NETWORK WORKING GROUP N. Williams
Internet-Draft Sun
Expires: December 31, 2006 June 29, 2006
On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels
draft-ietf-nfsv4-channel-bindings-04.txt
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This document defines and formalizes the concept of channel bindings
to secure layers and defines the channel bindings for several types
of secure channels.
The concept of channel bindings allows applications to prove that the
end-points of two secure channels at different network layers are the
same by binding authentication at one channel to the session
protection at the other channel. The use of channel bindings allows
applications to delegate session protection to lower layers, which
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may significantly improve performance for some applications.
Table of Contents
1. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Authentication protocols and channel bindings . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. The GSS-API and channel bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. SASL and channel bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Channel bindings for various secure layers . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Bindings to SSHv2 channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Bindings to TLS channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Bindings to IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Bindings to other types of channels . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Benefits of channel bindings to secure channels . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Introduction
Over the years several attempts have been made to delegate session
protection at one network layer to another, for performance and/or
scalability as well as for design elegance and also to avoid having
to reinvent the wheel (that is, cryptographic session protection) for
every new application or security layer.
The critical security problem to solve in order to achieve such
delegation of session protection is always the same: how to ensure
that there is no man-in-the-middle (MITM), from the point of view the
application, at the lower network layer to which session protection
is to be delegated.
An alternative statement of the problem: how does one ensure that the
end-points of two secure channels at different network layers are the
same?
And there may well be a MITM, particularly if the lower network layer
either provides no authentication or if there is no connection
between the authentication or principals used at the application and
those used at the lower network layer.
Such MITM attacks can be effected by, for example, spoofing IP
address lookups (which is possible, for example, when using DNS but
not DNSSEC) in a way that the application may not detect but which
directs the client application or network stack to connect to a
different host than had been intended (e.g., to the MITM's host).
Even if such MITM attacks seem particularly difficult to effect, the
attacks must be prevented for certain applications to be able to make
effective use of technologies such as IPsec.
A solution to this problem is highly desirable, particularly where
multi-user applications are run over secure network layers (e.g., NFS
over IPsec). For such applications the authentication model used at
the application layer (usually user<->server) is generally very
different from that used by secure, lower network layers, such as
IPsec (usually client<->server or single-user<->server), and may even
use different authentication infrastructures altogether (e.g.,
Kerberos V for the application layer, x.509 certificates at the lower
layer). Such applications cannot, at present, generally leverage the
security provided by the lower network layers, which, if they could,
would allow them to offload session security to the secure lower
layer.
One solution involves ensuring the use of secure name services for
hostname to network address translation along with the use of secure
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networks (e.g., IPsec). This approach can prevent the MITM attack
described above, but does not offer applications any guarantees that
there is no MITM in the lower layer.
This document describes another solution: the use of "channel
bindings" (a GSS-API concept [RFC2743] [RFC2744]) to bind
authentication at application layers to secure transports at lower
layers in the network stack.
"Channel bindings" are data which securely identify a secure channel
such that, when verified to match on both endpoints of end-to-end
application connections, leave no doubt that the endpoints of two
secure channels (the one identified by the bindings and the one used
to exchange/verify the bindings) are the same.
Because many applications exist which provide for authentication at
the application layer, because many such applications use generic
authentication frameworks, such as the GSS-API and SASL and are
already deployed along with a common authentication infrastructure
(e.g., Kerberos V, PKI, etc...), because such applications exist
which multiplex multiple users onto a single session (and so cannot
leverage network [e.g., IKE] authentication), the use of channel
bindings is an elegant solution even where secure name services and
networks are deployed.
A formal definition of the channel bindings concept is given below,
as well as the specific formulation of channel bindings for various
protocols that provide for session security.
Specific instructions for the use of channel bindings with GSS-API
instructions is given elsewhere.
