James Kempf Internet Draft DoCoMo Labs USA Document: draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key-01.txt Rajeev Koodli Intended Status: Proposed Standard Nokia-Siemens Expires: Feburary, 2008 Research Center August, 2007 Distributing a Symmetric FMIPv6 Handover Key using SEND (draft-ietf-mipshop-handover-key-01.txt) Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Abstract Fast Mobile IPv6 requires that a Fast Binding Update is secured using a security association shared between an Access Router and a Mobile Node in order to avoid certain attacks. In this document, a method for provisioning a shared key from the Access Router to the Mobile Node is defined to protect this signaling. The Mobile Node generates a public/private key pair using the same public key algorithm as for SEND (RFC 3971). The Mobile Node sends the public key to the Access Router. The Access Router encrypts a shared handover key using the public key and sends it back to the Mobile Node. The Mobile Node decrypts the shared handover key using the matching private key, and the handover key is then available for generating an authenticator on a Fast Binding Update. The Mobile Node and Access Router preferably use the Proxy Router Solicitation and Proxy Router Advertisement from Fast Mobile IPv6 for the key exchange. The key exchange messages are required to have SEND security; that is, the source address is a CGA and the Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 1]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 messages are signed using the CGA private key of the sending node. This allows the Access Router, prior to providing the shared handover key, to verify the authorization of the Mobile Node to claim the address so that the previous care-of CGA in the Fast Binding Update can act as the name of the key. Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction................................................2 2.0 Overview of the Protocol....................................3 3.0 Handover Key Provisioning and Use...........................4 4.0 Message Formats.............................................7 5.0 Security Considerations....................................10 6.0 IANA Considerations........................................10 7.0 Normative References.......................................11 8.0 Informative References.....................................11 9.0 Author Information.........................................11 10.0 IPR Statements............................................11 11.0 Disclaimer of Validity....................................12 12.0 Copyright Statement.......................................12 13.0 Acknowledgment............................................12 1.0 Introduction In Fast Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) [FMIP], a Fast Binding Update (FBU) is sent from a Mobile Node (MN), undergoing IP handover, to the previous Access Router (AR). The FBU causes a routing change so traffic sent to the MN's previous care-of address on the previous AR's link is tunneled to the new care-of address on the new AR's link. Only a MN authorized to claim the address should be able to change the routing for the previous care-of address. If such authorization is not established, an attacker can redirect a victim MN's traffic at will. In this document, a lightweight mechanism is defined by which a shared handover key for securing FMIP can be provisioned on the MN by the AR. The mechanism utilizes SEND [SEND] and a public/private key pair, generated on the MN using the same public key algorithm as SEND, to encrypt/decrypt a shared handover key sent from the AR to the MN. The key provisioning occurs at some arbitrary time prior to handover, thereby relieving any performance overhead on the handover process. The message exchange between the MN and AR to provision the key is required to be protected by SEND; that is, the source address for the key provisioning messages must be a CGA and the messages must be signed with the CGA private key. This allows the AR to establish the MN's authorization to operate on the CGA. The AR uses the CGA to name the handover key. Once the shared handover key has been established, when the MN undergoes IP handover, the MN generates an authorization MAC on the FBU. The previous care-of CGA included in the FBU is used by the AR to find the right handover key for checking the authorization. Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 2]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 Handover keys are an instantiation of the purpose built key architectural principle [PBK]. 1.1 Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. In addition, the following terminology is used: CGA public key Public key used to generate the CGA according to RFC 3972 [CGA]. CGA private key Private key corresponding to the CGA public key. Handover key encryption public key Public key generated by the MN and sent to the current AR to encrypt the shared handover key Handover key encryption private key Private key corresponding to handover key encryption public key, held by the MN 2.0 Overview of the Protocol 2.1 Brief Review of SEND SEND protects against a variety of threats to local link address resolution (also known as Neighbor Discovery) and last hop router (AR) discovery in IPv6 [RFC3756]. These threats are not exclusive to wireless networks, but they generally are easier to mount on certain wireless networks because the link between the access point and MN can't be physically secured. SEND utilizes CGAs in order to secure Neighbor Discovery signaling [CGA]. Briefly, a CGA is formed by hashing together the IPv6 subnet prefix for a node's subnet, a random nonce, and an RSA public key, called the CGA public key. The CGA private key is used to sign a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message sent to resolve the link layer address to the IPv6 address. The combination of the CGA and the signature on the NA proves to a receiving node the sender's authorization to claim the address. The node may opportunistically generate one or several keys specifically for Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 3]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 SEND, or it may use a certified key that it distributes more widely. 