MILE Working Group                                         P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Informational                             July 12, 2013
Expires: January 13, 2014


                          IODEF Usage Guidance
                   draft-ietf-mile-iodef-guidance-01.txt

Abstract

   The Incident Object Description Exchange Format [RFC5070] defines a
   data representation that provides a framework for sharing information
   commonly exchanged by Computer Security Incident Response Teams
   (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents.  Since the IODEF model
   includes a wealth of available options that can be used to describe a
   security incident or issue, it can be challenging for implementers to
   develop tools that can Leverage IODEF for incident sharing.  This
   document provides guidelines for IODEF implementers.  It will also
   address how common security indicators can be represented in IODEF.
   The goal of this document is to make IODEF's adoption by vendors
   easier and encourage faster and wider adoption of the model by
   Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) around the world.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Implementation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.1.  Recommended classes to implement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.2.  Decide what IODEF will be used for  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  IODEF considerations and how to address them  . . . . . . . . . 4
     4.1.  Unnecessary Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     4.2.  External References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     4.3.  Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.4.  Logic for watchlist of indications  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.5.  Externally defined Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     4.6.  Restrictions in IODEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   5.  Current uses of IODEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     5.1.  Anti-Phishing Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     5.2.  Collective Intelligence Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     5.3.  Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

















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1.  Introduction

   The Incident Object Description Exchange Format in [RFC5070] defines
   a data representation that provides a framework for sharing
   information commonly exchanged by Computer Security Incident Response
   Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents.  The IODEF data
   model consists of multiple classes and data types that are used in
   the IODEF XML schema.

   The IODEF schema was designed to be able to describe all the possible
   fields that would be needed in a security incident exchange.  Thus,
   IODEF contains plenty data constructs that could potentially make it
   harder for IODEF implementers to decide which are the most important
   ones.  Additionally, in the IODEF schema, there exist multiple fields
   and classes which do not necessarily need to be used in every
   possible data exchange.  Moreover, there are fields that are useful
   only in data exchanges of non-traditional security events.  This
   document tries to address the issues above.  It will also address how
   common security indicators can be represented in IODEF.  It will
   point out the most important IODEF classes for an implementer and
   describe other ones that are not as important.  Also, it addresses
   some common challenges for IODEF implementers and how they should be
   addressed.  The end goal of this document is to make IODEF's adoption
   by vendors easier and encourage faster and wider adoption of the
   model by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) around
   the world.

   Section 3 discusses the recommended classes and how an IODEF
   implementer should chose the classes to implement.  Section 4
   presents common considerations and implementer will come across and
   how to address them.  Section 5 goes over some basic security
   concepts and how they can be expressed in IODEF.


2.  Terminology

   The terminology used in this document follows the one defined in RFC
   5070 [RFC5070] and I-D.draft-ietf-mile-sci [I-D.ietf-mile-sci].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


3.  Implementation Strategy

   It is important for IODEF implementers to be able to distinguish how
   the IODEF classes will be used for incident information exchanges.



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   It is critical for an implementer to follow a strategy according to
   which he will chose to implement various IODEF classes.  It is also
   important to know what the most common classes that will be used to
   describe common security incident or indicators.  Thus, this section
   will describe the most important classes and factors an IODEF
   implementer should take into consideration before designing the
   implementation or tool.

3.1.  Recommended classes to implement

   This section explains the mandatory to implement IODEF classes that
   are required more than once and also are useful.

   [...More to be added...]

3.2.  Decide what IODEF will be used for

   This section describes that there is no need to implement all fields
   of IODEF, the ones that are necessary for your use-cases.  The
   implementer should look into the schema and decide classes to
   implement (or not) Also it explains that other external schemata
   might be needed to describe incidents or indicators, based on SCI
   draft extensions.

   [...More to be added...]


4.  IODEF considerations and how to address them

4.1.  Unnecessary Fields

   This section talks about fields that do not always play in important
   role like Assessment, Impact

   [...More to be added...]

4.2.  External References

   draft draft-montville-mile-enum-reference-format "This format allows
   the <Version> to be associated with the id rather than the id_type.
   By requiring that a specific type and version be associated with the
   identifier, an implementer can look up the type in an IANA table to
   understand exactly what the identifier in ReferenceName is and how
   s/he may expect that identifier to be structured."

   [...More to be added...]





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4.3.  Extensions

   This section explains how to describe things IODEF can't describe
   ([I-D.ietf-mile-sci] draft), or extensions not yet known, or
   implemented, when do you use another xml schema encapsulated in iodef

   [...More to be added...]

4.4.  Logic for watchlist of indications

   Multiple indicators occasionally need to be combined in an IODEF
   document.  For example, a botnet might have multiple command and
   control servers.  A consistent predicate logic should be followed in
   order to present such relationships in IODEF.

