Internet Engineering Task Force G. Montenegro
INTERNET DRAFT Sun Microsystems, Inc.
January 31, 1996
Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP
draft-ietf-mobileip-tunnel-reverse-00.txt
Status of This Memo
This document is a submission by the Mobile IP Working Group of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Comments should be submitted
to the Working Group mailing list at "mobile-ip@SmallWorks.COM".
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
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Abstract
Mobile IP uses tunneling from the home agent to the mobile node's
care-of address, but rarely in the reverse direction. Usually, a
mobile node sends its packets through a router on the foreign net,
and assumes that routing is independent of source address. When
this assumption is not true, it is convenient to establish a
topologically correct reverse tunnel from the care-of address to the
home agent.
This document proposes backwards-compatible extensions to Mobile IP
in order to support topologically correct reverse tunnels. This
document does not attempt to solve the problems posed by firewalls
located between the home agent and the mobile node's care-of
address.
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1. Introduction
Section 1.3 of the Mobile IP specification [1] lists the following
assumption:
It is assumed that IP unicast datagrams are routed based on the
destination address in the datagram header (i.e., not by source
address).
Because of security concerns (e.g. IP spoofing attacks), and in
accordance with the IAB [8] and CERT [3] advisories to this effect,
routers that break this assumption are increasingly more common.
In the presence of such routers, the source and destination IP
address in a packet must be topologically correct. The forward
tunnel complies with this, as its endpoints (home agent address and
care-of address) are properly assigned addresses for their
respective locations. On the other hand, the source IP address of a
packet transmitted by the mobile node does not correspond to the
location from where it emanates.
This document discusses topologically correct reverse tunnels.
Mobile IP does dictate the use of reverse tunnels in the context of
multicast datagram routing and mobile routers. However, the source
IP address is set to the mobile node's home address, so these
tunnels are not topologically correct.
Notice that there are several uses for reverse tunnels regardless of
their topological correctness:
- Mobile routers: reverse tunnels obviate the need for recursive
tunneling [1].
- Multicast: reverse tunnels enable a mobile node away from home
to (1) join multicast groups in its home network, and (2)
transmit multicast packets such that they emanate from its home
network [1].
- The TTL of packets sent by the mobile node (particularly when
it addresses other hosts in its home network) may be so low
that they may expire before reaching their destination. A
reverse tunnel solves the problem as it represents a TTL
decrement of one [5].
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1.1. Terminology
The discussion below uses terms defined in the Mobile IP
specification. Additionally, it uses the following terms:
Forward Tunnel
A tunnel that shuttles packets towards the mobile node. It
starts at the home agent, and ends at the mobile node's
care-of address.
Reverse Tunnel
A tunnel that starts at the mobile node's care-of address and
terminates at the home agent.
Light-weight mobile node
A mobile node that relies on a separate foreign agent for
tunneling services (i.e. the care-of address belongs to the
foreign agent).
1.2. Assumptions
Mobility is constrained to one IP address space (e.g. the routing
fabric between, say, the mobile node and the home agent is not
partitioned into a "private" and a "public" network).
This document does not attempt to solve the firewall traversal
problem. Rather, it assumes one of the following is true:
- There are no intervening firewalls along the path of the
tunneled packets.
- Any intervening firewalls share the security association
necessary to process any authentication [6] or encryption [7]
headers which may have been added to the tunneled packets.
The reverse tunnels considered here are symmetric, that is, they use
the same configuration (encapsulation method, IP address endpoints)
as the forward tunnel. IP in IP encapsulation [2] is assumed unless
stated otherwise.
Route optimization [4] introduces forward tunnels initiated at a
correspondent host. Since a mobile node cannot know if the
correspondent host can decapsulate packets, reverse tunnels in that
context are not discussed here.
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1.3. Justification
Why not let the mobile node itself initiate the tunnel to the home
agent? This is indeed what it should do if it is already operating
with a topologically significant co-located address.
However, one of the primary objectives of the Mobile IP
specification is to not *require* this mode of operation.
