NFSv4 S. Shepler
Internet-Draft M. Eisler
Intended status: Standards Track D. Noveck
Expires: December 13, 2007 Editors
June 11, 2007
NFSv4 Minor Version 1
draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion1-11.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
This Internet-Draft describes NFSv4 minor version one, including
features retained from the base protocol and protocol extensions made
subsequently. The current draft includes description of the major
extensions, Sessions, Directory Delegations, and parallel NFS (pNFS).
This Internet-Draft is an active work item of the NFSv4 working
group. Active and resolved issues may be found in the issue tracker
at: http://www.nfsv4-editor.org/cgi-bin/roundup/nfsv4. New issues
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related to this document should be raised with the NFSv4 Working
Group nfsv4@ietf.org and logged in the issue tracker.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.1. The NFSv4.1 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2. NFS Version 4 Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3. Minor Version 1 Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4. Overview of NFS version 4.1 Features . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.1. RPC and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.2. Protocol Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.3. File System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.4. Locking Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5. General Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.6. Differences from NFSv4.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2. Core Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2. RPC and XDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1. RPC-based Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3. COMPOUND and CB_COMPOUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4. Client Identifiers and Client Owners . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.1. Server Release of Client ID . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.2. Resolving Client Owner Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5. Server Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6. Security Service Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6.1. NFSv4.1 Security Tuples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6.2. SECINFO and SECINFO_NO_NAME . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6.3. Security Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7. Minor Versioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.8. Non-RPC-based Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.8.1. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.8.2. Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.8.3. Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.9. Transport Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.9.1. Required and Recommended Properties of Transports . 35
2.9.2. Client and Server Transport Behavior . . . . . . . . 36
2.9.3. Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.10. Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.10.1. Motivation and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.10.2. NFSv4 Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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2.10.3. Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.10.4. Trunking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.10.5. Exactly Once Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.10.6. RDMA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.10.7. Sessions Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.10.8. Session Mechanics - Steady State . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.10.9. Session Mechanics - Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.10.10. Parallel NFS and Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3. Protocol Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1. Basic Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2. Structured Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4. Filehandles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.1. Obtaining the First Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.1.1. Root Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.1.2. Public Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2. Filehandle Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.1. General Properties of a Filehandle . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.2. Persistent Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.3. Volatile Filehandle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3. One Method of Constructing a Volatile Filehandle . . . . 87
4.4. Client Recovery from Filehandle Expiration . . . . . . . 88
5. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1. Mandatory Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2. Recommended Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3. Named Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.4. Classification of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.5. Mandatory Attributes - Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.6. Recommended Attributes - Definitions . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.7. Time Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.8. Interpreting owner and owner_group . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.9. Character Case Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.10. Quota Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.11. mounted_on_fileid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.12. Directory Notification Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.12.1. dir_notif_delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.12.2. dirent_notif_delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.13. PNFS Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.13.1. fs_layout_type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.13.2. layout_alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.13.3. layout_blksize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.13.4. layout_hint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.13.5. layout_type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.13.6. mdsthreshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.14. Retention Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6. Security Related Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.1. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.2. File Attributes Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.2.1. ACL Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
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6.2.2. dacl and sacl Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.2.3. mode Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.2.4. mode_set_masked Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3. Common Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.3.1. Interpreting an ACL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.3.2. Computing a Mode Attribute from an ACL . . . . . . . 129
6.4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.4.1. Setting the mode and/or ACL Attributes . . . . . . . 131
6.4.2. Retrieving the mode and/or ACL Attributes . . . . . 132
6.4.3. Creating New Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7. Single-server Name Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.1. Server Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.2. Browsing Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.3. Server Pseudo File System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.4. Multiple Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.5. Filehandle Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.6. Exported Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.7. Mount Point Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.8. Security Policy and Name Space Presentation . . . . . . 140
8. File Locking and Share Reservations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.1. Locking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.1.1. Client and Session ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.1.2. State-owner Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.1.3. Stateid Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.1.4. Use of the Stateid and Locking . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.2. Lock Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.3. Upgrading and Downgrading Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.4. Blocking Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.5. Lease Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.6. Crash Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.6.1. Client Failure and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.6.2. Server Failure and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.6.3. Network Partitions and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.7. Server Revocation of Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
8.8. Share Reservations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
8.9. OPEN/CLOSE Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.10. Open Upgrade and Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.11. Short and Long Leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
8.12. Clocks, Propagation Delay, and Calculating Lease
Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
8.13. Vestigial Locking Infrastructure From V4.0 . . . . . . . 163
9. Client-Side Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
9.1. Performance Challenges for Client-Side Caching . . . . . 164
9.2. Delegation and Callbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9.2.1. Delegation Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
9.3. Data Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
9.3.1. Data Caching and OPENs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
9.3.2. Data Caching and File Locking . . . . . . . . . . . 170
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9.3.3. Data Caching and Mandatory File Locking . . . . . . 172
9.3.4. Data Caching and File Identity . . . . . . . . . . . 172
9.4. Open Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
9.4.1. Open Delegation and Data Caching . . . . . . . . . . 175
9.4.2. Open Delegation and File Locks . . . . . . . . . . . 177
9.4.3. Handling of CB_GETATTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
9.4.4. Recall of Open Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
9.4.5. Clients that Fail to Honor Delegation Recalls . . . 182
9.4.6. Delegation Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
9.5. Data Caching and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
9.5.1. Revocation Recovery for Write Open Delegation . . . 184
9.6. Attribute Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
9.7. Data and Metadata Caching and Memory Mapped Files . . . 187
9.8. Name Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
9.9. Directory Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
10. Multi-Server Name Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
10.1. Location attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
10.2. File System Presence or Absence . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
10.3. Getting Attributes for an Absent File System . . . . . . 193
10.3.1. GETATTR Within an Absent File System . . . . . . . . 193
10.3.2. READDIR and Absent File Systems . . . . . . . . . . 194
10.4. Uses of Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
10.4.1. File System Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
10.4.2. File System Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
10.4.3. Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
10.5. Additional Client-side Considerations . . . . . . . . . 199
10.6. Effecting File System Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . 200
10.6.1. File System Transitions and Simultaneous Access . . 201
10.6.2. Simultaneous Use and Transparent Transitions . . . . 202
10.6.3. Filehandles and File System Transitions . . . . . . 204
10.6.4. Fileid's and File System Transitions . . . . . . . . 204
10.6.5. Fsids and File System Transitions . . . . . . . . . 205
10.6.6. The Change Attribute and File System Transitions . . 205
10.6.7. Lock State and File System Transitions . . . . . . . 206
10.6.8. Write Verifiers and File System Transitions . . . . 210
10.7. Effecting File System Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
10.7.1. Referral Example (LOOKUP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
10.7.2. Referral Example (READDIR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
10.8. The Attribute fs_absent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
10.9. The Attribute fs_locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
10.10. The Attribute fs_locations_info . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
10.10.1. The fs_locations_server4 Structure . . . . . . . . . 221
10.10.2. The fs_locations_info4 Structure . . . . . . . . . . 226
10.10.3. The fs_locations_item4 Structure . . . . . . . . . . 227
10.11. The Attribute fs_status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
11. Directory Delegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
11.1. Introduction to Directory Delegations . . . . . . . . . 232
11.2. Directory Delegation Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
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11.3. Attributes in Support of Directory Notifications . . . . 234
11.4. Delegation Recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
11.5. Directory Delegation Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
12. Parallel NFS (pNFS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
12.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
12.2. PNFS Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
12.2.1. Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
12.2.2. Metadata Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
12.2.3. Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
12.2.4. Storage Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
12.2.5. Data Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
12.2.6. Storage Protocol or Data Protocol . . . . . . . . . 237
12.2.7. Control Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
12.2.8. Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
12.2.9. Layout Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
12.2.10. Layout Iomode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
12.2.11. Layout Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
12.2.12. Device IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
12.3. PNFS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
12.4. PNFS Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
12.5. Layout Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
12.5.1. Guarantees Provided by Layouts . . . . . . . . . . . 241
12.5.2. Getting a Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
12.5.3. Committing a Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
12.5.4. Recalling a Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
12.5.5. Metadata Server Write Propagation . . . . . . . . . 252
12.6. PNFS Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
12.7. Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
12.7.1. Client Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
12.7.2. Dealing with Lease Expiration on the Client . . . . 254
12.7.3. Dealing with Loss of Layout State on the Metadata
Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
12.7.4. Recovery from Metadata Server Restart . . . . . . . 256
12.7.5. Operations During Metadata Server Grace Period . . . 258
12.7.6. Storage Device Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
12.8. Metadata and Storage Device Roles . . . . . . . . . . . 259
12.9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
13. PNFS: NFSv4.1 File Layout Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
13.1. Session Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
13.2. File Layout Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
13.3. File Layout Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
13.4. Interpreting the File Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
13.5. Sparse and Dense Stripe Unit Packing . . . . . . . . . . 269
13.6. Data Server Multipathing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
13.7. Operations Issued to NFSv4.1 Data Servers . . . . . . . 271
13.8. COMMIT Through Metadata Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
13.9. Global Stateid Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
13.10. The Layout Iomode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
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13.11. Data Server State Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
13.11.1. Lock State Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
13.11.2. Open-mode Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
13.11.3. File Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
13.12. Data Server Component File Size . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
13.13. Recovery Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
13.14. Security Considerations for the File Layout Type . . . . 277
14. Internationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
14.1. Stringprep profile for the utf8str_cs type . . . . . . . 278
14.2. Stringprep profile for the utf8str_cis type . . . . . . 280
14.3. Stringprep profile for the utf8str_mixed type . . . . . 281
14.4. UTF-8 Related Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
15. Error Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
15.1. Error Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
15.2. Operations and their valid errors . . . . . . . . . . . 298
15.3. Callback operations and their valid errors . . . . . . . 312
15.4. Errors and the operations that use them . . . . . . . . 313
16. NFS version 4.1 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
16.1. Procedure 0: NULL - No Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
16.2. Procedure 1: COMPOUND - Compound Operations . . . . . . 321
17. NFS version 4.1 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
17.1. Operation 3: ACCESS - Check Access Rights . . . . . . . 326
17.2. Operation 4: CLOSE - Close File . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
17.3. Operation 5: COMMIT - Commit Cached Data . . . . . . . . 330
17.4. Operation 6: CREATE - Create a Non-Regular File Object . 332
17.5. Operation 7: DELEGPURGE - Purge Delegations Awaiting
Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
17.6. Operation 8: DELEGRETURN - Return Delegation . . . . . . 336
17.7. Operation 9: GETATTR - Get Attributes . . . . . . . . . 336
17.8. Operation 10: GETFH - Get Current Filehandle . . . . . . 338
17.9. Operation 11: LINK - Create Link to a File . . . . . . . 339
17.10. Operation 12: LOCK - Create Lock . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
17.11. Operation 13: LOCKT - Test For Lock . . . . . . . . . . 344
17.12. Operation 14: LOCKU - Unlock File . . . . . . . . . . . 345
17.13. Operation 15: LOOKUP - Lookup Filename . . . . . . . . . 347
17.14. Operation 16: LOOKUPP - Lookup Parent Directory . . . . 349
17.15. Operation 17: NVERIFY - Verify Difference in
Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
17.16. Operation 18: OPEN - Open a Regular File . . . . . . . . 351
17.17. Operation 19: OPENATTR - Open Named Attribute
Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
17.18. Operation 21: OPEN_DOWNGRADE - Reduce Open File Access . 367
17.19. Operation 22: PUTFH - Set Current Filehandle . . . . . . 368
17.20. Operation 23: PUTPUBFH - Set Public Filehandle . . . . . 369
17.21. Operation 24: PUTROOTFH - Set Root Filehandle . . . . . 371
17.22. Operation 25: READ - Read from File . . . . . . . . . . 372
17.23. Operation 26: READDIR - Read Directory . . . . . . . . . 374
17.24. Operation 27: READLINK - Read Symbolic Link . . . . . . 378
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17.25. Operation 28: REMOVE - Remove File System Object . . . . 379
17.26. Operation 29: RENAME - Rename Directory Entry . . . . . 381
17.27. Operation 31: RESTOREFH - Restore Saved Filehandle . . . 383
17.28. Operation 32: SAVEFH - Save Current Filehandle . . . . . 384
17.29. Operation 33: SECINFO - Obtain Available Security . . . 384
17.30. Operation 34: SETATTR - Set Attributes . . . . . . . . . 388
17.31. Operation 37: VERIFY - Verify Same Attributes . . . . . 390
17.32. Operation 38: WRITE - Write to File . . . . . . . . . . 391
17.33. Operation 40: BACKCHANNEL_CTL - Backchannel control . . 396
17.34. Operation 41: BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION . . . . . . . . . . . 397
17.35. Operation 42: EXCHANGE_ID - Instantiate Client ID . . . 399
17.36. Operation 43: CREATE_SESSION - Create New Session and
Confirm Client ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
17.37. Operation 44: DESTROY_SESSION - Destroy existing
session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
17.38. Operation 45: FREE_STATEID - Free stateid with no
locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
17.39. Operation 46: GET_DIR_DELEGATION - Get a directory
delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
17.40. Operation 47: GETDEVICEINFO - Get Device Information . . 433
17.41. Operation 48: GETDEVICELIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
17.42. Operation 49: LAYOUTCOMMIT - Commit writes made using
a layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
17.43. Operation 50: LAYOUTGET - Get Layout Information . . . . 438
17.44. Operation 51: LAYOUTRETURN - Release Layout
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
17.45. Operation 52: SECINFO_NO_NAME - Get Security on
Unnamed Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
17.46. Operation 53: SEQUENCE - Supply per-procedure
sequencing and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
17.47. Operation 54: SET_SSV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
17.48. Operation 55: TEST_STATEID - Test stateids for
validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
17.49. Operation 56: WANT_DELEGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
17.50. Operation 57: DESTROY_CLIENTID - Destroy existing
client ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
17.51. Operation 58: RECLAIM_COMPLETE - Indicates Reclaims
Finished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
17.52. Operation 10044: ILLEGAL - Illegal operation . . . . . . 460
18. NFS version 4.1 Callback Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
18.1. Procedure 0: CB_NULL - No Operation . . . . . . . . . . 461
18.2. Procedure 1: CB_COMPOUND - Compound Operations . . . . . 461
19. NFS version 4.1 Callback Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
19.1. Operation 3: CB_GETATTR - Get Attributes . . . . . . . . 463
19.2. Operation 4: CB_RECALL - Recall an Open Delegation . . . 465
19.3. Operation 5: CB_LAYOUTRECALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
19.4. Operation 6: CB_NOTIFY - Notify directory changes . . . 468
19.5. Operation 7: CB_PUSH_DELEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
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19.6. Operation 8: CB_RECALL_ANY - Keep any N delegations . . 472
19.7. Operation 9: CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL . . . . . . . . . . 475
19.8. Operation 10: CB_RECALL_SLOT - change flow control
limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
19.9. Operation 11: CB_SEQUENCE - Supply backchannel
sequencing and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
19.10. Operation 12: CB_WANTS_CANCELLED . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
19.11. Operation 13: CB_NOTIFY_LOCK - Notify of possible
lock availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
19.12. Operation 10044: CB_ILLEGAL - Illegal Callback
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
20. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
21. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
21.1. Defining new layout types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
22. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
22.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
22.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . 489
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1. Introduction
1.1. The NFSv4.1 Protocol
The NFSv4.1 protocol is a minor version of the NFSv4 protocol
described in [2]. It generally follows the guidelines for minor
versioning model laid in Section 10 of RFC 3530. However, it
diverges from guidelines 11 ("a client and server that supports minor
version X must support minor versions 0 through X-1"), and 12 ("no
features may be introduced as mandatory in a minor version"). These
divergences are due to the introduction of the sessions model for
managing non-idempotent operations and the RECLAIM_COMPLETE
operation. These two new features are infrastructural in nature and
simplify implementation of existing and other new features. Making
them optional would add undue complexity to protocol definition and
implementation. NFSv4.1 accordingly updates the Minor Versioning
guidelines (Section 2.7).
NFSv4.1, as a minor version, is consistent with the overall goals for
NFS Version 4, but extends the protocol so as to better meet those
goals, based on experiences with NFSv4.0. In addition, NFSv4.1 has
adopted some additional goals, which motivate some of the major
extensions in minor version 1.
1.2. NFS Version 4 Goals
The NFS version 4 protocol is a further revision of the NFS protocol
defined already by versions 2 [21] and 3 [22]. It retains the
essential characteristics of previous versions: design for easy
recovery, independent of transport protocols, operating systems and
file systems, simplicity, and good performance. The NFS version 4
revision has the following goals:
o Improved access and good performance on the Internet.
The protocol is designed to transit firewalls easily, perform well
where latency is high and bandwidth is low, and scale to very
large numbers of clients per server.
o Strong security with negotiation built into the protocol.
The protocol builds on the work of the ONCRPC working group in
supporting the RPCSEC_GSS protocol. Additionally, the NFS version
4 protocol provides a mechanism to allow clients and servers the
ability to negotiate security and require clients and servers to
support a minimal set of security schemes.
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o Good cross-platform interoperability.
The protocol features a file system model that provides a useful,
common set of features that does not unduly favor one file system
or operating system over another.
o Designed for protocol extensions.
The protocol is designed to accept standard extensions within a
framework that enable and encourages backward compatibility.
1.3. Minor Version 1 Goals
Minor version one has the following goals, within the framework
established by the overall version 4 goals.
o To correct significant structural weaknesses and oversights
discovered in the base protocol.
o To add clarity and specificity to areas left unaddressed or not
addressed in sufficient detail in the base protocol.
o To add specific features based on experience with the existing
protocol and recent industry developments.
o To provide protocol support to take advantage of clustered server
deployments including the ability to provide scalable parallel
access to files distributed among multiple servers.
1.4. Overview of NFS version 4.1 Features
To provide a reasonable context for the reader, the major features of
NFS version 4.1 protocol will be reviewed in brief. This will be
done to provide an appropriate context for both the reader who is
familiar with the previous versions of the NFS protocol and the
reader that is new to the NFS protocols. For the reader new to the
NFS protocols, there is still a set of fundamental knowledge that is
expected. The reader should be familiar with the XDR and RPC
protocols as described in [3] and [4]. A basic knowledge of file
systems and distributed file systems is expected as well.
This description of version 4.1 features will not distinguish those
added in minor version one from those present in the base protocol
but will treat minor version 1 as a unified whole. See Section 1.6
for a description of the differences between the two minor versions.
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1.4.1. RPC and Security
As with previous versions of NFS, the External Data Representation
(XDR) and Remote Procedure Call (RPC) mechanisms used for the NFS
version 4.1 protocol are those defined in [3] and [4]. To meet end-
to-end security requirements, the RPCSEC_GSS framework [5] will be
used to extend the basic RPC security. With the use of RPCSEC_GSS,
various mechanisms can be provided to offer authentication,
integrity, and privacy to the NFS version 4 protocol. Kerberos V5
will be used as described in [6] to provide one security framework.
The LIPKEY and SPKM-3 GSS-API mechanisms described in [7] will be
used to provide for the use of user password and client/server public
key certificates by the NFS version 4 protocol. With the use of
RPCSEC_GSS, other mechanisms may also be specified and used for NFS
version 4.1 security.
To enable in-band security negotiation, the NFS version 4.1 protocol
has operations which provide the client a method of querying the
server about its policies regarding which security mechanisms must be
used for access to the server's file system resources. With this,
the client can securely match the security mechanism that meets the
policies specified at both the client and server.
1.4.2. Protocol Structure
1.4.2.1. Core Protocol
Unlike NFS Versions 2 and 3, which used a series of ancillary
protocols (e.g. NLM, NSM, MOUNT), within all minor versions of NFS
version 4 only a single RPC protocol is used to make requests of the
server. Facilities that had been separate protocols, such as
locking, are now integrated within a single unified protocol.
1.4.2.2. Parallel Access
Minor version one supports high-performance data access to a
clustered server implementation by enabling a separation of metadata
access and data access, with the latter done to multiple servers in
parallel.
Such parallel data access is controlled by recallable objects known
as "layouts", which are integrated into the protocol locking model.
Clients direct requests for data access to a set of data servers
specified by the layout via a data storage protocol which may be
NFSv4.1 or may be another protocol.
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1.4.3. File System Model
The general file system model used for the NFS version 4.1 protocol
is the same as previous versions. The server file system is
hierarchical with the regular files contained within being treated as
opaque octet streams. In a slight departure, file and directory
names are encoded with UTF-8 to deal with the basics of
internationalization.
The NFS version 4.1 protocol does not require a separate protocol to
provide for the initial mapping between path name and filehandle.
All file systems exported by a server are presented as a tree so that
all file systems are reachable from a special per-server global root
filehandle. This allows LOOKUP operations to be used to perform
functions previously provided by the MOUNT protocol. The server
provides any necessary pseudo file systems to bridge any gaps that
arise due to unexported gaps between exported file systems.
1.4.3.1. Filehandles
As in previous versions of the NFS protocol, opaque filehandles are
used to identify individual files and directories. Lookup-type and
create operations are used to go from file and directory names to the
filehandle which is then used to identify the object to subsequent
operations.
The NFS version 4.1 protocol provides support for persistent
filehandles, guaranteed to be valid for the lifetime of the file
system object designated. In addition it provides support to servers
to provide filehandles with more limited validity guarantees, called
volatile filehandles.
1.4.3.2. File Attributes
The NFS version 4.1 protocol has a rich and extensible attribute
structure. Only a small set of the defined attributes are mandatory
and must be provided by all server implementations. The other
attributes are known as "recommended" attributes.
The acl, sacl, and dacl attributes are a significant set of file
attributes that make up the Access Control List (ACL) of a file.
These attributes provide for directory and file access control beyond
the model used in NFS Versions 2 and 3. The ACL definition allows
for specification of specific sets of permissions for individual
users and groups. In addition, ACL inheritance allows propagation of
access permissions and restriction down a directory tree as file
system objects are created.
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One other type of attribute is the named attribute. A named
attribute is an opaque octet stream that is associated with a
directory or file and referred to by a string name. Named attributes
are meant to be used by client applications as a method to associate
application-specific data with a regular file or directory.
1.4.3.3. Multi-server Namespace
NFS Version 4.1 contains a number of features to allow implementation
of namespaces that cross server boundaries and that allow and
facilitate a non-disruptive transfer of support for individual file
systems between servers. They are all based upon attributes that
allow one file system to specify alternate or new locations for that
file system.
These attributes may be used together with the concept of absent file
system which provide specifications for additional locations but no
actual file system content. This allows a number of important
facilities:
o Location attributes may be used with absent file systems to
implement referrals whereby one server may direct the client to a
file system provided by another server. This allows extensive
multi-server namespaces to be constructed.
o Location attributes may be provided for present file systems to
provide the locations of alternate file system instances or
replicas to be used in the event that the current file system
instance becomes unavailable.
o Location attributes may be provided when a previously present file
system becomes absent. This allows non-disruptive migration of
file systems to alternate servers.
1.4.4. Locking Facilities
As mentioned previously, NFS v4.1, is a single protocol which
includes locking facilities. These locking facilities include
support for many types of locks including a number of sorts of
recallable locks. Recallable locks such as delegations allow the
client to be assured that certain events will not occur so long as
that lock is held. When circumstances change, the lock is recalled
via a callback request. The assurances provided by delegations allow
more extensive caching to be done safely when circumstances allow it.
o Share reservations as established by OPEN operations.
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o Byte-range locks.
o File delegations which are recallable locks that assure the holder
that inconsistent opens and file changes cannot occur so long as
the delegation is held.
o Directory delegations which are recallable delegations that assure
the holder that inconsistent directory modifications cannot occur
so long as the delegation is held.
o Layouts which are recallable objects that assure the holder that
direct access to the file data may be performed directly by the
client and that no change to the data's location inconsistent with
that access may be made so long as the layout is held.
All locks for a given client are tied together under a single client-
wide lease. All requests made on sessions associated with the client
renew that lease. When leases are not promptly renewed lock are
subject to revocation. In the event of server reinitialization,
clients have the opportunity to safely reclaim their locks within a
special grace period.
1.5. General Definitions
The following definitions are provided for the purpose of providing
an appropriate context for the reader.
Client The "client" is the entity that accesses the NFS server's
resources. The client may be an application which contains the
logic to access the NFS server directly. The client may also be
the traditional operating system client remote file system
services for a set of applications.
A client is uniquely identified by a Client Owner.
In the case of file locking the client is the entity that
maintains a set of locks on behalf of one or more applications.
This client is responsible for crash or failure recovery for those
locks it manages.
Note that multiple clients may share the same transport and
connection and multiple clients may exist on the same network
node.
Client ID A 64-bit quantity used as a unique, short-hand reference
to a client supplied Verifier and client owner. The server is
responsible for supplying the client ID.
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Client Owner The client owner is a unique string, opaque to the
server, which identifies a client. Multiple network connections
and source network addresses originating those connections may
share a client owner. The server is expected to treat requests
from connnections with the same client owner has coming from the
same client.
Lease An interval of time defined by the server for which the client
is irrevocably granted a lock. At the end of a lease period the
lock may be revoked if the lease has not been extended. The lock
must be revoked if a conflicting lock has been granted after the
lease interval.
All leases granted by a server have the same fixed interval. Note
that the fixed interval was chosen to alleviate the expense a
server would have in maintaining state about variable length
leases across server failures.
Lock The term "lock" is used to refer to any of record (octet-range)
locks, share reservations, delegations or layouts unless
specifically stated otherwise.
Server The "Server" is the entity responsible for coordinating
client access to a set of file systems. A server can span
multiple network addresses. In NFSv4.1, a server is a two tiered
entity allows for servers consisting of multiple components the
flexibility to tightly or loosely couple their components without
requiring tight synchronization among the components. Every
server has a "Server Owner" which reflects the two tiers of a
server entity.
Server Owner The "Server Owner" identifies the server to the client.
The server owner consists of a major and minor identifier. When
the client has two connections each to a peer with the same major
and minor identifier, the client assumes both peers are the same
server (the server namespace is the same via each connection), and
further assumes session and lock state is sharable across both
connections. When each peer has the same major identifier but
different minor identifier, the client assumes both peers can
serve the same namespace, but session and lock state is not
sharable across both connections.
Stable Storage NFS version 4 servers must be able to recover without
data loss from multiple power failures (including cascading power
failures, that is, several power failures in quick succession),
operating system failures, and hardware failure of components
other than the storage medium itself (for example, disk,
nonvolatile RAM).
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Some examples of stable storage that are allowable for an NFS
server include:
1. Media commit of data, that is, the modified data has been
successfully written to the disk media, for example, the disk
platter.
2. An immediate reply disk drive with battery-backed on- drive
intermediate storage or uninterruptible power system (UPS).
3. Server commit of data with battery-backed intermediate storage
and recovery software.
4. Cache commit with uninterruptible power system (UPS) and
recovery software.
Stateid A 128-bit quantity returned by a server that uniquely
defines the open and locking state provided by the server for a
specific open or lock owner for a specific file and type of lock.
Verifier A 64-bit quantity generated by the client that the server
can use to determine if the client has restarted and lost all
previous lock state.
1.6. Differences from NFSv4.0
The following summarizes the differences between minor version one
and the base protocol:
o Implementation of the sessions model.
o Support for parallel access to data.
o Addition of the RECLAIM_COMPLETE operation to better structure the
lock reclamation process.
o Support for delegations on directories and other file types in
addition to regular files.
o Operations to re-obtain a delegation.
o Support for client and server implementation id's.
2. Core Infrastructure
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2.1. Introduction
NFS version 4.1 (NFSv4.1) relies on core infrastructure common to
nearly every operation. This core infrastructure is described in the
remainder of this section.
2.2. RPC and XDR
The NFS version 4.1 (NFSv4.1) protocol is a Remote Procedure Call
(RPC) application that uses RPC version 2 and the corresponding
eXternal Data Representation (XDR) as defined in [4] and [3].
2.2.1. RPC-based Security
Previous NFS versions have been thought of as having a host-based
authentication model, where the NFS server authenticates the NFS
client, and trust the client to authenticate all users. Actually,
NFS has always depended on RPC for authentication. The first form of
RPC authentication which required a host-based authentication
approach. NFSv4.1 also depends on RPC for basic security services,
and mandates RPC support for a user-based authentication model. The
user-based authentication model has user principals authenticated by
a server, and in turn the server authenticated by user principals.
RPC provides some basic security services which are used by NFSv4.
2.2.1.1. RPC Security Flavors
As described in section 7.2 "Authentication" of [4], RPC security is
encapsulated in the RPC header, via a security or authentication
flavor, and information specific to the specification of the security
flavor. Every RPC header conveys information used to identify and
authenticate a client and server. As discussed in Section 2.2.1.1.1,
some security flavors provide additional security services.
NFSv4.1 clients and servers MUST implement RPCSEC_GSS. (This
requirement to implement is not a requirement to use.) Other
flavors, such as AUTH_NONE, and AUTH_SYS, MAY be implemented as well.
2.2.1.1.1. RPCSEC_GSS and Security Services
RPCSEC_GSS ([5]) uses the functionality of GSS-API [8]. This allows
for the use of various security mechanisms by the RPC layer without
the additional implementation overhead of adding RPC security
flavors.
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2.2.1.1.1.1. Identification, Authentication, Integrity, Privacy
Via the GSS-API, RPCSEC_GSS can be used to identify and authenticate
users on clients to servers, and servers to users. It can also
perform integrity checking on the entire RPC message, including the
RPC header, and the arguments or results. Finally, privacy, usually
via encryption, is a service available with RPCSEC_GSS. Privacy is
performed on the arguments and results. Note that if privacy is
selected, integrity, authentication, and identification are enabled.
If privacy is not selected, but integrity is selected, authentication
and identification are enabled. If integrity and privacy are not
selected, but authentication is enabled, identification is enabled.
RPCSEC_GSS does not provide identification as a separate service.
Although GSS-API has an authentication service distinct from its
privacy and integrity services, GSS-API's authentication service is
not used for RPCSEC_GSS's authentication service. Instead, each RPC
request and response header is integrity protected with the GSS-API
integrity service, and this allows RPCSEC_GSS to offer per-RPC
authentication and identity. See [5] for more information.
NFSv4.1 client and servers MUST support RPCSEC_GSS's integrity and
authentication service. NFSv4.1 servers MUST support RPCSEC_GSS's
privacy service.
2.2.1.1.1.2. Security mechanisms for NFS version 4
RPCSEC_GSS, via GSS-API, normalizes access to mechanisms that provide
security services. Therefore NFSv4.1 clients and servers MUST
support three security mechanisms: Kerberos V5, SPKM-3, and LIPKEY.
The use of RPCSEC_GSS requires selection of: mechanism, quality of
protection (QOP), and service (authentication, integrity, privacy).
For the mandated security mechanisms, NFSv4.1 specifies that a QOP of
zero (0) is used, leaving it up to the mechanism or the mechanism's
configuration to use an appropriate level of protection that QOP zero
maps to. Each mandated mechanism specifies minimum set of
cryptographic algorithms for implementing integrity and privacy.
NFSv4.1 clients and servers MUST be implemented on operating
environments that comply with the mandatory cryptographic algorithms
of each mandated mechanism.
2.2.1.1.1.2.1. Kerberos V5
The Kerberos V5 GSS-API mechanism as described in [6] ( [[Comment.1:
need new Kerberos RFC]] ) MUST be implemented with the RPCSEC_GSS
services as specified in the following table:
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column descriptions:
1 == number of pseudo flavor
2 == name of pseudo flavor
3 == mechanism's OID
4 == RPCSEC_GSS service
5 == NFSv4.1 clients MUST support
6 == NFSv4.1 servers MUST support
1 2 3 4 5 6
------------------------------------------------------------------
390003 krb5 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 rpc_gss_svc_none yes yes
390004 krb5i 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 rpc_gss_svc_integrity yes yes
390005 krb5p 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 rpc_gss_svc_privacy no yes
Note that the number and name of the pseudo flavor is presented here
as a mapping aid to the implementor. Because the NFSv4.1 protocol
includes a method to negotiate security and it understands the GSS-
API mechanism, the pseudo flavor is not needed. The pseudo flavor is
needed for the NFS version 3 since the security negotiation is done
via the MOUNT protocol as described in [23].
2.2.1.1.1.2.2. LIPKEY
The LIPKEY V5 GSS-API mechanism as described in [7] MUST be
implemented with the RPCSEC_GSS services as specified in the
following table:
1 2 3 4 5 6
------------------------------------------------------------------
390006 lipkey 1.3.6.1.5.5.9 rpc_gss_svc_none yes yes
390007 lipkey-i 1.3.6.1.5.5.9 rpc_gss_svc_integrity yes yes
390008 lipkey-p 1.3.6.1.5.5.9 rpc_gss_svc_privacy no yes
2.2.1.1.1.2.3. SPKM-3 as a security triple
The SPKM-3 GSS-API mechanism as described in [7] MUST be implemented
with the RPCSEC_GSS services as specified in the following table:
1 2 3 4 5 6
------------------------------------------------------------------
390009 spkm3 1.3.6.1.5.5.1.3 rpc_gss_svc_none yes yes
390010 spkm3i 1.3.6.1.5.5.1.3 rpc_gss_svc_integrity yes yes
390011 spkm3p 1.3.6.1.5.5.1.3 rpc_gss_svc_privacy no yes
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2.2.1.1.1.3. GSS Server Principal
Regardless of what security mechanism under RPCSEC_GSS is being used,
the NFS server, MUST identify itself in GSS-API via a
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE name type. GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
names are of the form:
service@hostname
For NFS, the "service" element is
nfs
Implementations of security mechanisms will convert nfs@hostname to
various different forms. For Kerberos V5, LIPKEY, and SPKM-3, the
following form is RECOMMENDED:
nfs/hostname
2.3. COMPOUND and CB_COMPOUND
A significant departure from the versions of the NFS protocol before
version 4 is the introduction of the COMPOUND procedure. For the
NFSv4 protocol, in all minor versions, there are exactly two RPC
procedures, NULL and COMPOUND. The COMPOUND procedure is defined as
a series of individual operations and these operations perform the
sorts of functions performed by traditional NFS procedures.
The operations combined within a COMPOUND request are evaluated in
order by the server, without any atomicity guarantees. A limited set
of facilities exist to pass results from one operation to another.
Once an operation returns a failing result, the evaluation ends and
the results of all evaluated operations are returned to the client.
With the use of the COMPOUND procedure, the client is able to build
simple or complex requests. These COMPOUND requests allow for a
reduction in the number of RPCs needed for logical file system
operations. For example, multi-component lookup requests can be
constructed by combining multiple LOOKUP operations. Those can be
further combined with operations such as GETATTR, READDIR, or OPEN
plus READ to do more complicated sets of operation without incurring
additional latency.
NFSv4.1 also contains a considerable set of callback operations in
which the server makes an RPC directed at the client. Callback RPC's
have a similar structure to that of the normal server requests. For
the NFS version 4 protocol callbacks in all minor versions, there are
two RPC procedures, NULL and CB_COMPOUND. The CB_COMPOUND procedure
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is defined in an analogous fashion to that of COMPOUND with its own
set of callback operations.
Addition of new server and callback operation within the COMPOUND and
CB_COMPOUND request framework provide means of extending the protocol
in subsequent minor versions.
Except for a small number of operations needed for session creation,
server requests and callback requests are performed within the
context of a session. Sessions provide a client context for every
request and support robust reply protection for non-idempotent
requests.
2.4. Client Identifiers and Client Owners
For each operation that obtains or depends on locking state, the
specific client must be determinable by the server. In NFSv4, each
distinct client instance is represented by a client ID, which is a
64-bit identifier that identifies a specific client at a given time
and which is changed whenever the client or the server re-
initializes. Client IDs are used to support lock identification and
crash recovery.
In NFSv4.1, during steady state operation, the client ID associated
with each operation is derived from the session (see Section 2.10) on
which the operation is issued. Each session is associated with a
specific client ID at session creation and that client ID then
becomes the client ID associated with all requests issued using it.
Therefore, unlike NFSv4.0, the only NFSv4.1 operations possible
before a client ID is established, are those directly connected with
establishing the client ID.
A sequence of an EXCHANGE_ID operation followed by a CREATE_SESSION
operation using that client ID (eir_clientid as returned from
EXCHANGE_ID) is required to establish the identification on the
server. Establishment of identification by a new incarnation of the
client also has the effect of immediately releasing any locking state
that a previous incarnation of that same client might have had on the
server. Such released state would include all lock, share
reservation, layout state, and where the server is not supporting the
CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV claim type, all delegation state associated with
same client with the same identity. For discussion of delegation
state recovery, see Section 9.2.1. For discussion of layout state
recovery see Section 12.7.1.
Releasing such state requires that the server be able to determine
that one client instance is the successor of another. Where this
cannot be done, for any of a number of reasons, the locking state
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will remain for a time subject to lease expiration (see Section 8.5)
and the new client will need to wait for such state to be removed, if
it makes conflicting lock requests.
Client identification is encapsulated in the following Client Owner
structure:
struct client_owner4 {
verifier4 co_verifier;
opaque co_ownerid<NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT>;
};
The first field, co_verifier, is a client incarnation verifier that
is used to detect client reboots. Only if the co_verifier is
different from that the server had previously recorded for the client
(as identified by the second field of the structure, co_ownerid) does
the server start the process of canceling the client's leased state.
The second field, co_ownerid is a variable length string that
uniquely defines the client so that subsequent instances of the same
client bear the same co_ownerid with a different verifier.
There are several considerations for how the client generates the
co_ownerid string:
o The string should be unique so that multiple clients do not
present the same string. The consequences of two clients
presenting the same string range from one client getting an error
to one client having its leased state abruptly and unexpectedly
canceled.
o The string should be selected so the subsequent incarnations (e.g.
reboots) of the same client cause the client to present the same
string. The implementor is cautioned from an approach that
requires the string to be recorded in a local file because this
precludes the use of the implementation in an environment where
there is no local disk and all file access is from an NFS version
4 server.
o The string should be the same for each server network address that
the client accesses, (note: the precise opposite was advised in
the NFSv4.0 specification [2]). This way, if a server has
multiple interfaces, the client can trunk traffic over multiple
network paths as described in Section 2.10.4.
o The algorithm for generating the string should not assume that the
client's network address will not change, unless the client
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implementation knows it is using statically assigned network
addresses. This includes changes between client incarnations and
even changes while the client is still running in its current
incarnation. This means that if the client includes just the
client's network address in the co_ownerid string, there is a real
risk, with dynamic address assignment, that after the client gives
up the network address, another client, using a similar algorithm
for generating the co_ownerid string, would generate a conflicting
co_ownerid string.
Given the above considerations, an example of a well generated
co_ownerid string is one that includes:
o If applicable, the client's statically assigned network address.
o Additional information that tends to be unique, such as one or
more of:
* The client machine's serial number (for privacy reasons, it is
best to perform some one way function on the serial number).
* A MAC address (again, a one way function should be performed).
* The timestamp of when the NFS version 4 software was first
installed on the client (though this is subject to the
previously mentioned caution about using information that is
stored in a file, because the file might only be accessible
over NFS version 4).
* A true random number. However since this number ought to be
the same between client incarnations, this shares the same
problem as that of the using the timestamp of the software
installation.
o For a user level NFS version 4 client, it should contain
additional information to distinguish the client from other user
level clients running on the same host, such as a process
identifier or other unique sequence.
As a security measure, the server MUST NOT cancel a client's leased
state if the principal established the state for a given co_ownerid
string is not the same as the principal issuing the EXCHANGE_ID.
A server may compare a client_owner4 in an EXCHANGE_ID with an
nfs_client_id4 established using SETCLIENTID using NFSv4 minor
version 0, so that an NFSv4.1 client is not forced to delay until
lease expiration for locking state established by the earlier client
using minor version 0. This requires the client_owner4 be
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constructed the same way as the nfs_client_id4. If the latter's
contents included the server's network address, and the NFSv4.1
client does not wish to use a client ID that prevents trunking, it
should issue two EXCHANGE_ID operations. The first EXCHANGE_ID will
have a client_owner4 equal to the nfs_client_id4. This will clear
the state created by the NFSv4.0 client. The second EXCHANGE_ID will
not have the server's network address. The state created for the
second EXCHANGE_ID will not have to wait for lease expiration,
because there will be no state to expire.
Once an EXCHANGE_ID has been done, and the resulting client ID
established as associated with a session, all requests made on that
session implicitly identify that client ID, which in turn designates
the client specified using the long-form client_owner4 structure.
The shorthand client identifier (a client ID) is assigned by the
server (the eir_clientid result from EXCHANGE_ID) and should be
chosen so that it will not conflict with a client ID previously
assigned by the server. This applies across server restarts or
reboots.
In the event of a server restart, a client may find out that its
current client ID is no longer valid when receives a
NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID error. The precise circumstances depend of
the characteristics of the sessions involved, specifically whether
the session is persistent (see Section 2.10.5.5).
When a session is not persistent, the client will need to create a
new session. When the existing client ID is presented to a server as
part of creating a session and that client ID is not recognized, as
would happen after a server reboot, the server will reject the
request with the error NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID. When this happens,
the client must obtain a new client ID by use of the EXCHANGE_ID
operation and then use that client ID as the basis of the basis of a
new session and then proceed to any other necessary recovery for the
server reboot case (See Section 8.6.2).
In the case of the session being persistent, the client will re-
establish communication using the existing session after the reboot.
This session will be associated with a client ID that has had state
revoked (but the persistent session is never associated with a stale
client ID, because if the session is persistent, the client ID MUST
persist), and the client will receive an indication of that fact in
the sr_status_flags field returned by the SEQUENCE operation (see
Section 17.46.4). The client can then use the existing session to do
whatever operations are necessary to determine the status of requests
outstanding at the time of reboot, while avoiding issuing new
requests, particularly any involving locking on that session. Such
requests would fail with an NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID error, if
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attempted.
See the detailed descriptions of EXCHANGE_ID (Section 17.35 and
CREATE_SESSION (Section 17.36) for a complete specification of these
operations.
2.4.1. Server Release of Client ID
NFSv4.1 introduces a new operation called DESTROY_CLIENTID
(Section 17.50) which the client SHOULD use to destroy a client ID it
no longer needs. This permits graceful, bilateral release of a
client ID.
If the server determines that the client holds no associated state
for its client ID (including sessions, opens, locks, delegations,
layouts, and wants), the server may choose to unilaterally release
the client ID. The server may make this choice for an inactive
client so that resources are not consumed by those intermittently
active clients. If the client contacts the server after this
release, the server must ensure the client receives the appropriate
error so that it will use the EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION sequence to
establish a new identity. It should be clear that the server must be
very hesitant to release a client ID since the resulting work on the
client to recover from such an event will be the same burden as if
the server had failed and restarted. Typically a server would not
release a client ID unless there had been no activity from that
client for many minutes. As long as there are sessions, opens,
locks, delegations, layouts, or wants, the server MUST not release
the client ID. See Section 2.10.9.1.4 for discussion on releasing
inactive sessions.
2.4.2. Resolving Client Owner Conflicts
When the server gets an EXCHANGE_ID for a client owner that currently
has no state, or if it has state, but the lease has expired, server
MUST allow the EXCHANGE_ID, and confirm the new client ID if followed
by the appropriate CREATE_SESSION.
When the server gets an EXCHANGE_ID for a client owner that currently
has state and an unexpired lease, the server MUST NOT destroy any
state that currently exists for the client owner unless one of the
following are true:
o The principal that created the client ID for the client owner is
the same as the principal that is issuing the EXCHANGE_ID. Note
that if the client ID was created with SP4_MACH_CRED protection
(Section 17.35), the principal MUST be based on RPCSEC_GSS
authentication, the RPCSEC_GSS service used MUST be integrity or
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privacy, and the same GSS mechanism and principal must be used as
that used when the client ID was created.
o The client ID was established with SP4_SSV protection
(Section 17.35), and the client sends the EXCHANGE_ID with the
security flavor set to RPCSEC_GSS using the GSS SSV mechanism
(Section 2.10.7.4). Note that this is possible only if the server
and client persist the SSV.
o The client ID was established with SP4_SSV protection. Because
the SSV might not be persisted across client and server restart,
and because the first time a client issues EXCHANGE_ID to a server
it does not have an SSV, the client MAY issue the subsequent
EXCHANGE_ID without an SSV RPCSEC_GSS handle. Instead, as with
SP4_MACH_CRED protection, the principal MUST be based on
RPCSEC_GSS authentication, the RPCSEC_GSS service used MUST be
integrity or privacy, and the same GSS mechanism and principal
must be used as that used when the client ID was created.
If the none of the above situations apply, the server MUST return
NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE.
Even the server accepts the principal and co_ownerid as matching that
which created the client ID, it MUST NOT delete any state unless the
co_verifier in the EXCHANGE_ID does not match the co_verifier used
when client ID was created. If the co_verifier matches, then the
client is either updating properties of the client ID, or possibly
attempting trunking opportunity (Section 2.10.4).
2.5. Server Owners
The Server Owner is somewhat similar to a Client Owner (Section 2.4),
but unlike the Client Owner, there is no shorthand serverid. The
Server Owner is defined in the following structure:
struct server_owner4 {
uint64_t so_minor_id;
opaque so_major_id<NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT>;
};
The Server Owner is returned in the results of EXCHANGE_ID. When the
so_major_id fields are the same in two EXCHANGE_ID results, the
connections each EXCHANGE_ID are sent over can be assumed to address
the same Server (as defined in Section 1.5). If the so_minor_id
fields are also the same, then not only do both connections connect
to the same server, but the session and other state can be shared
across both connections. The reader is cautioned that multiple
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servers may deliberately or accidentally claim to have the same
so_major_id or so_major_id/so_minor_id; the reader should examine
Section 2.10.4 and Section 17.35.
The considerations for generating a so_major_id are similar to that
for generating a co_ownerid string (see Section 2.4). The
consequences of two servers generating conflicting so_major_id values
are less dire than they are for co_ownerid conflicts because the
client can use RPCSEC_GSS to compare the authenticity of each server
(see Section 2.10.4).
2.6. Security Service Negotiation
With the NFS version 4 server potentially offering multiple security
mechanisms, the client needs a method to determine or negotiate which
mechanism is to be used for its communication with the server. The
NFS server may have multiple points within its file system namespace
that are available for use by NFS clients. These points can be
considered security policy boundaries, and in some NFS
implementations are tied to NFS export points. In turn the NFS
server may be configured such that each of these security policy
boundaries may have different or multiple security mechanisms in use.
The security negotiation between client and server must be done with
a secure channel to eliminate the possibility of a third party
intercepting the negotiation sequence and forcing the client and
server to choose a lower level of security than required or desired.
See Section 20 for further discussion.
2.6.1. NFSv4.1 Security Tuples
An NFS server can assign one or more "security tuples" to each
security policy boundary in its namespace. Each security tuple
consists of a security flavor (see Section 2.2.1.1), and if the
flavor is RPCSEC_GSS, a GSS-API mechanism OID, a GSS-API quality of
protection, and an RPCSEC_GSS service.
2.6.2. SECINFO and SECINFO_NO_NAME
The SECINFO and SECINFO_NO_NAME operations allow the client to
determine, on a per filehandle basis, what security tuple is to be
used for server access. In general, the client will not have to use
either operation except during initial communication with the server
or when the client crosses security policy boundaries at the server.
It is possible that the server's policies change during the client's
interaction therefore forcing the client to negotiate a new security
tuple.
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Where the use of different security tuples would affect the type of
access that would be allowed if a request was issued over the same
connection used for the SECINFO or SECINFO_NO_NAME operation (e.g.
read-only vs. read-write) access, security tuples that allow greater
access should be presented first. Where the general level of access
is the same and different security flavors limit the range of
principals whose privileges are recognized (e.g. allowing or
disallowing root access), flavors supporting the greatest range of
principals should be listed first.
2.6.3. Security Error
Based on the assumption that each NFS version 4 client and server
must support a minimum set of security (i.e., LIPKEY, SPKM-3, and
Kerberos-V5 all under RPCSEC_GSS), the NFS client will initiate file
access to the server with one of the minimal security tuples. During
communication with the server, the client may receive an NFS error of
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. This error allows the server to notify the client
that the security tuple currently being used contravenes the server's
security policy. The client is then responsible for determining (see
Section 2.6.3.1) what security tuples are available at the server and
choosing one which is appropriate for the client.
2.6.3.1. Using NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, SECINFO, and SECINFO_NO_NAME
This section explains of the mechanics of NFSv4.1 security
negotiation. The term "put filehandle operation" refers to
PUTROOTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTFH, and RESTOREFH.
2.6.3.1.1. Put Filehandle Operation + SAVEFH
The client is saving a filehandle for a future RESTOREFH. The server
MUST NOT return NFS4ERR_WRONG to either the put filehandle operation
or SAVEFH.
2.6.3.1.2. Two or More Put Filehandle Operations
For a series of N put filehandle operations, the server MUST NOT
return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC to the first N-1 put filehandle operations.
The Nth put filehandle operation is handled as if it is the first in
a series of operations, and the second in the series of operations is
not a put filehandle operation. For example if the server received
PUTFH, PUTROOTFH, LOOKUP, then the PUTFH is ignored for
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC purposes, and the PUTROOTFH, LOOKUP subseries is
processed as according to Section 2.6.3.1.3.
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2.6.3.1.3. Put Filehandle Operation + LOOKUP (or OPEN by Name)
This situation also applies to a put filehandle operation followed by
a LOOKUP or an OPEN operation that specifies a component name.
In this situation, the client is potentially crossing a security
policy boundary, and the set of security tuples the parent directory
supports differ from those of the child. The server implementation
may decide whether to impose any restrictions on security policy
administration. There are at least three approaches
(sec_policy_child is the tuple set of the child export,
sec_policy_parent is that of the parent).
a) sec_policy_child <= sec_policy_parent (<= for subset). This
means that the set of security tuples specified on the security
policy of a child directory is always a subset of that of its
parent directory.
b) sec_policy_child ^ sec_policy_parent != {} (^ for intersection,
{} for the empty set). This means that the security tuples
specified on the security policy of a child directory always has a
non empty intersection with that of the parent.
c) sec_policy_child ^ sec_policy_parent == {}. This means that
the set of tuples specified on the security policy of a child
directory may not intersect with that of the parent. In other
words, there are no restrictions on how the system administrator
may set up these tuples.
For a server to support approach (b) (when client chooses a flavor
that is not a member of sec_policy_parent) and (c), the put
filehandle operation must NOT return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in case of
security mismatch. Instead, it should be returned from the LOOKUP
(or OPEN by component name) that follows.
Since the above guideline does not contradict approach (a), it should
be followed in general. Even if approach (a) is implemented, it is
possible for the security tuple used to be acceptable for the target
of LOOKUP but not for the filehandles used in the put filehandle
operation. The put filehandle operation could be a PUTROOTFH or
PUTPUBFH, where the client cannot know the security tuples for the
root or public filehandle. Or the security policy for the filehandle
used by the put filehandle operation could have changed since the
time the filehandle was obtained.
Therefore, an NFSv4.1 server MUST NOT return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in
response to the put filehandle operation if the operation is
immediately followed by a LOOKUP or an OPEN by component name.
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2.6.3.1.4. Put Filehandle Operation + LOOKUPP
Since SECINFO only works its way down, there is no way LOOKUPP can
return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC without SECINFO_NO_NAME. SECINFO_NO_NAME
solves this issue because via style SECINFO_STYLE4_PARENT, it works
in the opposite direction as SECINFO. As with Section 2.6.3.1.3, the
put filehandle operation must not return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC whenever it
is followed by LOOKUPP. If the server does not support
SECINFO_NO_NAME, the client's only recourse is to issue the put
filehandle operation, LOOKUPP, GETFH sequence of operations with
every security tuple it supports.
Regardless whether SECINFO_NO_NAME is supported, an NFSv4.1 server
MUST NOT return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in response to a put filehandle
operation if the operation is immediately followed by a LOOKUPP.
2.6.3.1.5. Put Filehandle Operation + SECINFO/SECINFO_NO_NAME
A security sensitive client is allowed to choose a strong security
tuple when querying a server to determine a file object's permitted
security tuples. The security tuple chosen by the client does not
have to be included in the tuple list of the security policy of the
either parent directory indicated in the put filehandle operation, or
the child file object indicated in SECINFO (or any parent directory
indicated in SECINFO_NO_NAME). Of course the server has to be
configured for whatever security tuple the client selects, otherwise
the request will fail at RPC layer with an appropriate authentication
error.
In theory, there is no connection between the security flavor used by
SECINFO or SECINFO_NO_NAME and those supported by the security
policy. But in practice, the client may start looking for strong
flavors from those supported by the security policy, followed by
those in the mandatory set.
The NFSv4.1 server MUST NOT return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC to a put
filehandle operation whenever it is immediately followed by SECINFO
or SECINFO_NO_NAME. The NFSv4.1 server MUST NOT return
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC from SECINFO or SECINFO_NO_NAME.
2.6.3.1.6. Put Filehandle Operation + Nothing
The NFSv4.1 server MUST NOT return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC.
2.6.3.1.7. Put Filehandle Operation + Anything Else
"Anything Else" includes OPEN by filehandle.
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The security policy enforcement applies to the filehandle specified
in the put filehandle operation. Therefore PUTFH must return
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC in case of security tuple on the part of the
mismatch. This avoids the complexity adding NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC as an
allowable error to every other operation.
A COMPOUND containing the series put filehandle operation +
SECINFO_NO_NAME (style SECINFO_STYLE4_CURRENT_FH) is an efficient way
for the client to recover from NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC.
The NFSv4.1 server MUST not return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC to any operation
other than a put filehandle operation, LOOKUP, LOOKUPP, and OPEN (by
component name).
2.7. Minor Versioning
To address the requirement of an NFS protocol that can evolve as the
need arises, the NFS version 4 protocol contains the rules and
framework to allow for future minor changes or versioning.
The base assumption with respect to minor versioning is that any
future accepted minor version must follow the IETF process and be
documented in a standards track RFC. Therefore, each minor version
number will correspond to an RFC. Minor version zero of the NFS
version 4 protocol is represented by [2], and minor version one is
represented by this document [[Comment.2: change "document" to "RFC"
when we publish]] . The COMPOUND and CB_COMPOUND procedures support
the encoding of the minor version being requested by the client.
The following items represent the basic rules for the development of
minor versions. Note that a future minor version may decide to
modify or add to the following rules as part of the minor version
definition.
1. Procedures are not added or deleted
To maintain the general RPC model, NFS version 4 minor versions
will not add to or delete procedures from the NFS program.
2. Minor versions may add operations to the COMPOUND and
CB_COMPOUND procedures.
The addition of operations to the COMPOUND and CB_COMPOUND
procedures does not affect the RPC model.
* Minor versions may append attributes to GETATTR4args,
bitmap4, and GETATTR4res.
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This allows for the expansion of the attribute model to allow
for future growth or adaptation.
* Minor version X must append any new attributes after the last
documented attribute.
Since attribute results are specified as an opaque array of
per-attribute XDR encoded results, the complexity of adding
new attributes in the midst of the current definitions would
be too burdensome.
3. Minor versions must not modify the structure of an existing
operation's arguments or results.
Again the complexity of handling multiple structure definitions
for a single operation is too burdensome. New operations should
be added instead of modifying existing structures for a minor
version.
This rule does not preclude the following adaptations in a minor
version.
* adding bits to flag fields such as new attributes to
GETATTR's bitmap4 data type
* adding bits to existing attributes like ACLs that have flag
words
* extending enumerated types (including NFS4ERR_*) with new
values
4. Minor versions may not modify the structure of existing
attributes.
5. Minor versions may not delete operations.
This prevents the potential reuse of a particular operation
"slot" in a future minor version.
6. Minor versions may not delete attributes.
7. Minor versions may not delete flag bits or enumeration values.
8. Minor versions may declare an operation as mandatory to NOT
implement.
Specifying an operation as "mandatory to not implement" is
equivalent to obsoleting an operation. For the client, it means
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that the operation should not be sent to the server. For the
server, an NFS error can be returned as opposed to "dropping"
the request as an XDR decode error. This approach allows for
the obsolescence of an operation while maintaining its structure
so that a future minor version can reintroduce the operation.
1. Minor versions may declare attributes mandatory to NOT
implement.
2. Minor versions may declare flag bits or enumeration values
as mandatory to NOT implement.
9. Minor versions may downgrade features from mandatory to
recommended, or recommended to optional.
10. Minor versions may upgrade features from optional to recommended
or recommended to mandatory.
11. A client and server that supports minor version X should support
minor versions 0 (zero) through X-1 as well.
12. Except for infrastructural changes, no new features may be
introduced as mandatory in a minor version.
This rule allows for the introduction of new functionality and
forces the use of implementation experience before designating a
feature as mandatory. On the other hand, some classes of
features are infrastructural and have broad effects. Allowing
such features to not be mandatory complicates implementation of
the minor version.
13. A client MUST NOT attempt to use a stateid, filehandle, or
similar returned object from the COMPOUND procedure with minor
version X for another COMPOUND procedure with minor version Y,
where X != Y.
2.8. Non-RPC-based Security Services
As described in Section 2.2.1.1.1.1, NFSv4.1 relies on RPC for
identification, authentication, integrity, and privacy. NFSv4.1
itself provides additional security services as described in the next
several subsections.
2.8.1. Authorization
Authorization to access a file object via an NFSv4.1 operation is
ultimately determined by the NFSv4.1 server. A client can
predetermine its access to a file object via the OPEN (Section 17.16)
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and the ACCESS (Section 17.1) operations.
Principals with appropriate access rights can modify the
authorization on a file object via the SETATTR (Section 17.30)
operation. Four attributes that affect access rights are: mode,
owner, owner_group, and acl. See Section 5.
2.8.2. Auditing
NFSv4.1 provides auditing on a per file object basis, via the ACL
attribute as described in Section 6. It is outside the scope of this
specification to specify audit log formats or management policies.
2.8.3. Intrusion Detection
NFSv4.1 provides alarm control on a per file object basis, via the
ACL attribute as described in Section 6. Alarms may serve as the
basis for intrusion detection. It is outside the scope of this
specification to specify heuristics for detecting intrusion via
alarms.
2.9. Transport Layers
2.9.1. Required and Recommended Properties of Transports
NFSv4.1 works over RDMA and non-RDMA_based transports with the
following attributes:
o The transport supports reliable delivery of data, which NFSv4.1
requires but neither NFSv4.1 nor RPC has facilities for ensuring.
[24]
o The transport delivers data in the order it was sent. Ordered
delivery simplifies detection of transmit errors, and simplifies
the sending of arbitrary sized requests and responses, via the
record marking protocol [4].
Where an NFS version 4 implementation supports operation over the IP
network protocol, any transport used between NFS and IP MUST be among
the IETF-approved congestion control transport protocols. At the
time this document was written, the only two transports that had the
above attributes were TCP and SCTP. To enhance the possibilities for
interoperability, an NFS version 4 implementation MUST support
operation over the TCP transport protocol.
Even if NFS version 4 is used over a non-IP network protocol, it is
RECOMMENDED that the transport support congestion control.
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It is permissible for a connectionless transport to be used under
NFSv4.1, however reliable and in-order delivery of data by the
connectionless transport are still required. NFSv4.1 assumes that a
client transport address and server transport address used to send
data over a transport together constitute a connection, even if the
underlying transport eschews the concept of a connection.
2.9.2. Client and Server Transport Behavior
If a connection-oriented transport (e.g. TCP) is used the client and
server SHOULD use long lived connections for at least three reasons:
1. This will prevent the weakening of the transport's congestion
control mechanisms via short lived connections.
2. This will improve performance for the WAN environment by
eliminating the need for connection setup handshakes.
3. The NFSv4.1 callback model differs from NFSv4.0, and requires the
client and server to maintain a client-created backchannel (see
Section 2.10.3.1) for the server to use.
In order to reduce congestion, if a connection-oriented transport is
used, and the request is not the NULL procedure,
o A requester MUST NOT retry a request unless the connection the
request was issued over was lost before the reply was received.
o A replier MUST NOT silently drop a request, even if the request is
a retry. (The silent drop behavior of RPCSEC_GSS [5] does not
apply because this behavior happens at the RPCSEC_GSS layer, a
lower layer in the request processing). Instead, the replier
SHOULD return an appropriate error (see Section 2.10.5.1) or it
MAY disconnect the connection.
When using RDMA transports there are other reasons for not tolerating
retries over the same connection:
o RDMA transports use "credits" to enforce flow control, where a
credit is a right to a peer to transmit a message. If one peer
were to retransmit a request (or reply), it would consume an
additional credit. If the replier retransmitted a reply, it would
certainly result in an RDMA connection loss, since the requester
would typically only post a single receive buffer for each
request. If the requester retransmitted a request, the additional
credit consumed on the server might lead to RDMA connection
failure unless the client accounted for it and decreased its
available credit, leading to wasted resources.
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o RDMA credits present a new issue to the reply cache in NFSv4.1.
The reply cache may be used when a connection within a session is
lost, such as after the client reconnects. Credit information is
a dynamic property of the RDMA connection, and stale values must
not be replayed from the cache. This implies that the reply cache
contents must not be blindly used when replies are issued from it,
and credit information appropriate to the channel must be
refreshed by the RPC layer.
In addition, the NFSv4.1 requester is not allowed to stop waiting for
a reply, as described in Section 2.10.5.2.
2.9.3. Ports
Historically, NFS version 2 and version 3 servers have listened over
TCP port 2049. The registered port 2049 [25] for the NFS protocol
should be the default configuration. NFSv4.1 clients SHOULD NOT use
the RPC binding protocols as described in [26].
2.10. Session
2.10.1. Motivation and Overview
Previous versions and minor versions of NFS have suffered from the
following:
o Lack of support for exactly once semantics (EOS). This includes
lack of support for EOS through server failure and recovery.
o Limited callback support, including no support for sending
callbacks through firewalls, and races between responses from
normal requests, and callbacks.
o Limited trunking over multiple network paths.
o Requiring machine credentials for fully secure operation.
Through the introduction of a session, NFSv4.1 addresses the above
shortfalls with practical solutions:
o EOS is enabled by a reply cache with a bounded size, making it
feasible to keep the cache in persistent storage and enable EOS
through server failure and recovery. One reason that previous
revisions of NFS did not support EOS was because some EOS
approaches often limited parallelism. As will be explained in
Section 2.10.5, NFSv4.1 supports both EOS and unlimited
parallelism.
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o The NFSv4.1 client (defined in Section 1.5, Paragraph 1) creates
transport connections and provides them to the server to use for
sending callback requests, thus solving the firewall issue
(Section 17.34). Races between responses from client requests,
and callbacks caused by the requests are detected via the
session's sequencing properties which are a consequence of EOS
(Section 2.10.5.3).
o The NFSv4.1 client can add an arbitrary number of connections to
the session, and thus provide trunking (Section 2.10.4).
o The NFSv4.1 client and server produces a session key independent
of client and server machine credentials which can be used to
compute a digest for protecting critical session management
operations (Section 2.10.7.3).
o The NFSv4.1 client can also create secure RPCSEC_GSS contexts for
use by the session's backchannel that do not require the server to
authenticate to a client machine principal (Section 2.10.7.2).
A session is a dynamically created, long-lived server object created
by a client, used over time from one or more transport connections.
Its function is to maintain the server's state relative to the
connection(s) belonging to a client instance. This state is entirely
independent of the connection itself, and indeed the state exists
whether the connection exists or not. A client may have one or more
sessions associated with it so that client-associated state may be
accessed using any of the sessions associated with that client's
client ID, when connections are associated with those sessions. When
no connections are associated for any of the sessions associated with
the client ID for an extended time such objects as locks, opens,
delegations, layouts, etc. are subject to expiration. The session
serves as an object representing a means of access by a client to the
associated client state on the server, independent of the physical
means of access to that state.
A single client may create multiple sessions. A single session MUST
NOT server multiple clients.
2.10.2. NFSv4 Integration
Sessions are part of NFSv4.1 and not NFSv4.0. Normally, a major
infrastructure change such as sessions would require a new major
version number to an ONC RPC program like NFS. However, because
NFSv4 encapsulates its functionality in a single procedure, COMPOUND,
and because COMPOUND can support an arbitrary number of operations,
sessions have been added to NFSv4.1 with little difficulty. COMPOUND
includes a minor version number field, and for NFSv4.1 this minor
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version is set to 1. When the NFSv4 server processes a COMPOUND with
the minor version set to 1, it expects a different set of operations
than it does for NFSv4.0. NFSv4.1 defines the SEQUENCE operation,
which is required for every COMPOUND that operates over an
established session, with the exception of some session
administration operations, such as DESTROY_SESSION (Section 17.37).
2.10.2.1. SEQUENCE and CB_SEQUENCE
In NFSv4.1, when the SEQUENCE operation is present, it MUST be the
first operation in the COMPOUND procedure. The primary purpose of
SEQUENCE is to carry the session identifier. The session identifier
associates all other operations in the COMPOUND procedure with a
particular session. SEQUENCE also contains required information for
maintaining EOS (see Section 2.10.5). Session-enabled NFSv4.1
COMPOUND requests thus have the form:
+-----+--------------+-----------+------------+-----------+----
| tag | minorversion | numops |SEQUENCE op | op + args | ...
| | (== 1) | (limited) | + args | |
+-----+--------------+-----------+------------+-----------+----
and the reply's structure is:
+------------+-----+--------+-------------------------------+--//
|last status | tag | numres |status + SEQUENCE op + results | //
+------------+-----+--------+-------------------------------+--//
//-----------------------+----
// status + op + results | ...
//-----------------------+----
A CB_COMPOUND procedure request and reply has a similar form to
COMPOUND, but instead of a SEQUENCE operation, there is a CB_SEQUENCE
operation. CB_COMPOUND also has an additional field called
"callback_ident", which is superfluous in NFSv4.1 and MUST be ignored
by the client. CB_SEQUENCE has the same information as SEQUENCE, and
also includes other information needed to resolve callback races
(Section 2.10.5.3).
2.10.2.2. Client ID and Session Association
Each client ID (Section 2.4) can have zero or more active sessions.
A client ID, and a session associated with it are required to perform
file access in NFSv4.1. Each time a session is used (whether by a
client sending a request to the server, or the client replying to a
callback request from the server), the state leased to its associated
client ID is automatically renewed.
