Network Working Group P. Srisuresh
INTERNET-DRAFT Kuokoa Networks
Expires as of January 9, 2002 J. Kuthan
GMD Fokus
J. Rosenberg
Dynamicsoft
A. Molitor
Aravox Technologies
A. Rayhan
Consultant
July, 2001
Middlebox Communication Architecture and framework
<draft-ietf-midcom-framework-03.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Abstract
There are a variety of intermediate devices in the Internet today
that require application intelligence for their operation.
Datagrams pertaining to real-time streaming applications such
as SIP and H.323 and peer-to-peer applications such as Napster
and NetMeeting cannot be identified by merely examining packet
headers. Middleboxes implementing Firewall and Network Address
Translator services typically embed application intelligence
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within the device for their operation. The document specifies an
architecture and framework in which trusted third parties can
be delegated to assist the middleboxes to perform their operation
without resorting to embedding application intelligence. Doing
this will allow a middlebox to continue to provide the services,
while keeping the middlebox application agnostic. A principal
objective of this document is to decribe the underlying framework
of middlebox communication to enable complex applications
through the middleboxes seamlessly using a trusted third party.
1. Introduction
Intermediate devices requiring application intelligence are the
subject of this document. These devices are referred as
middleboxes throughout the document. Many of these devices enforce
application specific policy based functions such as packet
filtering, VPN (Virtual Private Network) tunneling, Intrusion
detection, security and so forth. Network Address Translator
service, on the other hand, provides routing transparency across
address realms (within IPv4 routing network or across V4 and V6
routing realms), independent of applications. Application Level
Gateways (ALGs) are used in conjunction with NAT to examine and
optionally modify application payload so the end-to-end application
behaviour remains unchanged for many of the applications traversing
NAT middleboxes. There may be other types of services requiring
embedding application intelligence in middleboxes for their
operation. The discussion scope of this document is however limited
to middleboxes implementing Firewall and NAT services only.
Nonetheless, the middlebox framework is designed to be extensible
to support the deployment of new services.
Tight coupling of application intelligence with middleboxes makes
maintenance of middleboxes hard with the advent of new applications.
Built-in application awareness typically requires updates of
operating systems with new applications or newer versions of
existing applications. Operators requiring support for newer
applications will not be able to use third party software/hardware
specific to the application and are at the mercy of their
middlebox vendor to make the necessary upgrade. Further, embedding
intelligence for a large number of application protocols within
the same middlebox increases complexity of the middlebox and is
likely to be error prone and degrade in performance.
This document describes a framework in which application
intelligence can be moved from middleboxes into external MIDCOM
agents. The premise of the framework is to devise a MIDCOM
protocol that is application independent, so the middleboxes
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can stay focused on services such as firewall, NAT and other
functions, as required. MIDCOM agents with application intelligence
can, in turn, assist the middleboxes through the MIDCOM protocol in
permitting applications such as FTP, SIP and H.323. The
communication between a MIDCOM agent and a middlebox will not be
noticeable to the end-hosts that take part in the application,
unless one of the end-hosts assumes the role of a MIDCOM agent.
Discovery of middleboxes or MIDCOM agents in the path of an
application instance is outside the scope of this document. Further,
any communication amongst middleboxes is also outside the scope of
this document.
This document describes the framework in which middlebox
communication takes place and the various elements that constitute
the framework. Section 2 describes the terms used in the document.
Section 3 defines the architectural framework of a middlebox for
communication with MIDCOM agents. The remaining sections cover the
components of the framework, illustration using sample flows and
operational considerations with the MIDCOM architecture. Section 4
describes the nature of MIDCOM protocol. Section 5 identifies
entities that could potentially host the MIDCOM agent function.
Section 6 considers the role of Policy server and its function
with regard to communicating MIDCOM agent authorization policies.
Sections 7 is an illustration of SIP flows using MIDCOM framework
in which the MIDCOM agent is co-resident on a SIP proxy server.
Section 8 addresses operational considerations in deploying a
protocol adhering to the framework described here. Section 9 is
an applicability statement, scoping the location of middleboxes.
Section 11 outlines security considerations for the middlebox
in view of the MIDCOM framework.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALLNOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Below are the definitions for the terms used throughout the
document.
2.1. MiddleBox function/service
A middlebox function or a middlebox service is an operation or
method performed by a network intermediary that requires application
specific intelligence for its operation. Policy based packet
filtering (a.k.a. firewall), Network address translation (NAT),
Intrusion detection, Load balancing, Policy based tunneling and
IPsec security are all examples of a middlebox function (or
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service).
2.2. MiddleBox
Middlebox is a network intermediate device that implements one or
more of the middlebox services. A NAT middlebox is a middlebox
implementing NAT service. A firewall middlebox is a middlebox
implementing firewall service.
2.3. Firewall
Firewall is a policy based packet filtering Middlebox function,
typically used for restricting access to/from specific devices and
applications. The policies are often termed Access Control
Lists (ACLs).
2.4. NAT
Network Address Translation is a method by which IP addresses are
mapped from one address realm to another, providing transparent
routing to end-hosts. Transparent routing here refers to modifying
end-node addresses en-route and maintaining state for these updates
so that when a datagram leaves one realm and enters another,
datagrams pertaining to a session are forwarded to the right
end-host in either realm. Refer [NAT-TERM] for the definition of
Transparent routing, various NAT types and the associated terms
in use.
The term NAT in this document is very similar to the IPv4 NAT
described in [NAT-TERM], but is extended beyond IPv4 networks
to include the IPv4-v6 NAT-PT described in [NAT-PT]. While the
IPv4 NAT [NAT-TERM] translates one IPv4 address into another IPv4
address to provide routing between private V4 and external V4
address realms, IPv4-v6 NAT-PT [NAT-PT] translates an IPv4 address
into an IPv6 address and vice versa to provide routing between a
V6 address realm and an external V4 address realm.
Unless specified otherwise, NAT in this document is a middlebox
function referring to both IPv4 NAT as well as IPv4-v6 NAT-PT.
2.5. Proxy
A proxy is an intermediate relay agent between clients and servers
of an application, relaying application messages between the two.
Proxies use special protocol mechanisms to communicate with proxy
clients and relay client data to servers and vice versa. A Proxy
terminates sessions with both the client and the server, acting as
server to the end-host client and as client to the end-host server.
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Applications such as FTP, SIP and RTSP use a control connection to
establish data sessions. These control and data sessions can take
divergent paths. While a proxy can intercept both the control and
data connections, it might intercept only the control connection.
This is often the case with real-time streaming applications such
as SIP and RTSP.
2.6. ALG
Application Level Gateways (ALGs) are agents that possess the
application specific intelligence and knowledge of an associated
middlebox function. An ALG examines application traffic in transit
and assists middlebox in carrying out its function.
An ALG may be co-resident with a middlebox or reside externally,
communicating through a middlebox communication protocol. It
interacts with a middlebox to set up state, access control
filters, use middlebox state information, modify application
specific payload or perform whatever else is necessary to enable
the application to run through the middlebox.
ALGs are different from proxies. ALGs are not visible to
end-hosts, unlike the proxies which are relay agents terminating
sessions with both end-hosts. ALGs do not terminate session with
either end-host. Instead, ALGs examine and optionally modify
application payload content to facilitate the flow of application
traffic through a middlebox. ALGs are middlebox centric, in that
they assist the middleboxes in carrying out their function.
