Mobile IP                                                     S. Vaarala
Internet-Draft                                                   Codebay
Intended status: Standards Track                             E. Klovning
Expires: September 15, 2008                                     Birdstep
                                                          March 14, 2008

         Mobile IPv4 Traversal Across IPsec-based VPN Gateways

Status of this Memo

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   This document outlines a solution for the Mobile IPv4 and IPsec
   coexistence problem for enterprise users.  The solution consists of
   an applicability statement for using Mobile IPv4 and IPsec for
   session mobility in corporate remote access scenarios, and a required
   mechanism for detecting the trusted internal network securely.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.3.  Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.4.  Terms and abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.5.  Requirement levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     1.6.  Assumptions and rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     1.7.  Why IPsec lacks mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   2.  The network environment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     2.1.  Access mode: 'c' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     2.2.  Access mode: 'f' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     2.3.  Access mode: 'cvc' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     2.4.  Access mode: 'fvc' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     2.5.  NAT traversal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   3.  Internal network detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     3.1.  Assumptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     3.2.  Implementation requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       3.2.1.  Separate tracking of network interfaces  . . . . . . . 18
       3.2.2.  Connection status change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       3.2.3.  Registration-based internal network detection  . . . . 19
       3.2.4.  Registration-based internal network monitoring . . . . 19
     3.3.  Proposed algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     3.4.  Trusted Networks Configured (TNC) extension  . . . . . . . 21
     3.5.  Implementation issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     3.6.  Rationale for design choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       3.6.1.  Firewall configuration requirements  . . . . . . . . . 23
       3.6.2.  Registration-based internal network monitoring . . . . 24
       3.6.3.  No encryption when inside  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     3.7.  Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   4.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.1.  Mobile node requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.2.  VPN device requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.3.  Home agent requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   5.  Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     5.1.  Comparison against guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     5.2.  Packet overhead  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     5.3.  Latency considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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     5.4.  Firewall state considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     5.5.  Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     5.6.  Implementation of mobile node  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     5.7.  Non-IPsec VPN protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   6.  Security considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     6.1.  Internal network detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     6.2.  Mobile IPv4 versus IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   7.  IANA considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
   Appendix A.  Packet flow examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
     A.1.  Connection setup for access mode 'cvc' . . . . . . . . . . 39
   Appendix B.  Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 50

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1.  Introduction

   The Mobile IP working group set out to explore the problem and
   solution spaces of IPsec and Mobile IP coexistence.  The problem
   statement and solution requirements for Mobile IPv4 case was first
   documented in [ref.rfc4093].  This document outlines the proposed
   solution for IPv4.

   The document contains two parts:

   o  a basic solution which is an applicability statement of Mobile
      IPv4 and IPsec to provide session mobility between enterprise
      Intranets and other external networks, intended for enterprise
      mobile users; and

   o  a technical specification and a set of requirements for secure
      detection of the internal and the external networks, including a
      new extension which must be implemented by a mobile node and a
      home agent situated inside the enterprise network.

   There are many useful ways to combine Mobile IPv4 and IPsec.  The
   solution specified in this document is most applicable when the
   assumption documented in the problem statement [ref.rfc4093] are
   valid; among others that the solution:

   o  must minimize changes to existing firewall/VPN/DMZ deployments;

   o  must ensure that traffic is not routed through the DMZ when the
      mobile node is inside (to avoid scalability and management

   o  must support foreign networks with only foreign agent access;

   o  should not require changes to existing IPsec or key exchange

   o  must comply with the Mobile IPv4 protocol (but may require new
      extensions or multiple instances of Mobile IPv4); and

   o  must propose a mechanism to avoid or minimize IPsec re-negotiation
      when mobile node moves.

1.1.  Overview

   Typical corporate networks consist of three different domains: the
   Internet (untrusted external network), the intranet (trusted internal
   network), and the DMZ, which connects the two networks.  Access to
   the internal network is guarded both by a firewall and a VPN device;

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   access is only allowed if both firewall and VPN security policies are

   Enterprise mobile users benefit from unrestricted seamless session
   mobility between subnets, regardless of whether the subnets are part
   of the internal or the external network.  Unfortunately the current
   Mobile IPv4 and IPsec standards alone do not provide such a service

   The proposed solution is to use standard Mobile IPv4 (except for a
   new extension used by the home agent in the internal network to aid
   in network detection) when the mobile node is in the internal
   network, and to use the VPN tunnel endpoint address for the Mobile
   IPv4 registration when outside.  IPsec-based VPN tunnels require re-
   negotiation after movement.  To overcome this limitation, another
   layer of Mobile IPv4 is used underneath IPsec, in effect making IPsec
   unaware of movement.  Thus, the mobile node can freely move in the
   external network without disrupting the VPN connection.

   Briefly, when outside, the mobile node:

   o  detects that it is outside (Section 3);

   o  registers its co-located or foreign agent care-of address with the
      external home agent;

   o  establishes a VPN tunnel using e.g.  IKE (or IKEv2) if security
      associations are not already available;

   o  registers the VPN tunnel address as its co-located care-of address
      with the internal home agent; this registration request is sent
      inside the IPsec tunnel.

   The solution requires control over the protocol layers in the mobile
   node.  It must be capable of (1) detecting whether it is inside or
   outside in a secure fashion, and (2) control the protocol layers
   accordingly.  For instance, if the mobile node is inside, the IPsec
   layer needs to become dormant.

   Except for the new Mobile IPv4 extension to improve security of
   internal network detection, current Mobile IPv4 and IPsec standards,
   when used in a suitable combination, are sufficient to implement the
   solution; no changes are required to existing VPN devices or foreign

   The solution described is compatible with different kinds of IPsec-
   based VPNs, and no particular kind of VPN is required.  Because the
   appropriate security policy database (SPD) entries and other IKE and

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   IPsec specifics differ between deployed IPsec-based VPN products,
   these details are not discussed in the document.

1.2.  Scope

   This document describes a solution for IPv4 only.  The downside of
   the described approach is that an external home agent is required,
   and that the packet overhead (see Section 5) and overall complexity
   increase.  Optimizations would require significant changes to Mobile
   IPv4 and/or IPsec, and are out of scope of this document.

   VPN, in this document, refers to an IPsec-based remote access VPN.
   Other types of VPNs are out of scope.

1.3.  Related work

   Related work has been done on Mobile IPv6 in [ref.rfc3776] which
   discusses the interaction of IPsec and Mobile IPv6 in protecting
   Mobile IPv6 signaling.  The document also discusses dynamic updating
   of the IPsec endpoint based on Mobile IP signaling packets.

   The "transient pseudo-NAT" attack, described in [ref.pseudonat] and
   [ref.mipnat], affects any approach which attempts to provide security
   of mobility signaling in conjunction with NAT devices.  In many
   cases, one cannot assume any co-operation from NAT devices which thus
   have to be treated as any other networking entity.

   The IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE) [ref.rfc4555]
   provides better mobility for IPsec.  This would allow the external
   Mobile IPv4 layer described in this specification to be removed.
   However, deploying MOBIKE requires changes to VPN devices, and is
   thus out of scope of this specification.

1.4.  Terms and abbreviations

   co-CoA:   co-located care-of address.

   DMZ:   (DeMilitarized Zone) A small network inserted as a "neutral
      zone" between a company's private network and the outside public
      network to prevent outside users from getting direct access to the
      company's private network.

   external network:   the untrusted network (i.e.  Internet).  Note
      that a private network (e.g. another corporate network) other than
      the mobile node's internal network is considered an external

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   FA:   Mobile IPv4 foreign agent.

   FA-CoA:   foreign agent care-of address.

   FW:   Firewall.

   internal network:   the trusted network; for instance, a physically
      secure corporate network where the i-HA is located.

   i-FA:   Mobile IPv4 foreign agent residing in the internal network.

   i-HA:   Mobile IPv4 home agent residing in the internal network;
      typically has a private address [ref.privaddr].

   i-HoA:   home address of the mobile node in the internal home agent.

   MN:   Mobile Node.

   NAI:   Network Access Identifier [ref.rfc4282].

   R:   Router.

   VPN:   Virtual Private Network based on IPsec.