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State such as share reservations, locks, delegations, and layouts
(Section 1.4.4) is tied to the client ID. Client state is not tied
to the sessions of the client ID. Successive state changing
operations from a given state owner MAY go over different sessions,
provided the session is associated with the same client ID. A
callback MAY arrive over a different session than from the session
that originally acquired the state pertaining to the callback. For
example, if session A is used to acquire a delegation, a request to
recall the delegation MAY arrive over session B if both sessions are
associated with the same client ID. Section 2.10.7.1 and
Section 2.10.7.2 discuss the security considerations around
callbacks.
2.10.3. Channels
A channel is not a connection. A channel represents the direction
ONC RPC requests are sent to.
Each session has one or two channels: the fore channel and the
backchannel. Because there are at most two channels per session, and
because each channel has a distinct purpose, channels are not
assigned identifiers.
The fore channel is used for ordinary requests from the client to the
server, and carries COMPOUND requests and responses. A session
always has a fore channel.
The backchannel used for callback requests from server to client, and
carries CB_COMPOUND requests and responses. Whether there is a
backchannel or not is a decision by the client, however many features
of NFSv4.1 require a backchannel. NFSv4.1 servers MUST support
backchannels.
Each session has resources for each channel, including separate reply
caches (see Section 2.10.5.1). Note that even the backchannel
requires a reply cache because some callback operations are
nonidempotent.
2.10.3.1. Association of Connections, Channels, and Sessions
Each channel is associated with zero or more transport connections.
A connection can be associated with one channel or both channels of a
session; the client and server negotiate whether a connection will
carry traffic for one channel or both channels via the CREATE_SESSION
(Section 17.36) and the BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION (Section 17.34)
operations. When a session is created via CREATE_SESSION, the
connection that transported the CREATE_SESSION request is
automatically associated with the fore channel, and optionally the
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backchannel. If the client specifies no state protection
(Section 17.35). when the session is created, then when SEQUENCE is
transmitted on a different connection, the connection is
automatically associated with the fore channel of the session
specified in the SEQUENCE operation.
A connection's association with a session is not exclusive. A
connection associated with the channel(s) of one session may be
simultaneously associated with the channel(s) of other sessions
including sessions associated with other client IDs.
It is permissible for connections of multiple transport types to be
associated with the same channel. For example both a TCP and RDMA
connection can be associated with the fore channel. In the event an
RDMA and non-RDMA connection are associated with the same channel,
the maximum number of slots SHOULD be at least one more than the
total number of credits (Section 2.10.5.1. This way if all RDMA
credits are used, the non-RDMA connection can have at least one
outstanding request. If a server supports multiple transport types,
it MUST allow a client to associate connections from each transport
to a channel.
It is permissible for a connection of type of transport to be
associated with the fore channel, and a connection of a different
type to be associated with the backchannel.
2.10.4. Trunking
Trunking is the use of multiple connections between a client and
server in order to increase the speed of data transfer. NFSv4.1
supports two types of trunking: session trunking and client ID
trunking. NFSv4.1 servers MUST support trunking.
Session trunking is essentially the association of multiple
connections, each with a potentially different target network
address, to the same session.
Client ID trunking is the association of multiple sessions to the
same client ID, major server owner ID (Section 2.5), and server scope
(Section 10.6.7). When two servers return the same major server
owner and server scope it means the two servers are cooperating on
locking state management which is a prerequisite for client ID
trunking.
Understanding and distinguishing session and client ID trunking
requires understanding how the results of the EXCHANGE_ID
(Section 17.35) operation identify a server. Suppose a client issues
EXCHANGE_ID over two different connections each with a possibly
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different target network address but each EXCHANGE_ID with the same
value in the eia_clientowner field. If the same NFSv4.1 server is
listening over each connection, then each EXCHANGE_ID result MUST
return the same values of eir_clientid, eir_server_owner.so_major_id
and eir_server_scope. The client can then treat each connection as
referring to the same server (subject to verification, see
Paragraph 5 later in this section), and it can use each connection to
trunk requests and replies. The question is whether session trunking
and/or client ID trunking applies.
Session Trunking If the eia_clientowner argument is the same in two
different EXCHANGE_ID requests, and the eir_clientid,
eir_server_owner.so_major_id, eir_server_owner.so_minor_id, and
eir_server_scope results match in both EXCHANGE_ID results, then
the client is permitted to perform session trunking. If the
client has no session mapping to the tuple of eir_clientid,
eir_server_owner.so_major_id, eir_server_scope,
eir_server_owner.so_minor_id, then it creates the session via a
CREATE_SESSION operation over one of the connections, which
associates the connection to the session. If there is a session
for the tuple, the client can issue BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION to
associate the connection to the session. The client can invoke
CREATE_SESSION regardless whether there is session for the tuple.
The second connection is associated with the same session as the
first connection via the BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION operation.
Client ID Trunking If the eia_clientowner argument is the same in
two different EXCHANGE_ID requests, and the eir_clientid,
eir_server_owner.so_major_id, and eir_server_scope results match
in both EXCHANGE_ID results, but the eir_server_owner.so_minor_id
results do not match then the client is permitted to perform
client ID trunking. The client can associate each connection with
different sessions, where each session is associated with the same
server. Of course, even if the eir_server_owner.so_minor_id
fields do match, the client is free to employ client ID trunking
instead of sessiond trunking. The client completes the act of
client ID trunking by invoking CREATE_SESSION on each connection,
using the same client ID that was returned in eir_clientid. These
invocations create two sessions and also associate each connection
with each session.
When doing client ID trunking, locking state is shared across
sessions associated with the same client ID. This requires the
server to coordinate state across sessions.
When two servers over two connections claim matching or partially
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matching eir_server_owner, eir_server_scope, and eir_clientid values,
the client does not have to trust the servers' claims. The client
may verify these claims before trunking traffic in the following
ways:
o For session trunking, clients SHOULD reliably verify if
connections between different network paths are in fact associated
with the same NFSv4.1 server and usable on the same session, and
servers MUST allow clients to perform reliable verification. When
a client ID is created, the client SHOULD specify that
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION is to be verified according to the SP4_SSV or
SP4_MACH_CRED (Section 17.35) state protection options. For
SP4_SSV, reliable verification depends on a shared secret (the
SSV) that is established via the SET_SSV (Section 17.47)
operation.
When a new connection is associated with the session (via the
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION operation, see Section 17.34), if the client
specified SP4_SSV state protection for the BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION
operation, the client MUST issue the BIND_CONN_TO_SESSSION with
RPCSEC_GSS protection, using integrity or privacy, and a
RPCSEC_GSS using the GSS SSV mechanism (Section 2.10.7.4 If the
client mistakenly tries to associate a connection to a session of
a wrong server, the server will either reject the attempt because
it is not aware of the session identifier of the
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION arguments, or it will reject the attempt
because the RPCSEC_GSS authentication fails. Even if the server
mistakenly or maliciously accepts the connection association
attempt, the RPCSEC_GSS verifier it computes in the response will
not be verified by the client, the client will know it cannot use
the connection for trunking the specified session.
If the client specified SP4_MACH_CRED state protection, the
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION operation will use RPCSEC_GSS integrity or
privacy, using the same credential that was used when the client
ID was created. Mutual authentication via RPCSEC_GSS assures the
client that the connection is associated with the correct sesssion
of the correct server.
o For client ID trunking, the client has at least two options for
verifying that the same client ID obtained from two different
EXCHANGE_ID operations came from the same server. The first
option is to use RPCSEC_GSS authentication when issuing each
EXCHANGE_ID. Each time an EXCHANGE_ID is issued with RPCSEC_GSS
authentication, the client notes the principal name of GSS target.
If the EXCHANGE_ID results indicate client ID trunking is
possible, and the GSS targets' principal names are the same, the
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servers are the same and client ID trunking is allowed.
The second option for verification is to use SP4_SSV protection.
When the client issues EXCHANGE_ID is specifies SP4_SSV
protection. The first EXCHANGE_ID the client issues always has to
be confirmed by a CREATE_SESSION call. The client then issues
SET_SSV on the sessions. Later the client issues EXCHANGE_ID to a
second destination network address than the first EXCHANGE_ID was
issued with. The client checks that each EXCHANGE_ID reply has
the same eir_clientid, eir_server_owner.so_major_id, and
eir_server_scope. If so, the client verifies the claim by issuing
a CREATE_SESSION to the second destination address, protected with
RPCSEC_GSS integrity using an RPCSEC_GSS handle returned by the
second EXCHANGE_ID. If the server accept the CREATE_SESSION
request, and if the client verifies the RPCSEC_GSS verifier and
integrity codes, then the client has proof the second server knows
the SSV, and thus the two servers are the same for the purposes of
client ID trunking.
2.10.5. Exactly Once Semantics
Via the session, NFSv4.1 offers exactly once semantics (EOS) for
requests sent over a channel. EOS is supported on both the fore and
back channels.
Each COMPOUND or CB_COMPOUND request that is issued with a leading
SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE operation MUST be executed by the receiver
exactly once. This requirement is regardless whether the request is
issued with reply caching specified (see Section 2.10.5.1.2). The
requirement holds even if the requester is issuing the request over a
session created between a pNFS data client and pNFS data server. The
rationale for this requirement is understood by categorizing requests
into three classifications:
o Nonidempotent requests.
o Idempotent modifying requests.
o Idempotent non-modifying requests.
An example of a non-idempotent request is RENAME. If is obvious that
if a replier executes the same RENAME request twice, and the first
execution succeeds, the re-execution will fail. If the replier
returns the result from the re-execution, this result is incorrect.
Therefore, EOS is required for nonidempotent requests.
An example of an idempotent modifying request is a COMPOUND request
containing a WRITE operation. Repeated execution of the same WRITE
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has the same effect as execution of that write once. Nevertheless,
putting enforcing EOS for WRITEs and other idempotent modifying
requests is necessary to avoid data corruption.
Suppose a client issues WRITEs A, and B to a noncompliant server that
does not enforce EOS, and receives no response, perhaps due to a
network partition. The client reconnects to the server and re-issues
both WRITEs. Now, the server has outstanding two instances of each
of A and B. The server can be in a situation in which it executes and
replies to the retries of A and B, while the first A and B are still
waiting in the server's I/O system for some resource. Upon receiving
the replies to the second attempts of WRITEs A and B, the client
believes its writes are done so it is free to issue WRITE D which
overlaps the range of one or both of A and B. If A or B are
subsequently executed for the second time, then what has been written
by D can be overwritten and thus corrupted.
An example of an idempotent non-modifying request is a COMPOUND
containing SEQUENCE, PUTFH, READLINK and nothing else. The re-
execution of a such a request will not cause data corruption, or
produce an incorrect result. Nonetheless, to keep the implementation
simple, the replier MUST enforce EOS for all requests whether
idempotent and non-modifying or not.
Note that true and complete EOS is not possible unless the server
persists the reply cache in stable storage, unless the server is
somehow implemented to never require a restart (indeed if such a
server exists, the distinction between a reply cache kept in stable
storage versus one that is not is one without meaning). See
Section 2.10.5.5 for a discussion of persistence in the reply cache.
Regardless, even if the server does not persist the reply cache, EOS
improves robustness and correctness over previous versions of NFS
because the legacy duplicate request/reply caches were based on the
ONC RPC transaction identifier (XID). Section 2.10.5.1 explains the
shortcomings of the XID as a basis for a reply cache and describes
how NFSv4.1 sessions improve upon the XID.
2.10.5.1. Slot Identifiers and Reply Cache
The RPC layer provides a transaction ID (XID), which, while required
to be unique, is not convenient for tracking requests for two
reasons. First, the XID is only meaningful to the requester; it
cannot be interpreted by the replier except to test for equality with
previously issued requests. When consulting an RPC-based duplicate
request cache, the opaqueness of the XID requires a computationally
expensive lookup (often via a hash that includes XID and source
address). NFSv4.1 requests use a non-opaque slot id which is an
index into a slot table, which is far more efficient. Second,
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because RPC requests can be executed by the replier in any order,
there is no bound on the number of requests that may be outstanding
at any time. To achieve perfect EOS using ONC RPC would require
storing all replies in the reply cache. XIDs are 32 bits; storing
over four billion (2^32) replies in the reply cache is not practical.
In practice, previous versions of NFS have chosen to store a fixed
number of replies in the cache, and use a least recently used (LRU)
approach to replacing cache entries with new entries when the cache
is full. In NFSv4.1, the number of outstanding requests is bounded
by the size of the slot table, and a sequence id per slot is used to
tell the replier when it is safe to delete a cached reply.
In the NFSv4.1 reply cache, when the requester issues a new request,
it selects a slot id in the range 0..N, where N is the replier's
current maximum slot id granted to the requester on the session over
which the request is to be issued. The value of N starts out as
equal to ca_maxrequests - 1 (Section 17.36), but can be adjusted by
the response to SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE as described later in this
section. The slot id must be unused by any of the requests which the
requester has already active on the session. "Unused" here means the
requester has no outstanding request for that slot id.
A slot contains a sequence id and the cached reply corresponding to
the request send with that sequence id. The sequence id is a 32 bit
unsigned value, and is therefore in the range 0..0xFFFFFFFF (2^32 -
1). The first time a slot is used, the requester must specify a
sequence id of one (1) (Section 17.36). Each time a slot is re-used,
the request MUST specify a sequence id that is one greater than that
of the previous request on the slot. If the previous sequence id was
0xFFFFFFFF, then the next request for the slot MUST have the sequence
id set to zero (i.e. (2^32 - 1) + 1 mod 2^32).
The sequence id accompanies the slot id in each request. It is for
the critical check at the server: it used to efficiently determine
whether a request using a certain slot id is a retransmit or a new,
never-before-seen request. It is not feasible for the client to
assert that it is retransmitting to implement this, because for any
given request the client cannot know whether the server has seen it
unless the server actually replies. Of course, if the client has
seen the server's reply, the client would not retransmit.
The replier compares each received request's sequence id with the
last one previously received for that slot id, to see if the new
request is:
o A new request, in which the sequence id is one greater than that
previously seen in the slot (accounting for sequence wraparound).
The replier proceeds to execute the new request, and the replier
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MUST increase the slot's sequence id by one.
o A retransmitted request, in which the sequence id is equal to that
currently recorded in the slot. If the original request has
executed to completion, the replier returns the cached reply. See
Section 2.10.5.2 for direction on how the replier deals with
retries of requests that are stll in progress.
o A misordered retry, in which the sequence id is less than
(accounting for sequence wraparound) that previously seen in the
slot. The replier MUST return NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED (as the
result from SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE).
o A misordered new request, in which the sequence id is two or more
than (accounting for sequence wraparound) than that previously
seen in the slot. Note that because the sequence id must
wraparound to zero (0) once it reaches 0xFFFFFFFF, a misordered
new request and a misordered retry cannot be distinguished. Thus,
the replier MUST return NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED (as the result from
SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE).
Unlike the XID, the slot id is always within a specific range; this
has two implications. The first implication is that for a given
session, the replier need only cache the results of a limited number
of COMPOUND requests . The second implication derives from the
first, which is unlike XID-indexed reply caches (also known as
duplicate request caches - DRCs), the slot id-based reply cache
cannot be overflowed. Through use of the sequence id to identify
retransmitted requests, the replier does not need to actually cache
the request itself, reducing the storage requirements of the reply
cache further. These facilities make it practical to maintain all
the required entries for an effective reply cache.
The slot id and sequence id therefore take over the traditional role
of the XID and source network address in the replier's reply cache
implementation. This approach is considerably more portable and
completely robust - it is not subject to the reassignment of ports as
clients reconnect over IP networks. In addition, the RPC XID is not
used in the reply cache, enhancing robustness of the cache in the
face of any rapid reuse of XIDs by the requester. While the replier
does not care about the XID for the purposes of reply cache
management (but the replier MUST return the same XID that was in the
request), nonetheless there are considerations for the XID in NFSv4.1
that are the same as all other previous versions of NFS. The RPC XID
remains in each message and must be formulated in NFSv4.1 requests as
it any other ONC RPC request. The reasons include:
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o The RPC layer retains its existing semantics and implementation.
o The requester and replier must be able to interoperate at the RPC
layer, prior to the NFSv4.1 decoding of the SEQUENCE or
CB_SEQUENCE operation
o If an operation is being used that does not start with SEQUENCE or
CB_SEQUENCE (e.g. BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION), then the RPC XID is
needed for correct operation to match the reply to the request.
o The SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE operation may generate an error. If
so, the embedded slot id, sequence id, and sessionid (if present)
in the request will not be in the reply, and the requester has
only the XID to to match the reply to the request.
Givem that well formulated XIDs continue to be required, this begs
the question why SEQUENCE and CB_SEQUENCE replies have a sessionid,
slot id and sequence id? Having the sessionid in the reply means the
requester does not have to use the XID to lookup the sessionid, which
would be necessary if the connection were associated with multiple
sessions. Having the slot id and sequence id in the reply means
requester does not have to use the XID to lookup the slot id and
sequence id. Furhermore, since the XID is only 32 bits, it is too
small to guarantee the re-association of a reply with its request
([27]); having sessionid, slot id, and sequence id in the reply
allows the client to validate that the reply in fact belongs to the
matched request.
The SEQUENCE (and CB_SEQUENCE) operation also carries a
"highest_slotid" value which carries additional requester slot usage
information. The requester must always provide a slot id
representing the outstanding request with the highest-numbered slot
value. The requester should in all cases provide the most
conservative value possible, although it can be increased somewhat
above the actual instantaneous usage to maintain some minimum or
optimal level. This provides a way for the requester to yield unused
request slots back to the replier, which in turn can use the
information to reallocate resources.
The replier responds with both a new target highest_slotid, and an
enforced highest_slotid, described as follows:
o The target highest_slotid is an indication to the requester of the
highest_slotid the replier wishes the requester to be using. This
permits the replier to withdraw (or add) resources from a
requester that has been found to not be using them, in order to
more fairly share resources among a varying level of demand from
other requesters. The requester must always comply with the
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replier's value updates, since they indicate newly established
hard limits on the requester's access to session resources.
However, because of request pipelining, the requester may have
active requests in flight reflecting prior values, therefore the
replier must not immediately require the requester to comply.
o The enforced highest_slotid indicates the highest slot id the
requester is permitted to use on a subsequent SEQUENCE or
CB_SEQUENCE operation. The replier's enforced highest_slotid
SHOULD be no less than the highest_slotid the requester indicated
in the SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE arguments.
If a replier detects the client is being intransigent, i.e. it
fails in a series of requests to honor the target highest_slotid
even though the replier knows there are no outstanding requests a
higher slot ids, it MAY take more forceful action. When faced
with intransigence, the replier MAY reply with a new enforced
highest_slotid that is less than its previous enforced
highest_slotid. Thereafter, if the requester continues to send
requests with a highest_slotid that is greater than the replier's
new enforced highest_slotid the server MAY return
NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGHSLOT, unless the slot id in the request is greater
than the new enforced highest_slotid, and the request is a retry.
The replier SHOULD keep slots it wants to retire around until the
requester sends a request with a highest_slotid less than or equal
to the replier's new enforced highest_slotid. Also a request with
a slot that is higher than the new enforced highest_slotid can be
retired if the requester specifies a sequence id that is not equal
what is in the slot's reply cache. In other words, once the
replier has forcibly lowered the enforced highest_slotid, the
requester is only allowed to send retries to the to-be-retired
slots.
o The requester SHOULD use the lowest available slot when issuing a
new request. This way, the replier may be able to retire slot
entries faster. However, where the replier is actively adjusting
its granted highest_slotid, it will not not be able to use only
the receipt of the slot id and highest_slotid in the request.
Neither the slot id nor the highest_slotid used in a request may
reflect the replier's current idea of the requester's session
limit, because the request may have been sent from the requester
before the update was received. Therefore, in the downward
adjustment case, the replier may have to retain a number of reply
cache entries at least as large as the old value of maximum
requests outstanding, until operation sequencing rules allow it to
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infer that the requester has seen its reply. [[Comment.3: What
are the rules?]]
2.10.5.1.1. Errors from SEQUENCE and CB_SEQUENCE
Any time SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE return an error, the sequence id of
the slot MUST NOT change. The replier MUST NOT modify the reply
cache entry for the slot whenever an error is returned from SEQUENCE
or CB_SEQUENCE.
2.10.5.1.2. Optional Reply Caching
On a per-request basis the requester can choose to direct the replier
to cache the reply to all operations after the first operation
(SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE) via the sa_cachethis or csa_cachethis
fields of the arguments to SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE. The reason it
would not direct the replier to cache the entire reply is that the
request is composed of all idempotent operations [24]. Caching the
reply may offer little benefit. If the reply is too large (see
Section 2.10.5.4), it may not be cacheable anyway. Even if the reply
to idempotent request is small enough to cache, unnecessarily caching
the reply slows down the server and increases RPC latency.
Whether the requester requests the reply to be cached or not has no
effect on the slot processing. If the results of SEQUENCE or
CB_SEQUENCE are NFS4_OK, then the slot's sequence id MUST be
incremented by one. If a requester does not direct the replier to
cache the reply, the replier MUST do one of following:
o The replier can cache the entire original reply. Even though
sa_cachethis or csa_cachethis are FALSE, the replier is always
free to cache. It may choose this approach in order to simplify
implementation.
o The replier enters into its reply cache a reply consisting of the
original results to the SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE operation, and
with the next operation in COMPOUND or CB)COMPOUND having the
error NFS4ERR_RETRY_UNCACHED_REP. Thus if the requester later
retries the request, it will get NFS4ERR_RETRY_UNCACHED_REP.
2.10.5.2. Retry and Replay of Reply
A requester MUST NOT retry a request, unless the connection it used
to send the request disconnects. The requester can then reconnect
and resend the request, or it can resend the request over a different
connection that is associated with the same session.
If the requester is a server wanting to resend a callback operation
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over the backchannel of session, the requester of course cannot
reconnect because only the client can associate connections with the
backchannel. The server can resend the request over another
connection that is bound to the same session's backchannel. If there
is no such connection, the server MUST indicate that the session has
no backchannel by setting the SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN_SESSION flag
bit in the response to the next SEQUENCE operation from the client.
The client MUST then associate a connection with the session (or
destroy the session).
Note that it is not fatal for a client to retry without a disconnect
between the request and retry. However the retry does consume
resources, especially with RDMA, where each request, retry or not,
consumes a credit. Retries for no reason, especially retries issued
shortly after the previous attempt, are a poor use of network
bandwidth and defeat the purpose of a transport's inherent congestion
control system.
A client MUST wait for a reply to a request before using the slot for
another request. If it does not wait for a reply, then the client
does not know what sequence id to use for the slot on its next
request. For example, suppose a client sends a request with sequence
id 1, and does not wait for the response. The next time it uses the
slot, it sends the new request with sequence id 2. If the server has
not seen the request with sequence id 1, then the server is not
expecting sequence id 2, and rejects the client's new request with
NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED (as the result from SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE).
RDMA fabrics do not guarantee that the memory handles (Steering Tags)
within each RPC/RDMA "chunk" ([9]) are valid on a scope outside that
of a single connection. Therefore, handles used by the direct
operations become invalid after connection loss. The server must
ensure that any RDMA operations which must be replayed from the reply
cache use the newly provided handle(s) from the most recent request.
A retry might be issued while the original request is still in
progress on the replier. The replier SHOULD deal with issue by by
returning NFS4ERR_DELAY as the reply to SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE
operation, but implementations MAY return NFS4ERR_MISORDERED. Since
errors from SEQUENCE and CB_SEQUENCE are never recorded in the reply
cache, this approach allows the results of the execution of the
original request to be properly recorded in the reply cache (assuming
the requester specified the reply to be cached).
2.10.5.3. Resolving Server Callback Races
It is possible for server callbacks to arrive at the client before
the reply from related fore channel operations. For example, a
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client may have been granted a delegation to a file it has opened,
but the reply to the OPEN (informing the client of the granting of
the delegation) may be delayed in the network. If a conflicting
operation arrives at the server, it will recall the delegation using
the backchannel, which may be on a different transport connection,
perhaps even a different network, or even a different session
associated with the same client ID
The presence of a session between client and server alleviates this
issue. When a session is in place, each client request is uniquely
identified by its { sessionid, slot id, sequence id } triple. By the
rules under which slot entries (reply cache entries) are retired, the
server has knowledge whether the client has "seen" each of the
server's replies. The server can therefore provide sufficient
information to the client to allow it to disambiguate between an
erroneous or conflicting callback race condition.
For each client operation which might result in some sort of server
callback, the server SHOULD "remember" the { sessionid, slot id,
sequence id } triple of the client request until the slot id
retirement rules allow the server to determine that the client has,
in fact, seen the server's reply. Until the time the { sessionid,
slot id, sequence id } request triple can be retired, any recalls of
the associated object MUST carry an array of these referring
identifiers (in the CB_SEQUENCE operation's arguments), for the
benefit of the client. After this time, it is not necessary for the
server to provide this information in related callbacks, since it is
certain that a race condition can no longer occur.
The CB_SEQUENCE operation which begins each server callback carries a
list of "referring" { sessionid, slot id, sequence id } triples. If
the client finds the request corresponding to the referring
sessionid, slot id and sequence id to be currently outstanding (i.e.
the server's reply has not been seen by the client), it can determine
that the callback has raced the reply, and act accordingly. If the
client does not find the request corresponding the referring triple
to be outstanding (including the case of a sessionid referring to a
destroyed session), then there is no race with respect to this
triple. The server SHOULD limit the referring triples to requests
that refer to just those that apply to the objects referred to in the
CB_COMPOUND procedure.
The client must not simply wait forever for the expected server reply
to arrive before responding to the CB_COMPOUND that won the race,
because it is possible that it will be delayed indefinitely. The
client should assume the likely case that the reply will arrive
within the average round trip time for COMPOUND requests to the
server, and wait that period of time. If that period of expires it
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can respond to the CB_COMPOUND with NFS4ERR_DELAY.
There are other scenarios under which callbacks may race replies,
among them pNFS layout recalls, described in Section 12.5.4.2.
2.10.5.4. COMPOUND and CB_COMPOUND Construction Issues
Very large requests and replies may pose both buffer management
issues (especially with RDMA) and reply cache issues. When the
session is created, (Section 17.36), for each channel (fore and
back), the client and server negotiate the maximum sized request they
will send or process (ca_maxrequestsize), the maximum sized reply
they will return or process (ca_maxresponsesize), and the maximum
sized reply they will store in the reply cache
(ca_maxresponsesize_cached).
If a request exceeds ca_maxrequestsize, the reply will have the
status NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG. A replier MAY return NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG
as the status for first operation (SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE) in the
request (which means no operations in the request executed, and the
state of the slot in the reply cache is unchanged), or it MAY chose
to return it on a subsequent operation in the same COMPOUND or
CB_COMPOUND request (which means at least one operation did execute
and the state of the slot in reply cache does change). The replier
SHOULD set NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG on the operation that exceeds
ca_maxrequestsize.
If a reply exceeds ca_maxresponsesize, the reply will have the status
NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG. A replier MAY return NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG as the
status for first operation (SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE) in the request,
or it MAY chose to return it on a subsequent operation (in the same
COMPOUND or CB_COMPOUND reply). A replier MAY return
NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG in the reply to SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE, even if
the response would still exceed ca_maxresponsesize.
If sa_cachethis or csa_cachethis are TRUE, then the replier MUST
cache a reply except if an error is returned by the SEQUENCE or
CB_SEQUENCE operation (see Section 2.10.5.1.1). If the reply exceeds
ca_maxresponsesize_cached, (and sa_cachethis or csa_cachethis are
TRUE) then the server MUST return NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE. Even
if NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE (or any other error for that matter)
is returned on a operation other than first operation (SEQUENCE or
CB_SEQUENCE), then the reply MUST be cached if sa_cachethis or
csa_cachethis are TRUE. For example, if a COMPOUND has eleven
operations, including SEQUENCE, the fifth operation is a RENAME, and
the tenth operation is a READ for one million octets, the server may
return NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE on the tenth operation. Since
the server executed several operations, especially the non-idempotent
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RENAME, the client's request to cache the reply needs to be honored
in order for correct operation of exactly once semantics. If the
client retries the request, the server will have cached a reply that
contains results for ten of the eleven requested operations, with the
tenth operation having a status of NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE.
A client needs to take care that when sending operations that change
the current filehandle (except for PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, and PUTROOTFH)
that it not exceed the maximum reply buffer before the GETFH
operation. Otherwise the client will have to retry the operation
that changed the current filehandle, in order to obtain the desired
filehandle. For the OPEN operation (see Section 17.16), retry is not
always available as an option. The following guidelines for the
handling of filehandle changing operations are advised:
o Within the same COMPOUND procedure, a client SHOULD issue GETFH
immediately after a current filehandle changing operation. A
client MUST issue GETFH after a current filehandle change
operation that is also non-idempotent (for example, the OPEN
operation).
o A server MAY return NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG or
NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE (if sa_cachethis is TRUE) on a
filehandle changing operation if the reply would be too large on
the next operation.
o A server SHOULD return NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG or
NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE (if sa_cachethis is TRUE) on a
filehandle changing non-idempotent operation if the reply would be
too large on the next operation, especially if the operation is
OPEN.
o A server MAY return NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND to a non-idempotent
current filehandle change operation, if it looks at the next
operation (in the same COMPOUND procedure) and finds it is not
GETFH. The server SHOULD do this if it is unable to determine in
advance whether the total response size would exceed
ca_maxresponsesize_cached or ca_maxresponsesize.
2.10.5.5. Persistence
Since the reply cache is bounded, it is practical for the reply cache
to persist across server restarts. The replier MUST persist the
following information if it agreed to persist the session (when the
session was created; see Section 17.36):
o The sessionid.
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o The slot table including the sequence id and cached reply for each
slot.
The above are sufficient for a replier to provide EOS semantics for
any requests that were sent and executed before the server restarted.
If the replier is a client then there is no need for it to persist
any more information, unless the client will be persisting all other
state across client restart. In which case, the server will never
see any NFSv4.1-level protocol manifestation of a client restart. If
the replier is a server, with just the slot table and sessionid
persisting, any requests the client retries after the server restart
will return the results that are cached in reply cache. and any new
requests (i.e. the sequence id is one (1) greater than the slot's
sequence id) MUST be rejected with NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION (returned by
SEQUENCE). Such a session is considered: dead. A server MAY re-
animate a session after a server restart so that the session will
accept new requests as well as retries. To re-animate a session the
server needs to persist additional information through server
restart:
o The client ID. This is a prerequisite to let the client to create
more sessions associated with the same client ID as the
o The client ID's sequenceid that is used for creating sessions (see
Section 17.35 and Section 17.36. This is a prerequisite to let
the client create more sessions.
o The principal that created the client ID. This allows the server
to authenticate the client when it issues EXCHANGE_ID.
o The SSV, if SP4_SSV state protection was specified when the client
ID was created (see Section 17.35). This lets the client create
new sessions, and associate connections with the new and existing
sessions.
o The properties of the client ID as defined in Section 17.35.
A persistent reply cache places certain demands on the server. The
execution of the sequence of operations (starting with SEQUENCE) and
placement of its results in the persistent cache MUST be atomic. If
a client retries an sequence of operations that was previously
executed on the server the only acceptable outcomes are either the
original cached reply or an indication that client ID or session has
been lost (indicating a catastrophic loss of the reply cache or a
session that has been deleted because the client failed to use the
session for an extended period of time).
A server could fail and restart in the middle of a COMPOUND procedure
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that contains one or more non-idempotent or idempotent-but-modifying
operations. This creates an even higher challenge for atomic
execution and placement of results in the reply cache. One way to
view the problem is as a single transaction consisting of each
operation in the COMPOUND followed by storing the result in
persistent storage, then finally a transaction commit. If there is a
failure before the transaction is committed, then the server rolls
back the transaction. If server itself fails, then when it restarts,
its recovery logic could roll back the transaction before starting
the NFSv4.1 server.
While the description of the implementation for atomic execution of
the request and caching of the reply is beyond the scope of this
document, an example implementation for NFS version 2 is described in
[28].
2.10.6. RDMA Considerations
A complete discussion of the operation of RPC-based protocols over
RDMA transports is in [9]. A discussion of the operation of NFSv4,
including NFSv4.1, over RDMA is in [10]. Where RDMA is considered,
this specification assumes the use of such a layering; it addresses
only the upper layer issues relevant to making best use of RPC/RDMA.
2.10.6.1. RDMA Connection Resources
RDMA requires its consumers to register memory and post buffers of a
specific size and number for receive operations.
Registration of memory can be a relatively high-overhead operation,
since it requires pinning of buffers, assignment of attributes (e.g.
readable/writable), and initialization of hardware translation.
Preregistration is desirable to reduce overhead. These registrations
are specific to hardware interfaces and even to RDMA connection
endpoints, therefore negotiation of their limits is desirable to
manage resources effectively.
Following basic registration, these buffers must be posted by the RPC
layer to handle receives. These buffers remain in use by the RPC/
NFSv4.1 implementation; the size and number of them must be known to
the remote peer in order to avoid RDMA errors which would cause a
fatal error on the RDMA connection.
NFSv4.1 manages slots as resources on a per session basis (see
Section 2.10), while RDMA connections manage credits on a per
connection basis. This means that in order for a peer to send data
over RDMA to a remote buffer, it has to have both an NFSv4.1 slot,
and an RDMA credit. If multiple RDMA connections are associated with
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a session, then if the total number of creds across all RDMA
connections associated with the session is X, and the number slots in
the session is Y, then the maximum number of outstanding requests is
lesser of X and Y.
2.10.6.2. Flow Control
Previous versions of NFS do not provide flow control; instead they
rely on the windowing provided by transports like TCP to throttle
requests. This does not work with RDMA, which provides no operation
flow control and will terminate a connection in error when limits are
exceeded. Limits such as maximum number of requests outstanding are
therefore negotiated when a session is created (see the
ca_maxrequests field in Section 17.36). These limits then provide
the maxima which each connection associated with the session's
channel(s) must remain within. RDMA connections are managed within
these limits as described in section 3.3 ("Flow Control"[[Comment.4:
RFC Editor: please verify section and title of the RPCRDMA
document]]) of [9]; if there are multiple RDMA connections, then the
maximum number of requests for a channel will be divided among the
RDMA connections. Put a different way, the onus is on the replier to
ensure that total number of RDMA credits across all connections
associated with the replier's channel does exceed the channel's
maximum number of outstanding requests.
The limits may also be modified dynamically at the replier's choosing
by manipulating certain parameters present in each NFSv4.1 reply. In
addition, the CB_RECALL_SLOT callback operation (see Section 19.8)
can be issued by a server to a client to return RDMA credits to the
server, thereby lowering the maximum number of requests a client can
have outstanding to the server.
2.10.6.3. Padding
Header padding is requested by each peer at session initiation (see
the ca_headerpadsize argument to CREATE_SESSION in Section 17.36),
and subsequently used by the RPC RDMA layer, as described in [9].
Zero padding is permitted.
Padding leverages the useful property that RDMA preserve alignment of
data, even when they are placed into anonymous (untagged) buffers.
If requested, client inline writes will insert appropriate pad bytes
within the request header to align the data payload on the specified
boundary. The client is encouraged to add sufficient padding (up to
the negotiated size) so that the "data" field of the NFSv4.1 WRITE
operation is aligned. Most servers can make good use of such
padding, which allows them to chain receive buffers in such a way
that any data carried by client requests will be placed into
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appropriate buffers at the server, ready for file system processing.
The receiver's RPC layer encounters no overhead from skipping over
pad bytes, and the RDMA layer's high performance makes the insertion
and transmission of padding on the sender a significant optimization.
In this way, the need for servers to perform RDMA Read to satisfy all
but the largest client writes is obviated. An added benefit is the
reduction of message round trips on the network - a potentially good
trade, where latency is present.
The value to choose for padding is subject to a number of criteria.
A primary source of variable-length data in the RPC header is the
authentication information, the form of which is client-determined,
possibly in response to server specification. The contents of
COMPOUNDs, sizes of strings such as those passed to RENAME, etc. all
go into the determination of a maximal NFSv4.1 request size and
therefore minimal buffer size. The client must select its offered
value carefully, so as not to overburden the server, and vice- versa.
The payoff of an appropriate padding value is higher performance.
[[Comment.5: RFC editor please keep this diagram on one page.]]
Sender gather:
|RPC Request|Pad bytes|Length| -> |User data...|
\------+---------------------/ \
\ \
\ Receiver scatter: \-----------+- ...
/-----+----------------\ \ \
|RPC Request|Pad|Length| -> |FS buffer|->|FS buffer|->...
In the above case, the server may recycle unused buffers to the next
posted receive if unused by the actual received request, or may pass
the now-complete buffers by reference for normal write processing.
For a server which can make use of it, this removes any need for data
copies of incoming data, without resorting to complicated end-to-end
buffer advertisement and management. This includes most kernel-based
and integrated server designs, among many others. The client may
perform similar optimizations, if desired.
2.10.6.4. Dual RDMA and Non-RDMA Transports
Some RDMA transports (for example [11]), permit a "streaming" (non-
RDMA) phase, where ordinary traffic might flow before "stepping up"
to RDMA mode, commencing RDMA traffic. Some RDMA transports start
connections always in RDMA mode. NFSv4.1 allows, but does not
assume, a streaming phase before RDMA mode. When a connection is
associated with a session, the client and server negotiate whether
the connection is used in RDMA or non-RDMA mode (see Section 17.36
and Section 17.34).
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2.10.7. Sessions Security
2.10.7.1. Session Callback Security
Via session / connection association, NFSv4.1 improves security over
that provided by NFSv4.0 for the backchannel. The connection is
client-initiated (see Section 17.34), and subject to the same
firewall and routing checks as the fore channel. The connection
cannot be hijacked by an attacker who connects to the client port
prior to the intended server as is possible with NFSv4.0. At the
client's option (see Section 17.35), connection association is fully
authenticated before being activated (see Section 17.34). Traffic
from the server over the backchannel is authenticated exactly as the
client specifies (see Section 2.10.7.2).
2.10.7.2. Backchannel RPC Security
When the NFSv4.1 client establishes the backchannel, it informs the
server of the security flavors and principals to use when sending
requests. If the security flavor is RPCSEC_GSS, the client expresses
the principal in the form of an established RPCSEC_GSS context. The
server is free to use any of the flavor/principal combinations the
client offers, but it MUST NOT use unoffered combinations. This way,
the client need not to provide a target GSS principal for the
backchannel as it did with NFSv4.0, nor the server have to implement
an RPCSEC_GSS initiator as it did with NFSv4.0 [2].
The CREATE_SESSION (Section 17.36) and BACKCHANNEL_CTL
(Section 17.33) operations allow the client to specify flavor/
principal combinations.
Also note that the SP4_SSV state protection mode (see Section 17.35
and Section 2.10.7.3) has the side benefit of providing SSV-derived
RPCSEC_GSS contexts (Section 2.10.7.4).
2.10.7.3. Protection from Unauthorized State Changes
As described to this point in the specification, the state model of
NFSv4.1 is vulnerable to an attacker that issues a SEQUENCE operation
with a forged sessionid and with a slot id that it expects the
legitimate client to use next. When the legitimate client uses the
slot id with the same sequence number, the server returns the
attacker's result from the reply cache which disrupts the legitimate
client and thus denies service to it. Similarly an attacker could
issue a CREATE_SESSION with a forged client ID to create a new
session associated with the client ID. The attacker could issue
requests using the new session that change locking state, such as
LOCKU operations to release locks the legitimate client has acquired.
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Setting a security policy on the file which requires RPCSEC_GSS
credentials when manipulating the file's state is one potential work
around, but has the disadvantage of preventing a legitimate client
from releasing state when RPCSEC_GSS is required to do so, but a GSS
context cannot be obtained (possibly because the user has logged off
the client).
NFSv4.1 provides three options to a client for state protection which
are specified when a client creates a client ID via EXCHANGE_ID
(Section 17.35).
The first (SP4_NONE) is to simply waive state protection.
The other two options (SP4_MACH_CRED and SP4_SSV) share several
traits:
o An RPCSEC_GSS-based credential is used to authenticate client ID
and session maintenance operations, including creating and
destroying a session, associating a connection with the session,
and destroying the client ID.
o Because RPCSEC_GSS is used to authenticate client ID and session
maintenance, the attacker cannot associate a rogue connection with
a legitimate session, or associate a rogue session with a
legitimate client ID in order to maliciously alter the client ID's
lock state via CLOSE, LOCKU, DELEGRETURN, LAYOUTRETURN, etc.
o In cases where the server's security policies on a portion of its
namespace require RPCSEC_GSS authentication, a client may have to
use an RPCSEC_GSS credential to remove per-file state (for example
LOCKU, CLOSE, etc.). The server may require that the principal
that removes the state match certain criteria (for example, the
principal might have to be the same as the one that acquired the
state). However, the client might not be have an RPCSEC_GSS
context for such a principal, and might not be able to create such
a context (perhaps because the user has logged off). When the
client establishes SP4_MACH_CRED or SP4_SSV protection, it can
specify a list of operations that the server MUST allow using the
machine credential (if SP4_MACH_CRED is used) or the SSV
credential (if SP4_SSV is used).
The SP4_MACH_CRED state protection option uses a machine credential
where the principal that creates the client ID, must also be the
principal that performs client ID and session maintenance operations.
The security of the machine credential state protection approach
depends entirely on safe guarding the per-machine credential.
Assuming a proper safe guard, using the per-machine credential for
operations like CREATE_SESSION, BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION,
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DESTROY_SESSION, and DESTROY_CLIENTID will prevent an attacker from
associating a rogue connection with a session, or associating a rogue
session with a client ID.
There are at least three scenarios for the SP4_MACH_CRED option:
1. That the system administrator configures a unique, permanent per-
machine credential for one of the mandated GSS mechanisms (for
example, if Kerberos V5 is used, a "keytab" for principal named
after client host name could be used).
2. The client is used by a single user, and so the client ID and its
sessions are used by just that user. If the user's credential
expires, then session and client ID maintenance cannot occur, but
since the client has a single user, only that user is
inconvenienced.
3. The physical client has multiple users, but the client
implementation has a unique client ID for each user. This is
effectively the same as the second scenario, but a disadvantage
is that each user must be allocated at least one session each, so
the approach suffers from lack of economy.
The SP4_SSV protection option uses a Secret State Verifier (SSV)
which is shared between a client and server. The SSV serves as the
secret key for an internal (that is, internal to NFSv4.1) GSS
mechanism that uses the secret key for Message Integrity Code (MIC)
and Wrap tokens (Section 2.10.7.4). The SP4_SSV protection option is
intended for the client that has multiple users, and the system
administrator does not wish to configure a permanent machine
credential for each client. The SSV is established on the server via
SET_SSV (see Section 17.47). To prevent eavesdropping, a client
SHOULD issue SET_SSV via RPCSEC_GSS with the privacy service.
Several aspects of the SSV make it intractable for an attacker to
guess the SSV, and thus associate rogue connections with a session,
and rogue sessions with a client ID:
o The arguments to and results of SET_SSV include digests of the old
and new SSV, respectively.
o Because the initial value of the SSV is zero, therefore known, the
client that opts for SP4_SSV protection and opts to apply SP4_SSV
protection to BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION and CREATE_SESSION MUST issue
at least one SET_SSV operation before the first
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION operation or before the second CREATE_SESSION
operation on a client ID. If it does not, the SSV mechanism will
not generate tokens (Section 2.10.7.4). A client SHOULD issue
SET_SSV as soon as a session is created.
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o A SET_SSV does not replace the SSV with the argument to SET_SSV.
Instead, the current SSV on the server is logically exclusive ORed
(XORed) with the argument to SET_SSV. SET_SSV MUST NOT be called
with an SSV value that is zero. For this reason, each time a new
principal uses a client ID for the first time, the client SHOULD
issue a SET_SSV with that principal's RPCSEC_GSS credentials, with
RPCSEC_GSS service set to RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY.
Here are the types of attacks that can be attempted by an attacker
named Eve on a victim named Bob, and how SP4_SSV protection foils
each attack:
o Suppose Eve is the first user to log into a legitimate client.
Eve's use of an NFSv4.1 filesystem will cause an SSV to be created
via the legitimate client's NFSv4.1 implementation. The SET_SSV
that creates the SSV will be protected by the RPCSEC_GSS context
created by the legitimate client which uses Eve's GSS principal
and credentials. Eve can eavesdrop on the network while her
RPCSEC_GSS context is created, and the SET_SSV using her context
is issued. Even if the legitimate client issues the SET_SSV with
RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY, because Eve knows her own credentials, she
can decrypt the SSV. Eve can compute an RPCSEC_GSS credential
that BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION will accept, and so associate a new
connection with the legitimate session. Eve can change the slot
id and sequence state of a legitimate session, and/or the SSV
state, in such a way that when Bob accesses the server via the
same legitimate client, the legitimate client will be unable to
use the session.
The client's only recourse is to create a new client ID for Bob to
use, and establish a new SSV for the client ID. The client will
be unable to delete the old client ID, and will let the lease on
old client ID expire.
Once the legitimate client establishes an SSV over the new session
using Bob's RPCSEC_GSS context, Eve can use the new session via
the legitimate client, but she cannot disrupt Bob. Moreover,
because the client SHOULD have modified the SSV due to Eve using
the new session, Bob cannot get revenge on Eve by associating a
rogue connection with the session.
The question is how did the legitimate client detect that Eve has
hijacked the old session? When the client detects that a new
principal, Bob, wants to use the session, it SHOULD have issued a
SET_SSV, which leads to following sub-scenarios:
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* Let us suppose that from the rogue connection, Eve issued a
SET_SSV with the same slot id and sequence that the legitimate
client later uses. The server will assume this is a retry, and
return to the legitimate client the reply it sent Eve. However,
unless Eve can correctly guess the SSV the legitimate client
will use, the digest verification checks in the SET_SSV
response will fail. That is an indication to the client that
the session has apparently been hijacked.
* Alternatively, Eve issued a SET_SSV with a different slot id
than the legitimate client uses for its SET_SSV. Then the
digest verification on the server fails, and it is again
apparent to the client that the session has been hijacked.
* Alternatively, Eve issued an operation other than SET_SSV, but
with the same slot id and sequence that the legitimate client
uses for its SET_SSV. The server returns to the legitimate
client the response it sent Eve. The client sees that the
response is not at all what it expects. The client assumes
either session hijacking or a server bug, and either way
destroys the old session.
o Eve associates a rogue connection with the session as above, and
then destroys the session. Again, Bob goes to use the server from
the legitimate client by issuing a SET_SSV. The client receives
an error that indicates the session does not exist. When the
client tries to create a new session, this will fail because the
SSV it has does not that the server has, and now the client knows
the session was hijacked. The legitimate client establishes a new
client ID as before.
o If Eve creates a connection before the legitimate client
establishes an SSV, because the initial value of the SSV is zero
and therefore known, Eve can issue a SET_SSV that will pass the
digest verification check. However because the new connection has
not been associated with the session, the SET_SSV is rejected for
that reason.
In summary an attacker's disruption of state when SP4_SSV protection
is in use is limited to the formative period of a client ID, its
first session, and the establishment of the SSV. Once a non-
malicious user uses the client ID, the client quickly detects any
hijack and rectifies the situation. Once a non-malicious user
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successfully modifies the SSV, the attacker cannot use NFSv4.1
operations to disrupt the non-malicious user.
Note that neither the SP4_MACH_CRED nor SP4_SSV protection approaches
prevent hijacking of a transport connection that has previously been
associated with a session. If the goal of a counter threat strategy
is to prevent connection hijacking, the use of IPsec is RECOMMENDED.
If the goal of a counter threat strategy is to prevent a connection
hijacker from making unauthorized state changes, then the
SP4_MACH_CRED protection approach can be used with a client ID per
user (i.e. the aforementioned third scenario for machine credential
state protection). Each EXCHANGE_ID can specify the all operations
MUST be protected with the machine credential. The server will then
reject any subsequent operations on the client ID that do not use
RPCSEC_GSS with privacy or integrity and do not use the same
credential that created the client ID.
2.10.7.4. The SSV GSS Mechanism
The SSV provides the secret key for a mechanism that NFSv4.1 uses for
state protection. Contexts for this mechanism are not established
via the RPCSEC_GSS protocol. Instead, the contexts are automatically
created when EXCHANGE_ID specifies SP4_SSV protection. The only
tokens defined are the PerMsgToken (emitted by GSS_GetMIC) and the
SealedMessage (emitted by GSS_Wrap).
The mechanism OID for the SSV mechanism is:
iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprise.Michael Eisler.nfs.ssv_mech
(1.3.6.1.4.1.28882.1.1). While the SSV mechansims does not define
any initial context tokens, the OID can be used to let servers
indicate that the SSV mechanism is acceptable whenever the client
issues a SECINFO or SECINFO_NO_NAME operation (see Section 2.6).
The PerMsgToken description is based on an XDR definition:
/* Input for computing smt_hmac */
struct ssv_mic_plain_tkn4 {
uint32_t smpt_ssv_seq;
opaque smpt_orig_plain<>;
};
/* SSV GSS SealedMessage token */
struct ssv_mic_tkn4 {
uint64_t smt_ssv_seq;
opaque smt_hmac<>;
};
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The token emitted by GSS_GetMIC() is XDR encoded and of XDR data type
ssv_mic_tkn4. The field smt_ssv_seq comes from the SSV sequence
number which is equal to 1 after SET_SSV is called the first time on
a client ID. Thereafter, it is incremented on each SET_SSV. Thus
smt_ssv_seq represents the version of the SSV at the time
GSS_GetMIC() was called. This allows the SSV to be changed without
serializing all RPC calls that use the SSV mechanism with SET_SSV
operations.
The field smt_hmac is an HMAC ([12]), calculated by using the current
SSV as the key, the one way hash algorithm as negotiated by
EXCHANGE_ID, and the input text as represented by data of type
ssv_mic_plain_tkn4. The field smpt_ssv_seq is the same as
smt_ssv_seq. The field smt_orig_plain is the input text as passed
into GSS_GetMIC().
The SealedMessage description is based on an XDR definition:
/* Input for computing ssct_encr_data and ssct_hmac */
struct ssv_seal_plain_tkn4 {
opaque sspt_confounder<>;
uint32_t sspt_ssv_seq;
opaque sspt_orig_plain<>;
opaque sspt_pad<>;
};
/* SSV GSS SealedMessage token */
struct ssv_seal_cipher_tkn4 {
uint32_t ssct_ssv_seq;
opaque ssct_encr_data<>;
opaque ssct_hmac<>;
};
The token emitted by GSS_Wrap() is XDR encoded and of XDR data type
ssv_seal_cipher_tkn4. The field ssct_ssv_seq has the same meaning as
smt_ssv_seq. The ssct_encr_data field is the result of encrypting a
value of the XDR encoded data type ssv_seal_plain_tkn4. The
encryption key is the SSV, and the encryption algorithm is that
negotiated by EXCHANGE_ID.
The ssct_hmac field is the result of computing an HMAC using value of
the XDR encoded data type ssv_seal_plain_tkn4 as the input text. The
key is the SSV, and the one way hash algorithm is that negotiated by
EXCHANGE_ID.
The sspt_confounder field is a random value.
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The sspt_ssv_seq field is the same as ssvt_ssv_seq.
The sspt_orig_plain field is the original plaintext as passed to
GSS_Wrap().
The sspt_pad field is present to support encryption algorithms that
require inputs to be in fixed sized blocks. The content of sspt_pad
is zero filled except for the length. Beware that the XDR encoding
of ssv_seal_plain_tkn4 contains three variable length arrays, and so
each array consumes 4 octets for an array length, and each array that
follows the length is always padded to a multiple of 4 octets per the
XDR standard.
For example suppose the encryption algorithm uses 16 octet blocks,
and the sspt_confounder is 3 octets long, and the sspt_orig_plain
field is 15 octets long. The XDR encoding of sspt_confounder uses 8
octets (4 + 3 + 1 octet pad), the XDR encoding of sspt_ssv_seq uses 4
octets, the XDR encoding of sspt_orig_plain uses 20 octets (4 + 15 +
1 octet pad), and the smallest XDR encoding of the sspt_pad field is
4 octets. This totals 36 octets. The next multiple of 16 is 48,
thus the length field of sspt_pad needs to be set to 12 octets, or a
total encoding of 16 octets. The total number of XDR encoded octets
is thus 8 + 4 + 20 + 16 = 48.
GSS_Wrap() emits a token that is an XDR encoding of a value of data
type ssv_seal_cipher_tkn4. Note that regardless whether the caller
of GSS_Wrap() requests confidentiality or not, the token always has
confidentiality. This is because the SSV mechanism is for
RPCSEC_GSS, and RPCSEC_GSS never produces GSS_wrap() tokens without
confidentiality.
Effectively there is a single GSS context for all RPCSEC_GSS handles
that have been created on a session. And all sessions associated
with a a client ID share the same SSV. SSV GSS contexts do not
expire except when the SSV is destroyed (causes would include the
client ID being destroyed or a server restart). Since one purpose of
context expiration is to replace keys that have been in use for "too
long" hence vulnerable to compromise by brute force or accident, the
client can issue periodic SET_SSV operations, by cycling through
different users' RPCSEC_GSS credentials. This way the SSV is
replaced without destroying the SSV's GSS contexts. If for some
reason SSV RPCSEC_GSS handles expire, the EXCHANGE_ID operation can
be used to create more SSV RPCSEC_GSS handles.
The client MUST establish an SSV via SET_SSV before the GSS context
can be used to emit tokens from GSS_Wrap() and GSS_GetMIC(). If
SET_SSV has not been successfully called, attempts to emit tokens
MUST fail.
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The SSV mechanism does not support replay detection and sequencing in
its tokens becuase RPCSEC_GSS does not use those features (Section
5.2.2 "Context Creation Requests" in [5]).
2.10.8. Session Mechanics - Steady State
2.10.8.1. Obligations of the Server
The server has the primary obligation to monitor the state of
backchannel resources that the client has created for the server
(RPCSEC_GSS contexts and backchannel connections). If these
resources vanish, the server takes action as specified in
Section 2.10.9.2.
2.10.8.2. Obligations of the Client
The client SHOULD honor the following obligations in order to utilize
the session:
o Keep a necessary session from going idle on the server. A client
that requires a session, but nonetheless is not sending operations
risks having the session be destroyed by the server. This is
because sessions consume resources, and resource limitations may
force the server to cull a session that has not been used for long
time. [[Comment.6: Tom Talpey disagrees and thinks a server can
never cull a session. Mike Eisler doesn't know what the server is
supposed to do when it accumulates a zillion reply caches that no
client has touched in a century. :-)]]
o Destroy the session when not needed. If a client has multiple
sessions and one of them has no requests waiting for replies, and
has been idle for some period of time, it SHOULD destroy the
session.
o Maintain GSS contexts for the callback channel. If the client
requires the server to use the RPCSEC_GSS security flavor for
callbacks, then it needs to be sure the contexts handed to the
server via BACKCHANNEL_CTL are unexpired.
o Preserve a connection for a backchannel. The server requires a
backchannel in order to gracefully recall recallable state, or
notify the client of certain events. Note that if the connection
is not being used for the fore channel, there is no way the client
tell if the connection is still alive (e.g., the server rebooted
without sending a disconnect). The onus is on the server, not the
client, to determine if the backchannel's connection is alive, and
to indicate in the response to a SEQUENCE operation when the last
connection associated with a session's backchannel has
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disconnected.
2.10.8.3. Steps the Client Takes To Establish a Session
If the client does not have a client ID, the client issues
EXCHANGE_ID to establish a client ID. If it opts for SP4_MACH_CRED
or SP4_SSV protection, in the spo_must_enforce list of operations, it
SHOULD at minimum specify: CREATE_SESSION, DESTROY_SESSION,
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, BACKCHANNEL_CTL, and DESTROY_CLIENTID. If opts
for SP4_SSV protection, the client needs to ask for SSV-based
RPCSEC_GSS handles.
The client uses the client ID to issue a CREATE_SESSION on a
connection to the server. The results of CREATE_SESSION indicate
whether the server will persist the session reply cache through a
server reboot or not, and the client notes this for future reference.
If the client specified SP4_SSV state protection when the client ID
was created, then it SHOULD issue SET_SSV in the first COMPOUND after
the session is created. Each time a new principal goes to use the
client ID, it SHOULD issue a SET_SSV again.
If the client wants to use delegations, layouts, directory
notifications, or any other state that requires a backchannel, then
it must add a connection to the backchannel if CREATE_SESSION did not
already do so. The client creates a connection, and calls
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION to associate the connection with the session and
the session's backchannel. If CREATE_SESSION did not already do so,
the client MUST tell the server what security is required in order
for the client to accept callbacks. The client does this via
BACKCHANNEL_CTL. If the client selected SP4_MACH_CRED or SP4_SSV
protection when it called EXCHANGE_ID, then the client SHOULD specify
that the backchannel use RPCSEC_GSS contexts for security.
If the client wants to use additional connections for the
backchannel, then it must call BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION on each
connection it wants to use with the session. If the client wants to
use additional connections for the fore channel, then it must call
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION if it specified SP4_SSV or SP4_MACH_CRED state
protection when the client ID was created.
At this point the session has reached steady state.
2.10.9. Session Mechanics - Recovery
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2.10.9.1. Events Requiring Client Action
The following events require client action to recover.
2.10.9.1.1. RPCSEC_GSS Context Loss by Callback Path
If all RPCSEC_GSS contexts granted by the client to the server for
callback use have expired, the client MUST establish a new context
via BACKCHANNEL_CTL. The sr_status_flags field of the SEQUENCE
results indicates when callback contexts are nearly expired, or fully
expired (see Section 17.46.4).
2.10.9.1.2. Connection Loss
If the client loses the last connection of the session, and if wants
to retain the session, then it must create a new connection, and if,
when the client ID was created, BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION was specified in
the spo_must_enforce list, the client MUST use BIND_CONNN_TO_SESSION
to associate the connection with the session.
If there was a request outstanding at the time the of connection
loss, then if client wants to continue to use the session it MUST
retry the request, as described in Section 2.10.5.2. Note that it is
not necessary to retry requests over a connection with the same
source network address or the same destination network address as the
lost connection. As long as the sessionid, slot id, and sequence id
in the retry match that of the original request, the server will
recognize the request as a retry if it executed the request prior to
disconnect.
If the connection that was lost was the last one associated with the
backchannel, and the client wants to retain the backchannel and/or
not put recallable state subject to revocation, the client must
reconnect, and if it does, it MUST associate the connection to the
session and backchannel via BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION. The server SHOULD
indicate when it has no callback connection via the sr_status_flags
result from SEQUENCE.
2.10.9.1.3. Backchannel GSS Context Loss
Via the sr_status_flags result of the SEQUENCE operation or other
means, the client will learn if some or all of the RPCSEC_GSS
contexts it assigned to the backchannel have been lost. If the
client wants to the retain the backchannel and/or not put recallable
state subjection to revocation, the client must use BACKCHANNEL_CTL
to assign new contexts.
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2.10.9.1.4. Loss of Session
The replier might lose a record of the session. Causes include:
o Replier crash and reboot
o A catastrophe that causes the reply cache to be corrupted or lost
on the media it was stored on. This applies even if the replier
indicated in the CREATE_SESSION results that it would persist the
cache.
o The server purges the session of a client that has been inactive
for a very extended period of time.
Loss of reply cache is equivalent to loss of session. The replier
indicates loss of session to the requester by returning
NFS4ERR_BADSESSION on the next operation that uses the sessionid that
refers to the lost session.
After an event like a server reboot, the client may have lost its
connections. The client assumes for the moment that the session has
not been lost. It reconnects, and if it specified connection
association enforcement when the session was created, it invokes
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION using the sessionid. Otherwise, it invokes
SEQUENCE. If BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION or SEQUENCE returns
NFS4ERR_BADSESSION, the client knows the session was lost. If the
connection survives session loss, then the next SEQUENCE operation
the client issues over the connection will get back
NFS4ERR_BADSESSION. The client again knows the session was lost.
When the client detects session loss, it must call CREATE_SESSION to
recover. Any non-idempotent operations that were in progress may
have been performed on the server at the time of session loss. The
client has no general way to recover from this.
Note that loss of session does not imply loss of lock, open,
delegation, or layout state because locks, opens, delegations, and
layouts are tied to the client ID and depend on the client ID, not
the session. Nor does loss of lock, open, delegation, or layout
state imply loss of session state, because the session depends on the
client ID; loss of client ID however does imply loss of session,
lock, open, delegation, and layout state. See Section 8.6.2. A
session can survive a server reboot, but lock recovery may still be
needed.
It is possible CREATE_SESSION will fail with NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID
(for example the server reboots and does not preserve client ID
state). If so, the client needs to call EXCHANGE_ID, followed by
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CREATE_SESSION.
2.10.9.2. Events Requiring Server Action
The following events require server action to recover.
2.10.9.2.1. Client Crash and Reboot
As described in Section 17.35, a rebooted client issues EXCHANGE_ID
in such a way it causes the server to delete any sessions it had.
2.10.9.2.2. Client Crash with No Reboot
If a client crashes and never comes back, it will never issue
EXCHANGE_ID with its old client owner. Thus the server has session
state that will never be used again. After an extended period of
time and if the server has resource constraints, it MAY destroy the
old session as well as locking state.
2.10.9.2.3. Extended Network Partition
To the server, the extended network partition may be no different
from a client crash with no reboot (see Section 2.10.9.2.2). Unless
the server can discern that there is a network partition, it is free
to treat the situation as if the client has crashed permanently.
2.10.9.2.4. Backchannel Connection Loss
If there were callback requests outstanding at the time of a
connection loss, then the server MUST retry the request, as described
in Section 2.10.5.2. Note that it is not necessary to retry requests
over a connection with the same source network address or the same
destination network address as the lost connection. As long as the
sessionid, slot id, and sequence id in the retry match that of the
original request, the callback target will recognize the request as a
retry even if it did see the request prior to disconnect.
If the connection lost is the last one associated with the
backchannel, then the server MUST indicate that in the
sr_status_flags field of every SEQUENCE reply until the backchannel
is reestablished. There are two situations each of which use
different status flags: no connectivity for the session's
backchannel, and no connectivity for any session backchannel of the
client. See Section 17.46 for a description of the appropriate flags
in sr_status_flags.
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2.10.9.2.5. GSS Context Loss
The server SHOULD monitor when the number RPCSEC_GSS contexts
assigned to the backchannel reaches one, and that one context is near
expiry (i.e. between one and two periods of lease time), and indicate
so in the sr_status_flags field of all SEQUENCE replies. The server
MUST indicate when the all of the backchannel's assigned RPCSEC_GSS
contexts have expired in the sr_status_flags field of all SEQUENCE
replies.
2.10.10. Parallel NFS and Sessions
A client and server can potentially be a non-pNFS implementation, a
metadata server implementation, a data server implementation, or two
or three types of implementations. The EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS,
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS, and EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS flags (not
mutually exclusive) are passed in the EXCHANGE_ID arguments and
results to allow the client to indicate how it wants to use sessions
created under the client ID, and to allow the server to indicate how
it will allow the sessions to be used. See Section 13.1 for pNFS
sessions considerations.
3. Protocol Data Types
The syntax and semantics to describe the data types of the NFS
version 4 protocol are defined in the XDR RFC4506 [3] and RPC RFC1831
[4] documents. The next sections build upon the XDR data types to
define types and structures specific to this protocol.
3.1. Basic Data Types
These are the base NFSv4 data types.
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Data Type | Definition |
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| int32_t | typedef int int32_t; |
| uint32_t | typedef unsigned int uint32_t; |
| int64_t | typedef hyper int64_t; |
| uint64_t | typedef unsigned hyper uint64_t; |
| attrlist4 | typedef opaque attrlist4<>; |
| | Used for file/directory attributes |
| bitmap4 | typedef uint32_t bitmap4<>; |
| | Used in attribute array encoding. |
| changeid4 | typedef uint64_t changeid4; |
| | Used in definition of change_info |
| clientid4 | typedef uint64_t clientid4; |
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| | Shorthand reference to client identification |
| component4 | typedef utf8str_cs component4; |
| | Represents path name components |
| count4 | typedef uint32_t count4; |
| | Various count parameters (READ, WRITE, COMMIT) |
| length4 | typedef uint64_t length4; |
| | Describes LOCK lengths |
| linktext4 | typedef utf8str_cs linktext4; |
| | Symbolic link contents |
| mode4 | typedef uint32_t mode4; |
| | Mode attribute data type |
| nfs_cookie4 | typedef uint64_t nfs_cookie4; |
| | Opaque cookie value for READDIR |
| nfs_fh4 | typedef opaque nfs_fh4<NFS4_FHSIZE> |
| | Filehandle definition; NFS4_FHSIZE is defined as |
| | 128 |
| nfs_ftype4 | enum nfs_ftype4; |
| | Various defined file types |
| nfsstat4 | enum nfsstat4; |
| | Return value for operations |
| offset4 | typedef uint64_t offset4; |
| | Various offset designations (READ, WRITE, LOCK, |
| | COMMIT) |
| pathname4 | typedef component4 pathname4<>; |
| | Represents path name for fs_locations |
| qop4 | typedef uint32_t qop4; |
| | Quality of protection designation in SECINFO |
| sec_oid4 | typedef opaque sec_oid4<>; |
| | Security Object Identifier The sec_oid4 data type |
| | is not really opaque. Instead contains an ASN.1 |
| | OBJECT IDENTIFIER as used by GSS-API in the |
| | mech_type argument to GSS_Init_sec_context. See |
| | RFC2743 [8] for details. |
| sequenceid4 | typedef uint32_t sequenceid4; |
| | sequence number used for various session |
| | operations (EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, |
| | SEQUENCE, CB_SEQUENCE). |
| seqid4 | typedef uint32_t seqid4; |
| | Sequence identifier used for file locking |
| sessionid4 | typedef opaque sessionid4[16]; |
| | Session identifier |
| slotid4 | typedef uint32_t slotid4; |
| | sequencing artifact various session operations |
| | (SEQUENCE, CB_SEQUENCE). |
| utf8string | typedef opaque utf8string<>; |
| | UTF-8 encoding for strings |
| utf8str_cis | typedef opaque utf8str_cis; |
| | Case-insensitive UTF-8 string |
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| utf8str_cs | typedef opaque utf8str_cs; |
| | Case-sensitive UTF-8 string |
| utf8str_mixed | typedef opaque utf8str_mixed; |
| | UTF-8 strings with a case sensitive prefix and a |
| | case insensitive suffix. |
| verifier4 | typedef opaque verifier4[NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE]; |
| | Verifier used for various operations (COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, EXCHANGE_ID, OPEN, READDIR, WRITE) |
| | NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE is defined as 8. |
+---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
End of Base Data Types
Table 1
3.2. Structured Data Types
3.2.1. nfstime4
struct nfstime4 {
int64_t seconds;
uint32_t nseconds;
}
The nfstime4 structure gives the number of seconds and nanoseconds
since midnight or 0 hour January 1, 1970 Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC). Values greater than zero for the seconds field denote dates
after the 0 hour January 1, 1970. Values less than zero for the
seconds field denote dates before the 0 hour January 1, 1970. In
both cases, the nseconds field is to be added to the seconds field
for the final time representation. For example, if the time to be
represented is one-half second before 0 hour January 1, 1970, the
seconds field would have a value of negative one (-1) and the
nseconds fields would have a value of one-half second (500000000).