Whereas, the proxies act as focal point for application servers,
relaying traffic between application clients and servers.
ALGs are similar to Proxies, in that, both ALGs and proxies
facilitate Application specific communication between clients
and servers.
2.7. End-Hosts
End-hosts are entities that are party to a networked application
instance. End-hosts referred in this document are specifically
those terminating Real-time streaming Voice-over-IP
applications such as SIP and H.323 and peer-to-peer applications
such as Napster and NetMeeting.
2.8. MIDCOM Agents
MIDCOM agents are entities performing ALG function, logically
external to a middlebox. MIDCOM agents possess a combination of
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application awareness and knowledge of the middlebox function.
A MIDCOM agent may communicate with one or more middleboxes.
Only the MIDCOM agents, located in-Path of an application
instance will be considered in this document. These are also
refered as "In-Path MIDCOM agents". In-Path Midcom agents are
entities in which the MIDCOM agent function is co-resident on
devices that are naturally within the message path of the
application they are associated with. This may be an application
proxy, gateway, or in the extreme case, one of the end-hosts,
that is party to the application.
Agents not resident on entities that are natively in the path of
application flows, refered as Out-of-Path (OOP) agents, will be
considered out of scope for this document. As such, there will
be no further discussion on OOP agents in the reminder of this
document.
2.9. Policy Server
Policy Server is a management entity that acts in advisory
capacity and interfaces with a middlebox to communicate policies
concerning authorization of MIDCOM agents gaining access to
middlebox resources. A MIDCOM agent may be pre-configured on a
middlebox. In case a MIDCOM agent is not pre-configured, the
middlebox will consult the Policy Server and obtain the agent
profile to validate connection setup and authorization of the
agent to gain access to middlebox resources. A middlebox and
a policy server may communicate further if the policy server's
policy changes or if a middlebox needs further information.
The policy server may at anytime notify the middlebox to
terminate authorization for an agent.
The protocol facilitating the communication between a middlebox
and Policy Server need not be part of MIDCOM protocol. Section 6
in the document addresses the Policy server interface and protocol
framework independent of the MIDCOM framework.
Application specific policy data and policy interface between an
agent or application endpoint and a policy server is out of bounds
for this document. The Policy server issues addressed in the
document are focused at an aggregate domain level as befitting
the middlebox. For example, a SIP midcom agent may choose to query
a policy server for the administrative (or corporate) domain to
find whether a certain user is allowed to make an outgoing call.
This type of application specific policy data, as befitting an end
user is out of bounds for the Policy server considered in this
document. It is within bounds however for the middlebox policy
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server to specify the specific end-user applications (or tuples)
for which an agent is permitted to be an ALG.
2.10. Middlebox Communication (MIDCOM) protocol
The protocol between a MIDCOM agent and a middlebox that allows
the MIDCOM agent to gain access to middlebox resources and
allows the middlebox to delegate application specific processing
to MIDCOM agent. The MIDCOM protocol allows the middlebox to
perform its operation with the aid of MIDCOM agents, without
resorting to embedding application intelligence. The principal
motivation behind architecting this protocol is to enable complex
applications through middleboxes seamlessly using a trusted third
party, i.e., a MIDCOM agent.
This is a protocol yet to be devised.
3.0 Architectural framework for Middleboxes
A middlebox may implement one or more of the middlebox functions
selectively on multiple interfaces of the device. There can be a
variety of MIDCOM agents interfacing with the middlebox to
communicate with one or more of the middlebox functions on an
interface. As such, the Middlebox communication protocol MUST
allow for selective communication between a specific MIDCOM agent
and one or more middlebox functions on the interface. The following
diagram identifies a possible layering of the service supported
by a middlebox and a list of MIDCOM agents that might interact
with it.
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+---------------+ +--------------+
| MIDCOM agent | | MIDCOM agent |
| co-resident on| | co-resident |
| Proxy Server | | on Appl. GW |
+---------------+ +--------------+
^ ^
| | +--------+
MIDCOM | | | Policy |
Protocol | | +-| Server |
| | / +--------+
+-------------+ | | /
| MIDCOM agent| | | /
| co-resident | | | /
| on End-hosts|<-+ | | /
+-------------+ | | | |
v v v v
+-------------------------------------------+
| Middlebox Communication |Policy |
| Protocol (MIDCOM) Interface |Interface |
+----------+--------+-----------+-----------+
Middlebox | | | | |
Functions | Firewall | NAT | VPN | Intrusion |
| | | tunneling | Detection |
+----------+--------+-----------+-----------+
Middlebox | Firewall ACLs, Session-descriptors, |
Managed | NAT-BINDs, NAT Address-Maps and other |
Resources | Middlebox function specific attributes |
+-------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: MIDCOM agents interfacing with a middlebox
Firewall ACLs, NAT-BINDs, NAT address-maps and
Session-descriptors are a few of the middlebox managed
resources. Session-Descriptor above refers to a session denoted
by the tuple of (SessionDirection, SourceAddress,
DestinationAddress, Protocol, SourcePort, DestinationPort). An
aggregated Session-Descriptor may have one or more of the tuple
elements denoted by a regular expression (ex: Any source port).
The attributes associated with a Session-Descriptor may be
specific to the individual middlebox function. As
Session-Descriptors may be shared across middlebox functions, a
Session-Descriptor may be created by a function, and terminated
by a different function. For example, a session-descriptor may
be created by the firewall function, but terminated by the NAT
function, when a session timer expires.
A middlebox may also have function specific resources such as
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Address maps and Address binds to enforce NAT function and
application based policies to enforce firewall function.
Application specific MIDCOM agents (co-resident on the middlebox
or external to the middlebox) would examine the IP datagrams and
help identify the application the datagram belongs to and assist
the middlebox in performing functions unique to the application
and the middlebox service. For example, a MIDCOM agent assisting
a NAT middlebox might perform payload translations; whereas a
MIDCOM agent assisting a firewall middlebox might request the
firewall to permit access to application specific dynamically
generated session traffic.
4. MIDCOM Protocol
The MIDCOM protocol between a MIDCOM agent and a middlebox allows
the MIDCOM agent to gain access to middlebox resources and
allows the middlebox to delegate application specific processing
to MIDCOM agent. The protocol will allow MIDCOM agents to signal
the middleboxes to let complex applications using dynamic port
based sessions through them (i.e., middleboxes) seamlessly.
It is important to note that an agent and a middlebox can be on
the same physical device. In such a case, they may communicate
using a MIDCOM protocol message formats, but using a non-IP based
transport such as IPC messaging (or) they may communicate using a
well-defined API/DLL (or) the application intelligence is fully
embedded into the middlebox service (as it is done today in many
stateful inspection firewall devices and NAT devices).
The MIDCOM protocol will consist of a connection setup phase,
run-time connection phase and a connection termination phase.
Connection setup must be preceded by registration of the
MIDCOM agent with either the middlebox or the Policy Server.
The MIDCOM agent access and authorization profile may either
be pre-configured on the middlebox (or) listed on a Policy
Server the middlebox is configured to consult. MIDCOM is a
peer-to-peer protocol. As such, either the agent or the
middlebox may choose to initiate the connection.
