Long-term Archive And Notary A. Jerman Blazic
Services (LTANS) SETCCE
Internet Draft S. Saljic
Intended status: Standards Track SETCCE
Expires: February 20, 2011 T. Gondrom
August 20, 2010
Extensible Markup Language Evidence Record Syntax
draft-ietf-ltans-xmlers-07.txt
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Abstract
In many scenarios, users must be able to demonstrate the (time)
existence, integrity and validity of data including signed data for
long or undetermined period of time. This document specifies XML
syntax and processing rules for creating evidence for long-term non-
repudiation of existence of data. ERS-XML incorporates alternative
syntax and processing rules to ASN.1 ERS syntax by using XML
language.
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Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................6
1.1. Motivation................................................6
1.2. General Overview and Requirements.........................8
1.3. Terminology...............................................9
1.4. Conventions Used in This Document........................11
2. Evidence Record...............................................11
2.1. Structure................................................12
2.2. Generation...............................................16
2.3. Verification.............................................17
3. Archive Time-Stamp............................................17
3.1. Structure................................................18
3.1.1. Hash Tree...........................................18
3.1.2. Time-Stamp..........................................19
3.1.3. Cryptographic Information List......................21
3.2. Generation...............................................21
3.2.1. Generation of Hash-Tree.............................22
3.2.2. Reduction of Merkle Hash-Tree.......................26
3.3. Verification.............................................28
4. Archive Time-Stamp Sequence and Archive Time-Stamp Chain......29
4.1. Structure................................................30
4.1.1. Digest Method.......................................30
4.1.2. Canonicalization Method.............................31
4.2. Generation...............................................32
4.2.1. Time-Stamp Renewal..................................32
4.2.2. Hash Tree Renewal...................................33
4.3. Verification.............................................36
5. Encryption....................................................37
6. XSD Schema for the Evidence Record............................38
7. Security Considerations.......................................43
8. IANA Considerations...........................................44
9. References....................................................47
9.1. Normative References.....................................47
9.2. Informative References...................................48
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APPENDIX A: Detailed verification process of an Evidence Record..50
Author's Addresses...............................................52
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1. Introduction
The purpose of the document is to define XML Schema and processing
rules for Evidence Record Syntax in XML format. Document is related
to initial ASN.1 syntax for Evidence Record Syntax as defined in
[RFC4998].
1.1. Motivation
The evolution of electronic commerce and electronic data exchange in
general requires introduction of non-repudiable proof of data
existence as well as data integrity and authenticity. Such data and
non-repudiable proof of existence must endure for long periods of
time, even when information to prove data existence and integrity
weakens or ceases to exist. Mechanisms such as digital signatures
defined in [RFC5652] for example do not provide absolute reliability
on a long term basis. Algorithms and cryptographic material used to
create a signature can become weak in course of time and information
needed to validate digital signatures may became compromised or
simply cease to exist due to for example decomposing certificate
service provider. Providing a stable environment for electronic data
on a long term basis requires the introduction of additional means to
continually provide an appropriate level of trust in evidence on data
existence, integrity and authenticity.
All integrity and authenticity related techniques used today suffer
from the same problem of time related reliability degradation
including techniques for Time-Stamping, which are generally
recognized as data existence and integrity proofs mechanisms. Over
long periods of time cryptographic algorithms used may become weak or
encryption keys compromised. Some of the problems might not even be
technically related like decomposing Time-Stamping authority. To
create a stable environment where proof of existence and integrity
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can endure well into the future a new technical approach must be
used.
Long term non-repudiation of data existence and demonstration of data
integrity techniques have been already introduced for example by long
term signature syntaxes like [RFC5126]. Long term signature syntaxes
and processing rules address mostly the long term endurance of
digital signatures, while Evidence Record Syntax broadens this
approach for data of any type or format including digital signatures.
The XMLERS syntax is based on Evidence Record Syntax as defined in
[RFC4998] and is addressing the same problem of long term non-
repudiable proof of data existence and demonstration of data
integrity on a long term basis. XMLERS does not supplement the
[RFC4998] specification. Following extensible markup language
standards and [RFC3470] guidelines it introduces the same approach
but in a different format and with adapted processing rules.
The use of eXtensible Markup Language (XML) format is already
recognized by a wide range of applications and services and is being
selected as the de-facto standard for many applications based on data
exchange. The introduction of Evidence Record Syntax in XML format
broadens the horizon of XML use and presents a harmonized syntax with
a growing community of XML based standards including those related to
security services such as [XMLDSig] or [XAdES].
Due to the differences in XML processing rules and other
characteristics of XML language, XMLERS does not present a direct
transformation of ERS in ASN.1 syntax. The XMLERS syntax is based on
different processing rules as defined in [RFC4998] and it does not
support for example import of ASN.1 values in XML tags. Creating
Evidence Records in XML syntax must follow the steps as defined in
this draft. XMLERS is a standalone draft and is based on [RFC4998]
conceptually only.
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Evidence Record Syntax in XML format is based on long term archive
service requirements as defined in [RFC4810]. XMLERS syntax delivers
the same (level of) non-repudiable proof of data existence as ASN.1
ERS. The XML syntax supports archive data grouping (and de-grouping)
together with simple or complex Time-Stamp renewal process. Evidence
Records can be embedded in the data itself or stored separately as a
standalone XML file.
1.2. General Overview and Requirements
XMLERS draft specifies XML syntax and processing rules for creating
evidence for long-term non-repudiation of existence of data in a unit
called "Evidence Record". The XMLERS syntax is defined to meet the
requirements for data structures as set out in [RFC4810]. This
document also refers to ASN.1 ERS specification as defined in
[RFC4998].
An Evidence Record may be generated and maintained for a single data
object or a group of data objects that form an archive object. Data
object (binary chunk or a file) may represent any kind of document or
part of it. Dependencies among data objects, their validation or any
other relationship than "a data object is a part of particular
archived object" are out of the scope of this draft.
Evidence Record maintains a close relationship to Time-Stamping
techniques. However, Time-Stamps as defined in [RFC3161], can cover
only a single unit of data and do not provide processing rules for
maintaining a long term stability of Time-Stamps applied over a data
object. Evidence for an archive object is created by acquiring a
Time-Stamp from a trustworthy authority for a specific value that is
unambiguously related to a single or more data objects. Relationship
between several data objects and a single time-stamped value is
addressed using hash-treeing, a technique first described by Merkle
[MER1980], with data structures and procedures as specified in this
document. The Evidence Record Syntax enables processing of several
archive objects within a single processing pass using a hash-treeing
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technique and acquiring only one Time-Stamp to protect all archive
objects.
Besides a Time-Stamp other artifacts are also preserved in Evidence
Record: data necessary to verify the relationship between a Time-
Stamped value and a specific data object, packed into a structure
called a "hash-tree"; and long term proofs for the formal
verification of included Time-Stamp(s).