Values greater than 999,999,999 for nseconds are considered invalid.
This data type is used to pass time and date information. A server
converts to and from its local representation of time when processing
time values, preserving as much accuracy as possible. If the
precision of timestamps stored for a file system object is less than
defined, loss of precision can occur. An adjunct time maintenance
protocol is recommended to reduce client and server time skew.
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3.2.2. time_how4
enum time_how4 {
SET_TO_SERVER_TIME4 = 0,
SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME4 = 1
};
3.2.3. settime4
union settime4 switch (time_how4 set_it) {
case SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME4:
nfstime4 time;
default:
void;
};
The above definitions are used as the attribute definitions to set
time values. If set_it is SET_TO_SERVER_TIME4, then the server uses
its local representation of time for the time value.
3.2.4. specdata4
struct specdata4 {
uint32_t specdata1; /* major device number */
uint32_t specdata2; /* minor device number */
};
This data type represents additional information for the device file
types NF4CHR and NF4BLK.
3.2.5. fsid4
struct fsid4 {
uint64_t major;
uint64_t minor;
};
3.2.6. fs_location4
struct fs_location4 {
utf8str_cis server<>;
pathname4 rootpath;
};
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3.2.7. fs_locations4
struct fs_locations4 {
pathname4 fs_root;
fs_location4 locations<>;
};
The fs_location4 and fs_locations4 data types are used for the
fs_locations recommended attribute which is used for migration and
replication support.
3.2.8. fattr4
struct fattr4 {
bitmap4 attrmask;
attrlist4 attr_vals;
};
The fattr4 structure is used to represent file and directory
attributes.
The bitmap is a counted array of 32 bit integers used to contain bit
values. The position of the integer in the array that contains bit n
can be computed from the expression (n / 32) and its bit within that
integer is (n mod 32).
0 1
+-----------+-----------+-----------+--
| count | 31 .. 0 | 63 .. 32 |
+-----------+-----------+-----------+--
3.2.9. change_info4
struct change_info4 {
bool atomic;
changeid4 before;
changeid4 after;
};
This structure is used with the CREATE, LINK, REMOVE, RENAME
operations to let the client know the value of the change attribute
for the directory in which the target file system object resides.
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3.2.10. netaddr4
struct netaddr4 {
/* see struct rpcb in RFC1833 */
string r_netid<>; /* network id */
string r_addr<>; /* universal address */
};
The netaddr4 structure is used to identify TCP/IP based endpoints.
The r_netid and r_addr fields are specified in RFC1833 [26], but they
are underspecified in RFC1833 [26] as far as what they should look
like for specific protocols.
For TCP over IPv4 and for UDP over IPv4, the format of r_addr is the
US-ASCII string:
h1.h2.h3.h4.p1.p2
The prefix, "h1.h2.h3.h4", is the standard textual form for
representing an IPv4 address, which is always four octets long.
Assuming big-endian ordering, h1, h2, h3, and h4, are respectively,
the first through fourth octets each converted to ASCII-decimal.
Assuming big-endian ordering, p1 and p2 are, respectively, the first
and second octets each converted to ASCII-decimal. For example, if a
host, in big-endian order, has an address of 0x0A010307 and there is
a service listening on, in big endian order, port 0x020F (decimal
527), then complete universal address is "10.1.3.7.2.15".
For TCP over IPv4 the value of r_netid is the string "tcp". For UDP
over IPv4 the value of r_netid is the string "udp". That this
document specifies the universal address and netid for UDP/IPv6 does
not imply that UDP/IPv4 is a legal transport for NFSv4.1 (see
Section 2.9).
For TCP over IPv6 and for UDP over IPv6, the format of r_addr is the
US-ASCII string:
x1:x2:x3:x4:x5:x6:x7:x8.p1.p2
The suffix "p1.p2" is the service port, and is computed the same way
as with universal addresses for TCP and UDP over IPv4. The prefix,
"x1:x2:x3:x4:x5:x6:x7:x8", is the standard textual form for
representing an IPv6 address as defined in Section 2.2 of RFC1884
[13]. Additionally, the two alternative forms specified in Section
2.2 of RFC1884 [13] are also acceptable.
For TCP over IPv6 the value of r_netid is the string "tcp6". For UDP
over IPv6 the value of r_netid is the string "udp6". That this
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document specifies the universal address and netid for UDP/IPv6 does
not imply that UDP/IPv6 is a legal transport for NFSv4.1 (see
Section 2.9).
3.2.11. open_owner4
struct open_owner4 {
clientid4 clientid;
opaque owner<NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT>
};
This structure is used to identify the owner of open state.
NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT is defined as 1024.
3.2.12. lock_owner4
struct lock_owner4 {
clientid4 clientid;
opaque owner<NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT>
};
This structure is used to identify the owner of file locking state.
3.2.13. open_to_lock_owner4
struct open_to_lock_owner4 {
seqid4 open_seqid;
stateid4 open_stateid;
seqid4 lock_seqid;
lock_owner4 lock_owner;
};
This structure is used for the first LOCK operation done for an
open_owner4. It provides both the open_stateid and lock_owner such
that the transition is made from a valid open_stateid sequence to
that of the new lock_stateid sequence. Using this mechanism avoids
the confirmation of the lock_owner/lock_seqid pair since it is tied
to established state in the form of the open_stateid/open_seqid.
3.2.14. stateid4
struct stateid4 {
uint32_t seqid;
opaque other[12];
};
This structure is used for the various state sharing mechanisms
between the client and server. For the client, this data structure
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is read-only. The starting value of the seqid field is undefined.
The server is required to increment the seqid field monotonically at
each transition of the stateid. This is important since the client
will inspect the seqid in OPEN stateids to determine the order of
OPEN processing done by the server.
3.2.15. layouttype4
enum layouttype4 {
LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES = 1,
LAYOUT4_OSD2_OBJECTS = 2,
LAYOUT4_BLOCK_VOLUME = 3
};
A layout type specifies the layout being used. The implication is
that clients have "layout drivers" that support one or more layout
types. The file server advertises the layout types it supports
through the fs_layout_type file system attribute (Section 5.13.1). A
client asks for layouts of a particular type in LAYOUTGET, and passes
those layouts to its layout driver.
The layouttype4 structure is 32 bits in length. The range
represented by the layout type is split into three parts. Type 0x0
is reserved. Types within the range 0x00000001-0x7FFFFFFF are
globally unique and are assigned according to the description in
Section 21.1; they are maintained by IANA. Types within the range
0x80000000-0xFFFFFFFF are site specific and for "private use" only.
The LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES enumeration specifies that the NFSv4.1 file
layout type is to be used. The LAYOUT4_OSD2_OBJECTS enumeration
specifies that the object layout, as defined in [29], is to be used.
Similarly, the LAYOUT4_BLOCK_VOLUME enumeration that the block/volume
layout, as defined in [30], is to be used.
3.2.16. deviceid4
typedef uint32_t deviceid4; /* 32-bit device ID */
Layout information includes device IDs that specify a storage device
through a compact handle. Addressing and type information is
obtained with the GETDEVICEINFO operation. A client must not assume
that device IDs are valid across metadata server reboots. The device
ID is qualified by the layout type and are unique per file system
(FSID). This allows different layout drivers to generate device IDs
without the need for co-ordination. See Section 12.2.12 for more
details.
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3.2.17. device_addr4
struct device_addr4 {
layouttype4 da_layout_type;
opaque da_addr_body<>;
};
The device address is used to set up a communication channel with the
storage device. Different layout types will require different types
of structures to define how they communicate with storage devices.
The opaque da_addr_body field must be interpreted based on the
specified da_layout_type field.
This document defines the device address for the NFSv4.1 file layout
([[Comment.7: need xref]]), which identifies a storage device by
network IP address and port number. This is sufficient for the
clients to communicate with the NFSv4.1 storage devices, and may be
sufficient for other layout types as well. Device types for object
storage devices and block storage devices (e.g., SCSI volume labels)
will be defined by their respective layout specifications.
3.2.18. devlist_item4
struct devlist_item4 {
deviceid4 dli_id;
device_addr4 dli_device_addr<>;
};
An array of these values is returned by the GETDEVICELIST operation.
They define the set of devices associated with a file system for the
layout type specified in the GETDEVICELIST4args.
3.2.19. layout_content4
struct layout_content4 {
layouttype4 loc_type;
opaque loc_body<>;
};
The loc_body field must be interpreted based on the layout type
(loc_type). This document defines the loc_body for the NFSv4.1 file
layout type is defined; see Section 13.3 for its definition.
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3.2.20. layout4
struct layout4 {
offset4 lo_offset;
length4 lo_length;
layoutiomode4 lo_iomode;
layout_content4 lo_content;
};
The layout4 structure defines a layout for a file. The layout type
specific data is opaque within lo_content. Since layouts are sub-
dividable, the offset and length together with the file's filehandle,
the client ID, iomode, and layout type, identifies the layout.
3.2.21. layoutupdate4
struct layoutupdate4 {
layouttype4 lou_type;
opaque lou_body<>;
};
The layoutupdate4 structure is used by the client to return 'updated'
layout information to the metadata server at LAYOUTCOMMIT time. This
structure provides a channel to pass layout type specific information
(in field lou_body) back to the metadata server. E.g., for block/
volume layout types this could include the list of reserved blocks
that were written. The contents of the opaque lou_body argument are
determined by the layout type and are defined in their context. The
NFSv4.1 file-based layout does not use this structure, thus the
lou_body field should have a zero length.
3.2.22. layouthint4
struct layouthint4 {
layouttype4 loh_type;
opaque loh_body<>;
};
The layouthint4 structure is used by the client to pass in a hint
about the type of layout it would like created for a particular file.
It is the structure specified by the layout_hint attribute described
in Section 5.13.4. The metadata server may ignore the hint, or may
selectively ignore fields within the hint. This hint should be
provided at create time as part of the initial attributes within
OPEN. The loh_body field is specific to the type of layout
(loh_type). The NFSv4.1 file-based layout uses the
nfsv4_1_file_layouthint4 structure as defined in Section 13.3.
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3.2.23. layoutiomode4
enum layoutiomode4 {
LAYOUTIOMODE4_READ = 1,
LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW = 2,
LAYOUTIOMODE4_ANY = 3
};
The iomode specifies whether the client intends to read or write
(with the possibility of reading) the data represented by the layout.
The ANY iomode MUST NOT be used for LAYOUTGET, however, it can be
used for LAYOUTRETURN and LAYOUTRECALL. The ANY iomode specifies
that layouts pertaining to both READ and RW iomodes are being
returned or recalled, respectively. The metadata server's use of the
iomode may depend on the layout type being used. The storage devices
may validate I/O accesses against the iomode and reject invalid
accesses.
3.2.24. nfs_impl_id4
struct nfs_impl_id4 {
utf8str_cis nii_domain;
utf8str_cs nii_name;
nfstime4 nii_date;
};
This structure is used to identify client and server implementation
detail. The nii_domain field is the DNS domain name that the
implementer is associated with. The nii_name field is the product
name of the implementation and is completely free form. It is
recommended that the nii_name be used to distinguish machine
architecture, machine platforms, revisions, versions, and patch
levels. The nii_date field is the timestamp of when the software
instance was published or built.
3.2.25. threshold_item4
struct threshold_item4 {
layouttype4 thi_layout_type;
bitmap4 thi_hintset;
opaque thi_hintlist<>;
};
This structure contains a list of hints specific to a layout type for
helping the client determine when it should issue I/O directly
through the metadata server vs. the data servers. The hint structure
consists of the layout type (thi_layout_type), a bitmap (thi_hintset)
describing the set of hints supported by the server (they may differ
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based on the layout type), and a list of hints (thi_hintlist), whose
structure is determined by the hintset bitmap. See the mdsthreshold
attribute for more details.
The thi_hintset field is a bitmap of the following values:
+-------------------------+---+---------+---------------------------+
| name | # | Data | Description |
| | | Type | |
+-------------------------+---+---------+---------------------------+
| threshold4_read_size | 0 | length4 | The file size below which |
| | | | it is recommended to read |
| | | | data through the MDS. |
| threshold4_write_size | 1 | length4 | The file size below which |
| | | | it is recommended to |
| | | | write data through the |
| | | | MDS. |
| threshold4_read_iosize | 2 | length4 | For read I/O sizes below |
| | | | this threshold it is |
| | | | recommended to read data |
| | | | through the MDS |
| threshold4_write_iosize | 3 | length4 | For write I/O sizes below |
| | | | this threshold it is |
| | | | recommended to write data |
| | | | through the MDS |
+-------------------------+---+---------+---------------------------+
3.2.26. mdsthreshold4
struct mdsthreshold4 {
threshold_item4 mth_hints<>;
};
This structure holds an array of threshold_item4 structures each of
which is valid for a particular layout type. An array is necessary
since a server can support multiple layout types for a single file.
4. Filehandles
The filehandle in the NFS protocol is a per server unique identifier
for a file system object. The contents of the filehandle are opaque
to the client. Therefore, the server is responsible for translating
the filehandle to an internal representation of the file system
object.
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4.1. Obtaining the First Filehandle
The operations of the NFS protocol are defined in terms of one or
more filehandles. Therefore, the client needs a filehandle to
initiate communication with the server. With the NFS version 2
protocol RFC1094 [21] and the NFS version 3 protocol RFC1813 [22],
there exists an ancillary protocol to obtain this first filehandle.
The MOUNT protocol, RPC program number 100005, provides the mechanism
of translating a string based file system path name to a filehandle
which can then be used by the NFS protocols.
The MOUNT protocol has deficiencies in the area of security and use
via firewalls. This is one reason that the use of the public
filehandle was introduced in RFC2054 [31] and RFC2055 [32]. With the
use of the public filehandle in combination with the LOOKUP operation
in the NFS version 2 and 3 protocols, it has been demonstrated that
the MOUNT protocol is unnecessary for viable interaction between NFS
client and server.
Therefore, the NFS version 4 protocol will not use an ancillary
protocol for translation from string based path names to a
filehandle. Two special filehandles will be used as starting points
for the NFS client.
4.1.1. Root Filehandle
The first of the special filehandles is the ROOT filehandle. The
ROOT filehandle is the "conceptual" root of the file system name
space at the NFS server. The client uses or starts with the ROOT
filehandle by employing the PUTROOTFH operation. The PUTROOTFH
operation instructs the server to set the "current" filehandle to the
ROOT of the server's file tree. Once this PUTROOTFH operation is
used, the client can then traverse the entirety of the server's file
tree with the LOOKUP operation. A complete discussion of the server
name space is in the section "NFS Server Name Space".
4.1.2. Public Filehandle
The second special filehandle is the PUBLIC filehandle. Unlike the
ROOT filehandle, the PUBLIC filehandle may be bound or represent an
arbitrary file system object at the server. The server is
responsible for this binding. It may be that the PUBLIC filehandle
and the ROOT filehandle refer to the same file system object.
However, it is up to the administrative software at the server and
the policies of the server administrator to define the binding of the
PUBLIC filehandle and server file system object. The client may not
make any assumptions about this binding. The client uses the PUBLIC
filehandle via the PUTPUBFH operation.
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4.2. Filehandle Types
In the NFS version 2 and 3 protocols, there was one type of
filehandle with a single set of semantics. This type of filehandle
is termed "persistent" in NFS Version 4. The semantics of a
persistent filehandle remain the same as before. A new type of
filehandle introduced in NFS Version 4 is the "volatile" filehandle,
which attempts to accommodate certain server environments.
The volatile filehandle type was introduced to address server
functionality or implementation issues which make correct
implementation of a persistent filehandle infeasible. Some server
environments do not provide a file system level invariant that can be
used to construct a persistent filehandle. The underlying server
file system may not provide the invariant or the server's file system
programming interfaces may not provide access to the needed
invariant. Volatile filehandles may ease the implementation of
server functionality such as hierarchical storage management or file
system reorganization or migration. However, the volatile filehandle
increases the implementation burden for the client.
Since the client will need to handle persistent and volatile
filehandles differently, a file attribute is defined which may be
used by the client to determine the filehandle types being returned
by the server.
4.2.1. General Properties of a Filehandle
The filehandle contains all the information the server needs to
distinguish an individual file. To the client, the filehandle is
opaque. The client stores filehandles for use in a later request and
can compare two filehandles from the same server for equality by
doing an octet-by-octet comparison. However, the client MUST NOT
otherwise interpret the contents of filehandles. If two filehandles
from the same server are equal, they MUST refer to the same file.
Servers SHOULD try to maintain a one-to-one correspondence between
filehandles and files but this is not required. Clients MUST use
filehandle comparisons only to improve performance, not for correct
behavior. All clients need to be prepared for situations in which it
cannot be determined whether two filehandles denote the same object
and in such cases, avoid making invalid assumptions which might cause
incorrect behavior. Further discussion of filehandle and attribute
comparison in the context of data caching is presented in the section
"Data Caching and File Identity".
As an example, in the case that two different path names when
traversed at the server terminate at the same file system object, the
server SHOULD return the same filehandle for each path. This can
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occur if a hard link is used to create two file names which refer to
the same underlying file object and associated data. For example, if
paths /a/b/c and /a/d/c refer to the same file, the server SHOULD
return the same filehandle for both path names traversals.
4.2.2. Persistent Filehandle
A persistent filehandle is defined as having a fixed value for the
lifetime of the file system object to which it refers. Once the
server creates the filehandle for a file system object, the server
MUST accept the same filehandle for the object for the lifetime of
the object. If the server restarts or reboots the NFS server must
honor the same filehandle value as it did in the server's previous
instantiation. Similarly, if the file system is migrated, the new
NFS server must honor the same filehandle as the old NFS server.
The persistent filehandle will be become stale or invalid when the
file system object is removed. When the server is presented with a
persistent filehandle that refers to a deleted object, it MUST return
an error of NFS4ERR_STALE. A filehandle may become stale when the
file system containing the object is no longer available. The file
system may become unavailable if it exists on removable media and the
media is no longer available at the server or the file system in
whole has been destroyed or the file system has simply been removed
from the server's name space (i.e. unmounted in a UNIX environment).
4.2.3. Volatile Filehandle
A volatile filehandle does not share the same longevity
characteristics of a persistent filehandle. The server may determine
that a volatile filehandle is no longer valid at many different
points in time. If the server can definitively determine that a
volatile filehandle refers to an object that has been removed, the
server should return NFS4ERR_STALE to the client (as is the case for
persistent filehandles). In all other cases where the server
determines that a volatile filehandle can no longer be used, it
should return an error of NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED.
The mandatory attribute "fh_expire_type" is used by the client to
determine what type of filehandle the server is providing for a
particular file system. This attribute is a bitmask with the
following values:
FH4_PERSISTENT The value of FH4_PERSISTENT is used to indicate a
persistent filehandle, which is valid until the object is removed
from the file system. The server will not return
NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED for this filehandle. FH4_PERSISTENT is defined
as a value in which none of the bits specified below are set.
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FH4_VOLATILE_ANY The filehandle may expire at any time, except as
specifically excluded (i.e. FH4_NO_EXPIRE_WITH_OPEN).
FH4_NOEXPIRE_WITH_OPEN May only be set when FH4_VOLATILE_ANY is set.
If this bit is set, then the meaning of FH4_VOLATILE_ANY is
qualified to exclude any expiration of the filehandle when it is
open.
FH4_VOL_MIGRATION The filehandle will expire as a result of a file
system transition (migration or replication), in those case in
which the continuity of filehandle use is not specified by
_handle_ class information within the fs_locations_info attribute.
When this bit is set, clients without access to fs_locations_info
information should assume filehandles will expire on file system
transitions.
FH4_VOL_RENAME The filehandle will expire during rename. This
includes a rename by the requesting client or a rename by any
other client. If FH4_VOL_ANY is set, FH4_VOL_RENAME is redundant.
Servers which provide volatile filehandles that may expire while open
(i.e. if FH4_VOL_MIGRATION or FH4_VOL_RENAME is set or if
FH4_VOLATILE_ANY is set and FH4_NOEXPIRE_WITH_OPEN not set), should
deny a RENAME or REMOVE that would affect an OPEN file of any of the
components leading to the OPEN file. In addition, the server should
deny all RENAME or REMOVE requests during the grace period upon
server restart.
Servers which provide volatile filehandles that may expire while open
require special care as regards handling of RENAMESs and REMOVEs.
This situation can arise if FH4_VOL_MIGRATION or FH4_VOL_RENAME is
set, if FH4_VOLATILE_ANY is set and FH4_NOEXPIRE_WITH_OPEN not set,
or if a non-readonly file system has a transition target in a
different _handle _ class. In these cases, the server should deny a
RENAME or REMOVE that would affect an OPEN file of any of the
components leading to the OPEN file. In addition, the server should
deny all RENAME or REMOVE requests during the grace period, in order
to make sure that reclaims of files where filehandles may have
expired do not do a reclaim for the wrong file.
4.3. One Method of Constructing a Volatile Filehandle
A volatile filehandle, while opaque to the client could contain:
[volatile bit = 1 | server boot time | slot | generation number]
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o slot is an index in the server volatile filehandle table
o generation number is the generation number for the table entry/
slot
When the client presents a volatile filehandle, the server makes the
following checks, which assume that the check for the volatile bit
has passed. If the server boot time is less than the current server
boot time, return NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED. If slot is out of range, return
NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE. If the generation number does not match, return
NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED.
When the server reboots, the table is gone (it is volatile).
If volatile bit is 0, then it is a persistent filehandle with a
different structure following it.
4.4. Client Recovery from Filehandle Expiration
If possible, the client SHOULD recover from the receipt of an
NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED error. The client must take on additional
responsibility so that it may prepare itself to recover from the
expiration of a volatile filehandle. If the server returns
persistent filehandles, the client does not need these additional
steps.
For volatile filehandles, most commonly the client will need to store
the component names leading up to and including the file system
object in question. With these names, the client should be able to
recover by finding a filehandle in the name space that is still
available or by starting at the root of the server's file system name
space.
If the expired filehandle refers to an object that has been removed
from the file system, obviously the client will not be able to
recover from the expired filehandle.
It is also possible that the expired filehandle refers to a file that
has been renamed. If the file was renamed by another client, again
it is possible that the original client will not be able to recover.
However, in the case that the client itself is renaming the file and
the file is open, it is possible that the client may be able to
recover. The client can determine the new path name based on the
processing of the rename request. The client can then regenerate the
new filehandle based on the new path name. The client could also use
the compound operation mechanism to construct a set of operations
like:
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RENAME A B
LOOKUP B
GETFH
Note that the COMPOUND procedure does not provide atomicity. This
example only reduces the overhead of recovering from an expired
filehandle.
5. File Attributes
To meet the requirements of extensibility and increased
interoperability with non-UNIX platforms, attributes must be handled
in a flexible manner. The NFS version 3 fattr3 structure contains a
fixed list of attributes that not all clients and servers are able to
support or care about. The fattr3 structure can not be extended as
new needs arise and it provides no way to indicate non-support. With
the NFS version 4 protocol, the client is able query what attributes
the server supports and construct requests with only those supported
attributes (or a subset thereof).
To this end, attributes are divided into three groups: mandatory,
recommended, and named. Both mandatory and recommended attributes
are supported in the NFS version 4 protocol by a specific and well-
defined encoding and are identified by number. They are requested by
setting a bit in the bit vector sent in the GETATTR request; the
server response includes a bit vector to list what attributes were
returned in the response. New mandatory or recommended attributes
may be added to the NFS protocol between major revisions by
publishing a standards-track RFC which allocates a new attribute
number value and defines the encoding for the attribute. See the
section "Minor Versioning" for further discussion.
Named attributes are accessed by the new OPENATTR operation, which
accesses a hidden directory of attributes associated with a file
system object. OPENATTR takes a filehandle for the object and
returns the filehandle for the attribute hierarchy. The filehandle
for the named attributes is a directory object accessible by LOOKUP
or READDIR and contains files whose names represent the named
attributes and whose data bytes are the value of the attribute. For
example:
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+----------+-----------+---------------------------------+
| LOOKUP | "foo" | ; look up file |
| GETATTR | attrbits | |
| OPENATTR | | ; access foo's named attributes |
| LOOKUP | "x11icon" | ; look up specific attribute |
| READ | 0,4096 | ; read stream of bytes |
+----------+-----------+---------------------------------+
Named attributes are intended for data needed by applications rather
than by an NFS client implementation. NFS implementors are strongly
encouraged to define their new attributes as recommended attributes
by bringing them to the IETF standards-track process.
The set of attributes which are classified as mandatory is
deliberately small since servers must do whatever it takes to support
them. A server should support as many of the recommended attributes
as possible but by their definition, the server is not required to
support all of them. Attributes are deemed mandatory if the data is
both needed by a large number of clients and is not otherwise
reasonably computable by the client when support is not provided on
the server.
Note that the hidden directory returned by OPENATTR is a convenience
for protocol processing. The client should not make any assumptions
about the server's implementation of named attributes and whether the
underlying file system at the server has a named attribute directory
or not. Therefore, operations such as SETATTR and GETATTR on the
named attribute directory are undefined.
5.1. Mandatory Attributes
These MUST be supported by every NFS version 4 client and server in
order to ensure a minimum level of interoperability. The server must
store and return these attributes and the client must be able to
function with an attribute set limited to these attributes. With
just the mandatory attributes some client functionality may be
impaired or limited in some ways. A client may ask for any of these
attributes to be returned by setting a bit in the GETATTR request and
the server must return their value.
5.2. Recommended Attributes
These attributes are understood well enough to warrant support in the
NFS version 4 protocol. However, they may not be supported on all
clients and servers. A client may ask for any of these attributes to
be returned by setting a bit in the GETATTR request but must handle
the case where the server does not return them. A client may ask for
the set of attributes the server supports and should not request
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attributes the server does not support. A server should be tolerant
of requests for unsupported attributes and simply not return them
rather than considering the request an error. It is expected that
servers will support all attributes they comfortably can and only
fail to support attributes which are difficult to support in their
operating environments. A server should provide attributes whenever
they don't have to "tell lies" to the client. For example, a file
modification time should be either an accurate time or should not be
supported by the server. This will not always be comfortable to
clients but the client is better positioned decide whether and how to
fabricate or construct an attribute or whether to do without the
attribute.
5.3. Named Attributes
These attributes are not supported by direct encoding in the NFS
Version 4 protocol but are accessed by string names rather than
numbers and correspond to an uninterpreted stream of bytes which are
stored with the file system object. The name space for these
attributes may be accessed by using the OPENATTR operation. The
OPENATTR operation returns a filehandle for a virtual "attribute
directory" and further perusal of the name space may be done using
READDIR and LOOKUP operations on this filehandle. Named attributes
may then be examined or changed by normal READ and WRITE and CREATE
operations on the filehandles returned from READDIR and LOOKUP.
Named attributes may have attributes.
It is recommended that servers support arbitrary named attributes. A
client should not depend on the ability to store any named attributes
in the server's file system. If a server does support named
attributes, a client which is also able to handle them should be able
to copy a file's data and meta-data with complete transparency from
one location to another; this would imply that names allowed for
regular directory entries are valid for named attribute names as
well.
Names of attributes will not be controlled by this document or other
IETF standards track documents. See the section "IANA
Considerations" for further discussion.
5.4. Classification of Attributes
Each of the Mandatory and Recommended attributes can be classified in
one of three categories: per server, per file system, or per file
system object. Note that it is possible that some per file system
attributes may vary within the file system. See the "homogeneous"
attribute for its definition. Note that the attributes
time_access_set and time_modify_set are not listed in this section
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because they are write-only attributes corresponding to time_access
and time_modify, and are used in a special instance of SETATTR.
o The per server attribute is:
lease_time
o The per file system attributes are:
supp_attr, fh_expire_type, link_support, symlink_support,
unique_handles, aclsupport, cansettime, case_insensitive,
case_preserving, chown_restricted, files_avail, files_free,
files_total, fs_locations, homogeneous, maxfilesize, maxname,
maxread, maxwrite, no_trunc, space_avail, space_free,
space_total, time_delta, fs_status, fs_layout_type,
fs_locations_info
o The per file system object attributes are:
type, change, size, named_attr, fsid, rdattr_error, filehandle,
ACL, archive, fileid, hidden, maxlink, mimetype, mode,
numlinks, owner, owner_group, rawdev, space_used, system,
time_access, time_backup, time_create, time_metadata,
time_modify, mounted_on_fileid, dir_notif_delay,
dirent_notif_delay, dacl, sacl, layout_type, layout_hint,
layout_blksize, layout_alignment, mdsthreshold, retention_get,
retention_set, retentevt_get, retentevt_set, retention_hold,
mode_set_masked
For quota_avail_hard, quota_avail_soft, and quota_used see their
definitions below for the appropriate classification.
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5.5. Mandatory Attributes - Definitions
+-----------------+----+------------+--------+----------------------+
| name | # | Data Type | Access | Description |
+-----------------+----+------------+--------+----------------------+
| supp_attr | 0 | bitmap | READ | The bit vector which |
| | | | | would retrieve all |
| | | | | mandatory and |
| | | | | recommended |
| | | | | attributes that are |
| | | | | supported for this |
| | | | | object. The scope |
| | | | | of this attribute |
| | | | | applies to all |
| | | | | objects with a |
| | | | | matching fsid. |
| type | 1 | nfs4_ftype | READ | The type of the |
| | | | | object (file, |
| | | | | directory, symlink, |
| | | | | etc.) |
| fh_expire_type | 2 | uint32 | READ | Server uses this to |
| | | | | specify filehandle |
| | | | | expiration behavior |
| | | | | to the client. See |
| | | | | the section |
| | | | | "Filehandles" for |
| | | | | additional |
| | | | | description. |
| change | 3 | uint64 | READ | A value created by |
| | | | | the server that the |
| | | | | client can use to |
| | | | | determine if file |
| | | | | data, directory |
| | | | | contents or |
| | | | | attributes of the |
| | | | | object have been |
| | | | | modified. The |
| | | | | server may return |
| | | | | the object's |
| | | | | time_metadata |
| | | | | attribute for this |
| | | | | attribute's value |
| | | | | but only if the file |
| | | | | system object can |
| | | | | not be updated more |
| | | | | frequently than the |
| | | | | resolution of |
| | | | | time_metadata. |
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| size | 4 | uint64 | R/W | The size of the |
| | | | | object in bytes. |
| link_support | 5 | bool | READ | True, if the |
| | | | | object's file system |
| | | | | supports hard links. |
| symlink_support | 6 | bool | READ | True, if the |
| | | | | object's file system |
| | | | | supports symbolic |
| | | | | links. |
| named_attr | 7 | bool | READ | True, if this object |
| | | | | has named |
| | | | | attributes. In |
| | | | | other words, object |
| | | | | has a non-empty |
| | | | | named attribute |
| | | | | directory. |
| fsid | 8 | fsid4 | READ | Unique file system |
| | | | | identifier for the |
| | | | | file system holding |
| | | | | this object. fsid |
| | | | | contains major and |
| | | | | minor components |
| | | | | each of which are |
| | | | | uint64. |
| unique_handles | 9 | bool | READ | True, if two |
| | | | | distinct filehandles |
| | | | | guaranteed to refer |
| | | | | to two different |
| | | | | file system objects. |
| lease_time | 10 | nfs_lease4 | READ | Duration of leases |
| | | | | at server in |
| | | | | seconds. |
| rdattr_error | 11 | enum | READ | Error returned from |
| | | | | getattr during |
| | | | | readdir. |
| filehandle | 19 | nfs_fh4 | READ | The filehandle of |
| | | | | this object |
| | | | | (primarily for |
| | | | | readdir requests). |
+-----------------+----+------------+--------+----------------------+
5.6. Recommended Attributes - Definitions
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+-------------------+----+----------------+--------+----------------+
| name | # | Data Type | Access | Description |
+-------------------+----+----------------+--------+----------------+
| ACL | 12 | nfsace4<> | R/W | The access |
| | | | | control list |
| | | | | for the |
| | | | | object. |
| aclsupport | 13 | uint32 | READ | Indicates what |
| | | | | types of ACLs |
| | | | | are supported |
| | | | | on the current |
| | | | | file system. |
| archive | 14 | bool | R/W | True, if this |
| | | | | file has been |
| | | | | archived since |
| | | | | the time of |
| | | | | last |
| | | | | modification |
| | | | | (deprecated in |
| | | | | favor of |
| | | | | time_backup). |
| cansettime | 15 | bool | READ | True, if the |
| | | | | server able to |
| | | | | change the |
| | | | | times for a |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | object as |
| | | | | specified in a |
| | | | | SETATTR |
| | | | | operation. |
| case_insensitive | 16 | bool | READ | True, if |
| | | | | filename |
| | | | | comparisons on |
| | | | | this file |
| | | | | system are |
| | | | | case |
| | | | | insensitive. |
| case_preserving | 17 | bool | READ | True, if |
| | | | | filename case |
| | | | | on this file |
| | | | | system are |
| | | | | preserved. |
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| chown_restricted | 18 | bool | READ | If TRUE, the |
| | | | | server will |
| | | | | reject any |
| | | | | request to |
| | | | | change either |
| | | | | the owner or |
| | | | | the group |
| | | | | associated |
| | | | | with a file if |
| | | | | the caller is |
| | | | | not a |
| | | | | privileged |
| | | | | user (for |
| | | | | example, |
| | | | | "root" in UNIX |
| | | | | operating |
| | | | | environments |
| | | | | or in Windows |
| | | | | 2000 the "Take |
| | | | | Ownership" |
| | | | | privilege). |
| dacl | 58 | nfsacl41 | R/W | Access Control |
| | | | | List used for |
| | | | | determining |
| | | | | access to file |
| | | | | system |
| | | | | objects. |
| dir_notif_delay | 56 | nfstime4 | READ | notification |
| | | | | delays on |
| | | | | directory |
| | | | | attributes |
| dirent_ | 57 | nfstime4 | READ | notification |
| notif_delay | | | | delays on |
| | | | | child |
| | | | | attributes |
| fileid | 20 | uint64 | READ | A number |
| | | | | uniquely |
| | | | | identifying |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | within the |
| | | | | file system. |
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| files_avail | 21 | uint64 | READ | File slots |
| | | | | available to |
| | | | | this user on |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | system |
| | | | | containing |
| | | | | this object - |
| | | | | this should be |
| | | | | the smallest |
| | | | | relevant |
| | | | | limit. |
| files_free | 22 | uint64 | READ | Free file |
| | | | | slots on the |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | containing |
| | | | | this object - |
| | | | | this should be |
| | | | | the smallest |
| | | | | relevant |
| | | | | limit. |
| files_total | 23 | uint64 | READ | Total file |
| | | | | slots on the |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | containing |
| | | | | this object. |
| fs_absent | 60 | bool | READ | Is current |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | present or |
| | | | | absent. |
| fs_layout_type | 62 | layouttype4<> | READ | Layout types |
| | | | | available for |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | system. |
| fs_locations | 24 | fs_locations | READ | Locations |
| | | | | where this |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | may be found. |
| | | | | If the server |
| | | | | returns |
| | | | | NFS4ERR_MOVED |
| | | | | as an error, |
| | | | | this attribute |
| | | | | MUST be |
| | | | | supported. |
| fs_locations_info | 67 | | READ | Full function |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | location. |
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| fs_status | 61 | fs4_status | READ | Generic file |
| | | | | system type |
| | | | | information. |
| hidden | 25 | bool | R/W | True, if the |
| | | | | file is |
| | | | | considered |
| | | | | hidden with |
| | | | | respect to the |
| | | | | Windows API? |
| homogeneous | 26 | bool | READ | True, if this |
| | | | | object's file |
| | | | | system is |
| | | | | homogeneous, |
| | | | | i.e. are per |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | attributes the |
| | | | | same for all |
| | | | | file system's |
| | | | | objects. |
| layout_alignment | 66 | uint32_t | READ | Preferred |
| | | | | alignment for |
| | | | | layout related |
| | | | | I/O. |
| layout_blksize | 65 | uint32_t | READ | Preferred |
| | | | | block size for |
| | | | | layout related |
| | | | | I/O. |
| layout_hint | 63 | layouthint4 | WRITE | Client |
| | | | | specified hint |
| | | | | for file |
| | | | | layout. |
| layout_type | 64 | layouttype4<> | READ | Layout types |
| | | | | available for |
| | | | | the file. |
| maxfilesize | 27 | uint64 | READ | Maximum |
| | | | | supported file |
| | | | | size for the |
| | | | | file system of |
| | | | | this object. |
| maxlink | 28 | uint32 | READ | Maximum number |
| | | | | of links for |
| | | | | this object. |
| maxname | 29 | uint32 | READ | Maximum |
| | | | | filename size |
| | | | | supported for |
| | | | | this object. |
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| maxread | 30 | uint64 | READ | Maximum read |
| | | | | size supported |
| | | | | for this |
| | | | | object. |
| maxwrite | 31 | uint64 | READ | Maximum write |
| | | | | size supported |
| | | | | for this |
| | | | | object. This |
| | | | | attribute |
| | | | | SHOULD be |
| | | | | supported if |
| | | | | the file is |
| | | | | writable. |
| | | | | Lack of this |
| | | | | attribute can |
| | | | | lead to the |
| | | | | client either |
| | | | | wasting |
| | | | | bandwidth or |
| | | | | not receiving |
| | | | | the best |
| | | | | performance. |
| mdsthreshold | 68 | mdsthreshold4 | READ | Hint to client |
| | | | | as to when to |
| | | | | write through |
| | | | | the pnfs |
| | | | | metadata |
| | | | | server. |
| mimetype | 32 | utf8<> | R/W | MIME body |
| | | | | type/subtype |
| | | | | of this |
| | | | | object. |
| mode | 33 | mode4 | R/W | UNIX-style |
| | | | | mode including |
| | | | | permission |
| | | | | bits for this |
| | | | | object. |
| mode_set_masked | 74 | mode_masked4 | WRITE | Allows setting |
| | | | | or resetting a |
| | | | | subset of the |
| | | | | bits in a |
| | | | | UNIX-style |
| | | | | mode |
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| mounted_on_fileid | 55 | uint64 | READ | Like fileid, |
| | | | | but if the |
| | | | | target |
| | | | | filehandle is |
| | | | | the root of a |
| | | | | file system |
| | | | | return the |
| | | | | fileid of the |
| | | | | underlying |
| | | | | directory. |
| no_trunc | 34 | bool | READ | True, if a |
| | | | | name longer |
| | | | | than name_max |
| | | | | is used, an |
| | | | | error be |
| | | | | returned and |
| | | | | name is not |
| | | | | truncated. |
| numlinks | 35 | uint32 | READ | Number of hard |
| | | | | links to this |
| | | | | object. |
| owner | 36 | utf8<> | R/W | The string |
| | | | | name of the |
| | | | | owner of this |
| | | | | object. |
| owner_group | 37 | utf8<> | R/W | The string |
| | | | | name of the |
| | | | | group |
| | | | | ownership of |
| | | | | this object. |
| quota_avail_hard | 38 | uint64 | READ | For definition |
| | | | | see "Quota |
| | | | | Attributes" |
| | | | | section below. |
| quota_avail_soft | 39 | uint64 | READ | For definition |
| | | | | see "Quota |
| | | | | Attributes" |
| | | | | section below. |
| quota_used | 40 | uint64 | READ | For definition |
| | | | | see "Quota |
| | | | | Attributes" |
| | | | | section below. |
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| rawdev | 41 | specdata4 | READ | Raw device |
| | | | | identifier. |
| | | | | UNIX device |
| | | | | major/minor |
| | | | | node |
| | | | | information. |
| | | | | If the value |
| | | | | of type is not |
| | | | | NF4BLK or |
| | | | | NF4CHR, the |
| | | | | value return |
| | | | | SHOULD NOT be |
| | | | | considered |
| | | | | useful. |
| retentevt_get | 71 | retention_get4 | READ | Get the |
| | | | | event-based |
| | | | | retention |
| | | | | duration, and |
| | | | | if enabled, |
| | | | | the |
| | | | | event-based |
| | | | | retention |
| | | | | begin time of |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | object. |
| | | | | GETATTR use |
| | | | | only. |
| retentevt_set | 72 | retention_set4 | WRITE | Set the |
| | | | | event-based |
| | | | | retention |
| | | | | duration, and |
| | | | | optionally |
| | | | | enable |
| | | | | event-based |
| | | | | retention on |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | object. |
| | | | | SETATTR use |
| | | | | only. |
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| retention_get | 69 | retention_get4 | READ | Get the |
| | | | | retention |
| | | | | duration, and |
| | | | | if enabled, |
| | | | | the retention |
| | | | | begin time of |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | object. |
| | | | | GETATTR use |
| | | | | only. |
| retention_hold | 73 | uint64_t | R/W | Get or set |
| | | | | administrative |
| | | | | retention |
| | | | | holds, one |
| | | | | hold per bit |
| | | | | position. |
| retention_set | 70 | retention_set4 | WRITE | Set the |
| | | | | retention |
| | | | | duration, and |
| | | | | optionally |
| | | | | enable |
| | | | | retention on |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | object. |
| | | | | SETATTR use |
| | | | | only. |
| sacl | 59 | nfsacl41 | R/W | Access Control |
| | | | | List used for |
| | | | | auditing |
| | | | | access to file |
| | | | | system |
| | | | | objects. |
| space_avail | 42 | uint64 | READ | Disk space in |
| | | | | bytes |
| | | | | available to |
| | | | | this user on |
| | | | | the file |
| | | | | system |
| | | | | containing |
| | | | | this object - |
| | | | | this should be |
| | | | | the smallest |
| | | | | relevant |
| | | | | limit. |
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| space_free | 43 | uint64 | READ | Free disk |
| | | | | space in bytes |
| | | | | on the file |
| | | | | system |
| | | | | containing |
| | | | | this object - |
| | | | | this should be |
| | | | | the smallest |
| | | | | relevant |
| | | | | limit. |
| space_total | 44 | uint64 | READ | Total disk |
| | | | | space in bytes |
| | | | | on the file |
| | | | | system |
| | | | | containing |
| | | | | this object. |
| space_used | 45 | uint64 | READ | Number of file |
| | | | | system bytes |
| | | | | allocated to |
| | | | | this object. |
| system | 46 | bool | R/W | True, if this |
| | | | | file is a |
| | | | | "system" file |
| | | | | with respect |
| | | | | to the Windows |
| | | | | API? |
| time_access | 47 | nfstime4 | READ | The time of |
| | | | | last access to |
| | | | | the object by |
| | | | | a read that |
| | | | | was satisfied |
| | | | | by the server. |
| time_access_set | 48 | settime4 | WRITE | Set the time |
| | | | | of last access |
| | | | | to the object. |
| | | | | SETATTR use |
| | | | | only. |
| time_backup | 49 | nfstime4 | R/W | The time of |
| | | | | last backup of |
| | | | | the object. |
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| time_create | 50 | nfstime4 | R/W | The time of |
| | | | | creation of |
| | | | | the object. |
| | | | | This attribute |
| | | | | does not have |
| | | | | any relation |
| | | | | to the |
| | | | | traditional |
| | | | | UNIX file |
| | | | | attribute |
| | | | | "ctime" or |
| | | | | "change time". |
| time_delta | 51 | nfstime4 | READ | Smallest |
| | | | | useful server |
| | | | | time |
| | | | | granularity. |
| time_metadata | 52 | nfstime4 | READ | The time of |
| | | | | last meta-data |
| | | | | modification |
| | | | | of the object. |
| time_modify | 53 | nfstime4 | READ | The time of |
| | | | | last |
| | | | | modification |
| | | | | to the object. |
| time_modify_set | 54 | settime4 | WRITE | Set the time |
| | | | | of last |
| | | | | modification |
| | | | | to the object. |
| | | | | SETATTR use |
| | | | | only. |
+-------------------+----+----------------+--------+----------------+
5.7. Time Access
As defined above, the time_access attribute represents the time of
last access to the object by a read that was satisfied by the server.
The notion of what is an "access" depends on server's operating
environment and/or the server's file system semantics. For example,
for servers obeying POSIX semantics, time_access would be updated
only by the READLINK, READ, and READDIR operations and not any of the
operations that modify the content of the object. Of course, setting
the corresponding time_access_set attribute is another way to modify
the time_access attribute.
Whenever the file object resides on a writable file system, the
server should make best efforts to record time_access into stable
storage. However, to mitigate the performance effects of doing so,
and most especially whenever the server is satisfying the read of the
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object's content from its cache, the server MAY cache access time
updates and lazily write them to stable storage. It is also
acceptable to give administrators of the server the option to disable
time_access updates.
5.8. Interpreting owner and owner_group
The recommended attributes "owner" and "owner_group" (and also users
and groups within the "acl" attribute) are represented in terms of a
UTF-8 string. To avoid a representation that is tied to a particular
underlying implementation at the client or server, the use of the
UTF-8 string has been chosen. Note that section 6.1 of RFC2624 [33]
provides additional rationale. It is expected that the client and
server will have their own local representation of owner and
owner_group that is used for local storage or presentation to the end
user. Therefore, it is expected that when these attributes are
transferred between the client and server that the local
representation is translated to a syntax of the form "user@
dns_domain". This will allow for a client and server that do not use
the same local representation the ability to translate to a common
syntax that can be interpreted by both.
Similarly, security principals may be represented in different ways
by different security mechanisms. Servers normally translate these
representations into a common format, generally that used by local
storage, to serve as a means of identifying the users corresponding
to these security principals. When these local identifiers are
translated to the form of the owner attribute, associated with files
created by such principals they identify, in a common format, the
users associated with each corresponding set of security principals.
The translation used to interpret owner and group strings is not
specified as part of the protocol. This allows various solutions to
be employed. For example, a local translation table may be consulted
that maps between a numeric id to the user@dns_domain syntax. A name
service may also be used to accomplish the translation. A server may
provide a more general service, not limited by any particular
translation (which would only translate a limited set of possible
strings) by storing the owner and owner_group attributes in local
storage without any translation or it may augment a translation
method by storing the entire string for attributes for which no
translation is available while using the local representation for
those cases in which a translation is available.
Servers that do not provide support for all possible values of the
owner and owner_group attributes, should return an error
(NFS4ERR_BADOWNER) when a string is presented that has no
translation, as the value to be set for a SETATTR of the owner,
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owner_group, or acl attributes. When a server does accept an owner
or owner_group value as valid on a SETATTR (and similarly for the
owner and group strings in an acl), it is promising to return that
same string when a corresponding GETATTR is done. Configuration
changes and ill-constructed name translations (those that contain
aliasing) may make that promise impossible to honor. Servers should
make appropriate efforts to avoid a situation in which these
attributes have their values changed when no real change to ownership
has occurred.
The "dns_domain" portion of the owner string is meant to be a DNS
domain name. For example, user@ietf.org. Servers should accept as
valid a set of users for at least one domain. A server may treat
other domains as having no valid translations. A more general
service is provided when a server is capable of accepting users for
multiple domains, or for all domains, subject to security
constraints.
In the case where there is no translation available to the client or
server, the attribute value must be constructed without the "@".
Therefore, the absence of the @ from the owner or owner_group
attribute signifies that no translation was available at the sender
and that the receiver of the attribute should not use that string as
a basis for translation into its own internal format. Even though
the attribute value can not be translated, it may still be useful.
In the case of a client, the attribute string may be used for local
display of ownership.
To provide a greater degree of compatibility with previous versions
of NFS (i.e. v2 and v3), which identified users and groups by 32-bit
unsigned uid's and gid's, owner and group strings that consist of
decimal numeric values with no leading zeros can be given a special
interpretation by clients and servers which choose to provide such
support. The receiver may treat such a user or group string as
representing the same user as would be represented by a v2/v3 uid or
gid having the corresponding numeric value. A server is not
obligated to accept such a string, but may return an NFS4ERR_BADOWNER
instead. To avoid this mechanism being used to subvert user and
group translation, so that a client might pass all of the owners and
groups in numeric form, a server SHOULD return an NFS4ERR_BADOWNER
error when there is a valid translation for the user or owner
designated in this way. In that case, the client must use the
appropriate name@domain string and not the special form for
compatibility.
The owner string "nobody" may be used to designate an anonymous user,
which will be associated with a file created by a security principal
that cannot be mapped through normal means to the owner attribute.
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5.9. Character Case Attributes
With respect to the case_insensitive and case_preserving attributes,
each UCS-4 character (which UTF-8 encodes) has a "long descriptive
name" RFC1345 [34] which may or may not included the word "CAPITAL"
or "SMALL". The presence of SMALL or CAPITAL allows an NFS server to
implement unambiguous and efficient table driven mappings for case
insensitive comparisons, and non-case-preserving storage. For
general character handling and internationalization issues, see the
section "Internationalization".
5.10. Quota Attributes
For the attributes related to file system quotas, the following
definitions apply:
quota_avail_soft The value in bytes which represents the amount of
additional disk space that can be allocated to this file or
directory before the user may reasonably be warned. It is
understood that this space may be consumed by allocations to other
files or directories though there is a rule as to which other
files or directories.
quota_avail_hard The value in bytes which represent the amount of
additional disk space beyond the current allocation that can be
allocated to this file or directory before further allocations
will be refused. It is understood that this space may be consumed
by allocations to other files or directories.
quota_used The value in bytes which represent the amount of disc
space used by this file or directory and possibly a number of
other similar files or directories, where the set of "similar"
meets at least the criterion that allocating space to any file or
directory in the set will reduce the "quota_avail_hard" of every
other file or directory in the set.
Note that there may be a number of distinct but overlapping sets
of files or directories for which a quota_used value is
maintained. E.g. "all files with a given owner", "all files with
a given group owner". etc.
The server is at liberty to choose any of those sets but should do
so in a repeatable way. The rule may be configured per file
system or may be "choose the set with the smallest quota".
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5.11. mounted_on_fileid
UNIX-based operating environments connect a file system into the
namespace by connecting (mounting) the file system onto the existing
file object (the mount point, usually a directory) of an existing
file system. When the mount point's parent directory is read via an
API like readdir(), the return results are directory entries, each
with a component name and a fileid. The fileid of the mount point's
directory entry will be different from the fileid that the stat()
system call returns. The stat() system call is returning the fileid
of the root of the mounted file system, whereas readdir() is
returning the fileid stat() would have returned before any file
systems were mounted on the mount point.
Unlike NFS version 3, NFS version 4 allows a client's LOOKUP request
to cross other file systems. The client detects the file system
crossing whenever the filehandle argument of LOOKUP has an fsid
attribute different from that of the filehandle returned by LOOKUP.
A UNIX-based client will consider this a "mount point crossing".
UNIX has a legacy scheme for allowing a process to determine its
current working directory. This relies on readdir() of a mount
point's parent and stat() of the mount point returning fileids as
previously described. The mounted_on_fileid attribute corresponds to
the fileid that readdir() would have returned as described
previously.
While the NFS version 4 client could simply fabricate a fileid
corresponding to what mounted_on_fileid provides (and if the server
does not support mounted_on_fileid, the client has no choice), there
is a risk that the client will generate a fileid that conflicts with
one that is already assigned to another object in the file system.
Instead, if the server can provide the mounted_on_fileid, the
potential for client operational problems in this area is eliminated.
If the server detects that there is no mounted point at the target
file object, then the value for mounted_on_fileid that it returns is
the same as that of the fileid attribute.
The mounted_on_fileid attribute is RECOMMENDED, so the server SHOULD
provide it if possible, and for a UNIX-based server, this is
straightforward. Usually, mounted_on_fileid will be requested during
a READDIR operation, in which case it is trivial (at least for UNIX-
based servers) to return mounted_on_fileid since it is equal to the
fileid of a directory entry returned by readdir(). If
mounted_on_fileid is requested in a GETATTR operation, the server
should obey an invariant that has it returning a value that is equal
to the file object's entry in the object's parent directory, i.e.
what readdir() would have returned. Some operating environments
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allow a series of two or more file systems to be mounted onto a
single mount point. In this case, for the server to obey the
aforementioned invariant, it will need to find the base mount point,
and not the intermediate mount points.
5.12. Directory Notification Attributes
As described in Section 17.39, the client can request a minimum delay
for notifications of changes to attributes, but the server is free
ignore what the client requests. The client can determine in advance
what notification delays the server will accept by issuing a GETATTR
for either or both of two directory notification attributes. When
the client calls the GET_DIR_DELEGATION operation and asks^M for
attribute change notifications, it should request^M notification
delays that are no less than the values in the^M server-provided
attributes.
5.12.1. dir_notif_delay
The dir_notify_delay attribute is the minimum number of seconds the
server will delay before notifying the client of a change to the
directory's attributes.
5.12.2. dirent_notif_delay
The dirent_notif_delay attribute is the minimum number of seconds the
server will delay before notifying the client of a change to a file
object that has an entry in the directory.
5.13. PNFS Attributes
5.13.1. fs_layout_type
The fs_layout_type attribute (data type layouttype4, see
Section 3.2.15) applies to a file system and indicates what layout
types are supported by the file system. This attribute is expected
be queried when a client encounters a new fsid. This attribute is
used by the client to determine if it supports the layout type.
5.13.2. layout_alignment
The layout_alignment attribute indicates the preferred alignment for
I/O to files on the file system the client has layouts for. Where
possible, the client should issue READ and WRITE operations with
offsets are whole multiples of the layout_alignment attribute.
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5.13.3. layout_blksize
The layout_blksize attribute indicates the preferred block size for
I/O to files on the file system the client has layouts for. Where
possible, the client should issue READ operations with a count
argument that is a whole multiple of layout_blksize, and WRITE
operations with a data argument of size that is a whole multiple of
layout_blksize.
5.13.4. layout_hint
The layout_hint attribute (data type layouthint4, see Section 3.2.22)
may be set on newly created files to influence the metadata server's
choice for the file's layout. It is suggested that this attribute is
set as one of the initial attributes within the OPEN call. The
metadata server may ignore this attribute. This attribute is a sub-
set of the layout structure returned by LAYOUTGET. For example,
instead of specifying particular devices, this would be used to
suggest the stripe width of a file. It is up to the server
implementation to determine which fields within the layout it uses.
5.13.5. layout_type
This attribute indicates the particular layout type(s) used for a
file. This is for informational purposes only. The client needs to
use the LAYOUTGET operation in order to get enough information (e.g.,
specific device information) in order to perform I/O.
5.13.6. mdsthreshold
This attribute acts as a hint to the client to help it determine when
it is more efficient to issue read and write requests to the metadata
server vs. the data server. Two types of thresholds are described:
file size thresholds and I/O size thresholds. If a file's size is
smaller than the file size threshold, data accesses should be issued
to the metadata server. If an I/O is below the I/O size threshold,
the I/O should be issued to the metadata server. Each threshold can
be specified independently for read and write requests. For either
threshold type, a value of 0 indicates no read or write should be
issued to the metadata server, while a value of all 1s indicates all
reads or writes should be issued to the metadata server.
The attribute is available on a per filehandle basis. If the current
filehandle refers to a non-pNFS file or directory, the metadata
server should return an attribute that is representative of the
filehandle's file system. It is suggested that this attribute is
queried as part of the OPEN operation. Due to dynamic system
changes, the client should not assume that the attribute will remain
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constant for any specific time period, thus it should be periodically
refreshed.
5.14. Retention Attributes
Retention is a concept whereby a file object can be placed in an
immutable, undeletable, unrenamable state for a fixed or infinite
duration of time. Once in this "retained" state, the file cannot be
moved out of the state until the duration of retention has been
reached.
When retention is enabled, retention MUST extend to the data of the
file, and the name of file. The server MAY extend retention any
other property of the file, including any subset of mandatory,
recommended, and named attributes, with the exceptions noted in this
section.
Servers MAY support or not support retention on any file object type.
There are five retention attributes:
o retention_get. This attribute is only readable via GETATTR and
not setable via SETATTR. The value of the attribute consists of:
const RET4_DURATION_INFINITE = 0xffffffffffffffff;
struct retention_get4 {
uint64_t rg_duration;
nfstime4 rg_begin_time<1>;
};
The field rg_duration is duration in seconds indicating how long
the file will be retained once retention is enabled. The field
rg_begin_time is an array of up to one absolute time value. If
the array is zero length, no beginning retention time has been
established, and retention is not enabled. If rg_duration is
equal to RET4_DURATION_INFINITE, the file, once retention is
enabled, will be retained for an infinite duration.
o retention_set. This attribute corresponds to retention_get. This
attribute is only setable via SETATTR and not readable via
GETATTR. The value of the attribute consists of:
struct retention_set4 {
bool rs_enable;
uint64_t rs_duration<1>;
};
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If the client sets rs_enable to TRUE, then it is enabling
retention on the file object with the begin time of retention
commencing from the server's current time and date. The duration
of the retention can also be provided if the rs_duration array is
of length one. The duration is time is seconds from the begin
time of retention, and if set to RET4_DURATION_INFINITE, the file
is to be retained forever. If retention is enabled, with no
duration specified in either this SETATTR or a previous SETATTR,
the duration defaults to zero seconds. The server MAY restrict
the enabling of retention or the duration of retention on the
basis of the ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION ACL permission. The enabling of
retention does not prevent the enabling of event-based retention
nor the modification of the retention_hold attribute.
o retentevt_get. This attribute is like retention_get, but refers
to event-based retention. The event that triggers event-based
retention is not defined by the NFSv4.1 specification.
o retentevt_set. This attribute corresponds to retentevt_get, is
like retention_set, but refers to event-based retention. When
event based retention is set, the file MUST be retained even if
non-event-based retention has been set, and the duration of non-
event-based retention has been reached. Conversely, when non-
event-based retention has been set, the file MUST be retained even
the event-based retention has been set, and the duration of event-
based retention has been reached. The server MAY restrict the
enabling of event-based retention or the duration of event-based
retention on the basis of the ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION ACL permission.
The enabling of event-based retention does not prevent the
enabling of non-event-based retention nor the modification of the
retention_hold attribute.
o retention_hold. This attribute allows one to 64 administrative
holds, one hold per bit on the attribute. If retention_hold is
not zero, then the file MUST NOT be deleted, renamed, or modified,
even if the duration on enabled event or non-event-based retention
has been reached. The server MAY restrict the modification of
retention_hold on the basis of the ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION_HOLD ACL
permission. The enabling of administration retention holds does
not prevent the enabling of event-based or non-event-based
retention.
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6. Security Related Attributes
Access Control Lists (ACLs) are file attributes that specify fine
grained access control. This chapter covers the "acl", "dacl",
"sacl", "aclsupport", "mode", "mode_set_masked" file attributes, and
their interactions. Note that file attributes may apply to any file
system objects.
6.1. Goals
ACLs and modes represent two well established but different models
for specifying permissions. This chapter specifies requirements that
attempt to meet the following goals:
o If a server supports the mode attribute, it should provide
reasonable semantics to clients that only set and retrieve the
mode attribute.
o If a server supports ACL attributes, it should provide reasonable
semantics to clients that only set and retrieve those attributes.
o On servers that support the mode attribute, if ACL attributes have
never been set on an object, via inheritance or explicitly, the
behavior should be traditional UNIX-like behavior.
o On servers that support the mode attribute, if the ACL attributes
have been previously set on an object, either explicitly or via
inheritance:
* Setting only the mode attribute should effectively control the
traditional UNIX-like permissions of read, write, and execute
on owner, owner_group, and other.
* Setting only the mode attribute should provide reasonable
security. For example, setting a mode of 000 should be enough
to ensure that future opens for read or write by any principal
should fail, regardless of a previously existing or inherited
ACL.
o This minor version of NFSv4 may introduce different semantics
relating to the mode and ACL attributes, but it does not render
invalid any previously existing implementations. Additionally,
this chapter provides clarifications based on previous
implementations and discussions around them.
o If a server supports ACL attributes (any of "acl", "dacl" and
"sacl"), then at any time, the server can provide the supported
ACL attributes when requested. The ACL attributes will describe
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all permissions on the file object, except for the three high-
order bits of the mode attribute (described in Section 6.2.3).
The ACL attributes will not conflict with the mode attribute, on
servers that support the mode attribute. Briefly, "will not
conflict" means that applying the algorithm in Section 6.3.2 to
the ACL yields the nine low-order bits of the mode. See
Section 6.4.1 for exact requirements.
o If a server supports the mode attribute, then at any time, the
server can provide a mode attribute when requested. The mode
attribute will not conflict with the ACL attributes, on servers
that support the ACL attributes.
o When a mode attribute is set on an object, the ACL attributes may
need to be modified so as to not conflict with the new mode. In
such cases, it is desirable that the ACL keep as much information
as possible. This includes information about inheritance, AUDIT
and ALARM ACEs, and permissions granted and denied that do not
conflict with the new mode.
6.2. File Attributes Discussion
6.2.1. ACL Attributes
The NFS version 4 ACL attributes contain an array of access control
entries (ACEs). Although the client can read and write the acl
attribute, the server is responsible for using the ACL to perform
access control. The client can use the OPEN or ACCESS operations to
check access without modifying or reading data or metadata.
The NFS ACE structure is defined as follows:
typedef uint32_t acetype4;
typedef uint32_t aceflag4;
typedef uint32_t acemask4;
struct nfsace4 {
acetype4 type;
aceflag4 flag;
acemask4 access_mask;
utf8str_mixed who;
};
To determine if a request succeeds, the server processes each nfsace4
entry in order. Only ACEs which have a "who" that matches the
requester are considered. Each ACE is processed until all of the
bits of the requester's access have been ALLOWED. Once a bit (see
below) has been ALLOWED by an ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE, it is no longer
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considered in the processing of later ACEs. If an ACCESS_DENIED_ACE
is encountered where the requester's access still has unALLOWED bits
in common with the "access_mask" of the ACE, the request is denied.
When the ACL is fully processed, if there are bits in the requester's
mask that have not been ALLOWED or DENIED, access is denied.
Unlike the ALLOW and DENY ACE types, the ALARM and AUDIT ACE types do
not affect a requester's access, and instead are for triggering
events as a result of a requester's access attempt. Therefore, AUDIT
and ALARM ACEs are processed only after processing ALLOW and DENY
ACEs.
The NFS version 4 ACL model is quite rich. Some server platforms may
provide access control functionality that goes beyond the UNIX-style
mode attribute, but which is not as rich as the NFS ACL model. So
that users can take advantage of this more limited functionality, the
server may indicate that it supports ACLs as long as it follows the
guidelines for mapping between its ACL model and the NFS version 4
ACL model.
The situation is complicated by the fact that a server may have
multiple modules that enforce ACLs. For example, the enforcement for
NFS version 4 access may be different from, but not weaker than, the
enforcement for local access, and both may be different from the
enforcement for access through other protocols such as SMB. So it
may be useful for a server to accept an ACL even if not all of its
modules are able to support it.
The guiding principle with regard to NFSv4 access is that the server
must not accept ACLs that appear to make the file more secure than it
really is.
6.2.1.1. ACE Type
The constants used for the type field (acetype4) are as follows:
const ACE4_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000000;
const ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000001;
const ACE4_SYSTEM_AUDIT_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000002;
const ACE4_SYSTEM_ALARM_ACE_TYPE = 0x00000003;
Only the ALLOWED and DENIED bits types may be used in the dacl
attribute, and only the AUDIT and ALARM bits may be used in the sacl
attribute. All four are permitted in the acl attribute.
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+------------------------------+--------------+---------------------+
| Value | Abbreviation | Description |
+------------------------------+--------------+---------------------+
| ACE4_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE | ALLOW | Explicitly grants |
| | | the access defined |
| | | in acemask4 to the |
| | | file or directory. |
| ACE4_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE | DENY | Explicitly denies |
| | | the access defined |
| | | in acemask4 to the |
| | | file or directory. |
| ACE4_SYSTEM_AUDIT_ACE_TYPE | AUDIT | LOG (system |
| | | dependent) any |
| | | access attempt to a |
| | | file or directory |
| | | which uses any of |
| | | the access methods |
| | | specified in |
| | | acemask4. |
| ACE4_SYSTEM_ALARM_ACE_TYPE | ALARM | Generate a system |
| | | ALARM (system |
| | | dependent) when any |
| | | access attempt is |
| | | made to a file or |
| | | directory for the |
| | | access methods |
| | | specified in |
| | | acemask4. |
+------------------------------+--------------+---------------------+
The "Abbreviation" column denotes how the types will be referred to
throughout the rest of this document.