2.2 Protocol Overview The protocol utilizes the SEND secured Proxy Router Solicitation (PrRtSol)/Proxy Router Advertisement (PrRtAdv) [FMIP] exchange between the MN and the AR to transport an encrypted, shared handover key from the AR to the MN. The MN generates a public/private key pair for encrypting/decrypting the shared handover key exchange, using th same public key algorithm as SEND. The MN then sends a PrRtSol message with a Handover Key Request Option containing the handover key encryption public key. The source address of the PrRtSol message is the MN's care-of CGA on the AR's link, the PrRtSol message is signed with the MN's CGA key, and contains the CGA Parameters option, in accordance with RFC 3971 [SEND]. The AR verifies the message using SEND, then utilizes the handover key encryption public key to encrypt a shared handover key, which is included with the PrRtAdv in the Handover Key Reply Option. The MN decrypts the shared handover key and uses it to establish an authorization MAC when it sends an FBU to the previous AR. 3.0 Handover Key Provisioning and Use 3.1 Sending Proxy Router Solicitations At some time prior to handover, the MN MUST generate a handover key encryption public/private key pair, using exactly the same public key algorithm with exactly the same parameters (key size, etc.) as for SEND [SEND]. The MN can reuse the key pair on different access routers but MUST NOT use the key pair for any other encryption or authorization operation. In order to prevent cryptanalysis, the key pair SHOULD be timed out after a maximum of HKEPK-LIFETIME or HKEPK-HANDOVERS depending on which comes first. The MN SHOULD send a Proxy Router Solicitation (PrRtRSol) containing a Handover Key Encryption Public Key Option with the handover encryption public key. A CGA for the MN MUST be the source address on the packet, and the MN MUST include the SEND CGA Option and SEND Signature Option with the packet, as specified in [SEND]. The SEND signature covers all fields in the PrRtSol, including the 128 bit source and destination addresses and ICMP checksum as described in RFC 3971, except for the Signature Option itself. The MN also sets the handover authentication Algorithm Type (AT) extension field in the Handover Key Request Option to the MN's preferred FBU authentication algorithm. The SEND Nonce or Timestamp option is not necessary because the PrRtSol/PrRtAdv exchange is a request/response protocol that uses a message identifier to control replay attacks. If the AR does not respond to the PrRtSol, as would be the case if the proxy router functionality is not deployed, the MN MAY include Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 4]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 the Handover Key Request option in a standard IPv6 SEND-protected Router Solicitation (RS) instead [RFC2461]. 3.2 Receiving Proxy Router Solicitations and Sending Proxy Router Advertisements When an FMIPv6 capable AR with SEND receives a PrRtSol from a MN protected with SEND and including a Handover Key Request Option, the AR MUST first validate the PrRtSol using SEND as described in RFC 3971. If the PrRtSol can not be validated, the AR MUST NOT include a Handover Key Reply Option in the reply. The AR also MUST NOT change any existing key record for the address, since the message may be an attempt by an attacker to disrupt communications for a legitimate MN. The AR SHOULD respond to the PrRtSol but MUST NOT perform handover key provisioning. If the PrRtSol can be validated, the AR MUST then determine whether the CGA already has an associated shared handover key. If the CGA has an existing handover key, the AR MUST return the existing handover key to the MN. If the CGA does not have a shared handover key, the AR MUST construct a shared handover key as described in Section 3.6. The AR MUST encrypt the handover key with the handover key encryption public key included in the Handover Key Request Option. The AR MUST insert the encrypted handover key into a Handover Key Reply Option, along with a hash of the handover key encryption public key used to encrypt it, and MUST attach the Handover Key Reply Option to the PrRtAdv. The AR SHOULD set the AT field of the Handover Key Option to the MN's preferred algorithm type indicated in the AT field of the Handover Key Request Option, if it is supported; otherwise, the AR MUST select an authentication algorithm which is of equivalent strength and set the field to that. The AR MUST use its CGA as the source address for the PrRtAdv and include a SEND CGA Option and a SEND Signature Option with the SEND signature of the message. The SEND signature covers all fields in the PrRtAdv, including the 128 bit source and destination addresses and ICMP checksum as described in RFC 3971, except for the Signature Option itself. The PrRtAdv is then unicast back to the MN at the MN's care-of CGA that was the source address on the PrRtSol. The handover key MUST be stored by the AR for future use, indexed by the CGA, and the authentication algorithm type (i.e., the resolution of the AT field processing) MUST be recorded with the key. If the proxy router functionality is not deployed and the Handover Key Request Option was instead received in an RS, the AR MAY reply as described above in a standard IPv6 SEND-protected Router Advertisement (RA) unicast to the MN's care-of CGA. The Key Hash field MUST be used to allow the MN to match public key used to encrypt the handover key with the corresponding key needed to decrypt it, since the RS/RA exchange does not include a message identifier. 