Network Working Group E. Omara
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Informational B. Beurdouche
Expires: April 25, 2019 INRIA
E. Rescorla
Mozilla
S. Inguva
Twitter
A. Kwon
MIT
A. Duric
Wire
October 22, 2018
The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture
draft-ietf-mls-architecture-01
Abstract
This document describes the architecture and requirements for the
Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol. MLS provides a security
layer for group messaging applications with from two to a large
number of clients. It is meant to protect against eavesdropping,
tampering, and message forgery.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. General Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Group, Members and Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Authentication Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Delivery Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Key Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2. Key Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3. Delivery of messages and attachments . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.4. Membership knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.5. Membership and offline members . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1. Asynchronous Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2. Recovery After State Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.3. Support for Multiple Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.4. Extensibility / Pluggability . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.5. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.6. Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.7. Compatibility with future versions of MLS . . . . . . 10
3.2. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Connections between Clients and Servers (one-to-one) 10
3.2.2. Message Secrecy and Authentication . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Transport Security Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Delivery Service Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Authentication Service Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Client Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH
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The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes
should be submitted as pull requests at https://github.com/mlswg/mls-
architecture. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial
changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantive change should
be discussed on the MLS mailing list.
End-to-end security is a requirement for instant messaging systems
and is commonly deployed in many such systems. In this context,
"end-to-end" captures the notion that users of the system enjoy some
level of security - with the precise level depending on the system
design - even when the messaging service they are using performs
unsatisfactorily.
Messaging Layer Security (MLS) specifies an architecture (this
document) and an abstract protocol [MLSPROTO] for providing end-to-
end security in this setting. MLS is not intended as a full instant
messaging protocol but rather is intended to be embedded in a
concrete protocol such as XMPP [RFC6120]. In addition, it does not
specify a complete wire encoding, but rather a set of abstract data
structures which can then be mapped onto a variety of concrete
encodings, such as TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], CBOR [RFC7049], and JSON
[RFC7159]. Implementations which adopt compatible encodings will
have some degree of interoperability at the message level, though
they may have incompatible identity/authentication infrastructures.
This document is intended to describe the overall messaging system
architecture which the MLS protocol fits into, and the requirements
which it is intended to fulfill.
2. General Setting
A Group using a Messaging Service (MS) comprises a set of
participants called Members where each Member is typically expected
to own multiple devices, called Clients. A group may be as small as
two members (the simple case of person to person messaging) or as
large as thousands. In order to communicate securely, Group Members
initially use services at their disposal to obtain the necessary
secrets and credentials required for security.
The Messaging Service (MS) presents as two abstract services that
allow Members to prepare for sending and receiving messages securely:
o An Authentication Service (AS) which is responsible for
maintaining user long term identities, issuing credentials which
allow them to authenticate each other, and potentially allowing
users to discover each others long-term identity keys.
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o A Delivery Service (DS) which is responsible for receiving and
redistributing messages between group members. In the case of
group messaging, the delivery service may also be responsible for
acting as a "broadcaster" where the sender sends a single message
to a group which is then forwarded to each recipient in the group
by the DS. The DS is also responsible for storing and delivering
initial public key material required in order to proceed with the
group secret key establishment process.
---------------- --------------
| Authentication | | Delivery |
| Service (AS) | | Service (DS) |
---------------- --------------
/ | \ Group
*********************************************************
* / | \ *
* / | \ *
* ---------- ---------- ---------- *
* | Client 0 | | Client 1 | | Client N | *
* ---------- ---------- ---------- *
* ............................ ........... *
* Member 0 Member 1 *
* *
*********************************************************
In many systems, the AS and the DS are actually operated by the same
entity and may even be the same server. However, they are logically
distinct and, in other systems, may be operated by different
entities, hence we show them as being separate here. Other
partitions are also possible, such as having a separate directory
server.
A typical group messaging scenario might look like this:
1. Alice, Bob and Charlie create accounts with a messaging service
and obtain credentials from the AS.
2. Alice, Bob and Charlie authenticate to the DS and store some
initial keying material which can be used to send encrypted
messages to them for the first time. This keying material is
authenticated with their long term credentials.
