LTANS A. Jerman Blazic
Internet-Draft SETCCE
Intended status: Informational P. Sylvester
Expires: April 26, 2007 EdelWeb
C. Wallace
Orion Security Solutions
October 23, 2006
Long-term Archive Protocol (LTAP)
draft-ietf-ltans-ltap-03
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document describes a service operated as a trusted third party
to securely archive electronic document called a long-term archive
service (LTA). We describe an architecture framework and a protocol
allowing clients to interact with such a service. Bindings to
concrete transport and security protocol layers are given.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Functional Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Service functions of an LTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. Life cycles of objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.5. Roles, Service Types, Policies and Configurations . . . . 12
3.6. Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1. Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2. Message Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3. MetaData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4. Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5. RawData . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.6. DataOrTransaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.7. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8. SerialNumber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.9. RequestTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.10. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.11. EntityIdentifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.12. ServiceType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.13. StatusInformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.14. GeneralErrorNotice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.15. RequestInformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5. Top level protocol elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1. Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2. ErrorNotice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3. OperationResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.4. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. Service Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1. ARCHIVE operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2. STATUS operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.3. EXPORT operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.4. VERIFY operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.5. DELETE operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. Presentation and Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8. Security and Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9. Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. IPR Patent Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. IANA consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
13.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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13.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix B. XML schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 39
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1. Introduction
Conservation of documents is important, one can even say that
appropriate conservation rules are a prerequisite for data to be come
a document. Conservation has several aspects, e.g., duration or
accessibility, which vary based on the nature of the document. For
example, a document may be conserved for a certain period and may be
destroyed after that, or its lifetime may be extended when the
documents becomes part of a conflict. Also, documents may become
part of historical archives. A document may be accessible on a
public or restricted basis to a set of potentially interested or
authorized entities.
The protocol described in this document enables the use of a
specialized service for conservation of electronic documents. The
service creates and delivers enough information to demonstrate the
existence, integrity and authenticity of electronic data over any
period of time. In other words, the service assumes the
responsibility to retrieve and, optionally, store data for
conservation, create and store evidence to guarantee data integrity
and completeness, and to maintain accessibility of data and evidence
created.
This document describes a protocol for interacting with a long-term
archive service (LTA). The document contains only description of a
general request and response structure, and a detailed protocol
description concerning access to an LTA. Other specifications and
descriptions, e.g. a framework protocol containing mappings to
transport and security services, are addressed elsewhere. The
protocol is intended to be used in client-server architecture, where
client is simply an end user (a physical user or another service) and
the server as an LTA.
The process of replacing paper based workflow and document handling
is known as 'dematerialization', ignoring to a certain degree the
requirements for long term stability of documents. Document
conservation is generally performed by specialized services. For
electronic formats it is proposed to use similar approaches, while
maintaining the distance of technical characteristics (paper versus
electronic). Conservation might be taken out from other workflow
activities, while the same procedures (evidence creation) might be
used for any milestone in electronic document lifecycle (e.g. version
marking).
Since conservation of documents created by one entity is only
necessary if there is a potential entity to which the document may be
presented at some time, the conservation service (LTA) acts as a
trusted third party for those two entities. The main role of an LTA
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is to generate and provide enough information for archived data
existence in time, integrity and authenticity demonstration over long
periods of time. Provision of data storage services is optional and
may be assured by supportive infrastructure (e.g. database or
document storage/management system).
Conservation is more that just storing a document. Not only, but in
particular when the life time is very long, appropriate measures to
ensure the integrity of the document must be used. This aspect is
handled by this specification. Sometimes, complete transfer of the
document information to a new physical support has to be done like
transformations from marble to paper or paper to microfilm. The need
for such transformation make the definition of what constitutes the
actual document somewhat difficult, in particular it should be done
independantly of the support, and even independantly of a current
format of the document information. Transformation of documents are
largely the scope of this specification besides the obvious
possibility of storing all formats of a document and assertions about
the transformations.
Note: This is still a very incomplete text. The abstract service and
protocol is almost finished.
Note: This document does not contain a concrete binding to lower
layers. This may be added later or defined in a separate document.
Means to exchange protocol messages are not explicitly defined.
Transport should be possible over http/soap and other protocols.
Defined data structures are presented in XSD and ASN1 forms.
1.1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Background
A conservation service or long term archive (LTA) consists of several
functional blocks. Some of these blocks are not considered by LTANS
as they present the basic infrastructure, such as the communication
network, storage device, data management, etc. Instead, an LTA
implements the archive interaction protocol as defined by this
specification (LTAP) and manages archive objects (logically
interpreted as packages of archive data and conservation attributes)
and evidence records [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers]. An LTA is a part of a
general archive service that provides evidence used to demonstrate
the existence of an archived data object at a given time and the
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integrity of the archived data object since that time. The LTA is
the primary part tasked with creating and delivering conservation
attributes for archived data.
[I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs] defines the services that must be provided by
an LTA. A pricipal function of the LTA is to generate or obtain
evidence information for (archive) data submited. It may accept data
and generate (or acquire from another service) evidence inforamtion
or it may simply act as an evidence and demonstration information
servce without data storage capabilities (it only handles evidence
and demonstration information). Evidence generated and maintained by
an LTA addresses the problems of long-term integrity and temporal
existence.
Archive objects are the central logical structures defined by the LTA
and maintained on a long-term basis. They are atomic elements of an
LTA service consisting of three logical elements. The logical
structure of an archive object consists of:
o Archive data (including meta-data or other related data) entering
the LTA using the interaction protocol,
o Archive process related meta or binding information and
o Evidence information
The archive data may contain any data type, e.g., raw data, signed
data, encrypted data or time stamped data as defined by
[I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs]. Archive data may be associated with
additional data or attributes, e.g. meta information or digital
signatures.