The mechanisms outlined in this document are primarily intended for
use by mobile nodes that rely on the foreign agent for forward
tunnel support. It is desirable to continue supporting these
"lightweight" mobile nodes, even in the presence of filtering
routers.
2. Overview
A light-weight mobile node arrives at a foreign net, listens for
advertisements and selects a foreign agent that supports reverse
tunnels. It requests this service when it registers through the
selected foreign agent. At this time, and depending on how the
mobile node wishes to deliver packets to the foreign agent, it also
requests either the lightweight or the encapsulating style of
delivery (section 5).
In the lightweight delivery style, the mobile node designates the
foreign agent as its default router and proceeds to send packets as
usual. The foreign agent intercepts them, and tunnels them to the
home agent.
In the encapsulating delivery style, the mobile node encapsulates
all its outgoing packets to the foreign agent. The foreign agent
decapsulates and tunnels again, this time, directly to the home
agent.
3. New Packet Formats
3.1. Agent Advertisements: Mobile Service Extension
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Lifetime |R|B|H|F|M|G|V|T| reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| zero or more Care-of Addresses |
| ... |
The only change to the Mobile Service Extension [1] is the
additional 'T' bit:
T Agent offers reverse tunneling service.
A foreign agent that sets the 'T' bit MUST support the two delivery
styles currently supported (section 5).
Using this information, a mobile node is able to choose a foreign
agent that supports reverse tunnels. Notice that if a mobile node
does not understand this bit, it simply ignores it.
3.2. Registration Request
Reverse tunneling support is added directly into the Registration
Request by using one of the "rsvd" bits. If a foreign or home agent
that does not support reverse tunnels receives a request with the
'T' bit set, the Registration Request fails. This results in a
registration denial (failure codes are specified in section 3.4).
Most home agents would not object to providing reverse tunnel
support, because they "SHOULD be able to decapsulate and further
deliver packets addressed to themselves, sent by a mobile node"
[1]. In the case of topologically correct reverse tunnels, the
packets are not sent by the mobile node as distinguished by its home
address. Rather, the outermost (encapsulating) IP source address on
such datagrams is the care-of address of the mobile node.
Nevertheless, home agents probably already support the required
decapsulation and further forwarding.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |S|B|D|M|G|V|T|-| Lifetime |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Home Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Home Agent |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Care-of Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identification |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extensions ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
The only change to the Registration Request packet is the additional
'T' bit:
T If the 'T' bit is set, the mobile node asks its home
agent to accept a reverse tunnel from the care-of
address. Lightweight mobile nodes ask the foreign
agent to reverse-tunnel its packets.
3.3. Reverse Tunnel Extension
The Reverse Tunnel Extension is used to further specify reverse
tunneling behavior. Currently, it is only possible to request the
encapsulating style of delivery, but future behavior may be
defined. The Reverse Tunnel Extension MUST NOT be included if the
'T' bit is not set in the Registration Request.
If this extension is absent, or if no style is explicitly requested,
the Lightweight Delivery is assumed. Besides the latter, currently
only the Encapsulating style is defined (section 5).
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |E| reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 128
Length 2
E Encapsulating style of delivery. Encapsulation is done
according to what was negotiated for the forward tunnel
(i.e., IP in IP is assumed unless specified otherwise).
reserved Ignored upon reception. Must be set to zero when
transmitting.
3.4. New Registration Reply Codes
Foreign and home agent replies must convey if the reverse tunnel
request failed. Four new reply codes are defined. The use of codes
74 and 137 is preferred over code 70 for foreign agents and code 134
for home agents [1]:
Service denied by the foreign agent:
74 requested reverse tunnel unavailable
75 reverse tunnel is mandatory and 'T' bit not set
and
Service denied by the home agent:
137 requested reverse tunnel unavailable
138 reverse tunnel is mandatory and 'T' bit not set
4. Changes in Protocol Behavior
Reverse tunnels must be handled appropriately by the different
mobility entities. Differences in protocol behavior with respect to
the Mobile IP specification are:
4.1. Mobile Node Considerations
A mobile node sets the 'T' bit in its Registration Request to
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petition a reverse tunnel. It may optionally also include a
Reverse Tunnel Extension. Possible outcomes are:
- The foreign agent returns a registration denial. Depending on
the reply code and following the error checking guidelines in
[1], the mobile node MAY try zeroing the 'T' bit, eliminating
the Reverse Tunnel Extension (if one was present), and issuing
a new registration.