A MIDCOM session may be terminated by either of the parties.
A MIDCOM session termination may also be triggered by one of
(a) the middlebox or the agent going out of service and not
being available for further MIDCOM operations, or (b) policy
server notifying the middlebox that a particular MIDCOM agent
is no longer authorized.
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The MIDCOM protocol data exchanged during run-time is governed
principally by the middlebox services the protocol supports.
Firewall and NAT middlebox services are considered in this
document. Nonetheless, the MIDCOM framework is designed to
be extensible to support deployment of other services as well.
5.0. MIDCOM Agents
MIDCOM agents are logical entities which may reside physically
on nodes external to a middlebox, possessing a combination of
application awareness and knowledge of middlebox function. A
MIDCOM agent may communicate with one or more middleboxes. The
issues of middleboxes discovering agents or vice versa are
outside the scope of this document. The focus of the document
is the framework in which a MIDCOM agent communicates with a
middlebox using MIDCOM protocol, which is yet to be devised.
Specifically, the focus is restricted to just the In-Path agents.
In-Path MIDCOM agents are entities that have a native role in the
path of the application traversal (with prior knowledge to one of
the application end-hosts), independent of their MIDCOM function.
Bundled session applications such as H.323, SIP and RTSP which
have separate control and data sessions may have their
sessions take divergent paths. In those scenarios, In-Path MIDCOM
agents are those that find themselves in the control path.
In majority of cases, a middlebox will likely require the
assistance of a single agent for an application in the control
path alone. However, it is possible that a middlebox function
or a specific application traversing the middlebox might require
the intervention of more than a single MIDCOM agent for the same
application, one for each sub-session of the application.
Application Proxies and gateways are a good choice for In-Path
MIDCOM agents, as these entities, by definition, are in the path
of an application between a client and server. In addition to
hosting the MIDCOM agent function, these natively in-path
application specific entities may also enforce
application-specific choices locally, such as dropping messages
infected with known viruses, or lacking user authentication.
These entities can be interjecting both the control and data
connections. For example, FTP control and Data sessions are
interjected by an FTP proxy server. However, proxies may also be
interjecting just the control connection and not the data
connections, as is the case with real-time streaming applications
such as SIP and RTSP. Note, applications may not always traverse
a proxy and some applications may not have a proxy server
available.
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SIP proxies and H.323 gatekeepers may be used to host MIDCOM
agent function to control middleboxes implementing firewall and
NAT functions. The advantage of using in-path entities as opposed
to creating an entirely new agent is that the in-path entities
already possess application intelligence. You will need to merely
enable the use of MIDCOM protocol to be an effective MIDCOM
agent. Figure 2 below illustrates a scenario where the in-path
MIDCOM agents interface with the middlebox. Let us say, the
policy Server has pre-configured the in-path proxies as trusted
MIDCOM agents on the middlebox and the packet filter
implements 'default-deny' packet filtering policy. Proxies use
their application-awareness knowledge to control the firewall
function and selectively permit a certain number of voice stream
sessions dynamically using MIDCOM protocol.
In the illustration below, the proxies and the policy server are
shown inside a private domain. The intent however is not to imply
that they be inside the private boundary alone. The proxies may
also reside external to the domain. The only requirement is that
there be a trust relationship with the middlebox.
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+-----------+
| Middlebox |
| Policy |
| Server |~~~~~~~~~~~~~|
+-----------+ \
\
+--------+ \
| SIP |___ \
________| Proxy | \ Middlebox \
/ +--------+.. | +--------------------+
| : | MIDCOM | | |
| RTSP +---------+ :..|........| MIDCOM | POLICY |
SIP | ____| RTSP |.....|........| PROTOCOL | INTER- |
| / | Proxy |___ | | INTERFACE | FACE |
| | +---------+ \ \ |--------------------|
| | \ \-----| |
| | \-------| |
| | ---| FIREWALL |-->--
+-----------+ /---| |--<--
+-----------+| Data streams // +--------------------+
+-----------+||---------->----// |
|end-hosts ||-----------<----- .
+-----------+ (RTP, RTSP data, etc.) |
. Outside the
Within a private domain | private domain
Legend: ---- Application data path datagrams
____ Application control path datagrams
.... Middlebox Communication Protocol (MIDCOM)
~~~~ MIDCOM Policy Server Interface
|
. private domain Boundary
|
Figure 2: In-Path MIDCOM Agents for Middlebox Communication
5.1. End-hosts as In-Path MIDCOM agents
End-hosts are another variation of In-Path MIDCOM agents. Unlike
Proxies, End-hosts are direct party to the application and
possess all the end-to-end application intelligence there is to
it. End-hosts presumably terminate both the control and data
paths of an application. Unlike other entities hosting MIDCOM
agents, end-host is able to process secure datagrams. However,
the problem would be one of manageability - upgrading all the
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end-hosts running a specific application.
6.0. Policy Server functions
The functional decomposition of the MIDCOM architecture assumes
the existence of a logical entity known as Policy Server,
responsible for performing authorization and related provisioning
services for the middlebox as depicted in figure 1. The Policy
server is a logical entity which may reside physically on a
middlebox or on a node external to the middlebox. The protocol
employed for communication between the middlebox and the policy
server is unrelated to the MIDCOM protocol.
Agents are registered with a Policy Server for authorization to
gain access to a middlebox. The policy server maintains a list of
agents that are authorized to connect to each of the middleboxes the
policy server supports. The Policy server does not assist a
middlebox in the implementation of the services it provides or
with resource authorization on the middlebox.
The policy server acts in an advisory capacity to a middlebox to
authorize or terminate authorization for an agent to gain
connectivity to the middlebox. The primary objective of a policy
server is to communicate agent authorization information so as to
ensure that the security and integrity of a middlebox is not
jeopardized. Specifically, the policy server should associate a
trust level with each agent attempting to connect to a middlebox
and provide a security profile. The policy server should be capable
of addressing cases when end-hosts are agents to the middlebox.
6.1. Authentication, Integrity and Confidentiality
Host authenticity and individual message security are two distinct
types of security considerations. Host authentication refers to
credentials required of a MIDCOM agent to authenticate itself to
the middlebox and vice versa. When authentication fails, the
middlebox MUST not process signaling requests received from the
agent that failed authentication. Two-way authentication should be
supported. In some cases, the 2-way authentication may be tightly
linked to the establishment of keys to protect subsequent traffic.
Two-way authentication is often required to prevent various active
attacks on the MIDCOM protocol and secure establishment of keying
material.
Security services such as authentication, data integrity,
confidentiality and replay protection may be adapted to secure
MIDCOM messages in an untrusted domain. Message authentication is
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same as data origin authentication and is an affirmation that the
sender of the message is who it claims to be. Data integrity
refers to the ability to ensure that a message has not been
accidentally, maliciously or otherwise altered or destroyed.
Confidentiality is encryption of message with a key so that only
those in possession of the key can decipher the message content.
Lastly, replay protection is a form of sequence integrity so when
an intruder plays back a previously recorded sequence of messages,
the receiver of the replay messages will simply drop the replay
messages into bit-bucket. Certain applications of the MIDCOM
protocol might require support for non-repudiation as an option of
the data integrity service. Typically, support for non-repudiation
is required for billing, service level agreements, payment orders,
and receipts for delivery of service.
