Mobile IP Working Group                               Charles E. Perkins
INTERNET DRAFT                                     Nokia Research Center
6 February 2000                                           Pat R. Calhoun
                                           Sun Microsystems Laboratories

                Mobile IP Challenge/Response Extensions
                  draft-ietf-mobileip-challenge-09.txt


Status of This Memo

   This document is a submission by the mobile-ip Working Group of the
   Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  Comments should be submitted
   to the MOBILE-IP@STANDARDS.NORTELNETWORKS.COM mailing list.

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at
   any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at:
        http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at:
        http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

   Mobile IP, as originally specified, defines an authentication
   extension (the Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension) by
   which a mobile node can authenticate itself to a foreign agent.
   Unfortunately, this extension does not provide ironclad replay
   protection for the foreign agent, and does not allow for the use
   of existing techniques (such as CHAP) for authenticating portable
   computer devices.  In this specification, we define extensions for
   the Mobile IP Agent Advertisements and the Registration Request
   that allow a foreign agent to use a challenge/response mechanism to
   authenticate the mobile node.









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1. Introduction

   Mobile IP, as originally specified, defines an authentication
   extension (the Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension) by
   which a mobile node can authenticate itself to a foreign agent.
   Unfortunately, this extension does not provide ironclad replay
   protection, from the point of view of the foreign agent, and does
   not allow for the use of existing techniques (such as CHAP [15]) for
   authenticating portable computer devices.  In this specification,
   we define extensions for the Mobile IP Agent Advertisements and
   the Registration Request that allow a foreign agent to a use
   challenge/response mechanism to authenticate the mobile node.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [1].




































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2. Mobile IP Agent Advertisement Challenge Extension

   This section defines a new extension to the Router Discovery
   Protocol [5] for use by foreign agents that need to issue a challenge
   for authenticating mobile nodes.


       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |    Length     |          Challenge ...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                   Figure 1: The Challenge Extension


      Type        24

      Length      The length of the Challenge value in octets; SHOULD be
                  at least 4

      Challenge   A random value that SHOULD be at least 32 bits.

   The Challenge extension, illustrated in figure 1, is inserted
   in the Agent Advertisements by the Foreign Agent, in order to
   communicate the latest challenge value that can be used by the mobile
   node to compute an authentication for its registration request
   message.  The challenge is selected by the foreign agent to provide
   local assurance that the mobile node is not replaying any earlier
   registration request.  Eastlake, et al. [6] provides more information
   on generating pseudo-random numbers suitable for use as values for
   the challenge.


3. Operation

   This section describes modifications to the Mobile IP registration
   process which may occur after the Foreign Agent issues a Mobile IP
   Agent Advertisement containing the Challenge on its local link.


3.1. Mobile Node Processing for Registration Requests

   Whenever the Agent Advertisement contains the Challenge extension,
   if the mobile node does not have a security association with the
   Foreign Agent, then it MUST include the Challenge value in a MN-FA
   Challenge extension to the Registration Request message.  If, on
   the other hand, the mobile node does have a security association



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   with the foreign agent, it SHOULD include the Challenge value in its
   Registration Request message.

   If the Mobile Node has a security association with the Foreign
   Agent, it MUST include a Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension
   in its Registration Request message, according to the base
   Mobile IP specification [12].  When the Registration Request
   contains the MN-FA Challenge extension specified in section 4, the
   Mobile-Foreign Authentication MUST follow the Challenge extension in
   the Registration Request.

   If the Mobile Node does not have a security association with the
   Foreign Agent, the Mobile Node MUST include the MN-AAA Authentication
   extension as defined in section 6.  In addition, the Mobile
   Node SHOULD include the NAI extension [4], to enable the foreign
   agent to make use of any available verification infrastructure.
   The SPI field of the MN-AAA Authentication extension specifies
   the particular secret and algorithm (shared between the Mobile
   Node and the verification infrastructure) that must be used
   to perform the authentication.  If the SPI value is chosen as
   CHAP_SPI (see section 9), then the mobile node specifies CHAP-style
   authentication [15] using MD5 [14].

   In either case, the MN-FA Challenge extension and one of the above
   specified authentication extensions MUST follow the Mobile-Home
   Authentication extension, if present.