   VPN-TIA:   VPN tunnel inner address, the address(es) negotiated
      during IKE phase 2 (quick mode), assigned manually, using IPsec-
      DHCP [ref.rfc3456], using the "de facto" standard ISAKMP
      configuration mode, or by some other means.  Some VPN clients use
      their current care-of address as their TIA for architectural

   VPN tunnel:   an IPsec-based tunnel; for instance, IPsec tunnel mode
      IPsec connection, or L2TP combined with IPsec transport

   x-FA:   Mobile IPv4 foreign agent residing in the external network.

   x-HA:   Mobile IPv4 home agent residing in the external network.

   x-HoA:   home address of the mobile node in the external home agent.

1.5.  Requirement levels

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119

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1.6.  Assumptions and rationale

   The proposed solution is an attempt to solve the problem described in
   [ref.rfc4093].  The major assumptions and their rationale is
   summarized below.

   Changes to existing firewall and VPN deployments should be minimized:

   o  The current deployment of firewalls and IPsec-based VPNs is much
      larger than corresponding Mobile IPv4 elements.  Thus, a solution
      should work within the existing VPN infrastructure.

   o  Current enterprise network deployments typically centralize
      management of security and network access into a compact DMZ.

   When the mobile node is inside, traffic should not go through the DMZ

   o  Routing all mobile node traffic through the DMZ is seen as a
      performance problem in existing deployments of firewalls.  The
      more sophisticated firewall technology is used (e.g. content
      scanning), the more serious the performance problem is.

   o  Current deployments of firewalls and DMZs in general have been
      optimized for the case where only a small minority of total
      enterprise traffic goes through the DMZ.  Furthermore, users of
      current VPN remote access solutions do not route their traffic
      through the DMZ when connected to an internal network.

   An home agent inside the enterprise cannot be reached directly from
   outside, even if the home agent contains IPsec functionality:

   o  Deployment of current combined IPsec/MIPv4 solutions are not
      common in large installations.

   o  Doing decryption in the home agents "deep inside" the enterprise
      effectively means having a security perimeter much larger than the
      typical, compact DMZ used by a majority of enterprises today.

   o  In order to maintain a security level equal to current firewall/
      DMZ deployments, every home agent decapsulating IPsec would need
      to do the same firewalling as the current DMZ firewalls (content
      scanning, connection tracking, etc).

   Traffic cannot be encrypted when the mobile node is inside:

   o  There is a considerable performance impact on home agents (which
      currently do rather light processing), and mobile nodes

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      (especially for small devices).  Note that traffic throughput
      inside the enterprise is typically order(s) of magnitude larger
      than the remote access traffic through a VPN.

   o  Encryption consumes processing power and has a significant impact
      on device battery life.

   o  There is also a usability issue involved; the user needs to
      authenticate connection to the IPsec layer in the home agent to
      gain access.  For interactive authentication mechanisms (e.g.
      SecurID) this always means user interaction.

   o  Furthermore, if there is a separate VPN device in the DMZ for
      remote access, the user needs to authenticate to both devices, and
      might need to have separate credentials for both.

   o  Current Mobile IPv4 home agents do not typically incorporate IPsec
      functionality, which is relevant for the proposed solution when we
      assume zero or minimal changes to existing Mobile IPv4 nodes.

   o  Note, however, that the assumption (no encryption when inside)
      does not necessarily apply to all solutions in the solution space;
      if the abovementioned problems were resolved there is no
      fundamental reason why encryption could not be applied when

1.7.  Why IPsec lacks mobility

   IPsec, as currently specified [ref.rfc4301] requires that a new IKE
   negotiation be done whenever an IPsec peer moves, i.e. changes
   care-of address.  The main reason is that a security association is
   uni-directional and identified by a triplet consisting of (1) the
   destination address (which is the outer address when tunnel mode is
   used), (2) the security protocol (ESP or AH), and (3) the Security
   Parameter Index (SPI) ([ref.rfc4301], Section 4.1).  Although an
   implementation is not required to use all of these for its own SAs,
   an implementation cannot assume that a peer does not.

   When a mobile IPsec peer sends packets to a stationary IPsec peer,
   there is no problem; the SA is "owned" by the stationary IPsec peer,
   and therefore the destination address does not need to change.  The
   (outer) source address should be ignored by the stationary peer
   (although some implementations do check the source address as well).

   The problem arises when packets are sent from the stationary peer to
   the mobile peer.  The destination address of this SA (SAs are
   unidirectional) is established during IKE negotiation, and is
   effectively the care-of address of the mobile peer at time of

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   negotiation.  Therefore the packets will be sent to the original
   care-of address, not a changed care-of address.

   The IPsec NAT traversal mechanism can also be used for limited
   mobility, but UDP tunneling needs to be used even when there is no
   NAT in the route between the mobile and the stationary peers.
   Furthermore, support for changes in current NAT mapping is not
   required by the NAT traversal specification [ref.rfc3947].

   In summary, although the IPsec standard does not as such prevent
   mobility (in the sense of updating security associations on-the-fly),
   the standard does not include a built-in mechanism (explicit or
   implicit) for doing so.  Therefore it is assumed throughout this
   document that any change in the addresses comprising the identity of
   an SA requires IKE re-negotiation, which implies too heavy
   computation and too large latency for useful mobility.

   The IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE) [ref.rfc4555]
   provides better mobility for IPsec.  This would allow the external
   Mobile IPv4 layer described in this specification to be removed.
   However, deploying MOBIKE requires changes to VPN devices, and is
   thus out of scope of this specification.

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2.  The network environment

   Enterprise users will access both the internal and external networks
   using different networking technologies.  In some networks, the MN
   will use FAs and in others it will anchor at the HA using co-located
   mode.  The following figure describes an example network topology
   illustrating the relationship between the internal and external
   networks, the possible locations of the mobile node (i.e.  (MN)).

       (MN) {fvc}                            {home} (MN)   [i-HA]
        !                                             \     /
     .--+---.                                        .-+---+-.
    (        )                                      (         )
     `--+---'                      [VPN]             `--+----'
         \                           !                  !
       [R/FA]        [x-HA]       .--+--.              [R]
            \         /          (  DMZ  )              !
           .-+-------+--.         `--+--'         .-----+------.
          (              )           !           (              )
          ( external net +---[R]----[FW]----[R]--+ internal net )
          (              )                       (              )
           `--+---------'                         `---+---+----'
             /                                       /     \
   [DHCP]  [R]                              [DHCP] [R]     [R]    [i-FA]
      \    /                                   \   /         \    /
      .+--+---.                               .-+-+--.     .--+--+-.
     (         )                             (        )   (         )
      `---+---'                               `--+---'     `---+---'
          !                                      !             !
         (MN) {cvc}                             (MN) {c}      (MN) {f}

       Figure:  Basic topology, possible MN locations and access modes

   In every possible location described in the figure, the mobile node
   can establish a connection to the corresponding HA(s) by using a
   suitable "access mode".  An access mode is here defined to consist

   1.  a composition of the mobile node networking stack (i-MIP or
       x-MIP/VPN/i-MIP); and

   2.  registration mode(s) of i-MIP and x-MIP (if used); i.e. co-
       located care-of address or foreign agent care-of address.

   Each possible access mode is encoded as "xyz", where:

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   o  "x" indicates whether the x-MIP layer is used, and if used, the
      mode ("f" indicates FA-CoA, "c" indicates co-CoA, absence
      indicates not used);

   o  "y" indicates whether the VPN layer is used ("v" indicates VPN
      used, absence indicates not used);

   o  "z" indicates mode of i-MIP layer ("f" indicates FA-CoA, "c"
      indicates co-CoA).

   This results in four access modes:

         c:  i-MIP w/ co-CoA
         f:  i-MIP w/ FA-CoA
       cvc:  x-MIP w/ co-CoA, VPN-TIA as i-MIP co-CoA
       fvc:  x-MIP w/ FA-CoA, VPN-TIA as i-MIP co-CoA

   This notation is more useful when optimizations to protocol layers
   are considered.  The notation is preserved here so that work on the
   optimizations can refer to a common notation.

   The internal network is typically a multi-subnetted network using
   private addressing [ref.privaddr].  Subnets may contain internal home
   agent(s), DHCP server(s), and/or foreign agent(s).  Current IEEE
   802.11 wireless LANs are typically deployed in the external network
   or the DMZ because of security concerns.

   The figure leaves out a few details worth noticing:

   o  There may be multiple NAT devices anywhere in the diagram.

      *  When the MN is outside, the NAT devices may be placed between
         the MN and the x-HA or the x-HA and the VPN.

      *  There may be also be NAT(s) between the VPN and the i-HA, or a
         NAT integrated into the VPN.  In essence, any router in the
         figure may be considered to represent zero or more routers,
         each possibly performing NAT and/or ingress filtering.