IPsec AH ([IPSEC-AH]) offers data-origin authentication, data
integrity and protection from message replay. IPsec ESP
([IPSEC-ESP]) provides data-origin authentication to a lesser
degree (same as IPsec AH if the MIDCOM transport protocol turns out
to be TCP or UDP), message confidentiality, data integrity and
protection from replay. Besides the IPsec based protocols, there
are other security options as well. TLS based transport layer
security is one option. There are also many application-layer
security mechanisms available. Simple Source-address based
security is the least form of security in a trusted domain and
may be permitted to trusted hosts.
MIDCOM message security shall use existing standards, whenever the
existing standards satisfy the requirements. Security shall be
specified to minimize the impact on connections that do not use the
security option. Security should be designed to avoid introducing
and to minimize the impact of denial of service attacks. Some
security mechanisms and algorithms require substantial processing
or storage, in which case the security protocols should protect
themselves as well as against possible flooding attacks that
overwhelm the endpoint (i.e., the middlebox or the agent) with
such processing. For connection oriented protocols (such as TCP)
using security services, the security protocol should detect
premature closure or truncation attacks.
6.2. Registration and deregistration with a middlebox
Prior to giving MIDCOM agents access to the middlebox resources,
a registration process MUST take place. Registration is a
different process than establishing a transport connection.
The former requires exchanging agent profile information. The
latter refers to establishing a MIDCOM transport connection and
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exchanging security credentials between an agent and a
middlebox. The latter uses the information from the former for
connection establishment.
Profile of a MIDCOM agent includes agent authorization policy (i.e,
session tuples for which the agent is authorized to act as ALG),
agent-hosting-entity (e.g., Proxy, Gateway or end-host which hosts
the agent), agent accessibility profile (including any host level
authentication information) and security profile (i.e., security
requirements for messages exchanged between the middlebox and the
agent).
MIDCOM agent profile may be pre-configured on the middlebox while
provisioning the middlebox function. Either the agent or the
middlebox can choose to initiate a connection prior to any data
traffic. Alternately, either party (middlebox or the MIDCOM agent)
may choose to initiate a connection only upon noticing the
application specific traffic.
Coupling MIDCOM agents with the middlebox resources requires
a means of reflecting that into the resource description table
of the middlebox. In the case of a firewall, for example, the
ACL tuple may be altered to reflect the optional ALG presence.
The revised ACL may look something like the following.
(<Session-Direction>, <Source-Address>, <Destination-Address>,
<IP-Protocol>, <Source-Port>, <Destination-Port>, <ALG>)
The reader should note that this is an illustrative example and
not necessarily the actual definition of an ACL tuple. The formal
description of the ACL is yet to be devised. Agent accessibility
information should also be provisioned. For a MIDCOM agent,
accessibility information includes the IP address, trust level,
host authentication parameters and message authentication
parameters. Once a connection is established between a middlebox
and a MIDCOM agent, that connection should be usable with multiple
instances of the application(s), as appropriate. Note, all of this
could be captured in an agent profile for ease of management.
The technique described above is necessary for the pre-registration
of MIDCOM agents with the middlebox. However, it is possible to
retain the provisioning on middlebox unchanged, by requiring MIDCOM
agents to initiate the connection to middlebox. In such a case, the
agent should initiate the connection prior to the start of the
application. If the agent connection is delayed until after the
application has started, the agent might be unable to process the
control stream to permit the data connections. When Middlebox notices
an incoming MIDCOM connection, and the middlebox has no prior profile
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of the MIDCOM agent, the middlebox will consult its Policy Server for
authenticity, authorization and trust guidelines for the connection.
At the end of the MIDCOM session, it should be possible for either
the middlebox or the agent to disconnect. MIDCOM session
disconnection may be prompted by a successful termination or
failure of some sort.
It should be possible for the agent to deregister itself from the
middlebox, which means that the agent is going out of service and
will not be available for further MIDCOM operations. Alternately,
a policy server may notify a middlebox that a particular MIDCOM
agent is no longer authorized for a particular set of sessions
any longer. Note, Policy Server notifying the middlebox is one of
many ways by which a middlebox could disconnect an agent.
7.0. MIDCOM Framework Illustration using an In-Path agent
In figure 3 below, we consider SIP application (Refer [SIP]) to
illustrate the operation of MIDCOM protocol. Specifically, the
application assumes a caller, external to a private domain,
initiates the call. Middlebox is assumed to be located at the
edge of the private domain. A SIP phone (SIP User Agent
Client/Server) inside the private domain is capable of receiving
calls from external SIP phones. The caller uses a SIP Proxy
node, located external to the private domain, as its outbound
proxy. No interior proxy is assumed for the callee. Lastly, the
external SIP proxy node is designated to host the MIDCOM agent
function.
Arrows 1 and 4 in the figure below refer to SIP call setup
exchange between the external SIP phone and the SIP proxy.
Arrows 6 and 7 refer to SIP call setup exchange between the SIP
proxy and the interior SIP phone and are assumed to be
traversing the middlebox. Arrows 2 and 3 below between the SIP
proxy and the middlebox refer to MIDCOM communication. Na and Nb
represent RTP/RTCP media traffic (Refer [RTP]) path in the
external network. Nc and Nd represent media traffic inside the
private domain.
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_________
--->| SIP |<-----\
/ | Proxy | \
| |_________| |
1| | | 6|
| | | |
|4 |2 |3 |7
______________ | | | | _____________
| |<-/ _v_____^___ \->| |
| External | Na | | Nc | SIP Phone |
| SIP phone |>------->| MiddleBox |>------>| within |
| |<-------<|___________|<------<| Pvt. domain|
|____________| Nb Nd |____________|
Figure 3: MIDCOM framework illustration with In-Path SIP Proxy
As for the SIP application, we make the assumption that the
middlebox is pre-configured to accept SIP calls into the
private SIP phone. Specifically, this would imply that the
middlebox implementing firewall service is pre-configured to
permit SIP calls (destination TCP or UDP port number set to
5060) into the private phone. Likewise, middlebox implementing
NAPT service would have been pre-configured to provide a port
binding to permit incoming SIP calls to be redirected to the
specific private SIP phone. I.e., the INVITE from the external
caller is not made to the private IP address, but to the NAPT
external address.
The objective of the MIDCOM agent in the following illustration
is to merely permit the RTP/RTCP media stream (Refer [RTP])
through the middlebox, when using the MIDCOM protocol architecture
outlined in the document. RTP/RTCP media stream, When used in
conjunction with SIP will typically result in two independent
media sessions - one from the callee to the caller and another
from the caller to the callee. These media sessions are UDP based
and will use dynamic ports. The dynamic ports used for the media
stream are specified in the SDP section (Refer [SDP]) of SIP
payload message. The MIDCOM agent will parse the SDP section and
use the MIDCOM protocol to (a) open pinholes (i.e., permit RTP/RTCP
session tuples) in a middlebox implementing firewall service, or
(b) create PORT bindings and appropriately modify the SDP content to
permit the RTP/RTCP streams through a middlebox implementing NAT
service. The MIDCOM protocol should be sufficiently rich and
expressive to support the operations described under the timelines.