   A successful Registration Reply from the Foreign Agent MAY include
   a new Challenge value (see section 3.3).  The Mobile Node MAY use
   either the value found in the latest Advertisement, or the one found
   in the last Registration Reply from the Foreign Agent.  This approach
   enables the Mobile Node to make use of the challenge without having
   to wait for advertisements.

   A Mobile Node might receive an UNKNOWN_CHALLENGE error (see
   section 9) if it moves to a new Foreign Agent that cannot validate
   the challenge provided in the Registration Request.  In such
   instances, the Mobile Node MUST use a new Challenge value in any new
   registration, obtained either from an Agent Advertisement, or from a
   Challenge extension to the Registration Reply containing the error.

   A Mobile Node that does not include a Challenge when the
   Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension is present may receive a
   MISSING_CHALLENGE (see section 10) error.  In this case, the foreign
   agent will not process the request from the mobile node unless the
   request contains a valid Challenge.






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3.2. Foreign Agent Processing for Registration Requests

   Upon receipt of the Registration Request, if the Foreign Agent has
   issued a Challenge as part of its Agent Advertisements, and it does
   not have a security association with the mobile node, then the
   Foreign Agent MUST check that the MN-FA Challenge extension exists,
   and that it contains a challenge value previously unused by the
   Mobile Node.  This ensures that the mobile node is not attempting
   to replay a previous advertisement and authentication.  If the
   challenge extension is needed and does not exist, the Foreign Agent
   MUST send a Regstration Reply to the mobile node with the error code
   MISSING_CHALLENGE.

   A foreign agent that sends Agent Advertsements containing a Challenge
   value MAY send a Registration Reply message with a MISSING_CHALLENGE
   error if the mobile node sends a Registration Request with a
   Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension without including a
   Challenge.  In other words, such a foreign agent MAY refuse to
   process a Registration Request request from the mobile node unless
   the request contains a valid Challenge.

   If a mobile node retransmits a Registration Request with the same
   Identification field and the same Challenge extension, and the
   Foreign Agent still has a pending Registration Request record
   in effect for the mobile node, then the Foreign Agent forwards
   the Registration Request to the Home Agent again.  In all other
   circumstances, if the Foreign Agent receives a Registration
   Request with a Challenge extension containing a Challenge value
   previously used by that mobile node, the Foreign Agent SHOULD send
   a Registration Reply to the mobile node containing the Code value
   STALE_CHALLENGE.

   The Foreign Agent MUST NOT accept any Challenge in the Registration
   Request unless it was offered in last successful Registration Reply
   issued to the Mobile Node, or else advertised as one of the last
   CHALLENGE_WINDOW (see section 9) Challenge values inserted into the
   immediately preceding Agent advertisements.  If the Challenge is not
   one of the recently advertised values, the foreign Agent SHOULD send
   a Registration Reply with Code UNKNOWN_CHALLENGE (see section 10).

   Furthermore, the Foreign Agent MUST check that there is either a
   Mobile-Foreign, or a MN-AAA Authentication after the Challenge
   extension.  Any registration message containing the Challenge
   extension without either of these authentication extensions MUST
   be silently discarded.  If the registration message contains
   a Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension with an incorrect
   authenticator that fails verification, the Foreign Agent MAY
   send a Registration Reply to the mobile node with Code value
   BAD_AUTHENTICATION (see Section 10).



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   If MN-AAA Authentication extension (see Section 6) is present in
   the message, or if an NAI extension is included indicating that
   the mobile node belongs to a different administrative domain, the
   foreign agent may take actions outside the scope of this protocol
   specification to carry out the authentication of the mobile node.
   The appendix provides an example of an action that could be taken by
   a foreign agent.

   Since the Challenge extension, and the authentication extension that
   is used by the Mobile Node to satisfy the challenge, both follow
   the Mobile-Home Authentication extension whenever the latter is
   present, the Foreign Agent MAY remove the Challenge Extension and
   the applicable authentication from the Registration Request without
   disturbing the authentication value computed by the Mobile Node for
   use by the Home Agent.

   If the Foreign Agent does not remove those extensions, then the
   Foreign Agent SHOULD store the Challenge value as part of the pending
   registration request list [12].  Also in this case, the Foreign Agent
   MUST reject any Registration Reply message coming from the Home Agent
   that does not also include the Challenge Extension with the same
   Challenge Value that was included in the Registration Request.  The
   Foreign Agent MUST send the rejected Registration message to the
   mobile node, and change the status in the Registration Reply to the
   value MISSING_CHALLENGE (see section 10).