      *  When the MN is inside, there may be NAT devices between the MN
         and the i-HA.

   o  Site-to-site VPN tunnels are not shown.  Although mostly
      transparent, IPsec endpoints may perform ingress filtering as part
      of enforcing their policy.

   o  The figure represents a topology where each functional entity is
      illustrated as a separate device.  However, it is possible that

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      several network functions are co-located in a single device.  In
      fact, all three server components (x-HA, VPN, and i-HA) may be co-
      located in a single physical device.

   The following issues are also important when considering enterprise
   mobile users:

   o  Some firewalls are configured to block ICMP messages and/or
      fragments.  Such firewalls (routers) cannot be detected reliably.

   o  Some networks contain transparent application proxies, especially
      for the HTTP protocol.  Like firewalls, such proxies cannot be
      detected reliably in general.  IPsec and Mobile IPv4 are
      incompatible with such networks.

   Whenever a mobile node obtains either a co-CoA or a FA-CoA, the
   following conceptual steps take place:

   o  The mobile node detects whether the subnet where the care-of
      address was obtained belongs to the internal or the external
      network using the method described in Section 3 (or a vendor
      specific mechanism fulfilling the requirements described).

   o  The mobile node performs necessary registrations and other
      connection setup signaling for the protocol layers (in the
      following order):

      *  x-MIP (if used);

      *  VPN (if used); and

      *  i-MIP.

   Note that these two tasks are intertwined to some extent: detection
   of the internal network results in a successful registration to the
   i-HA using the proposed network detection algorithm.  An improved
   network detection mechanism not based on Mobile IPv4 registration
   messages might not have this side-effect.

   The following subsections describe the different access modes and the
   requirements for registration and connection setup phase.

2.1.  Access mode: 'c'

   This access mode is standard Mobile IPv4 [ref.rfc3344] with a co-
   located address, except that:

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   o  the mobile node MUST detect that it is in the internal network;

   o  the mobile node MUST re-register periodically (with a configurable
      interval) to ensure it is still inside the internal network (see
      Section 4).

2.2.  Access mode: 'f'

   This access mode is standard Mobile IPv4 [ref.rfc3344] with a foreign
   agent care-of address, except that

   o  the mobile node MUST detect that it is in the internal network;

   o  the mobile node MUST re-register periodically (with a configurable
      interval) to ensure it is still inside the internal network (see
      Section 4).

2.3.  Access mode: 'cvc'


   o  The mobile node obtains a care-of address.

   o  The mobile node detects it is not inside and registers with the
      x-HA, where

      *  T-bit MAY be set (reverse tunneling), which minimizes the
         probability of firewall related connectivity problems

   o  If the mobile node does not have an existing IPsec security
      association, it uses IKE to set up an IPsec security association
      with the VPN gateway, using the x-HoA as the IP address for IKE/
      IPsec communication.  How the VPN-TIA is assigned is outside the
      scope of this document.

   o  The mobile node sends a MIPv4 RRQ to the i-HA, registering the
      VPN-TIA as a co-located care-of address, where

      *  T-bit SHOULD be set (reverse tunneling) (see discussion below)

   Reverse tunneling in the inner Mobile IPv4 layer is often required
   because of IPsec security policy limitations.  IPsec selectors define
   allowed IP addresses for packets sent inside the IPsec tunnel.
   Typical IPsec remote VPN selectors restrict the client address to be
   VPN-TIA (remote address is often unrestricted).  If reverse tunneling
   is not used, the source address of a packet sent by the MN will be

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   the MN's home address (registered with i-HA), which is different from
   the VPN-TIA, thus violating IPsec security policy.  Consequently the
   packet will be dropped, resulting in a connection black hole.

   Some types of IPsec-based VPNs, in particular L2TP/IPsec VPNs (PPP-
   over-L2TP-over-IPsec), do not have this limitation and can use
   triangular routing.

   Note that although the MN can use triangular routing, i.e. skip the
   inner MIPv4 layer, it MUST NOT skip the VPN layer for security

2.4.  Access mode: 'fvc'


   o  The mobile node obtains a foreign agent advertisement from the
      local network.

   o  The mobile node detects it is outside and registers with the x-HA,

      *  T-bit MAY be set (reverse tunneling), which minimizes the
         probability of firewall related connectivity problems

   o  If necessary, the mobile node uses IKE to set up an IPsec
      connection with the VPN gateway, using the x-HoA as the IP address
      for IKE/IPsec communication.  How the VPN-TIA is assigned is
      outside the scope of this document.

   o  The mobile node sends a MIPv4 RRQ to the i-HA, registering the
      VPN-TIA as a co-located care-of address, where

      *  T-bit SHOULD be set (reverse tunneling) (see discussion in
         Section 2.3)

   Note that although the MN can use triangular routing, i.e. skip the
   inner MIPv4 layer, it MUST NOT skip the VPN layer for security

2.5.  NAT traversal

   NAT devices may affect each layer independently.  Mobile IPv4 NAT
   traversal [ref.mipnat] SHOULD be supported for x-MIP and i-MIP
   layers, while IPsec NAT traversal [ref.rfc3947][ref.rfc3948] SHOULD
   be supported for the VPN layer.

   Note that NAT traversal for the internal MIPv4 layer may be necessary

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   even when there is no separate NAT device between the VPN gateway and
   the internal network.  Some VPN implementations NAT VPN tunnel inner
   addresses before routing traffic to the intranet.  Sometimes this is
   done to make a deployment easier, but in some cases this approach
   makes VPN client implementation easier.  Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal is
   required to establish a MIPv4 session in this case.

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3.  Internal network detection

   Secure detection of the internal network is critical to prevent
   plaintext traffic from being sent over an untrusted network.  In
   other words, the overall security (confidentiality and integrity of
   user data) relies on the security of the internal network detection
   mechanism in addition to IPsec.  For this reason, security
   requirements are described in this section.

   In addition to detecting entry into the internal network, the mobile
   node must also detect when it has left the internal network.  Entry
   into the internal network is easier security-wise: the mobile node
   can ensure that it is inside the internal network before sending any
   plaintext traffic.  Exit from the internal network is more difficult
   to detect, and the MN may accidentally leak plaintext packets if the
   event is not detected in time.

   Several events can cause the mobile node to leave the internal
   network, including:

   o  a routing change upstream;

   o  a reassociation of 802.11 on layer 2 which the mobile node
      software does not detect;

   o  a physical cable disconnect and reconnect which the mobile node
      software does not detect.

   Whether the mobile node can detect such changes in the current
   connection reliably depends on the implementation and the networking
   technlogy.  For instance, some mobile nodes may be implemented as
   pure layer three entities.  Even if the mobile node software has
   access to layer two information, such information is not trustworthy
   security-wise, and depends on the network interface driver.

   If the mobile node does not detect these events properly, it may leak
   plaintext traffic into an untrusted network.  A number of approaches
   can be used to detect exit from the internal network, ranging from
   frequent re-registration to the use of layer two information.

   A mobile node MUST implement a detection mechanism fulfilling the
   requirements described in Section 3.2; this ensures that basic
   security requirements are fulfilled.  The basic algorithm described
   in Section 3.3 is one way to do that, but alternative methods may be
   used instead or in conjunction.  The assumptions that the
   requirements and the proposed mechanism rely upon are described in
   Section 3.1.

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3.1.  Assumptions

   The enterprise firewall MUST be configured to block traffic
   originating from external networks going to the i-HA.  In other
   words, the mobile node MUST NOT be able to perform a successful RRQ/
   RRP exchange (without using IPsec) unless it is connected to the
   trusted internal network; the mobile node can then stop using IPsec
   without compromising data confidentiality.

   If this assumption does not hold, data confidentiality is compromised
   in a potentially silent and thus dangerous manner.  To minimize the
   impact of this scenario the i-HA is also required to check the source
   address of any RRQ to determine whether it comes from a trusted
   (internal network) address.  The i-HA needs to indicate to the MN
   that it supports checking of trusted source addresses by including a
   Trusted Networks Configured extension in its registration reply.
   This new extension, which needs to be implemented by both i-HA and
   the MN, is described in Section 3.4.