The examples do not show the timers maintained by the agent to
keep the firewall pinholes and NAT session descriptors and BINDs
from timing out.
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Midcom agent Registration and connectivity between the Midcom
agent and the middlebox are not shown in the interest of
restricting the focus of the MIDCOM transactions to enabling the
middlebox to let the media stream through. Policy server is also
not shown in the diagram below or on the timelines for the same
reason.
The following subsections illustrate a typical timeline sequence
of operations that transpire with the various elements involved
in a SIP telephony application path. Each subsection is devoted
to a specific instantiation of a middlebox service - NAPT
(refer [NAT-TERM], [NAT-TRAD]), firewall and a combination of
both NAPT and firewall are considered.
7.1. Timeline flow - Middlebox implementing firewall service
In the following example, we will assume a middlebox implementing
a firewall service. We further assume that the middlebox is
pre-configured to permit SIP calls (destination TCP or UDP port
number set to 5060) into the private phone. The following timeline
illustrates the operations performed by the MIDCOM agent to permit
RTP/RTCP media stream through the middlebox.
The INVITE from the caller (external) is assumed to include the
SDP payload. You will note that the In-Path agent requests
the middlebox to permit the Private-to-external RTP/RTCP flows
before the INVITE is relayed to the callee. This is because,
in SIP, the calling party must be ready to receive the media when
it sends the INVITE with a session description. If the called
party (private phone) assumes this and sends "early media" before
sending the 200 OK response, the firewall will have blocked these
packets without this initial MIDCOM signaling from the agent.
SIP Phone SIP Proxy Middlebox SIP Phone
(External) (In-Path (FIREWALL (private)
MIDCOM agent) Service) |
| | | |
|----INVITE------>| | |
| | | |
| Identify end-2-end | |
| parameters (from Caller's | |
| SDP) for the pri-to-Ext | |
| RTP & RTCP sessions. | |
| (RTP1, RTCP1) | |
| | | |
| |+Permit RTP1, RTCP1 +>| |
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| |<+RTP1, RTCP1 OKed++++| |
| | | |
| |--------INVITE---------------------->|
|<---100Trying----| | |
| | | |
| |<-----180 Ringing--------------------|
|<--180Ringing----| | |
| |<-------200 OK-----------------------|
| | | |
| Identify end-2-end | |
| parameters (from callee's | |
| SDP) for the Ext-to-Pri | |
| RTP and RTCP sessions. | |
| (RTP2, RTCP2) | |
| | | |
| |+Permit RTP2, RTCP2 +>| |
| |<+RTP2, RTCP2 OKed++++| |
| | | |
|<---200 OK ------| | |
|-------ACK------>| | |
| |-----------ACK---------------------->|
| | | |
|<===================RTP/RTCP==========================>|
| | | |
|-------BYE------>| | |
| |--------------------------BYE------->|
| | | |
| |<----------200 OK--------------------|
| | | |
| |++Cancel permits to | |
| | RTP1, RTCP1, RTP2, | |
| | and RTCP2 +++++++++>| |
| |<+RTP1, RTP2, RTCP1 & | |
| | RTCP2 cancelled ++++| |
| | | |
|<---200 OK-------| | |
| | | |
Legend: ++++ MIDCOM control traffic
---- SIP control traffic
==== RTP/RTCP media traffic
7.2. Timeline flow - Middlebox implementing NAPT service
In the following example, we will assume a middlebox implementing
NAPT service. We make the assumption that the middlebox is
pre-configured to redirect SIP calls to the specific private SIP
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phone application. I.e., the INVITE from the external caller is
not made to the private IP address, but to the NAPT external
address. Let us say, the external phone's IP address is Ea, NAPT
middlebox external Address is Ma and the internal SIP phone's
private address is Pa. SIP calls to the private SIP phone will
arrive as TCP/UDP sessions with destination address and port set
to Ma and 5060 respectively. The middlebox will redirect these
datagrams to the internal SIP phone. The following timeline
will illustrate the operations necessary to be performed by the
MIDCOM agent to permit the RTP/RTCP media stream through the
middlebox.
As with the previous example (section 7.1), INVITE from the
caller (external) is assumed to include the SDP payload.
You will note that the In-Path agent requests middlebox to create
NAT session descriptors for the private-to-external RTP/RTCP flows
before the INVITE is relayed to the private SIP phone (for the
same reasons as described in section 7.1). If the called party
(private phone) sends "early media" before sending the 200 OK
response, the NAPT middlebox will have blocked these packets
without the initial MIDCOM signaling from the agent. Also, note
that after the 200 OK is received by the proxy from the private
phone, the agent requests the middlebox to allocate NAT session
descriptors for the external-to-private RTP2 and RTCP2 flows, such
that the ports assigned on the Ma for RTP2 and RTCP2 are
contiguous. RTCP stream does not happen with a non-contiguous
port. Lastly, you will note that even though each media stream
(RTP1, RTCP1, RTP2 and RTCP2) is independent, they are all tied to
the single SIP control session while theit NAT session descriptors
were being created. Finally, when the agent issues a terminate
session bundle command for the SIP session, the middlebox is
assumed to delete all associated media stream sessions
automagically.
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SIP Phone SIP Proxy Middlebox SIP Phone
(External) (In-Path (NAPT (Private)
IP Addr:Ea MIDCOM agent) Service) IP addr:Pa
| | IP addr:Ma |
| | | |
|----INVITE------>| | |
| |++ Query Port-BIND | |
| | for (Ma, 5060) +++>| |
| |<+ Port-BIND reply | |
| | for (Ma, 5060) ++++| |
| | | |
| |++ Query NAT Session | |
| | Descriptor for | |
| | Ea-to-Pa SIP flow+>| |
| |<+ Ea-to-Pa SIP flow | |
| | Session Descriptor+| |
| | | |
| Determine the Internal | |
| IP address (Pa) | |
| of the callee. | |
| | | |
| Identify UDP port numbers | |
| on Ea (Eport1, Eport1+1) | |
| for pri-to-ext RTP & RTCP | |
| sessions (RTP1, RTCP1) | |
| | | |
| |++Create NAT Session | |
| | descriptors for | |
| | RTP1, RTCP1; Set | |
| | parent session to | |
| | SIP-ctrl session ++>| |
| |<+RTP1, RTCP1 session | |
| | descriptors created+| |
| | | |
| | |..redirected..|
| |--------INVITE--------|------------->|
|<---100Trying----| | |
| | | |
| |<-----180Ringing---------------------|
| | | |
|<--180Ringing----| | |
| |<-------200 OK-----------------------|
| | | |
| Identify UDP port numbers | |
| on Pa (Pport2, Pport2+1) | |
| for ext-to-pri RTP & RTCP | |
| sessions (RTP2, RTCP2) | |
| | | |
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| |++Create consecutive | |
| | port BINDs on Ma | |
| | for (Pa, Pport2), | |
| | (Pa, Pport2+1) ++++>| |
| |<+Port BINDs created++| |
| | | |
| |++Create NAT Session | |
| | descriptors for | |
| | RTP2, RTCP2; Set | |
| | parent session to | |
| | SIP-ctrl session ++>| |
| |<+RTP2, RTCP2 session | |
| | descriptors created+| |
| | | |
| Modify the SDP | |
| parameters in "200 OK" | |
| with NAPT PORT-BIND | |
| for the RTP2 port on Ma. | |
| | | |
|<---200 OK ------| | |
| | | |
|-------ACK------>| | |
| | | |
| Modify IP addresses | |
| appropriately in the SIP | |
| header (e.g., To, from, | |
| Via, contact fields) | |
| | |..redirected..|
| |-----------ACK--------|------------->|
| | | |
| | | |
|<===================RTP/RTCP============|=============>|
| | | |
|-------BYE------>| | |
| | | |
| Modify IP addresses | |
| appropriately in the | |
| SIP header. | |
| | | |
| |----------------------|-----BYE----->|
| | | |
| |<----------200 OK--------------------|
| | | |
| |+++Terminate the SIP | |
| | Session bundle +++>| |
| |<++SIP Session bundle | |
| | terminated ++++++++| |
| | | |
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| Modify SDP | |
| parameters in "200 OK" | |
| | | |
|<---200 OK-------| | |
| | | |
Legend: ++++ MIDCOM control traffic
---- SIP control traffic
==== RTP/RTCP media traffic
7.3. Timeline flow - Middlebox implementing NAPT and firewall
In the following example, we will assume a middlebox
implementing a combination of a firewall and a stateful NAPT
service. We make the assumption that the NAPT function is
configured to translate the IP and TCP headers of the initial
SIP session into the private SIP phone and the firewall
function is configured to permit the initial SIP session.