3.3 Receiving Proxy Router Advertisements Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 5]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 Upon receipt of one or more PrRtAdvs secured with SEND and having the Handover Key Reply Option, the MN MUST first validate the PrRtAdvs as described in RFC 3971. From the messages that validate, the MN SHOULD choose one with an AT flag in the Handover Key Reply Option indicating an authentication algorithm that the MN supports. From that message, the MN MUST determine which handover key encryption public key to use in the event the MN has more than one. It does so by either matching the key hash field in the Handover Key Reply Option against the store of handover key encryption public keys or by using the same key as in the matching PrRtSol. The MN MUST use the matching private key to decrypt the handover key using its handover key encryption private key, and store the handover key for later use along with the algorithm type, named with the AR's CGA. If more than one router responds to the PrRtSol, the MN MAY keep track of all such keys. The MN MUST use the returned algorithm type indicated in the PrRtAdv. The MN MUST index the handover keys with the AR's IPv6 address, to which the MN later sends the FBU, and the CGA. This allows the MN to select the proper key when communicating with a previous AR. If none of the PrRtAdvs contains an algorithm type indicator corresponding to an algorithm the MN supports, the MN MAY re-send the PrRtSol requesting a different algorithm, but to prevent bidding down attacks from compromised routers, the MN SHOULD NOT request an algorithm that is weaker than its original request. If the Handover Key Request option was instead included in a standard IPv6 RS, the same procedure MUST be applied to any Handover Key Response Options included in reply IPv6 RAs. 3.4 Sending FBUs When the MN needs to signal the previous AR using an FMIPv6 FBU, the MN MUST utilize the handover key and the corresponding authentication algorithm to generate an authenticator for the message. The MN MUST select the appropriate key for the AR using the AR's CGA and its previous care-of CGA on the AR's link. The MN MUST generate the authentication MAC using the handover key and the appropriate algorithm, then include the MAC in the FBU message as defined by the FMIPv6 document. As specified by FMIPv6 [FMIP], the MN MUST include the old care-of CGA in a Home Address Option. The FMIPv6 document provides more detail about the construction of the authenticator on the FBU. 3.5 Receiving FBUs When the AR receives an FBU message containing an authenticator, the AR MUST find the corresponding handover key using the MN's care-of CGA in the Home Address Option as the index. If a handover key is found, the AR MUST utilize the handover key and the appropriate algorithm to verify the authenticator. The FMIPv6 document [FMIP] provides more detail on how the AR processes an FBU containing an authenticator. Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 6]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 3.6 Key Generation and Lifetime The AR MUST randomly generate a key having sufficient strength to match the authentication algorithm. Some authentication algorithms specify a required key size. The AR MUST generate a unique key for each CGA public key, and SHOULD take care that the key generation is uncorrelated between handover keys, and between handover keys and CGA keys. The actual algorithm used to generate the key is not important for interoperability since only the AR generates the key; the MN simply uses it. The AR SHOULD NOT discard the handover key immediately after use if it is still valid. It is possible that the MN may undergo rapid movement to another AR prior to the completion of Mobile IPv6 binding update on the new AR, and the MN MAY as a consequence initialize another, subsequent handover optimization to move traffic from the previous AR to another new AR. The default time for keeping the key valid corresponds to the default time during which forwarding from the previous AR to the new AR is performed for FMIP. The FMIPv6 document [FMIP] provides more detail about the FMIP forwarding time default. If the MN returns to a previous AR prior to the expiration of the handover key, the AR MAY send and the MN MAY receive the same handover key as was previously returned, if the MN generates the same CGA for its care-of address. However, the MN MUST NOT assume that it can continue to use the old key without actually receiving the handover key again from the AR. The MN SHOULD discard the handover key after MIPv6 binding update is complete on the new AR. The previous AR MUST discard the key after FMIPv6 forwarding for the previous care-of address times out. 3.7 Protocol Constants The following are protocol constants: HKEPK-LIFETIME: The maximum lifetime for the handover key encryption public key. Default is 12 hours. HKEPK-HANDOVERS: The maximum number of handovers for which the handover key encryption public key should be reused. Default is 10. 4.0 Message Formats 4.1 Handover Key Request Option The Handover Key Request Option is a standard IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [RFC2461] option in TLV format. Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 7]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Pad Length | AT |Resrvd.| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | . . . Handover Key Encryption Public Key . . . | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | . . . Padding . . . | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Fields: Type: To be assigned by IANA. Length: The length of the option in units of 8 octets, including the Type and Length fields. The value 0 is invalid. The receiver MUST discard a message that contains this value. Pad Length: The number of padding octets beyond the end of the Handover Key Encryption Public Key field but within the length specified by the Length field. Padding octets MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers. AT: A 4-bit algorithm type field describing the algorithm used by FMIPv6 to calculate the authenticator. See [FMIP] for details. Resrvd.: A 4-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be initialized to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. Handover Key Encryption Public: The handover key encryption public key. The key MUST be formatted according to the same specification as the CGA key in the CGA Parameters field [CGA] of the message. Padding: A variable-length field making the option length a multiple of 8, containing as many octets as specified in the Pad Length field. Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 8]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 4.2 Handover Key Reply Option The Handover Key Reply Option is a standard IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [RFC2461] option in TLV format. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Pad Length | AT |Resrvd.| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | Key Hash | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | . . . Encrypted Handover Key . . . | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | . . . Padding . . . | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Fields: Type: To be assigned by IANA. Length: The length of the option in units of 8 octets, including the Type and Length fields. The value 0 is invalid. The receiver MUST discard a message that contains this value. Pad Length: The number of padding octets beyond the end of the Handover Key Encryption Public Key field but within the length specified by the Length field. Padding octets MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers. AT: A 4-bit algorithm type field describing the algorithm used by FMIPv6 to calculate the authenticator. See [FMIP] for details. Resrvd.: A 4-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be initialized to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 9]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 Key Hash: A 128-bit field containing the most significant (leftmost) 128 bits of a SHA-1 [SHA1] hash of the public key used for encrypting the handover key. The SHA-1 hash is taken over the presentation used in the Handover Key Encryption Public Key field of Handover Key Request Option from the solicitation message to which this message is a response. Its purpose is to associate the encrypted handover key to a particular decryption private key known by the receiver. Encrypted Handover Key: The shared handover key, encrypted with the MN's handover key encryption public key. Padding: A variable-length field making the option length a multiple of 8, containing as many octets as specified in the Pad Length field. 5.0 Security Considerations This document describes a key provisioning protocol for the FMIPv6 handover optimization protocol. The key provisioning protocol utilizes a public key generated with the same public key algorithm as SEND to bootstrap a shared key for authorizing changes due to handover associated with the MN's former address on the previous AR. General security considerations involving CGAs apply to the protocol described in this document, see [CGA] for a discussion of security considerations around CGAs. This protocol is subject to the same risks from replay attacks and DoS attacks using the PrRtSol as the SEND protocol [SEND] for RS. The measures recommended in RFC 3971 for mitigating replay attacks and DoS attacks apply here as well. An additional consideration involves when to generate the handover key. To avoid state depletion attacks, the handover key MUST NOT be generated prior to SEND processing that verifies the originator of PrRtSol. State depletion attacks are possible if this ordering is not respected. For other FMIPv6 security considerations, please see the FMIPv6 document [FMIP]. 6.0 IANA Considerations Two new IPv6 Neighbor Discovery options, the Handover Key Request Option and Handover Key Reply Option, are defined, and require a IPv6 Neighbor Discovery option type code from IANA. Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 10]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 7.0 Normative References [FMIP] Koodli, R., editor, "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6", Internet Draft, Work in Progress. [SEND] Arkko, J., editor, Kempf, J., Zill, B., and Nikander, P., "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005. [CGA] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses", RFC 3972, March 2005. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2461] Narten, T., and Nordmark, E., "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998. [SHA1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-1, April 1995, <http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm>. 8.0 Informative References [RFC3756] Nikander, P., editor, Kempf, J., and Nordmark, E., " IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756, May 2004. [PBK] Bradner, S., Mankin, A., and Schiller, J., "A Framework for Purpose-Built Keys (PBK)", Internet Draft, work in progress. 9.0 Author Information James Kempf Phone: +1 650 496 4711 DoCoMo Labs USA Email: kempf@docomolabs-usa.com 3240 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94303 USA Rajeev Koodli Phone: +1 650 625 2359 Nokia-Siemens Research Center Fax: +1 650 625 2502 313 Fairchild Drive Email: Rajeev.Koodli@nokia.com Mountain View, CA 94043 USA 10.0 IPR Statements Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 11]
Internet Draft FMIP Security August, 2007 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. 11.0 Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 12.0 Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. 13.0 Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Kempf & Koodli Expires Feburary, 2008 [Page 12]