Due to the fact that digest algorithms or cryptographic methods used
may become weak or that certificates used within a Time-Stamp (and
signed data) may be revoked or expired, the collected evidence data
must be monitored and renewed before such events occur. This document
introduces XML based syntax and processing rules for the creation and
continuous renewal of evidence data.
1.3. Terminology
Archive data object: Data unit that is archived and has to be
preserved for a long time by the Long-term Archive Service.
Archive data object group: A multitude of (archive) data objects,
which for some reason (logically) belong together, e.g. a group of
document files or a document file and a signature file could
represent an archive data object group.
Archive object: an archive data object or an archive data object
group.
Archive Time-Stamp (ATS): An Archive Time-Stamp contains a Time-Stamp
Token, useful data for validation and optionally a set of ordered
lists of hash values (a hash tree). An Archive Time-Stamp relates to
a data object, if the hash value of this data object is part of the
first hash value list of the Archive Time-Stamp or its hash value
matches the Time-Stamped value. An Archive Time-Stamp relates to a
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data object group, if it relates to every data object of the group
and no other data object.
Archive Time-Stamp Chain (ATSC): holds a sequence of Archive Time-
Stamps generated during the preservation period.
Archive Time-Stamp Sequence (ATSSeq): is a sequence of Archive Time-
Stamp Chains.
Canonicalization: Processing rules for transforming an XML document
into its canonical form. Two XML documents may have different
physical representations, but they may have the same canonical form.
For example a sort order of attributes does not change the meaning of
the document as defined in [XMLC14N].
Cryptographic Information: Data or part of data related to the
validation process of signed data, e.g. digital certificates, digital
certificate chains, certificate revocation lists, etc.
Digest Method: Digest method is an identifier for a digest algorithm,
which is a strong one-way function, for which it is computationally
infeasible to find an input that corresponds to a given output or to
find two different input values that correspond to the same output.
Digest algorithm transforms input data into a short value of fixed
length. The output is called digest value, hash value or data
fingerprint.
Evidence: Information that may be used to resolve a dispute about
various aspects of authenticity, validity and existence of archived
data objects.
Evidence Record: Collection of evidence compiled for a given archive
object over time. An Evidence Record includes ordered collection of
ATSs, which are grouped into ATSCs and ATSSeqs.
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Long-term Archive Service (LTA): A service responsible for
generation, collection and maintenance (renewal) of evidence data. A
LTA service may also preserve data for long periods of time, e.g.
storage of archive data and associated evidences.
Hash Tree: Collection of significant values of protected objects
(input data objects and generated evidence within archival period)
that are unambiguously related to the Time-Stamped value within an
Archive Time-Stamp.
Time-Stamp Token (TS): A cryptographically secure confirmation
generated by a Time-Stamping Authority (TSA) e.g. [RFC3161] which
specifies a structure for Time-Stamps and a protocol for
communicating with a Time-Stamp Authority. Besides this, other data
structures and protocols may also be appropriate, such as defined in
[ISO-18014-1.2002], [ISO-18014-2.2002], [ISO-18014-3.2004], and
[ANSI.X9-95.2005].
1.4. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Evidence Record
An Evidence Record is a unit of data, which is to be used to prove
the existence of an archive object (a single archive data object or a
archive data object group) at a certain time. Through the lifetime of
an archive object, an Evidence Record also demonstrates data objects
integrity and non-repudiability. To achieve this, cryptographic means
are used, i.e. Time-Stamp Tokens obtained from the Time-Stamping
Authority (TSA). It is possible to store Evidence Record separately
from the archive object or to integrate it into the data itself.
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As cryptographic means are used to support Evidence Records, such
records may lose their value through time. Time-Stamps obtained from
Time-Stamping Authorities may become invalid for a number of reasons,
usually due to time constrains of Time-Stamp validity. Before Time-
Stamp Tokens used become unstable, Evidence Record has to be renewed.
This may result in a series of Time-Stamp Tokens, which are linked
between themselves according to the cryptographic methods and
algorithms used.
Evidence Record can be supported with additional information, which
can be used to ease the processes of Evidence Record validation and
renewal. Information such as digital certificates and certificate
revocation lists as defined in [RFC5280] or other cryptographic
material can be collected, enclosed and processed together with
archive object data (i.e. Time-Stamped).
2.1. Structure
The Evidence Record contains one or several Archive Time-Stamps
(ATS). An ATS contains a Time-Stamp Token and optionally other useful
data for Time-Stamp validation, e.g. certificates, CRLs or OCSP
responses and also specific attributes such as service policies.
Initially, an ATS is acquired and later, before it expires or becomes
invalid a new ATS is acquired, which prolongs the validity of the
archived object (its data objects together with all previously
generated Archive Time-Stamps). This process must continue during the
desired archiving period of archive data object. A series of
successive Archive Time-Stamps is collected in Archive Time-Stamp
Chains and a series of chains in Archive Time-Stamp Sequence.
In XML syntax the Evidence Record is represented by the
<EvidenceRecord> root element, which has the following structure
(where "?" denotes zero or one occurrences, "+" denotes one or more
occurrences and "*" denotes zero or more occurrences):
<EvidenceRecord Version>
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<EncryptionInformation>
<EncryptionInformationType>
<EncryptionInformationValue>
</EncryptionInformation> ?
<ArchiveTimeStampSequence>
<ArchiveTimeStampChain Order>
<DigestMethod Algorithm />
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm />
<ArchiveTimeStamp Order>
<HashTree /> ?
<TimeStamp>
<TimeStampToken Type />
<CryptographicInformationList>
<CryptographicInformation Order Type /> +
</CryptographicInformationList> ?
</TimeStamp>
<Attributes>
<Attribute Order Type /> +
</Attributes> ?
</ArchiveTimeStamp> +
</ArchiveTimeStampChain> +
</ArchiveTimeStampSequence>
</EvidenceRecord>
The syntax of an evidence record is defined as an XML schema
[XMLSchema], see Section 6. The schema uses the following XML
namespace [XMLName] urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers as default namespace
and starts with following definition:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns ="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
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The XML tags have the following meanings:
Version attribute indicates the syntax version, for compatibility
with future revisions of this specification and to distinguish it
from earlier non-conformant or proprietary versions of the XMLERS.
Current version of the XMLERS syntax is 1.0.
<EncryptionInformation> tag is optional and holds information on
cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic material used to encrypt
archive data (in case archive data is encrypted e.g. for privacy
purposes). This optional information is needed to unambiguously re-
encrypt data objects when processing Evidence Records. When
omitted, data objects are not encrypted or non-repudiation proof is
not needed for the unencrypted data. Details on how to process
encrypted archive data and generate Evidence Record(s) are
described in Section 5.
<ArchiveTimeStampSequence> is a sequence of
<ArchiveTimeStampChain>.