Data generated or collected by the LTA are archive process related
meta or binding information including demonstration information and
evidence information. Archive meta data is needed to provide enough
information for e.g. special (legal) purposes or validity
demonstration purposes (e.g. complementary information to digital
signatures). The LTA collects meta or binding information directly
from a user or some other entity (e.g. Certificate Authority). Such
information may contain the data owner name, organization, location,
etc. Meta or binding information may be submitted by the LTAP
protocol.
Demonstration information is collected to demonstrate facts on the
archive data. Such information may be digital signature reference
information. The LTA may use external resources to collect such
information usually without user intervention. Evidence data is
generated by the LTA or collected from an external resource, e.g. a
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time stamping authority. Evidence information is provided for all
data: archive data submitted by a client and archive process related
data (including binding and demonstration information) collected by
the LTA from the client or alternative resource.
The LTA performs perpetual maintenance of generated archive objects
for the main purpose of demonstrating archive data existence in time
and providing integrity information for the complete archiving time.
Archive objects are periodically processed to provide long term
stability (e.g. by proof-reading, copying to new material, or
performing time stamp renewal).
The LTAP protocol interprets the logical data structure to hold all
needed information (including references) to build an archive object
including archive data itself (or reference to archive data). The
logical structure of the LTAP messages includes archive data,
archiving process related information and references together with
request and processing information. Using LTAP, the LTA should have
enough information to build and perform operations on an archive
object(s).
3. Framework
This chapter describes a general framework for secure exchange of
request and response messages between an archive client and archive
server, e.g. an LTA. It provides a high level outline and identifies
common and external aspects from the concrete protocol data units.
3.1. Functional Overview
An LTA, as defined by [I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs], is a service that is
responsible for preserving evidence data and/or data for long periods
of time.
The service is accessible using the protocol defined in this
document. The protocol consists of two layers, the higher layer
defines the available service functions and their mapping to
encodings, the lower layer defines the rules for the exchange of
protocol messages common for all all functions.
It is assumed that an LTA ensures the long term availability of
stored data and created evidence information, as necessary, and uses
appropriate means to manage data and access rights. The details of
these important features of an LTA are outside the scope of this
specification.
The common high-level architecture consists of a protocol used to
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exchange requests and responses securely, potentially over different
types of transport connections, to ensure the long term validity of
responses.
Clients and servers use one of several object types to build requests
and responses. Data objects include raw (archive) data, request
information, meta information, identification information and
attestations.
Requests and responses are exchanged in a secure way responding to
different security requirements, which may concern the security of
the transport as well as the long term validity of the data being
exchanged.
The LTA is not a method for implementing something like a secure file
system. In general, archived data are rarely accessed, restored or
transferred. Thus, the archive operation is the most important one
and performance is an important concern. In this case that client
applications need frequenet access to the data, they generally keep a
copy of the data including evidence information, whose integrity can
be compared from time to time or when requested.
3.2. Service functions of an LTA
The primary aim of this protocol is to enable a formal interaction
between a client and an LTA. The result of the interaction is a
verifiable attestation of procedures performed by an LTA (e.g.
archive data plus evidence record). The format for data structures
used to demonstrate integrity, i.e. to demonstrate that data has not
undergone any transformations while in the care of the archive, is
partially defined in other documents, namely in [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers].
This specification does not place any requirements on the structure
of archived data objects. However, it operates on elements that are
derived from archive data objects (e.g. message imprints).
The LTA interface enables clients to perform at least the following
operations in cooperation with an LTA:
ARCHIVE: Submit data to an LTA and request creation of evidence
information for data
STATUS: Inform about the status of data.
VERIFY: Determine the integrity and validity of LTA archived data.
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EXPORT: Retrieve data (including archive data, meta information and
evidence information) from an LTA
DELETE: Remove data and/or evidence information from an LTA.
These operation form the minimal set that MUST be implemented by an
LTA service. Furthermore, there is a minimal profile for the
parameter structures for transactions with a single server that does
act as a final repository. Parameters and functions MAY be extended
in order to allow services to propose more complex operations like
data splitting or relaying.
An LTA may propose additional service either by extending the
operations by the means of additional parameters or by defining new
operations.
Often, an extension of the initial lifetime of an object must be
possible. To extend the lifetime of an object, an EXPORT operation
followed by an ARCHIVE operation has be used to transfer or copy the
object to an LTA service having the required lifetime policy/
configuration. At last, the initial object may be deleted or not.
The combination of such a sequence of operation into single one is an
example of an extended service provided to clients.
3.3. Transactions
The model for the exchange of LTAP requests and responses is borrowed
from other environments like EDI, X.400 or ebXML. It's main
caracteristic is that exchanges for LTAP are conceptually
asynchronous. As a consequence, it is necessary to provide a
mechanism to allow a client to determime that the LTA has received
and processed a request. An LTAP exchange consists of sending a
request and retrieving at least one of two different types of
responses. A client initiates an archive service by submiting a
request. This LTAP request consists of data to be archived and
information related to the archive process. The process information
may include client authorization, archive policy, service parameters,
etc. The first type of response is a technical acknowledgement from
the LTA that the request has been received and the process
information has been accepted (or rejected). The second type of
response is a statement from an LTA containing an indication of the
outcome of the requested operation. This result (called an
attestation) is, in general, a document with long term validity
allowing the client to reference the operation, and, in particular,
to reference the data that has been preserved by the LTA.
The asynchronous nature of the LTAP protocol is required by LTA
operations, which may require a specific amount of time to perform,
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e.g. the archive operation needs to safely store the data and to
produce evidence information.
The possibility to deliver the result attestation in a asynchronous
way permits cost effective implementations of the LTA.
An LTA may deliver immediately a second type response. This occurs
for example for a STATUS function or when an EXPORT operation is
retried.
A client can repeat an operation, since the request or the response
might have been lost.