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3. Definitions
Definitions:
o Secure channel: a packet, datagram or octet stream connection
between two end-points that affords cryptographic integrity and,
optionally, confidentiality to data exchanged over it.
o Channel binding: ensuring that no man-in-the-middle exists between
two end-points authenticated at one network layer but using a
secure channel at a lower network layer.
o Channel bindings
Generally some data which names a channel or its end-points
such that if this data can be shown, at a higher network layer,
to be the same at both ends of a channel then there are no
MITMs between the two end-points at that higher network layer.
The security properties and channel bindings of the channel,
once established, MUST NOT change for the lifetime of the
channel.
More formally, there are two types of channel bindings:
+ bindings that name a channel in a cryptographically secure
manner (e.g., the session ID in SSHv2; see below);
+ bindings that name the authenticated end-points, or even a
single end-point, of a channel (e.g., as in IPsec; see
below) which are, in turn, securely bound to the channel.
Applications can exchange authenticated, integrity-protected
verifiers of channel bindings data to prove that the end-points
of some channel are the logically the same as the application
endpoints and thus, there can be no MITM at the lower layer.
o Channel bindings to network addresses
The GSS-API originally defined only channel bindings to network
addresses.
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The network addresses of a channel's end-points typically say
nothing about the protection afforded by that channel, and
where the channel can be said to be secure the network
addresses may not be securely bound to the channel anyways.
In practice channel bindings to network addresses have mostly
just caused trouble with Network Address Translation (NAT).
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4. Authentication protocols and channel bindings
Some authentication services provide for channel bindings, such as
the GSS-API and some GSS-API mechanisms, whereas others may not, such
as SASL (however, ongoing work may add channel binding support to
SASL).
Where suitable channel bindings facilities are not provided,
application protocol designers may include a separate, protected
(where the authentication service provides message protection
services) exchange of channel bindings material.
4.1. The GSS-API and channel bindings
The GSS-API provides for the use of channel bindings during
initialization of GSS-API security contexts, though GSS-API
mechanisms are not required to support this facility.
This channel bindings facility is described in detail in RFC2744.
GSS-API applications must agree a priori, through negotiation or
otherwise, on the use of channel bindings. This is because the GSS-
API does not have a way to indicate that a security context was
successfully established but that the channel bindings supplied could
not be verified to be the same for both peers.
Fortunately, it is possible to design GSS-API pseudo-mechanisms that
simply wrap around existing mechanisms for the purpose of allowing
applications to negotiate the use of channel bindings within their
existing methods for negotiating GSS-API mechanisms. For example,
NFSv4 [RFC3530] provides its own GSS-API mechanism negotiation, as
does the SSHv2 protocol [SECSH-GSSAPI]. Such pseudo-mechanisms are
being proposed separately. [NOTE: Indirect reference to CCM...]
However, it does not, at this time, seem feasible to use SPNEGO with
such pseudo-mechanisms for negotiating the use of channel bindings.
4.2. SASL and channel bindings
SASL [RFC2222] does not yet provide for the use of channel bindings
during initialization of SASL contexts.
Work is ongoing [I-D.ietf-sasl-gs2] to specify how SASL, particularly
it's new bridge to the GSS-API, performs channel binding. SASL will
likely differ from the GSS-API in its handling of channel binding
failure (i.e., when there may be a MITM) in that channel binding
success/failure only affects the negotiation of SASL security layers.
I.e., when channel binding succeeds SASL should select no security
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layers, leaving session cryptographic protection to the secure
channel that has been bound to.
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5. Channel bindings for various secure layers
Not every secure session protocol or interface provides for secure
channels, and not every secure session protocol provides data
suitable for use as channel bindings.
5.1. Bindings to SSHv2 channels
SSHv2 [RFC4251] provides both, a secure channel and material (the
SSHv2 "session ID") that is suitable for use as channel bindings.
Thus it is RECOMMENDED that the SSHv2 "session ID" be used as the
channel bindings for SSHv2.