<ArchiveTimeStampChain> holds a sequence of Archive Time-Stamps
generated during the preservation period. Details on Archive Time-
Stamp Chains and Archive Time-Stamp Sequences are described in
section 4. The sequences of Archive Time-Stamp Chains and Archive
Time-Stamps are ordered and the order must be indicated with
"Order" attribute of the <ArchiveTimeStampChain> and
<ArchiveTimeStamp> element.
<DigestMethod> is a required element and identifies the digest
algorithm used within one Archive Time-Stamp chain to calculate
digest values from: archive data object(s), previous Archive Time-
Stamp sequence, Time-Stamps and within a Time-Stamp Token.
<CanonicalizationMethod> is a required element that specifies the
canonicalization algorithm applied over the archive data in case of
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XML data objects, <ArchiveTimeStampSequence> or <TimeStamp> element
prior to performing digest value calculations.
<HashTree> tag holds a structure as described in section 3.1.1.
<TimeStamp> tag holds a <TimeStampToken> element with a Time-Stamp
Token provided by the Time-Stamping Authority and optional element
<CryptographicInformationList>.
<CryptographicInformationList> tag allows the storage of data
needed in the process of Time-Stamp Token validation in case when
such data is not provided by the Time-Stamp Token itself. This
could include possible trust anchors, certificates, revocation
information or the current definition of the suitability of
cryptographic algorithms, past and present. Each data object is put
into separate child element <CryptographicInformation>, having
mandatory Order attribute to indicate the order within parent
element. These items may be added based on the policy used. This
data is protected by successive Time-Stamps in the sequence of the
Time-Stamps.
<Attributes> tag contains additional information that may be
provided by an LTA used for the renewal process. An example of
additional information may be processing (renewal) policies, which
are relevant for data object(s) preservation and evidence
validation at a later stage. Each data object is put into separate
child element <Attribute>, having mandatory Order attribute to
indicate the order within parent element and optional Type
attribute to indicate processing directions.
Order attribute is mandatory in all cases when one or more XML
elements with the same name occur on the same level in the XMLERS
structure. Although most of the XML parsers will preserve order of
the sibling elements having the same name, within XML structure
there is no definition how to unambiguously define such order.
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Preserving correct order in such cases is of significant importance
for digest value calculations over XML structures.
2.2. Generation
The generation of an <EvidenceRecord> element can be described as
follows:
1. Select an archive object (a data object or a data object group) to
archive.
2. Create the initial <ArchiveTimeStamp>. This is the first ATS
within the initial <ArchiveTimeStampChain> element of the
<ArchiveTimeStampSequence> element.
3. Refresh the <ArchiveTimeStamp> when necessary by Time-Stamp
Renewal or Hash-Tree Renewal (see Section 4.).
The Time-Stamping service may be, for a large number of archived
objects, expensive and time-demanding, so the LTA may profit from
acquiring one Time-Stamp Token for many archived objects, which are
not otherwise related to each other. It is possible to collect many
archive objects, build a Merkle Hash Tree to generate a single value
to be Time-Stamped, and respectively reduce that Merkle tree to small
subsets that for each archive object provide necessary binding with
the Time-Stamped (hash) value (see Section 3.2.1).
For performance reasons or in case of local Time-Stamp generation,
hash-treeing (<HashTree> element) can be omitted. It is also possible
to convert existing Time-Stamps into ATS for renewal.
In the case that only essential parts of documents or objects shall
be protected, the application not defined in this draft must ensure
that the correct extraction of binary data is made for generation of
Evidence Record.
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Example: an application may provide also evidence such as
certificates, revocation lists etc., needed to verify and validate
signed data objects or data object group. This evidence may be added
to the archived object data group and will be protected within
initial (and successive) Time-Stamp(s).
Note that <CryptographicInformationList> element of Evidence Record
is not to be used to store and protect cryptographic material related
to signed archive data. The use of this element is limited to
cryptographic material related to TS(s).
2.3. Verification
The overall Verification of an Evidence Record can be described as
follows:
1. Select an archive object (a data object or a data object group)
2. Re-encrypt data object or data object group, if encryption field
is used (for details, see Section 5.).
3. Verify Archive Timestamp Sequence (details in Section 3.3. and
Section 4.3.).
3. Archive Time-Stamp
An Archive Time-Stamp is a timestamp with additional artifacts that
allow verification of the existence of several data objects at a
certain time.
The process of construction of an ATS must support evidence on a long
term basis and prove that the archive object existed and was
identical, at the time of the Time-Stamp, to the currently present
archive object (at the time of verification). To achieve this, ATS
must be renewed before it becomes invalid (which may happen for
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several reasons such as invalid digital certificate or decomposing
TSA).
3.1. Structure
An Archive Time-Stamp contains a Time-Stamp Token, with useful data
for its validation (cryptographic information), such as certificate
chain or certificate revocation list, an optional ordered set of
ordered lists of hash values (a hash tree) that were protected with
the Time-Stamp Token and optional information describing renewal
steps (<Attributes> element). A hash tree may be used to store data
needed to bind Time-Stamped value with protected objects by the
Archive Time-Stamp. If a hash tree is not present, ATS simply refers
to a single object; either input data object or a previous TS.
3.1.1. Hash Tree
Hash tree structure is an optional container for significant values,
needed to unambiguously relate a Time-Stamped value to protected data
objects, and is represented by the <HashTree> element. The root hash
value that is generated from the values of the hash tree MUST be the
same as the Time-Stamped value.
<HashTree>
<Sequence Order>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded hash value</DigestValue> +
</Sequence> +
</HashTree>
The algorithm by which a root hash value is generated from the
<HashTree> element is as follows: content of each <DigestValue>
element within the first <Sequence> element is base64 decoded to
obtain a binary value (hash value). Collected hash values are ordered
in binary ascending order, concatenated and a new hash value is
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generated from that string (there is exception when the first
<Sequence> element has one <DigestValue> element, then its binary
value is added to the next list obtained from the next <Sequence>
element). Newly generated hash value is added to the next list of
hashes obtained from the next <Sequence> element and the previous
step is repeated until there is only one hash value left, i.e. when
there are no <Sequence> elements left, the last generated hash value
is the root hash value. When an archive object is composed of more
than one data object, the first hash list MUST contain hash values of
all its data objects. When a single Time-Stamp is obtained for a
group of archive objects, a Merkle Hash Tree MUST be constructed to
generate a single hash value to bind all archive objects from that
group and then a reduced hash tree MUST be extracted from a Merkle
hash tree for each archive object respectively (see Section 3.2.1).
For example: A SHA-1 digest value is a 160-bit string. The text value
of the <DigestValue> element shall be the base64 encoding of this bit
string viewed as a 20-octet octet stream. For example, the text value
of a <DigestValue> element for the message digest A9993E36 4706816A
BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D would be:
<DigestValue>qZk+NkcGgWq6PiVxeFDCbJzQ2J0=</DigestValue>
3.1.2. Time-Stamp
Time-Stamp Token is an attestation generated by a TSA that a data
item existed at a certain time. The Time-Stamp Token is a signed data
object that contains the hash value, the identity of the TSA, and the
exact time (obtained from trusted time source) of Time-Stamping. This
proves that the given data existed before the time of Time-Stamping.