3. When Alice wants to send a message to Bob and Charlie, she
contacts the DS and looks up their initial keying material. She
uses these keys to establish a new set of keys which she can use
to send encrypted messages to Bob and Charlie. She then sends
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the encrypted message(s) to the DS, which forwards them to the
recipients.
4. Bob and/or Charlie respond to Alice's message. Their messages
might trigger a new key derivation step which allows the shared
group key to be updated to provide post-compromise security
Section 3.2.2.1.
Clients may wish to do the following:
o create a group by inviting a set of other members;
o add one or more members to an existing group;
o remove one or more members from an existing group;
o join an existing group;
o leave a group;
o send a message to everyone in the group;
o receive a message from someone in the group.
At the cryptographic level, Clients in groups (and by extension
Members) are peers. For instance, any Client can add a member to a
group. This is in contrast to some designs in which there is a
single group controller who can modify the group. MLS is compatible
with having group administration restricted to certain users, but we
assume that those restrictions are enforced by authentication and
access control. Thus, for instance, while it might be technically
possible for any member to send a message adding a new member to a
group, the group might have the policy that only certain members are
allowed to make changes and thus other members can ignore or reject
such a message from an unauthorized user.
2.1. Group, Members and Clients
In MLS a Group is defined as a set of Members who possibly use
multiple endpoint devices (Clients) to interact with the Messaging
Service. These Clients will typically correspond to end-user devices
such as phones, web clients or other devices running MLS.
Each member device owns a long term identity key pair that uniquely
defines its identity to other Members of the Group. Because a single
Member may operate multiple devices simultaneously (e.g., a desktop
and a phone) or sequentially (e.g., replacing one phone with
another), the formal definition of a Group in MLS is the set of
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Clients that has legitimate knowledge of the shared (Encryption)
Group Key established in the group key establishment phase of the
protocol.
In some messaging systems, Clients belonging to the same Member must
all share the same identity key pair, but MLS does not assume this.
The MLS architecture considers the more general case and allows for
important use cases, such as a Member adding a new Client when all
their existing clients are offline.
MLS has been designed to provide similar security guarantees to all
Clients, for all group sizes, even when it reduces to only two
Clients.
2.2. Authentication Service
The basic function of the Authentication Service is to provide a
trusted mapping from user identities (usernames, phone numbers,
etc.), which exist 1:1 with Members, to identity keys, which may
either be one per Client or may be shared amongst the Clients
attached to a Member.
o A certification authority or similar service which signs some sort
of portable credential binding an identity to a key.
o A directory server which provides the key for a given identity
(presumably this connection is secured via some form of transport
security such as TLS).
By definition, the AS is invested with a large amount of trust. A
malicious AS can impersonate - or allow an attacker to impersonate -
any user of the system. This risk can be mitigated by publishing the
binding between identities and keys in a public log such as Key
Transparency (KT) [KeyTransparency]. It is possible to build a
functional MLS system without any kind of public key logging, but
such a system will necessarily be somewhat vulnerable to attack by a
malicious or untrusted AS.
2.3. Delivery Service
The Delivery Service (DS) is expected to play multiple roles in the
Messaging Service architecture:
o To act as a directory service providing the keying material
(authentication keys and initial keying material) for Clients to
use. This allows a Client to establish a shared key and send
encrypted messages to other Clients even if the other Client is
offline.
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o To route messages between Clients and to act as a message
broadcaster, taking in one message and forwarding it to multiple
Clients (also known as "server side fanout").
Depending on the level of trust given by the Group to the Delivery
Service, the functional and security guarantees provided by MLS may
differ.
2.3.1. Key Storage
Upon joining the system, each Client stores its initial cryptographic
key material with the DS. This key material represents the initial
contribution from each member that will be used in the establishment
of the shared group key. This initial keying material is
authenticated using the Client's identity key. Thus, the Client
stores:
o A credential from the Authentication service attesting to the
binding between the Member and the Client's identity key.
o The member's initial keying material signed with the Client's
identity key.
As noted above, Members may have multiple Clients, each with their
own keying material, and thus there may be multiple entries stored by
each Member.
2.3.2. Key Retrieval
When a Client wishes to establish a group and send an initial message
to that group, it contacts the DS and retrieves the initial key
material for each other Member, verifies it using the identity key,
and then is able to form a joint key with each other Client, and from
those forms the group key, which it can use for the encryption of
messages.