   If the Foreign Agent does remove the Challenge extension and
   applicable authentication from the Registration Request message,
   then it SHOULD insert the Identification field from the Registration
   Request message along with its record-keeping information about the
   particular Mobile Node in order to protect against replays.


3.3. Foreign Agent Processing for Registration Replies

   The Foreign Agent MAY include a new Challenge extension in any
   Registration Reply, successful or not.  If the foreign agent includes
   this extension in a successful Registration Reply, the extension
   SHOULD precede a MN-FA authentication extension.

   Suppose the Registration Reply includes a Challenge extension from
   the Home Agent, and the foreign agent wishes to include another
   Challenge extension with the Registration Reply for use by the mobile
   node.  In that case, the foreign agent MUST delete the Challenge
   extension from the Home Agent from the Registration Reply, along
   with any FA-HA authentication extension, before appending the new
   Challenge extension to the Registration Reply.





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3.4. Home Agent Processing for the Challenge Extensions

   If the Home Agent receives a Registration Request with the MN-FA
   Challenge extension, and recognizes the extension, the Home Agent
   MUST include the Challenge extension in the Registration Reply.
   The Challenge Extension MUST be placed after the Mobile-Home
   authentication extension, and the extension SHOULD be authenticated
   by a Foreign-Home Authentication extension.

   Since the extension type for the Challenge extension is within the
   range 128-255, the Home Agent MUST process such a Registration
   Request even if it does not recognize the Challenge extension [12].
   In this case, the Home Agent will send a Registration Reply to the
   Foreign Agent that does not include the Challenge extension.






































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4. MN-FA Challenge Extension

   This section specifies a new Mobile IP Registration extension that is
   used to satisfy a Challenge in an Agent Advertisement.  The Challenge
   extension to the Registration Request message is used to indicate the
   challenge that the mobile node is attempting to satisfy.


       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |    Length     |         Challenge...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                Figure 2: The MN-FA Challenge Extension


      Type        132 (skippable) (see [12])

      Length      Length of the Challenge value

      Challenge   The Challenge field is copied from the Challenge field
                  found in the Agent Advertisement Challenge extension
                  (see section 2).


5. Generalized Mobile IP Authentication Extension

   Several new authentication extensions have been designed for various
   control messages proposed for extensions to Mobile IP (see, for
   example, [13]).  A new authentication extension is required for a
   mobile node to present its credentials to any other entity other
   than the ones already defined; the only entities defined in the base
   Mobile IP specification [12] are the home agent and the foreign
   agent.  It is the purpose of the generalized authentication extension
   defined here to collect together data for all such new authentication
   applications into a single extension type with subtypes.














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       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |    Subtype    |            Length             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                              SPI                              |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                         Authenticator ...
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


      Figure 3: The Generalized Mobile IP Authentication Extension


      Type            36 (not skippable) (see [12])

      Subtype         a number assigned to identify the kind of
                      endpoints or characteristics of the particular
                      authentication strategy

      Length          4 plus the number of bytes in the Authenticator;
                      MUST be at least 20.

      SPI             Security Parameters Index

      Authenticator   The variable length Authenticator field

   In this document, only one subtype is defined:

      1               MN-AAA Authentication subtype (see section 6)


6. MN-AAA Authentication subtype

   The Generalized Authentication extension with subtype 1 will be
   referred to as a MN-AAA Authentication extension.  If the mobile node
   does not include a Mobile-Foreign Authentication [12] extension,
   then it MUST include the MN-AAA Authentication extension whenever
   the Challenge extension is present.  If the MN-AAA Authentication
   extension is present, then the Registration Message MAY be sent by
   the mobile node without containing the Mobile-HA Authentication
   extension [12].  The mobile node MAY include a MN-AAA Authentication
   extension in any Registration Request.

   The default algorithm for computation of the authenticator is
   MD5 [14] computed on the following data, in the order shown:

      Key || Preceding Mobile IP data ||
      Type, Subtype, Length, SPI || Key



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   where the Type, Length, Subtype, and SPI are as shown in
   section 5.  Each mobile node MUST support the ability to produce the
   authenticator by using MD5 as shown (known as "prefix+suffix" mode).
   Just as with Mobile IP, this default algorithm MUST be able to be
   configured for selection at any arbitrary 32-bit SPI outside of the
   SPIs in the reserved range 0-255.


