LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Updates: 3370 (if approved) Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track NIST
Expires: December 19, 2019 June 17, 2019
Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes-11
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
hash functions with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as one-way
hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and ECDSA
signature algorithms, as message digests and message authentication
codes. The conventions for the associated signer public keys in CMS
are also described.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 19, 2019.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Use in CMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Message Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-11:
* Minor nits.
* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-10:
* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
assignments.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-09:
* Fixed minor text nit.
* Updates in Sec Considerations section.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-08:
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* id-shake128-len and id-shake256-len were replaced with id-
sha128 with 32 bytes output length and id-shake256 with 64
bytes output length.
* Fixed a discrepancy between section 3 and 4.4 about the KMAC
OIDs that have parameters as optional.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-07:
* Small nit from Russ while in WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-06:
* Incorporated Eric's suggestion from WGLC.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-05:
* Added informative references.
* Updated ASN.1 so it compiles.
* Updated IANA considerations.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-04:
* Added RFC8174 reference and text.
* Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in
section 4.2.1.
* Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundant info from
RFCs.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-03:
* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
Deterministic ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
randomness of k because we are using deterministic ECDSA.
* Completed ASN.1 module and fixed KMAC ASN.1 based on Jim's
feedback.
* Text fixes.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-02:
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* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Started ASN.1 module.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-01:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in CMS.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcodes hash, salt and
MGF, according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
o draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shake-00:
* Various updates to title and section names.
* Content changes filling in text and references.
o draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00:
* Initial version
2. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] is used to digitally
sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
specified in [SHA3] as new hash functions in CMS. In addition, it
describes the use of these functions with the RSASSA-PSS signature
algorithm [RFC8017] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9.62] with the CMS signed-data content type.
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output
is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]).
And, the corresponding collision and second preimage resistance
strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits
respectively.
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A SHAKE can be used in CMS as the message digest function (to hash
the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA, message
authentication code and as the mask generation function (MGF) in
RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs
to be used in CMS and their meaning.
2.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Identifiers
This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs) for using
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in CMS.
Two object identifiers for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 hash functions are
defined in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for
convenience.
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 11 }
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 12 }
In this specification, when using the id-shake128 or id-shake256
algorithm identifiers, the parameters MUST be absent. That is, the
identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC
when it is ready ] defines two identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures
using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD1 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 }
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The same RSASSA-PSS algorithm identifiers can be used for identifying
public keys and signatures.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake] [ EDNOTE: Update reference with the RFC
when it is ready ] also defines two algorithm identifiers of ECDSA
signatures using SHAKEs which we include here for convenience.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD3 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD4 }
The parameters for the four RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA identifiers MUST be
absent. That is, each identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one
component, the OID.
Two object identifiers for KMACs using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as
defined in by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in [shake-nist-oids] and we include them here for convenience.
id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 19 }
id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
nistAlgorithm(4) 2 20 }
The parameters for id-KmacWithSHAKE128 and id-KmacWithSHAKE256 are
OPTIONAL.
Section 4.1, Section 4.2.1, Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.4 specify the
required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in
message digests, RSASSA-PSS, ECDSA and KMAC.
4. Use in CMS
4.1. Message Digests
The id-shake128 and id-shake256 OIDs (Section 3) can be used as the
digest algorithm identifiers located in the SignedData, SignerInfo,
DigestedData, and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm fields in CMS
[RFC5652]. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field and the
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output size, d, for the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 message digest MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively.
The digest values are located in the DigestedData field and the
Message Digest authenticated attribute included in the
signedAttributes of the SignedData signerInfo. In addition, digest
values are input to signature algorithms. The digest algorithm MUST
be the same as the message hash algorithms used in signatures.
4.2. Signatures
In CMS, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content type and
countersignature attribute. Signature values are located in the
SignerInfo signature field of SignedData content type and
countersignature attribute.
Conforming implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA with
SHAKE signatures when processing CMS data MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs specified in Section 3.
When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for
2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits.
SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or
curves with group order of 384-bits and higher.
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the
OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
respectively.
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
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the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As
explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length
of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message
length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32
and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
respectively. Thus when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output
length maskLen is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively. For
example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or
SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-
SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
4.2.2. ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function is used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-
ecdsa-with-shake256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively.
It is RECOMMENDED that conforming implementations that generate ECDSA
with SHAKE signatures in CMS generate such signatures with a
deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with all the
requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such
signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or
[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
these standards. These standards have not specified SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively can be used
instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and
SHA512 used in the standards.
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4.3. Public Keys
In CMS, the signer's public key algorithm identifiers are located in
the OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute. The conventions and
encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers
are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of
[RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier
continues to identify the public key when the RSA private key owner
does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to
RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to
limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the
AlgorithmIdentifier for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 SHOULD be
used as the algorithm attribute in the OriginatorPublicKey sequence.
Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE
public keys in CMS message MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs in
Section 3.
Conforming implementations MUST specify and process the algorithms
explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding
ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in CMS messages.
The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent.
4.4. Message Authentication Codes
KMAC message authentication code (KMAC) is specified in [SP800-185].
In CMS, KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the
AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. The KMAC values are located in
the AuthenticatedData mac field.
When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OID is used as
the MAC algorithm identifier, the parameters field is optional
(absent or present). If absent, the SHAKE256 output length used in
KMAC is 256 or 512 bits respectively and the customization string is
an empty string by default.