In the following time line, it may be noted that the firewall
description is based on packet fields on the wire (ex: as seen
on the external interface of the middlebox). In order to
ensure correct behavior of the individual services, you will
notice that NAT specific MIDCOM operations precede firewall
specific operations on the MIDCOM agent. This is noticeable in
the time line below when the MIDCOM agent processes the
"200 OK" from the private SIP phone. The MIDCOM agent initially
requests the NAT service on the middlebox to set up port-BIND
and session-descriptors for the media stream in both directions.
Subsequent to that, the MIDCOM agent determines the session
parameters (i.e, the dynamic UDP ports) for the media stream,
as viewed by the external interface and requests the firewall
service on the middlebox to permit those sessions through.
SIP Phone SIP Proxy Middlebox SIP Phone
(External) (In-Path (NAPT & (Private)
IP Addr:Ea MIDCOM agent) firewall IP addr:Pa
| | Services) |
| | IP addr:Ma |
| | | |
|----INVITE------>| | |
| |++ Query Port-BIND | |
| | for (Ma, 5060) +++>| |
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| |<+ Port-BIND reply | |
| | for (Ma, 5060) ++++| |
| | | |
| |++ Query NAT Session | |
| | Descriptor for | |
| | Ea-to-Pa SIP flow+>| |
| |<+ Ea-to-Pa SIP flow | |
| | Session Descriptor+| |
| | | |
| Determine the Internal | |
| IP address (Pa) | |
| of the callee. | |
| | | |
| Identify UDP port numbers | |
| on Ea (Eport1, Eport1+1) | |
| for pri-to-ext RTP & RTCP | |
| sessions (RTP1, RTCP1) | |
| | | |
| |++Create NAT Session | |
| | descriptors for | |
| | RTP1, RTCP1; Set the| |
| | parent session to | |
| | point to SIP flow++>| |
| |<+RTP1, RTCP1 session | |
| | descriptors created+| |
| | | |
| |++Permit RTP1 & RTCP1 | |
| | sessions External to| |
| | middlebox, namely | |
| | Ma to Ea:Eport1, | |
| | Ma to Ea:Eport1+1 | |
| | sessions ++++++++++>| |
| |<+Ma to Ea:Eport1, | |
| | Ma to Ea:Eport1+1 | |
| | sessions OKed ++++++| |
| | | |
| | |..redirected..|
| |--------INVITE--------|------------->|
|<---100Trying----| | |
| | | |
| |<-----180Ringing---------------------|
| | | |
| | | |
|<--180Ringing----| | |
| |<-------200 OK-----------------------|
| | | |
| Identify UDP port numbers | |
| on Pa (Pport2, Pport2+1) | |
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| for ext-to-pri RTP & RTCP | |
| sessions (RTP2, RTCP2) | |
| | | |
| |++Create consecutive | |
| | port BINDs on Ma | |
| | for (Pa, Pport2), | |
| | (Pa, Pport2+1) ++++>| |
| |<+Port BINDs created | |
| | on Ma as (Mport2, | |
| | Mport2+1) ++++++++++| |
| | | |
| |++Create NAT Session | |
| | descriptors for | |
| | RTP2, RTCP2; Set the| |
| | parent session to | |
| | point to SIP flow++>| |
| |<+RTP2, RTCP2 session | |
| | descriptors created+| |
| | | |
| Modify the SDP | |
| parameters in "200 OK" | |
| with NAPT PORT-BIND | |
| for RTP2 port on Ma. | |
| | | |
| |++Permit RTP2 & RTCP2 | |
| | sessions External | |
| | middlebox, namely | |
| | Ea to Ma:Mport2, | |
| | Ea to Ma:Mport2+1 | |
| | sessions ++++++++++>| |
| |<+Ea to Ma:Mport2, | |
| | Ea to Ma:Mport2 | |
| | sessions OKed ++++++| |
| | | |
|<---200 OK ------| | |
| | | |
|-------ACK------>| | |
| | |..redirected..|
| |-----------ACK--------|------------->|
| | | |
| | | |
|<===================RTP/RTCP============|=============>|
| | | |
|-------BYE------>| | |
| | | |
| Modify SDP payload | |
| parameters in BYE | |
| | | |
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| |----------------------|-----BYE----->|
| | | |
| |<----------200 OK--------------------|
| | | |
| |+++Terminate the SIP | |
| | Session bundle +++>| |
| |<++SIP Session bundle | |
| | terminated ++++++++| |
| | | |
| |++Cancel permits to | |
| | sessions External | |
| | middlebox, namely | |
| | Ma to Ea:Eport1, | |
| | Ma to Ea:Eport1+1 | |
| | Ea to Ma:Mport2, | |
| | Ea to Ma:Mport2+1 | |
| | sessions ++++++++++>| |
| |<+Removed permits to | |
| | sessions listed ++++| |
| | | |
| Modify SDP | |
| parameters in "200 OK" | |
| | | |
|<---200 OK-------| | |
| | | |
Legend: ++++ MIDCOM control traffic
---- SIP control traffic
==== RTP/RTCP media traffic
8.0. Operational considerations
8.1. Multiple MIDCOM connections between agents and middlebox
A middlebox cannot be assumed to be a simple device
implementing just one middlebox function and no more than a
couple of interfaces. Middleboxes often combine multiple
intermediate functions into the same device and have the
ability to provision individual interfaces of the same device
with different sets of functions and varied provisioning for
the same function across the interfaces.
As such, a MIDCOM agent ought to be able to have a single
MIDCOM connection with a middlebox and use the MIDCOM
interface on the middlebox to interface with different
services on the same middlebox interface.
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8.2. MIDCOM agent registration with a middlebox
A MIDCOM agent may be pre-configured on a middlebox as a
trusted entity. In the case where a MIDCOM agent is not
pre-configured, a policy server should be made available
to the middlebox, so the middlebox can consult the Policy
Server for authorization to accept requests from the agent.