7. Reserved SPIs for Mobile IP

   Mobile IP defines several authentication extensions for use in
   Registration Requests and Replies.  Each authentication extension
   carries a Security Parameters Index (SPI) which should be used to
   index a table of security associations.  Values in the range 0 - 255
   are reserved for special use.  A list of reserved SPI numbers is to
   be maintained by IANA at the following URL:

      http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/mobileip-numbers


8. SPI For RADIUS AAA Servers

   Some AAA servers only admit a single security association, and thus
   do not use the SPI numbers for Mobile IP authentication extensions
   for use when determining the security association that would be
   necessary for verifying the authentication information included with
   the Authentication extension.

   SPI number CHAP_SPI (see section 9) is reserved (see section 7) for
   indicating the following procedure for computing authentication data
   (called the "authenticator"), which is used by many RADIUS servers
   today.

   To compute the authenticator, apply MD5 [14] computed on the
   following data, in the order shown:

      High-order byte from Challenge || Key ||
      MD5(Preceding Mobile IP data ||
      Type, Subtype (if present), Length, SPI ||
      Least-order 237 bytes from Challenge

   where the Type, Length, SPI, and possibly Subtype, are the fields
   of the authentication extension in use.  For instance, all four of
   these fields would be in use when SPI == CHAP_SPI is used with the
   Generalized Authentication extension.  Since the RADIUS protocol
   cannot carry attributes greater than 253 in size, the preceding
   Mobile IP data, type, subtype (if present), length and SPI are
   hashed using MD5.  Finally, the least significant 237 octets of the
   challenge are concatenated.



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9. Configurable Parameters

   Every Mobile IP agent supporting the extensions defined in this
   document SHOULD be able to configure each parameter in the following
   table.  Each table entry contains the name of the parameter, the
   default value, and the section of the document in which the parameter
   first appears.

      Parameter Name     Default Value   Section(s) of Document
      --------------     -------------   ----------------------
      CHALLENGE_WINDOW   2               3.2
      CHAP_SPI           2               8




10. Error Values

   Each entry in the following table contains the name of Code [12] to
   be returned in a Registration Reply, the value for the Code, and the
   section in which the error is first mentioned in this specification.
      Error Name               Value   Section of Document
      ----------------------   -----   -------------------
      UNKNOWN_CHALLENGE        104     3.2
      BAD_AUTHENTICATION       67      3.2 - also see [12]
      MISSING_CHALLENGE        105     3.1,3.2
      STALE_CHALLENGE          106     3.2



11. IANA Considerations

   A new section for enumerating algorithms identified by specific SPIs
   within the range 0-255 is to be added to

      http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/mobileip-numbers.

   The CHAP_SPI number (2) discussed in section 8 is to be assigned
   from this range of reserved SPI numbers.  New assignments from this
   reserved range must be specified and approved by the Mobile IP
   working group.  SPI number 1 should not be assigned unless in the
   future the Mobile IP working group decides that SKIP is not important
   for enumeration in the list of reserved numbers.  SPI number 0 should
   not be assigned.

   The number, 24, for the Mobile IP Agent Advertisement Challenge
   extension (section 2) is taken from the numbering space defined for
   Mobile IP [12] extensions to the ICMP Router Advertisements [5].  The
   numbers, 36 and 132, for the Generalized Authentication extension



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   (section 5) and the MN-FA Challenge extension (section 4) are
   taken from the numbering space defined for Mobile IP registration
   extensions [12] The new Code values specified for errors 104, 105,
   and 106, as listed in section 10, MUST NOT conflict with any other
   code values listed in RFC 2002, RFC 2344 [9], or RFC 2356 [10].
   These code values are to be taken from the space of error values
   conventionally associated with rejection by the foreign agent (i.e.,
   64-127).  The Code value 67 is a pre-existing value which is to be
   used in some cases with the extension defined in this specification.

   A new number space is to be created for enumerating subtypes of the
   Generalized Authentication extension (see section 5).  New subtypes
   of the Generalized Authentication extension, other than the number
   (1) for the MN-AAA authentication extension specified in section 6,
   must be specified and approved by the Mobile IP working group.