- The home agent returns a registration denial. Depending on the
reply code and following the error checking guidelines in [1],
the mobile node MAY try zeroing the 'T' bit, eliminating the
Reverse Tunnel Extension (if one was present), and issuing a
new registration.
- The home agent returns a Registration Reply indicating that the
service will be provided.
In this last case, the mobile node has succeeded in establishing a
reverse tunnel between its care-of address and its home agent. If
the mobile node is operating with a co-located address, it SHOULD
encapsulate all outgoing data such that the destination address of
the outer header is the home agent. Not doing so does not
necessarily preclude data transmission, but it defeats the purpose
of the reverse tunnel.
If the care-of address belongs to a separate foreign agent, the
mobile node MUST employ whatever delivery style was requested
(lightweight or encapsulated) and proceed as specified in section
5.
4.2. Foreign Agent Considerations
A foreign agent that receives a Registration Request with the 'T'
bit set MAY either:
- Return a Registration Reply denying the request. Valid return
codes are 74 (requested reverse tunnel unavailable) or 70
(poorly formed request). Code 74 is preferred.
- Verify the packet according to [1] and then relay it to the
home agent.
Upon receipt of a Registration Reply that satisfies validity checks,
it MUST update its visitor list, including indication that this
mobile node has been granted a reverse tunnel and the delivery style
expected (section 5).
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While this visitor list entry is in effect, the foreign agent MUST
process incoming traffic according to the delivery style,
encapsulate it and tunnel it from the care-of address to the home
agent's address.
4.3. Home Agent Considerations
A home agent that receives a Registration Request with the 'T' bit
set processes the packet as specified in the Mobile IP specification
[1]. As a result, it determines if it can accomodate the forward
tunnel request. As a last check, the home agent verifies that it can
support a reverse tunnel with the same configuration.
If it can, the home agent sends back a Registration Reply with code
0 or 1. A registration denial should send back code 137 (requested
reverse tunnel unavailable) or 134 (poorly formed Request). Code
137 is preferred.
After a successful registration, the home agent will receive
encapsulated packets addressed to it. For each such packet it MAY
search for a mobility binding whose care-of address is the source of
the outer header, and whose mobile node address is the source of the
inner header.
The home agent MUST decapsulate, recover the original packet, and
then forward it on behalf of its sender (the mobile node) to the
destination address (the correspondent host).
5. Mobile Node to Foreign Agent Delivery Styles
5.1. Lightweight Delivery Style
This delivery mechanism is very simple to implement, and uses small
(non-encapsulated) packets on the link between the mobile node and
the foreign agent (potentially a very slow link). However, it only
supports reverse-tunneling of unicast packets.
It is achieved by the mobile node's designating the foreign agent as
its default router Not doing so will not guarantee encapsulation of
all the mobile node's outgoing traffic, and defeats the purpose of
the reverse tunnel. The foreign agent must modify its forwarding
function to detect packets sent by the mobile node, and
re-encapsulate before forwarding.
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Packet format received by the foreign agent (lightweight delivery):
Data Link fields:
Source Address = mobile node's MAC address
Destination Address = foreign agent's MAC address
IP fields:
Source Address = mobile node's home address
Destination Address = correspondent host's address
Upper Layer Protocol
Packet format forwarded by the foreign agent (lightweight delivery):
Data Link fields:
Source Address = foreign agent's MAC address
Destination Address = next hop router's MAC address
IP fields (encapsulating header):
Source Address = foreign agent's address
Destination Address = home agent's address
Protocol field: 4 (IP in IP)
IP fields (original header):
Source Address = mobile node's home address
Destination Address = correspondent host's address
Upper Layer Protocol
5.2. Encapsulating Delivery Style
This mechanism requires that the mobile node implement
encapsulation. The mobile node explicitly directs packets at the
foreign agent by designating it as the destination address in a new
outermost header. Mobile nodes that wish to send either broadcast
or multicast packets MUST use encapsulating delivery.