For an ARCHIVE operation, the client can provide a unique
identification for the request that to be used by the LTA to ensure
idempotence of the operation. When retrying an ARCHIVE operation, a
client MAY replace the raw data to be archived by a MessageDigest
representing the data in order to reduce the payload size.
For the ARCHIVE, DELETE, VERIFY operations, after receipt of the
technical acknowledgement (first type response), the client can also
use a STATUS operation for the object in order to indirectly
determine the outcome of a transaction. Depending on the lower layer
bindings, sending a STATUS request or retrying another operation may
be the only way to determine the outcome of an archive operation.
3.4. Life cycles of objects
Using the defined transactions and the operations on object, two
levels of life cycles are defined. One is directly derived from the
operation of a single transaction. The other is related to the long
term situation of an object.
3.4.1. Transaction Level Life Cycle
When a client initiates an archive operation, client and server have
some knowledge of the progress of the operation. The following list
explains the different states of a transaction seen by both the
client and the service, and decribes actions and events changing the
state of the transaction.
T0: The client has not initiated an archive operation. The LTA does
not know anything about an object.
T1: The client has initiated an archive operation. The LTA may have
received the object or not; the client cannot assume that the TAS
has received the request. Client may retry the operation after a
timeout.
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T2: The LTA has received the request and has generated a first type
response. The server ensures idempotence of at least the ARCHIVE
operation, i.e. on multiple occurrences of an identical request,
the LTA sends the same response and transaction identification.
The LTA may still loose the state, e.g., in case of a power
failure.
T3: The client has received the initial response. The client can
retry the initial operation using the transaction identification
at the place of the data in order to receive a final answer. In
case of negative response, i.e. LTA in state T0, client can fall
back to T1.
T4: The LTA has send a definitive answer for an operation and has
assumed the responsability of operation.
T5: The client has received a definitive answer and can consider the
operation as terminated.
In case of negative reponses to a transaction, the LTA keeps the
result for a certain time in order to provide a reasonable answer to
a client that retries an operation.
3.4.2. Long term life cycle.
When an LTA has archived an object, it keeps a certain number of
metadata, which gives information about the current status of the
object. Metadata may remain available even after deleting the
object, among the remaining metadata there is the date of deletion or
an information where the information can actually be received.
We can distinguish the following phases in the lifetimes of an
archived object:
T0: The LTA has no knowledge about an object.
T1: An LTA has received an archive object and is proceeding the
request. The LTA may accept or reject the request, or may loose
knowledge about it.
T2: An LTA has archived an object. An LTA can accept other
operations, i.e., EXPORT, DELETE or VERIFY operations. When
receiving an EXPORT or VERIFY operation, some metadata may be
updated, e.g., last time of access, last verification operation
etc.
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T3: After a DELETE operation prior to the initially defined lifetime
of the operation, the LTA MAY keep an information about the actual
status of the object (e.g. deleted) until the end of the lifetime.
If available, the LTA MAY returns other remaining metadata
containing for example a new location of the data.
T4: After the lifetime of an object, an object or the reference to
is being deleted. At the end of this internal operation, the LTA
is in state T0.
With the basic operations it is not possible to extend directly the
lifetime of an object. In order to do so, a client has to read the
object and store it under a different service.
A change from state T2 can also occur when an LTA determines loss of
integrity or loss of data.
3.5. Roles, Service Types, Policies and Configurations
The protocol assumes a number of different actors playing different
roles. The basic roles are a client and a server. These roles are
simply defined by the types of protocol data units, i.e., requests
and responses. Several other roles may exist, which are currently
not in the scope of the protocol specification. An example of an
additional role is a relay or a proxy using both the basic roles of
client and server. In general two entities are distinguished, based
on different characteristics: an entity that requests its data to be
archived or to be acted upon, and an entity that accepts data and
assures responsibility of archived data, or acts on the data. Other
entities serving as a lower layer transport services, data storage
services or security services are out of the scope of protocol
definition.
Clients may occur in different roles. Besides users that archive
data, there may be relying or controlling entities like a judge who
must be able to get access to it. Or, there are entities like
auditors that may access to some data. The protocol distinguish such
roles by the definition of the following service types and service
policy information.
The LTA interface implementation MUST enable clients to perform all
five service operations.
A client implementation MAY only support a subset of the service
types in order to have a small footprint. This is motivated from the
fact that different operations are generally invoked by different
entities in totally different environments, e.g., a client may only
submit data and never verify an evidence record.
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As mentioned above, depending on the lower layer transport bindings,
a client may be required to have implemented the STATUS operation in
order to retrieve the outcome of another operation.
The way a particular operation is performed is only defined at the
LTA server side implementation and can be influenced by policy
information parameters. A client MAY indicate one or more service
policy identifiers associated to a service type in order to select
different features to be performed by the LTA. The goal of policy
identifiers is to have client configurations simple.
An LTA service may provide additional features, which may be
identified by clients, that govern how services are performed. An
LTA might offer a series of features based on quality
characteristics, e.g. number of timestamps used, refresh period, etc.
The protocol specification builds on the assumption that features are
clearly identifiable and are included in the protocol elements.
Features enable clients to request specific handling by the LTA, such
as requesting a premium service that assures prompt and immediate
archiving vs. a standard service that handles queues and generates
evidence data periodically based on data collections, i.e., one
timestamp per a document bundle. Also, services may differ according
to data storage characteristics (e.g. client may request full
evidence and storage capacity or only evidence creation service),
redundancy characteristics (single timestamp versus multiple time
stamping), etc. Service characteristics are defined by archive or
operation policies.
An LTA may use external services, like validation and evidence
creation services. Another service is provision of physical
infrastructure or data storage and management systems. Such entities
can also be referenced by service policy identifiers.
In general, for each client, in particular those that are archiving,
a default or single possible configuration is defined at the server
in order to group features and policies into defined sets. A server
may operate different configurations and from the protocol
standpoint, general configuration is selected by the policy
identificator.