For example, [RFC3161] specifies a structure for signed Time-Stamp
Tokens in ASN.1 format. Since at the time being there is no standard
for an XML Time-Stamp, the following structure example is provided
(referring to the Entrust XML Schema for Time-Stamp
http://www.entrust.com/schemas/timestamp19protocol-20020207), which
is a digital signature compliant to [XMLDSig] specification
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containing Time-Stamp specific data, such as Time-Stamped value and
time within <Object> element of a signature.
<element name="TimeStampInfo">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ts:Policy" />
<element ref="ts:Digest" />
<element ref="ts:SerialNumber" minOccurs="0" />
<element ref="ts:CreationTime" />
<element ref="ts:Accuracy" minOccurs="0" />
<element ref="ts:Ordering" minOccurs="0" />
<element ref="ts:Nonce" minOccurs="0" />
<element ref="ts:Extensions" minOccurs="0" />
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
A <TimeStamp> element of ATS holds a complete structure of Time-Stamp
Token as provided by a TSA. Time-Stamp Token may come in XML or ASN.1
format. Attribute Type must be used to indicate format for processing
purposes, with values XMLENTRUST and RFC3161 respectively For RFC3161
type of a Time-Stamp Token, <TimeStamp> element must contain base64
encoding of a DER-encoded ASN1 data. These type values have been
registered by IANA (see Section 8). It may be necessary to register
further types not given in this section (in particular, for future
XML standards).
For example:
<TimeStamp Type="RFC3161">MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEH...</TimeStamp>
or
<TimeStamp Type="XMLENTRUST"><dsig:Signature>...</dsig:Signature>
</TimeStamp>.
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3.1.3. Cryptographic Information List
Digital certificates, CRLs, SCVP or OCSP-Responses needed to verify
the Time-Stamp Token should be stored in the Time-Stamp Token itself.
When this is not possible, such data may be stored in
<CryptographicInformationList> element, each data object into a
separate <CryptographicInformation> element, using a mandatory Order
attribute.
The attribute Type is mandatory and is used to store processing
information about type of stored cryptographic information. Following
values SHOULD be used as identifiers for the Type attribute: CRL,
OCSP, SCVP or CERT, and for each type the content must be encoded
respectively:
o for type CRL, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded X.509 CRL
[RFC5280];
o for type OCSP, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded OCSPResponse
[RFC2560];
o for type SCVP, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded CVResponse;
[RFC5055];
o for type CERT, a base64 encoding of a DER-encoded X.509
certificate [RFC5280];.
These values have been registered by IANA (see Section 8). It may be
necessary to register further types not given in this section (in
particular, for future validation standards).
3.2. Generation
Initial ATS relates to a data object or a data object group that
represents an archive object. The generation of the initial ATS
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element can be done in a single process pass for one or for many
archived objects, described as follows:
1. Collect one or more archive objects to be Time-Stamped.
2. Select a canonicalization method C to be used for obtaining binary
representation of archive data and for Archive Time-Stamp at a
later stage in renewing process (see section 4). Note that
selected canonicalization method MUST be used also for archive
data when data is represented in XML format.
3. Select a valid digest algorithm H. Selected secure hash algorithm
MUST be the same as hash algorithm used in the Time-Stamp Token
and for the hash tree computations.
4. Generate a hash tree for selected archive object (see 3.2.1).
Hash tree may be omitted in the initial ATS, when an archive
object has a single data object; then the Time-Stamped value must
match the digest value of that single data object.
5. Acquire Time-Stamp token from TSA for root hash value of a hash
tree (see 3.1.1). If the Time-Stamp token is valid, the initial
Archive Time-Stamp may be generated.
3.2.1. Generation of Hash-Tree
The <DigestValue> elements within the <Sequence> element MUST be
ordered in binary ascending order to ensure correct calculation of
digest values at time of renewal and later for verification purposes.
Note, that the text value of <DigestValue> element is base64 encoded,
so it MUST be base64 decoded in order to obtain a binary
representation of the hash value.
Hash tree MUST be generated when the Time-Stamped value is not equal
to the hash value of the input data object. This is the case:
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1. When an archive object is having more than one data object, its
digest value is the digest value of binary ascending ordered and
concatenated digest values of all its containing data objects.
Note that in this case the first list of the hash tree MUST
contain hash values of all data objects and only those values.
2. When for more than one archive object a single Time-Stamp Token is
generated, then the hash-tree is a reduced hash tree extracted
from Merkle Hash-Tree for that archive object (see Section 3.2.2).
The Merkle Hash-Tree for a group of archive objects is built from
bottom to the root. First are collected the leaves of the tree. The
leaves represent digest values of archive objects:
1. Collect archive objects and for each archive object its
corresponding data objects.
2. Chose a secure hash algorithm H and calculate digest values for
the data objects and put them into the input list for the Merkle
Hash-Tree as follows: a digest value of an archive object is the
digest value of its data object, if there is only one data object;
for more than one data object a digest value is the digest value
of binary sorted, concatenated digest values of all its containing
data objects.
Note that for archive objects having more than one data object,
lists of their sub-digest values are stored and later, when
creating a reduced hash-tree for that archive object, they will
became members of the first hash list.
3. Group together items in the input list by N (e.g. to make binary
tree group in pairs) and for each group: binary ascending sort,
concatenate and calculate hash values. The result is a new input
list.
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4. Repeat step 3, until only one digest value is left; this is the
root value of the Merkle Hash-Tree, which is Time-Stamped.
Note that selected secure hash algorithm MUST be the same as the one
defined in the <DigestMethod> element of the ATSChain.
Example: An input list with 18 hash values, where the h'1 is
generated for a group of data objects (d4, d5, d6 and d7) and has
been grouped by 3. The group could be of any size (2, 3...). It is
also possible to extend the tree with "dummy" values; to make every
node have the same number of children.
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----------
d1 -> h1 \
\
G1 d2 -> h2 |-> h''1
+--------+ / \
|d4 -> h4|\ d3 -> h3 / \
|d5 -> h5| \ ---------- |
| | | -> h'1\ |
|d6 -> h6| / \ |
|d7 -> h7|/ d8 -> h8 |-> h''2 |-> h'''1
+--------+ / | \
d9 -> h9 / | \
---------- | |
d10 -> h10\ / |
\ / |
d11 -> h11 |-> h''3 |
/ |
d12 -> h12/ |-> root hash value
---------- |
d13 -> h13\ |
\ |
d14 -> h14 |-> h''4 |
/ \ /
d15 -> h15/ \ /
---------- |-> h'''2
d16 -> h16\ /
\ /
d17 -> h17 |-> h''5
/
d18 -> h18/
----------
Figure 1 Generation of the Merkle Hash-Tree.