2.3.3. Delivery of messages and attachments
The DS's main responsibility is to ensure delivery of messages.
Specifically, we assume that DSs provide:
o Reliable delivery: when a message is provided to the DS, it is
eventually delivered to all group members.
o In-order delivery: messages are delivered to the group in the
order they are received from a given Client and in approximately
the order in which they are sent by Clients. The latter is an
approximate guarantee because multiple Clients may send messages
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at the same time and so the DS needs some latitude in reordering
between Clients.
o Consistent ordering: the DS must ensure that all Clients have the
same view of message ordering.
Note that the DS may provide ordering guarantees by ensuring in-order
delivery or by providing messages with some kind of sequence
information and allowing clients to reorder on receipt.
The MLS protocol itself can verify these properties. For instance,
if the DS reorders messages from a Client or provides different
Clients with inconsistent orderings, then Clients can to detect this
misconduct. However, MLS need not provide mechanisms to recover from
a misbehaving DS.
Note that some forms of DS misbehavior are still possible and
difficult to detect. For instance, a DS can simply refuse to relay
messages to and from a given Client. Without some sort of side
information, other Clients cannot generally distinguish this form of
Denial of Service (DoS) attack from the Client being actually
offline.
2.3.4. Membership knowledge
Group membership is itself sensitive information and MLS is designed
so that neither the DS nor the AS need have static knowledge of which
Clients are in which Group. However, they may learn this information
through traffic analysis. For instance, in a server side fanout
model, the DS learns that a given Client is sending the same message
to a set of other Clients. In addition, there may be applications of
MLS in which the Group membership list is stored on some server
associated with the MS.
2.3.5. Membership and offline members
Because Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS) rely
on the deletion and replacement of keying material, any Client which
is persistently offline may still be holding old keying material and
thus be a threat to both FS and PCS if it is later compromised. MLS
does not inherently defend against this problem, but MLS-using
systems can enforce some mechanism for doing so. Typically this will
consist of evicting Clients which are idle for too long, thus
containing the threat of compromise. The precise details of such
mechanisms are a matter of local policy and beyond the scope of this
document.
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3. System Requirements
3.1. Functional Requirements
MLS is designed as a large scale group messaging protocol and hence
aims to provide performance and safety to its users. Messaging
systems that implement MLS provide support for conversations
involving two or more participants, and aim to scale to approximately
50,000 clients, typically including many Members using multiple
devices.
3.1.1. Asynchronous Usage
No operation in MLS requires two distinct users to be online
simultaneously. In particular, clients participating in
conversations protected using MLS can update shared keys, add or
remove new members, and send messages and attachments without waiting
for another user's reply.
Messaging systems that implement MLS provide a transport layer for
delivering messages asynchronously and reliably.
3.1.2. Recovery After State Loss
Conversation participants whose local MLS state is lost or corrupted
can reinitialize their state and continue participating in the
conversation. This may entail some level of message loss, but does
not result in permanent exclusion from the group.
3.1.3. Support for Multiple Devices
It is typically expected for Members of the Group to own different
devices.
A new device can join the group and will be considered as a new
Client by the protocol. This Client will not gain access to the
history even if it is owned by someone who is already a Member of the
Group. Restoring history is typically not allowed at the protocol
level but applications can elect to provide such a mechanism outside
of MLS.
3.1.4. Extensibility / Pluggability
Messages that do not affect the group state can carry an arbitrary
payload with the purpose of sharing that payload between group
members. No assumptions are made about the format of the payload.
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3.1.5. Privacy
The protocol is designed in a way that limits the server-side (AS and
DS) metadata footprint. The DS only persists data required for the
delivery of messages and avoid Personally Identifiable Information
(PII) or other sensitive metadata wherever possible. A Messaging
Service provider that has control over both the AS and the DS, will
not be able to correlate encrypted messages forwarded by the DS, with
the initial public keys signed by the AS.
3.1.6. Federation
The protocol aims to be compatible with federated environments.
While this document does not specify all necessary mechanisms
required for federation, multiple MLS implementations can
interoperate and to form federated systems if they use compatible
wire encodings.