12. Security Considerations

   In the event that a malicious mobile node attempts to replay the
   authenticator for an old MN-FA Challenge, the Foreign Agent would
   detect it since the agent always checks whether it has recently
   advertised the Challenge (see section 3.2).  Allowing mobile nodes
   with different IP addresses or NAIs to use the same Challenge
   value does not represent a security vulnerability, because the
   authentication data provided by the mobile node will be computed over
   data that is different (at least by the bytes of the mobile nodes' IP
   addresses).

   Whenever a Foreign Agent updates a field of the Registration Reply
   (as suggested in section 3.2), it invalidates the authentication data
   supplied by the Home Agent in the MN-HA Authentication extension to
   the Registration Reply.  Thus, this opens up a security exposure
   whereby a node might try to supply a bogus Registration Reply to a
   mobile node that causes the mobile node to act as if its Registration
   Reply were rejected.  This might happen when, in fact, a Registration
   Reply showing acceptance of the registration might soon be received
   by the mobile node.

   If the foreign agent chooses a Challenge value (see section 2) with
   fewer than 4 bytes, the foreign agent SHOULD maintain records that
   also the Identification field for the mobile node.  The foreign
   agent can then find assurance that the Registration messages using
   the short Challenge value are in fact unique, and thus assuredly not
   replayed from any earlier registration.







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13. IPv6 Considerations

   For use with IPv6 mobility [7], the challenge extension should
   be applied to Router Advertisements [11].  In order to check the
   response from the mobile node, the router would need to have a
   security relationship with either the mobile node, its home agent,
   or another entity within the IPv6 security infrastructure.  It is
   not yet known which security model would be more appropriate, or
   whether it would make the most sense to enable maximum flexibility by
   specifying the protocol for each case.


14. Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Tom Hiller, Mark Munson, the TIA
   TR45-6 WG, Gabriel Montenegro, Vipul Gupta, and Pete McCann for their
   useful discussions.  A recent draft [8] by Mohamed Khalil, Raja
   Narayanan, Emad Qaddoura, and Haseeb Akhtar has also suggested the
   definition of a generalized authentication extension similar to the
   specification contained in section 5.


References

    [1] S. Bradner.  Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels.  Request for Comments (Best Current Practice) 2119,
        Internet Engineering Task Force, March 1997.

    [2] P. Calhoun and C. Perkins.  DIAMETER Mobile IP Extensions.
        Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force.
        draft-calhoun-diameter-mobileip-01.txt, November 1998.  Work in
        progress.

    [3] P. Calhoun and A. Rubens.  DIAMETER Base Protocol.  Internet
        Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force.
        draft-calhoun-diameter-07.txt, November 1998.  Work in progress.

    [4] Pat R. Calhoun and Charles E. Perkins.  Mobile IP Network
        Address Identifier Extension.
        draft-ietf-mobileip-mn-nai-05.txt, October 1999.  (work in
        progress).

    [5] S. Deering.  ICMP Router Discovery Messages.  Request for
        Comments (Proposed Standard) 1256, Internet Engineering Task
        Force, September 1991.

    [6] D. Eastlake, 3rd, S. Crocker, and J. Schiller.  Randomness
        Recommendations for Security.  Request for Comments




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        (Informational) 1750, Internet Engineering Task Force, December
        1994.

    [7] D. Johnson and C. Perkins.  Mobility Support in IPv6.
        draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-08.txt, June 1999.  (work in progress).

    [8] Mohamed Khalil, Raja Narayanan, Emad Qaddoura, and Haseeb
        Akhtar.  Mobile IP Extensions Rationalization (MIER).
        draft-ietf-mobileip-mier-00.txt, December 1999.  (work in
        progress).

    [9] G. Montenegro.  Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP.  Request for
        Comments (Proposed Standard) 2344, Internet Engineering Task
        Force, May 1998.

   [10] G. Montenegro and V. Gupta.  Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for
        Mobile IP.  Request for Comments (Informational) 2356, Internet
        Engineering Task Force, June 1998.

   [11] T. Narten, E. Nordmark, and W. Simpson.  Neighbor Discovery for
        IP Version 6 (IPv6).  Request for Comments (Draft Standard)
        2461, Internet Engineering Task Force, December 1998.