   The firewall MAY be configured to block registration traffic to the
   x-HA originating from within the internal network, which makes the
   network detection algorithm simpler and more robust.  However, as the
   registration request is basically UDP traffic, an ordinary firewall
   (even a stateful one) would typically allow the registration request
   to be sent, and a registration reply to be received through the

3.2.  Implementation requirements

   Any mechanism used to detect the internal network MUST fulfill the
   requirements described in this section.  An example of a network
   detection mechanism fulfilling these requirements is given in Section
   Section 3.3.

3.2.1.  Separate tracking of network interfaces

   The mobile node implementation MUST track each network interface
   separately.  Successful registration with the i-HA through interface
   X does not imply anything about the status of interface Y.

3.2.2.  Connection status change

   When the mobile node detects that its connection status on a certain
   network interface changes, the mobile node MUST:

   o  immediately stop relaying user data packets;

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   o  detect whether this interface is connected to the internal or the
      external network;

   o  resume data traffic only after the internal network detection and
      necessary registrations and VPN tunnel establishment have been

   The mechanisms used to detect a connection status change depends on
   the mobile node implementation, the networking technology, and the
   access mode.

3.2.3.  Registration-based internal network detection

   The mobile node MUST NOT infer that an interface is connected to the
   internal network unless a successful registration has been completed
   through that particular interface to the i-HA, the i-HA registration
   reply contained a Trusted Networks Configured extension
   (Section 3.4), and the connection status of the interface has not
   changed since.

3.2.4.  Registration-based internal network monitoring

   Some leak of plaintext packets to a (potentially) untrusted network
   cannot always be completely prevented; this depends heavily on the
   client implementation.  In some cases the client cannot detect such a
   change, e.g. if upstream routing is changed.

   More frequent re-registrations when the MN is inside is a simple way
   to ensure that MN is still inside.  The MN SHOULD start re-
   registration every (T_MONITOR - N) seconds when inside, where N is a
   grace period which ensures that re-registration is completed before
   T_MONITOR seconds are up.  To bound the maximum amount of time that a
   plaintext leak may persist, the mobile node must fulfill the
   following security requirements when inside:

   o  The mobile node MUST NOT send or receive a user data packet if
      more than T_MONITOR seconds has elapsed since last successful
      (re-)registration with the i-HA.

   o  If more than T_MONITOR seconds has elapsed, data packets MUST be
      either dropped or queued.  If the packets are queued, the queues
      MUST NOT be processed until the re-registration has been
      successfully completed without a connection status change.

   o  The T_MONITOR parameter MUST be configurable, and have the default
      value of 60 seconds.  This default is a trade-off between traffic
      overhead and a reasonable bound to exposure.

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   This approach is reasonable for a wide range of mobile nodes (e.g.
   laptops), but has unnecessary overhead when the mobile node is idle
   (not sending or receiving packets).  If re-registration does not
   complete before T_MONITOR seconds are up, data packets must be queued
   or dropped as specified above.  Note that re-registration packets
   MUST be sent even if bi-directional user data traffic is being
   relayed: data packets are no substitute for an authenticated re-

   To minimize traffic overhead when the mobile node is idle, re-
   registrations can be stopped when no traffic is being sent or
   received.  If the mobile node subsequently receives or needs to send
   a packet, the packet must be dropped or queued (as specified above)
   until a re-registration with the i-HA has been successfully
   completed.  Although this approach adds packet processing complexity,
   it may be appropriate for small battery powered devices which may be
   idle much of the time.  (Note that ordinary re-registration before
   the mobility binding lifetime is exhausted should still be done to
   keep the MN reachable.)

   T_MONITOR is required to be configurable so that an administrator can
   determine the required security level for the particular deployment.
   Configuring T_MONITOR in the order of few seconds is not practical;
   alternative mechanisms need to be considered if such confidence is

   The re-registration mechanism is a worst case fallback mechanism.  If
   additional information (such as layer two triggers) are available to
   the mobile node, the mobile node SHOULD use the triggers to detect MN
   movement and restart the detection process to minimize exposure.

   Note that re-registration is required by Mobile IPv4 by default
   (except for the untypical case of an infinite binding lifetime);
   however, the re-registration interval may be much larger when using
   an ordinary Mobile IPv4 client.  Shorter re-registration interval is
   usually not an issue, because the internal network is typically a
   fast, wired network, and the shortened re-registration interval
   applies only when the mobile node is inside the internal network.
   When outside, the ordinary Mobile IPv4 re-registration process (based
   on binding lifetime) is used.

3.3.  Proposed algorithm

   When the MN detects that it has changed its point of network
   attachment on a certain interface, it issues two simultaneous
   registration requests, one to the i-HA and another to the x-HA.
   These registration requests are periodically retransmitted if reply
   messages are not received.

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   Registration replies are processed as follows:

   o  If a response from the x-HA is received, the MN stops
      retransmitting its registration request to the x-HA and
      tentatively determines it is outside.  However, the MN MUST keep
      on retransmitting its registration to the i-HA for a period of
      time.  The MN MAY postpone the IPsec connection setup for some
      period of time while it waits for a (possible) response from the

   o  If a response from the i-HA is received and the response contains
      the Trusted Networks Configured extension (Section 3.4), the MN
      SHOULD determine that it is inside.  In any case, the MN MUST stop
      retransmitting its registration requests to both i-HA and x-HA.

   o  When successfully registered with the i-HA, MN SHOULD de-register
      with the x-HA.

   If the MN ends up detecting that it is inside, it MUST re-register
   periodically (regardless of binding lifetime); see Section 3.2.4.  If
   the re-registration fails, the MN MUST stop sending and receiving
   plaintext traffic, and MUST restart the detection algorithm.

   Plaintext re-registration messages are always addressed either to the
   x-HA or the i-HA, not to both.  This is because the MN knows, after
   initial registration, whether it is inside or outside.  (However,
   when the mobile node is outside, it re-registers independently with
   the x-HA using plaintext, and with the i-HA through the VPN tunnel.)

   Postponing the IPSec connection setup could prevent aborted IKE
   sessions.  Aborting IKE sessions may be a problem in some cases
   because IKE does not provide a reliable, standardized, and mandatory-
   to-implement mechanism for terminating a session cleanly.

   If the x-HA is not reachable from inside (i.e. the firewall
   configuration is known), a detection period of zero is preferred, as
   it minimizes connection setup overhead and causes no timing problems.
   Should the assumption have been invalid and a response from the i-HA
   received after a response from the x-HA, the MN SHOULD re-register
   with the i-HA directly.

3.4.  Trusted Networks Configured (TNC) extension

   This extension is a skippable extension.  An i-HA sending the
   extension must fulfill the requirements described in Section 4.3
   while an MN processing the extension must fulfill the requirements
   described in Section 4.1.  The format of the extension is described
   below.  It adheres to the short extension format described in

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       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      |     Type      |    Length     |    Sub-Type   |   Reserved    |

          Type        TBD:IANA

          Length      2

          Sub-Type    TBD:IANA (probably 0 if Type is new)

          Reserved    Set to 0 when sending, ignored when receiving

3.5.  Implementation issues

   When the MN uses a parallel detection algorithm and is using an FA,
   the MN sends two registration requests through the same FA with the
   same MAC address (or equivalent) and possibly even the same home
   address.  Although this is not in conflict with existing
   specifications, it is an unusual scenario; hence some FA
   implementations may not work properly in such a situation.  However,
   testing against deployed foreign agents seems to indicate that a
   majority of available foreign agents handle this situation.

   When the x-HA and i-HA addresses are the same, the scenario is even
   more difficult for the FA, and it is almost certain that existing FAs
   do not deal with the situation correctly.  Therefore, it is required
   that x-HA and i-HA addresses MUST be different.

   Regardless, if the MN detects that i-HA and x-HA have the same
   address, it MUST assume that it is in the external network and bypass
   network detection to avoid confusing the FA.  Because the HA
   addresses are used at different layers, achieving connectivity is
   possible without address confusion.

   The mobile node MAY use the following hints to determine that it is
   inside, but MUST verify reachability of the i-HA anyway:

   o  a domain name in a DHCPDISCOVER / DHCPOFFER message;

   o  a NAI in a foreign agent advertisement;

   o  a list of default gateway MAC addresses which are known to reside
      in the internal network (i.e. configured as such, or have been
      previously verified to be inside).

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   For instance, if the MN has reason to believe it is inside, it MAY
   postpone sending of registration request to the x-HA for some time.
   Similarly, if the MN has a reason to believe it is outside, it may
   start IPsec connection setup immediately after receiving a
   registration reply from the x-HA.  However, should the MN receive a
   registration reply from the i-HA after IPsec connection setup has
   been started, the MN SHOULD still switch to using the i-HA directly.