As a last mechanism to provide parameters to the archive server, LTA
clients MAY use specific configuration parameters in their requests.
The definition of such parameters is not in the scope of this
protocol. Configuration parameters allow clients to transfer
arbitary key/value pairs from the client to the server.
In principle, a single sequence of policy information is sufficient
to indicate both the service type and the configuration parameters.
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A multi-dimensional approach with configuration and service types
rounds up the requirements for LTA and scenarios of archiving
processes.
This specification defines no particular policy or configuration.
3.6. Entities
Entities that participate in protocol exchanges are represented by
identifiers and may possess attributes. It is outside the scope of
this definition to define an organisation of identifiers and
attributes, in particular the way how entity identifiers are related
to identifiers used for authentication, or what attributes are
associated to data.
As the current LTAP specification assumes end-to-end communication
only, there is no distinction between technical roles like 'client,
'server', 'relay', 'proxy' or 'authorized agent'. For LTAP, only
client and server roles are defined.
The explicit usage of identifiers and attributes enables decisions to
be traceable, i.e., the participating entities can indicate to a
certain degree why they want a service or why it has been provided.
Furthermore, entity identifiers and attributes MAY be provided by the
transport or security layer information. These information can be
added to protocol elements as trace attributes.
3.6.1. Entity Identifiers
Entity identifiers are used in the protocol to indicate the
participating entities. A client can indicate one or more
identifiers indicating who is making the request or participating in
its creation and one or more identifiers indicating who should
perform the service. A server can indidate who has provided the
service and who is the indented client.
It MUST be ensured in some way that in an actual context of a client/
server network names are scalable and global both in terms of actual
community space and time to live of the treated data objects.
Identifiers are labeled in some way, i.e. string representations are
typed and can be derived from various external layers. Identifiers
SHOULD use an appropriate structure such as ASN.1 definition of
GeneralName.
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3.6.2. Attributes
Entities may possess additional attributes like roles, scopes or
capabilities. Entities MAY indicate attribute values in protocol
exchanges so that they can be used for authentication purposes or
billing.
Attributes may be related to attributes of data, for example, an
entity may acts as a judge or arbitrator for a particular
jurisdiction. The attribute jurisdiction is associated to the entity
and to data treated by the service, and thus, can be used for
authorisation control.
3.7. Data Model
The data fields of a LTAP request are as follows:
o request information or status information
o raw data to archive, or references to data or to transactions.
o metadata providing additional information about the data to
archive
o authorisation and authentication information of the entities
paticipating in the procedure
o other information, required for supporting functions like billing
3.7.1. Data objects
The data to be archived are arbitrary binary data and, minimally, an
associated type that MUST be either available as part of a server
configuration policy or explicitly indicated by the client.
Data can be referenced by identifiers. Data identifiers are used to
uniquely identify data objects. Data identifiers SHOULD have an
additional local structure (e.g., contain a checksum), in order to
avoid or detect client copying errors. An additional measure to
enhance the redundancy of identifiers is the usage of time values
which can be used in combination with data identifiers.
Servers MUST create a server-wide unique identifier for each data
object managed by the LTA. The identifier MUST be global during the
intended lifetime of an object.
Clients may provide their own data identifiers in requests. Whether
the client provided identifiers are unique is outside the scope of
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the protocol. LTAs treat these identifiers as opaque information.
In order to identify data for the short lifespan of a transaction,
artifacts can be used to reference data or transactions.
3.7.2. Collection objects
Data grouping can occur for various reasons, i.e. logical,
contextual, semantic, operational, etc. It is out of the scope of
the LTA to perform grouping for other reasons than operational, e.g.
reducing costs or improving performance or scalability. Grouping is
performed on the level of evidence creation by building hash trees as
defined in [I-D.ietf-ltans-ers]. Grouping characteristics are
defined by service policies, e.g. per user or on a daily or volume
basis. The global parameters for selecting appropriate collection
strategies are entity and policy identfiers.
Collections of data can be defined explicitly or implicitly. A
document is added to a collection using policy and entity identifiers
to request a specific collection strategy (e.g. a collection of data
that is processed on a daily basis for a specific user). A
collection identifier may be presented as an extension to an object
identifier and is intially local to one object. Adding another
object to a collection requires the identification of the initial
object and the identification of one object in the collection.
3.7.3. MetaData
Meta information is associated with archive data and can be included
implicitly, i.e. be a part of a document, or explicitly, i.e. as a
document attachment. An LTA does not interprete meta data that may
express logical relations among documents in the archive that is
submitted selectively using several requests. For LTAs, the client
is only in control of selecting and enclosing meta information, which
is logically, contextually or for any other reason related to a
document.
Meta information may occur in various forms and may be an integral
part of archive data, e.g. security attributes in form of digital
signatures. To process such information, the LTA MUST retrieve
enough information on the type and purpose of information enclosed,
which may simply be defined with the use of an apropriate archive
service policy, e.g. archive service for digitally signed documents.
An LTA may perform specific actions related to meta information
processing (and preservation, such as complementary data collection
in form of digital certificates). This can also be done by an
external service, e.g. [RFC3029] or SVCP.
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In some scenarios, a specific set of meta information must be
preserved together with archive data, e.g. information identifying
the document owner/author, location or time. The LTAP protocol does
not define constraints on information type and structure. The LTAP
request structure is defined to accept any type of data.
3.7.4. Binding Information
Clients and servers MAY include additional information in their
requests and responses concerning the lower layer binding to a
transport like SOAP, HTTP or S/MIME, i.e. end-point addresses etc.
This category may also include things like billing/accounting
information, i.e. whatever a business transaction needs but which is
not part of metadata, i.e. outside the scope of the archived data.
Note: This section needs further discussion.
3.7.5. Evidence Data
Evidence information demonstrates the integrity and existence of
archived data. The LTA accepts data for the single purpose of
generating or obtaining evidence information for data submitted by a
client. The evidence information structure is defined in
[I-D.ietf-ltans-ers].