   [12] C. Perkins.  IP Mobility Support.  Request for Comments
        (Proposed Standard) 2002, Internet Engineering Task Force,
        October 1996.

   [13] C. Perkins and D. Johnson.  Route Optimization in Mobile IP.
        Internet Draft, Internet Engineering Task Force.
        draft-ietf-mobileip-optim-08.txt, February 1999.  Work in
        progress.

   [14] R. Rivest.  The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm.  Request for
        Comments (Informational) 1321, Internet Engineering Task Force,
        April 1992.

   [15] W. Simpson.  PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
        (CHAP).  Request for Comments (Draft Standard) 1994, Internet
        Engineering Task Force, August 1996.













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A. Verification Infrastructure

   The Challenge extensions in this protocol specification are expected
   to be useful to help the Foreign Agent manage connectivity for
   visiting mobile nodes, even in situations where the foreign agent
   does not have any security association with the mobile node or the
   mobile node's home agent.  In order to carry out the necessary
   authentication, it is expected that the foreign agent will need the
   assistance of external administrative systems, which have come to be
   called AAA systems.  For the purposes of this document, we call the
   external administrative support the "verification infrastructure".
   The verification infrastructure is described to motivate the design
   of the protocol elements defined in this document, and is not
   strictly needed for the protocol to work.  The foreign agent is free
   to use any means at its disposal to verify the credentials of the
   mobile node.  This could, for instance, rely on a separate protocol
   between the foreign agent and the Mobile IP home agent, and still be
   completely invisible to the mobile node.

   In order to verify the credentials of the mobile node, we imagine
   that the foreign agent has access to a verification infrastructure
   that can return a secure notification to the foreign agent that
   the authentication has been performed, along with the results of
   that authentication.  This infrastructure may be visualized as
   shown in figure 4.  For an example of another protocol that has
   been specified to actually carry out the challenge verification
   operations, see [3, 2].


            +----------------------------------------------------+
            |                                                    |
            |  Verification and Key Management Infrastructure    |
            |                                                    |
            +----------------------------------------------------+
                   ^ |                                  ^ |
                   | |                                  | |
                   | v                                  | v
            +---------------+                    +---------------+
            |               |                    |               |
            | Foreign Agent |                    |   Home Agent  |
            |               |                    |               |
            +---------------+                    +---------------+


               Figure 4: The Verification Infrastructure







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   After the foreign agent gets the Challenge authentication, it MAY
   pass the authentication to the (here unspecified) infrastructure,
   and await a Registration Reply.  If the Reply has a positive status
   (indicating that the registration was accepted), the foreign agent
   accepts the registration.  If the Reply contains the Code value
   BAD_AUTHENTICATION (see Section 10), the foreign agent takes actions
   indicated for rejected registrations.

   Implicit in this picture, is the important observation that the
   Foreign Agent and the Home Agent have to be equipped to make use
   of whatever protocol is made available to them by the challenge
   verification and key management infrastructure shown in the figure.

   The protocol messages for handling the authentication within the
   verification infrastructure, and identity of the agent performing the
   verification of the Foreign Agent challenge, are not specified in
   this document, because those operations do not have to be performed
   by any Mobile IP entity.


Addresses

   The working group can be contacted via the current chairs:

        Basavaraj Patil                 Phil Roberts
        Nokia Corporation               Motorola
        6000 Connection Drive           1501 West Shure Drive
        Irving, Texas 75039             Arlington Heights, IL 60004
        USA                             USA
                                        Phone:  +1 847-632-3148
        EMail:  bpatil@mindspring.com   EMail:  QA3445@email.mot.com


   Questions about this memo can also be directed to the authors:

        Charles E. Perkins                Pat R. Calhoun
        Communications Systems Lab        Network & Security Center
        Nokia Research Center             Sun Microsystems Laboratories
        313 Fairchild Drive               15 Network Circle
        Mountain View, California 94043   Menlo Park, California 94025
        USA                               USA
        Phone:  +1-650 625-2986           Phone:  +1 650-786-7733
        EMail:  charliep@iprg.nokia.com   EMail:  pcalhoun@eng.sun.com
        Fax:  +1 650 625-2502             Fax:  +1 650-786-6445








Perkins, Calhoun             Expires 6 August 2000             [Page 15]