5.2. Bindings to TLS channels
TLS provides both, a secure channel and material (the TLS "finished"
messages), that is suitable for use as channel bindings.
Alternatively the TLS PRF can be applied to a suitable constant octet
string to obtain value that is cryptographically bound to the given
TLS session.
The specification of channel bindings for TLS channels is still
ongoing.
Note that the TLS "session ID," in spite of being named similarly to
the SSHv2 session ID, is not suitable for use as channel bindings
because it is assigned by the server, so a MITM could assign the same
session ID on the client side as it gets from the server.
5.3. Bindings to IPsec
IPsec [RFC4301] does not provide for secure channels by itself, as it
protects individual packets. Further, the IPsec SAs used to protect
the packets for some channel (e.g., a TCP connection) over its
lifetime need not be related in any way that allows for construction
of channel bindings.
There is ongoing work to specify an IPsec secure channel construction
called "connection latching" [I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching].
Given connection latching the channel bindings for IPsec should
consist of the locally-observed ID types and values for the two end-
points of the IKE_SA that fathered the CHILD SA that triggered the
connection latch. A canonical encoding for these channel bindings
has not yet been agreed upon.
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5.4. Bindings to other types of channels
Channel bindings for other secure session protocols are not specified
here.
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6. Benefits of channel bindings to secure channels
The use of channel bindings to delegate session cryptographic
protection include:
o Performance improvements by avoiding double protection of
application data in cases where IPsec is in use and applications
provide their own secure channels.
o Performance improvements by leveraging hardware-accelerated IPsec.
o Performance improvements by allowing RDDP hardware offloading to
be integrated with IPsec hardware acceleration.
Where protocols layered above RDDP use privacy protection RDDP
offload cannot be done, thus by using channel bindings to IPsec
the privacy protection is moved to IPsec, which is layered
below RDDP, so RDDP can address application protocol data
that's in cleartext relative to the RDDP headers.
o Latency improvements for applications that multiplex multiple
users onto a single channel, such as NFS w/ RPCSEC_GSS.
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7. Security Considerations
When delegating session protection from one layer to another, one
will almost certainly be making some session security trade-offs,
such as using weaker cipher modes in one layer than might be used in
the other. Implementors and administrators SHOULD understand these
trade-offs.
Channel bindings cannot and MUST NOT be used without mutual
authentication (of client/user/initiator and server/user/acceptor).
Anonymous secure channels SHOULD NOT be used without authentication
and corresponding use of their channel bindings at higher network
layers.
The security of channel bindings depends on the security of the
channels, the construction of the bindings and the security of the
authentication and integrity protection used to exchange channel
bindings.
8. Normative
[I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching]
Williams, N., "IPsec Channels: Connection Latching",
draft-ietf-btns-connection-latching-00 (work in progress),
February 2006.
[I-D.ietf-sasl-gs2]
Josefsson, S., "Using GSS-API Mechanisms in SASL: The GS2
Mechanism Family", draft-ietf-sasl-gs2-00 (work in
progress), February 2006.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2222] Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000.
[RFC3530] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R.,
Beame, C., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System
(NFS) version 4 Protocol", RFC 3530, April 2003.
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[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Mike Eisler for his work on the
Channel Conjunction Mechanism I-D and for bringing the problem to a
head, Sam Hartman for pointing out that channel bindings provide a
general solution to the channel binding problem, Jeff Altman for his
suggestion of using the TLS finished messages as the TLS channel
bindings, Bill Sommerfeld, for his help in developing channel
bindings for IPsec, and Radia Perlman for her most helpful comments,
Simon Josefsson for his work on the new SASL GSS-API bridge and his
suggestion that the TLS PRF be used to generate channel bindings to
TLS, and to many others.
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Author's Address
Nicolas Williams
Sun Microsystems
5300 Riata Trace Ct
Austin, TX 78727
US
Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
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