In case the LTA accepts data only for the purpose of generating
evidence information (without storage capabilites to avoid, e.g.
confidentiality issues), the archivation process is limited in time.
When an LTA performs a renewal of evidence, archived data may be
required to be available, e.g. when renewing a hash tree. In such
scenarios, the LTA requires availability of archived data for hash
re-computation. The LTAP protocol does not support function for data
re-submission.
4. Data Types
A number of data types are common to both requests and responses. We
give definitions of data as well in XML schema notation as well as in
ASN.1. It is intended that an encoding using XML encoding rules of
the ASN.1 defined data give the same encoding as the XML Schema
defined type. We note that the ASN.1 definitions are not
automatically derived from the XSD definitions (but almost).
The following schema is defined by this text:
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XML Schema Identification
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
This text defines the following ASN.1 module.
ASN.1 Module start
LTAP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5)
ltans(11) id-mod(1) id-mod-ers(1) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
The asn.1 module exports all its identifiers and imports several
identifiers according the following definition:
ASN.1 Module Imports
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS AlgorithmIdentifier FROM AuthenticationFramework
{joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)}
4.1. Artifacts
Artificats are identifiers used to reference a transaction, or a
result of a transaction. They can be returned as a protocol answer
instead of a response, and allow to retrieve a response or progress
of a transaction later by the initial client or another authorised
entity.
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="Artifact">
<restriction base="string">
</restriction>
</simpleType>
ASN.1 definition
Artifact ::= UTF8STRING
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4.2. Message Imprint
A Message Imprint is a short representation of data which can be used
in evidences to link to some data. This is just another way of
saying that they are the result of a one way hash function applied to
some data.
We do not assume that a message imprint will always identify some
data in a unique way (which is not the case by definition of a hash
function), neither do we assume that collisions may not exist now or
in the future. We only assume that within a bounded collection of
data objects (in time and number), which are stored phyically safe,
message imprints uniquely designate other data.
Nevertheless, it is assumed that for the lifetime of protocol
exchanges, hash functions used to create message imprints are
crytographically safe.
The structure of a message imprint is a sequence of an globally
defined identification of a hash function and an representation of an
octet string encoding a value of the hash function.
Message Digests have two components, an identifier of the hash
algorithm, and a value represention the result of the hash algorithm
applied to the data.
XML Schema element
<complexType name="MessageImprint">
<sequence>
<element name="DigestAlgorithm" type="anyURI" />
<element name="DigestValue" type="base64Binary" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE {
digestAlgorithms AlgorithmIdentifier,
digestValue OCTET STRING
}
4.3. MetaData
Metadata are a list of open types which can be regarded as key/value
pairs giving addtional information about entities or data and are
related to preservation process.
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XML Schema element
<complexType name="MetaData">
<sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<element namespace="##any" processContents="lax" />
<sequence>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
Metadata ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value UTF8STRING
}
4.4. Nonce
A Nonce is an octetstring used to avoid replays of responses for the
STATUS operation. If present in a request, a server MUST respond
with a response containing the Nonce value..
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="Nonce">
<restriction base="hexBinary">
</restriction>
</simpleType>
ASN.1 Definition
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING ;
4.5. RawData
This type carries binary data to be verified, archived or returned.
A client MAY select a metadata type to indicate the type of the data.
TBD: For preservation purposes, an LTA must have information on
archive data type (e.g. signed or unsigned). If type is not
included, it is assumed that data retrived must be processed as
binary string (e.g signatures are not verifed and artifacts
collected).
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="RawData">
<restriction base="base64" />
</simpleType>
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ASN.1 Definition
RawData ::= OCTET STRING ;
4.6. DataOrTransaction
This choice type is used to identify data by:
o themselves
o an artifact identifying a transaction
o a data identifier
XML Schema element
<complexType name="DataOrTransaction">
<choice>
<element ref="RawData" / >
<element ref="Artifact" />
<element name="DataReference" type="anyURI" />
</choice>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
DataOrTransaction::= CHOICE {
raw RawData ,
artifact Artifact ,
datareference UTF8STRING
}
4.7. Data
This type is used to describe data together with metadata.
XML Schema element
<complexType name="Data">
<sequence>
<element ref="DataOrTransaction" / >
<element ref="MetaData" />
<element ref="MessageDigest />
</sequence>
</complexType>
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ASN.1 Definition
Data ::= SEQUENCE {
dataorid DataOrTransaction ,
metaData metaData ,
messageDigest MessageDigest
}
4.8. SerialNumber
Serial numbers are used to identify requests and responses. They are
represented as integers. Servers MAY add an additional verifyable
structure to identifiers, e.g. checksum digits, in order to avoid
copying errors in long term applications with potential media break.
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="SerialNumber">
<restriction base="integer" />
</simpleType>
ASN.1 Definition
SerialNumber ::= Integer ;
4.9. RequestTime
Clients and servers can add an indication of (its idea of) the time
when a request or response was created. A time value is represented
as string representation of the content of the ASN.1 type
GENERALIZEDTIME permitted to be encoded in ASN.1 distinguished
encodeing rules (DER).
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="RequestTime">
<restriction base="xs:dateTime">
<pattern
value="[\-]{0,1}\d{4}\-\d{2}\-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}.\d{3}Z"/>
<restriction>
</simpleType>
ASN.1 Definition
Time ::= GENERALIZEDTIME ;
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4.10. Version
Version is used in requests and responses to indicate the protocol
version used. This specification is provided for two values:
o v0 - This version should be used by implementation that want to
experiment with draft version of this specification.
o v1 - this version is used to indicate that the request and
response corresponds to this specification.
TBD: The purpose of version identifier.