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Note that there are no restrictions on the quantity of hash value
lists and of their length. Also note that it is profitable but not
required to build Merkle Hash-tree and reduce hash-trees. An Archive
Time-Stamp may consist only of one list of hash values and a Time-
Stamp or in the extreme case, only a Time-Stamp with no hash value
lists.
3.2.2. Reduction of Merkle Hash-Tree
The generated Merkle Hash-Tree can be reduced to lists of hash
values, necessary as a proof of existence for a single archive object
as follows:
1. For a selected archive object (AO) select its hash value h within
the leaves of the Merkle Hash-Tree.
2. Put h as base64 encoded text value of a new <DigestValue> element
within a first <Sequence> element. If selected AO is having more
than one data object, the first <Sequence> element MUST be in this
case formed from the hash values of all AO's data objects, each
within separate <DigestValue> element.
3. Select all hash values, which have the same father node as hash
value h. Place these hash values each as a base64 encoded text
value of a new <DigestValue> element within a new <Sequence>
element, increasing its Order attribute value by 1.
4. Repeat step 3 for the parent node until the root hash value is
reached, with each step create a new <Sequence> element and
increase its Order attribute by one. Note that node values are not
saved as they are computable.
The order of <DigestValue> elements within each <Sequence> element
MUST be binary ascending (by base64 decoded values).
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Reduced Hash tree for data object d4 (from the previous example,
presented in Figure 1):
<HashTree>
<Sequence Order=1>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h4</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h5</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h6</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h7</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
<Sequence Order=2>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h8</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h9</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
<Sequence Order=3>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h''1</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h''3</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
<Sequence Order=4>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h'''2</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
</HashTree>
Reduced Hash tree for data object d2 (from the previous example,
presented in Figure 1):
<HashTree>
<Sequence Order=1>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h2</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
<Sequence Order=2>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h1</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h3</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
<Sequence Order=3>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h''2</DigestValue>
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<DigestValue>base64 encoded h''3</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
<Sequence Order=4>
<DigestValue>base64 encoded h'''2</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
</HashTree>
3.3. Verification
The initial Archive Timestamp shall prove that an archive object
existed at a certain time, indicated by its Time-Stamp token.
Verification procedure is as follows:
1. Identify hash algorithm H (from <DigestMethod> element) and
calculate hash value for each data object of the archive object.
2. If the hash-tree is present, search for hash values in the first
<Sequence> element. If hash values are not present, terminate
verification process with negative result. If an additional proof
is necessary that the Archive Time-Stamp relates to a data object
group (e.g. a document and all its digital signatures), it can
also be verified that only the hash values of the given data
objects are in the first hash-value list.
3. If the hash-tree is present, calculate its root hash value.
Compare the root hash value with the Time-Stamped value. If not
equal, terminate verification process with negative result.
4. If the hash-tree is omitted, compare the hash value of the single
data object with the Time-Stamped value. If not equal, terminate
verification process with negative result. If an archive object is
having more data objects and the hash tree is omitted, also exit
with negative result.
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5. Check the validity of the Time-Stamp token. If the needed
information to verify formal validity of the Time-Stamp token is
not found within the <TimeStampToken> element or within
<CryptographicInformationList> element, exit with a negative
result.
4. Archive Time-Stamp Sequence and Archive Time-Stamp Chain
An Archive Time-Stamp proves the existence of single data objects or
data object group at a certain time. However, the initial Evidence
Record created can become invalid due to decomposing validity of
Time-Stamp Token for a number of reasons: hash algorithms or public
key algorithms used in its hash tree or the Time-Stamp may become
weak or the validity period of the timestamp authority certificate
expires or is revoked.
To preserve the validity of Evidence Record before such events occur,
Evidence Record has to be renewed. This can be done by creating a new
ATS. Depending on the reason for renewing Evidence Record (the Time-
Stamp becomes invalid or the hash algorithm of the hash tree becomes
weak) two types of renewal processes are possible:
o Time-Stamp renewal: For this process a new Archive Time-Stamp is
generated, which is applied over last Time-Stamp created. The
process results in a series of Archive Time-Stamps which are
contained within a single Archive Time-Stamp Chain (ATSC).
o Hash-tree renewal: For this process a new Archive Time-Stamp is
generated, which is applied over all existing Time-Stamps and data
objects. Newly generated Archive Time-Stamp is placed in a new
Archive Time-Stamp Chain. The process results in a series of
Archive Time-Stamps Chains which are contained within a single
Archive Time-Stamp Sequence (ATSS).
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After renewal process, only the most recent (i.e. the last generated)
Archive Time-Stamp has to be monitored for expiration or decomposing
validity.
4.1. Structure
Archive Time-Stamp Chain and Archive Time-Stamp Sequence are
containers for sequences of archive Time-Stamp(s) which are generated
through renewal processes. Renewal process results in a series of
Evidence Record elements: <ArchiveTimeStampSequence> element contains
an ordered sequence of <ArchiveTimeStampChain> elements and
<ArchiveTimeStampChain> element contains an ordered sequence of
<ArchiveTimeStamp> elements. Both elements MUST be sorted by time of
the Time-Stamp in ascending order. Order is indicated by the Order
attribute.
When Archive Time-Stamp must be renewed, a new <ArchiveTimeStamp>
element is generated and depending on the generation process, it is
either placed:
o as the last <ArchiveTimeStamp> child element in a sequence of the
last <ArchiveTimeStampChain> element in case of Time-Stamp renewal
or
o as the first <ArchiveTimeStamp> child element in a sequence of the
newly created <ArchiveTimeStampChain> element in case of hash-tree
renewal.
The ATS with the largest Order attribute value within the ATSC with
the largest Order attribute value is the latest ATS and must be valid
at the present time.
4.1.1. Digest Method
Digest method is a required element that identifies the digest
algorithm used to calculate hash values of archive data (and node
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values of hash tree). Digest method is specified in the
<ArchiveTimeStampChain> element by required <DigestMethod> element
and indicates the digest algorithm that MUST be used for all hash
value calculations related to the Archive Time-Stamps within Archive
Time-Stamp chain.
The Algorithm attribute contains URIs for identifiers and those must
be used as defined in [RFC3275] and [RFC4051]. For example when SHA-1
algorithm is used, algorithm identifier is:
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
Digest algorithms used for Evidence Record must be equal to the
algorithms used for Time-Stamp Token(s) within a single ATSC. When
algorithms used by TSA are changed (e.g. upgraded) a new ATSC must be
started using equal or stronger digest algorithm.
4.1.2. Canonicalization Method
Prior to hash value calculations of an XML element, a proper binary
representation must be extracted from its (abstract) XML data
presentation. The binary representation is determined by UTF-8
encoding and canonicalization of the XML element. The XML element
includes the entire text of the start and end tags as well as all
descendant markup and character data (i.e., the text and sub-
elements) between those tags.
<CanonicalizationMethod> is a required element that identifies the
canonicalization algorithm used to obtain binary representation of an
XML element(s). Algorithm identifiers (URIs) must be used as defined
in [RFC3275] and [RFC4051]. For example when Canonical XML 1.0 (omits
comments) is used, algorithm identifier is
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=" http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-
xml-c14n-20010315"/>.