3.6.  Rationale for design choices

3.6.1.  Firewall configuration requirements

   The requirement that the i-HA cannot be reached from the external
   network is necessary.  If not, a successful registration with the
   i-HA (without IPsec) cannot be used as a secure indication that the
   mobile node is inside.  A possible solution to the obvious security
   problem would be to define and deploy a secure internal network
   detection mechanism based on e.g. signed FA advertisement or signed
   DHCP messages.

   However, unless the mechanism is defined for both FA and DHCP
   messages and is deployed in every internal network, it has limited
   applicability.  In other words, the mobile node MUST NOT assume it is
   in the internal network unless it receives a signed FA or DHCP
   message (regardless of whether it can register directly with the i-HA
   or not!).  If it receives an unsigned FA or DHCP message, it MUST use
   IPsec; otherwise the mobile node can be easily tricked into using

   Assuming that all FA and DHCP servers in the internal network are
   upgraded to support such a feature does not seem realistic; it is
   highly desirable to be able to take advantage of existing DHCP and FA
   deployments.  Similar analysis seems to apply regardless of what kind
   of additional security mechanism is defined.

   Because a firewall configuration error can have catastrophic data
   security consequences (silent exposure of user data to external
   attackers), a separate protection mechanism is provided by the i-HA.
   The i-HA must be configured, by the administrator, with a list of
   trusted networks.  The i-HA advertises that it knows which
   registration request source addresses are trusted, using a
   registration reply extension (Trusted Networks Configured extension,
   Section 3.4).  Without this extension, an MN may not rely on a
   successful registration to indicate that it is connected to the
   internal network.  This ensures that user data compromise does not
   occur unless both the firewall and the i-HA are configured
   incorrectly.  Further, occurrences of registration requests from
   untrusted addresses should be logged by the i-HA, exposing them to

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   administrator review.

3.6.2.  Registration-based internal network monitoring

   This issue also affects IPsec client security.  However, as IPsec
   specifications take no stand on how and when client IPsec policies
   are configured or changed (for instance, in response to a change in
   network connectivity), the issue is out of scope for IPsec.  Because
   this document describes an algorithm and requirements for (secure)
   internal network detection, the issue is in scope of the document.

   The current requirement for internal network monitoring was added as
   a fallback mechanism.

3.6.3.  No encryption when inside

   If encryption was applied also when MN was inside, there would be no
   security reason to monitor the internal network periodically.

   The main rationale for why encryption cannot be applied when the MN
   is inside was given in Section 1.6.  In short, the main issues are
   (1) power consumption; (2) extra CPU load, especially because
   internal networks are typically switched networks and a lot of data
   may be routinely transferred; (3) existing HA devices do not
   typically integrate IPsec functionality; (4) (IPsec) encryption
   requires user authentication, which may be interactive in some cases
   (e.g.  SecurID) and thus a usability issue; and (5) user may need to
   have separate credentials for VPN devices in the DMZ and the HA.

3.7.  Improvements

   The registration process can be improved in many ways.  One simple
   way is to make the x-HA detect whether a registration request came
   from inside or outside the enterprise network.  If it came from
   inside the enterprise network, the x-HA can simply drop the
   registration request.

   This approach is feasible without protocol changes in scenarios where
   a corporation owns both the VPN and the x-HA.  The x-HA can simply
   determine based on incoming interface identifier (or the router which
   relayed the packet) whether the registration request came from inside
   or not.

   In other scenarios protocol changes may be needed.  Such changes are
   out of scope of this document.

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4.  Requirements

4.1.  Mobile node requirements

   The mobile node MUST implement an internal network detection
   algorithm fulfilling the requirements set forth in Section 3.2.  A
   new configurable MN parameter, T_MONITOR, is required.  The value of
   this parameter reflects a balance between security and the amount of
   signaling overhead, and thus needs to be configurable.  In addition,
   when doing internal network detection, the MN MUST NOT disable IPsec
   protection unless the registration reply from the i-HA contains a
   Trusted Networks Configured extension (Section 3.4).

   The mobile node MUST support access modes: c, f, cvc, fvc
   (Section 2).

   The mobile node SHOULD support Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal [ref.mipnat]
   for both internal and external Mobile IP.

   The mobile node SHOULD support IPsec NAT traversal

   When the mobile node has direct access to the i-HA, it SHOULD use
   only the inner Mobile IPv4 layer to minimize firewall and VPN impact.

   When the mobile node is outside and using the VPN connection, IPsec
   policies MUST be configured to encrypt all traffic sent to and from
   the enterprise network.  The particular Security Policy Database
   (SPD) entries depend on the type and configuration of the particular
   VPN (e.g. plain IPsec vs. L2TP/IPsec, full tunneling or split

4.2.  VPN device requirements

   The VPN security policy MUST allow communication using UDP to the
   internal home agent(s), with home agent port 434 and any remote port.
   The security policy SHOULD allow IP-IP to internal home agent(s) in
   addition to UDP port 434.

   The VPN device SHOULD implement the IPsec NAT traversal mechanism
   described in [ref.rfc3947] [ref.rfc3948].

4.3.  Home agent requirements

   The home agent SHOULD implement the Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal
   mechanism described in [ref.mipnat].  (This also refers to the i-HA:
   NAT traversal is required to support VPNs that NAT VPN tunnel
   addresses or block IP-IP traffic.)

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   To protect user data confidentiality against firewall configuration
   errors, the i-HA:

   o  MUST be configured with a list of trusted IP subnets (containing
      only addresses from the internal network), with no subnets being
      trusted by default.

   o  MUST reject (drop silently) any registration request coming from a
      source address which is not inside any of the configured trusted
      subnets.  These dropped registration requests SHOULD be logged.

   o  MUST include a Trusted Networks Configured extension (Section 3.4)
      in a registration reply sent in response to a registration request
      coming from a trusted address.

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5.  Analysis

   This section provides a comparison against guidelines described in
   Section 6 of the problem statement [ref.rfc4093] and additional
   analysis of packet overhead with and without the optional mechanisms.

5.1.  Comparison against guidelines

   Preservation of existing VPN infrastructure

   o  The proposed solution does not mandate any changes to existing VPN
      infrastructure, other than possibly changes in configuration to
      avoid stateful filtering of traffic.

   Software upgrades to existing VPN clients and gateways

   o  The solution described does not require any changes to VPN
      gateways or Mobile IPv4 foreign agents.

   IPsec protocol

   o  Proposed solution does not require any changes to existing IPsec
      or key exchange standard protocols, and does not require
      implementation of new protocols in the VPN device.

   Multi-vendor interoperability

   o  The proposed solution provides easy multi-vendor interoperability
      between server components (VPN device, foreign agents and home
      agents).  Indeed, these components need not be aware of each

   o  The mobile node networking stack is somewhat complex to implement,
      which may be an issue for multi-vendor interoperability.  However,
      this is a purely software architecture issue, and there are no
      known protocol limitations for multi-vendor interoperability.

   MIPv4 protocol

   o  The solution adheres to the MIPv4 protocol, but requires the new
      Trusted Networks Configured extension to improve the
      trustworthiness of internal network detection.

   o  The solution requires the use of two parallel MIPv4 layers.

   Handoff overhead

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   o  The solution provides a mechanism to avoid VPN tunnel SA
      renegotiation upon movement by using the external MIPv4 layer.

   Scalability, availability, reliability, and performance

   o  The solution complexity is linear with the number of MNs
      registered and accessing resources inside the intranet.

   o  Additional overhead is imposed by the solution.

   Functional entities

   o  The solution does not impose any new types of functional entities
      or required changes to existing entities.  However, an external HA
      device is required.

   Implications of intervening NAT gateways

   o  The solution leverages existing MIPv4 NAT traversal [ref.mipnat]
      and IPsec NAT traversal [ref.rfc3947] [ref.rfc3948] solutions and
      does not require any new functionality to deal with NATs.

   Security implications

   o  The solution requires a new mechanism to detect whether the mobile
      node is in the internal or the external network.  The security of
      this mechanism is critical in ensuring that the security level
      provided by IPsec is not compromised by a faulty detection

   o  When the mobile node is outside, the external Mobile IPv4 layer
      may allow some traffic redirection attacks that plain IPsec does
      not allow.  Other than that, IPsec security is unchanged.

   o  More security considerations are described in Section 6.