   [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] defines two new category attributes in
   the System Class.  These are watchlist-source and watchlist-
   destination and they serve for watchlist indicator groupings.  When
   an IODEF Node consists of two or more System Classes with various
   watchlist-source and watchlist-destination attributes (watchlist of
   Systems) the System information should be ORed with the information
   in the Flow Class.  In other words, either System description should
   be considered as a watchlist indicator.  The rest of the content in
   the EventData Class the Node belongs to should be combined with the
   watchlist of Systems using AND logic.  In other words, the rest of
   the EventData content describes a watchlist indicator for any of
   System in the watchlist of Systems.

   IODEF's grouping predicate logic follows the above pattern
   consistently.  [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] defined the
   HashInformation Class that describes a file hash information as also
   described in [RFC5901].  The HashInformation Class is of
   HashSigDetails type which consists of elements that describe the file
   hash details.  Some of the attributes of the HashSigDetails are
   introduced to describe watchlist groupings (i.e.
   PKI_email_ds_watchlist, PGP_email_ds_watchlist, file_hash_watchlist,
   email_hash_watchlist).  If any of these attributes are used in two or
   more HashInformation Classes of a Record then HashInformation content
   is ORed for the Record.  For example, if two HashInformation types
   are set to file_hash, the list of hash details provided are just
   alternate representations for the same hash (SHA256.  SHA1 etc).
   Similarly, if multiple HashInformation are in a Record using
   Reference elements or others, they should all be treated as different
   representations of the same file hash, assuming the FileName element
   is not used in the HashInformation.

   In some cases the predicate logic in IODEF can slightly change.
   [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] introduces the WindowsRegistryKeyModified



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   Class which is of type RegistryKeyModified.  RegistryKeyModified has
   an optional type attribute which has watchlist as an option in order
   to include the ability to group WindowsRegistryKeyModified.  In order
   to group multiple WindowsRegistryKeyModified of the same watchlist of
   indicators multiple WindowsRegistryKeysModified should be used in the
   same RecordData or EventData Class.  If the RegistryKeyModified
   Classes are not under the same RecordData or EventData Class they
   should be treated as different indicator Keys modified.

4.5.  Externally defined Indicators

   set-uid,uid and its use with SCI draft [I-D.ietf-mile-sci]

   [...More to be added...]

4.6.  Restrictions in IODEF

   This section describes how Restriction can pose challenges

   [...More to be added...]


5.  Current uses of IODEF

   IODEF is currently used by various organizations in order to
   represent security incidents and share incident and threat
   information between security operations organizations.

5.1.  Anti-Phishing Working Group

   The Anti-Phishing Working Group ([APWG]) is using [RFC5070] to
   represent email phishing information.  [APWG] also uses IODEF to
   aggregate and share Bot and Infected System Alerting and Notification
   System (BISANS) and Cyber Bullying IODEF records.  Special IODEF
   extensions are used in order to mark the sensitivity of the exchanged
   information.  Shared infected system or email phishing records can
   then be used by interested parties in order to provide mitigations.
   [APWG] leverages tools of its eCRISP-X toolkit in order to share and
   report e-Crime IODEF records.

5.2.  Collective Intelligence Framework

   The Collective Intelligence Framework [CIF] is a cyber threat
   intelligence management system that uses IODEF to combine known
   malicious threat information from multiple sources and use that it to
   identify, detect and mitigate.  The threat intelligence can be IP
   addresses, domains and URLs that are involved in malicious activity.
   IODEF records can be consumed by a CIF standalone client or CIF



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   browser plugins that a user can use to make informed decisions about
   threat information.

5.3.  Other

   IODEF is also used in various projects and products to consume and
   share security information.  Various vendor incident reporting
   products have the ability to consume and export in IODEF format.
   Perl and Java modules exist in order to parse IODEF documents and
   their extensions.  Additionally worldwide CERT organizations are
   already able to use receive incident information in IODEF.


6.  Security Considerations


7.  Acknowledgements


8.  Security Considerations


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5070]  Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident
              Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
              December 2007.

   [RFC5901]  Cain, P. and D. Jevans, "Extensions to the IODEF-Document
              Class for Reporting Phishing", RFC 5901, July 2010.

9.2.  Informative References

   [APWG]     "APWG", <http://apwg.org/>.

   [CIF]      "CIF", <https://code.google.com/p/
              collective-intelligence-framework/wiki/WhatisCIF>.

   [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis]
              Danyliw, R. and P. Stoecker, "The Incident Object
              Description Exchange Format",
              draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-00 (work in progress),
              May 2013.



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   [I-D.ietf-mile-sci]
              Takahashi, T., Landfield, K., Millar, T., and Y.
              Kadobayashi, "IODEF-extension for structured cybersecurity
              information", draft-ietf-mile-sci-08 (work in progress),
              July 2013.


Author's Address

   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems
   170 West Tasman Dr.
   San Jose, CA  95134
   US

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com



































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