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Canonicalization MUST be applied over XML structured archive data and
MUST be applied over elements of Evidence Record (namely ATS and ATSC
in the renewing process).
Canonicalization method is specified in the <Algorithm> attribute of
the <CanonicalizationMethod> element within <ArchiveTimeStampChain>
element and indicates the canonicalization method that MUST be used
for all binary representations of the Archive Time-Stamps within that
Archive Time-Stamp chain. In case of succeeding ATSC the
canonicalization method indicated within the ATSC must also be used
for calculation of digest value of preceding ATSC. Note that
canonicalization method is unlikely to change over time as it does
not impose the same constrains as digest method. In theory, the same
canonicalization method can be used for a single Archive Time-Stamp
Sequence. Although alternative canonicalization methods may be used,
it is recommended to use the c14n-20010315.
4.2. Generation
Before the cryptographic algorithms used within the most recent
Archive Time-Stamp become weak or the Time-Stamp certificates are
invalidated, Archive Time-Stamps have to be renewed by generating a
new Archive Time-Stamp.
4.2.1. Time-Stamp Renewal
In case of Time-Stamp renewal, i.e. if the digest algorithm (H) to be
used in the renewal process is the same as digest algorithm (H') used
in the last Archive Time-Stamp, the complete content of the last
<TimeStamp> element MUST be Time-Stamped and new <ArchiveTimeStamp>
element created as follows:
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1. If the current <ArchiveTimeStamp> element does not contain needed
proof for long-term formal validation of its Time-Stamp Token
within the <TimeStamp> element, collect needed data such as root
certificates, certificate revocation lists, etc., and include them
in <CryptographicInformationList> element of the last Archive
Time-Stamp (each data object into a separate
<CryptographicInformation> element).
2. Select canonicalization method from <CanonicalizationMethod>
element and select digest algorithm from <DigestMethod> element.
Calculate hash value from binary representation of the <TimeStamp>
element of the last <ArchiveTimeStamp> element including added
cryptographic information. Acquire the Time-Stamp for the
calculated hash value. If the Time-Stamp is valid, the new Archive
Time-Stamp may be generated.
3. Increase the value order of the new ATS by one and place the new
ATS into the last <ArchiveTimeStampChain> element.
The new ATS and its hash tree MUST use the same digest algorithm as
the preceding one, which is specified in the <DigestMethod> element
within <ArchiveTimeStampChain> element. Note that the new ATS MAY not
contain hash-tree. However, Time-Stamp Renewal process may be
optimized to acquire one Time-Stamp for many Archive Time-Stamps
using the Merkle Hash Tree. Note that each hash of the <TimeStamp>
element is treated as the document hash in Section 3.2.1.
4.2.2. Hash Tree Renewal
The process of hash tree renewal occurs when the new digest algorithm
is different to the one used in the last Archive Time-Stamp (H <>
H'). In this case the complete Archive Time-Stamp Sequence and the
archive data objects covered by existing Archive Time-stamp must be
Time-Stamped as follows:
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1. Select one or more archive objects to be renewed and theirs
current <ArchiveTimeStamp> elements.
2. For each archive object check the current <ArchiveTimeStamp>
element. If it does not contain needed proof for long-term formal
validation of its Time-Stamp Token within the Time-Stamp Token,
collect needed data such as root certificates, certificate
revocation lists, etc., and include them in
<CryptographicInformationList> element of the last Archive Time-
Stamp (each data object into a separate <CryptographicInformation>
element).
3. Select a canonicalization method C and select a new secure hash
algorithm H.
4. For each archive object select its data objects d(i). Generate
hash values h(i) = H(d(i)), for example: h(1), h(2).., h(n).
5. For each archive object calculate a hash hseq=H(ATSSeq) from
binary representation of the <ArchiveTimeStampSequence> element,
corresponding to that archive object. Note that Archive Time-Stamp
Chains and Archive Time-Stamps MUST be chronologically ordered,
each respectively to its Order attribute, and that the
canonicalization method C MUST be applied.
6. For each archive object sort in binary ascending order and
concatenate all h(i) and the hseq. Generate a new digest value
h(j)=H(h(1)..h(n),hseq).
7. Build a new Archive Time-Stamp for each h(j) (hash tree generation
and reduction is defined in sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.2.). Note that
each h(j) is treated as the document hash in section 3.2.1. The
first hash value list in the reduced hash tree should only contain
h(i) and hseq.
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8. Create new <ArchiveTimeStampChain> containing the new
<ArchiveTimeStamp> element (with order number 1), and place it
into the existing <ArchiveTimeStampSequence> as a last child with
the order number increased by one.
Example for an archive object with 3 data objects: Select a new hash
algorithm and canonicalization method. Collect all 3 data objects and
currently generated Archive Time-Stamp sequence.
AO
/ | \
d1 d2 d3
ATSSeq
ATSChain1: ATS0, ATS1
ATSChain2: ATS0, ATS1, ATS2
The hash values MUST be calculated with the new hash algorithm H for
all data objects and for the whole ATSSeq. Note, that ATSSeq MUST be
chronologically ordered and canonicalized before retrieving its
binary representation.
When generating the hash tree for the new ATS, the first sequence
become values: H(d1), H(d2),..., H(dn), H(ATSSeq). Note: hash values
MUST be sorted in binary ascending order.
<HashTree>
<Sequence Order=1>
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<DigestValue>H(d1)</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>H(d2)</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>H(d3)</DigestValue>
<DigestValue>H(ATSSeq)</DigestValue>
</Sequence>
</HashTree>
Note that if the group processing is being performed, the hash value
of the concatenation of the first sequence is an input hash value
into the Merkle Hash Tree.
4.3. Verification
An Evidence Record shall prove that an archive object existed and has
not been changed from the time of the initial Time-Stamp Token within
the first ATS. In order to complete the non-repudiation proof for an
archive object, the last ATS has to be valid and ATSCs and their
relations to each other have to be proved:
1. Select archive object and re-encrypt its data object or data
object group, if <EncryptionInformation> field is used. Select the
initial digest algorithm specified within the first Archive Time-
Stamp Chain and calculate hash value of the archive object. Verify
that the initial Archive Time-Stamp contains (identical) hash
value of the AO's data object (or hash values of AO's data object
group). Note that when Hash-tree is omitted, calculated AO's value
MUST match the Time-Stamped value.
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2. Verify each Archive Time-Stamp Chain and each Archive Time-Stamp
within. If the hash-tree is present within the second and the next
Archive Time-Stamps of an Archive Time-Stamp Chain, the first
<Sequence> MUST contain the hash value of the <TimeStamp> element
before. Each Archive Time-Stamp MUST be valid relative to the time
of the succeeding Archive Time-Stamp. All Archive Time-Stamps with
the Archive Time-Stamp Chain MUST use the same algorithm, which
was secure at the time of the first Archive Time-Stamp of the
succeeding Archive Time-Stamp Chain.