5.2.  Packet overhead

   The maximum packet overhead depends on access mode as follows:

   o  f: 0 octets

   o  c: 20 octets

   o  fvc: 77 octets

   o  cvc: 97 octets

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   The overhead consists of the following:

   o  IP-IP for i-MIPv4: 20 octets

   o  IPsec ESP: 57 octets total, consisting of: 20 (new IP header),
      4+4+8 = 16 (SPI, sequence number, cipher initialization vector),
      7+2 = 9 (padding, padding length field, next header field), 12
      (ESP authentication trailer)

   o  IP-IP for x-MIPv4: 20 octets

   When IPsec is used, a variable amount of padding is present in each
   ESP packet.  The figures were computed for a cipher with 64-bit block
   size, padding overhead of 9 octets (next header field, padding length
   field, and 7 octets of padding, see Section 2.4 of [ref.rfc4303]),
   and ESP authentication field of 12 octets (HMAC-SHA1-96 or
   HMAC-MD5-96).  Note that an IPsec implementation MAY pad with more
   than a minimum amount of octets.

   NAT traversal overhead is not included, and adds 8 octets when IPsec
   NAT traversal [ref.rfc3947] [ref.rfc3948] is used and 12 octets when
   MIP NAT traversal [ref.mipnat] is used.  For instance, when using
   access mode cvc, the maximum NAT traversal overhead is 12+8+12 = 32
   octets.  Thus, the worst case scenario (with the abovementioned ESP
   assumptions) is 129 octets for cvc.

5.3.  Latency considerations

   When the MN is inside, connection setup latency does not increase
   compared to standard MIPv4 if the MN implements the suggested
   parallel registration sequence (see Section 3.3).  Exchange of RRQ/
   RRP messages with the i-HA confirms the MN is inside, and the MN may
   start sending and receiving user traffic immediately.  For the same
   reason, handovers in the internal network have no overhead relative
   to standard MIPv4.

   When the MN is outside, the situation is slightly different.  Initial
   connection setup latency essentially consists of (1) registration
   with the x-HA, (2) optional detection delay (waiting for i-HA
   response), (3) IPsec connection setup (IKE), (4) registration with
   the i-HA.  All but (4) are in addition to standard MIPv4.

   However, handovers in the external network have performance
   comparable to standard MIPv4.  The MN simply re-registers with the
   x-HA and starts to send IPsec traffic to the VPN gateway from the new

   The MN may minimize latency by (1) not waiting for an i-HA response

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   before triggering IKE if the x-HA registration succeeds; and (2)
   sending first the RRQ most likely to succeed (e.g. if the MN is most
   likely outside.  These can be done based on heuristics about the
   network, e.g. addresses, MAC address of the default gateway (which
   the mobile node may remember from previous access), based on the
   previous access network (i.e. optimize for inside-inside and outside-
   outside movement), etc.

5.4.  Firewall state considerations

   A separate firewall device or an integrated firewall in the VPN
   gateway typically performs stateful inspection of user traffic.  The
   firewall may, for instance, track TCP session status and block TCP
   segments not related to open connections.  Other stateful inspection
   mechanisms also exist.

   Firewall state poses a problem when the mobile node moves between the
   internal and external networks.  The mobile node may, for instance,
   initiate a TCP connection while inside, and later go outside while
   expecting to keep the connection alive.  From the point of view of
   the firewall, the TCP connection has not been initiated, as it has
   not witnessed the TCP connection setup packets, thus potentially
   resulting in connectivity problems.

   When the VPN-TIA is registered as a co-located care-of address with
   the i-HA, all mobile node traffic appears as IP-IP for the firewall.
   Typically firewalls do not continue inspection beyond the IP-IP
   tunnel, but support for deeper inspection is available in many
   products.  In particular, an administrator can configure traffic
   policies in many firewall products even for IP-IP encapsulated
   traffic.  If this is done, similar statefulness issues may arise.

   In summary, the firewall must allow traffic coming from and going
   into the IPsec connection to be routed, even though they may not have
   successfully tracked the connection state.  How this is done is out
   of scope of this document.

5.5.  Intrusion detection systems (IDSs)

   Many firewalls incorporate intrusion detection systems monitoring
   network traffic for unusual patterns and clear signs of attack.
   Since traffic from a mobile node implementing this specification is
   UDP to i-HA port 434, and possibly IP-IP traffic to the i-HA address,
   existing IDSs may treat the traffic differently than ordinary VPN
   remote access traffic.  Like firewalls, IDSs are not standardized, so
   it is impossible to guarantee interoperability with any particular
   IDS system.

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5.6.  Implementation of mobile node

   Implementation of the mobile node requires the use of three tunneling
   layers, which may be used in various configurations depending on
   whether that particular interface is inside or outside.  Note that it
   is possible that one interface is inside and another interface is
   outside, which requires a different layering for each interface at
   the same time.

   For multi-vendor implementation, the IPsec and MIPv4 layers need to
   interoperate in the same mobile node.  This implies that a flexible
   framework for protocol layering (or protocol-specific APIs) are

5.7.  Non-IPsec VPN protocols

   The proposed solution works also for VPN tunneling protocols that are
   not IPsec-based, provided that the mobile node is provided IPv4
   connectivity with an address suitable for registration.  However,
   such VPN protocols are not explicitly considered.

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6.  Security considerations

6.1.  Internal network detection

   If the mobile node by mistake believes it is in the internal network
   and sends plaintext packets, it compromises IPsec security.  For this
   reason, the overall security (confidentiality and integrity) of user
   data is a minimum of (1) IPsec security, and (2) security of the
   internal network detection mechanism.

   Security of the internal network detection relies on a successful
   registration with the i-HA.  For standard Mobile IPv4 [ref.rfc3344]
   this means HMAC-MD5 and Mobile IPv4 replay protection.  The solution
   also assumes that the i-HA is not directly reachable from the
   external network, requiring careful enterprise firewall
   configuration.  To minimize the impact of a firewall configuration
   problem, the i-HA is separately required to be configured with
   trusted source addresses (i.e., addresses belonging to the internal
   network), and to include an indication of this in a new Trusted
   Networks Configured extension.  The MN is required not to trust a
   registration as an indication of being connected to the internal
   network, unless this extension is present in the registration reply.
   Thus, to actually compromise user data confidentiality, both the
   enterprise firewall and the i-HA have to be configured incorrectly,
   which reduces the likelihood of the scenario.

   When the mobile node sends a registration request to the i-HA from an
   untrusted network that does not go through the IPsec tunnel, it will
   reveal the i-HA's address, its own identity including the NAI and the
   home address, and the Authenticator value in the authentication
   extensions to the untrusted network.  This may be a concern in some

   When the connection status of an interface changes, an interface
   previously connected to the trusted internal network may suddenly be
   connected to an untrusted network.  Although the same problem is also
   relevant to IPsec-based VPN implementations, the problem is
   especially relevant in the scope of this specification.

   In most cases, mobile node implementations are expected to have layer
   two information available, making connection change detection both
   fast and robust.  To cover cases where such information is not
   available (or fails for some reason), the mobile node is required to
   periodically re-register with the internal home agent to verify that
   it is still connected to the trusted network.  It is also required
   that this re-registration interval be configurable, thus giving the
   administrator a parameter by which potential exposure may be

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6.2.  Mobile IPv4 versus IPsec

   MIPv4 and IPsec have different goals and approaches for providing
   security services.  MIPv4 typically uses a shared secret for
   authentication of signaling traffic, while IPsec typically uses IKE
   (an authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange) to set up session keys.
   Thus, the overall security properties of a combined MIPv4 and IPsec
   system depend on both mechanisms.

   In the solution outlined in this document, the external MIPv4 layer
   provides mobility for IPsec traffic.  If the security of MIPv4 is
   broken in this context, traffic redirection attacks against the IPsec
   traffic are possible.  However, such routing attacks do not affect
   other IPsec properties (confidentiality, integrity, replay
   protection, etc), because IPsec does not consider the network between
   two IPsec endpoints to be secure in any way.

   Because MIPv4 shared secrets are usually configured manually, they
   may be weak if easily memorizable secrets are chosen, thus opening up
   redirection attacks described above.  Note especially that a weak
   secret in the i-HA is fatal to security, as the mobile node can be
   fooled into dropping encryption if the i-HA secret is broken.

