 1: Extranet Application
Within the above topology, PE1 receives a prefix X from CE1. Prefix
X is installed in VRF 1 and is advertised to the route reflector with
route distinguisher (RD) 1 and route target (RT) 1 as configured on
PE1. The requirement is to import prefix X into VRF 2 and advertise
it to CE2 in support of extranet VPN connectivity between CE1/VRF1
and CE2/VRF2. Current BGP mechanisms for MPLS VPNs [RFC4364] require
changing the import RT value and/or import policy for VRF 2 on PE1.
This is operationally cumbersome in a network with a large number of
border routers having complex BGP policies. Alternatively, using the
new ACCEPT_OWN community value, the route reflector can simply re-
advertise prefix X back to PE1 with RT 2 appended. In this way, PE1
will accept prefix X despite its ORIGINATOR_ID or NEXT_HOP value,
import it into VRF 2 as a result of RT 2, and will then determine the
correct adjacency rewrite within VRF 1 based on the RD value (1) and
the prefix. Note that the RT 1 value originally attached to the
route will simply be ignored since associated with the source VRF 1.
The same operation needs also to happen in the reverse direction (VRF
1 learning a route from VRF 2) to achieve establishment of an
extranet VPN strictly via the route reflector without changing the
BGP policy of PE1 in any way. A router performing such an extranet
application can accept a route with its own ORIGINATOR_ID or NEXT_HOP
value only if the VRF in which the router originated the route is
different than the VRF in which the router accepts the re-advertised
route.
Authors' Addresses
James Uttaro
AT&T
200 S. Laurel Avenue
Middletown, NJ 07748
USA
Email: uttaro@att.com
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Pradosh Mohapatra
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: pmohapat@cisco.com
David J. Smith
Cisco Systems
111 Wood Avenue South
Iselin, NJ 08830
USA
Email: djsmith@cisco.com
Robert Raszuk
NTT MCL Inc.
101 S Ellsworth Avenue Suite 350
San Mateo, CA 94401
US
Email: robert@raszuk.net
John Scudder
Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
USA
Email: jgs@juniper.net
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