Conforming implementations that process KMACs with the SHAKEs when
processing CMS data MUST recognize these identifiers.
When calculating the KMAC output, the variable N is 0xD2B282C2, S is
an empty string, and L, the integer representing the requested output
length in bits, is 256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or
KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively in this specification.
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5. IANA Considerations
One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A was
requested for the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry:
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+
| TBD | CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 | [EDNOTE: THIS RFC] |
+---------+----------------------+--------------------+
6. Security Considerations
This document updates [RFC3370]. The security considerations section
of that document applies to this specification as well.
NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of
the algorithm strengths and expected time frames for secure use in
Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107]. These
documents can be used as guides to choose appropriate key sizes for
various security scenarios.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties.
7. Acknowledgements
This document is based on Russ Housley's draft
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]. It replaces SHA3 hash functions
by SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as the LAMPS WG agreed.
The authors would like to thank Russ Housley for his guidance and
very valuable contributions with the ASN.1 module. Valuable feedback
was also provided by Eric Rescorla.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, DOI 10.17487/RFC3370, August 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3370>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
August 2015.
[SP800-185]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash]
Housley, R., "Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-housley-
lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00 (work in progress), March 2017.
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[I-D.ietf-lamps-pkix-shake]
Kampanakis, P. and Q. Dang, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for
RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs", draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-
shake-11 (work in progress), June 2019.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5753>.
[RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5911>.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[shake-nist-oids]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
Security Objects Register", October 2017,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
Register/Algorithm-Registration>.
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[SP800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-107: Recommendation for Applications Using Approved
Hash Algorithms", May 2014,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-107/
rev-1/final/documents/draft_revised_sp800-107.pdf>.
[SP800-78-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"SP800-78-4: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Personal Identity Verification", May 2014,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/publications/sp/800-
78/4/final/documents/sp800_78-4_revised_draft.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in CMS. This
module includes some ASN.1 from other standards for reference.
CMSAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-cms-shakes-2019(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ;
--
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-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
-- used in SignedData, SignerInfo, DigestedData,
-- and the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm
-- fields in CMS
--
MessageDigestAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652]
-- and MessageDigestAlgs in [RFC5753]
mda-shake128 |
mda-shake256,
...
}
--
-- One-Way Hash Functions
-- SHAKE128
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
}
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
}
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 }
--
-- Public key algorithm identifiers located in the
-- OriginatorPublicKey's algorithm attribute in CMS.
-- And Signature identifiers used in SignerInfo
-- signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData content
-- type and countersignature attribute in CMS.
--
-- From RFC5280, for reference.
-- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
-- When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used
-- for a public key, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
-- field MUST contain NULL.
--
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
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security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD1 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 }
-- When the id-RSASSA-PSS-* algorithm identifiers are used
-- for a public key or signature in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- parameters field MUST be absent. The message digest algorithm
-- used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or
-- 64 byte outout length respectively. The mask generation
-- function MUST be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with an output length
-- of (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n
-- is the RSA modulus in bits. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST
-- be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The trailerField MUST be 1,
-- which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value
-- 0xBC. Regardless of id-RSASSA-PSS-* or rsaEncryption being
-- used as the AlgorithmIdentifier of the OriginatorPublicKey,
-- the RSA public key MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey
-- type.
-- From RFC4055, for reference.
-- RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
-- modulus INTEGER, -- -- n
-- publicExponent INTEGER } -- -- e
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD3 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD4 }
-- When the id-ecdsa-with-shake* algorithm identifiers are
-- used in CMS, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field
-- MUST be absent and the signature algorithm should be
-- deterministic ECDSA [RFC6979]. The message digest MUST
-- be SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 with a 32 or 64 byte outout
-- length respectively. In both cases, the ECDSA public key,
-- MUST be encoded using the id-ecPublicKey type.
-- From RFC5480, for reference.
-- id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
-- The id-ecPublicKey parameters must be absent or present
-- and are defined as
-- ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
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-- namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- -- -- implicitCurve NULL
-- -- -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
-- }
--
-- Message Authentication (maca-) Algorithms
-- used in AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm in CMS
--
MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- This expands MessageAuthAlgs from [RFC5652] and [RFC6268]
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 |
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256,
...
}
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5911]
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
...
}
--
-- KMAC with SHAKE128
maca-KMACwithSHAKE128 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE128-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE128-params parameters are absent
-- the SHAKE128 output length used in KMAC is 256 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string.
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE128}
}
id-KMACWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 19 }
KMACwithSHAKE128-params ::= SEQUENCE {
kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 256, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
}
-- KMAC with SHAKE256
maca-KMACwithSHAKE256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-KMACWithSHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE KMACwithSHAKE256-params ARE optional
-- If KMACwithSHAKE256-params parameters are absent
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-- the SHAKE256 output length used in KMAC is 512 bits
-- and the customization string is an empty string.
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-KMACWithSHAKE256}
}
id-KMACWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 20 }
KMACwithSHAKE256-params ::= SEQUENCE {
kMACOutputLength INTEGER DEFAULT 512, -- Output length in bits
customizationString OCTET STRING DEFAULT ''H
}
END
Authors' Addresses
Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Quynh Dang
NIST
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Email: quynh.Dang@nist.gov
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