6.2.1.2. The aclsupport Attribute
A server need not support all of the above ACE types. The bitmask
constants used to represent the above definitions within the
aclsupport attribute are as follows:
const ACL4_SUPPORT_ALLOW_ACL = 0x00000001;
const ACL4_SUPPORT_DENY_ACL = 0x00000002;
const ACL4_SUPPORT_AUDIT_ACL = 0x00000004;
const ACL4_SUPPORT_ALARM_ACL = 0x00000008;
Servers which support either the ALLOW or DENY ACE type SHOULD
support both ALLOW and DENY ACE types.
Clients should not attempt to set an ACE unless the server claims
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support for that ACE type. If the server receives a request to set
an ACE that it cannot store, it MUST reject the request with
NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP. If the server receives a request to set an ACE
that it can store but cannot enforce, the server SHOULD reject the
request with NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP.
Support for any of the ACL attributes is optional. However, a server
that supports either of the new ACL attributes (dacl or sacl) must
allow use of the new ACL attributes to access all of the ACE types
which it supports. In more detail: if such a server supports ALLOW
or DENY ACEs, then it must support the dacl attribute, and if it
supports AUDIT or ALARM ACEs, then it must support the sacl
attribute.
6.2.1.3. ACE Access Mask
The bitmask constants used for the access mask field are as follows:
const ACE4_READ_DATA = 0x00000001;
const ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY = 0x00000001;
const ACE4_WRITE_DATA = 0x00000002;
const ACE4_ADD_FILE = 0x00000002;
const ACE4_APPEND_DATA = 0x00000004;
const ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY = 0x00000004;
const ACE4_READ_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000008;
const ACE4_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS = 0x00000010;
const ACE4_EXECUTE = 0x00000020;
const ACE4_TRAVERSE = 0x00000020;
const ACE4_DELETE_CHILD = 0x00000040;
const ACE4_READ_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000080;
const ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000100;
const ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION = 0x00000200;
const ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION_HOLD = 0x00000400;
const ACE4_DELETE = 0x00010000;
const ACE4_READ_ACL = 0x00020000;
const ACE4_WRITE_ACL = 0x00040000;
const ACE4_WRITE_OWNER = 0x00080000;
const ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE = 0x00100000;
Note that some masks have coincident values, for example,
ACE4_READ_DATA and ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY. The mask entries
ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY, ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY, and ACE4_TRAVERSE are
intended to be used with directory objects, while ACE4_READ_DATA,
ACE4_WRITE_DATA, and ACE4_EXECUTE are intended to be used with non-
directory objects.
6.2.1.3.1. Discussion of Mask Attributes
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ACE4_READ_DATA
Operation(s) affected:
READ
OPEN
Discussion:
Permission to read the data of the file.
Servers SHOULD allow a user the ability to read the data
of the file when only the ACE4_EXECUTE access mask bit is
allowed.
ACE4_LIST_DIRECTORY
Operation(s) affected:
READDIR
Discussion:
Permission to list the contents of a directory.
ACE4_WRITE_DATA
Operation(s) affected:
WRITE
OPEN
SETATTR of size
Discussion:
Permission to modify a file's data.
ACE4_ADD_FILE
Operation(s) affected:
CREATE
LINK
OPEN
RENAME
Discussion:
Permission to add a new file in a directory. The CREATE
operation is affected when nfs_ftype4 is NF4LNK, NF4BLK,
NF4CHR, NF4SOCK, or NF4FIFO. (NF4DIR is not listed because
it is covered by ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY.) OPEN is affected
when used to create a regular file. LINK and RENAME are
always affected.
ACE4_APPEND_DATA
Operation(s) affected:
WRITE
OPEN
SETATTR of size
Discussion:
The ability to modify a file's data, but only starting at
EOF. This allows for the notion of append-only files, by
allowing ACE4_APPEND_DATA and denying ACE4_WRITE_DATA to
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the same user or group. If a file has an ACL such as the
one described above and a WRITE request is made for
somewhere other than EOF, the server SHOULD return
NFS4ERR_ACCESS.
ACE4_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY
Operation(s) affected:
CREATE
RENAME
Discussion:
Permission to create a subdirectory in a directory. The
CREATE operation is affected when nfs_ftype4 is NF4DIR.
The RENAME operation is always affected.
ACE4_READ_NAMED_ATTRS
Operation(s) affected:
OPENATTR
Discussion:
Permission to read the named attributes of a file or to
lookup the named attributes directory. OPENATTR is
affected when it is not used to create a named attribute
directory. This is when 1.) createdir is TRUE, but a
named attribute directory already exists, or 2.) createdir
is FALSE.
ACE4_WRITE_NAMED_ATTRS
Operation(s) affected:
OPENATTR
Discussion:
Permission to write the named attributes of a file or
to create a named attribute directory. OPENATTR is
affected when it is used to create a named attribute
directory. This is when createdir is TRUE and no named
attribute directory exists. The ability to check whether
or not a named attribute directory exists depends on the
ability to look it up, therefore, users also need the
ACE4_READ_NAMED_ATTRS permission in order to create a
named attribute directory.
ACE4_EXECUTE
Operation(s) affected:
READ
OPEN
Discussion:
Permission to execute a file.
Servers SHOULD allow a user the ability to read the data
of the file when only the ACE4_EXECUTE access mask bit is
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allowed. This is because there is no way to execute a
file without reading the contents. Though a server may
treat ACE4_EXECUTE and ACE4_READ_DATA bits identically
when deciding to permit a READ operation, it SHOULD still
allow the two bits to be set independently in ACLs, and
MUST distinguish between them when replying to ACCESS
operations. In particular, servers SHOULD NOT silently
turn on one of the two bits when the other is set, as
that would make it impossible for the client to correctly
enforce the distinction between read and execute
permissions.
As an example, following a SETATTR of the following ACL:
nfsuser:ACE4_EXECUTE:ALLOW
A subsequent GETATTR of ACL for that file SHOULD return:
nfsuser:ACE4_EXECUTE:ALLOW
Rather than:
nfsuser:ACE4_EXECUTE/ACE4_READ_DATA:ALLOW
ACE4_EXECUTE
Operation(s) affected:
LOOKUP
Discussion:
Permission to traverse/search a directory.
ACE4_DELETE_CHILD
Operation(s) affected:
REMOVE
RENAME
Discussion:
Permission to delete a file or directory within a
directory. See section "ACE4_DELETE vs. ACE4_DELETE_CHILD"
for information on how these two access mask bits interact.
ACE4_READ_ATTRIBUTES
Operation(s) affected:
GETATTR of file system object attributes
READDIR
Discussion:
The ability to read basic attributes (non-ACLs) of a file.
On a UNIX system, basic attributes can be thought of as
the stat level attributes. Allowing this access mask bit
would mean the entity can execute "ls -l" and stat. If
a READDIR operation requests attributes, this mask must
be allowed for the READDIR to succeed.
ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
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Operation(s) affected:
SETATTR of time_access_set, time_backup,
time_create, time_modify_set, mimetype, hidden, system
Discussion:
Permission to change the times associated with a file or
directory to an arbitrary value. Also permission to change
the mimetype, hidden and system attributes. A user having
ACE4_WRITE_DATA or ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES will be allowed to
set the times associated with a file to the current server
time.
ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION
Operation(s) affected:
SETATTR of retention_set, retentevt_set.
Discussion:
Permission to modify the durations of event and
non-event-based retention. Also permission to enable event and
non-event-based retention. A server MAY behave such that
setting ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES allows ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION.
ACE4_WRITE_RETENTION_HOLD
Operation(s) affected:
SETATTR of retention_hold.
Discussion:
Permission to modify the administration retention holds.
A server MAY map ACE4_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES to
ACE_WRITE_RETENTION_HOLD.
ACE4_DELETE
Operation(s) affected:
REMOVE
Discussion:
Permission to delete the file or directory. See section
"ACE4_DELETE vs. ACE4_DELETE_CHILD" for information on how
these two access mask bits interact.
ACE4_READ_ACL
Operation(s) affected:
GETATTR of acl, dacl, or sacl
NVERIFY
VERIFY
Discussion:
Permission to read the ACL.
ACE4_WRITE_ACL
Operation(s) affected:
SETATTR of acl and mode
Discussion:
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Permission to write the acl and mode attributes.
ACE4_WRITE_OWNER
Operation(s) affected:
SETATTR of owner and owner_group
Discussions:
Permission to write the owner and owner_group attributes.
On UNIX systems, this is the ability to execute chown() and
chgrp().
ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE
Operation(s) affected:
NONE
Discussion:
Permission to access file locally at the server with
synchronized reads and writes.
Server implementations need not provide the granularity of control
that is implied by this list of masks. For example, POSIX-based
systems might not distinguish ACE4_APPEND_DATA (the ability to append
to a file) from ACE4_WRITE_DATA (the ability to modify existing
contents); both masks would be tied to a single "write" permission.
When such a server returns attributes to the client, it would show
both ACE4_APPEND_DATA and ACE4_WRITE_DATA if and only if the write
permission is enabled.
If a server receives a SETATTR request that it cannot accurately
implement, it should err in the direction of more restricted access,
except in the previously discussed cases of execute and read. For
example, suppose a server cannot distinguish overwriting data from
appending new data, as described in the previous paragraph. If a
client submits an ACE where ACE4_APPEND_DATA is set but
ACE4_WRITE_DATA is not (or vice versa), the server should reject the
request with NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP. Nonetheless, if the ACE has type
DENY, the server may silently turn on the other bit, so that both
ACE4_APPEND_DATA and ACE4_WRITE_DATA are denied.
6.2.1.3.2. ACE4_DELETE vs. ACE4_DELETE_CHILD
Two access mask bits govern the ability to delete a file or directory
object: ACE4_DELETE on the object itself, and ACE4_DELETE_CHILD on
the object's parent directory.
Many systems also consult the "sticky bit" (MODE4_SVTX) and write
mode bit on the parent directory when determining whether to allow a
file to be deleted. The mode bit for write corresponds to
ACE4_WRITE_DATA, which is the same physical bit as ACE4_ADD_FILE.
Therefore, ACE4_WRITE_DATA can come into play when determining
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permission to delete.
In the algorithm below, the strategy is that ACE4_DELETE and
ACE4_DELETE_CHILD take precedence over the sticky bit, and the sticky
bit takes precedence over the "write" mode bits (reflected in
ACE4_ADD_FILE).
Server implementations SHOULD grant or deny permission to delete
based on the following algorithm.
if ACE4_TRAVERSE is denied by the parent directory ACL {
deny delete
} else if ACE4_DELETE is allowed by the target object ACL {
allow delete
} else if ACE4_DELETE_CHILD is allowed by the parent
directory ACL {
allow delete
} else if ACE4_DELETE_CHILD is denied by the
parent directory ACL {
deny delete
} else if ACE4_ADD_FILE is allowed by the parent directory ACL {
if MODE4_SVTX is set for the parent directory {
if the principal owns the parent directory OR
the principal owns the target object OR
ACE4_WRITE_DATA is allowed by the target
object ACL {
allow delete
} else {
deny delete
}
} else {
allow delete
}
} else {
deny delete
}
6.2.1.4. ACE flag
The bitmask constants used for the flag field are as follows:
const ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000001;
const ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000002;
const ACE4_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE = 0x00000004;
const ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE = 0x00000008;
const ACE4_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000010;
const ACE4_FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = 0x00000020;
const ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP = 0x00000040;
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const ACE4_INHERITED_ACE = 0x00000080;
A server need not support any of these flags. If the server supports
flags that are similar to, but not exactly the same as, these flags,
the implementation may define a mapping between the protocol-defined
flags and the implementation-defined flags.
For example, suppose a client tries to set an ACE with
ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE set but not ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE. If the
server does not support any form of ACL inheritance, the server
should reject the request with NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP. If the server
supports a single "inherit ACE" flag that applies to both files and
directories, the server may reject the request (i.e., requiring the
client to set both the file and directory inheritance flags). The
server may also accept the request and silently turn on the
ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE flag.
6.2.1.4.1. Discussion of Flag Bits
ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE
Any non-directory file in any sub-directory will get this ACE
inherited.
ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE
Can be placed on a directory and indicates that this ACE should be
added to each new directory created.
If this flag is set in an ACE in an ACL attribute to be set on a
non-directory file system object, the operation attempting to set
the ACL SHOULD fail with NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP.
ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE
Can be placed on a directory but does not apply to the directory;
ALLOW and DENY ACEs with this bit set do not affect access to the
directory, and AUDIT and ALARM ACEs with this bit set do not
trigger log or alarm events. Such ACEs only take effect once they
are applied (with this bit cleared) to newly created files and
directories as specified by the above two flags.
If this flag is present on an ACE, but neither
ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE nor ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE is present,
then an operation attempting to set such an attribute SHOULD fail
with NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP.
ACE4_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE
Can be placed on a directory. This flag tells the server that
inheritance of this ACE should stop at newly created child
directories.
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ACE4_INHERITED_ACE
Indicates that this ACE is inherited from a parent directory. A
server that supports automatic inheritance will place this flag on
any ACEs inherited from the parent directory when creating a new
object. Client applications will use this to perform automatic
inheritance. Clients and servers MUST clear this bit in the acl
attribute; it may only be used in the dacl and sacl attributes.
ACE4_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG
ACE4_FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG
The ACE4_SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG (SUCCESS) and
ACE4_FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG (FAILED) flag bits relate only to
ACE4_SYSTEM_AUDIT_ACE_TYPE (AUDIT) and ACE4_SYSTEM_ALARM_ACE_TYPE
(ALARM) ACE types. If during the processing of the file's ACL,
the server encounters an AUDIT or ALARM ACE that matches the
principal attempting the OPEN, the server notes that fact, and the
presence, if any, of the SUCCESS and FAILED flags encountered in
the AUDIT or ALARM ACE. Once the server completes the ACL
processing, it then notes if the operation succeeded or failed.
If the operation succeeded, and if the SUCCESS flag was set for a
matching AUDIT or ALARM ACE, then the appropriate AUDIT or ALARM
event occurs. If the operation failed, and if the FAILED flag was
set for the matching AUDIT or ALARM ACE, then the appropriate
AUDIT or ALARM event occurs. Either or both of the SUCCESS or
FAILED can be set, but if neither is set, the AUDIT or ALARM ACE
is not useful.
The previously described processing applies to that of the ACCESS
operation as well, the difference being that "success" or
"failure" does not mean whether ACCESS returns NFS4_OK or not.
Success means whether ACCESS returns all requested and supported
bits. Failure means whether ACCESS failed to return at least one
bit that was requested and supported.
ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP
Indicates that the "who" refers to a GROUP as defined under UNIX
or a GROUP ACCOUNT as defined under Windows. Clients and servers
MUST ignore the ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP flag on ACEs with a who
value equal to one of the special identifiers outlined in
Section 6.2.1.5.
6.2.1.5. ACE Who
The "who" field of an ACE is an identifier that specifies the
principal or principals to whom the ACE applies. It may refer to a
user or a group, with the flag bit ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP specifying
which.
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There are several special identifiers which need to be understood
universally, rather than in the context of a particular DNS domain.
Some of these identifiers cannot be understood when an NFS client
accesses the server, but have meaning when a local process accesses
the file. The ability to display and modify these permissions is
permitted over NFS, even if none of the access methods on the server
understands the identifiers.
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Who | Description |
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| OWNER | The owner of the file |
| GROUP | The group associated with the file. |
| EVERYONE | The world, including the owner and owning group. |
| INTERACTIVE | Accessed from an interactive terminal. |
| NETWORK | Accessed via the network. |
| DIALUP | Accessed as a dialup user to the server. |
| BATCH | Accessed from a batch job. |
| ANONYMOUS | Accessed without any authentication. |
| AUTHENTICATED | Any authenticated user (opposite of ANONYMOUS) |
| SERVICE | Access from a system service. |
+---------------+--------------------------------------------------+
Table 7
To avoid conflict, these special identifiers are distinguish by an
appended "@" and should appear in the form "xxxx@" (note: no domain
name after the "@"). For example: ANONYMOUS@.
The ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP flag MUST be ignored on entries with these
special identifiers. When encoding entries with these special
identifiers, the ACE4_IDENTIFIER_GROUP flag SHOULD be set to zero.
6.2.1.5.1. Discussion of EVERYONE@
It is important to note that "EVERYONE@" is not equivalent to the
UNIX "other" entity. This is because, by definition, UNIX "other"
does not include the owner or owning group of a file. "EVERYONE@"
means literally everyone, including the owner or owning group.
6.2.2. dacl and sacl Attributes
The dacl and sacl attributes are like the acl attribute, but dacl and
sacl each allow only certain types of ACEs. The dacl attribute
allows just ALLOW and DENY ACEs. The sacl attribute allows just
AUDIT and ALARM ACEs. The dacl and sacl attributes also support
automatic inheritance (see Section 6.4.3.2).
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6.2.3. mode Attribute
The NFS version 4 mode attribute is based on the UNIX mode bits. The
following bits are defined:
const MODE4_SUID = 0x800; /* set user id on execution */
const MODE4_SGID = 0x400; /* set group id on execution */
const MODE4_SVTX = 0x200; /* save text even after use */
const MODE4_RUSR = 0x100; /* read permission: owner */
const MODE4_WUSR = 0x080; /* write permission: owner */
const MODE4_XUSR = 0x040; /* execute permission: owner */
const MODE4_RGRP = 0x020; /* read permission: group */
const MODE4_WGRP = 0x010; /* write permission: group */
const MODE4_XGRP = 0x008; /* execute permission: group */
const MODE4_ROTH = 0x004; /* read permission: other */
const MODE4_WOTH = 0x002; /* write permission: other */
const MODE4_XOTH = 0x001; /* execute permission: other */
Bits MODE4_RUSR, MODE4_WUSR, and MODE4_XUSR apply to the principal
identified in the owner attribute. Bits MODE4_RGRP, MODE4_WGRP, and
MODE4_XGRP apply to principals identified in the owner_group
attribute but who are not identified in the owner attribute. Bits
MODE4_ROTH, MODE4_WOTH, MODE4_XOTH apply to any principal that does
not match that in the owner attribute, and does not have a group
matching that of the owner_group attribute.
Bits within the mode other than those specified above are not defined
by this protocol. A server MUST NOT return bits other than those
defined above in a GETATTR or READDIR operation, and it MUST return
NFS4ERR_INVAL if bits other than those defined above are set in a
SETATTR, CREATE, OPEN, VERIFY or NVERIFY operation.
6.2.4. mode_set_masked Attribute
The mode_set_masked attribute is a write-only attribute that allows
individual bits in the mode attribute to be set or reset, without
changing others. It allows, for example, the bits MODE4_SUID,
MODE4_SGID, and MODE4_SVTX to be modified while leaving unmodified
any of the nine low-order mode bits devoted to permissions.
In such instances that the nine low-order bits are left unmodified,
then neither the acl nor the dacl attribute should be automatically
modified as discussed in Section 6.4.1.
The mode_set_masked attribute consists of two words each in the form
of a mode4. The first consists of the value to be applied to the
current mode value and the second is a mask. Only bits set to one in
the mask word are changed (set or reset) in the file's mode. All
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other bits in the mode remain unchanged. Bits in the first word that
correspond to bits which are zero in the mask are ignored, except
that undefined bits are checked for validity and can result in
NFS4ERR_INVAL as described below.
The mode_set_masked attribute is only valid in a SETATTR operation.
If it is used in a CREATE or OPEN operation, the server MUST return
NFS4ERR_INVAL.
Bits not defined as valid in the mode attribute are not valid in
either word of the mode_set_masked attribute. The server MUST return
NFS4ERR_INVAL if any of those are on in a SETATTR. If the mode and
mode_set_masked attributes are both specified in the same SETATTR,
the server MUST also return NFS4ERR_INVAL.
6.3. Common Methods
The requirements in this section will be referred to in future
sections, especially Section 6.4.
6.3.1. Interpreting an ACL
6.3.1.1. Server Considerations
The server uses the algorithm described in Section 6.2.1 to determine
whether an ACL allows access to an object. However, the ACL may not
be the sole determiner of access. For example:
o In the case of a file system exported as read-only, the server may
deny write permissions even though an object's ACL grants it.
o Server implementations MAY grant ACE4_WRITE_ACL and ACE4_READ_ACL
permissions to prevent a situation from arising in which there is
no valid way to ever modify the ACL.
o All servers will allow a user the ability to read the data of the
file when only the execute permission is granted (i.e. If the ACL
denies the user the ACE4_READ_DATA access and allows the user
ACE4_EXECUTE, the server will allow the user to read the data of
the file).
o Many servers have the notion of owner-override in which the owner
of the object is allowed to override accesses that are denied by
the ACL. This may be helpful, for example, to allow users
continued access to open files on which the permissions have
changed.
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o Many servers have the notion of a "superuser" that has privileges
beyond an ordinary user. The superuser may be able to read or
write data or metadata in ways that would not be permitted by the
ACL.
6.3.1.2. Client Considerations
Clients SHOULD NOT do their own access checks based on their
interpretation the ACL, but rather use the OPEN and ACCESS operations
to do access checks. This allows the client to act on the results of
having the server determine whether or not access should be granted
based on its interpretation of the ACL.
Clients must be aware of situations in which an object's ACL will
define a certain access even though the server will not enforce it.
In general, but especially in these situations, the client needs to
do its part in the enforcement of access as defined by the ACL. To
do this, the client MAY issue the appropriate ACCESS operation prior
to servicing the request of the user or application in order to
determine whether the user or application should be granted the
access requested. For examples in which the ACL may define accesses
that the server doesn't enforce see Section 6.3.1.1.
6.3.2. Computing a Mode Attribute from an ACL
The following method can be used to calculate the MODE4_R*, MODE4_W*
and MODE4_X* bits of a mode attribute, based upon an ACL.
1. To determine MODE4_ROTH, MODE4_WOTH, and MODE4_XOTH:
A. If the special identifier EVERYONE@ is granted
ACE4_READ_DATA, then the bit MODE4_ROTH SHOULD be set.
Otherwise, MODE4_ROTH SHOULD NOT be set.
B. If the special identifier EVERYONE@ is granted
ACE4_WRITE_DATA or ACE4_APPEND_DATA, then the bit MODE4_WOTH
SHOULD be set. Otherwise, MODE4_WOTH SHOULD NOT be set.
C. If the special identifier EVERYONE@ is granted ACE4_EXECUTE,
then the bit MODE4_XOTH SHOULD be set. Otherwise, MODE4_XOTH
SHOULD NOT be set.
2. To determine MODE4_RGRP, MODE4_WGRP, and MODE4_XGRP, note that
the EVERYONE@ special identifier SHOULD be taken into account.
In other words, when determining if the GROUP@ special identifier
is granted a permission, ACEs with the identifier EVERYONE@
should take effect just as ACEs with the special identifier
GROUP@ would.
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A. If the special identifier GROUP@ is granted ACE4_READ_DATA,
then the bit MODE4_RGRP SHOULD be set. Otherwise, MODE4_RGRP
SHOULD NOT be set.
B. If the special identifier GROUP@ is granted ACE4_WRITE_DATA
or ACE4_APPEND_DATA, then the bit MODE4_WGRP SHOULD be set.
Otherwise, MODE4_WGRP SHOULD NOT be set.
C. If the special identifier GROUP@ is granted ACE4_EXECUTE,
then the bit MODE4_XGRP SHOULD be set. Otherwise, MODE4_XGRP
SHOULD NOT be set.
3. To determine MODE4_RUSR, MODE4_WUSR, and MODE4_XUSR, note that
the EVERYONE@ special identifier SHOULD be taken into account.
In other words, when determining if the OWNER@ special identifier
is granted a permission, ACEs with the identifier EVERYONE@
should take effect just as ACEs with the special identifer OWNER@
would.
A. If the special identifier OWNER@ is granted ACE4_READ_DATA,
then the bit MODE4_RUSR SHOULD be set. Otherwise, MODE4_RUSR
SHOULD NOT be set.
B. If the special identifier OWNER@ is granted ACE4_WRITE_DATA
or ACE4_APPEND_DATA, then the bit MODE4_WUSR SHOULD be set.
Otherwise, MODE4_WUSR SHOULD NOT be set.
C. If the special identifier OWNER@ is granted ACE4_EXECUTE,
then the bit MODE4_XUSR SHOULD be set. Otherwise, MODE4_XUSR
SHOULD NOT be set.
6.3.2.1. Discussion
The nine low-order mode bits (MODE4_R*, MODE4_W*, MODE4_X*)
correspond to ACE4_READ_DATA, ACE4_WRITE_DATA/ACE4_APPEND_DATA, and
ACE4_EXECUTE for OWNER@, GROUP@, and EVERYONE@. On some
implementations, mode bits may represent a superset of these
permissions, e.g. if a specific user is granted ACE4_WRITE_DATA, then
MODE4_WGRP will be set, even though the file's owner_group is not
granted ACE4_WRITE_DATA.
Server implementations are discouraged from doing this, as experience
has shown that this is confusing and annoying to end users. The
specifications above also discourage this practice to enforce the
semantic that setting the mode attribute effectively specifies read,
write, and execute for owner, group, and other.
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6.4. Requirements
The server that supports both mode and ACL must take care to
synchronize the MODE4_*USR, MODE4_*GRP, and MODE4_*OTH bits with the
ACEs which have respective who fields of "OWNER@", "GROUP@", and
"EVERYONE@" so that the client can see semantically equivalent access
permissions exist whether the client asks for owner, owner_group and
mode attributes, or for just the ACL.
In this section, much is made of the methods in Section 6.3.2. Many
requirements refer to this section. But note that the methods have
behaviors specified with "SHOULD". This is intentional, to avoid
invalidating existing implementations that compute the mode according
to the withdrawn POSIX ACL draft (1003.1e draft 17), rather than by
actual permissions on owner, group, and other.
6.4.1. Setting the mode and/or ACL Attributes
In the case where a server supports the sacl or dacl attribute, in
addition to the acl attribute, the server MUST fail a request to set
the acl attribute simultaneously with a dacl or sacl attribute. The
error to be given is NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUP.
6.4.1.1. Setting mode and not ACL
When any of the nine low-order mode permission bits are subject to
change, either because the mode attribute was set or because the
mode_set_masked attribute was set and the mask included one or more
bits from the low-order nine mode bits that control permissions, and
no ACL attribute is explicitly set, the acl and dacl attributes must
be modified in accordance with the updated value of the permissions
bits within the mode. This must happen even if the value of the
permission bits within the mode is the same after the mode is set as
before.
Note that any AUDIT or ALARM ACEs (hence any ACEs in the sacl
attribute) are unaffected by changes to the mode.
In cases in which the permissions bits are subject to change, the acl
and dacl attributes MUST be modified such that the mode computed via
the method in Section 6.3.2 yields the low-order nine bits (MODE4_R*,
MODE4_W*, MODE4_X*) of the mode attribute as modified by the
attribute change. The ACL attributes SHOULD also be modified such
that:
1. If MODE4_RGRP is not set, entities explicitly listed in the ACL
other than OWNER@ and EVERYONE@ SHOULD NOT be granted
ACE4_READ_DATA.
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2. If MODE4_WGRP is not set, entities explicitly listed in the ACL
other than OWNER@ and EVERYONE@ SHOULD NOT be granted
ACE4_WRITE_DATA or ACE4_APPEND_DATA.
3. If MODE4_XGRP is not set, entities explicitly listed in the ACL
other than OWNER@ and EVERYONE@ SHOULD NOT be granted
ACE4_EXECUTE.
Access mask bits other those listed above, appearing in ALLOW ACEs,
MAY also be disabled.
Note that ACEs with the flag ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE set do not affect
the permissions of the ACL itself, nor do ACEs of the type AUDIT and
ALARM. As such, it is desirable to leave these ACEs unmodified when
modifying the ACL attributes.
Also note that the requirement may be met by discarding the acl and
dacl, in favor of an ACL that represents the mode and only the mode.
This is permitted, but it is preferable for a server to preserve as
much of the ACL as possible without violating the above requirements.
Discarding the ACL makes it effectively impossible for a file created
with a mode attribute to inherit an ACL (see Section 6.4.3).
6.4.1.2. Setting ACL and not mode
When setting the acl or dacl and not setting the mode or
mode_set_masked attributes, the permission bits of the mode need to
be derived from the ACL. In this case, the ACL attribute SHOULD be
set as given. The nine low-order bits of the mode attribute
(MODE4_R*, MODE4_W*, MODE4_X*) MUST be modified to match the result
of the method Section 6.3.2. The three high-order bits of the mode
(MODE4_SUID, MODE4_SGID, MODE4_SVTX) SHOULD remain unchanged.
6.4.1.3. Setting both ACL and mode
When setting both the mode (includes use of either the mode attribute
or the mode_set_masked attribute) and the acl or dacl attributes in
the same operation, the attributes MUST be applied in this order:
mode (or mode_set_masked), then ACL. The mode-related attribute is
set as given, then the ACL attribute is set as given, possibly
changing the final mode, as described above in Section 6.4.1.2.
6.4.2. Retrieving the mode and/or ACL Attributes
This section applies only to servers that support both the mode and
ACL attributes.
Some server implementations may have a concept of "objects without
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ACLs", meaning that all permissions are granted and denied according
to the mode attribute, and that no ACL attribute is stored for that
object. If an ACL attribute is requested of such a server, the
server SHOULD return an ACL that does not conflict with the mode;
that is to say, the ACL returned SHOULD represent the nine low-order
bits of the mode attribute (MODE4_R*, MODE4_W*, MODE4_X*) as
described in Section 6.3.2.
For other server implementations, the ACL attribute is always present
for every object. Such servers SHOULD store at least the three high-
order bits of the mode attribute (MODE4_SUID, MODE4_SGID,
MODE4_SVTX). The server SHOULD return a mode attribute if one is
requested, and the low-order nine bits of the mode (MODE4_R*,
MODE4_W*, MODE4_X*) MUST match the result of applying the method in
Section 6.3.2 to the ACL attribute.
6.4.3. Creating New Objects
If a server supports any ACL attributes, it may use the ACL
attributes on the parent directory to compute an initial ACL
attribute for a newly created object. This will be referred to as
the inherited ACL within this section. The act of adding one or more
ACEs to the inherited ACL that are based upon ACEs in the parent
directory's ACL will be referred to as inheriting an ACE within this
section.
Implementors should standardize on what the behavior of CREATE and
OPEN must be depending on the presence or absence of the mode and ACL
attributes.
1. If just the mode is given in the call:
In this case, inheritance SHOULD take place, but the mode MUST be
applied to the inherited ACL as described in Section 6.4.1.1,
thereby modifying the ACL.
2. If just the ACL is given in the call:
In this case, inheritance SHOULD NOT take place, and the ACL as
defined in the CREATE or OPEN will be set without modification,
and the mode modified as in Section 6.4.1.2
3. If both mode and ACL are given in the call:
In this case, inheritance SHOULD NOT take place, and both
attributes will be set as described in Section 6.4.1.3.
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4. If neither mode nor ACL are given in the call:
In the case where an object is being created without any initial
attributes at all, e.g. an OPEN operation with an opentype4 of
OPEN4_CREATE and a createmode4 of EXCLUSIVE4, inheritance SHOULD
NOT take place. Instead, the server SHOULD set permissions to
deny all access to the newly created object. It is expected that
the appropriate client will set the desired attributes in a
subsequent SETATTR operation, and the server SHOULD allow that
operation to succeed, regardless of what permissions the object
is created with. For example, an empty ACL denies all
permissions, but the server should allow the owner's SETATTR to
succeed even though WRITE_ACL is implicitly denied.
In other cases, inheritance SHOULD take place, and no
modifications to the ACL will happen. The mode attribute, if
supported, MUST be as computed in Section 6.3.2, with the
MODE4_SUID, MODE4_SGID and MODE4_SVTX bits clear. If no
inheritable ACEs exist on the parent directory, the rules for
creating acl, dacl or sacl attributes are implementation defined.
If either the dacl or sacl attribute is supported, then the
ACL4_DEFAULTED flag SHOULD be set on the newly created
attributes.
6.4.3.1. The Inherited ACL
If the object being created is not a directory, the inherited ACL
SHOULD NOT inherit ACEs from the parent directory ACL unless the
ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_FLAG is set.
If the object being created is a directory, the inherited ACL should
inherit all inheritable ACEs from the parent directory, those that
have ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE or ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE flag set.
If the inheritable ACE has ACE4_FILE_INHERIT_ACE set, but
ACE4_DIRECTORY_INHERIT_ACE is clear, the inherited ACE on the newly
created directory MUST have the ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE flag set to
prevent the directory from being affected by ACEs meant for non-
directories.
If when a new directory is created and it inherits ACEs from its
parent, for each inheritable ACE which affects the directory's
permissions, a server MAY create two ACEs on the directory being
created; one effective and one which is only inheritable (i.e. has
ACE4_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE flag set). In the case of a dacl or sacl
attribute, both of these ACEs SHOULD have the ACE4_INHERITED_ACE flag
set. This gives the user and the server, in the cases which it must
mask certain permissions upon creation, the ability to modify the
effective permissions without modifying the ACE which is to be
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inherited to the new directory's children.
When a newly created object is created with attributes, and those
attributes contain an ACL attribute and/or a mode attribute, the
server MUST apply those attributes to the newly created object, as
described in Section 6.4.1.
6.4.3.2. Automatic Inheritance
The acl attribute consists only of an array of ACEs, but the sacl and
dacl attributes (see Section 6.2.2) also include an additional flag
field. The flag field applies to the entire sacl or dacl; three flag
values are defined:
const ACL4_AUTO_INHERIT = 0x00000001;
const ACL4_PROTECTED = 0x00000002;
const ACL4_DEFAULTED = 0x00000004;
and all other bits must be cleared. The ACE4_INHERITED_ACE flag may
be set in the ACEs of the sacl or dacl (whereas it must always be
cleared in the acl).
Together these features allow a server to support automatic
inheritance, which we now explain in more detail.
Inheritable ACEs are normally inherited by child objects only at the
time that the child objects are created; later modifications to
inheritable ACEs do not result in modifications to inherited ACEs on
descendents.
However, the dacl and sacl provide an optional mechanism which allows
a client application to propagate changes to inheritable ACEs to an
entire directory hierarchy.
A server that supports this performs inheritance at object creation
time in the normal way, and SHOULD set the ACE4_INHERITED_ACE flag on
any inherited ACEs as they are added to the new object.
A client application such as an ACL editor may then propagate changes
to inheritable ACEs on a directory by recursively traversing that
directory's descendants and modifying each ACL encountered to remove
any ACEs with the ACE4_INHERITED_ACE flag and to replace them by the
new inheritable ACEs (also with the ACE4_INHERITED_ACE flag set). It
uses the existing ACE inheritance flags in the obvious way to decide
which ACEs to propagate. (Note that it may encounter further
inheritable ACEs when descending the directory hierarchy, and that
those will also need to be taken into account when propagating
inheritable ACEs to further descendants.)
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The reach of this propagation may be limited in two ways: first,
automatic inheritance is not performed from any directory ACL that
has the ACL4_AUTO_INHERIT flag cleared; and second, automatic
inheritance stops wherever an ACL with the ACL4_PROTECTED flag is
set, preventing modification of that ACL and also (if the ACL is set
on a directory) of the ACL on any of the object's descendants.
This propagation is performed independently for the sacl and the dacl
attributes; thus the ACL4_AUTO_INHERIT and ACL4_PROTECTED flags may
be independently set for the sacl and the dacl, and propagation of
one type of acl may continue down a hierarchy even where propagation
of the other acl has stopped.
New objects should be created with a dacl and a sacl that both have
the ACL4_PROTECTED flag cleared and the ACL4_AUTO_INHERIT flag set to
the same value as that on, respectively, the sacl or dacl of the
parent object.
Both the dacl and sacl attributes are RECOMMENDED, and a server may
support one without supporting the other.
A server that supports both the old acl attribute and one or both of
the new dacl or sacl attributes must do so in such a way as to keep
all three attributes consistent with each other. Thus the ACEs
reported in the acl attribute should be the union of the ACEs
reported in the dacl and sacl attributes, except that the
ACE4_INHERITED_ACE flag must be cleared from the ACEs in the acl.
And of course a client that queries only the acl will be unable to
determine the values of the sacl or dacl flag fields.
When a client performs a SETATTR for the acl attribute, the server
SHOULD set the ACL4_PROTECTED flag to true on both the sacl and the
dacl. By using the acl attribute, as opposed to the dacl or sacl
attributes, the client signals that it may not understand automatic
inheritance, and thus cannot be trusted to set an ACL for which
automatic inheritance would make sense.
When a client application queries an ACL, modifies it, and sets it
again, it should leave any ACEs marked with ACE4_INHERITED_ACE
unchanged, in their original order, at the end of the ACL. If the
application is unable to do this, it should set the ACL4_PROTECTED
flag. This behavior is not enforced by servers, but violations of
this rule may lead to unexpected results when applications perform
automatic inheritance.
If a server also supports the mode attribute, it SHOULD set the mode
in such a way that leaves inherited ACEs unchanged, in their original
order, at the end of the ACL. If it is unable to do so, it SHOULD
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set the ACL4_PROTECTED flag on the file's dacl.
Finally, in the case where the request that creates a new file or
directory does not also set permissions for that file or directory,
and there are also no ACEs to inherit from the parent's directory,
then the server's choice of ACL for the new object is implementation-
dependent. In this case, the server SHOULD set the ACL4_DEFAULTED
flag on the ACL it chooses for the new object. An application
performing automatic inheritance takes the ACL4_DEFAULTED flag as a
sign that the ACL should be completely replaced by one generated
using the automatic inheritance rules.
7. Single-server Name Space
This chapter describes the NFSv4 single-server name space. Single-
server namespaces may be presented directly to clients, or they may
be used as a basis to form larger multi-server namespaces (e.g. site-
wide or organization-wide) to be presented to clients, as described
in Section 10.
7.1. Server Exports
On a UNIX server, the name space describes all the files reachable by
pathnames under the root directory or "/". On a Windows NT server
the name space constitutes all the files on disks named by mapped
disk letters. NFS server administrators rarely make the entire
server's file system name space available to NFS clients. More often
portions of the name space are made available via an "export"
feature. In previous versions of the NFS protocol, the root
filehandle for each export is obtained through the MOUNT protocol;
the client sends a string that identifies the export of name space
and the server returns the root filehandle for it. The MOUNT
protocol supports an EXPORTS procedure that will enumerate the
server's exports.
7.2. Browsing Exports
The NFS version 4 protocol provides a root filehandle that clients
can use to obtain filehandles for the exports of a particular server,
via a series of LOOKUP operations within a COMPOUND, to traverse a
path. A common user experience is to use a graphical user interface
(perhaps a file "Open" dialog window) to find a file via progressive
browsing through a directory tree. The client must be able to move
from one export to another export via single-component, progressive
LOOKUP operations.
This style of browsing is not well supported by the NFS version 2 and
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3 protocols. The client expects all LOOKUP operations to remain
within a single server file system. For example, the device
attribute will not change. This prevents a client from taking name
space paths that span exports.
An automounter on the client can obtain a snapshot of the server's
name space using the EXPORTS procedure of the MOUNT protocol. If it
understands the server's pathname syntax, it can create an image of
the server's name space on the client. The parts of the name space
that are not exported by the server are filled in with a "pseudo file
system" that allows the user to browse from one mounted file system
to another. There is a drawback to this representation of the
server's name space on the client: it is static. If the server
administrator adds a new export the client will be unaware of it.
7.3. Server Pseudo File System
NFS version 4 servers avoid this name space inconsistency by
presenting all the exports for a given server within the framework of
a single namespace, for that server. An NFS version 4 client uses
LOOKUP and READDIR operations to browse seamlessly from one export to
another. Portions of the server name space that are not exported are
bridged via a "pseudo file system" that provides a view of exported
directories only. A pseudo file system has a unique fsid and behaves
like a normal, read only file system.
Based on the construction of the server's name space, it is possible
that multiple pseudo file systems may exist. For example,
/a pseudo file system
/a/b real file system
/a/b/c pseudo file system
/a/b/c/d real file system
Each of the pseudo file systems are considered separate entities and
therefore will have its own unique fsid.
7.4. Multiple Roots
The DOS and Windows operating environments are sometimes described as
having "multiple roots". File Systems are commonly represented as
disk letters. MacOS represents file systems as top level names. NFS
version 4 servers for these platforms can construct a pseudo file
system above these root names so that disk letters or volume names
are simply directory names in the pseudo root.
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7.5. Filehandle Volatility
The nature of the server's pseudo file system is that it is a logical
representation of file system(s) available from the server.
Therefore, the pseudo file system is most likely constructed
dynamically when the server is first instantiated. It is expected
that the pseudo file system may not have an on disk counterpart from
which persistent filehandles could be constructed. Even though it is
preferable that the server provide persistent filehandles for the
pseudo file system, the NFS client should expect that pseudo file
system filehandles are volatile. This can be confirmed by checking
the associated "fh_expire_type" attribute for those filehandles in
question. If the filehandles are volatile, the NFS client must be
prepared to recover a filehandle value (e.g. with a series of LOOKUP
operations) when receiving an error of NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED.
7.6. Exported Root
If the server's root file system is exported, one might conclude that
a pseudo-file system is unneeded. This not necessarily so. Assume
the following file systems on a server:
/ disk1 (exported)
/a disk2 (not exported)
/a/b disk3 (exported)
Because disk2 is not exported, disk3 cannot be reached with simple
LOOKUPs. The server must bridge the gap with a pseudo-file system.
7.7. Mount Point Crossing
The server file system environment may be constructed in such a way
that one file system contains a directory which is 'covered' or
mounted upon by a second file system. For example:
/a/b (file system 1)
/a/b/c/d (file system 2)
The pseudo file system for this server may be constructed to look
like:
/ (place holder/not exported)
/a/b (file system 1)
/a/b/c/d (file system 2)
It is the server's responsibility to present the pseudo file system
that is complete to the client. If the client sends a lookup request
for the path "/a/b/c/d", the server's response is the filehandle of
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the file system "/a/b/c/d". In previous versions of the NFS
protocol, the server would respond with the filehandle of directory
"/a/b/c/d" within the file system "/a/b".
The NFS client will be able to determine if it crosses a server mount
point by a change in the value of the "fsid" attribute.
7.8. Security Policy and Name Space Presentation
The application of the server's security policy needs to be carefully
considered by the implementor. One may choose to limit the
viewability of portions of the pseudo file system based on the
server's perception of the client's ability to authenticate itself
properly. However, with the support of multiple security mechanisms
and the ability to negotiate the appropriate use of these mechanisms,
the server is unable to properly determine if a client will be able
to authenticate itself. If, based on its policies, the server
chooses to limit the contents of the pseudo file system, the server
may effectively hide file systems from a client that may otherwise
have legitimate access.
As suggested practice, the server should apply the security policy of
a shared resource in the server's namespace to the components of the
resource's ancestors. For example:
/
/a/b
/a/b/c
The /a/b/c directory is a real file system and is the shared
resource. The security policy for /a/b/c is Kerberos with integrity.
The server should apply the same security policy to /, /a, and /a/b.
This allows for the extension of the protection of the server's
namespace to the ancestors of the real shared resource.
For the case of the use of multiple, disjoint security mechanisms in
the server's resources, the security for a particular object in the
server's namespace should be the union of all security mechanisms of
all direct descendants.
8. File Locking and Share Reservations
Integrating locking into the NFS protocol necessarily causes it to be
stateful. With the inclusion of such features as share reservations,
file and directory delegations, recallable layouts, and support for
mandatory record locking the protocol becomes substantially more
dependent on state than the traditional combination of NFS and NLM
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[XNFS]. There are three components to making this state manageable:
o Clear division between client and server
o Ability to reliably detect inconsistency in state between client
and server
o Simple and robust recovery mechanisms
In this model, the server owns the state information. The client
requests changes in locks and the server responds with the changes
made. Non-client-initiated changes in locking state are infrequent
and the client receives prompt notification of them and can adjust
its view of the locking state to reflect the server's changes.
To support Win32 share reservations it is necessary to provide
operations which atomically OPEN or CREATE files. Having a separate
share/unshare operation would not allow correct implementation of the
Win32 OpenFile API. In order to correctly implement share semantics,
the previous NFS protocol mechanisms used when a file is opened or
created (LOOKUP, CREATE, ACCESS) need to be replaced. The NFS
version 4.1 protocol defines OPEN operation which looks up or creates
a file and establishes locking state on the server.
8.1. Locking
It is assumed that manipulating a lock is rare when compared to READ
and WRITE operations. It is also assumed that crashes and network
partitions are relatively rare. Therefore it is important that the
READ and WRITE operations have a lightweight mechanism to indicate if
they possess a held lock. A lock request contains the heavyweight
information required to establish a lock and uniquely define the lock
owner.
The following sections describe the transition from the heavyweight
information to the eventual lightweight stateid used for most client
and server locking interactions.
8.1.1. Client and Session ID
A client must establish a client ID (see Section 2.4) and then one or
more sessionids (see Section 2.10) before performing any operations
to open, lock, or delegate a file object. The sessionid services as
a shorthand referral to an NFSv4.1 client.
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8.1.2. State-owner Definition
When opening a file or requesting a record lock, the client must
specify an identifier which represents the owner of the requested
lock. This identifier is in the form of a state-owner, represented
in the protocol by a state_owner4, a variable-length opaque array
which, when concatenated with the current client ID uniquely defines
the owner of lock managed by the client. This may be a thread id,
process id, or other unique value.
Owners of opens and owners of record locks are separate entities and
remain separate even if the same opaque arrays are used to designate
owners of each. The protocol distinguishes between open-owners
(represented by open_owner4 structures) and lock-owners (represented
by lock_owner4 structures).
Each open is associated with a specific open-owner while each record
lock is associated with a lock-owner and an open-owner, the latter
being the open-owner associated with the open file under which the
LOCK operation was done. Delegations and layouts, on the other hand,
are not associated with a specific owner but are associated the
client as a whole.
8.1.3. Stateid Definition
When the server grants a lock of any type (including opens, record
locks, delegations, and layouts) it responds with a unique stateid,
that represents a set of locks (often a single lock) for the same
file, of the same type, and sharing the same ownership
characteristics. Thus opens of the same file by different open-
owners each have an identifying stateid. Similarly, each set of
record locks on a file owned by a specific lock-owner and gotten via
an open for a specific open-owner, has its own identifying stateid.
Delegations and layouts also have associated stateids by which they
may be referenced. The stateid is used as a shorthand reference to a
lock or set of locks and given a stateid the server can determine the
associated state-owner or state-owners (in the case of an open-owner/
lock-owner pair) and the associated filehandle. When stateids are
used the current filehandle must be the one associated with that
stateid.
The server may assign stateids independently for different clients
and a stateid with the same bit pattern for one client may designate
an entirely different set of locks for a different client. The
stateid is always interpreted with respect to the client ID
associated with the current session. Stateids apply to all sessions
associated with the given client ID and the client may use a stateid
obtained from one session on another session associated with the same
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client ID.
8.1.3.1. Stateid Structure
Stateids are divided into two fields, a 96-bit "other" field
identifying the specific set of locks and a 32-bit "seqid" sequence
value. Except in the case of special stateids, to be discussed
below, the purpose of the sequence value within NFSv4.1 is to allow
the replier to communicate to the requester the order in which
operations that modified locking state associated with a stateid have
been processed.
In the case of stateids associated with opens, i.e. the stateids
returned by OPEN (the state for the open, rather than that for the
delegation), OPEN_DOWNGRADE, or CLOSE, the server MUST provide an
"seqid" value starting at one for the first use of a given "other"
value and incremented by one with each subsequent operation returning
a stateid.
In the case of other sorts of stateids (i.e. stateids associated with
record locks and delegations), the server MAY provide an incrementing
sequence value on successive stateids returned with same identifying
field, or it may return the value zero. If it does return a non-zero
"seqid" value it MUST start at one and be incremented by one with
each subsequent operation returning a stateid with same "other"
value, just as is done with open state.
The client when using a stateid as a parameter to an operation, must,
except in the case of a special stateid, set the sequence value to
zero. If the value is non-zero, the server MUST return the error
NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
8.1.3.2. Special Stateids
Stateid values whose "other" field is either all zeros or all ones
are reserved. They may not be assigned by the server but have
special meanings defined by the protocol. The particular meaning
depends on whether the "other" field is all zeros or all ones and the
specific value of the "seqid" field.
The following combinations of "other" and "seqid" are defined in
NFSv4.1:
o When "other" and "seqid" are both zero, the stateid is treated as
a special anonymous stateid, which can be used in READ, WRITE, and
SETATTR requests to indicate the absence of any open state
associated with the request. When an anonymous stateid value is
used, and an existing open denies the form of access requested,
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then access will be denied to the request.
o When "other" and "seqid" are both all ones, the stateid is a
special read bypass stateid. When this value is used in WRITE or
SETATTR, it is treated like the anonymous value. When used in
READ, the server MAY grant access, even if access would normally
be denied to READ requests.
o When "other" is zero and "seqid" is one, the stateid represents
the current stateid, which is whatever value is the last stateid
returned by an operation within the COMPOUND. In the case of an
OPEN, the stateid returned for the open file, and not the
delegation is used. The stateid passed to the operation in place
of the special value has its "seqid" value set to zero. If there
is no operation in the COMPOUND which has returned a stateid
value, the server MUST return the error NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
If a stateid value is used which has all zero or all ones in the
"other" field, but does not match one of the cases above, the server
MUST return the error NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
Special stateids, unlike other stateids are not associated with
individual client ID's or filehandles and can be used with all valid
client ID's and filehandles. In the case of a special stateid
designating the current current stateid, the current stateid value
substituted for the special stateid is associated with a particular
client ID and filehandle.
8.1.3.3. Stateid Lifetime and Validation
Stateids must remain valid until either a client reboot or a sever
reboot or until the client returns all of the locks associated with
the stateid by means of an operation such as CLOSE or DELEGRETURN.
If the locks are lost due to revocation the stateid remains a valid
designation of that revoked state until the client frees it by using
FREE_STATEID. Stateids associated with record locks are an
exception. They remain valid even if a LOCKU free all remaining
locks, so long as the open file with which they are associated
remains open, unless the client does a FREE_STATEID to cause the
stateid to be freed.
An "other" value must never be reused for a different purpose (i.e.
different filehandle, owner, or type of locks) within the context of
a single client ID. A server may retain the "other" value for the
same purpose beyond the point where it may otherwise be freed but if
it does so, it must maintain "seqid" continuity with previous values,
in all case in which it is required to return incrementing "seqid"
values in general.
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One mechanism that may be used to satisfy the requirement that the
server recognize invalid and out-of-date stateids is for the server
to divide the "other" field of the stateid into two fields.
o An index into a table of locking-state structures.
o A generation number which is incremented on each allocation of a
table entry for a particular use.
And then store in each table entry,
o The current generation number.
o The client ID with which the stateid is associated.
o The filehandle of the file on which the locks are taken.
o An indication of the type of stateid (open, record lock, file
delegation, directory delegation, layout).
o The last "seqid" value returned corresponding to the current
"other" value.
With this information, the following procedure would be used to
validate an incoming stateid and return an appropriate error, when
necessary:
o If the server has restarted resulting in loss of all leased state
but the sessionid and clientID are still valid, return
NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID. (If server restart has resulted in an
invalid client ID or sessionid is invalid, SEQUENCE will return an
error - not NFS4ERR_STATE_STATEID - and the operation that takes a
stateid as an argument will never be processed.)
o If the "other" field is all zeros or all ones, check that the
"other" and "seqid" match a defined combination for a special
stateid and that that stateid can be used in the current context.
If not, then return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
o If the "seqid" field is not zero, return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
o Otherwise divide the "other" into a table index and an entry
generation.
o If the table index field is outside the range of the associated
table, return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
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o If the selected table entry is of a different generation than that
specified in the incoming stateid, return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
o If the selected table entry does not match the current file
handle, return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
o If the client ID in the table entry does not match the client ID
associated with the current session, return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
o If the stateid type is not valid for the context in which the
stateid appears, return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID.
o Otherwise, the stateid is valid and the table entry should contain
any additional information about the associated set of locks, such
as open-owner and lock-owner information, as well as information
on the specific locks, such as open modes and octet ranges.
8.1.4. Use of the Stateid and Locking
All READ, WRITE and SETATTR operations contain a stateid. For the
purposes of this section, SETATTR operations which change the size
attribute of a file are treated as if they are writing the area
between the old and new size (i.e. the range truncated or added to
the file by means of the SETATTR), even where SETATTR is not
explicitly mentioned in the text.
If the state-owner performs a READ or WRITE in a situation in which
it has established a lock or share reservation on the server (any
OPEN constitutes a share reservation) the stateid (previously
returned by the server) must be used to indicate what locks,
including both record locks and share reservations, are held by the
state-owner. If no state is established by the client, either record
lock or share reservation, a special stateid for anonymous state
(zero as "other" and "seqid") is used. Regardless whether a stateid
for anonymous state or a stateid returned by the server is used, if
there is a conflicting share reservation or mandatory record lock
held on the file, the server MUST refuse to service the READ or WRITE
operation.
Share reservations are established by OPEN operations and by their
nature are mandatory in that when the OPEN denies READ or WRITE
operations, that denial results in such operations being rejected
with error NFS4ERR_LOCKED. Record locks may be implemented by the
server as either mandatory or advisory, or the choice of mandatory or
advisory behavior may be determined by the server on the basis of the
file being accessed (for example, some UNIX-based servers support a
"mandatory lock bit" on the mode attribute such that if set, record
locks are required on the file before I/O is possible). When record
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locks are advisory, they only prevent the granting of conflicting
lock requests and have no effect on READs or WRITEs. Mandatory
record locks, however, prevent conflicting I/O operations. When they
are attempted, they are rejected with NFS4ERR_LOCKED. When the
client gets NFS4ERR_LOCKED on a file it knows it has the proper share
reservation for, it will need to issue a LOCK request on the region
of the file that includes the region the I/O was to be performed on,
with an appropriate locktype (i.e. READ*_LT for a READ operation,
WRITE*_LT for a WRITE operation).
Note that for UNIX environments that support mandatory file locking,
the distinction between advisory and mandatory locking is subtle. In
fact, advisory and mandatory record locks are exactly the same in so
far as the APIs and requirements on implementation. If the mandatory
lock attribute is set on the file, the server checks to see if the
lock-owner has an appropriate shared (read) or exclusive (write)
record lock on the region it wishes to read or write to. If there is
no appropriate lock, the server checks if there is a conflicting lock
(which can be done by attempting to acquire the conflicting lock on
the behalf of the lock-owner, and if successful, release the lock
after the READ or WRITE is done), and if there is, the server returns
NFS4ERR_LOCKED.
For Windows environments, there are no advisory record locks, so the
server always checks for record locks during I/O requests.
Thus, the NFS version 4 LOCK operation does not need to distinguish
between advisory and mandatory record locks. It is the NFS version 4
server's processing of the READ and WRITE operations that introduces
the distinction.
Every stateid with the exception of special stateid values, whether
returned by an OPEN-type operation (i.e. OPEN, OPEN_DOWNGRADE), or
by a LOCK-type operation (i.e. LOCK or LOCKU), defines an access
mode for the file (i.e. READ, WRITE, or READ-WRITE) as established
by the original OPEN which caused the allocation of the open stateid
and as modified by subsequent OPENs and OPEN_DOWNGRADEs for the same
open-owner/file pair. Stateids returned by record lock operations
imply the access mode for the open stateid associated with the lock
set represented by the stateid. Delegation stateids have an access
mode based on the type of delegation. When a READ, WRITE, or SETATTR
which specifies the size attribute, is done, the operation is subject
to checking against the access mode to verify that the operation is
appropriate given the OPEN with which the operation is associated.
In the case of WRITE-type operations (i.e. WRITEs and SETATTRs which
set size), the server must verify that the access mode allows writing
and return an NFS4ERR_OPENMODE error if it does not. In the case, of
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READ, the server may perform the corresponding check on the access
mode, or it may choose to allow READ on opens for WRITE only, to
accommodate clients whose write implementation may unavoidably do
reads (e.g. due to buffer cache constraints). However, even if READs
are allowed in these circumstances, the server MUST still check for
locks that conflict with the READ (e.g. another open specify denial
of READs). Note that a server which does enforce the access mode
check on READs need not explicitly check for conflicting share
reservations since the existence of OPEN for read access guarantees
that no conflicting share reservation can exist.
The read bypass special stateid (all bits of "other" and "seqid" set
to one) stateid indicates a desire to bypass locking checks. The
server MAY allow READ operations to bypass locking checks at the
server, when this special stateid is used. However, WRITE operations
with this special stateid value MUST NOT bypass locking checks and
are treated exactly the same as if a special stateid for anonymous
state were used.
A lock may not be granted while a READ or WRITE operation using one
of the special stateids is being performed and the range of the lock
request conflicts with the range of the READ or WRITE operation. For
the purposes of this paragraph, a conflict occurs when a shared lock
is requested and a WRITE operation is being performed, or an
exclusive lock is requested and either a READ or a WRITE operation is
being performed. A SETATTR that sets size is treated similarly to a
WRITE as discussed above.
8.2. Lock Ranges
The protocol allows a lock owner to request a lock with an octet
range and then either upgrade, downgrade, or unlock a sub-range of
the initial lock. It is expected that this will be an uncommon type
of request. In any case, servers or server filesystems may not be
able to support sub-range lock semantics. In the event that a server
receives a locking request that represents a sub-range of current
locking state for the lock owner, the server is allowed to return the
error NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE to signify that it does not support sub-
range lock operations. Therefore, the client should be prepared to
receive this error and, if appropriate, report the error to the
requesting application.
The client is discouraged from combining multiple independent locking
ranges that happen to be adjacent into a single request since the
server may not support sub-range requests and for reasons related to
the recovery of file locking state in the event of server failure.
As discussed in the section "Server Failure and Recovery" below, the
server may employ certain optimizations during recovery that work
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effectively only when the client's behavior during lock recovery is
similar to the client's locking behavior prior to server failure.
8.3. Upgrading and Downgrading Locks
If a client has a write lock on a record, it can request an atomic
downgrade of the lock to a read lock via the LOCK request, by setting
the type to READ_LT. If the server supports atomic downgrade, the
request will succeed. If not, it will return NFS4ERR_LOCK_NOTSUPP.
The client should be prepared to receive this error, and if
appropriate, report the error to the requesting application.
If a client has a read lock on a record, it can request an atomic
upgrade of the lock to a write lock via the LOCK request by setting
the type to WRITE_LT or WRITEW_LT. If the server does not support
atomic upgrade, it will return NFS4ERR_LOCK_NOTSUPP. If the upgrade
can be achieved without an existing conflict, the request will
succeed. Otherwise, the server will return either NFS4ERR_DENIED or
NFS4ERR_DEADLOCK. The error NFS4ERR_DEADLOCK is returned if the
client issued the LOCK request with the type set to WRITEW_LT and the
server has detected a deadlock. The client should be prepared to
receive such errors and if appropriate, report the error to the
requesting application.
8.4. Blocking Locks
Some clients require the support of blocking locks. NFSv4.1 does not
provide a callback when a previously unavailable lock becomes
available. Clients thus have no choice but to continually poll for
the lock. This presents a fairness problem. Two new lock types are
added, READW and WRITEW, and are used to indicate to the server that
the client is requesting a blocking lock. The server should maintain
an ordered list of pending blocking locks. When the conflicting lock
is released, the server may wait the lease period for the first
waiting client to re-request the lock. After the lease period
expires the next waiting client request is allowed the lock. Clients
are required to poll at an interval sufficiently small that it is
likely to acquire the lock in a timely manner. The server is not
required to maintain a list of pending blocked locks as it is used to
increase fairness and not correct operation. Because of the
unordered nature of crash recovery, storing of lock state to stable
storage would be required to guarantee ordered granting of blocking
locks.
Servers may also note the lock types and delay returning denial of
the request to allow extra time for a conflicting lock to be
released, allowing a successful return. In this way, clients can
avoid the burden of needlessly frequent polling for blocking locks.
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The server should take care in the length of delay in the event the
client retransmits the request.
If a server receives a blocking lock request, denies it, and then
later receives a nonblocking request for the same lock, which is also
denied, then it should remove the lock in question from its list of
pending blocking locks. Clients should use such a nonblocking
request to indicate to the server that this is the last time they
intend to poll for the lock, as may happen when the process
requesting the lock is interrupted. This is a courtesy to the
server, to prevent it from unnecessarily waiting a lease period
before granting other lock requests. However, clients are not
required to perform this courtesy, and servers must not depend on
them doing so. Also, clients must be prepared for the possibility
that this final locking request will be accepted.
8.5. Lease Renewal
The purpose of a lease is to allow a server to remove stale locks
that are held by a client that has crashed or is otherwise
unreachable. It is not a mechanism for cache consistency and lease
renewals may not be denied if the lease interval has not expired.
Since each session is associated with a specific client, any
operation issued on that session is an indication that the associated
client is reachable. When a request is issued for a given session,
successful execution of a SEQUENCE operation (or successful retrieval
of the result of SEQUENCE from the reply cache) will result in all
leases for the associated client to be implicitly renewed. This
approach allows for low overhead lease renewal which scales well. In
the typical case no extra RPC calls are required for lease renewal
and in the worst case one RPC is required every lease period, via a
COMPOUND that consists solely of a single SEQUENCE operation. The
number of locks held by the client is not a factor since all state
for the client is involved with the lease renewal action.
Since all operations that create a new lease also renew existing
leases, the server must maintain a common lease expiration time for
all valid leases for a given client. This lease time can then be
easily updated upon implicit lease renewal actions.
8.6. Crash Recovery
The important requirement in crash recovery is that both the client
and the server know when the other has failed. Additionally, it is
required that a client sees a consistent view of data across server
restarts or reboots. All READ and WRITE operations that may have
been queued within the client or network buffers must wait until the
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client has successfully recovered the locks protecting the READ and
WRITE operations.
8.6.1. Client Failure and Recovery
In the event that a client fails, the server may release the client's
locks when the associated leases have expired. Conflicting locks
from another client may only be granted after this lease expiration.
When a client has not failed and re-establishes his lease before
expiration occurs, requests for conflicting locks will not be
granted.
To minimize client delay upon restart, lock requests are associated
with an instance of the client by a client supplied verifier. This
verifier is part of the initial EXCHANGE_ID call made by the client.
The server returns a client ID as a result of the EXCHANGE_ID
operation. The client then confirms the use of the client ID by
establishing a session associated with that client ID. All locks,
including opens, record locks, delegations, and layout obtained by
sessions using that client ID are associated with that client ID.
Since the verifier will be changed by the client upon each
initialization, the server can compare a new verifier to the verifier
associated with currently held locks and determine that they do not
match. This signifies the client's new instantiation and subsequent
loss of locking state. As a result, the server is free to release
all locks held which are associated with the old client ID which was
derived from the old verifier. At this point conflicting locks from
other clients, kept waiting while the leaser had not yet expired, can
be granted.
Note that the verifier must have the same uniqueness properties of
the verifier for the COMMIT operation.
8.6.2. Server Failure and Recovery
If the server loses locking state (usually as a result of a restart
or reboot), it must allow clients time to discover this fact and re-
establish the lost locking state. The client must be able to re-
establish the locking state without having the server deny valid
requests because the server has granted conflicting access to another
client. Likewise, if there is a possibility that clients have not
yet re-established their locking state for a file, the server must
disallow READ and WRITE operations for that file.
A client can determine that loss of locking state has occurred via
several methods.
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1. When a SEQUENCE succeeds, but sr_status_flags in the reply to
SEQUENCE indicates SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED (see
Section 17.46.4), this indicates client's client ID and session
are valid (have persisted through server restart) and the client
can now re-establish its lock state (Section 8.6.2.1).
2. When an operation returns NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID, this indicates a
stateid invalidated by a server reboot or restart. Since the
operation that returned NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID MUST have been
preceded by SEQUENCE, and SEQUENCE did not return an error, this
means the client ID and session are valid. The client can now
re-establish is lock state as described in Section 8.6.2.1. Note
that the server should (MUST) have set
SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED in the sr_status_flags of the
results of the SEQUENCE operation, and thus this situation should
be the same as that described above.
3. When a SEQUENCE operation returns NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, this
means both sessionid SEQUENCE refers to (field sa_sessionid) and
the implied client ID are now invalid, where the client ID was
invalidated by server reboot or restart or by lease expiration.
When SEQUENCE returns NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, the client must
establish a new client ID (see Section 8.1.1) and re-establish
its lock state (Section 8.6.2.1).
4. When a SEQUENCE operation returns NFS4ERR_BADSESSION, this may
mean the session has been destroyed, but the client ID is still
valid. The client issues a CREATE_SESSION request with the
client ID to re-establish the session. If CREATE_SESSION fails
with NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, the client must establish a new
client ID (see Section 8.1.1) and re-establish its lock state
(Section 8.6.2.1). If CREATE_SESSION succeeds, the client must
then re-establish its lock state (Section 8.6.2.1).
5. When a operation, neither SEQUENCE nor preceded by SEQUENCE (for
example, CREATE_SESSION, DESTROY_SESSION) returns
NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID. The client MUST establish a new client
ID (Section 8.1.1) and re-establish its lock state
(Section 8.6.2.1).
8.6.2.1. State Reclaim
Once a session is established using the new client ID, the client
will use reclaim-type locking requests (i.e. LOCK requests with
reclaim set to true and OPEN operations with a claim type of
CLAIM_PREVIOUS) to re-establish its locking state. Once this is
done, or if there is no such locking state to reclaim, the client
does a RECLAIM_COMPLETE operation to indicate that it has reclaimed
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all of the locking state that it will reclaim. Once a client does a
RECLAIM_COMPLETE operation, it may attempt non-reclaim locking
operations, although it may get NFS4ERR_GRACE errors on these until
the period of special handling is over.
Note that if the client ID persisted through a server reboot (which
will be self-evident if the client never received a
NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID error, and instead got
SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED status from SEQUENCE
(Section 17.46.4), no client ID was re-established. For reasons
described in Section 17.46.5, OPEN reclaims that perform upgrades can
cause the client and server to not have the same view of open state.