   Assuming the MIPv4 shared secrets have sufficient entropy, there are
   still at least the following differences and similarities between
   MIPv4 and IPsec worth considering:

   o  Both IPsec and MIPv4 are susceptible to the "transient pseudo NAT"
      attack described in [ref.pseudonat] and [ref.mipnat], assuming
      that NAT traversal is enabled (which is typically the case).
      "Pseudo NAT" attacks allow an attacker to redirect traffic flows,
      resulting in resource consumption, lack of connectivity, and
      denial-of-service.  However, such attacks cannot compromise the
      confidentiality of user data protected using IPsec.

   o  When considering a "pseudo NAT" attack against standard IPsec and
      standard MIP (with NAT traversal), redirection attacks against MIP
      may be easier because:

      *  MIPv4 re-registrations typically occur more frequently than
         IPsec SA setups (although this may not be the case for mobile

      *  It suffices to catch and modify a single registration request,
         whereas attacking IKE requires that multiple IKE packets are
         caught and modified.

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   o  There may be concerns about mixing of algorithms.  For instance,
      IPsec may be using HMAC-SHA1-96, while MIP is always using HMAC-
      MD5 (RFC 3344) or prefix+suffix MD5 (RFC 2002).  Furthermore,
      while IPsec algorithms are typically configurable, MIPv4 clients
      typically use only HMAC-MD5 or prefix+suffix MD5.  Although this
      is probably not a security problem as such, it is more difficult
      to communicate to users.

   o  When IPsec is used with a PKI, the key management properties are
      superior to those of basic MIPv4.  Thus, adding MIPv4 to the
      system makes key management more complex.

   o  In general, adding new security mechanisms increases overall
      complexity and makes the system more difficult to understand.

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7.  IANA considerations

   This document specifies a new skippable extension (in the short
   format) in Section 3.4, whose Type and Sub-Type values need to be

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8.  Acknowledgements

   This document is a joint work of the contributing authors (in
   alphabetical order):

           - Farid Adrangi (Intel Corporation)
           - Nitsan Baider (Check Point Software Technologies, Inc.)
           - Gopal Dommety (Cisco Systems)
           - Eli Gelasco (Cisco Systems)
           - Dorothy Gellert (Nokia Corporation)
           - Espen Klovning (Birdstep)
           - Milind Kulkarni (Cisco Systems)
           - Henrik Levkowetz (ipUnplugged AB)
           - Frode Nielsen (Birdstep)
           - Sami Vaarala (Codebay)
           - Qiang Zhang (Liqwid Networks, Inc.)

   The authors would like to thank MIP/VPN design team, especially Mike
   Andrews, Gaetan Feige, Prakash Iyer, Brijesh Kumar, Joe Lau, Kent
   Leung, Gabriel Montenegro, Ranjit Narjala, Antti Nuopponen, Alan
   O'Neill, Alpesh Patel, Ilkka Pietikainen, Phil Roberts, Hans
   Sjostrand, and Serge Tessier for their continuous feedback and
   helping us improve this draft.  Special thanks to Radia Perlman for
   giving the document a thorough read and a security review.  Tom
   Hiller pointed out issues with battery powered devices.  We would
   also like to thank the previous Mobile IP working group chairs
   (Gabriel Montenegro, Basavaraj Patil, and Phil Roberts) for important
   feedback and guidance.

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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

              Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

              Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

              Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4", RFC 3344,
              August 2002.

              Levkowetz, H. and S. Vaarala, "Mobile IP Traversal of
              Network Address Translation (NAT) Devices", RFC 3519,
              April 2003.

              Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
              and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              RFC 1918, BCP 5, February 1996.

              Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
              "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", RFC 3947,
              January 2005.

              Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
              Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec packets", RFC 3948,
              January 2005.

              Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

9.2.  Informative References

              Adrangi, F. and H. Levkowetz, "Problem Statement: Mobile
              IPv4 Traversal of Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways",
              RFC 4093, August 2005.


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              Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
              Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

              Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006.

              Tessier, S., "Guidelines for Mobile IP and IPsec VPN
              Usage", December 2002.

              Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to
              Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and
              Home Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004.

              Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S., and V. Gupta, "Dynamic
              Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
              IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.

              Dupont, F. and J. Bernard, "Transient pseudo-NAT attacks
              or how NATs are even more evil than you believed
              (draft-dupont-transient-pseudonat-04, work in progress)",
              June 2004.

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Appendix A.  Packet flow examples

A.1.  Connection setup for access mode 'cvc'

   The following figure illustrates connection setup when the mobile
   node is outside and using a co-located care-of address.  IKE
   connection setup is not shown in full, and involves multiple round
   trips (4.5 round trips when using main mode followed by quick mode).

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    MN-APP      MN        x-HA       VPN        i-HA        CN
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     !          ! -------> !          !          !          !
     !          !  rrq     !          !          !          !
     !          ! -----------------X  !          !          ! rrq not
     !          !  rrq     !          !          !          ! received
     !          !          !          !          !          ! by i-HA
     !          ! <------- !          !          !          !
     !          !  rrp     !          !          !          !
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     !  [wait for detection period for response from i-HA]  !
     !  [may also retransmit to i-HA, depending on config]  ! no rrp
     !          !          !          !          !          ! from i-HA
     !          ! ==(1)==> !          !          !          !
     !          !  ike {1a}! -------> !          !          !
     !          !          !  ike     !          !          !
     !          !          ! <------- !          !          !
     !          ! <==(1)== !  ike     !          !          !
     !          !  ike     !          !          !          !
     :          :          :          :          :          :
     :          :          :          :          :          :
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     !          ! ==(2)==> !          !          !          !
     !          !  rrq {2a}! ==(1)==> !          !          !
     !          !          !  rrq {2b}! -------> !          !
     !          !          !          !  rrq {2c}!          !
     !          !          !          ! <------- !          !
     !          !          ! <==(1)== !  rrp     !          !
     !          ! <==(2)== !  rrp     !          !          !
     !          !  rrp     !          !          !          !
     !          !          !          !          !          !
    [[--- connection setup ok, bidirectional connection up ---]]
     !          !          !          !          !          !
     ! -------> !          !          !          !          !
     !  pkt {3a}! ==(3)==> !          !          !          !
     !          !  pkt {3b}! ==(2)==> !          !          !
     !          !          !  pkt {3c}! ==(1)==> !          !
     !          !          !          !  pkt {3d}! -------> !
     !          !          !          !          !  pkt {3e}!
     !          !          !          !          ! <------- !
     !          !          !          ! <==(1)== !  pkt     !
     !          !          ! <==(2)== !  pkt     !          !
     !          ! <==(3)== !  pkt     !          !          !
     !  <------ !  pkt     !          !          !          !
     !   pkt    !          !          !          !          !
     :          :          :          :          :          :
     :          :          :          :          :          :

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   The notation "==(N)==>" or "<==(N)==" indicates that the innermost
   packet has been encapsulated N times, using IP-IP, ESP, or MIP NAT

   Packets marked with {xx} are shown in more detail below.  Each area
   represents a protocol header (labeled).  Source and destination
   addresses or ports are shown underneath the protocol name when
   applicable.  Note that there are no NAT traversal headers in the
   example packets.

       Packet {1a}
           ! IP      ! IP      ! UDP   ! IKE    !
           !  co-CoA !  x-HoA  !  500  !        !
           !  x-HA   !  VPN-GW !  500  !        !

       Packet {2a}
           ! IP      ! IP      ! ESP   ! IP       ! UDP   ! MIP RRQ !
           !  co-CoA !  x-HoA  !       !  VPN-TIA !  ANY  !         !
           !  x-HA   !  VPN-GW !       !  i-HA    !  434  !         !

       Packet {2b}
           ! IP      ! ESP   ! IP       ! UDP   ! MIP RRQ !
           !  x-HoA  !       !  VPN-TIA !  ANY  !         !
           !  VPN-GW !       !  i-HA    !  434  !         !

       Packet {2c}
           ! IP       ! UDP   ! MIP RRQ !
           !  VPN-TIA !  ANY  !         !
           !  i-HA    !  434  !         !

       Packet {3a}
           ! IP     ! user     !
           !  i-HoA ! protocol !
           !  CN    !          !

       Packet {3b}
           .------------------------------------------------------- -
           ! IP      ! IP      ! ESP ! IP       ! IP     ! user      \

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           !  co-CoA !  x-HoA  !     !  VPN-TIA !  i-HoA ! protocol../
           !  x-HA   !  VPN-GW !     !  i-HA    !  CN    !           \
           `------------------------------------------------------- -
              - - -----------------.
             \..user     ! ESP     !
             /  protocol ! trailer !
             \           !         !
              - - -----------------'

       Packet {3c}
           ! IP      ! ESP ! IP       ! IP     ! user     ! ESP     !
           !  x-HoA  !     !  VPN-TIA !  i-HoA ! protocol ! trailer !
           !  VPN-GW !     !  i-HA    !  CN    !          !         !