The foreign agent does not have to modify its forwarding function.
Rather, it receives the encapsulated packets and after verifying
that they were sent by the mobile node, recovers the inner packets,
re-encapsulates them and sends them to the home agent.
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Packet format received by the foreign agent (encapsulated delivery):
Data Link fields:
Source Address = mobile node's MAC address
Destination Address = foreign agent's MAC address
IP fields (encapsulating header):
Source Address = mobile node's address
Destination Address = foreign agent's address
Protocol field: 4 (IP in IP)
IP fields (original header):
Source Address = mobile node's home address
Destination Address = correspondent host's address
Upper Layer Protocol
Packet format forwarded by the foreign agent (encapsulated delivery):
Data Link fields:
Source Address = foreign agent's MAC address
Destination Address = next hop router's MAC address
IP fields (encapsulating header):
Source Address = foreign agent's address
Destination Address = home agent's address
Protocol field: 4 (IP in IP)
IP fields (original header):
Source Address = mobile node's home address
Destination Address = correspondent host's address
Upper Layer Protocol
5.3. Support for Broadcast and Multicast Datagrams
If a mobile node is operating with a co-located address, broadcast
and multicast datagrams are handled according to Sections 4.3 and
4.4 of the Mobile IP specification [1]. Light-weight mobile nodes
MAY have their broadcast and multicast datagrams reverse-tunneled by
the foreign agent. However, this requires the use of the the
encapulating delivery style.
This delivers the datagram only to the foreign agent. The latter
decapsulates it and then processes it as any other packet from the
mobile node, namely, by reverse tunneling it to the home agent.
6. Security Considerations
The extensions outlined in this document are subject to the security
considerations outlined in the Mobile IP specification [1].
Essentialy, creation of both forward and reverse tunnels involves an
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authentication procedure, which reduces the risk for attack.
However, once the tunnel is set up, a malicious user could hijack it
to inject packets into the network. Reverse tunnels might exacerbate
this problem, because upon reaching the tunnel exit point packets
are forwarded beyond the local network. This concern is also present
in the Mobile IP specification, as it already dictates the use of
reverse tunnels for certain applications.
There has been some concern regarding the long-term effectiveness of
reverse-tunneling in the presence of ingress filtering. The
conjecture is that network administrators will target
reverse-tunneled packets (IP in IP encapsulated packets) for
filtering. The ingress filtering recommendation spells out why this
is not the case [8]:
Tracking the source of an attack is simplified when the source is
more likely to be "valid."
7. Acknowledgements
The encapsulating style of delivery was proposed by Charlie Perkins.
References
[1] C. Perkins. IP Mobility Support. RFC 2002, October 1996.
[2] C. Perkins. IP Encapsulation within IP. RFC 2003, October
1996.
[3] Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), "IP Spoofing Attacks
and Hijacked Terminal Connections", CA-95:01, January 1995.
Available via anonymous ftp from info.cert.org in
/pub/cert_advisories.
[4] D. Johnson and C. Perkins. Route Optimization in Mobile IP --
work in progress, draft-ietf-mobileip-optim-05.txt, November
1996.
[5] Manuel Rodriguez, private communication, August 1995.
[6] R. Atkinson. IP Authentication Header. RFC 1826, August 1995.
[7] R. Atkinson. IP Encapsulating Security Payload. RFC 1827,
August 1995.
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[8] P. Ferguson and D. Senie. Network Ingress Filtering: Defending
Against IP Source Address Spoofing -- work in progress,
draft-ferguson-ingress-filtering-01.txt, February 1996
Author's Address
Gabriel E. Montenegro
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
2550 Garcia Avenue
Mailstop UMPK 15-214
Mountain View, California 94043-1100
Tel: (415)786-6288
Fax: (415)786-6445
gab@eng.sun.com
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