Therefore, the client MUST NOT perform an OPEN reclaim that is also
an OPEN upgrade (Section 8.10) unless the client precedes the OPEN
upgrade/reclaim with a TEST_STATEID operation in the same COMPOUND.
The stateid used in TEST_STATEID will be that returned by the reclaim
OPEN the OPEN upgrade/reclaim is upgrading the open state from.
Alternatively, the client can avoid OPEN upgrade during the reclaim
phase.
The period of special handling of locking and READs and WRITEs, is
referred to as the "grace period". During the grace period, clients
recover locks and the associated state using reclaim-type locking
requests. During this period, the server must reject READ and WRITE
operations and non-reclaim locking requests (i.e. other LOCK and OPEN
operations) with an error of NFS4ERR_GRACE, unless it is able to
guarantee that these may be done safely, as described below.
The grace period may last until all clients who are known to possibly
have had locks have done a RECLAIM_COMPLETE operation, indicating
that they have finished reclaiming the locks they held before the
server reboot. The server is assumed to maintain in stable storage a
list of clients who may have such locks. The server may also
terminate the grace period before all clients have done
RECLAIM_COMPLETE. The server SHOULD NOT terminate the grace period
before a time equal to the lease period in order to give clients an
opportunity to find out about the server reboot. Some additional
time in order to allow time to establish a new client ID and session
and to effect lock reclaims may be added.
If the server can reliably determine that granting a non-reclaim
request will not conflict with reclamation of locks by other clients,
the NFS4ERR_GRACE error does not have to be returned even within the
grace period, although NFS4ERR_GRACE must always be returned to
clients attempting a non-reclaim lock request before doing their own
RECLAIM_COMPLETE. For the server to be able to service READ and
WRITE operations during the grace period, it must again be able to
guarantee that no possible conflict could arise between a potential
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reclaim locking request and the READ or WRITE operation. If the
server is unable to offer that guarantee, the NFS4ERR_GRACE error
must be returned to the client.
For a server to provide simple, valid handling during the grace
period, the easiest method is to simply reject all non-reclaim
locking requests and READ and WRITE operations by returning the
NFS4ERR_GRACE error. However, a server may keep information about
granted locks in stable storage. With this information, the server
could determine if a regular lock or READ or WRITE operation can be
safely processed.
For example, if the server maintained on stable storage summary
information on whether mandatory locks exist, either mandatory record
locks, or share reservations specifying deny modes, many requests
could be allowed during the grace period. If it is known that no
such share reservations exist, OPEN request that do not specify deny
modes may be safely granted. If, in addition, it is known that no
mandatory record locks exist, either through information stored on
stable storage or simply because the server does not support such
locks, READ and WRITE requests may be safely processed during the
grace period.
To reiterate, for a server that allows non-reclaim lock and I/O
requests to be processed during the grace period, it MUST determine
that no lock subsequently reclaimed will be rejected and that no lock
subsequently reclaimed would have prevented any I/O operation
processed during the grace period.
Clients should be prepared for the return of NFS4ERR_GRACE errors for
non-reclaim lock and I/O requests. In this case the client should
employ a retry mechanism for the request. A delay (on the order of
several seconds) between retries should be used to avoid overwhelming
the server. Further discussion of the general issue is included in
[Floyd]. The client must account for the server that is able to
perform I/O and non-reclaim locking requests within the grace period
as well as those that can not do so.
A reclaim-type locking request outside the server's grace period can
only succeed if the server can guarantee that no conflicting lock or
I/O request has been granted since reboot or restart.
A server may, upon restart, establish a new value for the lease
period. Therefore, clients should, once a new client ID is
established, refetch the lease_time attribute and use it as the basis
for lease renewal for the lease associated with that server.
However, the server must establish, for this restart event, a grace
period at least as long as the lease period for the previous server
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instantiation. This allows the client state obtained during the
previous server instance to be reliably re-established.
8.6.3. Network Partitions and Recovery
If the duration of a network partition is greater than the lease
period provided by the server, the server will have not received a
lease renewal from the client. If this occurs, the server may free
all locks held for the client, or it may allow the lock state to
remain for a considerable period, subject to the constraint that if a
request for a conflicting lock is made, locks associated with expired
leases do not prevent such a conflicting lock from being granted but
are revoked as necessary so as not to interfere with such conflicting
requests.
If the server chooses to delay freeing of lock state until there is a
conflict, it may either free all of the clients locks once there is a
conflict, or it may only revoke the minimum set of locks necessary to
allow conflicting requests. When it adopts the finer-grained
approach, it must revoke all locks associated with a given stateid,
as long as it revokes a single such lock.
When the server chooses to free all of a client's lock state, either
immediately upon lease expiration, or a result of the first attempt
to get a lock, all stateids held by the client will become invalid or
stale. Once the client is able to reach the server after such a
network partition, the status returned by the SEQUENCE operation will
indicate a loss of locking state. In addition all I/O submitted by
the client with the now invalid stateids will fail with the server
returning the error NFS4ERR_EXPIRED. Once the client learns of the
loss of locking state, it will suitably notify the applications that
held the invalidated locks. The client should then take action to
free invalidated stateids, either by establishing a new client ID
using a new verifier or by doing a FREE_STATEID operation to release
each of the invalidated stateids.
When the server adopts a finer-grained approach to revocation of
locks when lease have expired, only a subset of stateids will
normally become invalid during a network partition. When the client
is able to communicate with the server after such a network
partition, the status returned by the SEQUENCE operation will
indicate a partial loss of locking state. In addition, operations,
including I/O submitted by the client with the now invalid stateids
will fail with the server returning the error NFS4ERR_EXPIRED. Once
the client learns of the loss of locking state, it will use the
TEST_STATEID operation on all of its stateids to determine which
locks have been lost and them suitably notify the applications that
held the invalidated locks. The client can then release the
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invalidated locking state and acknowledge the revocation of the
associated locks by doing a FREE_STATEID operation on each of the
invalidated stateids.
When a network partition is combined with a server reboot, there are
edge conditions that place requirements on the server in order to
avoid silent data corruption following the server reboot. Two of
these edge conditions are known, and are discussed below.
The first edge condition arises as a result of the scenarios such as
the following:
1. Client A acquires a lock.
2. Client A and server experience mutual network partition, such
that client A is unable to renew its lease.
3. Client A's lease expires, and the server releases lock.
4. Client B acquires a lock that would have conflicted with that of
Client A.
5. Client B releases its lock.
6. Server reboots.
7. Network partition between client A and server heals.
8. Client A connects to new server instance and finds out about
server reboot.
9. Client A reclaims its lock within the server's grace period.
Thus, at the final step, the server has erroneously granted client
A's lock reclaim. If client B modified the object the lock was
protecting, client A will experience object corruption.
The second known edge condition arises in situations such as the
following:
1. Client A acquires one or more locks.
2. Server reboots.
3. Client A and server experience mutual network partition, such
that client A is unable to reclaim all of its locks within the
grace period.
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4. Server's reclaim grace period ends. Client A has either no
locks or an incomplete set of locks known to the server.
5. Client B acquires a lock that would have conflicted with a lock
of client A that was not reclaimed.
6. Client B releases the lock.
7. Server reboots a second time.
8. Network partition between client A and server heals.
9. Client A connects to new server instance and finds out about
server reboot.
10. Client A reclaims its lock within the server's grace period.
As with the first edge condition, the final step of the scenario of
the second edge condition has the server erroneously granting client
A's lock reclaim.
Solving the first and second edge conditions requires that the server
either always assumes after it reboots that some edge condition
occurs, and thus return NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE for all reclaim attempts, or
that the server record some information in stable storage. The
amount of information the server records in stable storage is in
inverse proportion to how harsh the server intends to be whenever
edge conditions arise. The server that is completely tolerant of all
edge conditions will record in stable storage every lock that is
acquired, removing the lock record from stable storage only when the
lock is released. For the two edge conditions discussed above, the
harshest a server can be, and still support a grace period for
reclaims, requires that the server record in stable storage
information some minimal information. For example, a server
implementation could, for each client, save in stable storage a
record containing:
o the client's id string
o a boolean that indicates if the client's lease expired or if there
was administrative intervention (see Section 8.7) to revoke a
record lock, share reservation, or delegation and there has been
no acknowledgement (via FREE_STATEID) of such revocation.
o a boolean that indicates whether the client may have locks that it
believes to be reclaimable in situations which the grace period
was terminated, making the server's view of lock reclaimability
suspect. The server will set this for any client record in stable
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storage where the client has not done a RECLAIM_COMPLETE, before
it grants any new (i.e. not reclaimed) lock to any client.
Assuming the above record keeping, for the first edge condition,
after the server reboots, the record that client A's lease expired
means that another client could have acquired a conflicting record
lock, share reservation, or delegation. Hence the server must reject
a reclaim from client A with the error NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE.
For the second edge condition, after the server reboots for a second
time, the indication that the client had not completed its reclaims
at the time at which the grace period ended means that the server
must reject a reclaim from client A with the error NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE.
When either edge condition occurs, the client's attempt to reclaim
locks will result in the error NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE. When this is
received, or after the client reboots with no lock state, the client
will issue a RECLAIM_COMPLETE. When the RECLAIM_COMPLETE is
received, the server and client are again in agreement regarding
reclaimable locks and both booleans in persistent storage can be
reset, to be set again only when there is a subsequent event that
causes lock reclaim operations to be questionable.
Regardless of the level and approach to record keeping, the server
MUST implement one of the following strategies (which apply to
reclaims of share reservations, record locks, and delegations):
1. Reject all reclaims with NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE. This is extremely
unforgiving, but necessary if the server does not record lock
state in stable storage.
2. Record sufficient state in stable storage such that all known
edge conditions involving server reboot, including the two noted
in this section, are detected. False positives are acceptable.
Note that at this time, it is not known if there are other edge
conditions.
In the event that, after a server reboot, the server determines
that there is unrecoverable damage or corruption to the
information in stable storage, then for all clients and/or locks
which may be affected, the server MUST return NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE.
A mandate for the client's handling of the NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE error is
outside the scope of this specification, since the strategies for
such handling are very dependent on the client's operating
environment. However, one potential approach is described below.
When the client receives NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE, it could examine the
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change attribute of the objects the client is trying to reclaim state
for, and use that to determine whether to re-establish the state via
normal OPEN or LOCK requests. This is acceptable provided the
client's operating environment allows it. In other words, the client
implementor is advised to document for his users the behavior. The
client could also inform the application that its record lock or
share reservations (whether they were delegated or not) have been
lost, such as via a UNIX signal, a GUI pop-up window, etc. See the
section, "Data Caching and Revocation" for a discussion of what the
client should do for dealing with unreclaimed delegations on client
state.
For further discussion of revocation of locks see Section 8.7.
8.7. Server Revocation of Locks
At any point, the server can revoke locks held by a client and the
client must be prepared for this event. When the client detects that
its locks have been or may have been revoked, the client is
responsible for validating the state information between itself and
the server. Validating locking state for the client means that it
must verify or reclaim state for each lock currently held.
The first occasion of lock revocation is upon server reboot or
restart. In this instance the client will receive an error
(NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID on an operation that takes a stateid as an
argument or NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID on an operation that takes a
sessionid or client ID) and the client will proceed with normal crash
recovery as described in the Section 8.6.2.1.
The second occasion of lock revocation is the inability to renew the
lease before expiration, as discussed above. While this is
considered a rare or unusual event, the client must be prepared to
recover. The server is responsible for determining lease expiration,
and deciding exactly how to deal with it, informing the client of the
scope of the lock revocation. The client then uses the status
information provided by the server in the SEQUENCE results (field
sr_status_flags, see Section 17.46.4) to synchronize its locking
state with that of the server, in order to recover.
The third occasion of lock revocation can occur as a result of
revocation of locks within the lease period, either because of
administrative intervention, or because a recallable lock (a
delegation or layout) was not returned within the lease period after
having been recalled. While these are considered rare events, they
are possible and the client must be prepared to deal with them. When
either of these events occur, the client finds out about the
situation through the status returned by the SEQUENCE operation. Any
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use of stateids associated with revoked locks will receive the error
NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED or NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED, as appropriate.
In all situations in which a subset of locking state may have been
revoked, which include all cases in which locking state is revoked
within the lease period, it is up to the client to determine which
locks have been revoked and which have not. It does this by using
the TEST_STATEID operation on the appropriate set of stateids. Once
the set of revoked locks has been determined, the applications can be
notified, and the invalidated stateids can be freed and lock
revocation acknowledged by using FREE_STATEID.
8.8. Share Reservations
A share reservation is a mechanism to control access to a file. It
is a separate and independent mechanism from record locking. When a
client opens a file, it issues an OPEN operation to the server
specifying the type of access required (READ, WRITE, or BOTH) and the
type of access to deny others (deny NONE, READ, WRITE, or BOTH). If
the OPEN fails the client will fail the application's open request.
Pseudo-code definition of the semantics:
if (request.access == 0)
return (NFS4ERR_INVAL)
else
if ((request.access & file_state.deny)) ||
(request.deny & file_state.access))
return (NFS4ERR_DENIED)
This checking of share reservations on OPEN is done with no exception
for an existing OPEN for the same open-owner.
The constants used for the OPEN and OPEN_DOWNGRADE operations for the
access and deny fields are as follows:
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ = 0x00000001;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE = 0x00000002;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_BOTH = 0x00000003;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_NONE = 0x00000000;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_READ = 0x00000001;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_WRITE = 0x00000002;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_BOTH = 0x00000003;
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8.9. OPEN/CLOSE Operations
To provide correct share semantics, a client MUST use the OPEN
operation to obtain the initial filehandle and indicate the desired
access and what access, if any, to deny. Even if the client intends
to use a special stateid for anonymous state or read bypass, it must
still obtain the filehandle for the regular file with the OPEN
operation so the appropriate share semantics can be applied. For
clients that do not have a deny mode built into their open
programming interfaces, deny equal to NONE should be used.
The OPEN operation with the CREATE flag, also subsumes the CREATE
operation for regular files as used in previous versions of the NFS
protocol. This allows a create with a share to be done atomically.
The CLOSE operation removes all share reservations held by the open-
owner on that file. If record locks are held, the client SHOULD
release all locks before issuing a CLOSE. The server MAY free all
outstanding locks on CLOSE but some servers may not support the CLOSE
of a file that still has record locks held. The server MUST return
failure, NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD, if any locks would exist after the
CLOSE.
The LOOKUP operation will return a filehandle without establishing
any lock state on the server. Without a valid stateid, the server
will assume the client has the least access. For example, a file
opened with deny READ/WRITE using a filehandle obtained through
LOOKUP could only be read using the special read bypass stateid and
could not be written at all because it would not have a valid stateid
and the special anonymous stateid would not be allowed access.
8.10. Open Upgrade and Downgrade
When an OPEN is done for a file and the open-owner for which the open
is being done already has the file open, the result is to upgrade the
open file status maintained on the server to include the access and
deny bits specified by the new OPEN as well as those for the existing
OPEN. The result is that there is one open file, as far as the
protocol is concerned, and it includes the union of the access and
deny bits for all of the OPEN requests completed. Only a single
CLOSE will be done to reset the effects of both OPENs. Note that the
client, when issuing the OPEN, may not know that the same file is in
fact being opened. The above only applies if both OPENs result in
the OPENed object being designated by the same filehandle.
When the server chooses to export multiple filehandles corresponding
to the same file object and returns different filehandles on two
different OPENs of the same file object, the server MUST NOT "OR"
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together the access and deny bits and coalesce the two open files.
Instead the server must maintain separate OPENs with separate
stateids and will require separate CLOSEs to free them.
When multiple open files on the client are merged into a single open
file object on the server, the close of one of the open files (on the
client) may necessitate change of the access and deny status of the
open file on the server. This is because the union of the access and
deny bits for the remaining opens may be smaller (i.e. a proper
subset) than previously. The OPEN_DOWNGRADE operation is used to
make the necessary change and the client should use it to update the
server so that share reservation requests by other clients are
handled properly.
8.11. Short and Long Leases
When determining the time period for the server lease, the usual
lease tradeoffs apply. Short leases are good for fast server
recovery at a cost of increased operations to effect lease renewal
(when there are no other operations during the period to effect lease
renewal as a side-effect). Long leases are certainly kinder and
gentler to servers trying to handle very large numbers of clients.
The number of extra requests to effect lock renewal drop in inverse
proportion to the lease time. The disadvantages of long leases
include the possibility of slower recovery after certain failures.
After server failure, a longer grace period may be required when some
clients do not promptly reclaim their locks and do a
RECLAIM_COMPLETE. In the event of client failure, it can longer
period for leases to expire thus forcing conflicting requests to
wait.
Long leases are usable if the server is able to store lease state in
non-volatile memory. Upon recovery, the server can reconstruct the
lease state from its non-volatile memory and continue operation with
its clients and therefore long leases would not be an issue.
8.12. Clocks, Propagation Delay, and Calculating Lease Expiration
To avoid the need for synchronized clocks, lease times are granted by
the server as a time delta. However, there is a requirement that the
client and server clocks do not drift excessively over the duration
of the lock. There is also the issue of propagation delay across the
network which could easily be several hundred milliseconds as well as
the possibility that requests will be lost and need to be
retransmitted.
To take propagation delay into account, the client should subtract it
from lease times (e.g. if the client estimates the one-way
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propagation delay as 200 msec, then it can assume that the lease is
already 200 msec old when it gets it). In addition, it will take
another 200 msec to get a response back to the server. So the client
must send a lock renewal or write data back to the server 400 msec
before the lease would expire.
The server's lease period configuration should take into account the
network distance of the clients that will be accessing the server's
resources. It is expected that the lease period will take into
account the network propagation delays and other network delay
factors for the client population. Since the protocol does not allow
for an automatic method to determine an appropriate lease period, the
server's administrator may have to tune the lease period.
8.13. Vestigial Locking Infrastructure From V4.0
There are a number of operations and fields within existing
operations that no longer have a function in minor version one. In
one way or another, these changes are all due to the implementation
of sessions which provides client context and exactly once semantics
as a base feature of the protocol, separate from locking itself.
The following operations have become mandatory-to-not-implement. The
server should return NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP if these operations are found in
an NFSv4.1 COMPOUND.
o SETCLIENTID since its function has been replaced by EXCHANGE_ID.
o SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM since client ID confirmation now happens by
means of CREATE_SESSION.
o OPEN_CONFIRM because OPEN's no longer require confirmation to
establish an owner-based sequence value.
o RELEASE_LOCKOWNER because lock-owners with no associated locks
have any sequence-related state and so can be deleted by the
server at will.
o RENEW because every SEQUENCE operation for a session causes lease
renewal, making a separate operation useless.
Also, there are a number of fields, present in existing operations
related to locking that have no use in minor version one. They were
used in minor version zero to perform functions now provided in a
different fashion.
o Sequence ids used to sequence requests for a given state-owner and
to provide retry protection, now provided via sessions.
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o Client IDs used to identify the client associated with a given
request. Client identification is now available using the client
ID associated with the current session, without needing an
explicit client ID field.
Such vestigial fields in existing operations should be set by the
client to zero. When they are not, the server MUST return an
NFS4ERR_INVAL error.
9. Client-Side Caching
Client-side caching of data, of file attributes, and of file names is
essential to providing good performance with the NFS protocol.
Providing distributed cache coherence is a difficult problem and
previous versions of the NFS protocol have not attempted it.
Instead, several NFS client implementation techniques have been used
to reduce the problems that a lack of coherence poses for users.
These techniques have not been clearly defined by earlier protocol
specifications and it is often unclear what is valid or invalid
client behavior.
The NFS version 4 protocol uses many techniques similar to those that
have been used in previous protocol versions. The NFS version 4
protocol does not provide distributed cache coherence. However, it
defines a more limited set of caching guarantees to allow locks and
share reservations to be used without destructive interference from
client side caching.
In addition, the NFS version 4 protocol introduces a delegation
mechanism which allows many decisions normally made by the server to
be made locally by clients. This mechanism provides efficient
support of the common cases where sharing is infrequent or where
sharing is read-only.
9.1. Performance Challenges for Client-Side Caching
Caching techniques used in previous versions of the NFS protocol have
been successful in providing good performance. However, several
scalability challenges can arise when those techniques are used with
very large numbers of clients. This is particularly true when
clients are geographically distributed which classically increases
the latency for cache revalidation requests.
The previous versions of the NFS protocol repeat their file data
cache validation requests at the time the file is opened. This
behavior can have serious performance drawbacks. A common case is
one in which a file is only accessed by a single client. Therefore,
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sharing is infrequent.
In this case, repeated reference to the server to find that no
conflicts exist is expensive. A better option with regards to
performance is to allow a client that repeatedly opens a file to do
so without reference to the server. This is done until potentially
conflicting operations from another client actually occur.
A similar situation arises in connection with file locking. Sending
file lock and unlock requests to the server as well as the read and
write requests necessary to make data caching consistent with the
locking semantics (see the section "Data Caching and File Locking")
can severely limit performance. When locking is used to provide
protection against infrequent conflicts, a large penalty is incurred.
This penalty may discourage the use of file locking by applications.
The NFS version 4 protocol provides more aggressive caching
strategies with the following design goals:
.IP o Compatibility with a large range of server semantics. .IP o
Provide the same caching benefits as previous versions of the NFS
protocol when unable to provide the more aggressive model. .IP o
Requirements for aggressive caching are organized so that a large
portion of the benefit can be obtained even when not all of the
requirements can be met. .LP The appropriate requirements for the
server are discussed in later sections in which specific forms of
caching are covered. (see the section "Open Delegation").
9.2. Delegation and Callbacks
Recallable delegation of server responsibilities for a file to a
client improves performance by avoiding repeated requests to the
server in the absence of inter-client conflict. With the use of a
"callback" RPC from server to client, a server recalls delegated
responsibilities when another client engages in sharing of a
delegated file.
A delegation is passed from the server to the client, specifying the
object of the delegation and the type of delegation. There are
different types of delegations but each type contains a stateid to be
used to represent the delegation when performing operations that
depend on the delegation. This stateid is similar to those
associated with locks and share reservations but differs in that the
stateid for a delegation is associated with a client ID and may be
used on behalf of all the open_owners for the given client. A
delegation is made to the client as a whole and not to any specific
process or thread of control within it.
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The backchannel is established by CREATE_SESSION and
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, and the client is required to maintain it.
Because the backchannel may be down, even temporarily, correct
protocol operation does not depend on them. Preliminary testing of
callback functionality by means of a CB_COMPOUND procedure with a
single operation, CB_SEQUENCE, can be used to check the continuity of
the backchannel. A server avoids delegating responsibilities until
it has determined that the backchannel exists. Because the granting
of a delegation is always conditional upon the absence of conflicting
access, clients must not assume that a delegation will be granted and
they must always be prepared for OPENs, WANT_DELEGATIONs, and
GET_DIR_DELEGATIONs to be processed without any delegations being
granted.
Once granted, a delegation behaves in many ways like a lock. There
is an associated lease that is subject to renewal together with all
of the other leases held by that client.
Unlike locks, an operation by a second client to a delegated file
will cause the server to recall a delegation through a callback.
On recall, the client holding the delegation must flush modified
state (such as modified data) to the server and return the
delegation. The conflicting request will not receive a response
until the recall is complete. The recall is considered complete when
the client returns the delegation or the server times out on the
recall and revokes the delegation as a result of the timeout.
Following the resolution of the recall, the server has the
information necessary to grant or deny the second client's request.
At the time the client receives a delegation recall, it may have
substantial state that needs to be flushed to the server. Therefore,
the server should allow sufficient time for the delegation to be
returned since it may involve numerous RPCs to the server. If the
server is able to determine that the client is diligently flushing
state to the server as a result of the recall, the server may extend
the usual time allowed for a recall. However, the time allowed for
recall completion should not be unbounded.
An example of this is when responsibility to mediate opens on a given
file is delegated to a client (see the section "Open Delegation").
The server will not know what opens are in effect on the client.
Without this knowledge the server will be unable to determine if the
access and deny state for the file allows any particular open until
the delegation for the file has been returned.
A client failure or a network partition can result in failure to
respond to a recall callback. In this case, the server will revoke
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the delegation which in turn will render useless any modified state
still on the client.
9.2.1. Delegation Recovery
There are three situations that delegation recovery must deal with:
o Client reboot or restart
o Server reboot or restart
o Network partition (full or callback-only)
In the event the client reboots or restarts, the failure to renew
leases will result in the revocation of record locks and share
reservations. Delegations, however, may be treated a bit
differently.
There will be situations in which delegations will need to be
reestablished after a client reboots or restarts. The reason for
this is the client may have file data stored locally and this data
was associated with the previously held delegations. The client will
need to reestablish the appropriate file state on the server.
To allow for this type of client recovery, the server MAY extend the
period for delegation recovery beyond the typical lease expiration
period. This implies that requests from other clients that conflict
with these delegations will need to wait. Because the normal recall
process may require significant time for the client to flush changed
state to the server, other clients need be prepared for delays that
occur because of a conflicting delegation. This longer interval
would increase the window for clients to reboot and consult stable
storage so that the delegations can be reclaimed. For open
delegations, such delegations are reclaimed using OPEN with a claim
type of CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV. (See the sections on "Data Caching and
Revocation" and "Operation 18: OPEN" for discussion of open
delegation and the details of OPEN respectively).
A server MAY support a claim type of CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV, but if it
does, it MUST NOT remove delegations upon a CREATE_SESSION that
confirms a client ID created by EXCHANGE_ID, and instead MUST, for a
period of time no less than that of the value of the lease_time
attribute, maintain the client's delegations to allow time for the
client to issue CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV requests. The server that
supports CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV MUST support the DELEGPURGE operation.
When the server reboots or restarts, delegations are reclaimed (using
the OPEN operation with CLAIM_PREVIOUS) in a similar fashion to
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record locks and share reservations. However, there is a slight
semantic difference. In the normal case if the server decides that a
delegation should not be granted, it performs the requested action
(e.g. OPEN) without granting any delegation. For reclaim, the
server grants the delegation but a special designation is applied so
that the client treats the delegation as having been granted but
recalled by the server. Because of this, the client has the duty to
write all modified state to the server and then return the
delegation. This process of handling delegation reclaim reconciles
three principles of the NFS version 4 protocol:
o Upon reclaim, a client reporting resources assigned to it by an
earlier server instance must be granted those resources.
o The server has unquestionable authority to determine whether
delegations are to be granted and, once granted, whether they are
to be continued.
o The use of callbacks is not to be depended upon until the client
has proven its ability to receive them.
When a network partition occurs, delegations are subject to freeing
by the server when the lease renewal period expires. This is similar
to the behavior for locks and share reservations. For delegations,
however, the server may extend the period in which conflicting
requests are held off. Eventually the occurrence of a conflicting
request from another client will cause revocation of the delegation.
A loss of the backchannel (e.g. by later network configuration
change) will have the same effect. A recall request will fail and
revocation of the delegation will result.
A client normally finds out about revocation of a delegation when it
uses a stateid associated with a delegation and receives the error
NFS4ERR_EXPIRED. It also may find out about delegation revocation
after a client reboot when it attempts to reclaim a delegation and
receives that same error. Note that in the case of a revoked write
open delegation, there are issues because data may have been modified
by the client whose delegation is revoked and separately by other
clients. See the section "Revocation Recovery for Write Open
Delegation" for a discussion of such issues. Note also that when
delegations are revoked, information about the revoked delegation
will be written by the server to stable storage (as described in the
section "Crash Recovery"). This is done to deal with the case in
which a server reboots after revoking a delegation but before the
client holding the revoked delegation is notified about the
revocation.
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9.3. Data Caching
When applications share access to a set of files, they need to be
implemented so as to take account of the possibility of conflicting
access by another application. This is true whether the applications
in question execute on different clients or reside on the same
client.
Share reservations and record locks are the facilities the NFS
version 4 protocol provides to allow applications to coordinate
access by providing mutual exclusion facilities. The NFS version 4
protocol's data caching must be implemented such that it does not
invalidate the assumptions that those using these facilities depend
upon.
9.3.1. Data Caching and OPENs
In order to avoid invalidating the sharing assumptions that
applications rely on, NFS version 4 clients should not provide cached
data to applications or modify it on behalf of an application when it
would not be valid to obtain or modify that same data via a READ or
WRITE operation.
Furthermore, in the absence of open delegation (see the section "Open
Delegation") two additional rules apply. Note that these rules are
obeyed in practice by many NFS version 2 and version 3 clients.
o First, cached data present on a client must be revalidated after
doing an OPEN. Revalidating means that the client fetches the
change attribute from the server, compares it with the cached
change attribute, and if different, declares the cached data (as
well as the cached attributes) as invalid. This is to ensure that
the data for the OPENed file is still correctly reflected in the
client's cache. This validation must be done at least when the
client's OPEN operation includes DENY=WRITE or BOTH thus
terminating a period in which other clients may have had the
opportunity to open the file with WRITE access. Clients may
choose to do the revalidation more often (i.e. at OPENs specifying
DENY=NONE) to parallel the NFS version 3 protocol's practice for
the benefit of users assuming this degree of cache revalidation.
Since the change attribute is updated for data and metadata
modifications, some client implementors may be tempted to use the
time_modify attribute and not change to validate cached data, so
that metadata changes do not spuriously invalidate clean data.
The implementor is cautioned in this approach. The change
attribute is guaranteed to change for each update to the file,
whereas time_modify is guaranteed to change only at the
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granularity of the time_delta attribute. Use by the client's data
cache validation logic of time_modify and not change runs the risk
of the client incorrectly marking stale data as valid.
o Second, modified data must be flushed to the server before closing
a file OPENed for write. This is complementary to the first rule.
If the data is not flushed at CLOSE, the revalidation done after
client OPENs as file is unable to achieve its purpose. The other
aspect to flushing the data before close is that the data must be
committed to stable storage, at the server, before the CLOSE
operation is requested by the client. In the case of a server
reboot or restart and a CLOSEd file, it may not be possible to
retransmit the data to be written to the file. Hence, this
requirement.
9.3.2. Data Caching and File Locking
For those applications that choose to use file locking instead of
share reservations to exclude inconsistent file access, there is an
analogous set of constraints that apply to client side data caching.
These rules are effective only if the file locking is used in a way
that matches in an equivalent way the actual READ and WRITE
operations executed. This is as opposed to file locking that is
based on pure convention. For example, it is possible to manipulate
a two-megabyte file by dividing the file into two one-megabyte
regions and protecting access to the two regions by file locks on
octets zero and one. A lock for write on octet zero of the file
would represent the right to do READ and WRITE operations on the
first region. A lock for write on octet one of the file would
represent the right to do READ and WRITE operations on the second
region. As long as all applications manipulating the file obey this
convention, they will work on a local file system. However, they may
not work with the NFS version 4 protocol unless clients refrain from
data caching.
The rules for data caching in the file locking environment are:
o First, when a client obtains a file lock for a particular region,
the data cache corresponding to that region (if any cache data
exists) must be revalidated. If the change attribute indicates
that the file may have been updated since the cached data was
obtained, the client must flush or invalidate the cached data for
the newly locked region. A client might choose to invalidate all
of non-modified cached data that it has for the file but the only
requirement for correct operation is to invalidate all of the data
in the newly locked region.
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o Second, before releasing a write lock for a region, all modified
data for that region must be flushed to the server. The modified
data must also be written to stable storage.
Note that flushing data to the server and the invalidation of cached
data must reflect the actual octet ranges locked or unlocked.
Rounding these up or down to reflect client cache block boundaries
will cause problems if not carefully done. For example, writing a
modified block when only half of that block is within an area being
unlocked may cause invalid modification to the region outside the
unlocked area. This, in turn, may be part of a region locked by
another client. Clients can avoid this situation by synchronously
performing portions of write operations that overlap that portion
(initial or final) that is not a full block. Similarly, invalidating
a locked area which is not an integral number of full buffer blocks
would require the client to read one or two partial blocks from the
server if the revalidation procedure shows that the data which the
client possesses may not be valid.
The data that is written to the server as a prerequisite to the
unlocking of a region must be written, at the server, to stable
storage. The client may accomplish this either with synchronous
writes or by following asynchronous writes with a COMMIT operation.
This is required because retransmission of the modified data after a
server reboot might conflict with a lock held by another client.
A client implementation may choose to accommodate applications which
use record locking in non-standard ways (e.g. using a record lock as
a global semaphore) by flushing to the server more data upon an LOCKU
than is covered by the locked range. This may include modified data
within files other than the one for which the unlocks are being done.
In such cases, the client must not interfere with applications whose
READs and WRITEs are being done only within the bounds of record
locks which the application holds. For example, an application locks
a single octet of a file and proceeds to write that single octet. A
client that chose to handle a LOCKU by flushing all modified data to
the server could validly write that single octet in response to an
unrelated unlock. However, it would not be valid to write the entire
block in which that single written octet was located since it
includes an area that is not locked and might be locked by another
client. Client implementations can avoid this problem by dividing
files with modified data into those for which all modifications are
done to areas covered by an appropriate record lock and those for
which there are modifications not covered by a record lock. Any
writes done for the former class of files must not include areas not
locked and thus not modified on the client.
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9.3.3. Data Caching and Mandatory File Locking
Client side data caching needs to respect mandatory file locking when
it is in effect. The presence of mandatory file locking for a given
file is indicated when the client gets back NFS4ERR_LOCKED from a
READ or WRITE on a file it has an appropriate share reservation for.
When mandatory locking is in effect for a file, the client must check
for an appropriate file lock for data being read or written. If a
lock exists for the range being read or written, the client may
satisfy the request using the client's validated cache. If an
appropriate file lock is not held for the range of the read or write,
the read or write request must not be satisfied by the client's cache
and the request must be sent to the server for processing. When a
read or write request partially overlaps a locked region, the request
should be subdivided into multiple pieces with each region (locked or
not) treated appropriately.
9.3.4. Data Caching and File Identity
When clients cache data, the file data needs to be organized
according to the file system object to which the data belongs. For
NFS version 3 clients, the typical practice has been to assume for
the purpose of caching that distinct filehandles represent distinct
file system objects. The client then has the choice to organize and
maintain the data cache on this basis.
In the NFS version 4 protocol, there is now the possibility to have
significant deviations from a "one filehandle per object" model
because a filehandle may be constructed on the basis of the object's
pathname. Therefore, clients need a reliable method to determine if
two filehandles designate the same file system object. If clients
were simply to assume that all distinct filehandles denote distinct
objects and proceed to do data caching on this basis, caching
inconsistencies would arise between the distinct client side objects
which mapped to the same server side object.
By providing a method to differentiate filehandles, the NFS version 4
protocol alleviates a potential functional regression in comparison
with the NFS version 3 protocol. Without this method, caching
inconsistencies within the same client could occur and this has not
been present in previous versions of the NFS protocol. Note that it
is possible to have such inconsistencies with applications executing
on multiple clients but that is not the issue being addressed here.
For the purposes of data caching, the following steps allow an NFS
version 4 client to determine whether two distinct filehandles denote
the same server side object:
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o If GETATTR directed to two filehandles returns different values of
the fsid attribute, then the filehandles represent distinct
objects.
o If GETATTR for any file with an fsid that matches the fsid of the
two filehandles in question returns a unique_handles attribute
with a value of TRUE, then the two objects are distinct.
o If GETATTR directed to the two filehandles does not return the
fileid attribute for both of the handles, then it cannot be
determined whether the two objects are the same. Therefore,
operations which depend on that knowledge (e.g. client side data
caching) cannot be done reliably. Note that if GETATTR does not
return the fileid attribute for both filehandles, it will return
it for neither of the filehandles, since the fsid for both
filehandles is the same.
o If GETATTR directed to the two filehandles returns different
values for the fileid attribute, then they are distinct objects.
o Otherwise they are the same object.
9.4. Open Delegation
When a file is being OPENed, the server may delegate further handling
of opens and closes for that file to the opening client. Any such
delegation is recallable, since the circumstances that allowed for
the delegation are subject to change. In particular, the server may
receive a conflicting OPEN from another client, the server must
recall the delegation before deciding whether the OPEN from the other
client may be granted. Making a delegation is up to the server and
clients should not assume that any particular OPEN either will or
will not result in an open delegation. The following is a typical
set of conditions that servers might use in deciding whether OPEN
should be delegated:
o The client must be able to respond to the server's callback
requests. The server will use the CB_NULL procedure for a test of
callback ability.
o The client must have responded properly to previous recalls.
o There must be no current open conflicting with the requested
delegation.
o There should be no current delegation that conflicts with the
delegation being requested.
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o The probability of future conflicting open requests should be low
based on the recent history of the file.
o The existence of any server-specific semantics of OPEN/CLOSE that
would make the required handling incompatible with the prescribed
handling that the delegated client would apply (see below).
There are two types of open delegations, read and write. A read open
delegation allows a client to handle, on its own, requests to open a
file for reading that do not deny read access to others. Multiple
read open delegations may be outstanding simultaneously and do not
conflict. A write open delegation allows the client to handle, on
its own, all opens. Only one write open delegation may exist for a
given file at a given time and it is inconsistent with any read open
delegations.
When a client has a read open delegation, it may not make any changes
to the contents or attributes of the file but it is assured that no
other client may do so. When a client has a write open delegation,
it may modify the file data since no other client will be accessing
the file's data. The client holding a write delegation may only
affect file attributes which are intimately connected with the file
data: size, time_modify, change.
When a client has an open delegation, it does not send OPENs or
CLOSEs to the server but updates the appropriate status internally.
For a read open delegation, opens that cannot be handled locally
(opens for write or that deny read access) must be sent to the
server.
When an open delegation is made, the response to the OPEN contains an
open delegation structure which specifies the following:
o the type of delegation (read or write)
o space limitation information to control flushing of data on close
(write open delegation only, see the section "Open Delegation and
Data Caching")
o an nfsace4 specifying read and write permissions
o a stateid to represent the delegation for READ and WRITE
The delegation stateid is separate and distinct from the stateid for
the OPEN proper. The standard stateid, unlike the delegation
stateid, is associated with a particular lock_owner and will continue
to be valid after the delegation is recalled and the file remains
open.
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When a request internal to the client is made to open a file and open
delegation is in effect, it will be accepted or rejected solely on
the basis of the following conditions. Any requirement for other
checks to be made by the delegate should result in open delegation
being denied so that the checks can be made by the server itself.
o The access and deny bits for the request and the file as described
in the section "Share Reservations".
o The read and write permissions as determined below.
The nfsace4 passed with delegation can be used to avoid frequent
ACCESS calls. The permission check should be as follows:
o If the nfsace4 indicates that the open may be done, then it should
be granted without reference to the server.
o If the nfsace4 indicates that the open may not be done, then an
ACCESS request must be sent to the server to obtain the definitive
answer.
The server may return an nfsace4 that is more restrictive than the
actual ACL of the file. This includes an nfsace4 that specifies
denial of all access. Note that some common practices such as
mapping the traditional user "root" to the user "nobody" may make it
incorrect to return the actual ACL of the file in the delegation
response.
The use of delegation together with various other forms of caching
creates the possibility that no server authentication will ever be
performed for a given user since all of the user's requests might be
satisfied locally. Where the client is depending on the server for
authentication, the client should be sure authentication occurs for
each user by use of the ACCESS operation. This should be the case
even if an ACCESS operation would not be required otherwise. As
mentioned before, the server may enforce frequent authentication by
returning an nfsace4 denying all access with every open delegation.
9.4.1. Open Delegation and Data Caching
OPEN delegation allows much of the message overhead associated with
the opening and closing files to be eliminated. An open when an open
delegation is in effect does not require that a validation message be
sent to the server. The continued endurance of the "read open
delegation" provides a guarantee that no OPEN for write and thus no
write has occurred. Similarly, when closing a file opened for write
and if write open delegation is in effect, the data written does not
have to be flushed to the server until the open delegation is
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recalled. The continued endurance of the open delegation provides a
guarantee that no open and thus no read or write has been done by
another client.
For the purposes of open delegation, READs and WRITEs done without an
OPEN are treated as the functional equivalents of a corresponding
type of OPEN. This refers to the READs and WRITEs that use the
special stateids consisting of all zero bits or all one bits.
Therefore, READs or WRITEs with a special stateid done by another
client will force the server to recall a write open delegation. A
WRITE with a special stateid done by another client will force a
recall of read open delegations.
With delegations, a client is able to avoid writing data to the
server when the CLOSE of a file is serviced. The file close system
call is the usual point at which the client is notified of a lack of
stable storage for the modified file data generated by the
application. At the close, file data is written to the server and
through normal accounting the server is able to determine if the
available file system space for the data has been exceeded (i.e.
server returns NFS4ERR_NOSPC or NFS4ERR_DQUOT). This accounting
includes quotas. The introduction of delegations requires that a
alternative method be in place for the same type of communication to
occur between client and server.
In the delegation response, the server provides either the limit of
the size of the file or the number of modified blocks and associated
block size. The server must ensure that the client will be able to
flush data to the server of a size equal to that provided in the
original delegation. The server must make this assurance for all
outstanding delegations. Therefore, the server must be careful in
its management of available space for new or modified data taking
into account available file system space and any applicable quotas.
The server can recall delegations as a result of managing the
available file system space. The client should abide by the server's
state space limits for delegations. If the client exceeds the stated
limits for the delegation, the server's behavior is undefined.
Based on server conditions, quotas or available file system space,
the server may grant write open delegations with very restrictive
space limitations. The limitations may be defined in a way that will
always force modified data to be flushed to the server on close.
With respect to authentication, flushing modified data to the server
after a CLOSE has occurred may be problematic. For example, the user
of the application may have logged off the client and unexpired
authentication credentials may not be present. In this case, the
client may need to take special care to ensure that local unexpired
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credentials will in fact be available. This may be accomplished by
tracking the expiration time of credentials and flushing data well in
advance of their expiration or by making private copies of
credentials to assure their availability when needed.
9.4.2. Open Delegation and File Locks
When a client holds a write open delegation, lock operations are
performed locally. This includes those required for mandatory file
locking. This can be done since the delegation implies that there
can be no conflicting locks. Similarly, all of the revalidations
that would normally be associated with obtaining locks and the
flushing of data associated with the releasing of locks need not be
done.
When a client holds a read open delegation, lock operations are not
performed locally. All lock operations, including those requesting
non-exclusive locks, are sent to the server for resolution.
9.4.3. Handling of CB_GETATTR
The server needs to employ special handling for a GETATTR where the
target is a file that has a write open delegation in effect. The
reason for this is that the client holding the write delegation may
have modified the data and the server needs to reflect this change to
the second client that submitted the GETATTR. Therefore, the client
holding the write delegation needs to be interrogated. The server
will use the CB_GETATTR operation. The only attributes that the
server can reliably query via CB_GETATTR are size and change.
Since CB_GETATTR is being used to satisfy another client's GETATTR
request, the server only needs to know if the client holding the
delegation has a modified version of the file. If the client's copy
of the delegated file is not modified (data or size), the server can
satisfy the second client's GETATTR request from the attributes
stored locally at the server. If the file is modified, the server
only needs to know about this modified state. If the server
determines that the file is currently modified, it will respond to
the second client's GETATTR as if the file had been modified locally
at the server.
Since the form of the change attribute is determined by the server
and is opaque to the client, the client and server need to agree on a
method of communicating the modified state of the file. For the size
attribute, the client will report its current view of the file size.
For the change attribute, the handling is more involved.
For the client, the following steps will be taken when receiving a
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write delegation:
o The value of the change attribute will be obtained from the server
and cached. Let this value be represented by c.
o The client will create a value greater than c that will be used
for communicating modified data is held at the client. Let this
value be represented by d.
o When the client is queried via CB_GETATTR for the change
attribute, it checks to see if it holds modified data. If the
file is modified, the value d is returned for the change attribute
value. If this file is not currently modified, the client returns
the value c for the change attribute.
For simplicity of implementation, the client MAY for each CB_GETATTR
return the same value d. This is true even if, between successive
CB_GETATTR operations, the client again modifies in the file's data
or metadata in its cache. The client can return the same value
because the only requirement is that the client be able to indicate
to the server that the client holds modified data. Therefore, the
value of d may always be c + 1.
While the change attribute is opaque to the client in the sense that
it has no idea what units of time, if any, the server is counting
change with, it is not opaque in that the client has to treat it as
an unsigned integer, and the server has to be able to see the results
of the client's changes to that integer. Therefore, the server MUST
encode the change attribute in network order when sending it to the
client. The client MUST decode it from network order to its native
order when receiving it and the client MUST encode it network order
when sending it to the server. For this reason, change is defined as
an unsigned integer rather than an opaque array of octets.
For the server, the following steps will be taken when providing a
write delegation:
o Upon providing a write delegation, the server will cache a copy of
the change attribute in the data structure it uses to record the
delegation. Let this value be represented by sc.
o When a second client sends a GETATTR operation on the same file to
the server, the server obtains the change attribute from the first
client. Let this value be cc.
o If the value cc is equal to sc, the file is not modified and the
server returns the current values for change, time_metadata, and
time_modify (for example) to the second client.
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o If the value cc is NOT equal to sc, the file is currently modified
at the first client and most likely will be modified at the server
at a future time. The server then uses its current time to
construct attribute values for time_metadata and time_modify. A
new value of sc, which we will call nsc, is computed by the
server, such that nsc >= sc + 1. The server then returns the
constructed time_metadata, time_modify, and nsc values to the
requester. The server replaces sc in the delegation record with
nsc. To prevent the possibility of time_modify, time_metadata,
and change from appearing to go backward (which would happen if
the client holding the delegation fails to write its modified data
to the server before the delegation is revoked or returned), the
server SHOULD update the file's metadata record with the
constructed attribute values. For reasons of reasonable
performance, committing the constructed attribute values to stable
storage is OPTIONAL.
As discussed earlier in this section, the client MAY return the same
cc value on subsequent CB_GETATTR calls, even if the file was
modified in the client's cache yet again between successive
CB_GETATTR calls. Therefore, the server must assume that the file
has been modified yet again, and MUST take care to ensure that the
new nsc it constructs and returns is greater than the previous nsc it
returned. An example implementation's delegation record would
satisfy this mandate by including a boolean field (let us call it
"modified") that is set to false when the delegation is granted, and
an sc value set at the time of grant to the change attribute value.
The modified field would be set to true the first time cc != sc, and
would stay true until the delegation is returned or revoked. The
processing for constructing nsc, time_modify, and time_metadata would
use this pseudo code:
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if (!modified) {
do CB_GETATTR for change and size;
if (cc != sc)
modified = TRUE;
} else {
do CB_GETATTR for size;
}
if (modified) {
sc = sc + 1;
time_modify = time_metadata = current_time;
update sc, time_modify, time_metadata into file's metadata;
}
return to client (that sent GETATTR) the attributes
it requested, but make sure size comes from what
CB_GETATTR returned. Do not update the file's metadata
with the client's modified size.
In the case that the file attribute size is different than the
server's current value, the server treats this as a modification
regardless of the value of the change attribute retrieved via
CB_GETATTR and responds to the second client as in the last step.
This methodology resolves issues of clock differences between client
and server and other scenarios where the use of CB_GETATTR break
down.
It should be noted that the server is under no obligation to use
CB_GETATTR and therefore the server MAY simply recall the delegation
to avoid its use.
9.4.4. Recall of Open Delegation
The following events necessitate recall of an open delegation:
o Potentially conflicting OPEN request (or READ/WRITE done with
"special" stateid)
o SETATTR issued by another client
o REMOVE request for the file
o RENAME request for the file as either source or target of the
RENAME
Whether a RENAME of a directory in the path leading to the file
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results in recall of an open delegation depends on the semantics of
the server file system. If that file system denies such RENAMEs when
a file is open, the recall must be performed to determine whether the
file in question is, in fact, open.
In addition to the situations above, the server may choose to recall
open delegations at any time if resource constraints make it
advisable to do so. Clients should always be prepared for the
possibility of recall.
When a client receives a recall for an open delegation, it needs to
update state on the server before returning the delegation. These
same updates must be done whenever a client chooses to return a
delegation voluntarily. The following items of state need to be
dealt with:
o If the file associated with the delegation is no longer open and
no previous CLOSE operation has been sent to the server, a CLOSE
operation must be sent to the server.
o If a file has other open references at the client, then OPEN
operations must be sent to the server. The appropriate stateids
will be provided by the server for subsequent use by the client
since the delegation stateid will not longer be valid. These OPEN
requests are done with the claim type of CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR. This
will allow the presentation of the delegation stateid so that the
client can establish the appropriate rights to perform the OPEN.
(see the section "Operation 18: OPEN" for details.)
o If there are granted file locks, the corresponding LOCK operations
need to be performed. This applies to the write open delegation
case only.
o For a write open delegation, if at the time of recall the file is
not open for write, all modified data for the file must be flushed
to the server. If the delegation had not existed, the client
would have done this data flush before the CLOSE operation.
o For a write open delegation when a file is still open at the time
of recall, any modified data for the file needs to be flushed to
the server.
o With the write open delegation in place, it is possible that the
file was truncated during the duration of the delegation. For
example, the truncation could have occurred as a result of an OPEN
UNCHECKED with a size attribute value of zero. Therefore, if a
truncation of the file has occurred and this operation has not
been propagated to the server, the truncation must occur before
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any modified data is written to the server.
In the case of write open delegation, file locking imposes some
additional requirements. To precisely maintain the associated
invariant, it is required to flush any modified data in any region
for which a write lock was released while the write delegation was in
effect. However, because the write open delegation implies no other
locking by other clients, a simpler implementation is to flush all
modified data for the file (as described just above) if any write
lock has been released while the write open delegation was in effect.
An implementation need not wait until delegation recall (or deciding
to voluntarily return a delegation) to perform any of the above
actions, if implementation considerations (e.g. resource availability
constraints) make that desirable. Generally, however, the fact that
the actual open state of the file may continue to change makes it not
worthwhile to send information about opens and closes to the server,
except as part of delegation return. Only in the case of closing the
open that resulted in obtaining the delegation would clients be
likely to do this early, since, in that case, the close once done
will not be undone. Regardless of the client's choices on scheduling
these actions, all must be performed before the delegation is
returned, including (when applicable) the close that corresponds to
the open that resulted in the delegation. These actions can be
performed either in previous requests or in previous operations in
the same COMPOUND request.
9.4.5. Clients that Fail to Honor Delegation Recalls
A client may fail to respond to a recall for various reasons, such as
a failure of the backchannel from server to the client. The client
may be unaware of a failure in the backchannel. This lack of
awareness could result in the client finding out long after the
failure that its delegation has been revoked, and another client has
modified the data for which the client had a delegation. This is
especially a problem for the client that held a write delegation.
The server also has a dilemma in that the client that fails to
respond to the recall might also be sending other NFS requests,
including those that renew the lease before the lease expires.
Without returning an error for those lease renewing operations, the
server leads the client to believe that the delegation it has is in
force.
This difficulty is solved by the following rules:
o When the backchannel is down, the server MUST NOT revoke the
delegation if one of the following occurs:
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* The client has issued a SEQUENCE operation and the server has
returned SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN status. The server MUST
renew the lease for any record locks and share reservations the
client has that the server has known about (as opposed to those
locks and share reservations the client has established but not
yet sent to the server, due to the delegation). The server
SHOULD give the client a reasonable time re-establish the
backchannel. This will allow the client to receive the recall
from the server and then allow the client to gracefully return
delegations. If the backchannel is not re-established, the
server is then free to revoke the client's delegations.
* The client has not issued a SEQUENCE operation for some period
of time after the server attempted to recall the delegation.
This period of time MUST NOT be less than the value of the
lease_time attribute.
o When the client holds a delegation, it cannot rely on operations
that take a stateid to renew delegation leases across backchannel
failures. The client that wants to keep delegations in force
across backchannel failures must use SEQUENCE to do so and check
the sr_status_flags for the SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN status.
9.4.6. Delegation Revocation
At the point a delegation is revoked, if there are associated opens
on the client, the applications holding these opens need to be
notified. This notification usually occurs by returning errors for
READ/WRITE operations or when a close is attempted for the open file.
If no opens exist for the file at the point the delegation is
revoked, then notification of the revocation is unnecessary.
However, if there is modified data present at the client for the
file, the user of the application should be notified. Unfortunately,
it may not be possible to notify the user since active applications
may not be present at the client. See the section "Revocation
Recovery for Write Open Delegation" for additional details.
9.5. Data Caching and Revocation
When locks and delegations are revoked, the assumptions upon which
successful caching depend are no longer guaranteed. For any locks or
share reservations that have been revoked, the corresponding owner
needs to be notified. This notification includes applications with a
file open that has a corresponding delegation which has been revoked.
Cached data associated with the revocation must be removed from the
client. In the case of modified data existing in the client's cache,
that data must be removed from the client without it being written to
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the server. As mentioned, the assumptions made by the client are no
longer valid at the point when a lock or delegation has been revoked.
For example, another client may have been granted a conflicting lock
after the revocation of the lock at the first client. Therefore, the
data within the lock range may have been modified by the other
client. Obviously, the first client is unable to guarantee to the
application what has occurred to the file in the case of revocation.
Notification to a lock owner will in many cases consist of simply
returning an error on the next and all subsequent READs/WRITEs to the
open file or on the close. Where the methods available to a client
make such notification impossible because errors for certain
operations may not be returned, more drastic action such as signals
or process termination may be appropriate. The justification for
this is that an invariant for which an application depends on may be
violated. Depending on how errors are typically treated for the
client operating environment, further levels of notification
including logging, console messages, and GUI pop-ups may be
appropriate.
9.5.1. Revocation Recovery for Write Open Delegation
Revocation recovery for a write open delegation poses the special
issue of modified data in the client cache while the file is not
open. In this situation, any client which does not flush modified
data to the server on each close must ensure that the user receives
appropriate notification of the failure as a result of the
revocation. Since such situations may require human action to
correct problems, notification schemes in which the appropriate user
or administrator is notified may be necessary. Logging and console
messages are typical examples.
If there is modified data on the client, it must not be flushed
normally to the server. A client may attempt to provide a copy of
the file data as modified during the delegation under a different
name in the file system name space to ease recovery. Note that when
the client can determine that the file has not been modified by any
other client, or when the client has a complete cached copy of file
in question, such a saved copy of the client's view of the file may
be of particular value for recovery. In other case, recovery using a
copy of the file based partially on the client's cached data and
partially on the server copy as modified by other clients, will be
anything but straightforward, so clients may avoid saving file
contents in these situations or mark the results specially to warn
users of possible problems.
Saving of such modified data in delegation revocation situations may
be limited to files of a certain size or might be used only when
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sufficient disk space is available within the target file system.
Such saving may also be restricted to situations when the client has
sufficient buffering resources to keep the cached copy available
until it is properly stored to the target file system.
9.6. Attribute Caching
The attributes discussed in this section do not include named
attributes. Individual named attributes are analogous to files and
caching of the data for these needs to be handled just as data
caching is for ordinary files. Similarly, LOOKUP results from an
OPENATTR directory are to be cached on the same basis as any other
pathnames and similarly for directory contents.
Clients may cache file attributes obtained from the server and use
them to avoid subsequent GETATTR requests. Such caching is write
through in that modification to file attributes is always done by
means of requests to the server and should not be done locally and
cached. The exception to this are modifications to attributes that
are intimately connected with data caching. Therefore, extending a
file by writing data to the local data cache is reflected immediately
in the size as seen on the client without this change being
immediately reflected on the server. Normally such changes are not
propagated directly to the server but when the modified data is
flushed to the server, analogous attribute changes are made on the
server. When open delegation is in effect, the modified attributes
may be returned to the server in the response to a CB_RECALL call.
The result of local caching of attributes is that the attribute
caches maintained on individual clients will not be coherent.
Changes made in one order on the server may be seen in a different
order on one client and in a third order on a different client.
The typical file system application programming interfaces do not
provide means to atomically modify or interrogate attributes for
multiple files at the same time. The following rules provide an
environment where the potential incoherences mentioned above can be
reasonably managed. These rules are derived from the practice of
previous NFS protocols.
o All attributes for a given file (per-fsid attributes excepted) are
cached as a unit at the client so that no non-serializability can
arise within the context of a single file.
o An upper time boundary is maintained on how long a client cache
entry can be kept without being refreshed from the server.
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o When operations are performed that change attributes at the
server, the updated attribute set is requested as part of the
containing RPC. This includes directory operations that update
attributes indirectly. This is accomplished by following the
modifying operation with a GETATTR operation and then using the
results of the GETATTR to update the client's cached attributes.
Note that if the full set of attributes to be cached is requested by
READDIR, the results can be cached by the client on the same basis as
attributes obtained via GETATTR.
A client may validate its cached version of attributes for a file by
fetching just both the change and time_access attributes and assuming
that if the change attribute has the same value as it did when the
attributes were cached, then no attributes other than time_access
have changed. The reason why time_access is also fetched is because
many servers operate in environments where the operation that updates
change does not update time_access. For example, POSIX file
semantics do not update access time when a file is modified by the
write system call. Therefore, the client that wants a current
time_access value should fetch it with change during the attribute
cache validation processing and update its cached time_access.
The client may maintain a cache of modified attributes for those
attributes intimately connected with data of modified regular files
(size, time_modify, and change). Other than those three attributes,
the client MUST NOT maintain a cache of modified attributes.
Instead, attribute changes are immediately sent to the server.
In some operating environments, the equivalent to time_access is
expected to be implicitly updated by each read of the content of the
file object. If an NFS client is caching the content of a file
object, whether it is a regular file, directory, or symbolic link,
the client SHOULD NOT update the time_access attribute (via SETATTR
or a small READ or READDIR request) on the server with each read that
is satisfied from cache. The reason is that this can defeat the
performance benefits of caching content, especially since an explicit
SETATTR of time_access may alter the change attribute on the server.
If the change attribute changes, clients that are caching the content
will think the content has changed, and will re-read unmodified data
from the server. Nor is the client encouraged to maintain a modified
version of time_access in its cache, since this would mean that the
client will either eventually have to write the access time to the
server with bad performance effects, or it would never update the
server's time_access, thereby resulting in a situation where an
application that caches access time between a close and open of the
same file observes the access time oscillating between the past and
present. The time_access attribute always means the time of last
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access to a file by a read that was satisfied by the server. This
way clients will tend to see only time_access changes that go forward
in time.
9.7. Data and Metadata Caching and Memory Mapped Files
Some operating environments include the capability for an application
to map a file's content into the application's address space. Each
time the application accesses a memory location that corresponds to a
block that has not been loaded into the address space, a page fault
occurs and the file is read (or if the block does not exist in the
file, the block is allocated and then instantiated in the
application's address space).
As long as each memory mapped access to the file requires a page
fault, the relevant attributes of the file that are used to detect
access and modification (time_access, time_metadata, time_modify, and
change) will be updated. However, in many operating environments,
when page faults are not required these attributes will not be
updated on reads or updates to the file via memory access (regardless
whether the file is local file or is being access remotely). A
client or server MAY fail to update attributes of a file that is
being accessed via memory mapped I/O. This has several implications:
o If there is an application on the server that has memory mapped a
file that a client is also accessing, the client may not be able
to get a consistent value of the change attribute to determine
whether its cache is stale or not. A server that knows that the
file is memory mapped could always pessimistically return updated
values for change so as to force the application to always get the
most up to date data and metadata for the file. However, due to
the negative performance implications of this, such behavior is
OPTIONAL.
o If the memory mapped file is not being modified on the server, and
instead is just being read by an application via the memory mapped
interface, the client will not see an updated time_access
attribute. However, in many operating environments, neither will
any process running on the server. Thus NFS clients are at no
disadvantage with respect to local processes.
o If there is another client that is memory mapping the file, and if
that client is holding a write delegation, the same set of issues
as discussed in the previous two bullet items apply. So, when a
server does a CB_GETATTR to a file that the client has modified in
its cache, the response from CB_GETATTR will not necessarily be
accurate. As discussed earlier, the client's obligation is to
report that the file has been modified since the delegation was
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granted, not whether it has been modified again between successive
CB_GETATTR calls, and the server MUST assume that any file the
client has modified in cache has been modified again between
successive CB_GETATTR calls. Depending on the nature of the
client's memory management system, this weak obligation may not be
possible. A client MAY return stale information in CB_GETATTR
whenever the file is memory mapped.
o The mixture of memory mapping and file locking on the same file is
problematic. Consider the following scenario, where a page size
on each client is 8192 octets.
* Client A memory maps first page (8192 octets) of file X
* Client B memory maps first page (8192 octets) of file X
* Client A write locks first 4096 octets
* Client B write locks second 4096 octets
* Client A, via a STORE instruction modifies part of its locked
region.
* Simultaneous to client A, client B issues a STORE on part of
its locked region.
Here the challenge is for each client to resynchronize to get a
correct view of the first page. In many operating environments, the
virtual memory management systems on each client only know a page is
modified, not that a subset of the page corresponding to the
respective lock regions has been modified. So it is not possible for
each client to do the right thing, which is to only write to the
server that portion of the page that is locked. For example, if
client A simply writes out the page, and then client B writes out the
page, client A's data is lost.
Moreover, if mandatory locking is enabled on the file, then we have a
different problem. When clients A and B issue the STORE
instructions, the resulting page faults require a record lock on the
entire page. Each client then tries to extend their locked range to
the entire page, which results in a deadlock. Communicating the
NFS4ERR_DEADLOCK error to a STORE instruction is difficult at best.
If a client is locking the entire memory mapped file, there is no
problem with advisory or mandatory record locking, at least until the
client unlocks a region in the middle of the file.
Given the above issues the following are permitted:
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o Clients and servers MAY deny memory mapping a file they know there
are record locks for.
o Clients and servers MAY deny a record lock on a file they know is
memory mapped.
o A client MAY deny memory mapping a file that it knows requires
mandatory locking for I/O. If mandatory locking is enabled after
the file is opened and mapped, the client MAY deny the application
further access to its mapped file.
9.8. Name Caching
The results of LOOKUP and READDIR operations may be cached to avoid
the cost of subsequent LOOKUP operations. Just as in the case of
attribute caching, inconsistencies may arise among the various client
caches. To mitigate the effects of these inconsistencies and given
the context of typical file system APIs, an upper time boundary is
maintained on how long a client name cache entry can be kept without
verifying that the entry has not been made invalid by a directory
change operation performed by another client. .LP When a client is
not making changes to a directory for which there exist name cache
entries, the client needs to periodically fetch attributes for that
directory to ensure that it is not being modified. After determining
that no modification has occurred, the expiration time for the
associated name cache entries may be updated to be the current time
plus the name cache staleness bound.
When a client is making changes to a given directory, it needs to
determine whether there have been changes made to the directory by
other clients. It does this by using the change attribute as
reported before and after the directory operation in the associated
change_info4 value returned for the operation. The server is able to
communicate to the client whether the change_info4 data is provided
atomically with respect to the directory operation. If the change
values are provided atomically, the client is then able to compare
the pre-operation change value with the change value in the client's
name cache. If the comparison indicates that the directory was
updated by another client, the name cache associated with the
modified directory is purged from the client. If the comparison
indicates no modification, the name cache can be updated on the
client to reflect the directory operation and the associated timeout
extended. The post-operation change value needs to be saved as the
basis for future change_info4 comparisons.
As demonstrated by the scenario above, name caching requires that the
client revalidate name cache data by inspecting the change attribute
of a directory at the point when the name cache item was cached.
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This requires that the server update the change attribute for
directories when the contents of the corresponding directory is
modified. For a client to use the change_info4 information
appropriately and correctly, the server must report the pre and post
operation change attribute values atomically. When the server is
unable to report the before and after values atomically with respect
to the directory operation, the server must indicate that fact in the
change_info4 return value. When the information is not atomically
reported, the client should not assume that other clients have not
changed the directory.
9.9. Directory Caching
The results of READDIR operations may be used to avoid subsequent
READDIR operations. Just as in the cases of attribute and name
caching, inconsistencies may arise among the various client caches.
To mitigate the effects of these inconsistencies, and given the
context of typical file system APIs, the following rules should be
followed:
o Cached READDIR information for a directory which is not obtained
in a single READDIR operation must always be a consistent snapshot
of directory contents. This is determined by using a GETATTR
before the first READDIR and after the last of READDIR that
contributes to the cache.
o An upper time boundary is maintained to indicate the length of
time a directory cache entry is considered valid before the client
must revalidate the cached information.
The revalidation technique parallels that discussed in the case of
name caching. When the client is not changing the directory in
question, checking the change attribute of the directory with GETATTR
is adequate. The lifetime of the cache entry can be extended at
these checkpoints. When a client is modifying the directory, the
client needs to use the change_info4 data to determine whether there
are other clients modifying the directory. If it is determined that
no other client modifications are occurring, the client may update
its directory cache to reflect its own changes.
As demonstrated previously, directory caching requires that the
client revalidate directory cache data by inspecting the change
attribute of a directory at the point when the directory was cached.
This requires that the server update the change attribute for
directories when the contents of the corresponding directory is
modified. For a client to use the change_info4 information
appropriately and correctly, the server must report the pre and post
operation change attribute values atomically. When the server is
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unable to report the before and after values atomically with respect
to the directory operation, the server must indicate that fact in the
change_info4 return value. When the information is not atomically
reported, the client should not assume that other clients have not
changed the directory.
10. Multi-Server Name Space
NFSv4.1 supports attributes that allow a namespace to extend beyond
the boundaries of a single server. Use of such multi-server
namespaces is optional, and for many purposes, single-server
namespace are perfectly acceptable. Use of multi-server namespaces
can provide many advantages, however, by separating a file system's
logical position in a name space from the (possibly changing)
logistical and administrative considerations that result in
particular file systems being located on particular servers.
10.1. Location attributes
NFSv4 contains recommended attributes that allow file systems on one
server to be associated with one or more instances of that file
system on other servers. These attributes specify such file systems
by specifying a server name (either a DNS name or an IP address)
together with the path of that file system within that server's
single-server name space.
The fs_locations_info recommended attribute allows specification of
one more file systems instance locations where the data corresponding
to a given file system may be found. This attribute provides to the
client, in addition to information about file system instance
locations, extensive information about the various file system
instance choices (e.g. priority for use, writability, currency, etc.)
as well as information to help the client efficiently effect as
seamless a transition as possible among multiple file system
instances, when and if that should be necessary.