3.1.7. Compatibility with future versions of MLS
It is important that multiple versions of MLS be able to coexist in
the future. Thus, MLS offers a version negotiation mechanism; this
mechanism prevents version downgrade attacks where an attacker would
actively rewrite messages messages with a lower protocol version than
the ones originally offered by the endpoints. When multiple versions
of MLS are available, the negotiation protocol guarantees that the
version agreed upon will be the highest version supported in common
by the group.
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Connections between Clients and Servers (one-to-one)
We assume that all transport connections are secured via some
transport layer security mechanism such as TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
However, as noted above, the security of MLS will generally survive
compromise of the transport layer, so long as identities provided by
the AS are authenticated at a minimum.
3.2.2. Message Secrecy and Authentication
The trust establishment step of the MLS protocol is followed by a
conversation protection step where encryption is used by clients to
transmit authenticated messages to other clients through the DS.
This ensures that the DS does not have access to the Group's private
content.
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MLS aims to provide Secrecy, Integrity and Authentication for all
messages.
Message Secrecy in the context of MLS means that only intended
recipients (current group members), can read any message sent to the
group, even in the context of an active adversary as described in the
threat model.
Message Integrity and Authentication mean that an honest Client can
only accept a message if it was sent by a group member and that one
Client cannot send a message which other Clients accept as being from
another Client.
A corollary to this statement is that the AS and the DS cannot read
the content of messages sent between Members as they are not Members
of the Group. MLS optionally provides additional protections
regarding traffic analysis so as to reduce the ability of
adversaries, or a compromised member of the messaging system, to
deduce the content of the messages depending on (for example) their
size. One of these protections includes padding messages in order to
produce ciphertexts of standard length. While this protection is
highly recommended it is not mandatory as it can be costly in terms
of performance for clients and the MS.
Message content can be deniable if the signature keys are exchanged
over a deniable channel prior to signing messages.
3.2.2.1. Forward and Post-Compromise Security
MLS provides additional protection regarding secrecy of past messages
and future messages. These cryptographic security properties are
Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS).
FS means that access to all encrypted traffic history combined with
an access to all current keying material on clients will not defeat
the secrecy properties of messages older than the oldest key of the
client. Note that this means that clients have the extremely
important role of deleting appropriate keys as soon as they have been
used with the expected message, otherwise the secrecy of the messages
and the security for MLS is considerably weakened.
PCS means that if a group member is compromised at some time t but
subsequently performs an update at some time t', then all MLS
guarantees apply to messages sent after time t'. For example, if an
adversary learns all secrets known to Alice at time t, including both
Alice's secret keys and all shared group keys, but Alice performs a
key update at time t', then the adversary is unable to violate any of
the MLS security properties after time t'.
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Both of these properties are satisfied even against compromised DSs
and ASs.
3.2.2.2. Membership Changes
MLS aims to provide agreement on group membership, meaning that all
group members have agreed on the list of current group members.
Some applications may wish to enforce ACLs to limit addition or
removal of group members, to privileged users. Others may wish to
require authorization from the current group members or a subset
thereof. Regardless, MLS does not allow addition or removal of group
members without informing all other members.
Once a Member is part of a Group, the set of devices controlled by
the member can only be altered by an authorized member of the group.
This authorization could depend on the application: some applications
might want to allow certain other members of the group to add or
remove devices on behalf of another member, while other applications
might want a more strict policy and allow only the owner of the
devices to add or remove them at the potential cost of weaker PCS
guarantees.
Members who are removed from a group do not enjoy special privileges:
compromise of a removed group member does not affect the security of
messages sent after their removal.
3.2.2.3. Security of Attachments
The security properties expected for attachments in the MLS protocol
are very similar to the ones expected from messages. The distinction
between messages and attachments stems from the fact that the typical
average time between the download of a message and the one from the
attachments may be different. For many reasons (a typical reason
being the lack of high bandwidth network connectivity), the lifetime
of the cryptographic keys for attachments is usually higher than for
messages, hence slightly weakening the PCS guarantees for
attachments.
3.2.2.4. Denial of Service
In general we do not consider Denial of Service (DoS) resistance to
be the responsibility of the protocol. However, it should not be
possible for anyone aside from the DS to perform a trivial DoS attack
from which it is hard to recover.