       Packet {3d}
           ! IP       ! IP     ! user     !
           !  VPN-TIA !  i-HoA ! protocol !
           !  i-HA    !  CN    !          !

       Packet {3e}
           ! IP     ! user     !
           !  i-HoA ! protocol !
           !  CN    !          !

   Packet {3b} with all NAT traversal headers (x-MIP, ESP, and i-MIP) is
   shown below for comparison.

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       Packet {3b} (with NAT traversal headers)
           .------------------------------------------------- -
           ! IP      ! UDP  ! MIP    ! IP      ! UDP   ! ESP.. \
           !  co-CoA !  ANY ! tunnel !  x-HoA  !  4500 !       /
           !  x-HA   !  434 ! data   !  VPN-GW !  4500 !       \
           `------------------------------------------------- -
            <=== external MIPv4 ====> <=== IPsec ESP ======== = =

              - - ------------------------------------------------ -
             \..ESP ! IP       ! UDP  ! MIP    ! IP     ! user      \
             /      !  VPN-TIA !  ANY ! tunnel !  i-HoA ! protocol../
             \      !  i-HA    !  434 ! data   !  CN    !           \
              - - ------------------------------------------------ -
              = ===> <==== internal MIPv4 ====> <== user packet == =

              - - -----------------.
             \..user     ! ESP     !
             /  protocol ! trailer !
             \           !         !
              - - -----------------'
              = = ======> <= ESP =>

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Appendix B.  Changes

   Changes from draft-ietf-mip4-vpn-problem-solution-04 to

   o  Clarification of why IPsec and IKE specifics related to "useipsec"
      are not discussed: added text to Overview.

   o  Document category changed from BCP to STD, because new protocol
      elements are now introduced for network detection.

   Changes from draft-ietf-mip4-vpn-problem-solution-03 to

   o  Minor corrections and editorial changes:

      *  Intended status explicit.

      *  Remove "no MIPv4 changes" from abstract and Introduction.

      *  Firewall assumptions for i-HA and network detection security
         more explicitly mentioned in security considerations.

      *  T_MONITOR configuration knob stated as a new MN parameter.

      *  Wording of second and third bullets in Section 3.3 changed to
         reflect comment from Suresh Krishnan.

      *  The term "inside" was clarified in Section 3.6 to be more

      *  Topology figure moved to right after the first paragraph of
         Section 2 to improve readability.

      *  More explicit handling of the case where i-HA and x-HA have the
         same address in Section 3.4.

      *  Pseudo NAT attack impact stated more clearly in Security

      *  Added informative reference to "IPsec DHCP", and clarified that
         "mode config" is a "de facto" standard only.

      *  Explicitly mention that IPsec must not be bypassed in cvc mode
         regardless of use of triangular routing.

      *  Added a paragraph about IPsec policies to Section 4.1.

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      *  Section 3.2 text made more explicit with respect to what is
         required of all network detection mechanisms.

      *  Section 3.3 no longer requires that a successful RRQ/RRP
         exchange be necessarily trust ("MUST determine.." => "SHOULD

      *  Section 3.5.2 reference to "IPsec does not take a stand on..."
         changed to be more accurate: IPsec does not specify how and
         when IPsec policies are altered if network connectivity

      *  Section 5.1 reference to multi-vendor interoperability
         augmented with a clarification that known multi-vendor issues
         are software architecture related, and there are no known
         protocol issues for interoperability.

      *  Section 5.4 IP-IP inspection text clarified: IP-IP encapsulated
         traffic can be inspected and may suffer from statefulness
         issues too.

      *  "Current version" reference from Introduction removed as

      *  Section 1.2: "require changes" changed to "require significant

      *  Section 3.2: separate tracking of network interfaces put into a
         separate section for clarity.

   o  Added a new extension used by the i-HA to indicate that it has
      been configured with a list of trusted networks, and that the RRQ
      came from a trusted address.  This mechanism was added based on
      feedback from security review.  Individual changes are:

      *  Introduction: mention new extension.

      *  Section 3.1: wording changes for firewall requirements; refer
         to the new extension.

      *  Section 3.2.2 (Registration-based internal network detection):
         add requirement for checking RRP for Trusted Networks
         Configured extension.  Rationale is given in Section 3.5.

      *  New Section 3.4 describing the extension format.

      *  Section 3.5.1 (Firewall configuration requirements): rationale
         for the new extension.

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      *  Section 4.1 (Mobile node requirements): requirement for
         checking i-HA RRP for Trusted Networks Configured extension.

      *  Section 4.3 (Home agent requirements): configuration and RRQ
         processing requirements for i-HA.

      *  Section 5.1 (Comparison against guidelines): Mobile IPv4 change
         (new extension) mentioned.

      *  Section 6.1 (Internal network detection): new extension
         mentioned in firewall security consideration part.

   Changes from draft-ietf-mip4-vpn-problem-solution-02 to

   o  Added one paragraph to the security considerations section which
      explains that RRQ packets which are not IPsec protected reveal the
      MN's NAI and other RRQ extension information.

   o  Added a new reference to MOBIKE instead of referring to the now
      closed MOBIKE working group, reworded some MOBIKE related text.

   o  ID nits cleaned up: references and boilerplate updated, etc.

   Changes from draft-ietf-mip4-vpn-problem-solution-01 to

   o  Feedback from Vijay Devarapalli incorporated.

   o  Added references to MOBIKE WG where applicable.

   o  Changed requirement for reverse tunneling of inner MIPv4 when MN
      is outside, from MUST to SHOULD.  Reason: not all IPsec-based VPNs
      have the policy limitation; in particular, L2TP/IPsec
      implementations do not.

   o  Added better explanation of why reverse tunneling to i-HA is often
      required when the MN is outside.

   o  Re-added latency considerations section in a simplified form.

   o  IPR reference from RFC 3667 updated to RFC 3978.

   o  Removed explicit IPR section, as the general reference to on-line
      IPR statements suffices.

   o  Removed unused document references.

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   o  Other minor cleanups.

   Changes from draft-ietf-mip4-vpn-problem-solution-00 to

   o  Presentation style cleaned up in many places, wording changes
      throughout the document to improve readability.

   o  More compact introduction section, terminology additions, IPsec
      mobility problem description shortened.

   o  Sections 2 (topology) and 3 (access modes) merged.

   o  Section 6.8 (shortcoming for enterprise use) removed.

   o  Appendix A.2 (connection setup for access mode 'fvc') removed, it
      contained mostly duplicate information (from A.1).

   Changes from draft-ietf-mobileip-vpn-problem-solution-03 to

   o  Renamed and resubmitted document.

   o  New boilerplate to match RFCs 3667 and 3668.

   Changes from -02 to -03:

   o  Remaining issues from security review worked into document.

   o  Short rationale for why (a) IPsec is not mobile, and (b) the
      essential problem statement assumptions added.

   o  Minor wording changes (IETF 57 comments).

   o  Internal network monitoring section revised with "relaxed re-
      registration" approach to improve applicability to battery powered

   o  IPR section needs to refer to on-line rights (and current text
      moved on-line).  Not done yet.

   Changes from -01 to -02:

   o  Packet flow examples added.

   o  Explicit IDS reference added.

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   o  Requirement levels adjusted; NAT traversal requirements changed
      from MUST to SHOULD and other changes.

   o  MN no longer required to use i-HA directly whenever available (in
      some cases that may not be desired).

   o  IPR section revised.

   o  Latency considerations section added.

   o  External HA reachability assumption refined; if firewall properly
      configured, handover performance can be improved.  This is now
      mentioned in the detection section.

   o  Overhead section simplified, only base solution discussed.

   o  Proposed solutions section removed from appendix.

   o  Strawmen of optimizations removed from appendix, references to
      optimizations removed from text.

   Changes from -00 to -01:

   o  First description of proposed solution based on basic and
      optimized dual HA drafts, as well as IPsec endpoint update

   o  List of proposed solutions in -00 included in appendix.

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Authors' Addresses

   Sami Vaarala
   P.O. Box 63
   Espoo  02601

   Phone: +358 (0)50 5733 862

   Espen Klovning
   Bryggegata 7
   Oslo  0250

   Phone: +47 95 20 26 29

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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
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