The fs_locations recommended attribute is inherited from NFSv4.0 and
only allows specification of the file system locations where the data
corresponding to a given file system may be found. Servers should
make this attribute available whenever fs_locations_info is
supported, but client use of fs_locations_info is to be preferred.
10.2. File System Presence or Absence
A given location in an NFSv4 namespace (typically but not necessarily
a multi-server namespace) can have a number of file system instance
locations associated with it (via the fs_locations or
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fs_locations_info attribute). There may also be an actual current
file system at that location, accessible via normal namespace
operations (e.g. LOOKUP). In this case, the file system is said to
be "present" at that position in the namespace and clients will
typically use it, reserving use of additional locations specified via
the location-related attributes to situations in which the principal
location is no longer available.
When there is no actual file system at the namespace location in
question, the file system is said to be "absent". An absent file
system contains no files or directories other than the root and any
reference to it, except to access a small set of attributes useful in
determining alternate locations, will result in an error,
NFS4ERR_MOVED. Note that if the server ever returns NFS4ERR_MOVED
(i.e. file systems may be absent), it MUST support the fs_locations
attribute and SHOULD support the fs_locations_info and fs_absent
attributes.
While the error name suggests that we have a case of a file system
which once was present, and has only become absent later, this is
only one possibility. A position in the namespace may be permanently
absent with the file system(s) designated by the location attributes
the only realization. The name NFS4ERR_MOVED reflects an earlier,
more limited conception of its function, but this error will be
returned whenever the referenced file system is absent, whether it
has moved or not.
Except in the case of GETATTR-type operations (to be discussed
later), when the current filehandle at the start of an operation is
within an absent file system, that operation is not performed and the
error NFS4ERR_MOVED returned, to indicate that the file system is
absent on the current server.
Because a GETFH cannot succeed if the current filehandle is within an
absent file system, filehandles within an absent file system cannot
be transferred to the client. When a client does have filehandles
within an absent file system, it is the result of obtaining them when
the file system was present, and having the file system become absent
subsequently.
It should be noted that because the check for the current filehandle
being within an absent file system happens at the start of every
operation, operations which change the current filehandle so that it
is within an absent file system will not result in an error. This
allows such combinations as PUTFH-GETATTR and LOOKUP-GETATTR to be
used to get attribute information, particularly location attribute
information, as discussed below.
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The recommended file system attribute fs_absent can used to
interrogate the present/absent status of a given file system.
10.3. Getting Attributes for an Absent File System
When a file system is absent, most attributes are not available, but
it is necessary to allow the client access to the small set of
attributes that are available, and most particularly those that give
information about the correct current locations for this file system,
fs_locations and fs_locations_info.
10.3.1. GETATTR Within an Absent File System
As mentioned above, an exception is made for GETATTR in that
attributes may be obtained for a filehandle within an absent file
system. This exception only applies if the attribute mask contains
at least one attribute bit that indicates the client is interested in
a result regarding an absent file system: fs_locations,
fs_locations_info, or fs_absent. If none of these attributes is
requested, GETATTR will result in an NFS4ERR_MOVED error.
When a GETATTR is done on an absent file system, the set of supported
attributes is very limited. Many attributes, including those that
are normally mandatory will not be available on an absent file
system. In addition to the attributes mentioned above (fs_locations,
fs_locations_info, fs_absent), the following attributes SHOULD be
available on absent file systems, in the case of recommended
attributes at least to the same degree that they are available on
present file systems.
change: This attribute is useful for absent file systems and can be
helpful in summarizing to the client when any of the location-
related attributes changes.
fsid: This attribute should be provided so that the client can
determine file system boundaries, including, in particular, the
boundary between present and absent file systems.
mounted_on_fileid: For objects at the top of an absent file system
this attribute needs to be available. Since the fileid is one
which is within the present parent file system, there should be no
need to reference the absent file system to provide this
information.
Other attributes SHOULD NOT be made available for absent file
systems, even when it is possible to provide them. The server should
not assume that more information is always better and should avoid
gratuitously providing additional information.
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When a GETATTR operation includes a bit mask for one of the
attributes fs_locations, fs_locations_info, or absent, but where the
bit mask includes attributes which are not supported, GETATTR will
not return an error, but will return the mask of the actual
attributes supported with the results.
Handling of VERIFY/NVERIFY is similar to GETATTR in that if the
attribute mask does not include fs_locations, fs_locations_info, or
fs_absent, the error NFS4ERR_MOVED will result. It differs in that
any appearance in the attribute mask of an attribute not supported
for an absent file system (and note that this will include some
normally mandatory attributes), will also cause an NFS4ERR_MOVED
result.
10.3.2. READDIR and Absent File Systems
A READDIR performed when the current filehandle is within an absent
file system will result in an NFS4ERR_MOVED error, since, unlike the
case of GETATTR, no such exception is made for READDIR.
Attributes for an absent file system may be fetched via a READDIR for
a directory in a present file system, when that directory contains
the root directories of one or more absent file systems. In this
case, the handling is as follows:
o If the attribute set requested includes one of the attributes
fs_locations, fs_locations_info, or fs_absent, then fetching of
attributes proceeds normally and no NFS4ERR_MOVED indication is
returned, even when the rdattr_error attribute is requested.
o If the attribute set requested does not include one of the
attributes fs_locations, fs_locations_info, or fs_absent, then if
the rdattr_error attribute is requested, each directory entry for
the root of an absent file system, will report NFS4ERR_MOVED as
the value of the rdattr_error attribute.
o If the attribute set requested does not include any of the
attributes fs_locations, fs_locations_info, fs_absent, or
rdattr_error then the occurrence of the root of an absent file
system within the directory will result in the READDIR failing
with an NFSERR_MOVED error.
o The unavailability of an attribute because of a file system's
absence, even one that is ordinarily mandatory, does not result in
any error indication. The set of attributes returned for the root
directory of the absent file system in that case is simply
restricted to those actually available.
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10.4. Uses of Location Information
The location-bearing attributes (fs_locations and fs_locations_info),
provide, together with the possibility of absent file systems, a
number of important facilities in providing reliable, manageable, and
scalable data access.
When a file system is present, these attribute can provide
alternative locations, to be used to access the same data, in the
event that server failures, communications problems, or other
difficulties, make continued access to the current file system
impossible or otherwise impractical. Under some circumstances
multiple alternative locations may be used simultaneously to provide
higher performance access to the file system in question. Provision
of such alternate locations is referred to as "replication" although
there are cases in which replicated sets of data are not in fact
present, and the replicas are instead different paths to the same
data.
When a file system is present and becomes absent, clients can be
given the opportunity to have continued access to their data, at an
alternate location. In this case, a continued attempt to use the
data in the now-absent file system will result in an NFSERR_MOVED
error and at that point the successor locations (typically only one
but multiple choices are possible) can be fetched and used to
continue access. Transfer of the file system contents to the new
location is referred to as "migration", but it should be kept in mind
that there are cases in which this term can be used, like
"replication", when there is no actual data migration per se.
Where a file system was not previously present, specification of file
system location provides a means by which file systems located on one
server can be associated with a name space defined by another server,
thus allowing a general multi-server namespace facility. Designation
of such a location, in place of an absent file system, is called
"referral".
10.4.1. File System Replication
The fs_locations and fs_locations_info attributes provide alternative
locations, to be used to access data in place of or in a addition to
the current file system instance. On first access to a file system,
the client should obtain the value of the set alternate locations by
interrogating the fs_locations or fs_locations_info attribute, with
the latter being preferred.
In the event that server failures, communications problems, or other
difficulties, make continued access to the current file system
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impossible or otherwise impractical, the client can use the alternate
locations as a way to get continued access to his data. Depending on
specific attributes of these alternate locations, as indicated within
the fs_locations_info attribute, multiple locations may be used
simultaneously, to provide higher performance through the
exploitation of multiple paths between client and target file system.
The alternate locations may be physical replicas of the (typically
read-only) file system data, or they may reflect alternate paths to
the same server or provide for the use of various form of server
clustering in which multiple servers provide alternate ways of
accessing the same physical file system. How these different modes
of file system transition are represented within the fs_locations and
fs_locations_info attributes and how the client deals with file
system transition issues will be discussed in detail below.
When multiple server addresses correspond to the same actual server,
as shown by a common so_major_id field within the eir_server_owner
field returned by EXCHANGE_ID, the client may assume that for each
file system in the namespace of a given server network address, there
exist file systems at corresponding namespace locations for each of
the other server network addresses, even in the absence of explicit
listing in fs_locations and fs_locations_info. Such corresponding
file system locations can be used as alternate locations, just as
those explicitly specified via the fs_locations and fs_locations_info
attributes. Where these specific locations are designated in the
fs_locations_info attribute, the conditions of use specified in this
attribute (e.g. priorities, specification of simultaneous use) may
limit the clients use of these alternate locations.
When multiple replicas exist and are used simultaneously or in
succession by a client, they must designate the same data (with
metadata being the same to the degree indicated by the
fs_locations_info attribute). Where file systems are writable, a
change made on one instance must be visible on all instances,
immediately upon the earlier of the return of the modifying request
or the visibility of that change on any of the associated replicas.
Where a file system is not writable but represents a read-only copy
(possibly periodically updated) of a writable file system, similar
requirements apply to the propagation of updates. It must be
guaranteed that any change visible on the original file system
instance must be immediately visible on any replica before the client
transitions access to that replica, to avoid any possibility, that a
client in effecting a transition to a replica, will see any reversion
in file system state. The specific means by which this will be
prevented varies based on fs4_status_type reported as part of the
fs_status attribute. (See Section 10.11).
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10.4.2. File System Migration
When a file system is present and becomes absent, clients can be
given the opportunity to have continued access to their data, at an
alternate location, as specified by the fs_locations or
fs_locations_info attribute. Typically, a client will be accessing
the file system in question, get an NFS4ERR_MOVED error, and then use
the fs_locations or fs_locations_info attribute to determine the new
location of the data. When fs_locations_info is used, additional
information will be available which will define the nature of the
client's handling of the transition to a new server.
Such migration can be helpful in providing load balancing or general
resource reallocation. The protocol does not specify how the file
system will be moved between servers. It is anticipated that a
number of different server-to-server transfer mechanisms might be
used with the choice left to the server implementer. The NFSv4.1
protocol specifies the method used to communicate the migration event
between client and server.
The new location may be an alternate communication path to the same
server, or, in the case of various forms of server clustering,
another server providing access to the same physical file system.
The client's responsibilities in dealing with this transition depend
on the specific nature of the new access path and how and whether
data was in fact migrated. These issues will be discussed in detail
below.
When multiple server addresses correspond to the same actual server,
as shown by a common value for so_major_id field of the
eir_server_owner field returned by EXCHANGE_ID, the location or
locations may designate alternate server addresses in the form of
specific server network addresses, when the file system in question
is available at those addresses, and no longer accessible at the
original address.
Although a single successor location is typical, multiple locations
may be provided, together with information that allows priority among
the choices to be indicated, via information in the fs_locations_info
attribute. Where suitable clustering mechanisms make it possible to
provide multiple identical file systems or paths to them, this allows
the client the opportunity to deal with any resource or
communications issues that might limit data availability.
When an alternate location is designated as the target for migration,
it must designate the same data (with metadata being the same to the
degree indicated by the fs_locations_info attribute). Where file
systems are writable, a change made on the original file system must
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be visible on all migration targets. Where a file system is not
writable but represents a read-only copy (possibly periodically
updated) of a writable file system, similar requirements apply to the
propagation of updates. Any change visible in the original file
system must already be effected on all migration targets, to avoid
any possibility, that a client in effecting a transition to the
migration target will see any reversion in file system state.
10.4.3. Referrals
Referrals provide a way of placing a file system in a location
essentially without respect to its physical location on a given
server. This allows a single server of a set of servers to present a
multi-server namespace that encompasses file systems located on
multiple servers. Some likely uses of this include establishment of
site-wide or organization-wide namespaces, or even knitting such
together into a truly global namespace.
Referrals occur when a client determines, upon first referencing a
position in the current namespace, that it is part of a new file
system and that that file system is absent. When this occurs,
typically by receiving the error NFS4ERR_MOVED, the actual location
or locations of the file system can be determined by fetching the
fs_locations or fs_locations_info attribute.
The locations-related attribute may designate a single file system
location or multiple file system locations, to be selected based on
the needs of the client. The server, in the fs_locations_info
attribute may specify priorities to be associated with various file
system location choices. The server may assign different priorities
to different locations as reported to individual clients, in order to
adapt to client physical location or to effect load balancing. When
both read-only and read-write file systems are present, some of the
read-only locations may not absolutely up-to-date (as they would have
to be in the case of replication and migration). Servers may also
specify file system locations that include client-substituted
variable so that different clients are referred to different file
systems (with different data contents) based on client attributes
such as cpu architecture.
Use of multi-server namespaces is enabled by NFSv4 but is not
required. The use of multi-server namespaces and their scope will
depend on the applications used, and system administration
preferences.
Multi-server namespaces can be established by a single server
providing a large set of referrals to all of the included file
systems. Alternatively, a single multi-server namespace may be
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administratively segmented with separate referral file systems (on
separate servers) for each separately-administered section of the
name space. Any segment or the top-level referral file system may
use replicated referral file systems for higher availability.
Generally, multi-server namespaces are for the most part uniform, in
that the same data made available to one client at a given location
in the namespace is made availably to all clients at that location.
There are however facilities provided which allow different client to
be directed to different sets of data, so as to adapt to such client
characteristics as cpu architecture.
10.5. Additional Client-side Considerations
When clients make use of servers that implement referrals,
replication, and migration, care should be taken so that a user who
mounts a given file system that includes a referral or a relocated
file system continue to see a coherent picture of that user-side file
system despite the fact that it contains a number of server-side file
systems which may be on different servers.
One important issue is upward navigation from the root of a server-
side file system to its parent (specified as ".." in UNIX). The
client needs to determine when it hits an fsid root going up the file
tree. When at such a point, and needs to ascend to the parent, it
must do so locally instead of sending a LOOKUPP call to the server.
The LOOKUPP would normally return the ancestor of the target file
system on the target server, which may not be part of the space that
the client mounted.
A related issue is upward navigation from named attribute
directories. The named attribute directories are essentially
detached from the namespace and this property should be safely
represented in the client operating environment. LOOKUPP on a named
attribute directory may return the filehandle of the associated file
and conveying this to applications might be unsafe as many
applications expect the parent of a directory to be a directory by
itself. Therefore the client may want to hide the parent of named
attribute directories (represented as ".." in UNIX) or represent the
named attribute directory as its own parent (as typically done for
the file system root directory in UNIX)
Another issue concerns refresh of referral locations. When referrals
are used extensively, they may change as server configurations
change. It is expected that clients will cache information related
to traversing referrals so that future client side requests are
resolved locally without server communication. This is usually
rooted in client-side name lookup caching. Clients should
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periodically purge this data for referral points in order to detect
changes in location information. When the change attribute changes
for directories that hold referral entries or for the referral
entries themselves, clients should consider any associated cached
referral information to be out of date.
10.6. Effecting File System Transitions
Transitions between file system instances, whether due to switching
between replicas upon server unavailability, or in response to a
server-initiated migration events are best dealt with together. Even
though the prototypical use cases of replication and migration
contain distinctive sets of features, when all possibilities for
these operations are considered, the underlying unity of these
operations, from the client's point of view is clear, even though for
the server pragmatic considerations will normally force different
implementation strategies for planned and unplanned transitions.
A number of methods are possible for servers to replicate data and to
track client state in order to allow clients to transition between
file system instances with a minimum of disruption. Such methods
vary between those that use inter-server clustering techniques to
limit the changes seen by the client, to those that are less
aggressive, use more standard methods of replicating data, and impose
a greater burden on the client to adapt to the transition.
The NFSv4.1 protocol does not impose choices on clients and servers
with regard to that spectrum of transition methods. In fact, there
are many valid choices, depending on client and application
requirements and their interaction with server implementation
choices. The NFSv4.1 protocol does define the specific choices that
can be made, how these choices are communicated to the client and how
the client is to deal with any discontinuities.
In the sections below, references will be made to various possible
server implementation choices as a way of illustrating the transition
scenarios that clients may deal with. The intent here is not to
define or limit server implementations but rather to illustrate the
range of issues that clients may face.
In the discussion below, references will be made to a file system
having a particular property or of two file systems (typically the
source and destination) belonging to a common class of any of several
types. Two file systems that belong to such a class share some
important aspect of file system behavior that clients may depend upon
when present, to easily effect a seamless transition between file
system instances. Conversely, where the file systems do not belong
to such a common class, the client has to deal with various sorts of
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implementation discontinuities which may cause performance or other
issues in effecting a transition.
Where the fs_locations_info attribute is available, such file system
classification data will be made directly available to the client.
See Section 10.10 for details. When only fs_locations is available,
default assumptions with regard to such classifications have to be
inferred. See Section 10.9 for details.
In cases in which one server is expected to accept opaque values from
the client that originated from another server, it is a wise
implementation practice for the servers to encode the "opaque" values
in big endian octet order. If this is done, servers acting as
replicas or immigrating file systems will be able to parse values
like stateids, directory cookies, filehandles, etc. even if their
native octet order is different from that of other servers
cooperating in the replication and migration of the file system.
10.6.1. File System Transitions and Simultaneous Access
When a single file system may be accessed at multiple locations,
whether this is because of an indication of file system identity as
reported by the fs_locations or fs_locations_info attributes or
because two file systems instances have corresponding locations on
server addresses which connect to the same server as indicated by a
common so_major_id field in the eir_server_owner field returned by
EXCHANGE_ID, the client will, depending on specific circumstances as
discussed below, either:
o Access multiple instances simultaneously, as representing
alternate paths to the same data and metadata.
o The client accesses one instance (or set of instances) and then
transitions to an alternative instance (or set of instances) as a
result of network issues, server unresponsiveness, or server-
directed migration. The transition may involve changes in
filehandles, fileids, the change attribute, and or locking state,
depending on the attributes of the source and destination file
system instances, as specified in the fs_locations_info attribute.
Which of these choices is possible, and how a transition is effected
is governed by equivalence classes of file system instances as
reported by the fs_locations_info attribute, and, for file systems
instances in the same location within multiple single-server
namespace, by the so_major_id field in the eir_server_owner field
returned by EXCHANGE_ID.
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10.6.2. Simultaneous Use and Transparent Transitions
When two file system instances have the same location within their
respective single-server namespaces and those two server IP addresses
return the so_major_id value in the eir_server_owner value returned
in response to EXCHANGE_ID, those file systems instances can be
treated as the same, and either used together simultaneously or
serially with no transition activity required on the part of the
client.
Whether simultaneous use of the two file system instances is valid is
controlled by whether the fs_locations_info attribute shows the two
instances as having the same _simultaneous-use_ class.
Note that for two such file systems, any information within the
fs_locations_info attribute that indicates the need for special
transition activity, i.e. the appearance of the two file system
instances with different _handle_, _fileid_, _verifier_, _change_
classes, MUST be ignored by the client. The server SHOULD not
indicate that these instances belong to different _handle_, _fileid_,
_verifier_, _change_ classes, whether the two instances are shown
belonging to the same _simultaneous-use_ class or not.
Where these conditions do not apply, a non-transparent file system
instance transition is required with the details depending on the
respective _handle_, _fileid_, _verifier_, _change_ classes of the
two file system instances and whether the two servers in question
have the same eir_server_scope value as reported by EXCHANGE_ID.
10.6.2.1. Simultaneous Use of File System Instances
When the conditions above hold, in either of the following two cases,
the client may use the two file system instances simultaneously.
o The fs_locations_info attribute does not contain separate per-IP
address entries for file systems instances at the distinct IP
addresses. This includes the case in which the fs_locations_info
attribute is unavailable.
o The fs_locations_info attribute indicates that two file system
instances belong to the same _simultaneous-use_ class.
In this case, the client may use both file system instances
simultaneously, as representations of the same file system, whether
that happens because the two IP addresses connect to the same
physical server or because different servers connect to clustered
file systems and export their data in common. When simultaneous use
is in effect, any change made to one file system instance must be
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immediately reflected in the other file system instance(s). Locks
are treated as part of a common lease, associated with a common
client ID. Depending on the details of the eir_server_owner returned
by EXCHANGE_ID, the two server instances may be accessed by different
sessions or a single session in common.
10.6.2.2. Transparent File System Transitions
When the conditions above hold and the fs_locations_info attribute
explicitly shows the file system instances for these distinct IP
addresses as belonging to different _simultaneous-use_ classes, the
file system instances should not be used by the client
simultaneously, but rather serially with one being used unless and
until communication difficulties, lack of responsiveness, or an
explicit migration event causes another file system instance (or set
of file system instances sharing a common _simultaneous-use_ class to
be used.
When a change in file system instance is to be done, the client will
use the same client ID already in effect. If it already has
connections to the new server address, these will be used. Otherwise
new connections to existing sessions or new sessions associated with
the existing client ID are established as indicated by the
eir_server_owner returned by EXCHANGE_ID.
In all such transparent transition cases, the following apply:
o File handles stay the same if persistent and if volatile are only
subject to expiration, if they would be in the absence of file
system transition.
o Fileid values do not change across the transition.
o The file system will have the same fsid in both the old and new
locations.
o Change attribute values are consistent across the transition and
do not have to be refetched. When change attributes indicate that
a cached object is still valid, it can remain cached.
o Client, and state identifier retain their validity across the
transition, except where their staleness is recognized and
reported by the new server. Except where such staleness requires
it, no lock reclamation is needed.
o Write verifiers are presumed to retain their validity and can be
presented to COMMIT, with the expectation that if COMMIT on the
new server accept them as valid, then that server has all of the
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data unstably written to the original server and has committed it
to stable storage as requested.
10.6.3. Filehandles and File System Transitions
There are a number of ways in which filehandles can be handled across
a file system transition. These can be divided into two broad
classes depending upon whether the two file systems across which the
transition happens share sufficient state to effect some sort of
continuity of file system handling.
When there is no such co-operation in filehandle assignment, the two
file systems are reported as being in different _handle_ classes. In
this case, all filehandles are assumed to expire as part of the file
system transition. Note that this behavior does not depend on
fh_expire_type attribute and supersedes the specification of
FH4_VOL_MIGRATION bit, which only affects behavior when
fs_locations_info is not available.
When there is co-operation in filehandle assignment, the two file
systems are reported as being in the same _handle_ classes. In this
case, persistent filehandle remain valid after the file system
transition, while volatile filehandles (excluding those while are
only volatile due to the FH4_VOL_MIGRATION bit) are subject to
expiration on the target server.
10.6.4. Fileid's and File System Transitions
In NFSv4.0, the issue of continuity of fileid's in the event of a
file system transition was not addressed. The general expectation
had been that in situations in which the two file system instances
are created by a single vendor using some sort of file system image
copy, fileid's will be consistent across the transition while in the
analogous multi-vendor transitions they will not. This poses
difficulties, especially for the client without special knowledge of
the of the transition mechanisms adopted by the server.
It is important to note that while clients themselves may have no
trouble with a fileid changing as a result of a file system
transition event, applications do typically have access to the fileid
(e.g. via stat), and the result of this is that an application may
work perfectly well if there is no file system instance transition or
if any such transition is among instances created by a single vendor,
yet be unable to deal with the situation in which a multi-vendor
transition occurs, at the wrong time.
Providing the same fileid's in a multi-vendor (multiple server
vendors) environment has generally been held to be quite difficult.
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While there is work to be done, it needs to be pointed out that this
difficulty is partly self-imposed. Servers have typically identified
fileid with inode number, i.e. with a quantity used to find the file
in question. This identification poses special difficulties for
migration of an fs between vendors where assigning the same index to
a given file may not be possible. Note here that a fileid does not
require that it be useful to find the file in question, only that it
is unique within the given fs. Servers prepared to accept a fileid
as a single piece of metadata and store it apart from the value used
to index the file information can relatively easily maintain a fileid
value across a migration event, allowing a truly transparent
migration event.
In any case, where servers can provide continuity of fileids, they
should and the client should be able to find out that such continuity
is available, and take appropriate action. Information about the
continuity (or lack thereof) of fileid's across a file system is
represented by specifying whether the file systems in question are of
the same _fileid_ class.
10.6.5. Fsids and File System Transitions
Since fsids are only unique within a per-server basis, it is to be
expected that they will change during a file system transition.
Clients should not make the fsid's received from the server visible
to application since they may not be globally unique, and because
they may change during a file system transition event. Applications
are best served if they are isolated from such transitions to the
extent possible.
When a file system transition is made and the fs_locations_info
indicates that file system in question may be split into multiple
file systems (via the FSLI4F_MULTI_FS flag), client should do
GETATTR's on all known objects within the file system undergoing
transition, to determine the new file system boundaries. Clients may
maintain the fsid's passed to existing applications by mapping all of
the fsid for the descendent file systems to a the common fsid used
for the original file system.
10.6.6. The Change Attribute and File System Transitions
Since the change attribute is defined as a server-specific one,
change attributes fetched from one server are normally presumed to be
invalid on another server. Such a presumption is troublesome since
it would invalidate all cached change attributes, requiring
refetching. Even more disruptive, the absence of any assured
continuity for the change attribute means that even if the same value
is gotten on refetch no conclusions can drawn as to whether the
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object in question has changed. The identical change attribute could
be merely an artifact, of a modified file with a different change
attribute construction algorithm, with that new algorithm just
happening to result in an identical change value.
When the two file systems have consistent change attribute formats,
and this fact is communicated to the client by reporting as in the
same _change_ class, the client may assume a continuity of change
attribute construction and handle this situation just as it would be
handled without any file system transition.
10.6.7. Lock State and File System Transitions
In a file system transition, the client needs to handle cases in
which the two servers have cooperated in state management and in
which they have not. Cooperation by two servers in state management
requires coordination of clientids. Before the client attempts to
use a client ID associated with one server in a request to the server
of the other file system, it must eliminate the possibility that two
non-cooperating servers have assigned the same client ID by accident.
The client needs to compare the eir_server_scope values returned by
each server. If the scope values do not match, then the servers have
not cooperated in state management. If the scope values match, then
this indicates the servers have cooperated in assigning clientids to
the point that they will reject clientids that refer to state they do
not know about.
In the case of migration, the servers involved in the migration of a
file system SHOULD transfer all server state from the original to the
new server. When this done, it must be done in a way that is
transparent to the client. With replication, such a degree of common
state is typically not the case. Clients, however should use the
information provided by the eir_server_scope returned by EXCHANGE_ID
to determine whether such sharing may be in effect, rather than
making assumptions based on the reason for the transition.
This state transfer will reduce disruption to the client when a file
system transition If the servers are successful in transferring all
state, the client can attempt to establish sessions associated with
the client ID used for the source file system instance. If the
server accepts that as a valid client ID, then the client may used
the existing stateid's associated with that client ID for the old
file system instance in connection with the that same client ID in
connection with the file system instance.
When the two servers belong to the same server scope, it does
necessarily mean that when dealing with the transition, the client
will not have to reclaim state. However it does mean that the client
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may proceed using his current client ID when establishing
communication with the new server and that that new server will
either recognize that client ID as valid, or reject it, in which case
locks must be reclaimed by the client.
File systems co-operating in state management may actually share
state or simply divide the id space so as to recognize (and reject as
stale) each others state and clients id's. Servers which do share
state may not do so under all conditions or at all times. The
requirement for the server is that if it cannot be sure in accepting
a client ID that it reflects the locks the client was given, it must
treat all associated state as stale and report it as such to the
client.
When the two file systems instances are on servers that do not share
a server scope value the client must establish a new client ID on the
destination, if it does not have one already and reclaim if possible.
In this case, old stateids and client ID's should not be presented to
the new server since there is no assurance that they will not
conflict with IDs valid on that server.
In either case, when actual locks are not known to be maintained, the
destination server may establish a grace period specific to the given
file system, with non-reclaim locks being rejected for that file
system, even though normal locks are being granted for other file
systems. Clients should not infer the absence of a grace period for
file systems being transitioned to a server from responses to
requests for other file systems.
In the case of lock reclamation for a given file system after a file
system transition, edge conditions can arise similar to those for
reclaim after server reboot (although in the case of the planned
state transfer associated with migration, these can be avoided by
securely recording lock state as part of state migration. Where the
destination server cannot guarantee that locks will not be
incorrectly granted, the destination server should not establish a
file-system-specific grace period.
In place of a file-system-specific version of RECLAIM_COMPLETE,
servers may assume that an attempt to obtain a new lock, other than
be reclaim, indicate the end of the client's attempt to reclaim locks
for that file system. [NOTE: The alternative would be to adapt
RECLAIM_COMPLETE to this task].
Information about client identity that may be propagated between
servers in the form of client_owner4 and associated verifiers, under
the assumption that the client presents the same values to all the
servers with which it deals.
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Servers are encouraged to provide facilities to allow locks to be
reclaimed on the new server after a file system transition. Often,
however, in cases in which the two servers do not share a server
scope value, such facilities may not be available and client should
be prepared to re-obtain locks, even though it is possible that the
client may have his LOCK or OPEN request denied due to a conflicting
lock. In some environments, such as the transition between read-only
file systems, such denial of locks should not pose large difficulties
in practice. When an attempt to re-establish a lock on a new server
is denied, the client should treat the situation as if his original
lock had been revoked. In all cases in which the lock is granted,
the client cannot assume that no conflicting could have been granted
in the interim. Where change attribute continuity is present, the
client may check the change attribute to check for unwanted file
modifications. Where even this is not available, and the file system
is not read-only, a client may reasonably treat all pending locks as
having been revoked.
10.6.7.1. Leases and File System Transitions
In the case of lease renewal, the client may not be submitting
requests for a file system that has been transferred to another
server. This can occur because of the lease renewal mechanism. The
client renews leases for all file systems when submitting a request
on an associated session, regardless of the specific file system
being referenced.
In order for the client to schedule renewal of leases that may have
been relocated to the new server, the client must find out about
lease relocation before those leases expire. To accomplish this, the
SEQUENCE operation will return the status bit
SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED, if responsibility for any of the leases to
be renewed has been transferred to a new server. This condition will
continue until the client receives an NFS4ERR_MOVED error and the
server receives the subsequent GETATTR for the fs_locations or
fs_locations_info attribute for an access to each file system for
which a lease has been moved to a new server.
When a client receives an SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED indication, it
should perform an operation on each file system associated with the
server in question. When the client receives an NFS4ERR_MOVED error,
the client can follow the normal process to obtain the new server
information (through the fs_locations and fs_locations_info
attributes) and perform renewal of those leases on the new server,
unless information in fs_locations_info attribute shows that no state
could have been transferred. If the server has not had state
transferred to it transparently, the client will receive
NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID from the new server, as described above, and
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the client can then reclaim locks as is done in the event of server
failure. [[Comment.8: Comment from Benny Halevy: server receives the
subsequent GETATTR for the fs_locations or 10959 fs_locations_info
attribute for an access to each file system for 10960 which a lease
has been moved to a new server. This paragraph is somewhat troubling
as it says that the server may treat GETATTR as a state-changing
operation but the this state may last indefinitely if the client does
not query all filesystems on the server. I think we need to provide
a more precise recommendation to the client implementation that will
deal with corner cases in this area. For example, the client knows
exactly which file systems it has state on (based on state it keeps
in the client inode cache). When seeing SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED it
can do the GETATTR on each of these filesystems to see where they
were moved to. At this point the client and server should be back in
sync and the client can resume normal operation. If it still gets
SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED and the state lingers (i.e. another scan of
the filesystems it knows of does not yield new NFS4ERR_MOVED
indications) it can destroy the session to release all of its state
on the server and get back in sync with the server. It should be
said, however, that destroying the session clears the aforementioned
lease_moved "state" (if it indeed does so).]] [[Comment.9: Comment
from Trond: What does the error SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED mean? A
lease is supposed to be global to the client, whereas fs_locations
returns information about a specific filesystem. What exactly is the
client expected to do if the original server exported 2 filesystems
that are now being migrated to 2 different servers? ( [...] I still
don't see [for example ] what particular operation is the client
guaranteed to be able to perform on each file system?)]]
10.6.7.2. Transitions and the Lease_time Attribute
In order that the client may appropriately manage its leases in the
case of a file system transition, the destination server must
establish proper values for the lease_time attribute.
When state is transferred transparently, that state should include
the correct value of the lease_time attribute. The lease_time
attribute on the destination server must never be less than that on
the source since this would result in premature expiration of leases
granted by the source server. Upon transitions in which state is
transferred transparently, the client is under no obligation to re-
fetch the lease_time attribute and may continue to use the value
previously fetched (on the source server).
If state has not been transferred transparently, either because the
associated servers are show as have different eir_server_scope
strings or because the client ID is rejected when presented to the
new server, the client should fetch the value of lease_time on the
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new (i.e. destination) server, and use it for subsequent locking
requests. However the server must respect a grace period at least as
long as the lease_time on the source server, in order to ensure that
clients have ample time to reclaim their lock before potentially
conflicting non-reclaimed locks are granted.
10.6.8. Write Verifiers and File System Transitions
In a file system transition, the two file systems may be clustered in
the handling of unstably written data. When this is the case, and
the two file systems belong to the same _verifier_ class, valid
verifiers from one system may be recognized by the other and
superfluous writes avoided. There is no requirement that all valid
verifiers be recognized, but it cannot be the case that a verifier is
recognized as valid when it is not. [NOTE: We need to resolve the
issue of proper verifier scope].
When two file systems belong to different _verifier_ classes, the
client must assume that all unstable writes in existence at the time
file system transition, have been lost since there is no way the old
verifier can recognized as valid (or not) on the target server.
10.7. Effecting File System Referrals
Referrals are effected when an absent file system is encountered, and
one or more alternate locations are made available by the
fs_locations or fs_locations_info attributes. The client will
typically get an NFS4ERR_MOVED error, fetch the appropriate location
information and proceed to access the file system on different
server, even though it retains its logical position within the
original namespace.
The examples given in the sections below are somewhat artificial in
that an actual client will not typically do a multi-component lookup,
but will have cached information regarding the upper levels of the
name hierarchy. However, these example are chosen to make the
required behavior clear and easy to put within the scope of a small
number of requests, without getting unduly into details of how
specific clients might choose to cache things.
10.7.1. Referral Example (LOOKUP)
Let us suppose that the following COMPOUND is issued in an
environment in which /this/is/the/path is absent from the target
server. This may be for a number of reasons. It may be the case
that the file system has moved, or, it may be the case that the
target server is functioning mainly, or solely, to refer clients to
the servers on which various file systems are located.
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o PUTROOTFH
o LOOKUP "this"
o LOOKUP "is"
o LOOKUP "the"
o LOOKUP "path"
o GETFH
o GETATTR fsid,fileid,size,ctime
Under the given circumstances, the following will be the result.
o PUTROOTFH --> NFS_OK. The current fh is now the root of the
pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "this" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "is" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "the" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is/the and
is within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "path" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is/the/path
and is within a new, absent fs, but ... the client will never see
the value of that fh.
o GETFH --> NFS4ERR_MOVED. Fails because current fh is in an absent
fs at the start of the operation and the spec makes no exception
for GETFH.
o GETATTR fsid,fileid,size,ctime. Not executed because the failure
of the GETFH stops processing of the COMPOUND.
Given the failure of the GETFH, the client has the job of determining
the root of the absent file system and where to find that file
system, i.e. the server and path relative to that server's root fh.
Note here that in this example, the client did not obtain filehandles
and attribute information (e.g. fsid) for the intermediate
directories, so that he would not be sure where the absent file
system starts. It could be the case, for example, that /this/is/the
is the root of the moved file system and that the reason that the
lookup of "path" succeeded is that the file system was not absent on
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that op but was moved between the last LOOKUP and the GETFH (since
COMPOUND is not atomic). Even if we had the fsid's for all of the
intermediate directories, we could have no way of knowing that /this/
is/the/path was the root of a new fs, since we don't yet have its
fsid.
In order to get the necessary information, let us re-issue the chain
of lookup's with GETFH's and GETATTR's to at least get the fsid's so
we can be sure where the appropriate fs boundaries are. The client
could choose to get fs_locations_info at the same time but in most
cases the client will have a good guess as to where fs boundaries are
(because of where NFS4ERR_MOVED was gotten and where not) making
fetching of fs_locations_info unnecessary.
OP01: PUTROOTFH --> NFS_OK
- Current fh is root of pseudo-fs.
OP02: GETATTR(fsid) --> NFS_OK
- Just for completeness. Normally, clients will know the fsid of
the pseudo-fs as soon as they establish communication with a
server.
OP03: LOOKUP "this" --> NFS_OK
OP04: GETATTR(fsid) --> NFS_OK
- Get current fsid to see where fs boundaries are. The fsid will be
that for the pseudo-fs in this example, so no boundary.
OP05: GETFH --> NFS_OK
- Current fh is for /this and is within pseudo-fs.
OP06: LOOKUP "is" --> NFS_OK
- Current fh is for /this/is and is within pseudo-fs.
OP07: GETATTR(fsid) --> NFS_OK
- Get current fsid to see where fs boundaries are. The fsid will be
that for the pseudo-fs in this example, so no boundary.
OP08: GETFH --> NFS_OK
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- Current fh is for /this/is and is within pseudo-fs.
OP09: LOOKUP "the" --> NFS_OK
- Current fh is for /this/is/the and is within pseudo-fs.
OP10: GETATTR(fsid) --> NFS_OK
- Get current fsid to see where fs boundaries are. The fsid will be
that for the pseudo-fs in this example, so no boundary.
OP11: GETFH --> NFS_OK
- Current fh is for /this/is/the and is within pseudo-fs.
OP12: LOOKUP "path" --> NFS_OK
- Current fh is for /this/is/the/path and is within a new, absent
fs, but ...
- The client will never see the value of that fh
OP13: GETATTR(fsid, fs_locations_info) --> NFS_OK
- We are getting the fsid to know where the fs boundaries are. Note
that the fsid we are given will not necessarily be preserved at
the new location. That fsid might be different and in fact the
fsid we have for this fs might a valid fsid of a different fs on
that new server.
- In this particular case, we are pretty sure anyway that what has
moved is /this/is/the/path rather than /this/is/the since we have
the fsid of the latter and it is that of the pseudo-fs, which
presumably cannot move. However, in other examples, we might not
have this kind of information to rely on (e.g. /this/is/the might
be a non-pseudo file system separate from /this/is/the/path), so
we need to have another reliable source information on the
boundary of the fs which is moved. If, for example, the file
system "/this/is" had moved we would have a case of migration
rather than referral and once the boundaries of the migrated file
system was clear we could fetch fs_locations_info.
- We are fetching fs_locations_info because the fact that we got an
NFS4ERR_MOVED at this point means that it most likely that this is
a referral and we need the destination. Even if it is the case
that "/this/is/the" is a file system which has migrated, we will
still need the location information for that file system.
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OP14: GETFH --> NFS4ERR_MOVED
- Fails because current fh is in an absent fs at the start of the
operation and the spec makes no exception for GETFH. Note that
this has the happy consequence that we don't have to worry about
the volatility or lack thereof of the fh. If the root of the fs
on the new location is a persistent fh, then we can assume that
this fh, which we never saw is a persistent fh, which, if we could
see it, would exactly match the new fh. At least, there is no
evidence to disprove that. On the other hand, if we find a
volatile root at the new location, then the filehandle which we
never saw must have been volatile or at least nobody can prove
otherwise.
Given the above, the client knows where the root of the absent file
system is, by noting where the change of fsid occurred. The
fs_locations_info attribute also gives the client the actual location
of the absent file system, so that the referral can proceed. The
server gives the client the bare minimum of information about the
absent file system so that there will be very little scope for
problems of conflict between information sent by the referring server
and information of the file system's home. No filehandles and very
few attributes are present on the referring server and the client can
treat those it receives as basically transient information with the
function of enabling the referral.
10.7.2. Referral Example (READDIR)
Another context in which a client may encounter referrals is when it
does a READDIR on directory in which some of the sub-directories are
the roots of absent file systems.
Suppose such a directory is read as follows:
o PUTROOTFH
o LOOKUP "this"
o LOOKUP "is"
o LOOKUP "the"
o READDIR (fsid, size, ctime, mounted_on_fileid)
In this case, because rdattr_error is not requested,
fs_locations_info is not requested, and some of attributes cannot be
provided the result will be an NFS4ERR_MOVED error on the READDIR,
with the detailed results as follows:
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o PUTROOTFH --> NFS_OK. The current fh is at the root of the
pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "this" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "is" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "the" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is/the and
is within the pseudo-fs.
o READDIR (fsid, size, ctime, mounted_on_fileid) --> NFS4ERR_MOVED.
Note that the same error would have been returned if /this/is/the
had migrated, when in fact it is because the directory contains
the root of an absent fs.
So now suppose that we reissue with rdattr_error:
o PUTROOTFH
o LOOKUP "this"
o LOOKUP "is"
o LOOKUP "the"
o READDIR (rdattr_error, fsid, size, ctime, mounted_on_fileid)
The results will be:
o PUTROOTFH --> NFS_OK. The current fh is at the root of the
pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "this" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "is" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "the" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is/the and
is within the pseudo-fs.
o READDIR (rdattr_error, fsid, size, ctime, mounted_on_fileid) -->
NFS_OK. The attributes for "path" will only contain rdattr_error
with the value will be NFS4ERR_MOVED, together with an fsid value
and an a value for mounted_on_fileid.
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So suppose we do another READDIR to get fs_locations_info, although
we could have used a GETATTR directly, as in the previous section.
o PUTROOTFH
o LOOKUP "this"
o LOOKUP "is"
o LOOKUP "the"
o READDIR (rdattr_error, fs_locations_info, mounted_on_fileid, fsid,
size, ctime)
The results would be:
o PUTROOTFH --> NFS_OK. The current fh is at the root of the
pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "this" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "is" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is and is
within the pseudo-fs.
o LOOKUP "the" --> NFS_OK. The current fh is for /this/is/the and
is within the pseudo-fs.
o READDIR (rdattr_error, fs_locations_info, mounted_on_fileid, fsid,
size, ctime) --> NFS_OK. The attributes will be as shown below.
The attributes for "path" will only contain
o rdattr_error (value: NFS4ERR_MOVED)
o fs_locations_info )
o mounted_on_fileid (value: unique fileid within referring fs)
o fsid (value: unique value within referring server)
The attribute entry for "latest" will not contain size or ctime.
10.8. The Attribute fs_absent
In order to provide the client information about whether the current
file system is present or absent, the fs_absent attribute may be
interrogated.
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As noted above, this attribute, when supported, may be requested of
absent file systems without causing NFS4ERR_MOVED to be returned and
it should always be available. Servers are strongly urged to support
this attribute on all file systems if they support it on any file
system.
10.9. The Attribute fs_locations
The fs_locations attribute is structured in the following way:
struct fs_location {
utf8str_cis server<>;
pathname4 rootpath;
};
struct fs_locations {
pathname4 fs_root;
fs_location locations<>;
};
The fs_location struct is used to represent the location of a file
system by providing a server name and the path to the root of the
file system within that server's namespace. When a set of servers
have corresponding file systems at the same path within their
namespaces, an array of server names may be provided. An entry in
the server array is an UTF8 string and represents one of a
traditional DNS host name, IPv4 address, or IPv6 address. It is not
a requirement that all servers that share the same rootpath be listed
in one fs_location struct. The array of server names is provided for
convenience. Servers that share the same rootpath may also be listed
in separate fs_location entries in the fs_locations attribute.
The fs_locations struct and attribute contains an array of such
locations. Since the name space of each server may be constructed
differently, the "fs_root" field is provided. The path represented
by fs_root represents the location of the file system in the current
server's name space, i.e. that of the server from which the
fs_locations attribute was obtained. The fs_root path is meant to
aid the client by clearly referencing the root of the file system
whose locations are being reported, no matter what object within the
current file system, the current filehandle designates.
As an example, suppose there is a replicated file system located at
two servers (servA and servB). At servA, the file system is located
at path "/a/b/c". At, servB the file system is located at path
"/x/y/z". If the client were to obtain the fs_locations value for
the directory at "/a/b/c/d", it might not necessarily know that the
file system's root is located in servA's name space at "/a/b/c".
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When the client switches to servB, it will need to determine that the
directory it first referenced at servA is now represented by the path
"/x/y/z/d" on servB. To facilitate this, the fs_locations attribute
provided by servA would have a fs_root value of "/a/b/c" and two
entries in fs_locations. One entry in fs_locations will be for
itself (servA) and the other will be for servB with a path of
"/x/y/z". With this information, the client is able to substitute
"/x/y/z" for the "/a/b/c" at the beginning of its access path and
construct "/x/y/z/d" to use for the new server.
Since fs_locations attribute lacks information defining various
attributes of the various file system choices presented, it should
only be interrogated and used when fs_locations_info is not
available. When fs_locations is used, information about the specific
locations should be assumed based on the following rules.
The following rules are general and apply irrespective of the
context.
o All listed file system instances should be considered as of the
same _handle_ class, if and only if, the current fh_expire_type
attribute does not include the FH4_VOL_MIGRATION bit. Note that
in the case of referral, filehandle issues do not apply since
there can be no filehandles known within the current file system
nor is there any access to the fh_expire_type attribute on the
referring (absent) file system.
o All listed file system instances should be considered as of the
same _fileid_ class, if and only if, the fh_expire_type attribute
indicates persistent filehandles and does not include the
FH4_VOL_MIGRATION bit. Note that in the case of referral, fileid
issues do not apply since there can be no fileids known within the
referring (absent) file system nor is there any access to the
fh_expire_type attribute.
o All file system instances servers should be considered as of
different _change_ classes.
For other class assignments, handling depends of file system
transitions depends on the reasons for the transition:
o When the transition is due to migration, the target should be
treated as being of the same _verifier_ class as the source.
o When the transition is due to failover to another replica, the
target should be treated as being of a different _verifier_ class
from the source.
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The specific choices reflect typical implementation patterns for
failover and controlled migration respectively. Since other choices
are possible and useful, this information is better obtained by using
fs_locations_info.
See the section "Security Considerations" for a discussion on the
recommendations for the security flavor to be used by any GETATTR
operation that requests the "fs_locations" attribute.
10.10. The Attribute fs_locations_info
The fs_locations_info attribute is intended as a more functional
replacement for fs_locations which will continue to exist and be
supported. Clients can use it get a more complete set of information
about alternative file system locations. When the server does not
support fs_locations_info, fs_locations can be used to get a subset
of the information. A server which supports fs_locations_info MUST
support fs_locations as well.
There is additional information present in fs_locations_info, that is
not available in fs_locations:
o Attribute continuity information to allow a client to select a
location which meets the transparency requirements of the
applications accessing the data and to take advantage of
optimizations that server guarantees as to attribute continuity
may provide (e.g. change attribute).
o File System identity information which indicates when multiple
replicas, from the clients point of view, correspond to the same
target file system, allowing them to be used interchangeably,
without disruption, as multiple paths to the same thing.
o Information which will bear on the suitability of various
replicas, depending on the use that the client intends. For
example, many applications need an absolutely up-to-date copy
(e.g. those that write), while others may only need access to the
most up-to-date copy reasonably available.
o Server-derived preference information for replicas, which can be
used to implement load-balancing while giving the client the
entire fs list to be used in case the primary fails.
The fs_locations_info attribute consists of a root pathname (just
like fs_locations), together with an array of fs_location_item4
structures.
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struct fs_locations_server4 {
int32_t fls_currency;
opaque fls_info<>;
utf8str_cis fls_server;
};
const FSLI4BX_GFLAGS = 0;
const FSLI4BX_TFLAGS = 1;
const FSLI4BX_CLSIMUL = 2;
const FSLI4BX_CLHANDLE = 3;
const FSLI4BX_CLFILEID = 4;
const FSLI4BX_CLVERIFIER = 5;
const FSLI4BX_CHANGE = 6;
const FSLI4BX_READRANK = 7;
const FSLI4BX_WRITERANK = 8;
const FSLI4BX_READORDER = 9;
const FSLI4BX_WRITEORDER = 10;
const FSLI4GF_WRITABLE = 0x01;
const FSLI4GF_CUR_REQ = 0x02;
const FSLI4GF_ABSENT = 0x04;
const FSLI4GF_GOING = 0x08;
const FSLI4GF_SPLIT = 0x10;
const FSLI4TF_RDMA = 0x01;
struct fs_locations_item4 {
fs_locations_server4 fli_entries<>;
pathname4 fli_rootpath;
};
struct fs_locations_info4 {
uint32_t fli_flags;
pathname4 fli_fs_root;
fs_locations_item4 fli_items<>;
};
const FSLI4IF_VAR_SUB = 0x00000001;
typedef fs_locations_info4 fattr4_fs_locations_info;
The fs_locations_info attribute is structured similarly to the
fs_locations attribute. A top-level structure (fs_locations_info4)
contains the entire attribute including the root pathname of the fs
and an array of lower-level structures that define replicas that
share a common root path on their respective servers. The lower-
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level structure in turn ( fs_locations_item4) contain a specific
pathname and information on one or more individual server replicas.
For that last lowest-level fs_locations_info has a
fs_locations_server4 structure that contains per-server-replica
information in addition to the server name.
As noted above, the fs_locations_info attribute, when supported, may
be requested of absent file systems without causing NFS4ERR_MOVED to
be returned and it is generally expected that it will be available
for both present and absent file systems even if only a single
fs_locations_server4 entry is present, designating the current
(present) file system, or two fs_locations_server4 entries
designating the current (and now previous) location of an absent file
system and its successor location. Servers are strongly urged to
support this attribute on all file systems if they support it on any
file system.
10.10.1. The fs_locations_server4 Structure
The fs_locations_server4 structure consists of the following items:
o An indication of file system up-to-date-ness (fls_currency) in
terms of approximate seconds before the present. A negative value
indicates that the server is unable to give any reasonably useful
value here. A zero indicates that file system is the actual
writable data or a reliably coherent and fully up-to-date copy.
Positive values indicate how out- of-date this copy can normally
be before it is considered for update. Such a value is not a
guarantee that such updates will always be performed on the
required schedule but instead serve as a hint about how far behind
the most up-to-date copy of the data, this copy would normally be
expected to be.
o A counted array of one-octet values (fls_info) containing
information about the particular file system instance. This data
includes general flags, transport capability flags, file system
equivalence class information, and selection priority information.
The encoding will be discussed below.
o The server string (fls_server). For the case of the replica
currently being accessed (via GETATTR), a null string may be used
to indicate the current address being used for the RPC call.
Data within the fls_info array, is in the form of 8-bit data items
with constants giving the offsets within the array of various values
describing this particular file system instance. This style of
definition was chosen, in preference to explicit XDR structure
definitions for these values for a number of reasons.
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o The kinds of data in the fls_info array, representing, flags, file
system classes and priorities among set of file systems
representing the same data are such that eight bits provides a
quite acceptable range of values. Even where there might be more
than 256 such file system instances, having more than 256 distinct
classes or priorities is unlikely.
o Explicit definition of the various specific data items within XDR
would limit expandability in that any extension within a
subsequent minor version would require yet another attribute,
leading to specification and implementation clumsiness.
o Such explicit definitions would also make it impossible to propose
standards-track extensions apart from a full minor version.
This encoding scheme can be adapted to the specification of multi-
octet numeric values, even though none are currently defined. If
extensions are made via standards-track RFC's, multi-octet quantities
will be encoded as a range of octet with a range of indices with the
octet interpreted in big endian octet order.
The set of fls_info data is subject to expansion in a future minor
version, or in a standard-track RFC, within the context of a single
minor version. The server SHOULD NOT send and the client MUST not
use indices within the fls_info array that are not defined in
standards-track RFC's.
The fls_info array contains within it:
o Two 8-bit flag fields, one devoted to general file-system
characteristics and a second reserved for transport-related
capabilities.
o Four 8-bit class values which define various file system
equivalence classes as explained below.
o Four 8-bit priority values which govern file system selection as
explained below.
The general file system characteristics flag (at octet index
FSLI4BX_GFLAGS) has the following bits defined within it:
o FSLI4GF_WRITABLE indicates that this fs target is writable,
allowing it to be selected by clients which may need to write on
this file system. When the current file system instance is
writable, then any other file system to which the client might
switch must incorporate within its data any committed write made
on the current file system instance. See the section on verifier
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class, for issues related to uncommitted writes. While there is
no harm in not setting this flag for a file system that turns out
to be writable, turning the flag on for read-only file system can
cause problems for clients who select a migration or replication
target based on it and then find themselves unable to write.
o FSLI4GF_CUR_REQ indicates that this replica is the one on which
the request is being made. Only a single server entry may have
this flag set and in the case of a referral, no entry will have
it.
o FSLI4GF_ABSENT indicates that this entry corresponds an absent
file system replica. It can only be set if FSLI4GF_CUR_REQ is
set. When both such bits are set it indicates that a file system
instance is not usable but that the information in the entry can
be used to determine the sorts of continuity available when
switching from this replica to other possible replicas. Since
this bit can only be true if FSLI4GF_CUR_REQ is true, the value
could be determined using the fs_absent attribute but the
information is also made available here for the convenience of the
client. An entry with this bit, since it represents a true file
system (albeit absent) does not appear in the event of a referral,
but only where a file system has been accessed at this location
and subsequently been migrated.
o FSLI4GF_GOING indicates that a replica, while still available,
should not be used further. The client, if using it, should make
an orderly transfer to another file system instance as
expeditiously as possible. It is expected that file systems going
out of service will be announced as FSLI4GF_GOING some time before
the actual loss of service and that the valid_for value will be
sufficiently small to allow clients to detect and act on scheduled
events while large enough that the cost of the requests to fetch
the fs_locations_info values will not be excessive. Values on the
order of ten minutes seem reasonable.
o FSLI4GF_SPLIT indicates that when a transition occurs from the
current file system instance to this one, the replacement may
consist of multiple file systems. In this case, the client has to
be prepared for the possibility that objects on the same fs before
migration will be on different ones after. Note that
FSLI4GF_SPLIT is not incompatible with the file systems belong to
the same _fileid_ class since, if one has a set of fileid's that
are unique within an fs, each subset assigned to a smaller fs
after migration would not have any conflicts internal to that fs.
A client, in the case of a split file system will interrogate
existing files with which it has continuing connection (it is free
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simply forget cached filehandles). If the client remembers the
directory filehandle associated with each open file, it may
proceed upward using LOOKUPP to find the new fs boundaries.
Once the client recognizes that one file system has been split
into two, it could maintain applications running without
disruption by presenting the two file systems as a single one
until a convenient point to recognize the transition, such as a
reboot. This would require a mapping of fsids from the server's
fsids to fsids as seen by the client but this is already necessary
for other reasons. As noted above, existing fileids within the
two descendant fs's will not conflict. Creation of new files in
the two descendent fs's may require some amount of fileid mapping
which can be performed very simply in many important cases.
The transport-flag field (at octet index FSLI4BX_TFLAGS) contains the
following bits related to the transport capabilities of the specific
file system.
o FSLI4TF_RDMA indicates that this file system provides NFSv4.1 file
system access using an RDMA-capable transport.
Attribute continuity and file system identity information are
expressed by defining equivalence relations on the sets of file
systems presented to the client. Each such relation is expressed as
a set of file system equivalence classes. For each relation, a file
system has an 8-bit class number. Two file systems belong to the
same class if both have identical non-zero class numbers. Zero is
treated as non-matching. Most often, the relevant question for the
client will be whether a given replica is identical-to/
continuous-with the current one in a given respect but the
information should be available also as to whether two other replicas
match in that respect as well.
The following fields specify the file system's class numbers for the
equivalence relations used in determining the nature of file system
transitions. See Section 10.6 for details about how this information
is to be used.
o The field with octet index FSLI4BX_CLSIMUL defines the
simultaneous-use class for the file system.
o The field with octet index FSLI4BX_CLHANDLE defines the handle
class for the file system.
o The field with octet index FSLI4BX_CLFILEID defines the fileid
class for the file system.
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o The field with octet index FSLI4BX_CLVERIFIER defines the verifier
class for the file system.
o The field with octet index FSLI4BX_CLCHANGE defines the change
class for the file system.
Server-specified preference information is also provided via 8-bit
values within the fls_info array. The values provide a rank and an
order (see below) to be used with separate values specifiable for the
cases of read-only and writable file systems. These values are
compared for different file systems to establish the server-specified
preference, with lower values indicating "more preferred".
Rank is used to express a strict server-imposed ordering on clients,
with lower values indicating "more preferred." Clients should
attempt to use all replicas with a given rank before they use one
with a higher rank. Only if all of those file systems are
unavailable should the client proceed to those of a higher rank.
Within a rank, the order value is used to specify the server's
preference to guide the client's selection when the client's own
preferences are not controlling, with lower values of order
indicating "more preferred." If replicas are approximately equal in
all respects, clients should defer to the order specified by the
server. When clients look at server latency as part of their
selection, they are free to use this criterion but it is suggested
that when latency differences are not significant, the server-
specified order should guide selection.
o The field at octet index FSLI4BX_READRANK gives the rank value to
be used for read-only access.
o The field at octet index FSLI4BX_READOREDER gives the order value
to be used for read-only access.
o The field at octet index FSLI4BX_WRITERANK gives the rank value to
be used for writable access.
o The field at octet index FSLI4BX_WRITEOREDER gives the order value
to be used for writable access.
Depending on the potential need for write access by a given client,
one of the pairs of rank and order values is used. The read rank and
order should only be used if the client knows that only reading will
ever be done or if it is prepared to switch to a different replica in
the event that any write access capability is required in the future.
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10.10.2. The fs_locations_info4 Structure
The fs_locations_info4 structure, encoding the fs_locations_info
attribute, contains the following:
o The fli_flags field which contains general flags that affect the
interpretation of this fs_locations_info4 structure and all
fs_locations_item4 structures within it. The only flag currently
defined is FSLI4IF_VAR_SUB. All bits in the fli_flags field which
are not defined should always be returned as zero.
o The fli_fs_root field which contains the pathname of the root of
the current file system on the current server, just as it does the
fs_locations4 structure.
o An array called fli_items of fs_locations4_item structures, which
contain information about replicas of the current file system.
Where the current file system is actually present, or has been
present, i.e. this is not a referral situation, one of the
fs_locations_item4 structures will contain an fs_locations_server4
for the current server. This structure will have FSLI4GF_ABSENT
set if the current file system is absent, i.e. normal access to it
will return NFS4ERR_MOVED.
o The fli_valid_for field specifies a time in seconds for which it
is reasonable for a client to use the fs_locations_info attribute
without refetch. The fli_valid_for value does not provide a
guarantee of validity since servers can unexpectedly go out of
service or become inaccessible for any number of reasons. Clients
are well-advised to refetch this information for actively accessed
file system at every fli_valid_for seconds. This is particularly
important when file system replicas may go out of service in a
controlled way using the FSLI4GF_GOING flag to communicate an
ongoing change. The server should set fli_valid_for to a value
which allows well-behaved clients to notice the FSLI4GF_GOING flag
and make an orderly switch before the loss of service becomes
effective. If this value is zero, then no refetch interval is
appropriate and the client need not refetch this data on any
particular schedule. In the event of a transition to a new file
system instance, a new value of the fs_locations_info attribute
will be fetched at the destination and it is to be expected that
this may have a different valid_for value, which the client should
then use, in the same fashion as the previous value.
The FSLI4IF_VAR_SUB flag within fli_flags controls whether variable
substitution is to be enabled
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10.10.3. The fs_locations_item4 Structure
The fs_locations_item4 structure contains a pathname (in the field
fli_rootpath) which encodes the path of the target file system
replicas on the set of servers designated by the included
fs_locations_server4 entries. The precise manner in which this
target location is specified depends on the value of the
FSLI4IF_VAR_SUB flag within the associated fs_locations_info4
structure.
If this flag is not set, then fli_rootpath simply designates the
location of the target file system within each server's single-server
namespace just as it does for the rootpath within the fs_location
structure. When this bit is set, however, component entries of a
certain form are subject to client-specific variable substitution so
as to allow a degree of namespace non-uniformity in order to
accommodate the selection of client-specific file system targets to
adapt to different client architectures or other characteristics.
When such substitution is in effect a variable beginning with the
string "${" and ending with the string "}" and containing a colon is
to be replaced by the client-specific value associated with that
variable. The string "unknown" should be used by the client when it
has no value for such a variable. The pathname resulting from such
substitutions is used to designate the target file system, so that
different clients may have different file systems, corresponding to
that location in the multi-server namespace.
As mentioned above, such substituted pathname variables contain a
colon. The part before the colon is to be a DNS domain name with the
part after being a case-insensitive alphanumeric string.
Where the domain is "ietf.org", only variable names defined in this
document or subsequent standards-track RFC's are subject to such
substitution. Organizations are free to use their domain names to
create their own sets of client-specific variables, to be subject to
such substitution. In case where such variables are intended to be
used more broadly than a single organization, publication of an
informational RFC defining such variables is recommended.
The variable ${ietf.org:CPU_ARCH} is used to denote the CPU
architecture object files are compiled. This specification does not
limit the acceptable values (except that they must be valid UTF-8
strings) but such values as "x86", "x86_64" and "sparc" would be
expected to be used in line with industry practice.
The variable ${ietf.org:OS_TYPE} is used to denote the operating
system and thus the kernel and library API's for which code might be
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compiled. This specification does not limit the acceptable values
(except that they must be valid UTF-8 strings) but such values as
"linux" and "freebsd" would be expected to be used in line with
industry practice.
The variable ${ietf.org:OS_VERSION} is used to denote the operating
system version and the thus the specific details of versioned
interfaces for which code might be compiled. This specification does
not limit the acceptable values (except that they must be valid UTF-8
strings) but combinations of numbers and letters with interspersed
dots would be expected to be used in line with industry practice,
with the details of the version format depending on the specific
value of the value of the variable ${ietf.org:OS_TYPE} with which it
is used.
Use of these variable could result in direction of different clients
to different file systems on the same server, as appropriate to
particular clients. In cases in which the target file systems are
located on different servers, a single server could serve as a
referral point so that each valid combination of variable values
would designate a referral hosted on a single server, with the
targets of those referrals on a number of different servers.
Although variable substitution is most suitable for use in the
context of referrals, if may be used in the context of replication
and migration. If it is used in these contexts, the server must
ensure that no matter what values the client presents for the
substituted variables, the result is always a valid successor file
system instance to that from which a transition is occurring, i.e.
that the data is identical or represents a later image of a writable
file system.
Note that when fli_rootpath is a null pathname (that is, one with
zero components), the file system designated is at the root of the
specified server, whether the FSLI4IF_VAR_SUB flag within the
associated fs_locations_info4 structure is set or not.
10.11. The Attribute fs_status
In an environment in which multiple copies of the same basic set of
data are available, information regarding the particular source of
such data and the relationships among different copies, can be very
helpful in providing consistent data to applications.
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enum fs4_status_type {
STATUS4_FIXED = 1,
STATUS4_VERSIONED = 2,
STATUS4_UPDATED = 3,
STATUS4_WRITABLE = 4,
STATUS4_ABSENT = 5
};
struct fs4_status {
fs4_status_type fsstat_type;
utf8str_cs fsstat_source;
utf8str_cs fsstat_current;
int32_t fsstat_age;
nfstime4 fsstat_version;
};
The type value indicates the kind of file system image represented.
This is of particular importance when using the version values to
determine appropriate succession of file system images. Five types
are distinguished:
o STATUS4_FIXED which indicates a read-only image in the sense that
it will never change. The possibility is allowed that as a result
of migration or switch to a different image, changed data can be
accessed but within the confines of this instance, no change is
allowed. The client can use this fact to aggressively cache.
o STATUS4_VERSIONED which indicates that the image, like the
STATUS4_UPDATED case, is updated exogenously, but it provides a
guarantee that the server will carefully update an associated
version value so that the client can protect itself from a
situation in which it reads data from one version of the file
system, and then later reads data from an earlier version of the
same file system. See below for a discussion of how this can be
done.
o STATUS4_UPDATED which indicates an image that cannot be updated by
the user writing to it but may be changed exogenously, typically
because it is a periodically updated copy of another writable file
system somewhere else. In this case, version information is not
provided and the client does not have the responsibility of making
sure that this version only advances upon a file system instance
transition. In this case, it is the responsibility of the server
to make sure that the data presented after a file system instance
transition is a proper successor image and includes all changes
seen by the client and any change made before all such changes.
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o STATUS4_WRITABLE which indicates that the file system is an actual
writable one. The client need not of course actually write to the
file system, but once it does, it should not accept a transition
to anything other than a writable instance of that same file
system.
o STATUS4_ABSENT which indicates that the information is the last
valid for a file system which is no longer present.
The opaque strings source and current provide a way of presenting
information about the source of the file system image being present.
It is not intended that client do anything with this information
other than make it available to administrative tools. It is intended
that this information be helpful when researching possible problems
with a file system image that might arise when it is unclear if the
correct image is being accessed and if not, how that image came to be
made. This kind of debugging information will be helpful, if, as
seems likely, copies of file systems are made in many different ways
(e.g. simple user-level copies, file system- level point-in-time
copies, cloning of the underlying storage), under a variety of
administrative arrangements. In such environments, determining how a
given set of data was constructed can be very helpful in resolving
problems.
The opaque string 'source' is used to indicate the source of a given
file system with the expectation that tools capable of creating a
file system image propagate this information, when that is possible.
It is understood that this may not always be possible since a user-
level copy may be thought of as creating a new data set and the tools
used may have no mechanism to propagate this data. When a file
system is initially created associating with it data regarding how
the file system was created, where it was created, by whom, etc. can
be put in this attribute in a human- readable string form so that it
will be available when propagated to subsequent copies of this data.
The opaque string 'current' should provide whatever information is
available about the source of the current copy. Such information as
the tool creating it, any relevant parameters to that tool, the time
at which the copy was done, the user making the change, the server on
which the change was made etc. All information should be in a human-
readable string form.