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3.2.2.5. Non-Repudiation and Deniability
As described in Section 4.4, MLS provides data origin authentication
within a group, such that one group member cannot send a message that
appears to be from another group member. Additionally, some services
require that a recipient be able to prove to the messaging service
that a message was sent by a given Client, in order to report abuse.
MLS supports both of these use cases. In some deployments, these
services are provided by mechanisms which allow the receiver to prove
a message's origin to a third party (this if often called "non-
repudiation"), but it should also be possible to operate MLS in a
"deniable" mode where such proof is not possible. [[OPEN ISSUE:
Exactly how to supply this is still a protocol question.]]
4. Security Considerations
MLS adopts the Internet threat model [RFC3552] and therefore assumes
that the attacker has complete control of the network. It is
intended to provide the security services described in in the face of
such attackers. In addition, these guarantees are intended to
degrade gracefully in the presence of compromise of the transport
security links as well as of both Clients and elements of the
messaging system, as described in the remainder of this section.
4.1. Transport Security Links
[TODO: Mostly DoS, message suppression, and leakage of group
membership.]
4.2. Delivery Service Compromise
MLS is intended to provide strong guarantees in the face of
compromise of the DS. Even a totally compromised DS should not be
able to read messages or inject messages that will be acceptable to
legitimate Clients. It should also not be able to undetectably
remove, reorder or replay messages.
However, a DS can mount a variety of DoS attacks on the system,
including total DoS attacks (where it simply refuses to forward any
messages) and partial DoS attacks (where it refuses to forward
messages to and from specific Clients). As noted in Section 2.3.3,
these attacks are only partially detectable by clients without an
out-of-band channel. Ultimately, failure of the DS to provide
reasonable service must be dealt with as a customer service matter,
not via technology.
Because the DS is responsible for providing the initial keying
material to Clients, it can provide stale keys. This does not
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inherently lead to compromise of the message stream, but does allow
it to attack forward security to a limited extent. This threat can
be mitigated by having initial keys expire.
4.3. Authentication Service Compromise
A compromised AS is a serious matter, as the AS can provide incorrect
or adversarial identities to clients. As noted in Section 2.2,
mitigating this form of attack requires some sort of transparency/
logging mechanism. Without such a mechanism, MLS will only provide
limited security against a compromised AS.
4.4. Client Compromise
In general, MLS only provides limited protection against compromised
Clients. When the Client is compromised, then the attacker will
obviously be able to decrypt any messages for groups in which the
Client is a member. It will also be able to send messages
impersonating the compromised Client until the Client updates its
keying material (see Section 3.2.2.1). MLS attempts to provide some
security in the face of client compromise.
In addition, a Client cannot send a message to a group which appears
to be from another Client with a different identity. Note that if
Clients from the same Member share keying material, then one will be
able to impersonate another.
Finally, Clients should not be able to perform DoS attacks
Section 3.2.2.4.
5. Contributors
o Katriel Cohn-Gordon
University of Oxford
me@katriel.co.uk
o Cas Cremers
University of Oxford
cas.cremers@cs.ox.ac.uk
o Thyla van der Merwe
Royal Holloway, University of London
thyla.van.der@merwe.tech
o Jon Millican
Facebook
jmillican@fb.com
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o Raphael Robert
Wire
raphael@wire.com
6. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28 (work in progress),
March 2018.
[KeyTransparency]
Google, ., "Key Transparency", n.d.,
<https://KeyTransparency.org>.
[MLSPROTO]
Barnes, R., Millican, J., Omara, E., Cohn-Gordon, K., and
R. Robert, "Messaging Layer Security Protocol", 2018.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
Authors' Addresses
Emad Omara
Google
Email: emadomara@google.com
Benjamin Beurdouche
INRIA
Email: benjamin.beurdouche@inria.fr
Omara, et al. Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft MLS Architecture October 2018
Eric Rescorla
Mozilla
Email: ekr@rtfm.com
Srinivas Inguva
Twitter
Email: singuva@twitter.com
Albert Kwon
MIT
Email: kwonal@mit.edu
Alan Duric
Wire
Email: alan@wire.com
Omara, et al. Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 16]