3. Verify that the first hash value list of the first Archive Time-
Stamp of all succeeding Archive Time-Stamp Chains contains hash
values of data object and the hash value of Archive Time-Stamp
Sequence of the preceding Archive Time-Stamp Chains. Verify that
Archive Time-Stamp was created when the last Archive Time-Stamp of
the preceding Archive Time-Stamp Chain was valid.
4. To prove the Archive Time-Stamp Sequence relates to a data object
group, verify that the first Archive Time-Stamp of the first
Archive Time-Stamp Chain does not contain other hash values in its
first hash value list (than the hash values of those data
objects).
For non-repudiation proof for the data object, the last Archive Time-
Stamp MUST be valid at the time of verification process.
5. Encryption
In some archive services scenarios it may be required that clients
send encrypted data only, preventing information disclosure to third
parties, such as archive service providers. In such scenarios it must
be clear that Evidence Records generated refer to encrypted data
objects. Evidence Records in general protect the bit-stream (or
binary representation of XML data) which freezes the bit structure at
the time of archiving. Encryption schemes in such scenarios cannot be
changed afterwards without losing the integrity proof. Therefore, an
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ERS record must hold and preserve encryption information in a
consistent manner.
Encryption is a two way process, whose result depends on the
cryptographic material used, e.g. encryption keys and encryption
algorithms. Encryption and decryption keys as well as algorithms must
match in order to reconstruct the original message or data that was
encrypted. When different cryptographic material is used, the results
may not be the same, i.e. decrypted data does not match the original
(unencrypted) data. In cases when evidence was generated to prove the
existence of encrypted data the corresponding algorithm and
decryption keys used for encryption must become a part of the
Evidence Record and is used to unambiguously represent original
(unencrypted) data that was encrypted.
Cryptographic material may also be used in scenarios when a local
copy of encrypted data submitted to the archive service provider for
preservation is kept in an unencrypted form by a client. In such
scenarios cryptographic material is used to re-encrypt unencrypted
data kept by a client for the purpose of performing validation of
Evidence Record, which is related to the encrypted form of client's
data.
The attribute Type within <EncrytionInformation> element is optional
and is used to store processing information about type of stored
encryption information, e.g. encryption algorithm or encryption key.
The use of encryption elements heavily depends on the cryptographic
mechanism and has to be defined by other specification.
6. XSD Schema for the Evidence Record
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
elementFormDefault="qualified"
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attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:element name="EvidenceRecord" type="EvidenceRecordType"/>
<!-- TYPE DEFINITIONS-->
<xs:complexType name="EvidenceRecordType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="EncryptionInformation"
type="EncryptionInfo" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="ArchiveTimeStampSequence"
type="ArchiveTimeStampSequenceType"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Version" type="xs:string" use="required"
fixed="1"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="EncryptionInfo">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="EncryptionInfoType" type="ObjectIdentifier"/>
<xs:element name="EncryptionInfoValue">
<xs:complexType mixed="true">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="ArchiveTimeStampSequenceType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="ArchiveTimeStampChain" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="DigestMethod"
type="DigestMethodType"/>
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<xs:element name="CanonicalizationMethod"
type="CanonicalizationMethodType"/>
<xs:element name="ArchiveTimeStamp"
type="ArchiveTimeStampType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="ArchiveTimeStampType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="HashTree" type="HashTreeType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="TimeStamp" type="TimeStampType"/>
<xs:element name="Attributes" type="Attributes" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="DigestMethodType" mixed="true">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace="##other" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="CanonicalizationMethodType" mixed="true">
<xs:sequence minOccurs="0">
<xs:any namespace="##any" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
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<xs:complexType name="TimeStampType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="TimeStampToken">
<xs:complexType mixed="true">
<xs:complexContent mixed="true">
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any processContents="skip" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:string"
use="required"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="CryptographicInformationList"
type="CryptographicInformationType" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="HashTreeType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Sequence" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="DigestValue" type="xs:base64Binary"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
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<xs:complexType name="Attributes">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Attribute" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:complexType mixed="true">
<xs:complexContent mixed="true">
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any processContents="skip" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:string"
use="optional"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="CryptographicInformationType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="CryptographicInformation"
maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:complexType mixed="true">
<xs:complexContent mixed="true">
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any processContents="skip" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Order" type="OrderType"
use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:string"
use="required"/>
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</xs:restriction>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="ObjectIdentifier">
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<xs:pattern value="[0-2](\.[1-3]?[0-9]?(\.\d+)*)?"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="OrderType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:int">
<xs:minInclusive value="1"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
7. Security Considerations
Secure Algorithms
Cryptographic algorithms and parameters that are used within Archive
Time-Stamps must always be secure at the time of generation. This
concerns the hash algorithm used in the hash lists of Archive
Timestamp as well as hash algorithms and public key algorithms of the
timestamps. Publications regarding security suitability of
cryptographic algorithms ([NIST.800-57-Part1.2006] and [ETSI TS 102
176-1 V2.0.0]) have to be considered by verifying components. A
generic solution for automatic interpretation of security suitability
policies in electronic form is not the subject of this specification.
Redundancy
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Evidence Records may become affected by weakening cryptographic
algorithms even before this is publicly known. Retrospectively this
has an impact on Archive Time-Stamps generated and renewed during
the archival period. In this case the validity of Evidence Records
created may end without any options for retroactive action.
Many TSAs are using the same cryptographic algorithms. While
compromise of a private key of a TSA may compromise the security of
only one TSA (and only on Archive Time-Stamp for example), weakening
cryptographic algorithms used to generate Time-Stamp Tokens would
affect many TSAs at the same time.
To manage such risks and to avoid the loss of Evidence Record
validity due to weakening cryptographic algorithms used, it is
recommended to generate and manage at least two redundant Evidence
Records for a single data object. In such scenarios Redundant
Evidence Records must use different hash algorithms within Archive
Time-Stamp Sequences and different TSAs using different
cryptographic algorithms for Time-Stamp Tokens.
Secure Time-Stamps
Archive Time-Stamps depend upon the security of normal Time-Stamping
provided by TSA and stated in security policies. Renewed Archive
Time-Stamps should have the same or higher quality as the initial
Archive Time-Stamp of archive data. Archive Time-Stamps used for
signed archive data should have the same or higher quality than the
maximum quality of the signatures.
8. IANA Considerations
This document defines the XML namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:ers"
according to the guidelines in [RFC3688]. This namespace has been
registered in the IANA XML Registry.
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This document defines an XML schema (see Section 6) according to the
guidelines in [RFC3688]. This XML schema has been registered in the
IANA XML Registry and can be identified with the URN
"urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:ers".
This specification creates a new IANA registry entitled "XML Evidence
Record Syntax (ERSXML)". This registry contains two sub-registries
entitled "Time-Stamp Token Type" and "Cryptographic Information
Type". The policy for future assignments to the both sub-registries
is "RFC Required".