The age provides an indication of how out-of-date the file system
currently is with respect to its ultimate data source (in case of
cascading data updates). This complements the fls_currency field of
fs_locations_server4 (See Section 10.10) in the following way: the
information in fls_currency gives a bound for how out of date the
data in a file system might typically get, while the age gives a
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bound on how out of date that data actually is. Negative values
imply no information is available. A zero means that this data is
known to be current. A positive value means that this data is known
to be no older than that number of seconds with respect to the
ultimate data source.
The version field provides a version identification, in the form of a
time value, such that successive versions always have later time
values. When the file system type is anything other than
STATUS4_VERSIONED, the server may provide such a value but there is
no guarantee as to its validity and clients will not use it except to
provide additional information to add to 'source' and 'current'.
When the type is STATUS4_VERSIONED, servers should provide a value of
version which progresses monotonically whenever any new version of
the data is established. This allows the client, if reliable image
progression is important to it, to fetch this attribute as part of
each COMPOUND where data or metadata from the file system is used.
When it is important to the client to make sure that only valid
successor images are accepted, it must make sure that it does not
read data or metadata from the file system without updating its sense
of the current state of the image, to avoid the possibility that the
fs_status which the client holds will be one for an earlier image,
and so accept a new file system instance which is later than that but
still earlier than updated data read by the client.
In order to do this reliably, it must do a GETATTR of fs_status that
follows any interrogation of data or metadata within the file system
in question. Often this is most conveniently done by appending such
a GETATTR after all other operations that reference a given file
system. When errors occur between reading file system data and
performing such a GETATTR, care must be exercised to make sure that
the data in question is not used before obtaining the proper
fs_status value. In this connection, when an OPEN is done within
such a versioned file system and the associated GETATTR of fs_status
is not successfully completed, the open file in question must not be
accessed until that fs_status is fetched.
The procedure above will ensure that before using any data from the
file system the client has in hand a newly-fetched current version of
the file system image. Multiple values for multiple requests in
flight can be resolved by assembling them into the required partial
order (and the elements should form a total order within it) and
using the last. The client may then, when switching among file
system instances, decline to use an instance which is not of type
STATUS4_VERSIONED or whose version field is earlier than the last one
obtained from the predecessor file system instance.
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11. Directory Delegations
11.1. Introduction to Directory Delegations
Directory caching for the NFSv4.1 protocol is similar to previous
versions. Clients typically cache directory information for a
duration determined by the client. At the end of a predefined
timeout, the client will query the server to see if the directory has
been updated. By caching attributes, clients reduce the number of
GETATTR calls made to the server to validate attributes.
Furthermore, frequently accessed files and directories, such as the
current working directory, have their attributes cached on the client
so that some NFS operations can be performed without having to make
an RPC call. By caching name and inode information about most
recently looked up entries in the Directory Name Lookup Cache (DNLC),
clients do not need to send LOOKUP calls to the server every time
these files are accessed.
This caching approach works reasonably well at reducing network
traffic in many environments. However, it does not address
environments where there are numerous queries for files that do not
exist. In these cases of "misses", the client must make RPC calls to
the server in order to provide reasonable application semantics and
promptly detect the creation of new directory entries. Examples of
high miss activity are compilation in software development
environments. The current behavior of NFS limits its potential
scalability and wide-area sharing effectiveness in these types of
environments. Other distributed stateful file system architectures
such as AFS and DFS have proven that adding state around directory
contents can greatly reduce network traffic in high miss
environments.
Delegation of directory contents is a RECOMMENDED feature of NFSv4.1.
Directory delegations provide similar traffic reduction benefits as
with file delegations. By allowing clients to cache directory
contents (in a read-only fashion) while being notified of changes,
the client can avoid making frequent requests to interrogate the
contents of slowly-changing directories, reducing network traffic and
improving client performance.
Directory delegations allow improved namespace cache consistency to
be achieved through delegations and synchronous recalls alone without
asking for notifications. In addition, if time-based consistency is
sufficient, asynchronous notifications can provide performance
benefits for the client, and possibly the server, under some common
operating conditions such as slowly-changing and/or very large
directories.
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11.2. Directory Delegation Design
NFSv4.1 introduces the GET_DIR_DELEGATION (Section 17.39) operation
to allow the client to ask for a directory delegation. The
delegation covers directory attributes and all entries in the
directory. If either of these change the delegation will be recalled
synchronously. The operation causing the recall will have to wait
before the recall is complete. Any changes to directory entry
attributes will not cause the delegation to be recalled.
In addition to asking for delegations, a client can also ask for
notifications for certain events. These events include changes to
directory attributes and/or its contents. If a client asks for
notification for a certain event, the server will notify the client
when that event occurs. This will not result in the delegation being
recalled for that client. The notifications are asynchronous and
provide a way of avoiding recalls in situations where a directory is
changing enough that the pure recall model may not be effective while
trying to allow the client to get substantial benefit. In the
absence of notifications, once the delegation is recalled the client
has to refresh its directory cache which might not be very efficient
for very large directories.
The delegation is read only and the client may not make changes to
the directory other than by performing NFSv4 operations that modify
the directory or the associated file attributes so that the server
has knowledge of these changes. In order to keep the client
namespace synchronized with the server, the server will notify the
client holding the delegation of the changes made as a result. This
is to avoid any subsequent GETATTR or READDIR calls to the server.
If a single client is holding the delegation and that client makes
any changes to the directory, the delegation will not be recalled.
Multiple clients may hold a delegation on the same directory, but if
any such client modifies the directory, the server MUST recall the
delegation from the other clients.
Delegations can be recalled by the server at any time. Normally, the
server will recall the delegation when the directory changes in a way
that is not covered by the notification, or when the directory
changes and notifications have not been requested.
Also if the server notices that handing out a delegation for a
directory is causing too many notifications or recalls to be sent
out, it may decide not to hand out a delegation for that directory or
recall existing delegations. If another client removes the directory
for which a delegation has been granted, the server will recall the
delegation.
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11.3. Attributes in Support of Directory Notifications
See Section 5.12 for a description of the attributes associated with
directory notifications.
11.4. Delegation Recall
The server will recall the directory delegation by sending a callback
to the client. It will use the same callback procedure as used for
recalling file delegations. The server will recall the delegation
when the directory changes in a way that is not covered by the
notification. However the server will not recall the delegation if
attributes of an entry within the directory change. Also if the
server notices that handing out a delegation for a directory is
causing too many notifications to be sent out, it may decide not to
hand out a delegation for that directory. If another client tries to
remove the directory for which a delegation has been granted, the
server will recall the delegation.
The server will recall the delegation by sending a CB_RECALL callback
to the client. If the recall is done because of a directory changing
event, the request making that change will need to wait while the
client returns the delegation.
11.5. Directory Delegation Recovery
Crash recovery for state on regular files has two main goals,
avoiding the necessity of breaking application guarantees with
respect to locked files and delivery of updates cached at the client.
Neither of these applies to directories protected by read delegations
and notifications. Thus, the client is required to establish a new
delegation on a server or client reboot. [[Comment.10: we have
special reclaim types allow clients to recovery delegations through
client reboot. Do we really want EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION to
destroy directory delegation state?]]
12. Parallel NFS (pNFS)
12.1. Introduction
PNFS is a set of OPTIONAL features of NFSv4.1 which allow direct
client access to the storage devices containing the file data. When
file data for a single NFSv4 server is stored on multiple and/or
higher throughput storage devices (by comparison to the server's
throughput capability), the result can be significantly better file
access performance. The relationship among multiple clients, a
single server, and multiple storage devices for pNFS (server and
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clients have access to all storage devices) is shown in this diagram:
+-----------+
|+-----------+ +-----------+
||+-----------+ | |
||| | NFSv4 + pNFS | |
+|| Clients |<------------------------------>| Server |
+| | | |
+-----------+ | |
||| +-----------+
||| |
||| |
||| Storage +-----------+ |
||| Protocol |+-----------+ |
||+----------------||+-----------+ Control |
|+-----------------||| | Protocol|
+------------------+|| Storage |------------+
+| Devices |
+-----------+
Figure 64
In this structure, the responsibility for coordination of file access
by multiple clients is shared among the server, clients, and storage
devices. This is in contrast to NFSv4 without pNFS in which this is
primarily the server's responsibility, some of which can be delegated
to clients under strictly specified conditions.
PNFS takes the form of OPTIONAL operations that manage data location
information called a layout. The layout is managed in a similar
fashion as NFSv4 data delegations (e.g., they are recallable and
revocable). However, they are distinct abstractions and are
manipulated with new operations. When a client holds a layout, it
has rights to access the data directly using the location information
in the layout.
This document specifies the use of NFSv4.1 as a storage protocol.
PNFS allows other storage protocols, and these protocols are
deliberately not specified here. These might include:
o Block/volume protocols such as iSCSI ([35]), and FCP ([36]). The
block/volume protocol support can be independent of the addressing
structure of the block/volume protocol used, allowing more than
one protocol to access the same file data and enabling
extensibility to other block/volume protocols.
o Object protocols such as OSD over iSCSI or Fibre Channel [37].
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o Other storage protocols, including PVFS and other file systems
that are in use in HPC environments.
With some storage protocols, the storage devices cannot perform fine-
grained access checks to ensure that clients are only performing
accesses within the bounds permitted to them by the pNFS operations
with the server (e.g., the checks may only be possible at file system
granularity rather than file granularity). In situations where this
added responsibility placed on clients creates unacceptable security
risks, pNFS configurations in which storage devices cannot perform
fine-grained access checks SHOULD NOT be used. All pNFS server
implementations MUST support NFSv4.1 access to any file accessible
via pNFS in order to provide an interoperable means of file access in
such situations. See Section 12.9 on Security for further
discussion.
There are issues about how layouts interact with the existing NFSv4
abstractions of data delegations and record locking. Delegation
issues are discussed in Section 12.5.4. Byte range locking issues
are discussed in Section 12.2.10 and Section 12.5.1.
12.2. PNFS Definitions
PNFS partitions the NFSv4.1 file system protocol into two parts, the
metadata path and the data path. The metadata path is implemented by
a metadata server that supports pNFS and the operations described in
this document (Section 17). The data path is implemented by a
storage device that supports the storage protocol. A subset (defined
in Section 13.7) of NFSv4.1 is one such storage protocol. This leads
to new terms used to describe the protocol extension and some
clarifications of existing terms.
12.2.1. Metadata
This is information about a file, such as its name, owner, where it
stored, and so forth. Metadata also includes lower-level information
like block addresses and indirect block pointers.
12.2.2. Metadata Server
A pNFS metadata server is an NFSv4.1 server which supports pNFS
operations and features. When supporting pNFS the metadata server
might hold only the metadata associated with a file, while the data
can be stored on the storage devices. However, data may also be
written through the metadata server which in turn ensures data is
written to the storage devices.
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12.2.3. Client
A pNFS client is a NFSv4.1 client as defined by this document, which
supports pNFS operations and features, and supports least one storage
protocol for performing I/O directly to storage devices.
12.2.4. Storage Device
A storage device controls a regular file's data, but leaves other
metadata management up to the metadata server. A storage device
could be another NFSv4.1 server, an object storage device (OSD), a
block device accessed over a SAN (e.g., either FiberChannel or iSCSI
SAN), or some other entity.
12.2.5. Data Server
A data server is a storage device that is implemented by a server of
higher level storage access protocol, such as NFSv4.1.
12.2.6. Storage Protocol or Data Protocol
A storage protocol or data protocol is the used between the pNFS
client and the storage device to access the file data. Three layout
types have been described: file protocols (i.e., NFSv4.1), object
protocols (e.g., OSD), and block/volume protocols (e.g., based on
SCSI-block commands). These protocols are in turn realizable over a
variety of transport stacks.
Depending the storage protocol, block-level metadata may or may not
be managed by the metadata server, but is instead managed by object
storage devices or other servers acting as a storage device.
12.2.7. Control Protocol
The control protocol is used by the exported file system between the
metadata server and storage devices. Specification of such protocols
is outside the scope of this document. Such control protocols would
be used to control such activities as the allocation and deallocation
of storage and the management of state required by the data servers
to perform client access control.
While pNFS allows for any control protocol, in practice the control
protocol is closely related to the storage protocol. For example, if
the data servers are NFSv4.1 servers, then the protocol between the
metadata server and the data servers is likely to involve NFSv4.1
operations. Similarly, when object storage devices are used, the
pNFS metadata server will likely use iSCSI/OSD commands to manipulate
storage.
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Regardless, this document does not mandate any particular control
protocol. Instead, it just describes the requirements on the control
protocol for maintaining attributes like modify time, the change
attribute, and the end-of-file (EOF) position.
12.2.8. Layout
A layout defines how a file's data is organized on one or more
storage devices. There are many possible layout types. They vary in
the storage protocol used to access the data, and in the aggregation
scheme that lays out the file data on the underlying storage devices.
A layout is more precisely identified by the following tuple:
<Client, filehandle, layout type>; where filehandle refers to the
filehandle of the file on the metadata server. Layouts describe a
file, not an octet-range of a file; Section 12.2.11 describes layout
segments which do pertain to a range.
12.2.9. Layout Types
A layout describes the mapping of a file's data to the storage
devices that hold the data. A layout is said to belong to a specific
layout type (data type layouttype4, see Section 3.2.15). The layout
type allows for variants to handle different storage protocols, such
as block/volume [30], object [29], and file (Section 13) layout
types. A metadata server, along with its control protocol, MUST
support at least one layout type. A private sub-range of the layout
type name space is also defined. Values from the private layout type
range can be used for internal testing or experimentation.
As an example, a file layout type could be an array of tuples (e.g.,
deviceID, file_handle), along with a definition of how the data is
stored across the devices (e.g., striping). A block/volume layout
might be an array of tuples that store <deviceID, block_number, block
count> along with information about block size and the file offset of
the first block. An object layout might be an array of tuples
<deviceID, objectID> and an additional structure (i.e., the
aggregation map) that defines how the logical octet sequence of the
file data is serialized into the different objects. Note, the actual
layouts are more complex than these simple expository examples.
12.2.10. Layout Iomode
The layout iomode (data type layoutiomode4, see Section 3.2.23)
indicates to the metadata server the client's intent to perform
either just READ operations (Section 17.22) or a mixture of I/O
possibly containing WRITE (Section 17.32) and READ operations. For
certain layout types, it is useful for a client to specify this
intent at LAYOUTGET (Section 17.43) time. E.g., for block/volume
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based protocols, block allocation could occur when a READ/WRITE
iomode is specified. A special LAYOUTIOMODE4_ANY iomode is defined
and can only be used for LAYOUTRETURN and LAYOUTRECALL, not for
LAYOUTGET. It specifies that layouts pertaining to both READ and
READ/WRITE iomodes are being returned or recalled, respectively.
A storage device may validate I/O with regards to the iomode; this is
dependent upon storage device implementation and layout type. Thus,
if the client's layout iomode differs from the I/O being performed,
the storage device may reject the client's I/O with an error
indicating a new layout with the correct I/O mode should be fetched.
E.g., if a client gets a layout with a READ iomode and performs a
WRITE to a storage device, the storage device is allowed to reject
that WRITE.
The iomode does not conflict with OPEN share modes or lock requests;
open mode checks and lock enforcement are always enforced, and are
logically separate from the pNFS layout level. As well, open modes
and locks are the preferred method for restricting user access to
data files. E.g., an OPEN of read, deny-write does not conflict with
a LAYOUTGET containing an iomode of READ/WRITE performed by another
client. Applications that depend on writing into the same file
concurrently may use record locking to serialize their accesses.
12.2.11. Layout Segment
Since a layout that describes an entire file may be very large, there
is a desire to manage layouts in smaller chunks that correspond to
octet-ranges of the file. For example, the entire layout need not be
returned, recalled, or committed. These chunks are called layout
segments and are further identified by the octet-range and iomode
they represent, yielding a layout segment identifier consisting of
<client ID, filehandle, layout type, range, iomode>. The concepts of
a layout and its layout segments allow clients and metadata servers
to aggregate the results of layout operations into a singly
maintained layout.
It is important to define when layout segments overlap and/or
conflict with each other. For two layout segments with overlapping
octet ranges to actually overlap each other, both segments must be of
the same layout type, correspond to the same filehandle, and have the
same iomode. Layout segments conflict, when they overlap and differ
in the content of the layout (i.e., the storage device/file mapping
parameters differ). Note, differing iomodes do not lead to
conflicting layouts. It is permissible for layout segments with
different iomodes, pertaining to the same octet range, to be held by
the same client.
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12.2.12. Device IDs
The device ID (data type deviceid4, see Section 3.2.16) names a
storage device. In practice, a significant amount of information may
be required to fully address a storage device. Instead of embedding
all that information in a layout, layouts embed device IDs. The
NFSv4.1 operation GETDEVICEINFO (Section 17.40) is used to retrieve
the complete address information about the storage device according
to its layout type. For example, the address of an NFSv4.1 data
server or of an object storage device could be an IP address and
port. The address of a block storage device could be a volume label.
The device ID is qualified by the layout type and unique per file
system identifier (FSID, see Section 3.2.5). This allows different
layout drivers to generate device IDs without the need for co-
ordination.
Clients cannot expect the mapping between device ID and storage
device address to persist across metadata server restart. See
Section 12.7.4 for a description of how recovery works in that
situation.
12.3. PNFS Operations
NFSv4.1 has several operations that are needed for pNFS servers,
regardless of layout type or storage protocol. These operations are
all issued to a metadata server and summarized here.
GETDEVICEINFO. As noted previously (Section 12.2.12), GETDEVICEINFO
(Section 17.40) returns the mapping of device ID to storage device
address.
GETDEVICELIST (Section 17.41), allows clients to fetch the all the
device ID to storage device address mappings of particular file
system.
LAYOUTGET (Section 17.43) is used by a client to get a layout
segment for a file.
LAYOUTCOMMIT (Section 17.42) is used to inform the metadata server
that the client wants to commit data it wrote to the storage
device (which as indicated in the layout segment returned by
LAYOUTGET).
LAYOUTRETURN (Section 17.44) is used to return a layout segment or
all layouts belong to a file system to a metadata server.
The following pNFS-related operations are callback operations a
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metadata server might issue to a pNFS client.
CB_LAYOUTRECALL (Section 19.3) recalls a layout segment or all
layouts belonging to a file system, or all layouts belong to a
client ID.
CB_RECALL_ANY (Section 19.6), tells a client that it needs to return
some number of recallable objects, including layouts, to the
metadata server.
CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL (Section 19.7) tells a client that a
recallable object that it was denied (in case of pNFS, a layout,
denied by LAYOUTGET) due to resource exhaustion, is now available.
12.4. PNFS Attributes
A number of attributes specific to pNFS are listed and described in
Section 5.13
12.5. Layout Semantics
12.5.1. Guarantees Provided by Layouts
Layouts delegate to the client the ability to access data out of
band. The layout guarantees the holder that the layout will be
recalled when the state encapsulated by the layout becomes invalid
(e.g., through some operation that directly or indirectly modifies
the layout) or, possibly, when a conflicting layout is requested, as
determined by the layout's iomode. When a layout is recalled, and
then returned by the client, the client retains the ability to access
file data with normal NFSv4.1 I/O operations through the metadata
server. Only the right to do I/O out-of-band is affected.
Holding a layout does not guarantee that a user of the layout has the
rights to access the data represented by the layout. All user access
rights MUST be obtained through the appropriate open, lock, and
access operations (i.e., those that would be used in the absence of
pNFS). However, if a valid layout for a file is not held by the
client, the storage device should reject all I/Os to that file's
octet range that originate from that client. In summary, layouts and
ordinary file access controls are independent. The act of modifying
a file for which a layout is held, does not necessarily conflict with
the holding of the layout that describes the file being modified.
However, with certain layout types (e.g., block/volume layouts), the
layout's iomode must agree with the type of I/O being performed.
Depending upon the layout type and storage protocol in use, storage
device access permissions may be granted by LAYOUTGET and may be
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encoded within the type specific layout. If access permissions are
encoded within the layout, the metadata server must recall the layout
when those permissions become invalid for any reason; for example
when a file becomes unwritable or inaccessible to a client. Note,
clients are still required to perform the appropriate access
operations as described above (e.g., open and lock ops). The degree
to which it is possible for the client to circumvent these access
operations must be clearly addressed by the individual layout type
documents, as well as the consequences of doing so. In addition,
these documents must be clear about the requirements and non-
requirements for the checking performed by the server.
If the pNFS metadata server supports mandatory record locks then
record locks must behave as specified by the NFSv4.1 protocol, as
observed by users of files. If a storage device is unable to
restrict access by a pNFS client which does not hold a required
mandatory record lock then the metadata server must not grant layouts
to a client, for that storage device, that permits any access that
conflicts with a mandatory record lock held by another client. In
this scenario, it is also necessary for the metadata server to ensure
that record locks are not granted to a client if any other client
holds a conflicting layout (a layout that overlaps the range, and has
an iomode that conflicts with the lock type); in this case all
conflicting layouts must be recalled and returned before the lock
request can be granted. This requires the metadata server to
understand the capabilities of its storage devices.
12.5.2. Getting a Layout
A client obtains a layout through a new operation, LAYOUTGET. The
metadata server will give out layouts of a particular type (e.g.,
block/volume, object, or file) and aggregation as requested by the
client. The client selects an appropriate layout type which the
server supports and the client is prepared to use. The layout
returned to the client may not line up exactly with the requested
octet range. A field within the LAYOUTGET request, loga_minlength,
specifies the minimum overlap that MUST exist between the requested
layout and the layout returned by the metadata server. The
loga_minlength field should at least one. A metadata server may give
out multiple overlapping, non-conflicting layout segments to the same
client in response to a LAYOUTGET.
There is no implied ordering between getting a layout and performing
a file OPEN. For example, a layout may first be retrieved by placing
a LAYOUTGET operation in the same COMPOUND as the initial file OPEN.
Once the layout has been retrieved, it can be held across multiple
OPEN and CLOSE sequences.
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The storage protocol used by the client to access the data on the
storage device is determined by the layout's type. The client needs
to select a layout driver that understands how to interpret and use
that layout. The method for layout driver selection used by the
client is outside the scope of the pNFS extension.
Although the metadata server is in control of the layout for a file,
the pNFS client can provide hints to the server when a file is opened
or created about the preferred layout type and aggregation schemes.
PNFS introduces a layout_hint (Section 5.13.4) attribute that the
client can set at file creation time to provide a hint to the server
for new files. Setting this attribute separately, after the file has
been created could make it difficult, or impossible, for the server
implementation to comply. This in turn further complicates the
exclusive file creation via OPEN, which when done via the EXCLUSIVE4
createmode does not allow the setting of attributes at file creation
time. However as noted in Section 17.16.4, if the server supports a
persistent reply cache, the EXCLUSIVE4 createmode is not needed.
Therefore, a metadata server that supports the layout_hint attribute
MUST support a persistent session reply cache, and a pNFS client that
wants to set layout_hint at file creation (OPEN) time MUST NOT use
the EXCLUSIVE4 createmode, and instead MUST used GUARDED for an
exclusive regular file creation.
12.5.3. Committing a Layout
Due to the nature of the protocol, the file attributes, and data
location mapping (e.g., which offsets store data versus store holes,
see Section 13.5) information that exists on the metadata server may
become inconsistent in relation to the data stored on the storage
devices; e.g., when WRITEs occur before a layout has been committed
(e.g., between a LAYOUTGET and a LAYOUTCOMMIT). Thus, it is
necessary to occasionally re-synchronized this state and make it
visible to other clients through the metadata server.
The LAYOUTCOMMIT operation is responsible for committing a modified
layout segment to the metadata server. Note: the data should be
written and committed to the appropriate storage devices before the
LAYOUTCOMMIT occurs. Note, if the data is being written
asynchronously (i.e., if using NFSv4.1 as the storage protocol, the
field committed in WRITE4resok is UNSTABLE4) through the metadata
server, a COMMIT to the metadata server is required to synchronize
the data and make it visible on the storage devices (see
Section 12.5.5 for more details). The scope of this operation
depends on the storage protocol in use. For block/volume-based
layouts, it may require updating the block list that comprises the
file and committing this layout to stable storage. Whereas, for
file-layouts it requires some synchronization of attributes between
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the metadata and storage devices (i.e., mainly the size attribute:
EOF). It is important to note that the level of synchronization is
from the point of view of the client which issued the LAYOUTCOMMIT.
The updated state on the metadata server need only reflect the state
as of the client's last operation previous to the LAYOUTCOMMIT, it
need not reflect a globally synchronized state (e.g., other clients
may be performing, or may have performed I/O since the client's last
operation and the LAYOUTCOMMIT).
The control protocol is free to synchronize the attributes before it
receives a LAYOUTCOMMIT, however upon successful completion of a
LAYOUTCOMMIT, state that exists on the metadata server that describes
the file MUST be in sync with the state existing on the storage
devices that comprise that file as of the issuing client's last
operation. Thus, a client that queries the size of a file between a
WRITE to a storage device and the LAYOUTCOMMIT may observe a size
that does not reflects the actual data written.
12.5.3.1. LAYOUTCOMMIT and mtime/atime/change
The change attribute and the modify/access times may be updated, by
the server, at LAYOUTCOMMIT time; since for some layout types, the
change attribute and atime/mtime cannot be updated by the appropriate
I/O operation performed at a storage device. The arguments to
LAYOUTCOMMIT allow the client to provide suggested access and modify
time values to the server. Again, depending upon the layout type,
these client provided values may or may not be used. The server
should sanity check the client provided values before they are used.
For example, the server should ensure that time does not flow
backwards. According to the NFSv4 specification, The client always
has the option to set these attributes through an explicit SETATTR
operation.
As mentioned, for some layout protocols the change attribute and
mtime/atime may be updated at or after the time the I/O occurred
(e.g., if the storage device is able to communicate these attributes
to the metadata server). If, upon receiving a LAYOUTCOMMIT, the
server implementation is able to determine that the file did not
change since the last time the change attribute was updated (e.g., no
WRITEs or over-writes occurred), the implementation need not update
the change attribute; file-based protocols may have enough state to
make this determination or may update the change attribute upon each
file modification. This also applies for mtime and atime; if the
server implementation is able to determine that the file has not been
modified since the last mtime update, the server need not update
mtime at LAYOUTCOMMIT time. Once LAYOUTCOMMIT completes, the new
change attribute and mtime/atime should be visible if that file was
modified since the latest previous LAYOUTCOMMIT or LAYOUTGET.
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12.5.3.2. LAYOUTCOMMIT and size
The file's size may be updated at LAYOUTCOMMIT time as well. The
LAYOUTCOMMIT argument contains a field, loca_last_write_offset, that
indicates the highest octet offset written but not yet committed via
LAYOUTCOMMIT. Note: this argument is switched on a boolean value
(field no_newoffset) indicating whether or not a previous write
occurred. If no_newoffset is FALSE, no loca_last_write_offset is
given. A loca_last_write_offset specifying an offset of 0 means
octet 0 was the highest last octet written.
The metadata server may do one of the following:
1. It may update the file's size based on the last write offset.
However, to the extent possible, the metadata server should
sanity check any value to which the file's size is going to be
set. E.g., it must not truncate the file based on the client
presenting a smaller last write offset than the file's current
size.
2. If it has sufficient other knowledge of file size (e.g., by
querying the storage devices through the control protocol), it
may ignore the client provided argument and use the query-derived
value.
3. It may use the last write offset as a hint, subject to correction
when other information is available as above.
The method chosen to update the file's size will depend on the
storage device's and/or the control protocol's implementation. For
example, if the storage devices are block devices with no knowledge
of file size, the metadata server must rely on the client to set the
size appropriately. A new size flag and length are also returned in
the results of a LAYOUTCOMMIT. This union indicates whether a new
size was set, and to what length it was set. If a new size is set as
a result of LAYOUTCOMMIT, then the metadata server must reply with
the new size. As well, if the size is updated, the metadata server
in conjunction with the control protocol SHOULD ensure that the new
size is reflected by the storage devices immediately upon return of
the LAYOUTCOMMIT operation; e.g., a READ up to the new file size
should succeed on the storage devices (assuming no intervening
truncations). Again, if the client wants to explicitly zero-extend
or truncate a file, SETATTR must be used; it need not be used when
simply writing past EOF via WRITE.
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12.5.3.3. LAYOUTCOMMIT and layoutupdate
The LAYOUTCOMMIT argument contains a loca_layoutupdate field
(Section 17.42.2) of data type layoutupdate4 (Section 3.2.21). This
argument is a layout type-specific structure. The structure can be
used to pass arbitrary layout type-specific information from the
client to the metadata server at LAYOUTCOMMIT time. For example, if
using a block/volume layout, the client can indicate to the metadata
server which reserved or allocated blocks the client used and did not
use. The content of loca_layoutupdate (field lou_body) need not be
the same the layout type-specific content returned by LAYOUTGET
(Section 17.43.3) in the loc_body field of the lo_content field, of
the logr_layout field. The content of loca_layoutupdate is defined
by the layout type specification and is opaque to LAYOUTCOMMIT.
12.5.4. Recalling a Layout
Since a layout protects a client's access to a file via a direct
client-storage-device path, a layout need only be recalled when it is
semantically unable to serve this function. Typically, this occurs
when the layout no longer encapsulates the true location of the file
over the octet range it represents. Any operation or action (e.g.,
server driven restriping or load balancing) that changes the layout
will result in a recall of the layout. A layout is recalled by the
CB_LAYOUTRECALL callback operation (see Section 19.3). This callback
can either recall a layout segment identified by a octet range, all
the layouts associated with a file system (FSID), or all layouts.
Recalling all layouts or all the layouts associated with a file
system also invalidates the client's device cache for the affected
file systems. Multiple layout segments may be returned in a single
compound operation. Section 12.5.4.2 discusses sequencing issues
surrounding the getting, returning, and recalling of layouts.
The iomode is also specified when recalling a layout or layout
segment. Generally, the iomode in the recall request must match the
layout, or segment, being returned; e.g., a recall with an iomode of
LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW should cause the client to only return
LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW layout segments (not
LAYOUTIOMODE4_REALAYOUTIOMODE4_READ segments). However, a special
LAYOUTIOMODE4_ANY enumeration is defined to enable recalling a layout
of any type (i.e., the client must return both read-only and read/
write layouts).
A REMOVE operation may cause the metadata server to recall the layout
to prevent the client from accessing a non-existent file and to
reclaim state stored on the client. Since a REMOVE may be delayed
until the last close of the file has occurred, the recall may also be
delayed until this time. As well, once the file has been removed,
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after the last reference, the client SHOULD no longer be able to
perform I/O using the layout (e.g., with file-based layouts an error
such as ESTALE could be returned).
Although pNFS does not alter the caching capabilities of clients, or
their semantics, it recognizes that some clients may perform more
aggressive write-behind caching to optimize the benefits provided by
pNFS. However, write-behind caching may impact the latency in
returning a layout in response to a CB_LAYOUTRECALL; just as caching
impacts DELEGRETURN with regards to data delegations. Client
implementations should limit the amount of unwritten data they have
outstanding at any one time. Server implementations may fence
clients from performing direct I/O to the storage devices if they
perceive that the client is taking too long to return a layout once
recalled. A server may be able to monitor client progress by
watching client I/Os or by observing LAYOUTRETURNs of sub-portions of
the recalled layout. The server can also limit the amount of dirty
data to be flushed to storage devices by limiting the octet ranges
covered in the layouts it gives out.
Once a layout has been returned, the client MUST NOT issue I/Os to
the storage devices for the file, octet range, and iomode represented
by the returned layout. If a client does issue an I/O to a storage
device for which it does not hold a layout, the storage device SHOULD
reject the I/O.
12.5.4.1. Recall Callback Robustness
It has been assumed thus far that pNFS client state for a file
exactly matches the pNFS server state for that file and client
regarding layout ranges and permissions. This assumption leads to
the implication that any callback results in a LAYOUTRETURN or set of
LAYOUTRETURNs that exactly match the range in the callback, since
both client and server agree about the state being maintained.
However, it can be useful if this assumption does not always hold.
For example:
o It may be useful for clients to be able to discard layout
information without calling LAYOUTRETURN. If conflicts that
require callbacks are very rare, and a server can use a multi-file
callback to recover per-client resources (e.g., via a FSID recall,
or a multi-file recall within a single compound), the result may
be significantly less client-server pNFS traffic.
o It may be similarly useful for servers to maintain information
about what ranges are held by a client on a coarse-grained basis,
leading to the server's layout ranges being beyond those actually
held by the client. In the extreme, a server could manage
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conflicts on a per-file basis, only issuing whole-file callbacks
even though clients may request and be granted sub-file ranges.
o In order to avoid errors, it is vital that a client not assign
itself layout permissions beyond what the server has granted and
that the server not forget layout permissions that have been
granted. On the other hand, if a server believes that a client
holds a layout segment that the client does not know about, it's
useful for the client to cleanly indicate completion of the
requested recall either by issuing a LAYOUTRETURN for the entire
requested range or by returning an NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT error
to the layout recall callback.
Thus, in light of the above, it is useful for a server to be able to
issue callbacks for layout ranges it has not granted to a client, and
for a client to return ranges it does not hold. A pNFS client must
always return layout segments that comprise the full range specified
by the recall. Note, the full recalled layout range need not be
returned as part of a single operation, but may be returned in
segments. This allows the client to stage the flushing of dirty
data, layout commits, and returns. Also, it indicates to the
metadata server that the client is making progress.
It is possible that write requests may be presented to a storage
device no longer allowed to perform them. This behavior is limited
by requiring that a client MUST wait for completion of all writes
covered by a layout range before returning a layout that covers that
range. Since the server has no control as to when the client will
return the layout, the server may later decide to unilaterally revoke
the client's access provided by the layout in question. Upon doing
so the server must deal with the possibility of lingering writes,
outstanding writes still in flight to data servers identified by the
revoked layout. Each layout-specification MUST define whether
unilateral layout revocation by the metadata server is supported, and
if so, the specification must also outline how lingering writes are
to be dealt with; e.g., storage devices identified by the revoked
layout in question could be fenced off from the appropriate client.
If unilateral revocation is not supported, there MUST be no
possibility that the client has outstanding write requests when a
layout is returned.
In order to ensure client/server convergence on the layout state, the
final LAYOUTRETURN operation in a sequence of LAYOUTRETURN operations
for a particular recall, MUST specify the entire range being
recalled, echoing the recalled layout type, iomode, recall/return
type (FILE, FSID, or ALL), and octet range; even if layout segments
pertaining to partial ranges were previously returned. In addition,
if the client holds no layout segment that overlaps the range being
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recalled, the client should return the NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT
error code. This allows the server to update its view of the
client's layout state.
12.5.4.2. Serialization of Layout Operations
As with other stateful operations, pNFS requires the correct
sequencing of layout operations. PNFS uses the sessions feature of
NFSv4.1 to provide the correct sequencing between regular operations
and callbacks. It is the server's responsibility to avoid
inconsistencies regarding the layouts it hands out and the client's
responsibility to properly serialize its layout requests and layout
returns.
12.5.4.2.1. Get/Return Serialization
The protocol allows the client to send concurrent LAYOUTGET and
LAYOUTRETURN operations to the server. However, the protocol does
not provide any means for the server to process the requests in the
same order in which they were created, nor does it provide a way for
the client to determine the order in which parallel outstanding
operations were processed by the server. Thus, when a layout segment
retrieved by an outstanding LAYOUTGET operation intersects with a
layout segment returned by an outstanding LAYOUTRETURN the order in
which the two conflicting operations are processed determines the
final state of the overlapping segment. To disambiguate between the
two cases the client MUST serialize LAYOUTGET operations and
voluntary LAYOUTRETURN operations for the same file.
It is permissible for the client to send in parallel multiple
LAYOUTGET operations for the same file or multiple LAYOUTRETURN
operations for the same file; but never a mix of both. It is also
permissible for the client to combine LAYOUTRETURN and LAYOUTGET
operations for the same file in the same COMPOUND request as the
server MUST process these in order. If a client does issue such
requests, it MUST NOT have more than one outstanding for the same
file at the same time and MUST NOT have other LAYOUTGET or
LAYOUTRETURN operations outstanding at the same time for that same
file.
12.5.4.2.2. Recall/Return Sequencing
One critical issue with operation sequencing concerns callbacks. The
protocol must defend against races between the reply to a LAYOUTGET
operation and a subsequent CB_LAYOUTRECALL. A client MUST NOT
process a CB_LAYOUTRECALL that identifies an outstanding LAYOUTGET
operation to which the client has not yet received a reply.
Conflicting LAYOUTGET operations are identified in the CB_SEQUENCE
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preceding the CB_LAYOUTRECALL.
The callback races section (Section 2.10.5.3) describes the sessions
mechanism for allowing the client to detect such situations in order
to not process such a CB_LAYOUTRECALL. The server MUST reference all
conflicting LAYOUTGET operations in the CB_SEQUENCE that precedes the
CB_LAYOUTRECALL. A zero length array of referenced operations is
used by the server to tell the client that the server does not know
of any LAYOUTGET operations that conflict with the recall.
12.5.4.2.2.1. Client Side Considerations
Consider a pNFS client that has issued a LAYOUTGET and then receives
an overlapping recall callback for the same file. There are two
possibilities, which the client would be unable to distinguish
without additional information provided by the sessions
implementation.
1. The server processed the LAYOUTGET before issuing the recall, so
the LAYOUTGET response is in flight, and must be waited for
because it may be carrying layout info that will need to be
returned to deal with the recall callback.
2. The server issued the callback before receiving the LAYOUTGET.
The server will not respond to the LAYOUTGET until the recall
callback is processed.
These possibilities could cause deadlock, as the client must wait for
the LAYOUTGET response before processing the recall in the first
case, but that response will not arrive until after the recall is
processed in the second case. Via the CB_SEQUENCE operation, the
server provides the client with the { slotid , sequence id } of any
earlier LAYOUTGET operations which remain unconfirmed at the server
by the session slot usage rules. This allows the client to
disambiguate between the two cases, in case 1, the server will
provide the operation reference(s), whereas in case 2 it will not
(because there are no dependent client operations). Therefore, the
action at the client will only require waiting in the case that the
client has not yet seen the server's earlier responses to the
LAYOUTGET operation(s).
The following requirements apply to avoid this deadlock: by adhering
to the following requirements:
o A LAYOUTGET MUST be rejected with the error NFS4ERR_RECALLCONFLICT
if there's an overlapping outstanding recall callback to the same
client.
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o When processing a recall, the client MUST wait for a response to
all conflicting outstanding LAYOUTGETs that are referenced in the
CB_SEQUENCE for the recall before performing any RETURN that could
be affected by any such response.
o The client SHOULD wait for responses to all operations required to
complete a recall before sending any LAYOUTGETs that would
conflict with the recall because the server is likely to return
errors for them.
o Before sending a new LAYOUTGET for a range covered by a layout
recall, the client SHOULD wait for responses to any outstanding
LAYOUTGET that overlaps any portion of the new LAYOUTGET's range .
This is because it is possible (although unlikely) that the prior
operation may have arrived at the server after the recall
completed and hence will succeed.
o The recall process can be considered as done by the client when
the final LAYOUTRETURN operation for the recalled range is issued.
12.5.4.2.2.2. Server Side Considerations
Consider a related situation from the metadata server's point of
view. The metadata server has issued a recall layout callback and
receives an overlapping LAYOUTGET for the same file before the
LAYOUTRETURN(s) that respond to the recall callback. Again, there
are two cases:
1. The client issued the LAYOUTGET before processing the recall
callback.
2. The client issued the LAYOUTGET after processing the recall
callback, but it arrived before the LAYOUTRETURN that completed
that processing.
The metadata server MUST reject the overlapping LAYOUTGET. The
client has two ways to avoid this result - it can issue the LAYOUTGET
as a subsequent element of a COMPOUND containing the LAYOUTRETURN
that completes the recall callback, or it can wait for the response
to that LAYOUTRETURN.
There is little the session sequence logic can do to disambiguate
between these two cases, because both operations are independent of
one another. They are simply asynchronous events which crossed. The
situation can even occur if the session is configured to use a single
connection for both operations and callbacks.
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12.5.5. Metadata Server Write Propagation
Asynchronous writes written through the metadata server may be
propagated lazily to the storage devices. For data written
asynchronously through the metadata server, a client performing a
read at the appropriate storage device is not guaranteed to see the
newly written data until a COMMIT occurs at the metadata server.
While the write is pending, reads to the storage device can give out
either the old data, the new data, or a mixture thereof. After
either a synchronous write completes, or a COMMIT is received (for
asynchronously written data), the metadata server must ensure that
storage devices give out the new data and that the data has been
written to stable storage. If the server implements its storage in
any way such that it cannot obey these constraints, then it must
recall the layouts to prevent reads being done that cannot be handled
correctly.
12.6. PNFS Mechanics
This section describes the operations flow taken by a pNFS client to
a metadata server and storage device.
When a pNFS client encounters a new FSID, it issues a GETATTR to the
NFSv4.1 server for the fs_layout_type (Section 5.13.1) attribute. If
the attribute returns at least one layout type, and the layout
type(s) returned is(are) among the set supported by the client, the
client knows that pNFS is a possibility for the filesystem. If, from
the server that returned the new FSID, the client does not have a
client ID that came from an EXCHANGE_ID result that returned
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS, it must send an EXCHANGE_ID to the server
with the EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS bit set. If the server's
response does not have EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS, then contrary to
what the fs_layout_type attribute said, the server does not support
pNFS, and the client will not be able use pNFS to that server.
Once the client has a client ID that supports pNFS, it creates a
persistent session over the client ID, requesting persistent.
If the client wants to create a file on the file system identified by
the FSID that supports pNFS, it issues an OPEN with a create type of
GUARDED4 (if it wants an exclusive create), or UNCHECKED4 (if it does
not want an exclusive create). Among the various attributes it sets
in createattrs, it includes layout_hint and fills it with information
pertinent to the layout type it wants to use. The COMPOUND procedure
that the OPEN is sent with should include a GETATTR operation (on the
filehandle OPEN sets) that retrieves the layout_type attribute. This
is so the client can determine what layout type the server will in
fact support, and thus what storage protocol the client must use.
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If the client wants to open an existing file, then it also includes a
GETATTR to determine what layout type the file supports.
The GETATTR in either the file creation or plain file open case can
also include the layout_blksize and layout_alignment attributes so
that the client can determine optimal offsets and lengths for I/O on
the file.
Assuming the client supports the layout type returned by GETATTR, it
then issues LAYOUTGET using the filehandle returned by OPEN,
specifying the range it wants to do I/O on. The response is a layout
segment, which may be a subset of the range the client asked for. It
also includes device IDs and a description of how data is organized
(or in the case of writing, how data is to be organized) across the
devices. The device IDs and data description are encoded in a format
that is specific to the layout type, but the client is expected to
understand.
When the client wants to issue an I/O, it determines which device ID
it needs to send the I/O command to by examining the data description
in the layout. It then issues a GETDEVICEINFO to find the device
address of the device ID. The client then sends the I/O command to
device address, using the storage protocol defined for the layout
type.
If the I/O was an input request, then at some point the client may
want to commit the access time to the metadata server. It uses the
LAYOUTCOMMIT operation. If the I/O was an output request, then at
some point the client may want to commit the modification time and
the new size of the file if it believes it lengthed the file, to the
metadata server and the modified data to the filesystem. Again, it
uses LAYOUTCOMMIT.
12.7. Recovery
Recovery is complicated due to the distributed nature of the pNFS
protocol. In general, crash recovery for layouts is similar to crash
recovery for delegations in the base NFSv4 protocol. However, the
client's ability to perform I/O without contacting the metadata
server and the fact that unlike delegations, layouts are not bound to
stateids introduces subtleties that must be handled correctly if file
system corruption is to be avoided.
12.7.1. Client Recovery
Client recovery for layouts is similar to client recovery for other
lock/delegation state. When an pNFS client reboots, it will lose all
information about the layouts that it previously owned. There are
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two methods by which the server can reclaim these resources and allow
otherwise conflicting layouts to be provided to other clients.
The first is through the expiry of the client's lease. If the client
recovery time is longer than the lease period, the client's lease
will expire and the server will know that state may be released. For
layouts the server may release the state immediately upon lease
expiry or it may allow the layout to persist awaiting possible lease
revival, as long as there are no conflicting requests.
On the other hand, the client may restart in less time than it takes
for the lease period to expire. In such a case, the client will
contact the server through the standard EXCHANGE_ID protocol. The
server will find that the client's co_ownerid matches the co_ownerid
of the previous client invocation, but that the verifier is
different. The server uses this as a signal to release all layout
state associated with the client's previous invocation. It is
possible that all data written by the client to storage devices but
not completed via LAYOUTCOMMIT is lost.
12.7.2. Dealing with Lease Expiration on the Client
The mappings between device IDs and device addresses are what allow a
pNFS client to safely write data to and read data from a storage
device. These mappings are leased (just like with locking state)
from the metadata server, and as long as the lease is valid, the
client has a right to issue I/O to the storage devices. The lease on
device ID to device address mappings is renewed when the metadata
server receives a SEQUENCE operation from the pNFS client. The same
is not specified to be true for the data server receiving a SEQUENCE
operation, and the client MUST NOT assume that a SEQUENCE sent to a
data server will renew its lease.
The loss of the lease leads to the loss of the device ID to device
address mappings. If a mapping is used for I/O after lease
expiration, the consequences could be data corruption. To avoid
losing its lease, the client should start its lease timer based on
the time that it issued the operation to the metadata server rather
than based on the time the response was received. It is also
necessary to take propagation delay into account as described in
Section 8.12. Thus, the client must be aware of the one-way
propagation delay and should issue renewals well in advance of lease
expiration.
If a client believes its lease has expired, it MUST NOT issue I/O to
the storage device until it has validated its lease. The client can
issue a SEQUENCE operation to the metadata server. If the SEQUENCE
operation is successful, but sr_status_flag has
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SEQ4_STATUS_EXPIRED_ALL_STATE_REVOKED,
SEQ4_STATUS_EXPIRED_SOME_STATE_REVOKED, or
SEQ4_STATUS_ADMIN_STATE_REVOKED set, the client must recover by
deleting all its records of layouts and device ID to device address
mappings, then writing any modified but uncommitted data in its
memory directly to the metadata server with the stable argument to
WRITE set to FILE_SYNC4, and finally reacquiring any layouts it needs
via LAYOUTGET.
If sr_status_flags from the metadata server has
SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED set (or SEQUENCE returns
NFS4ERR_STATE_CLIENTID, or SEQUENCE returns NFS4ERR_BAD_SESSION and
CREATE_SESSION returns NFS4ERR_STATE_CLIENTID) then the metadata
server has restarted, and the client must recovery using the methods
described in Section 12.7.4.
If sr_status_flags from the metadata server has
SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED set, then the client recovers by following
the procedure described in Section 10.6.7.1. After that, the client
may get an indication that the layout state was not moved with the
filesystem. The client is then required the client to recover per
other applicable situations discussed in Paragraph 3 or Paragraph 4
of this section.
If sr_status_flags reports no loss of state, then the lease the
client has with the metadata server is valid and renewed, and the
client can re-commence I/O to the storage devices.
While clients should not issue I/Os to storage devices that may
extend past the lease expiration time period, this is not always
possible (e.g. an extended network partition that starts after the
I/O is send and does nor heal till the I/O request is received by the
data server). Thus the metadata server and/or storage device are
responsible for protecting the pNFS server from I/Os that are sent
before the lease expires, but arrive after the lease expires. See
Section 12.7.3.
12.7.3. Dealing with Loss of Layout State on the Metadata Server
This section describes recovery from the situation where all of the
following are true: the metadata server has not restarted; a pNFS
client's device ID to device address mappings and/or layouts have
been discarded (usually because the client's lease expired) and are
invalid; and an I/O from the pNFS client arrives at the storage
device. The metadata server and its storage devices may solve this
by fencing the client (i.e. prevent the execution of I/O operations
from the client to the storage devices after layout state loss). The
details of how fencing is done are specific to the layout type. The
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solution for NFSv4.1 file-based layouts is described in this document
(Section 13.13), and for other layout types in their respective
external specification documents.
12.7.4. Recovery from Metadata Server Restart
The pNFS client will discover that the metadata server has restarted
(e.g. rebooted) via the methods described in Section 8.6.2 and
discussed in a pNFS-specific context in Paragraph 4, of
Section 12.7.2. The client MUST stop using and delete device ID to
device address mappings it previously received from the metadata
server. Having done that, if the client wrote data to the storage
device without committing the layout segment(s) via LAYOUTCOMMIT,
then client has additional work to do in order to get the client,
metadata server and storage device(s) all synchronized on the state
of the data.
o If the client has data still modified and unwritten in the
client's memory, the client has only two choices.
1. The client can obtain a layout segment via LAYOUTGET after the
server's grace period and write the data to the storage
devices.
2. The client can write that data through the metadata server
using the WRITE (Section 17.32) operation, and then obtain
layout segments as needed.
As noted in Paragraph 3 of Section 8.6.2.1, and in
Section 17.43.4, LAYOUTGET and WRITE may not be allowed until the
grace period expires. Under some conditions, as described in
Section 12.7.5, LAYOUTGET and/or WRITE maybe permitted during the
metadata server's grace period.
o If the client synchronously wrote data to the storage device, but
still a copy of that data in its memory, then it has available to
it the recovery options listed above in the previous bullet point.
If the metadata server is also in its grace period, the client has
available to it the options below in the next bullet item.
o The client does not have a copy of the data in its memory and the
metadata server is still in its grace period. The client cannot
use LAYOUTGET (within or outside the grace period) to reclaim a
layout segment because the contents of the response from LAYOUTGET
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may not match what it had previously. The range might be
different or it might get the same range but the content of the
layout might be different. Even if the content of the layout
appears to be the same, the device IDs may map to difference
device addresses, and even if the device addresses are the same,
the device addresses could have been assigned to a different
storage device. The option of retrieving the data from the
storage device and writing it to the metadata server per the
recovery scenario described above in the previous two bullets is
not available because, again, the mappings of range to device ID,
device ID to device address, device address to physical device are
stale and new mappings via new LAYOUTGET do not solve the problem.
The only recovery option for this scenario is to issue a
LAYOUTCOMMIT in reclaim mode, which the metadata server will
accept as long as it is in its grace period. The use of
LAYOUTCOMMIT in reclaim mode informs the metadata server that the
layout segment has changed. It is critical the metadata server
receive this information before its grace period ends, and thus
before it starts allowing updates to the filesystem.
To issue LAYOUTCOMMIT in reclaim mode, the client sets the
loca_reclaim field of the operation's arguments (Section 17.42.2)
to TRUE. During the metadata server's recovery grace period (and
only during the recovery grace period) the metadata server is
prepared to accept LAYOUTCOMMIT requests with the loca_reclaim
field set to TRUE.
When loca_reclaim is TRUE, the client is attempting to commit
changes to the layout segment that occurred prior to the restart
of the metadata server. The metadata server applies some
consistency checks on the loca_layoutupdate field of the arguments
to determine whether the client can commit the data written to the
data server to the filesystem. The loca_layoutupdate field is of
data type layoutupdate4, and contains layout type-specific content
(in the lou_body field of loca_layoutupdate). The layout type-
specific information that loca_layoutupdate might have is
discussed in Section 12.5.3.3. If the metadata server's
consistency checks on loca_layoutupdate succeed, then the metadata
server MUST commit the data (as described by the loca_offset,
loca_length, and loca_layoutupdate fields of the arguments) that
was written to storage device. If the metadata server's
consistency checks on loca_layoutupdate fail, the metadata server
rejects the LAYOUTCOMMIT operation, and makes no changes to the
file system. However, any time LAYOUTCOMMIT with loca_reclaim
TRUE fails, the pNFS client has lost all the data in the range
defined by <loca_offset, loca_length>. A client can defend
against this risk by caching all data, whether written
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synchronously or asynchronously in its memory and not release the
cached data until a successful LAYOUTCOMMIT.
o The client does not have a copy of the data in its memory and the
metadata server is no longer in its grace period; i.e. the
metadata server returns NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE. As with the scenario in
the above bullet item, the failure of LAYOUTCOMMIT means the data
in the range <loca_offset, loca_length> lost. The defense against
the risk is the same; cache all written data on the client until a
successful LAYOUTCOMMIT.
12.7.5. Operations During Metadata Server Grace Period
Some of the recovery scenarios thus far noted that some operations,
namely WRITE and LAYOUTGET might be permitted during the metadata
server's grace period. The metadata server may allow these
operations during its grace period, if it can reliably determine that
servicing such a request will not conflict with an impending
LAYOUTCOMMIT (or, in the case of WRITE, conflicting with an impending
OPEN, or a LOCK on a file with mandatory record locking enabled)
reclaim request. As mentioned previously, some operations, namely
WRITE and LAYOUTGET are likely to be rejected during the metadata
server's grace period, because to provide simple, valid handling
during the grace period, the easiest method is to simply reject all
non-reclaim pNFS requests and WRITE operations by returning the
NFS4ERR_GRACE error. However, depending on the storage protocol
(which is specific to the layout type) and metadata server
implementation, the metadata server may be able to determine that a
particular request is safe. For example, a metadata server may save
provisional allocation mappings for each file to stable storage, as
well as information about potentially conflicting OPEN share modes
and mandatory record locks that might have been in effect at the time
of restart, and use this information during the recovery grace period
to determine that a WRITE request is safe.
12.7.6. Storage Device Recovery
Recovery from storage device restart is mostly dependent upon the
layout type in use. However, there are a few general techniques a
client can use if it discovers a storage device has crashed while
holding modified, uncommitted data that was asynchronously written.
First and foremost, it is important to realize that the client is the
only one who has the information necessary to recover non-committed
data; since, it holds the modified data and most probably nobody else
does. Second, the best solution is for the client to err on the side
of caution and attempt to re-write the modified data through another
path.
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The client should immediately write the data to the metadata server,
with the stable field in the WRITE4args set to FILE_SYNC4. Once it
does this, there is no need to wait for the original storage device.
12.8. Metadata and Storage Device Roles
If the same physical hardware is used to implement both a metadata
server and storage device, then the same hardware entity is to be
understood to be implementing two distinct roles and it is important
that it be clearly understood on behalf of which role the hardware is
executing at any given time.
Various sub-cases can be distinguished.
1. The storage device uses NFSv4.1 as the storage protocol. The
same physical hardware is used to implement both a metadata and
data server. If an EXCHANGE_ID operation issued to the metadata
server has EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS set and not
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS not set, the role of all sessions
derived from the client ID is metadata server-only. If an
EXCHANGE_ID operation issued to the data server has
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS set and EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS not
set, the role of all sessions derived from the client ID is data
server only. These assertions are true regardless whether the
network addresses of the metadata server and data server are the
same or not.
The client will use the same client owner for both the metadata
server EXCHANGE_ID and the data server EXCHANGE_ID. Since the
client issues one with EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS set, and the
other with EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS set, the server will need to
return unique client IDs, as well as server_owners, which will
eliminate ambiguity about dual roles the same physical entity
serves.
2. The metadata and data server each return EXCHANGE_ID results with
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS and EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS both
set, the server_owner and server_scope results are the same, and
the client IDs are the same, and if RPCSEC_GSS is used, the
server principals are the same. As noted in Section 2.10.4 the
two servers are the same, whether they have the same network
address or not. If the pNFS server is ambiguous in its
EXCHANGE_ID results as to what role a client ID may be used for,
yet still requires the NFSv4.1 request be directed in a manner
specific to a role (e.g. a READ request for a particular offset
directed to the metadata server role might use a different offset
if the READ was intended for the data server role, if the file is
using STRIPE4_DENSE packing, see Section 13.5), the pNFS server
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may mark the the metadata filehandle differently from the data
filehandle so that operations addressed to the metadata server
can be distinguished from those directed to the data servers.
Marking the metadata and data server filehandles differently (and
this is RECOMMENDED) is possible because the former are derived
from OPEN operations, and the latter are derived from LAYOUTGET
operations.
Note, that it may be the case that while the metadata server and
the storage device are distinct from one client's point of view,
the roles may be reversed according to another client's point of
view. For example, in the cluster file system model a metadata
server to one client, may be a data server to another client. If
NFSv4.1 is being used as the storage protocol, then pNFS servers
need to mark filehandles according to their specific roles.
If a current filehandle is set that is inconsistent with the role
to which it is directed, then the error NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE should
result. For example, if a request is directed at the data
server, because the first current handle is from a layout, any
attempt to set the current filehandle to be a value not from a
layout should be rejected. Similarly, if the first current file
handle was for a value not from a layout, a subsequent attempt to
set the current filehandle to a value obtained from a layout
should be rejected.
3. The storage device does not use NFSv4.1 as the storage protocol,
and the same physical hardware is used to implement both a
metadata and storage device. Whether distinct network addresses
are used to access metadata server and storage device is
immaterial, because, it is always clear to the pNFS client and
server, from upper layer protocol being used (NFSv4.1 or non-
NFSv4.1) what role the request to the common server network
address is directed to.
12.9. Security Considerations
PNFS has a metadata path and a data path (i.e., storage protocol).
The metadata path includes the pNFS-specific operations (listed in
Section 12.3); all existing NFSv4.1 conventional (non-pNFS) security
mechanisms and features apply to the metadata path. The combination
of components in a pNFS system (see Figure 64) is required to
preserve the security properties of NFSv4.1 with respect to an entity
accessing storage device from a client, including security
countermeasures to defend against threats that NFSv4.1 provides
defenses for in environments where these threats are considered
significant.
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In some cases, the security countermeasures for connections to
storage devices may take the form of physical isolation or a
recommendation not to use pNFS in an environment. For example, it
may be impractical to provide confidentiality protection for some
storage protocols to protect against eavesdropping; in environments
where eavesdropping on such protocols is of sufficient concern to
require countermeasures, physical isolation of the communication
channel (e.g., via direct connection from client(s) to storage
device(s)) and/or a decision to forego use of pNFS (e.g., and fall
back to conventional NFSv4.1) may be appropriate courses of action.
Where communication with storage devices is subject to the same
threats as client to metadata server communication, the protocols
used for that communication need to provide security mechanisms
comparable to those available via RPSEC_GSS for NFSv4.1. Many
situations in which pNFS is likely to be used will not be subject to
the overall threat profile for which NFSv4.1 is required to provide
countermeasures.
PNFS implementations MUST NOT remove NFSv4's access controls. The
combination of clients, storage devices, and the metadata server are
responsible for ensuring that all client to storage device file data
access respects NFSv4.1's ACLs and file open modes. This entails
performing both of these checks on every access in the client, the
storage device, or both (as applicable; when the storage device is an
NFSv4.1 server, the storage device is ultimately responsible for
controlling access). If a pNFS configuration performs these checks
only in the client, the risk of a misbehaving client obtaining
unauthorized access is an important consideration in determining when
it is appropriate to use such a pNFS configuration. Such
configurations SHOULD NOT be used when client-only access checks do
not provide sufficient assurance that NFSv4.1 access control is being
applied correctly.
13. PNFS: NFSv4.1 File Layout Type
This section describes the semantics and format of NFSv4.1 file-based
layouts for pNFS. NFSv4.1 file-based layouts uses the
LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES layout type. The LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES type
defines striping data across multiple NFSv4.1 data servers.
13.1. Session Considerations
Sessions are a mandatory feature of NFSv4.1, and this extends to both
the metadata server and file-based (NFSv4.1-based) data servers. If
data is served by both the metadata server and an NFSv4.1-based data
server, the metadata and data server MUST have separate client IDs
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(unless the EXCHANGE_ID results indicate the server will allow the
client ID to support both metadata and data pNFS operations).
When a creating a client ID to access a pNFS metadata server, the
pNFS metadata client sends an EXCHANGE_ID operation that has
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS set (EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS and
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS MAY be set as well). If the server's
EXCHANGE_ID results have EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS set, then the
client may use the client ID to create sessions that will exchange
pNFS metadata operations.
If pNFS metadata client gets a layout that refers it to an NFSv4.1
data server, it needs a client ID on that data server. If it does
not yet have a client ID from the server that had the
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS flag set in the EXCHANGE_ID results, then
the client must send an EXCHANGE_ID to the data server, using the
same co_ownerid as it sent to the metadata server, with the
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS flag set in arguments. If the server's
EXCHANGE_ID results have EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS set, then the
client may use the client ID to create sessions that will exchange
pNFS data operations.
The client ID returned by a metadata server has no required
association to the client ID returned by a data server that the
metadata server's layouts referred the client to, although a server
implementation is free construct such an association (e.g. via a
private data server/metadata server protocol and client ID table).
Similarly the EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION sequence id state used by
the pNFS metadata client and server has no association with the
EXCHANGE_ID/CREATE_SESSION sequence id state used by the data client/
server (and the pNFS server and the pNFS client MUST NOT make this
association). By decoupling the client IDs of metadata and data
servers from each other, implementation of the session on pNFS
servers is potentially simpler.
In a non-pNFS server or in a metadata server, the sessionid in the
SEQUENCE operation implies the client ID, which in turn might be used
by the server to map the stateid to the right client/server pair.
However, when a data server is presented with a READ or WRITE
operation with a stateid, because the stateid is associated with
client ID on a metadata server, and because the sessionid in the
preceding SEQUENCE operation is tied to the potentially unrelated
data server client ID, the data server has no obvious way to
determine the metadata server from the COMPOUND procedure, and thus
has no way to validate the stateid. One recommended approach is for
pNFS servers to encode metadata server routing and/or identity
information in the data server filehandles as returned in the layout.
If the metadata server identity or location changes, requiring the
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data server filehandles to become invalid (stale), the metadata
server must first recall the layouts.
Invalidating data server filehandles does not render the pNFS data
cache invalid. If the metadata server file handle of a file is
persistent, the client can map the metadata server filehandle to
cached data, and when granted data server filehandles, map the data
server filehandles to their metadata server filehandle.
13.2. File Layout Definitions
The following definitions apply to the LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES layout
type, and may be applicable to other layout types.
Unit. A unit is a set of data written to a data server.
Pattern. A pattern is a method of distributing fix sized units
across a set of data servers. A pattern is iterated one or more
times. A pattern has one or more units. Each unit in each
iteration of a pattern MUST be the same size.
Stripe. An stripe is a set of data distributed across a set of data
servers in a pattern before that pattern repeats.
Stripe Width. A stripe width is the size of stripe in octets.
Hereafter, this document will refer to a unit that is a written in a
pattern as a "stripe unit".
A pattern may have more stripe units than data servers. If so, some
data servers will have more than one stripe unit per stripe. A data
server that has multiple stripe units per stripe MAY store each unit
in a different data file.
13.3. File Layout Data Types
The high level NFSv4.1 layout types are nfsv4_1_file_layout_ds_addr4,
nfsv4_1_file_layouthint4, and nfsv4_1_file_layout4.
When LAYOUTGET returns a LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES layout (indicated in
the loc_type field of the lo_content field), the loc_body field of
the lo_content field contains a value of data type
nfsv4_1_file_layout4. Among other content, nfsv4_1_file_layout4 has
storage device IDs (within the nfl_ds_fh_list array) of data type
deviceid4.
The GETDEVICEINFO operation maps a device ID to a storage device
address (type device_addr4). When GETDEVICEINFO returns a device
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address with a layout type of LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES (the
da_layout_type field), the da_addr_body field contains a value of
data type nfsv4_1_file_layout_ds_addr4.
The SETATTR operation supports a layout hint attribute
(Section 5.13.4). When the client sets a layout hint (data type
layouthint4) with a layout type of LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES (the
loh_type field), the loh_body field contains a value of data type
nfsv4_1_file_layouthint4.
The top level and lower level NFSv4.1 layout data types have the
following XDR descriptions.
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enum file_layout_ds_type4 {
FILEDS4_SIMPLE = 1,
FILEDS4_COMPLEX = 2
};
%/* Encoded in the da_addr_body field of type device_addr4: */
union nfsv4_1_file_layout_ds_addr4
switch (file_layout_ds_type4 nflda_type) {
case FILEDS4_SIMPLE:
netaddr4 nflda_simp_ds_list<>;
case FILEDS4_COMPLEX:
deviceid4 nflda_comp_ds_list<>;
default:
void;
};
enum stripetype4 {
STRIPE4_SPARSE = 1,
STRIPE4_DENSE = 2
};
%/* Encoded in the loh_body field of type layouthint4: */
struct nfsv4_1_file_layouthint4 {
stripetype4 nflh_stripe_type;
length4 nflh_stripe_unit_size;
uint32_t nflh_stripe_width;
};
struct nfsv4_1_file_layout_ds_fh4 {
deviceid4 nfldf_ds_id;
uint32_t nfldf_ds_index;
nfs_fh4 nfldf_fh;
};
%/* Encoded in the loc_body field of type layout_content4: */
struct nfsv4_1_file_layout4 {
stripetype4 nfl_stripe_type;
bool nfl_commit_through_mds;
length4 nfl_stripe_unit_size;
length4 nfl_file_size;
uint32_t nfl_stripe_indices<>;
nfsv4_1_file_layout_ds_fh4 nfl_ds_fh_list<>;
};
%/*
% * Encoded in the lou_body field of type layoutupdate4:
% * Nothing. lou_body is a zero length array of octets.
% */
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The nfsv4_1_file_layout_ds_addr4 data server address is composed of a
FILEDS4_SIMPLE or a FILEDS4_COMPLEX data server address. A
FILEDS4_SIMPLE data server address is composed of an array of network
addresses (data type netaddr4). All data servers in a FILEDS4_SIMPLE
list (field nflda_simp_ds_list) must be equivalent and are used for
data server multipathing; see Section 13.6 for more details on
equivalent data servers. FILEDS4_SIMPLE data servers always refer to
actual data servers. On the other hand, a FILEDS4_COMPLEX data
server address is constructed of list of device IDs (field
nflda_comp_ds_list). Each device ID in nflda_comp_ds_list
corresponds to the device ID of a data server address of type
FILEDS4_SIMPLE. A FILEDS4_COMPLEX data server list MUST NOT contain
device IDs of other FILEDS4_COMPLEX data servers; only device IDs of
FILEDS4_SIMPLE data servers are to be referenced. This enables
multiple equivalent data servers to be identified through a single
device ID and provides a space efficient mechanism by which to
identify multiple data servers within a layout. FILEDS4_COMPLEX and
FILEDS4_SIMPLE data servers share the same device ID space and should
be cached similarly by the client.