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="Version">
<restriction base="NMTOKEN">
<enumeration value="v0"/>
<enumeration value="v1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
ASN.1 Definition
Version ::= ENUMERATED {v0(0), v1(1), ... } ;
4.11. EntityIdentifier
Entity identifiers are used in the protocol to indicate the
participating entities. A client can indicate one or more
identifiers indicating who is making the request or participating in
its creation and one or more identifiers indicating who should
perform the service. A server can indidate who has provided the
service and who is the indented client.
It MUST be ensured in some way that in an actual context of a client/
server network names are scalable and global both in terms of actual
community space and time to live of the treated data objects.
Since identifiers can be derived from various external layers an
appropriate structure in ASN.1 or XML structure is used.
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="EntityIdentifier">
<restriction base="string">
</restriction>
</simpleType>
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ASN.1 Definition
Entityidentifier ::= GeneralName ;
4.12. ServiceType
This types is an enumeration of the different operations accessible
by the protocol. This element provides an explicit general protocol
element to indicate the intended class of operation which may not
explicitely be available otherwise with policy information.
TBA: ASN.1 and XML structure need redefintion.
XML Schema element
<simpleType name="ServiceType">
<restriction base="NMTOKEN">
<enumeration value="archive" />
<enumeration value="status" />
<enumeration value="verify" />
<enumeration value="export" />
<enumeration value="delete" />
</restriction>
</simpleType>
ASN.1 Definition
ServiceType ::= ENUMERATED
{archive , status, verify , export, delete };
4.13. StatusInformation
The LTA indicate the global status of a transaction using this
enumeration type. The semantics of the values is as follows:
The response is an initial first type reponse. The request has
been technically accepted by the LTA.
The response is an second type final response from the LTA.
The response is an second type final response from the LTA. The
operation performed by the LTA but only with some modifications.
The operation has not been accepted.
In case of modifications or error, the LTA MUST also return details
using the following GeneralErrorNotice
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XML Schema element
<xs:simpleType name="StatusInformation">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="waiting" />
<xs:enumeration value="granted" />
<xs:enumeration value="grantedWithMods" />
<xs:enumeration value="rejection" />
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
ASN.1 Definition
ServiceType ::= ENUMERATED
{waiting , granted, grantedWithMods, rejection };
4.14. GeneralErrorNotice
This item is used to indicate details of the status of a transaction.
XML Schema element
<xs:element name="GeneralErrorNotice" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="GeneralErrorIdentification" type="xs:int" />
<xs:element name="GeneralErrorInformation">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:maxLength value="8192"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
ASN.1 Definition
-- TBD
4.15. RequestInformation
This data structure comprises information about the request others
that the raw data and metadata.
TBA: ASN.1 and XML Structure to be redefined.
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XML Schema element
<complexType name="RequestInformation">
<sequence>
<element name="Version" type="xs:int" fixed="1" />
<element name="Nonce" minOccurs="0" />
<element name="SerialNumber" type="xs:long" minOccurs="0" />
<element name="RequestTime"/>
<element name="RequestEntityIdentifier" />
<element name="ServerEntityIdentifier" />
<element name="ServiceType" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element name="ServicePolicyInformation"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<element name="ServiceConfiguration" minOccurs="0" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
RequestInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version DEFAULT v1 ,
nonce Nonce OPTIONAL,
serial SerialNumber OPTIONAL,
service ServiceType,
time RequestTime OPTIONAL,
requester SEQUENCE OF RequestEntityIdentifier OPTIONAL,
server SEQUENCE OF RequestEntityIdentifier OPTIONAL,
policies PolicyIdentifier
}
5. Top level protocol elements
On the top level, there are three protocol element, one is used in
requests, and the two other are either describing the successful
outcome of an operation or an error notice.
5.1. Request
This data structure describes a request made by a client. It
contains a RequestInformation data structure, as well as data or data
references. At least one of the Data and MessageDigest elements must
be provided.
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XML Schema element
<complexType name="Request">
<sequence>
<element name="RequestInformation" minOccurs="1" />
<element name="Data" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
Request::= SEQUENCE {
requestInformation RequestInformation,
theData SEQUENCE OF Data OPTIONAL
}
5.2. ErrorNotice
A server may return a general error notice indicating an important
failure with referencing the request. The element can be created
either by the service, e.g., when a request cannot be decoded, but
also by a client lower layer, e.g. when a connection cannot be
established.
XML Schema element
<complexType>
<element name="ErrorNotice" minOccurs="0">
<sequence>
<element name="ErrorIdentification" type="xs:int"/>
<element name="ErrorInformation" type="xs:string"/>
</sequence>
</element>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
ErrorNotice::= SEQUENCE {
errorIdentification INTEGER,
errorInformation BIT STIRNG,
}
5.3. OperationResponse
This structure is returned on a successful or unsuccessful operation
of the service. It references the initial request as well as the
data that had been submitted.
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XML Schema element
<complexType name="OperationResponse">
<sequence>
<element name="RequestInformation" />
<element name="Data" />
<element name="StatusInformation" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
Response::= SEQUENCE {
requestInformation RequestInformation ,
data SEQUENCE OF Data ,
serviceInformation ServiceInformation OPTIONAL
}
5.4. Response
This structure is returned on a successful or unsuccessful operation
of the service.
XML Schema element
<complexType>
<choice>
<element name="OperationResponse" >
<element name="ErrorNotice" >
</choice>
</complexType>
ASN.1 Definition
Response::= CHOICE {
response OperationResponse ,
error [0] ErrorNotice
}
6. Service Operations
This section describes in detail the different operations that a
client can initiate with a request and their outcomes. All
operations share the same data types for the input and output but the
choices are filled in differently.
For all operations, the archive service may react in the following
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ways.
o Error - The request is not understood or cannot be transmitted, an
ErrorNotice is returned.
o Acceptance - The request is accepted, an OperationResponse
indicating that the transaction is 'waiting'.
o Rejection - The request is rejected. an OperationResponse
describing the error is returned.
o Result - This a final response, an OperationResponse containing
the result of the transaction is returned.