The sub-registry "Time-Stamp Token Type" contains textual names and
description, which should refer to specification or standard defining
that type. It serves as assistance when validating a time-stamp
token.
When registering a new time-stamp token type, the following
information MUST be provided:
o The textual name of the time-stamp token type (value)
o A reference to a publicly available specification that defines the
time-stamp token type (description)
The initial values for the "Time-Stamp Token Type" sub-registry are:
Value Description Reference
----- ------------- ------------------------
RFC3161 RFC3161 Time-Stamp RFC 3161
Token
XMLENTRUST EnTrust XML Schema http://www.entrust.com
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/schemas/timestamp
19protocol-20020207
The sub-registry "Cryptographic Information Type" contains textual
names and description, which should refer to specification or
standard defining that type. It serves as assistance when validating
cryptographic information such as digital certificates, CRLs or OCSP-
Responses.
When registering a new cryptographic information type, the following
information MUST be provided:
o The textual name of the cryptographic information type (value)
o A reference to a publicly available specification that defines the
cryptographic information type (description)
The initial values for the "Cryptographic Information Type" sub-
registry are:
Value Description Reference
----- ------------------ -----------------
CERT DER-encoded X.509 Certificate RFC 5280
CRL DER-encoded X.509 RFC 5280
Certificate Revocation List
OCSP DER-encoded OCSPResponse RFC 2560
SCVP DER-encoded SCVP response RFC 5055
(CVResponse)
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BPC 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
[RFC3161] Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp
Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., "XML-Signature Syntax
and Processing", RFC 3275, March 2002.
[RFC4051] Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource
Identifiers", RFC 4051, April 2005.
[RFC4998] Gondrom, T., Brandner, R., Pordesch, U., "Evidence Record
Syntax (ERS)", RFC 4998, August 2007.
[RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D. and Polk,
W., "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)",
RFC 5055, December 2007
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farell, S., Boyen, S., Housley,
R.,Polk, W., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
RFC 5280, May 2008.
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[XMLC14N] Boyer, J., "Canonical XML", W3C Recommendation, March 2001.
[XMLDSig] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., Hirsch, F., Roessler,
T., "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", XMLDSig, W3C
Recommendation, July 2006.
[XMLName] Layman, A., Hollander, D., Tobin, R., and T. Bray,
"Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Second Edition)", W3C
Recommendation, August 2006.
[XMLSchema] Thompson, H., Beech, D., Mendelsohn, N., and M. Maloney,
"XML Schema Part 1: Structures Second Edition", W3C
Recommendation, October 2004.
9.2. Informative References
[ETSI TS 102 176-1 V2.0.0] ETSI, "Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for Secure
Electronic Signatures; Part 1: Hash functions and
asymmetric algorithms", ETSI TS 102 176-1 V2.0.0 (2007-11),
November 2007.
[MER1980] Merkle, R., "Protocols for Public Key Cryptosystems,
Proceedings of the 1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA)", pages 122-134, April 1980.
[RFC3470] Hollenbeck, S., Rose, M., Masinter, L., "Guidelines for the
Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) within IETF
Protocols", RFC 3470, January 2003.
[RFC4810] Wallace, C., Pordesch, U., Brandner, R., "Long-Term Archive
Service Requirements", RFC 4810, March 2007.
[RFC5126] Pinkas, D., Popoe, N., Ross, J., "CMS Advanced Electronic
Signatures (CAdES)", RFC 5126, February 2008.
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[XAdES] Cruellas, J. C., Karlinger, G., Pinkas, D., Ross, J., "XML
Advanced Electronic Signatures", XAdES, W3C Note, February
2003.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
5652, September 2009.
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APPENDIX A: Detailed verification process of an Evidence Record
To verify the validity of an Evidence Record start with the first ATS
till the last ATS (ordered by attribute Order) and perform
verification for each ATS, as follows:
1. Select corresponding archive object and its data object or a group
of data objects.
2. Re-encrypt data object or data object group, if
<EncryptionInformation> field is used (see section 5. for more
details)
3. Get a canonicalization method C and a digest method H from the
<DigestMethod> element of the current chain.
4. Make a new list L of digest values of (binary representation of)
objects (data, ATS or sequence) that MUST be protected with this
ATS as follows:
a. If this ATS is the first in the Archive Time-Stamp Chain:
i. If this is the first ATS of the first ATSC (the initial
ATS) in the ATSSeq, calculate digest values of data
objects with H and add each digest value to the list L.
ii. If this ATS is not the initial ATS, calculate a digest
value with H of ordered ATSSeq without this and
successive chains. Add value H and digest values of data
objects to the list L.
b. If this ATS is not the first in the ATSC:
i. Calculate the digest value with H of the previous
<TimeSatmp> element and add this digest value to the list
L.
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5. Verify the ATS's Time-Stamped value as follows. Get the first
sequence of the hash tree for this ATS.
a. If this ATS has no hash tree elements then:
ii. If this ATS is not the first in the ATSSeq(the initial
ATS), then the Time-Stamped value must be equal to digest
value of previous Time-Stamp element. If not, exit with a
negative result.
iii. If this ATS is the initial ATS in ATSC, there must be
only one data object of the archive object. The digest
value of that data object must be the same as its Time-
Stamped value. If not, exit with a negative result.
b. If this ATS has a hash-tree then: If there is a digest value
in the list L of digest values of protected objects, which
cannot be found in the first sequence of the hash tree or if
there is a hash value in the first sequence of the hash tree
which is not in the list L of digest values of protected
objects, exit with a negative result.
i. Get the hash tree from the current ATS and use H to
calculate the root hash value (see sections 3.2.1. and
3.2.2.)
ii. Get Time-Stamped value from the Time-Stamp Token. If
calculated root hash value from the hash tree does not
match the Time-Stamped value, exit with a negative
result.
6. Verify Time-Stamp cryptographically and formally (validate the
used certificate and its chain which may be available within the
Time-Stamp Token itself or <CryptographicInformation> tag).
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7. If this ATS is the last ATS, check formal validity for the current
time (now), or get "valid from" time of the next ATS and verify
formal validity at that specific time.
8. If the needed information to verify formal validity is not found
within the Time-Stamp or within its Cryptographic Information
section of ATS, exit with a negative result.
Author's Addresses
Aleksej Jerman Blazic
SETCCE
Tehnoloski park 21
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia
Phone: +386 (0) 1 620 4500
Fax: +386 (0) 1 620 4509
Email: aljosa@setcce.si
Svetlana Saljic
SETCCE
Tehnoloski park 21
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia
Phone: +386 (0) 1 620 4506
Fax: +386 (0) 1 620 4509
Email: svetlana.saljic@setcce.si
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Tobias Gondrom
Waisenhausstr. 67C
80637 Munich
Germany
Phone: +49 (0) 89 3205 330
Fax: /
Email: tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org
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