A middlebox should be capable of connecting to more than
a single MIDCOM agent.
8.3. Asynchronous notification to MIDCOM agents
Asynchronous notification by the middlebox to a MIDCOM agent
can be useful for events such as Session creation, Session
termination, MIDCOM protocol failure, Middlebox function
failure or any other significant event. Independently, ICMP
error codes can also be useful to notify transport layer
failures to the agents.
In addition, periodic notification of various forms of data
such as statistics update would also be a useful function
that would be beneficial to certain types of agents.
8.4. Timers on Middlebox considered useful
When supporting MIDCOM protocol, the middlebox is required to
allocate dynamic resources such as pin-holes, upon request from
agents. Explicit release of dynamically allocated resources
happens when the application session is ended or when a Midcom
agent requests the middlebox to release the resource.
However, the middlebox should be able to recover the dynamically
allocated resources even as the agent that was responsible for
the allocation is not alive. Associating a lifetime for these
dynamic resources and using a timer to track the lifetime can
be a good way to accomplish this.
8.5. Middleboxes supporting multiple services
A middlebox could be implementing a variety of services (e.g. NAT
and firewall) in the same box. Some of these services might have
inter-dependency on shared resources and sequence of operation.
Others may be independent of each other. Generally speaking,
the sequence in which these function operations may be performed
on datagrams is not within the scope of this document.
In the case of a middlebox implementing NAT and firewall
services, it is safe to state that the NAT operation will precede
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firewall on the egress and will follow firewall on the ingress.
Further, firewall access control lists used by a firewall are
assumed to be based on session parameters as seen on the
interface supporting firewall service.
8.6. Signaling and Data traffic
The class of applications the MIDCOM architecture is addressing
focus around applications that have a combination of one or more
signaling and data traffic sessions. The signaling
may be done out-of-band using a dedicated stand-alone session
or may be done in-band with data session. Alternately, signaling
may also be done as a combination of both stand-alone and
in-band sessions.
SIP is an example of an application based on distinct signaling
and data sessions. SIP signaling session is used for call setup
between a caller and a callee. MIDCOM agent may be required to
examine/modify SIP payload content to administer the middlebox
so as to let the media streams (RTP/RTCP based) through. MIDCOM
agent is not required to intervene in the data traffic.
Signaling and context specific Header information is sent in-band
within the same data stream for applications such as HTTP embedded
applications, sun-RPC (embedding a variety of NFS apps), Oracle
transactions (embedding oracle SQL+, MS ODBC, Peoplesoft) etc.
H.323 is an example of application that sends signaling in both
dedicated stand-alone session as well as in conjunction with data.
Q.931 traffic traverses middleboxes by virtue of static policy,
no MIDCOM control needed. Q.931 also negotiates ports for an
H.245 TCP stream. A MIDCOM agent is required to examine/modify
the contents of the H.245 so that H.245 can traverse it.
H.245 traverses the middlebox and also carries Open Logical
Channel information for media data. So the MIDCOM agent is once
again required to examine/modify the payload content needs to
let the media traffic flow.
The MIDCOM architecture takes into consideration, supporting
applications with independent signaling and data sessions as
well as applications that have signaling and data communicated
over the same session.
In the cases where signaling is done on a single stand-alone
session, it is desirable to have a MIDCOM agent interpret the
signaling stream and program the middlebox (that transits the
data stream) so as to let the data traffic through uninterrupted.
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9. Applicability Statement
Middleboxes may be stationed in a number of topologies. However, the
signaling framework outlined in this document may be limited to only
those middleboxes that are located in a DMZ (De-Militarized Zone) at
the edge of a private domain, connecting to the Internet.
Specifically, the assumption is that you have a single middlebox
(running NAT or firewall) along the application route. Discovery of
middlebox along application route is outside the scope of this
document. It is conceivable to have middleboxes located between
departments within the same domain or inside service provider's
domain and so forth. However, care must be taken to review each
individual scenario and determine the applicability on a
case-by-case basis.
The applicability may also be illustrated as follows. Real-time and
streaming applications such as Voice-Over-IP and peer-to-peer
applications such as Napster and Netmeeting require administering
firewall and NAT middleboxes to let their media streams reach hosts
inside a private domain. The requirements are in the form of
establishing a "pin-hole" to permit a TCP/UDP session (the port
parameters of which are dynamically determined) through a firewall
or retain an address/port bind in the NAT device to permit
connections to a port. These requirements are met by current
generation middleboxes using adhoc methods, such as embedding
application intelligence within a middlebox to identify the dynamic
session parameters and administering the middlebox internally as
appropriate. The objective of the MIDCOM architecture is to create
a unified, standard way to exercise this functionality, currently
existing in an ad-hoc fashion in some of the middleboxes.
By adopting MIDCOM architecture, middleboxes will be able to
support newer applications they have not been able to support thus
far. MIDCOM architecture does not and MUST not, in anyway, change
the fundamental characteristic of the services supported on the
middlebox.
Typically, organizations shield a majority of their corporate
resources (such as end-hosts) from visibility to the external
network by the use of a De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) at the domain
edge. Only a portion of these hosts are allowed to be accessed by
the external world. The remaining hosts and their names are unique
to the private domain. Hosts visible to the external world and the
authoritative name server that maps their names to network
addresses are often configured within a DMZ (De-Militarized Zone)
in front of a firewall. Hosts and middleboxes within DMZ are
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referred to as DMZ nodes.
Figure 4 below illustrates configuration of a private domain with
a DMZ at its edge. Actual configurations may vary. Internal hosts
are accessed only by users inside the domain. Middleboxes,
located in the DMZ may be accessed by agents inside or outside
the domain.
\ | /
+-----------------------+
|Service Provider Router|
+-----------------------+
WAN |
Stub A .........|\|....
|
+---------------+
| NAT Middlebox |
+---------------+
|
| DMZ - Network
------------------------------------------------------------
| | | | |
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+ +-----------+
|__| |__| |__| |__| | Firewall |
/____\ /____\ /____\ /____\ | Middlebox |
DMZ-Host1 DMZ-Host2 ... DMZ-Name DMZ-Web +-----------+
Server Server etc. |
|
Internal Hosts (inside the private domain) |
------------------------------------------------------------
| | | |
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+
|__| |__| |__| |__|
/____\ /____\ /____\ /____\
Int-Host1 Int-Host2 ..... Int-Hostn Int-Name Server
Figure 4: DMZ network configuration of a private domain.
11. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Christian Huitema, Joon Maeng, Jon
Peterson, Mike Fisk, Matt Holdrege, Melinda Shore, Paul Sijben,
Philip Mart, Scott Brim and Richard Swale for their valuable
critique, advice and input on an earlier rough version of this
document. The authors owe special thanks to Eliot Lear for
kick-starting the e-mail discussion on use-case scenarios with a
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SIP application flow diagram through a middlebox. Much thanks to
Bob Penfield, Cedric Aoun, Christopher Martin, Eric Fleischman,
George Michaelson, Wanqun Bao and others in the MIDCOM work group
for their very detailed feedback on a variety of topics and
adding clarity to the discussion. Last, but not the least, the
authors owe much thanks to Melinda Shore for her continued
support, critique and feedback throughout in bringing out fine
subtleties and helping to make the document a better read.