6.1. ARCHIVE operation
The major operation of the archive service is the ARCHIVE operation.
A client prepares the data and associated metadata, and transfers the
request to the archive service
When service returns acknowledgement only as an asynchronous
notification, either the client has to perform a STATUS operation to
determine the final outcome, or service pools client with service
result status
Client builds a Request with request information including service
policy interpreting service characteristics and service configuration
parameters. Data to be archived and meta data are enclosed.
o the service type is set to "archive"
o If this is an initial request, the data are filled in with a
rawData and a messageDigest.
o If this a retry of a previous operation, the client MAY choose
either to simply repeat an identical operation, or remove the
rawData and send the messageDigest and, if provided, an artifact.
As a result the server responds with acknowledgement including
service identification and data identification (artifact and/or
message imprint is included) or service error. Server may also
include service result.
The server MAY use an artifact an optimization feature when the
StatusInformation is 'waiting', in order to simplify its processing
when the client retries the operation. When an operation is retried,
the client SHOULD use the returned artifact.
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The final response contains a data reference to be usable in other
operations concerning the same data object.
6.2. STATUS operation
A client can request the status of a data object.
Client builds a Request with request information including service
policy interpreting service characteristics and service configuration
parameters.
o The service type is set to "status".
o Data identification must be a data reference and/or a message
imprint.
In the final response, the LTA returns the current status and the
metadata for the object.
6.3. EXPORT operation
This operation allows a client to retrieve data.
o Data identification must be a data reference and/or a message
imprint.
o The service type is set to "export".
In the final response, the LTA returns data and metadata of the
object.
6.4. VERIFY operation
This operation allows a client to verify the authenticity of
information stored in the archive. Depending on the actual status of
the object and on the policy of the LTA, the LTA initiates an
internal procedure to determine the validity of the data. The LTA
MAY choose not to perform this proecdure for example if the actual
status is sufficiently recent. In this case, the operation is
identical to STATUS operation.
o Data identification must be a data reference and/or a message
imprint.
o The service type is set to "verify".
The LTA returns updated metadata of the object.
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6.5. DELETE operation
This operation allows a client to delete data or request data
shredding. After a successful operation, the the server does not
maintain any status information about the object. Note that this
does not mean that the server does not maintain a trace record of the
delete operation.
o Data identification must include data itself or data reference or
message imprint.
o The metadata MAY be set to replace the existing metadata of the
object.
o The service type is set to "delete".
The LTA returns the updated metadata (or nothing).
7. Presentation and Bindings
In the previous chapters we have presented all basic data types as
well as XSD schema as in with ASN.1. This is done in order to allow
implentations work on both data syntaxes and to be able to present
and transform messages in a defined way.
TBD: Complete data structures.
8. Security and Transport
TBD: This chapter needs rework.
TBD: LTAP requests may include security parameters in meta
information section.
TBD: Security may be provided using lower layers, e.g. XML Security
for XML syntax based requests/responses.
The protocol consists of the exchange of data objects encoded as
different CMS content types, i.e. requests and responses. These data
are optionally encapsulated by CMS content types that provide for
authentication and/or confidentiality, e.g. SignedData or
EnvelopedData.
This document describes the usage of a SignedData construct of
[RFC3852], where the content type indicated in the eContentType of
the encapContentInfo is one of the LTAP content types and the
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eContent of the encapContentInfo, carried as an octet string
containing an encoded request or response structure.
When using a SignedData structure for authentication, an LTAP request
and response MAY contain one or more SignerInfo structures, each of
which may contain countersignature attributes depending on
operational environments. When an end user client creates a request,
there is one SignerInfo. A relaying LTA MAY add an additional
signature or a countersignature attribute.
Clients and relays MUST ensure authenticity of a server when
submitting data. In order to do so, they MAY add another
encapsulation from [RFC3852] that provides for confidentiality,
and/or MAY use a secure transport layer, e.g., TLS to perform server
authentication and to ensure confidentiality of the transport.
Responses are generally protected in similar way by using a
SignedData encapsulation with one or more SignerInfos, and
CounterSignatures, depending on the number of participating servers.
The number of signatures is not related to the number of
participating servers but rather to the number of entities that may
be used to authenticate a response or part of it.
In some circumstances, a client/server communication may be secured
only by lower layer transport mechanism, e.g. SSL/TLS.
A client MUST NOT trust a response that cannot be authenticated.
Archive clients and servers MUST always create requests and responses
that can be authenticated with the explicit exception of a global
error status, which may be returned as a non-signed response.
There is no mandatory transport mechanism in this document. All
mechanisms are optional. Two examples of transport protocols are
given that allow online exchange of request and a response, and
asynchronous communication between a client and an LTA. A LTA MAY
use a combination of protocols, for example in order to return
additional responses.
Protocol via HTTP or HTTPS: This subsection specifies means for
conveying ASN.1-encoded messages for the LTAP protocol exchanges via
the HyperText Transfer Protocol. The DER encoded LTAP requests and
responses are encapsulated using a simple MIME object with Content-
Type application/ltans (and with the default binary encoding). This
MIME object can be sent and received using common HTTP or HTTPS
processing engines and provides a simple client-server transport for
ltans requests and responses.
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A server MUST understand an HTTP 1.1 request together with chunked
input of a POST request. A server SHOULD understand a Content-
Encoding value of gzip. In case of a HTTP 1.0 request and response,
a positive value Content-Length indicating the total size of the data
MUST be used. A clienst SHOULD send a Host header in the request. A
client MUST be able to react to the following status codes: TBC
Protocol using Email: This section specifies a means for conveying
ASN.1-encoded messages for the protocol exchanges described via
Internet mail. The DER encoded LTAP requests and responses are
encapsulated using a simple MIME object with Content-Type
application/ltans with an appropriate Content-Transfer-Encoding.
This MIME object can be sent and received using MIME processing
engines and provides a simple Internet mail transport for LTAP
responses.
In order to be able to associate a possible error response with a
request, the requester SHOULD use the field 'transactionIdentifier'.
The requester SHOULD not make any assumption about the usage of
message header fields by the responding service, in particular the
usage of fields like Subject, Message-ID or References.
9. Credits
This document has been created using XML2RFC ([RFC2629]).
10. Security Considerations
This section discusses addition security considerations of the
framework.
When designing an LTA service, the following considerations have been
identified that have an impact upon the validity or "trust" in the
ltans server responses.
An LTA is assumed to operate with best effort. Nevertheless, an
operation can fail or get totally lost. A client SHOULD be able to
recover from lost requests, i.e., avoid deleting data until an
attestation has been received.
It is possible for an LTA to report loss of integrity for archived
data, or simply non-existence of data which is equivalent to loss of
data. Depending on the value of the data, appropriate measures to
address these catastrophic scenarios need to be provided outside the
basic service, e.g., by using redundant copies managed either by a
client of internally of a broker type service.
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The validity of data should be checked by periodic execution of
VERIFY operations intended to ensure data with demonstratable
integrity is available throughout the lifetime of an archived data
object. The rate of refresh will be driven by a number of factors,
some of which have a direct impact of demonstration of integrity.
For example, the confidence in the strength of cryptographic
algorithms or the quality of storage devices are factors determining
the verification intervals.
Depending on the lifetime and the quality of data, relying on
cryptographic protection of data object may not be a sufficient means
to determine authenticity in time, other means may be required, e.g.
physical protection of data storage material.
It is imperative that keys used to sign responses are guarded with
proper security and controls in order to minimize the possibility of
compromise. Nevertheless, in case the private key does become
compromised, an audit trail of all the response generated by the
service SHOULD be kept as a means to help discriminate between
genuine and false responses. Aa LTA MAY provide for a service to
validate responses created by this service or another one solely
based on the audit trail.
As already indicated, when confidentiality and server authentication
is required, requests and responses MAY be protected using
appropriate mechanisms (e.g., CMS encapsulation [RFC3369] or TLS
[RFC3546]).
Server authentication is highly recommended for all service which
transfer data to a server.
Client identification and authentication MAY use services defined by
TLS ([RFC3546]) instead of, or in addition to, using a document or
message protection format, e.g. CMS.
It is possible for an LTA to report loss of integrity for archived
data, or simply non-existence of data which is equivalent to loss of
data. Depending on the value of the data, appropriate measures to
address these catastrophic scenarios need to be provided outside the
basic service, e.g., by using redundant copies managed either by a
client of internally of a broker type service.
11. IPR Patent Information
The material presented in this document was initially drafted in
2005.
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The following United States Patents related to data validation and
certification services, listed in chronological order, are known by
the authors to exist at this time. This may not be an exhaustive
list. Other patents may exist or be issued at any time.
Implementers of this protocol and applications using the protocol
SHOULD perform their own patent search and determine whether or not
any encumberences exist on their implementation. The list is
intitially taken from [RFC3029].
# 4,309,569 Method of Providing Digital Signatures
(issued) January 5, 1982
(inventor) Ralph C. Merkle
(assignee) The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University
# 5,001,752 Public/Key Date-Time Notary Facility
(issued) March 19, 1991
(inventor) Addison M. Fischer
# 5,022,080 Electronic Notary
(issued) June 4, 1991
(inventors) Robert T. Durst, Kevin D. Hunter
# 5,136,643 Public/Key Date-Time Notary Facility
(issued) August 4, 1992
(inventor) Addison M. Fischer
(Note: This is a continuation of patent # 5,001,752.)
# 5,136,646 Digital Document Time-Stamping with Catenate Certificate
(issued) August 4, 1992
(inventors) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc.
# 5,136,647 Method for Secure Time-Stamping of Digital Documents
(issued) August 4, 1992
(inventors) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc.
# 5,373,561 Method of Extending the Validity of a Cryptographic
Certificate
(issued) December 13, 1994
(inventors) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc.,
# 5,422,95 Personal Date/Time Notary Device
(issued) June 6, 1995
(inventor) Addison M. Fischer
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# 5,781,629 Digital Document Authentication System
(issued) July 14, 1998
(inventor) Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Surety Technologies, Inc.
12. IANA consideration
None.
13. References
13.1. Normative references
[I-D.ietf-ltans-ers]
Brandner, R., "Evidence Record Syntax (ERS)",
draft-ietf-ltans-ers-08 (work in progress), October 2006.
[I-D.ietf-ltans-reqs]
Wallace, C., "Long-Term Archive Service Requirements",
draft-ietf-ltans-reqs-09 (work in progress), October 2006.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3369] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3369, August 2002.
[RFC3546] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3852, July 2004.
13.2. Informative references
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
[RFC3029] Adams, C., Sylvester, P., Zolotarev, M., and R.
Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data
Validation and Certification Server Protocols", RFC 3029,
February 2001.
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Appendix A. ASN.1 module
The following ASN.1 module has been checked using the asn1c tool.
LTANS_LTAP
--OID TBD
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL maybe not --
Appendix B. XML schema
to be done.
Authors' Addresses
Aleksej Jerman Blazic
SETCCE
Jamova 39
Ljubljana SI-1000
SLOVENIA
Fax: +386 1 4773861
Email: aljosa@setcce.org
Peter Sylvester
EdelWeb
15 quai de Dion-Bouton
Puteaux F-92816
FRANCE
Fax: +33 1 40 99 14 14
Email: Peter.Sylvester@edelweb.fr
Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 37]
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Carl Wallace
Orion Security Solutions
Suite 300
1489 Chain Bridge Road
McLean, VA 22101
Fax: +1 703 9170260
Email: cwallace@orionsec.com
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Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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Jerman Blazic, et al. Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 39]