12. Security Considerations
Discussed below are security consideration in accessing a
middlebox. The premise of middlebox operation fundamentally
requires the data to be in the clear as the middlebox needs the
ability to inspect and/or modify packet headers and payload.
This compromises the confidentiality requirement in some
environments. Further, Updating transport headers and rewriting
application payload data in some cases by NAT prevents the use
of integrity protection on some data streams traversing NAT
middleboxes. Clearly, this can pose a significant security threat
to the application in an untrusted transport domain.
However, the MIDCOM protocol removes the need for a middlebox
to inspect or manipulate data. This in turn allows applications
to better protect themselves end-to-end with the aid of a trusted
MIDCOM agent. This is especially the case when the agent is
resident on the end-host. When an agent has the same end-to-end
ability as the end-host to interpret encrypted and integrity
protected data, data transiting a middlebox can be encrypted and
integrity protected. The MIDCOM agent will still be able to
interpret the data and simply notify the middlebox to open holes,
install NAT table entries, etc.
Security between a MIDCOM agent and a middlebox has a number of
components. Authorization, authentication, integrity and
confidentiality. Authorization refers to whether a particular
agent is authorized to signal middlebox with requests for one or
more applications adhering to a certain policy profile. Failing the
authorization process might indicate resource theft attempt or
failure due to administrative and/or credential deficiencies. In
either case, the middlebox should take the proper measures to
audit/log such attempts and consult its designated policy server
for the required action if the middlebox is configured with one.
Alternatively, the middlebox may resort to a default service deny
policy when a midcom agent fails to prompt the required
credentials. Section 6 discusses the middlebox-policy server
interactions in view of policy decisions.
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Authentication refers to confirming the identity of originator
for all datagrams received from the originator. Lack of strong
credentials for authentication of MIDCOM messages between an agent
and a middlebox can seriously jeopardize the fundamental service
rendered by the middlebox. A consequence of not authenticating an
agent would be that an attacker could spoof the identity of a
"legitimate" agent and open holes in the firewall. Another would
be that it could otherwise manipulate state on a middlebox,
creating a denial-of-service attack by closing needed pinholes or
filling up a NAT table. A consequence of not authenticating the
middlebox to an agent is that an attacker could pose as a
middlebox and respond to NAT requests in a manner that would divert
data to the attacker. Failing to submit the required/valid
credentials once challenged may indicate a replay attack and in
which case a proper action is required by the middlebox such as
auditing, logging, consulting its designated policy server to
reflect such failure. A consequence of not protecting the
middlebox against replay attacks would be that a specific
pinhole may be reopened or closed by an attacker at will, thereby
bombarding end hosts with unwarranted data or causing denial of
service.
Integrity is required to ensure that a MIDCOM message has not been
accidentally or maliciously altered or destroyed. Result of a lack
of data integrity enforcement in an untrusted environment could be
that an imposter will alter the messages sent by an agent and
bring the middlebox to a halt or cause a denial of service for the
application the agent is attempting to enable.
Confidentiality of MIDCOM messages ensure that the signaling data
is accessible only to the authorized entities. When a middlebox
agent is deployed in an untrusted environment, lack of
confidentiality will allow an intruder to perform traffic flow
analysis and snoop the middlebox resources. The intruder could
cannibalize a lesser secure MIDCOM connection and destroy or
compromise the middlebox resources he uncovered on other
connections. Needless to say, the least secure MIDCOM connection
will become the achilles heel and make the middlebox vulnerable
to security attacks.
Lastly, there can be security vulnerability to the applications
traversing a middlebox when a resource on a middlebox is controlled
by multiple external agents. A middlebox service may be abruptly
disrupted due to malicious manipulation or incorrect implementation
of the middlebox or its agents of a certain shared resource by an
agent purporting to offer ALG service for a different middlebox
function. Care must be taken in the protocol design to ensure that
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agents for one function do not abruptly step over resources impacting
a different function. Alternately, the severity of such
manifestations could be lessened when a single MIDCOM agent is
responsible for supporting all the middlebox services for an
application due to the reduced complexity and synchronization effort
in managing the middlebox resources.
REFERENCES
[IETF-STD] Bradner, S., " The Internet Standards Process --
Revision 3", RFC 1602, IETF, October 1996.
[SIP] Handley, M., H. Schulzrinne, E. Schooler, and
J. Rosenberg, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol",
RFC 2543, IETF, March 1999.
[SDP] Handley, M., and Jacobson, V., "SDP: session
description protocol", RFC 2327, IETF, April 1998.
[H.323] ITU-T Recommendation H.323. "Packet-based Multimedia
Communications Systems," 1998.
[RTP] Schulzrinne, H., S. Casner, R. Frederick, and V. Jacobson,
"RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications",
RFC 1889, IETF, January 1996.
[RTSP] Schulzrinne, H., A. Rao, R. Lanphier: "Real Time
Streaming Protocol", RFC 2326, IETF, April 1998.
[FTP] J. Postel, J. Reynolds, "FILE TRANSFER PROTOCOL (FTP)",
RFC 959
[NAT-TERM] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations",
RFC 2663, August 1999.
[NAT-TRAD] Srisuresh, P. and Egevang, K., "Traditional IP Network
Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
January 2001.
[NAT-COMP] Holdrege, M. and Srisuresh, P., "Protocol Complications
with the IP Network Address Translator", RFC 3027,
January 2001.
[NAT-PT] Tsirtsis, G. and Srisuresh, P., "Network Address
Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)",
RFC 2766, February 2000.
Srisuresh et al. [Page 33]
Internet-Draft MIDCOM Architecture & Framework July 2001
[APPL-ID] Bernet, Y. and Pabbati, R., "Application and Sub
Application Identity Policy Element for Use with
RSVP", RFC 2872, June 2000.
[RFC 1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D.,
de Groot, G. and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for
Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC 1700] J. Reynolds and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers",
RFC 1700
[IPsec-AH] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication
Header", RFC 2402, November 1998.
[IPsec-ESP] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[TLS] Dierks, T., and Allen, C., "The TLS Protocol
Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999.
Authors' Addresses
Pyda Srisuresh
Kuokoa Networks, Inc.
2901 Tasman Dr., Suite 202
Santa Clara, CA 95054
U.S.A.
EMail: srisuresh@yahoo.com
Jiri Kuthan
GMD Fokus
Kaiserin-Augusta-Allee 31
D-10589 Berlin, Germany
E-mail: kuthan@fokus.gmd.de
Jonathan Rosenberg
dynamicsoft
200 Executive Drive
Suite 120
West Orange, NJ 07052
U.S.A.
email: jdrosen@dynamicsoft.com
Srisuresh et al. [Page 34]
Internet-Draft MIDCOM Architecture & Framework July 2001
Andrew Molitor
Aravox technologies
4201 Lexington Avenue North, Suite 1105
Arden Hills, MN 55126
U.S.A.
voice: (651) 256-2700
email: amolitor@visi.com
Abdallah Rayhan
P.O. Box 3511 Stn C
Ottawa, ON, Canada K1Y 4H7
eMail: ar_rayhan@yahoo.ca
Srisuresh et al. [Page 35]