The nfsv4_1_file_layout4 data type specifies an ordered array of
<device ID, filehandle> tuples, as well as the stripe unit size, type
of stripe layout (discussed later in this section and in
Section 13.4), and the file's current size as of LAYOUTGET
(Section 17.43) time.
The nfl_ds_fh_list array within the nfsv4_1_file_layout4 data type
contains a list of nfsv4_1_file_layout_devfh4 structures. Each of
these structures describes one or more FILEDS4_SIMPLE or
FILEDS4_COMPLEX data servers that contribute to a stripe of the file.
The nfl_stripe_indices array contains a list of indices into the
nfl_ds_fh_list array; an index of zero specifies the first entry in
nfl_ds_fh_list. Each successive index selects a nfl_ds_fh_list entry
which are to be used next in sequence for that stripe. This allows
an arbitrary sequencing through the possible data servers to be
encoded compactly. The value of every element in nfl_stripe_indices
must be less than the number of elements in the nfl_ds_fh_list array.
When the nfl_stripe_indices array is of zero length, the elements of
the nfl_ds_fh_list array are simply used in order, so that the
portion of the stripe held by the corresponding entry is determined
by its position within the data server list.
If the nfl_stripe_indices array is of non-zero length, there is no
requirement that the nfl_stripe_indices and nfl_ds_fh_list arrays
have the same number of entries. If the nfl_stripe_indices array has
fewer entries than the nfl_ds_fh_list array, this simply means not
all entries of nfl_ds_fh_list are in the striping pattern.
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Even if nfl_stripe_indices has the same number of entries as the
nfl_ds_fh_list array, this does not necessarily mean all entries of
nfl_ds_fh_list are used, because nothing prevents an index value from
appearing in multiple entries of nfl_stripe_indices.
If the nfl_stripe_indices array has more entries than the
nfl_ds_fh_list array, then this simply means index values in
nfl_stripe_indices are appearing more than once.
Each nfl_ds_fh_list entry contains a device ID, data server index,
and a filehandle. The device ID (field nfldf_ds_id), identifies the
data server. The GETDEVICEINFO operation is used to map nfldf_ds_id
to a data server address, which will be either a FILEDS4_COMPLEX or
FILEDS4_SIMPLE data server address. When the device ID maps to a
FILEDS4_COMPLEX data server address server, the data server index
(field nfldf_ds_index) indicates the starting element of the to use
from the list of device IDs (nflda_comp_ds_list) of the
FILEDS4_COMPLEX address. (As discussed in Section 13.4 the
nfldf_ds_index field plays a critical role in the flattening of a
FILEDS4_COMPLEX device.) If the nfldf_ds_id field maps to a
FILEDS4_SIMPLE device, the nfldf_ds_index field has no meaning and
should be zero. The filehandle, nfldf_fh, identifies the file on the
data server identified by the device ID.
The generic layout hint structure is described in Section 3.2.22.
The client uses the layout hint in the layout_hint (Section 5.13.4)
attribute to specify the type of layout to be used for a newly
created file. The LAYOUT4_NFSV4_1_FILES layout type-specific content
for the layout hint is composed of the preferred stripe packing type
(field nflh_stripe_type, discussed in Section 13.5), the size of the
stripe unit (field nflh_stripe_unit_size), and the width of the
stripe (field nflh_stripe_width).
13.4. Interpreting the File Layout
The client is expected to construct a flat list of <data server, file
handle> pairs over which the file is striped. A flat data server
list contains no FILEDS4_COMPLEX data servers, and is constructed by
concatenating each data server encountered while traversing
nfl_stripe_indices (or nfl_ds_fh_list in the case of a zero sized
nfl_stripe_indices array), while expanding each FILEDS4_COMPLEX data
server address. The client must expand the FILEDS4_COMPLEX data
server address's device ID list by starting at the device ID entry of
the nflda_comp_ds_list array indexed by nfldf_ds_index, ending with
the device ID prior to nfldf_ds_index (or ending with the last entry
the of the nflda_comp_ds_list array if nfldf_ds_index is zero. All
devices IDs in the nflda_comp_ds_list must be consumed; this may
require wrapping around the end of the array if nfldf_ds_index is
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non-zero. The stripe width is determined by the stripe unit size
multiplied by the number of data server entries within the flattened
stripe.
Consider the following example:
Given a set of data servers with the following device IDs:
1->{simple}; 2->{complex, ds_list=<3, 4>}; 3->{simple};
4->{simple}; 5->{simple}; 6->{complex, ds_list=<1, 5>};
Device IDs 1, 3, 4 and 5 identify FILEDS4_SIMPLE data servers.
Device ID 2 is a FILEDS4_COMPLEX data server constructed of
FILEDS4_SIMPLE data servers 3 and 4. Device ID 6 is a
FILEDS4_COMPLEX data server constructed of FILEDS4_SIMPLE data
servers 4, 1, and 5.
Within an instance of nfsv4_1_file_layout4, imagine a nfl_ds_fh_list
constructed of <device ID, device index, FH> tuples:
ds_fh_list = [<6, 1, 0x17>, <1, 0, 0x12>, <5, 0, 0x22>,
<2, 0, 0x13>, <3, 0, 0x14>, <4, 0, 0x15>]
And a nfl_stripe_indices array containing the following indices:
nfl_stripe_indices = [5, 2, 4, 0, 1, 3]
Using nfl_stripe_indices as indices into the nfl_ds_fh_list, we get
the following re-ordered list of nfsv4_1_file_layout_devfh4 values:
[<4, 0, 0x15>, <5, 0, 0x22>, <2, 0, 0x13>,
<6, 3, 0x17>, <1, 0, 0x12>, <5, 0, 0x22>]
Converting the FILEDS4_COMPLEX devices to FILEDS4_SIMPLE devices
gives us the following list of 9 FILEDS4_SIMPLE <device ID, FH>
tuples.
[<4, 0x15>, <5, 0x22>, <3, 0x13>, <4, 0x13>,
<1, 0x17>, <5, 0x17>, <4, 0x14>, <1, 0x12>,
<5, 0x22>]
The above list of tuples fully describes the striping pattern. We
observe several things. First, the tuples are not 3-tuples; they do
not have an index value because FILEDS4_SIMPLE devices do not use the
index. Second, each tuple in the sequence represents a destination
for each stripe unit in the pattern. Third, device 2 is a
FILEDS4_COMPLEX device that gets replaced with devices 3 and 4.
Fourth, device 6 is a FILEDS4_COMPLEX device that gets replaced with
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devices 1, 5, 4 (and not in the order 4, 1, 5, because the
nfl_ds_fh_list entry for device 6 has a non-zero index value 1, so we
start with second simple device that device 6 maps to and wrap around
to the first simple device after processing the third simple device
that device 6 maps to). Fifth, when converting from FILEDS4_COMPLEX
to FILEDS4_SIMPLE, the filehandle in the FILEDS4_SIMPLE entries that
replace a FILEDS4_COMPLEX entry is from the replaced FILEDS4_COMPLEX
entry. As a result the striping pattern can have the same device ID
appear multiple times, and with different filehandles.
The flattened data server list specifies the pattern over which the
devices must be striped and over which data is written (in increments
of the stripe unit size). It also specifies the filehandle to be
used for each stripe unit of the pattern. A data server that has
more than one stripe unit of a pattern to store each unit may store
those stripes in different files, but to do so, will need unique
filehandles in the data server list, as the previous example showed.
While data servers may be repeated multiple times within the
flattened data server list, if a STRIPE4_DENSE stripe type is used
(see Section 13.5), the same filehandle MUST NOT be used on the same
data server for different stripe units of the same file.
A data file stored on a data server MUST map to a single file as
defined by the metadata server; i.e., data from two files as viewed
by the metadata server MUST NOT be stored within the same data file
on any data server.
13.5. Sparse and Dense Stripe Unit Packing
The nfl_stripe_type field specifies how the data is packed within the
data file on a data server. It allows for two different data
packings: STRIPE4_SPARSE and STRIPE4_DENSE. The stripe type
determines the calculation that must be made to map the client
visible file offset to the offset within the data file located on the
data server.
STRIPE4_SPARSE merely means that the logical offsets of the file as
viewed by a client issuing READs and WRITEs directly to the metadata
server are the same offsets each data server uses when storing a
stripe unit. The effect then, for striping patterns consisting of at
least two stripe units, is for each data server file to be sparse or
holey. So for example, suppose a pattern with 3 stripe units, the
stripe unit size is a block of 4 kilobytes, there are 3 data servers
in the pattern, then the file in data server 1 will have blocks 0, 3,
6, 9, ... filled, data server 2's file will have blocks 1, 4, 7, 10,
... filled, and data server 3's file will have blocks 2, 5, 8, 11,
... filled. The unfilled blocks of each file will be holes, hence
the files in each data server are sparse. Logical blocks 0, 3, 6,
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... of the file would exist as physical blocks 0, 3, 6 on data server
1, logical blocks 1, 4, 7, ... would exists as physical blocks 1, 4,
7 on data server 2, and logical blocks 2, 5, 8, ... would exist as
physical blocks 2, 5, 8 on data server 3.
The STRIPE4_SPARSE stripe type has holes for the octet ranges not
exported by that data server, thereby allowing pNFS clients to use
the real offset into the data server's file, regardless of the data
server's position within the pattern. However, if a client attempts
I/O to one of the holes, then an error MUST be returned by the data
server. Using the above example, if data server 2 received a READ or
WRITE request for block 4, the data server would return
NFS4ERR_PNFS_IO_HOLE. Thus data servers need to understand the
striping pattern in order to support STRIPE4_SPARSE layouts.
STRIPE4_DENSE means that the data server files have no holes.
STRIPE4_DENSE might be selected because the data server does not
(efficiently) support holey files, e.g. the data server's file system
allocates storage in the gaps, making STRIPE4_SPARSE a waste of
space. If the STRIPE4_DENSE stripe type is indicated in the layout,
the data files must be packed. Using the example striping pattern
and stripe unit size that was used for the STRIPE4_SPARSE example,
the STRIPE4_DENSE example would have all data servers' data files
blocks, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... filled. Logical blocks 0, 3, 6, ... of
the file would live on blocks 0, 1, 2, ... of the file of data server
1, logical blocks 1, 4, 7, ... of the file would live on blocks 0, 1,
2, ... of the file of data server 2, and logical blocks 2, 5, 8, ...
of the file would live on blocks 0, 1, 2, ... of the file of data
server 3.
Since the STRIPE4_DENSE layout does not leave holes on the data
servers, the pNFS client is allowed to write to any offset of any
data file of any data server in the stripe. Thus the the data
servers need not know the file's striping pattern.
The calculation to determine the octet offset within the data file
for dense data server layouts is:
stripe_width = stripe_unit_size * N;
where N = number of <data server, filehandle pairs>
in flattened nfl_ds_fh_list
data_file_offset = floor(file_offset / stripe_width)
* stripe_unit_size
+ file_offset % stripe_unit_size
Regardless of the data server layout, the calculation to determine
the index into the device array is the same:
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data_server_idx = floor(file_offset / stripe_unit_size) mod N
Section 13.12 describe the semantics for dealing with reads to holes
within the striped file. This is of particular concern, since each
individual component stripe file (i.e., the component of the striped
file that lives on a particular data server) may be of different
length. Thus, clients may experience 'short' reads when reading off
the end of one of these component files.
13.6. Data Server Multipathing
The NFSv4.1 file layout supports multipathing to "equivalent"
(defined later in this section) data servers. Data server-level
multipathing is primarily of use in the case of a data server
failure; it allows the client to switch to another data server that
is exporting the same data stripe unit, without having to contact the
metadata server for a new layout.
To support data server multipathing, there is an array of data server
network addresses (nflda_simp_ds_list) within the FILEDS4_SIMPLE case
of the nfsv4_1_file_layout_ds_addr4 switched union. This array
represents an ordered list of data server (each identified by a
network address) where the first element has the highest priority.
Each data server in the list MUST be equivalent to every other data
server in the list and each data server MUST be attempted in the
order specified.
Two data servers are equivalent if they export the same system image
(e.g., the stateids and filehandles that they use are the same) and
provide the same consistency guarantees. Two equivalent data servers
must also have sufficient connections to the storage, such that
writing to one data server is equivalent to writing to another; this
also applies to reading. Also, if multiple copies of the same data
exist, reading from one must provide access to all existing copies.
As such, it is unlikely that multipathing will provide additional
benefit in the case of an I/O error.
[[Comment.11: [NOTE: the error cases in which a client is expected to
attempt an equivalent data server should be specified.]]]
13.7. Operations Issued to NFSv4.1 Data Servers
Clients MUST use the filehandle described within the layout when
accessing data on NFSv4.1 data servers. When using the layout's
filehandle, the client MUST only issue the NULL procedure and the
COMPOUND procedure's BACKCHANNEL_CTL, BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION,
CREATE_SESSION, COMMIT, DESTROY_CLIENTID, DESTROY_SESSION,
EXCHANGE_ID, READ, WRITE, PUTFH, SECINFO_NO_NAME, SET_SSV, and
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SEQUENCE operations to the NFSv4.1 data server associated with that
data server filehandle. If a client issues an operation to the data
server other than those specified above, using the filehandle and
data server listed in the file's layout, that data server MUST return
an error to the client (unless the pNFS server has chosen to not
disambiguate the data server filehandle from the metadata server
filehandle, and/or the pNFS server has chosen to not disambiguate the
metadata server client ID from the data server client ID). The
client MUST follow the instruction implied by the layout (i.e., which
filehandles to use on which data servers). As described in
Section 12.5.1, a client MUST NOT issue I/Os to data servers for
which it does not hold a valid layout. The data servers MAY reject
such requests.
GETATTR and SETATTR MUST be directed to the metadata server. In the
case of a SETATTR of the size attribute, the control protocol is
responsible for propagating size updates/truncations to the data
servers. In the case of extending WRITEs to the data servers, the
new size must be visible on the metadata server once a LAYOUTCOMMIT
has completed (see Section 12.5.3.2). Section 13.12, describes the
mechanism by which the client is to handle data server files that do
not reflect the metadata server's size.
13.8. COMMIT Through Metadata Server
The nfl_commit_through_mds field in the file layout (data type
nfsv4_1_file_layout4) gives the metadata server the preferred way of
performing COMMIT. If this field is TRUE, the client SHOULD send
COMMIT to the metadata server instead of sending it to the same data
server to which the associated WRITEs were sent. In order to
maintain the current NFSv4.1 commit and recovery model, all the data
servers MUST return a common writeverf verifier in all WRITE
responses for a given file layout. The value of the writeverf
verifier MUST be changed at the metadata server or any data server
that is referenced in the layout, whenever there is a server event
that can possibly lead to loss of uncommitted data. The scope of the
verifier can be for a file or for the entire pNFS server. It might
be more difficult for the server to maintain the verifier at the file
level but the benefit is that only events that impact a given file
will require recovery action.
The single COMMIT to the metadata server will return a verifier and
the client should compare it to all the verifiers from the WRITEs and
fail the COMMIT if there is any mismatched verifiers. If COMMIT to
the metadata server fails, the client should reissue WRITEs for all
the modified data in the file. The client should treat modified data
with a mismatched verifier as a WRITE failure and try to recover by
reissuing the WRITEs to the original data server or using another
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path to that data if the layout has not been recalled. Another
option the client has is getting a new layout or just rewrite the
data through the metadata server. If the flag nfl_commit_through_mds
is FALSE, the client should not send COMMIT to the metadata server.
Although it is valid to send COMMIT to the metadata server it should
be used only to commit data that was written through the metadata
server. See Section 12.7.6 for recovery options.
13.9. Global Stateid Requirements
Note, there are no stateids embedded within the layout returned by
the metadata server to the pNFS client. The client uses a stateid
returned previously by the metadata server (including results from
OPEN -- a delegation stateid is acceptable as well as a non-
delegation stateid -- lock operations, WANT_DELEGATION, and also from
the CB_PUSH_DELEG callback operation) or a special stateid to perform
I/O on the data servers, as in regular NFSv4.1. Special stateid
usage for I/O is subject to the NFSv4.1 protocol specification. The
stateid used for I/O MUST have the same effect and be subject to the
same validation on data server as it would if the I/O was being
performed on the metadata server itself in the absence of pNFS. This
has the implication that stateids are globally valid on both the
metadata and data servers. This requires the metadata server to
propagate changes in lock and open state to the data servers, so that
the data servers can validate I/O accesses. This is discussed
further in Section 13.11. Depending on when stateids are propagated,
the existence of a valid stateid on the data server may act as proof
of a valid layout.
13.10. The Layout Iomode
The layout iomode need not be used by the metadata server when
servicing NFSv4.1 file-based layouts, although in some circumstances
it may be useful to use. For example, if the server implementation
supports reading from read-only replicas or mirrors, it would be
useful for the server to return a layout enabling the client to do
so. As such, the client SHOULD set the iomode based on its intent to
read or write the data. The client may default to an iomode of
LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW. The iomode need not be checked by the data servers
when clients perform I/O. However, the data servers SHOULD still
validate that the client holds a valid layout and return an error if
the client does not.
13.11. Data Server State Propagation
Since the metadata server, which handles lock and open-mode state
changes, as well as ACLs, may not be co-located with the data servers
where I/O access are validated, as such, the server implementation
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MUST take care of propagating changes of this state to the data
servers. Once the propagation to the data servers is complete, the
full effect of those changes must be in effect at the data servers.
However, some state changes need not be propagated immediately,
although all changes SHOULD be propagated promptly. These state
propagations have an impact on the design of the control protocol,
even though the control protocol is outside of the scope of this
specification. Immediate propagation refers to the synchronous
propagation of state from the metadata server to the data server(s);
the propagation must be complete before returning to the client.
13.11.1. Lock State Propagation
If the pNFS server supports mandatory locking, any mandatory locks on
a file MUST be made effective at the data servers before the request
that establishes them returns to the caller. Thus, mandatory lock
state MUST be synchronously propagated to the data servers. On the
other hand, since advisory lock state is not used for checking I/O
accesses at the data servers, there is no semantic reason for
propagating advisory lock state to the data servers. However, since
all lock, unlock, open downgrades and upgrades MAY affect the "seqid"
stored within the stateid (see Section 8.1.3.1), the stateid changes
may cause difficulty if this state is not propagated. Thus, when a
client uses a stateid on a data server for I/O with a newer "seqid"
number than the one the data server has, the data server may need to
query the metadata server and get any pending updates to that
stateid. This allows stateid sequence number changes to be
propagated lazily, on-demand.
Since updates to advisory locks neither confer nor remove privileges,
these changes need not be propagated immediately, and may not need to
be propagated promptly. The updates to advisory locks need only be
propagated when the data server needs to resolve a question about a
stateid. In fact, if record locking is not mandatory (i.e., is
advisory) the clients are advised not to use the lock-based stateids
for I/O at all. The stateids returned by open are sufficient and
eliminate overhead for this kind of state propagation.
13.11.2. Open-mode Validation
Open-mode validation MUST be performed against the open mode(s) held
by the data servers. However, the server implementation may not
always require the immediate propagation of changes. Reduction in
access because of CLOSEs or DOWNGRADEs does not have to be propagated
immediately, but SHOULD be propagated promptly; whereas changes due
to revocation MUST be propagated immediately. On the other hand,
changes that expand access (e.g., new OPEN's and upgrades) do not
have to be propagated immediately but the data server SHOULD NOT
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reject a request because of open mode issues without making sure that
the upgrade is not in flight.
13.11.3. File Attributes
Since the SETATTR operation has the ability to modify state that is
visible on both the metadata and data servers (e.g., the size), care
must be taken to ensure that the resultant state across the set of
data servers is consistent; especially when truncating or growing the
file.
As described earlier, the LAYOUTCOMMIT operation is used to ensure
that the metadata is synchronized with changes made to the data
servers. For the NFSv4.1-based data storage protocol, it is
necessary to re-synchronize state such as the size attribute, and the
setting of mtime/change/atime. See Section 12.5.3 for a full
description of the semantics regarding LAYOUTCOMMIT and attribute
synchronization. It should be noted, that by using an NFSv4.1-based
layout type, it is possible to synchronize this state before
LAYOUTCOMMIT occurs. For example, the control protocol can be used
to query the attributes present on the data servers.
Any changes to file attributes that control authorization or access
as reflected by ACCESS calls or READs and WRITEs on the metadata
server, MUST be propagated to the data servers for enforcement on
READ and WRITE I/O calls. If the changes made on the metadata server
result in more restrictive access permissions for any user, those
changes MUST be propagated to the data servers synchronously.
The OPEN operation (Section 17.16.5) does not impose any requirement
that I/O operations on an open file have the same credentials as the
OPEN itself, and so requires the server's READ and WRITE operations
to perform appropriate access checking. Changes to ACLs also require
new access checking by READ and WRITE on the server. The propagation
of access right changes due to changes in ACLs may be asynchronous
only if the server implementation is able to determine that the
updated ACL is not more restrictive for any user specified in the old
ACL. Due to the relative infrequency of ACL updates, it is suggested
that all changes be propagated synchronously.
13.12. Data Server Component File Size
A potential problem exists when a component data file on a particular
data server is grown past EOF; the problem exists for both dense and
sparse layouts. Imagine the following scenario: a client creates a
new file (size == 0) and writes to octet 131072; the client then
seeks to the beginning of the file and reads octet 100. The client
should receive 0s back as a result of the READ. However, if the READ
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falls on a data server different than that that received client's
original WRITE, the data server servicing the READ may still believe
that the file's size is at 0 and return no data with the EOF flag
set. The data server can only return 0s if it knows that the file's
size has been extended. This would require the immediate propagation
of the file's size to all data servers, which is potentially very
costly. Therefore, the client that has initiated the extension of
the file's size MUST be prepared to deal with these EOF conditions;
the EOF'ed or short READs will be treated as a hole in the file and
the NFS client will substitute 0s for the data when the offset is
less than the client's view of the file size.
The NFSv4.1 protocol only provides close to open file data cache
semantics; meaning that when the file is closed all modified data is
written to the server. When a subsequent OPEN of the file is done,
the change attribute is inspected for a difference from a cached
value for the change attribute. For the case above, this means that
a LAYOUTCOMMIT will be done at close (along with the data WRITEs) and
will update the file's size and change attribute. Access from
another client after that point will result in the appropriate size
being returned.
13.13. Recovery Considerations
As described in Section 12.7, the layout type-specific storage
protocol is responsible for handling the effects of I/Os started
before lease expiration, extending through lease expiration. The
NFSv4.1 file layout type prevents all I/Os from being executed after
lease expiration, without relying on a precise client lease timer and
without requiring data servers to maintain lease timers.
It works as follows. As described in Section 13.1, in COMPOUND
procedure requests to the data server, the data filehandle provided
by the PUTFH operation and the stateid in the READ or WRITE operation
are used to validate that the client has a valid layout for the I/O
being performed, if it does not, the I/O is rejected. Before the
metadata server takes any action to invalidate a layout given out by
a previous instance, it must make sure that all layouts from that
previous instance are invalidated at the data servers.
This means that a metadata server may not restripe a file until it
has contacted all of the data servers to invalidate the layouts from
the previous instance nor may it give out mandatory locks that
conflict with layouts from the previous instance without either doing
a specific invalidation (as it would have to do anyway) or doing a
global data server invalidation.
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13.14. Security Considerations for the File Layout Type
The NFSv4.1 file layout type MUST adhere to the security
considerations outlined in Section 12.9. NFSv4.1 data servers must
make all of the required access checks on each READ or WRITE I/O as
determined by the NFSv4.1 protocol. If the metadata server would
deny READ or WRITE operation on a given file due its ACL, mode
attribute, open mode, open deny mode, mandatory lock state, or any
other attributes and state, the data server MUST also deny the READ
or WRITE operation. This impacts the control protocol and the
propagation of state from the metadata server to the data servers;
see Section 13.11 for more details.
The methods for authentication, integrity, and privacy for file
layout-based data servers are the same as that used for metadata
servers. Metadata and data servers use ONC RPC security flavors to
authenticate, and SECINFO and SECINFO_NO_NAME to negotiate the
security mechanism and services to be used.
For a given file object, a metadata server MAY require different
security parameters (secinfo4 value) than the data server. For a
given file object with multiple data servers, the secinfo4 value
SHOULD be the same across all data servers.
If an NFSv4.1 implementation supports pNFS and supports NFSv4.1 file
layouts, then the implementation MUST support the SECINFO_NO_NAME
operation, on both the metadata and data servers.
14. Internationalization
The primary issue in which NFS version 4 needs to deal with
internationalization, or I18N, is with respect to file names and
other strings as used within the protocol. The choice of string
representation must allow reasonable name/string access to clients
which use various languages. The UTF-8 encoding of the UCS as
defined by ISO10646 [14] allows for this type of access and follows
the policy described in "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
Languages", RFC2277 [15].
RFC3454 [16], otherwise know as "stringprep", documents a framework
for using Unicode/UTF-8 in networking protocols, so as "to increase
the likelihood that string input and string comparison work in ways
that make sense for typical users throughout the world." A protocol
must define a profile of stringprep "in order to fully specify the
processing options." The remainder of this Internationalization
section defines the NFS version 4 stringprep profiles. Much of
terminology used for the remainder of this section comes from
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stringprep.
There are three UTF-8 string types defined for NFS version 4:
utf8str_cs, utf8str_cis, and utf8str_mixed. Separate profiles are
defined for each. Each profile defines the following, as required by
stringprep:
o The intended applicability of the profile
o The character repertoire that is the input and output to
stringprep (which is Unicode 3.2 for referenced version of
stringprep)
o The mapping tables from stringprep used (as described in section 3
of stringprep)
o Any additional mapping tables specific to the profile
o The Unicode normalization used, if any (as described in section 4
of stringprep)
o The tables from stringprep listing of characters that are
prohibited as output (as described in section 5 of stringprep)
o The bidirectional string testing used, if any (as described in
section 6 of stringprep)
o Any additional characters that are prohibited as output specific
to the profile
Stringprep discusses Unicode characters, whereas NFS version 4
renders UTF-8 characters. Since there is a one-to-one mapping from
UTF-8 to Unicode, when the remainder of this document refers to
Unicode, the reader should assume UTF-8.
Much of the text for the profiles comes from RFC3491 [17].
14.1. Stringprep profile for the utf8str_cs type
Every use of the utf8str_cs type definition in the NFS version 4
protocol specification follows the profile named nfs4_cs_prep.
14.1.1. Intended applicability of the nfs4_cs_prep profile
The utf8str_cs type is a case sensitive string of UTF-8 characters.
Its primary use in NFS Version 4 is for naming components and
pathnames. Components and pathnames are stored on the server's file
system. Two valid distinct UTF-8 strings might be the same after
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processing via the utf8str_cs profile. If the strings are two names
inside a directory, the NFS version 4 server will need to either:
o disallow the creation of a second name if it's post processed form
collides with that of an existing name, or
o allow the creation of the second name, but arrange so that after
post processing, the second name is different than the post
processed form of the first name.
14.1.2. Character repertoire of nfs4_cs_prep
The nfs4_cs_prep profile uses Unicode 3.2, as defined in stringprep's
Appendix A.1
14.1.3. Mapping used by nfs4_cs_prep
The nfs4_cs_prep profile specifies mapping using the following tables
from stringprep:
Table B.1
Table B.2 is normally not part of the nfs4_cs_prep profile as it is
primarily for dealing with case-insensitive comparisons. However, if
the NFS version 4 file server supports the case_insensitive file
system attribute, and if case_insensitive is true, the NFS version 4
server MUST use Table B.2 (in addition to Table B1) when processing
utf8str_cs strings, and the NFS version 4 client MUST assume Table
B.2 (in addition to Table B.1) are being used.
If the case_preserving attribute is present and set to false, then
the NFS version 4 server MUST use table B.2 to map case when
processing utf8str_cs strings. Whether the server maps from lower to
upper case or the upper to lower case is an implementation
dependency.
14.1.4. Normalization used by nfs4_cs_prep
The nfs4_cs_prep profile does not specify a normalization form. A
later revision of this specification may specify a particular
normalization form. Therefore, the server and client can expect that
they may receive unnormalized characters within protocol requests and
responses. If the operating environment requires normalization, then
the implementation must normalize utf8str_cs strings within the
protocol before presenting the information to an application (at the
client) or local file system (at the server).
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14.1.5. Prohibited output for nfs4_cs_prep
The nfs4_cs_prep profile specifies prohibiting using the following
tables from stringprep:
Table C.3
Table C.4
Table C.5
Table C.6
Table C.7
Table C.8
Table C.9
14.1.6. Bidirectional output for nfs4_cs_prep
The nfs4_cs_prep profile does not specify any checking of
bidirectional strings.
14.2. Stringprep profile for the utf8str_cis type
Every use of the utf8str_cis type definition in the NFS version 4
protocol specification follows the profile named nfs4_cis_prep.
14.2.1. Intended applicability of the nfs4_cis_prep profile
The utf8str_cis type is a case insensitive string of UTF-8
characters. Its primary use in NFS Version 4 is for naming NFS
servers.
14.2.2. Character repertoire of nfs4_cis_prep
The nfs4_cis_prep profile uses Unicode 3.2, as defined in
stringprep's Appendix A.1
14.2.3. Mapping used by nfs4_cis_prep
The nfs4_cis_prep profile specifies mapping using the following
tables from stringprep:
Table B.1
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Table B.2
14.2.4. Normalization used by nfs4_cis_prep
The nfs4_cis_prep profile specifies using Unicode normalization form
KC, as described in stringprep.
14.2.5. Prohibited output for nfs4_cis_prep
The nfs4_cis_prep profile specifies prohibiting using the following
tables from stringprep:
Table C.1.2
Table C.2.2
Table C.3
Table C.4
Table C.5
Table C.6
Table C.7
Table C.8
Table C.9
14.2.6. Bidirectional output for nfs4_cis_prep
The nfs4_cis_prep profile specifies checking bidirectional strings as
described in stringprep's section 6.
14.3. Stringprep profile for the utf8str_mixed type
Every use of the utf8str_mixed type definition in the NFS version 4
protocol specification follows the profile named nfs4_mixed_prep.
14.3.1. Intended applicability of the nfs4_mixed_prep profile
The utf8str_mixed type is a string of UTF-8 characters, with a prefix
that is case sensitive, a separator equal to '@', and a suffix that
is fully qualified domain name. Its primary use in NFS Version 4 is
for naming principals identified in an Access Control Entry.
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14.3.2. Character repertoire of nfs4_mixed_prep
The nfs4_mixed_prep profile uses Unicode 3.2, as defined in
stringprep's Appendix A.1
14.3.3. Mapping used by nfs4_cis_prep
For the prefix and the separator of a utf8str_mixed string, the
nfs4_mixed_prep profile specifies mapping using the following table
from stringprep:
Table B.1
For the suffix of a utf8str_mixed string, the nfs4_mixed_prep profile
specifies mapping using the following tables from stringprep:
Table B.1
Table B.2
14.3.4. Normalization used by nfs4_mixed_prep
The nfs4_mixed_prep profile specifies using Unicode normalization
form KC, as described in stringprep.
14.3.5. Prohibited output for nfs4_mixed_prep
The nfs4_mixed_prep profile specifies prohibiting using the following
tables from stringprep:
Table C.1.2
Table C.2.2
Table C.3
Table C.4
Table C.5
Table C.6
Table C.7
Table C.8
Table C.9
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14.3.6. Bidirectional output for nfs4_mixed_prep
The nfs4_mixed_prep profile specifies checking bidirectional strings
as described in stringprep's section 6.
14.4. UTF-8 Related Errors
Where the client sends an invalid UTF-8 string, the server should
return an NFS4ERR_INVAL (Table 8) error. This includes cases in
which inappropriate prefixes are detected and where the count
includes trailing bytes that do not constitute a full UCS character.
Where the client supplied string is valid UTF-8 but contains
characters that are not supported by the server as a value for that
string (e.g. names containing characters that have more than two
octets on a file system that supports Unicode characters only), the
server should return an NFS4ERR_BADCHAR (Table 8) error.
Where a UTF-8 string is used as a file name, and the file system,
while supporting all of the characters within the name, does not
allow that particular name to be used, the server should return the
error NFS4ERR_BADNAME (Table 8). This includes situations in which
the server file system imposes a normalization constraint on name
strings, but will also include such situations as file system
prohibitions of "." and ".." as file names for certain operations,
and other such constraints.
15. Error Values
NFS error numbers are assigned to failed operations within a compound
request. A compound request contains a number of NFS operations that
have their results encoded in sequence in a compound reply. The
results of successful operations will consist of an NFS4_OK status
followed by the encoded results of the operation. If an NFS
operation fails, an error status will be entered in the reply and the
compound request will be terminated.
15.1. Error Definitions
Protocol Error Definitions
+-----------------------------------+--------+----------------------+
| Error | Number | Description |
+-----------------------------------+--------+----------------------+
| NFS4_OK | 0 | Indicates the |
| | | operation completed |
| | | successfully. |
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| NFS4ERR_ACCESS | 13 | Permission denied. |
| | | The caller does not |
| | | have the correct |
| | | permission to |
| | | perform the |
| | | requested operation. |
| | | Contrast this with |
| | | NFS4ERR_PERM, which |
| | | restricts itself to |
| | | owner or privileged |
| | | user permission |
| | | failures. |
| NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP | 10032 | An attribute |
| | | specified is not |
| | | supported by the |
| | | server. Does not |
| | | apply to the GETATTR |
| | | operation. |
| NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED | 10047 | Due to administrator |
| | | intervention, the |
| | | lockowner's record |
| | | locks, share |
| | | reservations, and |
| | | delegations have |
| | | been revoked by the |
| | | server. |
| NFS4ERR_BACK_CHAN_BUSY | 10057 | The session cannot |
| | | be destroyed because |
| | | the server has |
| | | callback requests |
| | | outstanding. |
| NFS4ERR_BADCHAR | 10040 | A UTF-8 string |
| | | contains a character |
| | | which is not |
| | | supported by the |
| | | server in the |
| | | context in which it |
| | | being used. |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_COOKIE | 10003 | READDIR cookie is |
| | | stale. |
| NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE | 10001 | Illegal NFS |
| | | filehandle. The |
| | | filehandle failed |
| | | internal consistency |
| | | checks. |
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| NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT | 10077 | The highest_slot |
| | | argument in SEQUENCE |
| | | or CB_SEQUENCE |
| | | exceeds the |
| | | replier's enforced |
| | | highest_slotid. |
| NFS4ERR_BADIOMODE | 10049 | Layout iomode is |
| | | invalid. |
| NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT | 10050 | Layout specified is |
| | | invalid. |
| NFS4ERR_BADNAME | 10041 | A name string in a |
| | | request consists of |
| | | valid UTF-8 |
| | | characters supported |
| | | by the server but |
| | | the name is not |
| | | supported by the |
| | | server as a valid |
| | | name for current |
| | | operation. |
| NFS4ERR_BADOWNER | 10039 | An owner, |
| | | owner_group, or ACL |
| | | attribute value can |
| | | not be translated to |
| | | local |
| | | representation. |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_SESSION_DIGEST | 10051 | The digest used in a |
| | | SET_SSV or |
| | | BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION |
| | | request is not |
| | | valid. |
| NFS4ERR_BADTYPE | 10007 | An attempt was made |
| | | to create an object |
| | | of a type not |
| | | supported by the |
| | | server. |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE | 10042 | The range for a |
| | | LOCK, LOCKT, or |
| | | LOCKU operation is |
| | | not appropriate to |
| | | the allowable range |
| | | of offsets for the |
| | | server. |
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| NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID | 10026 | The sequence number |
| | | in a locking request |
| | | is neither the next |
| | | expected number or |
| | | the last number |
| | | processed. This |
| | | error does not apply |
| | | to and should never |
| | | be generated in |
| | | NFSv4.1. |
| NFS4ERR_BADSESSION | 10052 | The specified |
| | | sessionid does not |
| | | exist. |
| NFS4ERR_BADSLOT | 10053 | The requester sent a |
| | | SEQUENCE or |
| | | CB_SEQUENCE request |
| | | that attempted to |
| | | use a slot the |
| | | replier does not |
| | | have in its slot |
| | | table. It is |
| | | possible the slot |
| | | may have been |
| | | retired. |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID | 10025 | A stateid generated |
| | | by the current |
| | | server instance, but |
| | | which does not |
| | | designate any |
| | | locking state |
| | | (either current or |
| | | superseded) for a |
| | | current |
| | | lockowner-file pair, |
| | | was used. |
| NFS4ERR_BADXDR | 10036 | The server |
| | | encountered an XDR |
| | | decoding error while |
| | | processing an |
| | | operation. |
| NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE | 10017 | The EXCHANGE_ID |
| | | operation has found |
| | | that a client ID is |
| | | already in use by |
| | | another client. |
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| NFS4ERR_CLIENTID_BUSY | 10074 | The DESTROY_CLIENTID |
| | | operation has found |
| | | there are has |
| | | sessions and/or |
| | | stateids bound to |
| | | the client ID. |
| NFS4ERR_COMPLETE_ALREADY | 10054 | The client |
| | | previously sent a |
| | | successful |
| | | RECLAIM_COMPLETE |
| | | operation; the |
| | | additional |
| | | RECLAIM_COMPLETE |
| | | operation is not |
| | | needed. |
| NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION | 10055 | The connection is |
| | | not associated with |
| | | the specified |
| | | session. |
| NFS4ERR_CONN_BINDING_NOT_ENFORCED | 10073 | Client is trying use |
| | | enforced connection |
| | | association, but it |
| | | disabled enforcement |
| | | when the session was |
| | | created. |
| NFS4ERR_DEADLOCK | 10045 | The server has been |
| | | able to determine a |
| | | file locking |
| | | deadlock condition |
| | | for a blocking lock |
| | | request. |
| NFS4ERR_BADSESSION | 10782 | The specified |
| | | session is dead and |
| | | does not accept new |
| | | requests. |
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| NFS4ERR_DELAY | 10008 | The server initiated |
| | | the request, but was |
| | | not able to complete |
| | | it in a timely |
| | | fashion. The client |
| | | should wait and then |
| | | try the request with |
| | | a new RPC |
| | | transaction ID. For |
| | | example, this error |
| | | should be returned |
| | | from a server that |
| | | supports |
| | | hierarchical storage |
| | | and receives a |
| | | request to process a |
| | | file that has been |
| | | migrated. In this |
| | | case, the server |
| | | should start the |
| | | immigration process |
| | | and respond to |
| | | client with this |
| | | error. This error |
| | | may also occur when |
| | | a necessary |
| | | delegation recall |
| | | makes processing a |
| | | request in a timely |
| | | fashion impossible. |
| NFS4ERR_DELEG_ALREADY_WANTED | 10056 | The client has |
| | | already registered |
| | | that it wants a |
| | | delegation. |
| NFS4ERR_DENIED | 10010 | An attempt to lock a |
| | | file is denied. |
| | | Since this may be a |
| | | temporary condition, |
| | | the client is |
| | | encouraged to retry |
| | | the lock request |
| | | until the lock is |
| | | accepted. |
| NFS4ERR_DQUOT | 69 | Resource (quota) |
| | | hard limit exceeded. |
| | | The user's resource |
| | | limit on the server |
| | | has been exceeded. |
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| NFS4ERR_EXIST | 17 | File exists. The |
| | | file specified |
| | | already exists. |
| NFS4ERR_EXPIRED | 10011 | A lease has expired |
| | | that is being used |
| | | in the current |
| | | operation. |
| NFS4ERR_FBIG | 27 | File too large. The |
| | | operation would have |
| | | caused a file to |
| | | grow beyond the |
| | | server's limit. |
| NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED | 10014 | The filehandle |
| | | provided is volatile |
| | | and has expired at |
| | | the server. |
| NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN | 10046 | The operation can |
| | | not be successfully |
| | | processed because a |
| | | file involved in the |
| | | operation is |
| | | currently open. |
| NFS4ERR_GRACE | 10013 | The server is in its |
| | | recovery or grace |
| | | period which should |
| | | match the lease |
| | | period of the |
| | | server. |
| NFS4ERR_INVAL | 22 | Invalid argument or |
| | | unsupported argument |
| | | for an operation. |
| | | Two examples are |
| | | attempting a |
| | | READLINK on an |
| | | object other than a |
| | | symbolic link or |
| | | specifying a value |
| | | for an enum field |
| | | that is not defined |
| | | in the protocol |
| | | (e.g. nfs_ftype4). |
| NFS4ERR_IO | 5 | I/O error. A hard |
| | | error (for example, |
| | | a disk error) |
| | | occurred while |
| | | processing the |
| | | requested operation. |
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| NFS4ERR_ISDIR | 21 | Is a directory. The |
| | | caller specified a |
| | | directory in a |
| | | non-directory |
| | | operation. |
| NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER | 10058 | Layouts are |
| | | temporarily |
| | | unavailable for the |
| | | file, client should |
| | | retry later. |
| NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE | 10059 | Layouts are not |
| | | available for the |
| | | file or its |
| | | containing file |
| | | system. |
| NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED | 10031 | A lease being |
| | | renewed is |
| | | associated with a |
| | | file system that has |
| | | been migrated to a |
| | | new server. |
| NFS4ERR_LOCKED | 10012 | A read or write |
| | | operation was |
| | | attempted on a |
| | | locked file. |
| NFS4ERR_LOCK_NOTSUPP | 10043 | Server does not |
| | | support atomic |
| | | upgrade or downgrade |
| | | of locks. |
| NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE | 10028 | A lock request is |
| | | operating on a |
| | | sub-range of a |
| | | current lock for the |
| | | lock owner and the |
| | | server does not |
| | | support this type of |
| | | request. |
| NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD | 10037 | A CLOSE was |
| | | attempted and file |
| | | locks would exist |
| | | after the CLOSE. |
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| NFS4ERR_MINOR_VERS_MISMATCH | 10021 | The server has |
| | | received a request |
| | | that specifies an |
| | | unsupported minor |
| | | version. The server |
| | | must return a |
| | | COMPOUND4res with a |
| | | zero length |
| | | operations result |
| | | array. |
| NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED | 10063 | The requester sent a |
| | | SEQUENCE or |
| | | CB_SEQUENCE |
| | | operation with an |
| | | invalid sequence id. |
| NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY | 10076 | The requester sent a |
| | | SEQUENCE or |
| | | CB_SEQUENCE |
| | | operation with slot |
| | | id and sequence id |
| | | that are in the |
| | | reply cache, but |
| | | replier detects that |
| | | the retry is not the |
| | | same as the original |
| | | request. |
| NFS4ERR_SEQUENCE_POS | 10064 | The requester sent a |
| | | COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND with a |
| | | SEQUENCE or |
| | | CB_SEQUENCE |
| | | operation that was |
| | | not the first |
| | | operation. |
| NFS4ERR_MLINK | 31 | Too many hard links. |
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| NFS4ERR_MOVED | 10019 | The file system |
| | | which contains the |
| | | current filehandle |
| | | object is not |
| | | present at the |
| | | server. It may have |
| | | been relocated, |
| | | migrated to another |
| | | server or may have |
| | | never been present. |
| | | The client may |
| | | obtain the new file |
| | | system location by |
| | | obtaining the |
| | | "fs_locations" |
| | | attribute for the |
| | | current filehandle. |
| | | For further |
| | | discussion, refer to |
| | | the section |
| | | "Multi-server Name |
| | | Space". |
| NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG | 63 | The filename in an |
| | | operation was too |
| | | long. |
| NFS4ERR_NOENT | 2 | No such file or |
| | | directory. The file |
| | | or directory name |
| | | specified does not |
| | | exist. |
| NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE | 10020 | The logical current |
| | | filehandle value |
| | | (or, in the case of |
| | | RESTOREFH, the saved |
| | | filehandle value) |
| | | has not been set |
| | | properly. This may |
| | | be a result of a |
| | | malformed COMPOUND |
| | | operation (i.e. no |
| | | PUTFH or PUTROOTFH |
| | | before an operation |
| | | that requires the |
| | | current filehandle |
| | | be set). |
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| NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE | 10033 | A reclaim of client |
| | | state was attempted |
| | | in circumstances in |
| | | which the server |
| | | cannot guarantee |
| | | that conflicting |
| | | state has not been |
| | | provided to another |
| | | client. This can |
| | | occur because the |
| | | reclaim has been |
| | | done outside of the |
| | | grace period of the |
| | | server, after the |
| | | client has done a |
| | | RECLAIM_COMPLETE |
| | | operation, or |
| | | because previous |
| | | operations have |
| | | created a situation |
| | | in which the server |
| | | is not able to |
| | | determine that a |
| | | reclaim-interfering |
| | | edge condition does |
| | | not exist. |
| NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT | 10060 | Client has no |
| | | matching layout |
| | | (segment) to return. |
| NFS4ERR_NOSPC | 28 | No space left on |
| | | device. The |
| | | operation would have |
| | | caused the server's |
| | | file system to |
| | | exceed its limit. |
| NFS4ERR_NOTDIR | 20 | Not a directory. |
| | | The caller specified |
| | | a non-directory in a |
| | | directory operation. |
| NFS4ERR_NOTEMPTY | 66 | An attempt was made |
| | | to remove a |
| | | directory that was |
| | | not empty. |
| NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP | 10004 | Operation is not |
| | | supported. |
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| NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME | 10027 | This error is |
| | | returned by the |
| | | VERIFY operation to |
| | | signify that the |
| | | attributes compared |
| | | were not the same as |
| | | provided in the |
| | | client's request. |
| NFS4ERR_NXIO | 6 | I/O error. No such |
| | | device or address. |
| NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID | 10024 | A stateid which |
| | | designates the |
| | | locking state for a |
| | | lockowner-file at an |
| | | earlier time was |
| | | used. This error |
| | | does not apply to |
| | | and should never be |
| | | generated in |
| | | NFSv4.1. |
| NFS4ERR_OPENMODE | 10038 | The client attempted |
| | | a READ, WRITE, LOCK |
| | | or SETATTR operation |
| | | not sanctioned by |
| | | the stateid passed |
| | | (e.g. writing to a |
| | | file opened only for |
| | | read). |
| NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL | 10044 | An illegal operation |
| | | value has been |
| | | specified in the |
| | | argop field of a |
| | | COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND |
| | | procedure. |
| NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION | 10070 | The COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND contains |
| | | an operation that |
| | | requires a SEQUENCE |
| | | or CB_SEQUENCE |
| | | operation to precede |
| | | it in order to |
| | | establish a session. |
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| NFS4ERR_PERM | 1 | Not owner. The |
| | | operation was not |
| | | allowed because the |
| | | caller is either not |
| | | a privileged user |
| | | (root) or not the |
| | | owner of the target |
| | | of the operation. |
| NFS4ERR_PNFS_IO_HOLE | 10075 | The pNFS client has |
| | | attempted to read |
| | | from or write to a |
| | | illegal hole of a |
| | | file of a data |
| | | server that is using |
| | | the STRIPE4_SPARSE |
| | | stripe type. See |
| | | Section 13.5. |
| NFS4ERR_RECALLCONFLICT | 10061 | Layout is |
| | | unavailable due to a |
| | | conflicting |
| | | LAYOUTRECALL that is |
| | | in progress. |
| NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_BAD | 10034 | The reclaim provided |
| | | by the client does |
| | | not match any of the |
| | | server's state |
| | | consistency checks |
| | | and is bad. |
| NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_CONFLICT | 10035 | The reclaim provided |
| | | by the client has |
| | | encountered a |
| | | conflict and can not |
| | | be provided. |
| | | Potentially |
| | | indicates a |
| | | misbehaving client. |
| NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG | 10066 | The reply to a |
| | | COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND would |
| | | exceed the channel's |
| | | negotiated maximum |
| | | response size. |
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| NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE | 10067 | The reply to a |
| | | COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND would |
| | | exceed the channel's |
| | | negotiated maximum |
| | | size for replies |
| | | cached in the reply |
| | | cache. |
| NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG | 10065 | The COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND request |
| | | exceeds the |
| | | channel's negotiated |
| | | maximum size for |
| | | requests. |
| NFS4ERR_RESTOREFH | 10030 | The RESTOREFH |
| | | operation does not |
| | | have a saved |
| | | filehandle |
| | | (identified by |
| | | SAVEFH) to operate |
| | | upon. |
| NFS4ERR_RETRY_UNCACHED_REP | 10068 | The requester has |
| | | attempted a retry of |
| | | COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND which it |
| | | previously requested |
| | | not be placed in the |
| | | reply cache. |
| NFS4ERR_ROFS | 30 | Read-only file |
| | | system. A modifying |
| | | operation was |
| | | attempted on a |
| | | read-only file |
| | | system. |
| NFS4ERR_SAME | 10009 | This error is |
| | | returned by the |
| | | NVERIFY operation to |
| | | signify that the |
| | | attributes compared |
| | | were the same as |
| | | provided in the |
| | | client's request. |
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| NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT | 10006 | An error occurred on |
| | | the server which |
| | | does not map to any |
| | | of the legal NFS |
| | | version 4 protocol |
| | | error values. The |
| | | client should |
| | | translate this into |
| | | an appropriate |
| | | error. UNIX clients |
| | | may choose to |
| | | translate this to |
| | | EIO. |
| NFS4ERR_SHARE_DENIED | 10015 | An attempt to OPEN a |
| | | file with a share |
| | | reservation has |
| | | failed because of a |
| | | share conflict. |
| NFS4ERR_STALE | 70 | Invalid filehandle. |
| | | The filehandle given |
| | | in the arguments was |
| | | invalid. The file |
| | | referred to by that |
| | | filehandle no longer |
| | | exists or access to |
| | | it has been revoked. |
| NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID | 10022 | A client ID not |
| | | recognized by the |
| | | server was used in a |
| | | locking or |
| | | CREATE_SESSION |
| | | request. |
| NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID | 10023 | A stateid generated |
| | | by an earlier server |
| | | instance was used. |
| NFS4ERR_SYMLINK | 10029 | The current |
| | | filehandle provided |
| | | for a LOOKUP is not |
| | | a directory but a |
| | | symbolic link. Also |
| | | used if the final |
| | | component of the |
| | | OPEN path is a |
| | | symbolic link. |
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| NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL | 10005 | The encoded response |
| | | to a READDIR request |
| | | exceeds the size |
| | | limit set by the |
| | | initial request. |
| NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS | 10070 | The COMPOUND or |
| | | CB_COMPOUND request |
| | | has too many |
| | | operations. |
| NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE | 10062 | Layout type is |
| | | unknown. |
| NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND | 10069 | The client has sent |
| | | a COMPOUND request |
| | | with an unsafe mix |
| | | of operations. |
| NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC | 10016 | The security |
| | | mechanism being used |
| | | by the client for |
| | | the operation does |
| | | not match the |
| | | server's security |
| | | policy. The client |
| | | should change the |
| | | security mechanism |
| | | being used and retry |
| | | the operation. |
| NFS4ERR_XDEV | 18 | Attempt to do an |
| | | operation between |
| | | different fsids. |
+-----------------------------------+--------+----------------------+
Table 8
15.2. Operations and their valid errors
Mappings of valid error returns for each protocol operation
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+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| Operation | Errors |
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| ACCESS | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION | NFS4ERR_BADSESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_SESSION_DIGEST, |
| | NFS4ERR_CONN_BINDING_NOT_ENFORCED, |
| | NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION |
| CLOSE | NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_ISDIR, NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
| COMMIT | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_ISDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
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| CREATE | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADNAME, NFS4ERR_BADOWNER, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADTYPE, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_DQUOT, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXIST, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOSPC, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, NFS4ERR_PERM, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| EXCHANGE_ID | |
| CREATE_SESSION | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID |
| DELEGPURGE | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID |
| DELEGRETURN | NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
| DESTROY_CLIENTID | NFS4ERR_CLIENTID_BUSY, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID |
| DESTROY_SESSION | NFS4ERR_BACK_CHAN_BUSY, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADSESSION, NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID |
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| GET_DIR_DELEGATION | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, NFS4ERR_EIO, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP |
| GETATTR | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| GETDEVICEINFO | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE |
| GETDEVICELIST | NFS4ERR_BAD_COOKIE, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE |
| GETFH | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| ILLEGAL | NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL |
| LAYOUTCOMMIT | NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT, NFS4ERR_BADIOMODE, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_BAD, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE |
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| LAYOUTGET | NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT, NFS4ERR_BADIOMODE, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER, NFS4ERR_LOCKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_RECALLCONFLICT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE |
| LAYOUTRETURN | NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT, NFS4ERR_BADIOMODE, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE, NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE |
| LINK | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADNAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_DQUOT, NFS4ERR_EXIST, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_ISDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_MLINK, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOSPC, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, NFS4ERR_XDEV |
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| LOCK | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_DEADLOCK, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_DENIED, NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_ISDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, NFS4ERR_LOCK_NOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OPENMODE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_BAD, |
| | NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_CONFLICT, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
| LOCKT | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_DENIED, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_ISDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID |
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| LOCKU | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_GRACE, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_ISDIR, NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
| LOOKUP | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADNAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_SYMLINK, NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC |
| LOOKUPP | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_IO, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC |
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| NVERIFY | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_SAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| OPEN | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADNAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADOWNER, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_DQUOT, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXIST, NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_ISDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOSPC, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_PERM, NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_BAD, |
| | NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_CONFLICT, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_SHARE_DENIED, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE, NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID, |
| | NFS4ERR_SYMLINK, NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC |
| OPEN_DOWNGRADE | NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
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| OPENATTR | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_DQUOT, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOSPC, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| PUTFH | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC |
| PUTPUBFH | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC |
| PUTROOTFH | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC |
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| READ | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_GRACE, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_ISDIR, NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_LOCKED, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NXIO, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_OPENMODE, NFS4ERR_PNFS_IO_HOLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
| READDIR | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_COOKIE, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL |
| READLINK | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_ISDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| RECLAIM_COMPLETE | NFS4ERR_COMPLETE_ALREADY |
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| RELEASE_LOCKOWNER | NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID |
| REMOVE | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADNAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOTEMPTY, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| RENAME | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADNAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_DQUOT, NFS4ERR_EXIST, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOSPC, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, NFS4ERR_NOTEMPTY, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, NFS4ERR_XDEV |
| RESTOREFH | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_RESTOREFH, NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE, NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC |
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| SAVEFH | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| SECINFO | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADNAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| SECINFO_NO_NAME | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADNAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG, NFS4ERR_NOENT, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOTDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| SEQUENCE | NFS4ERR_BADSESSION, NFS4ERR_BADSLOT, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT, |
| | NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY, |
| | NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED, |
| | NFS4ERR_SEQUENCE_POS, NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE |
| SET_SSV | NFS4ERR_BAD_SESSION_DIGEST, |
| | NFS4ERR_CONN_BINDING_NOT_ENFORCED |
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| SETATTR | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP, NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BADOWNER, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, NFS4ERR_BADXDR, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_DQUOT, |
| | NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, NFS4ERR_FBIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_GRACE, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, NFS4ERR_ISDIR, |
| | NFS4ERR_LOCKED, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOSPC, |
| | NFS4ERR_OPENMODE, NFS4ERR_PERM, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
| EXCHANGE_ID | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT |
| CREATE_SESSION | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE, |
| | NFS4ERR_DELAY, NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID |
| VERIFY | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADCHAR, NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, NFS4ERR_INVAL, |
| | NFS4ERR_MOVED, NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME, |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE |
| WANT_DELEGATION | |
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| WRITE | NFS4ERR_ACCESS, NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE, NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR, NFS4ERR_DELAY, |
| | NFS4ERR_DQUOT, NFS4ERR_EXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_FBIG, NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED, |
| | NFS4ERR_GRACE, NFS4ERR_INVAL, NFS4ERR_IO, |
| | NFS4ERR_ISDIR, NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_LOCKED, NFS4ERR_MOVED, |
| | NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE, NFS4ERR_NOSPC, |
| | NFS4ERR_NXIO, NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_OPENMODE, NFS4ERR_PNFS_IO_HOLE, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, NFS4ERR_ROFS, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT, NFS4ERR_STALE, |
| | NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID |
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
Table 9
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15.3. Callback operations and their valid errors
Mappings of valid error returns for each protocol callback operation
+-------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Callback Operation | Errors |
+-------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| CB_GETATTR | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE NFS4ERR_BADXDR |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT |
| CB_ILLEGAL | NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL |
| CB_LAYOUTRECALL | NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT |
| CB_NOTIFY | NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID NFS4ERR_INVAL |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT |
| CB_PUSH_DELEG | |
| CB_RECALL | NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID |
| | NFS4ERR_BADXDR |
| | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT |
| CB_RECALL_ANY | NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, |
| | NFS4ERR_INVAL |
| CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL | |
| CB_RECALL_CREDIT | |
| CB_SEQUENCE | NFS4ERR_BADSESSION, NFS4ERR_BADSLOT, |
| | NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT, |
| | NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION, |
| | NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY, |
| | NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED, |
| | NFS4ERR_SEQUENCE_POS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG, |
| | NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE |
+-------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
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Table 10
15.4. Errors and the operations that use them
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| Error | Operations |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| NFS4ERR_ACCESS | ACCESS, COMMIT, CREATE, |
| | GETATTR, GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LINK, LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, |
| | LOOKUP, LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, |
| | OPEN, OPENATTR, READ, |
| | READDIR, READLINK, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED | CLOSE, DELEGRETURN, LOCK, |
| | LOCKU, OPEN, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | READ, RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, |
| | SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP | CREATE, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | SETATTR, VERIFY |
| NFS4ERR_BACK_CHAN_BUSY | DESTROY_SESSION |
| NFS4ERR_BADCHAR | CREATE, LINK, LOOKUP, |
| | NVERIFY, OPEN, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY |
| NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_RECALL, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, READ, READDIR, |
| | READLINK, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_BADIOMODE | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN |
| NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN |
| NFS4ERR_BADNAME | CREATE, LINK, LOOKUP, OPEN, |
| | REMOVE, RENAME, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME |
| NFS4ERR_BADOWNER | CREATE, OPEN, SETATTR |
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| NFS4ERR_BADSESSION | BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, |
| | CB_SEQUENCE, DESTROY_SESSION, |
| | SEQUENCE |
| NFS4ERR_BADSLOT | CB_SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE |
| NFS4ERR_BADTYPE | CREATE |
| NFS4ERR_BADXDR | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_NOTIFY, CB_RECALL, CLOSE, |
| | COMMIT, CREATE, |
| | CREATE_SESSION, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, EXCHANGE_ID, |
| | GETATTR, GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LINK, LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, |
| | LOOKUP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, READ, READDIR, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_COOKIE | GETDEVICELIST, READDIR |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT | CB_SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_SESSION_DIGEST | BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, SET_SSV |
| NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID | CB_NOTIFY, CB_RECALL, CLOSE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, LOCK, LOCKU, |
| | OPEN_DOWNGRADE, READ, |
| | SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE | CREATE_SESSION, EXCHANGE_ID |
| NFS4ERR_CLIENTID_BUSY | DESTROY_CLIENTID |
| NFS4ERR_COMPLETE_ALREADY | RECLAIM_COMPLETE |
| NFS4ERR_CONN_BINDING_NOT_ENFORCED | BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, SET_SSV |
| NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION | CB_SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE |
| NFS4ERR_DEADLOCK | LOCK |
| NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION | BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, |
| | DESTROY_SESSION, SEQUENCE |
| NFS4ERR_DELAY | ACCESS, CLOSE, CREATE, |
| | CREATE_SESSION, GETATTR, |
| | LINK, LOCK, LOCKT, NVERIFY, |
| | OPEN, OPENATTR, READ, |
| | READDIR, READLINK, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, SETATTR, VERIFY, |
| | WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_DENIED | LOCK, LOCKT |
| NFS4ERR_DQUOT | CREATE, LINK, OPEN, OPENATTR, |
| | RENAME, SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_EIO | GET_DIR_DELEGATION |
| NFS4ERR_EXIST | CREATE, LINK, OPEN, RENAME |
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| NFS4ERR_EXPIRED | CLOSE, DELEGRETURN, LOCK, |
| | LOCKU, OPEN, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | READ, RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, |
| | SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_FBIG | SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_FHEXPIRED | ACCESS, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, GETATTR, |
| | GETDEVICEINFO, GETDEVICELIST, |
| | GETFH, GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN, LINK, LOCK, |
| | LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, READ, READDIR, |
| | READLINK, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN | LINK, REMOVE, RENAME |
| NFS4ERR_GRACE | LAYOUTGET, LOCK, LOCKT, |
| | LOCKU, OPEN, READ, SETATTR, |
| | WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_INVAL | ACCESS, CB_NOTIFY, |
| | CB_RECALL_ANY, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGRETURN, |
| | EXCHANGE_ID, GETATTR, |
| | GETDEVICEINFO, GETDEVICELIST, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN, LINK, LOCK, |
| | LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPEN_DOWNGRADE, READ, |
| | READDIR, READLINK, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_IO | ACCESS, COMMIT, CREATE, |
| | GETATTR, LINK, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, READ, READDIR, |
| | READLINK, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_ISDIR | CLOSE, COMMIT, LINK, LOCK, |
| | LOCKT, LOCKU, OPEN, READ, |
| | READLINK, SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER | LAYOUTGET |
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| NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE | LAYOUTGET |
| NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED | CLOSE, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, LOCK, LOCKT, |
| | LOCKU, OPEN, READ, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_LOCKED | LAYOUTGET, READ, SETATTR, |
| | WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD | CLOSE, RELEASE_LOCKOWNER |
| NFS4ERR_LOCK_NOTSUPP | LOCK |
| NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU |
| NFS4ERR_MLINK | LINK |
| NFS4ERR_MOVED | ACCESS, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, READ, READDIR, |
| | READLINK, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_NAMETOOLONG | CREATE, LINK, LOOKUP, OPEN, |
| | REMOVE, RENAME, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME |
| NFS4ERR_NOENT | LINK, LOOKUP, LOOKUPP, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME |
| NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE | ACCESS, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, |
| | GETFH, GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN, LINK, LOCK, |
| | LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | REMOVE, RENAME, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SETATTR, VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT | CB_LAYOUTRECALL |
| NFS4ERR_NOSPC | CREATE, LINK, OPEN, OPENATTR, |
| | RENAME, SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_NOTDIR | CREATE, GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LINK, LOOKUP, LOOKUPP, OPEN, |
| | READDIR, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME |
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| NFS4ERR_NOTEMPTY | REMOVE, RENAME |
| NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP | DELEGPURGE, DELEGRETURN, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LAYOUTGET, LINK, OPENATTR, |
| | READLINK |
| NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME | READDIR, VERIFY |
| NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTRETURN, |
| | LOCK, OPEN |
| NFS4ERR_NXIO | READ, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_OPENMODE | LOCK, READ, SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL | CB_ILLEGAL, ILLEGAL |
| NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_RECALL, CB_RECALL_ANY, |
| | CLOSE, COMMIT, CREATE, |
| | DELEGPURGE, DELEGRETURN, |
| | GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SETATTR, VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_PERM | CREATE, OPEN, SETATTR |
| NFS4ERR_PNFS_IO_HOLE | READ, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_RECALLCONFLICT | LAYOUTGET |
| NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_BAD | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LOCK, OPEN |
| NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_CONFLICT | LOCK, OPEN |
| NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_RECALL, CB_RECALL_ANY, |
| | CB_SEQUENCE, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SEQUENCE, SETATTR, VERIFY, |
| | WRITE |
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| NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_RECALL, CB_RECALL_ANY, |
| | CB_SEQUENCE, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SEQUENCE, SETATTR, VERIFY, |
| | WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_RECALL, CB_RECALL_ANY, |
| | CB_SEQUENCE, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SEQUENCE, SETATTR, VERIFY, |
| | WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_RESTOREFH | RESTOREFH |
| NFS4ERR_ROFS | COMMIT, CREATE, LINK, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_SAME | NVERIFY |
| NFS4ERR_SEQUENCE_POS | CB_SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE |
| NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY | CB_SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE |
| NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED | CB_SEQUENCE, SEQUENCE |
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| NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_NOTIFY, CB_RECALL, CLOSE, |
| | COMMIT, CREATE, |
| | CREATE_SESSION, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, EXCHANGE_ID, |
| | GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SETATTR, VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_SHARE_DENIED | OPEN |
| NFS4ERR_STALE | ACCESS, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, |
| | GETFH, GET_DIR_DELEGATION, |
| | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN, LINK, LOCK, |
| | LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, READ, READDIR, |
| | READLINK, REMOVE, RENAME, |
| | RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, SECINFO, |
| | SECINFO_NO_NAME, SETATTR, |
| | VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID | CREATE_SESSION, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DESTROY_CLIENTID, |
| | DESTROY_SESSION, |
| | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN, LOCK, LOCKT, |
| | OPEN, RELEASE_LOCKOWNER |
| NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID | CLOSE, DELEGRETURN, LOCK, |
| | LOCKU, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, READ, |
| | SETATTR, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_SYMLINK | LOOKUP, OPEN |
| NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL | GETDEVICEINFO, GETDEVICELIST, |
| | LAYOUTGET, READDIR |
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| NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, |
| | CB_RECALL, CB_RECALL_ANY, |
| | CB_SEQUENCE, CLOSE, COMMIT, |
| | CREATE, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SEQUENCE, SETATTR, VERIFY, |
| | WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE | GETDEVICEINFO, GETDEVICELIST, |
| | LAYOUTCOMMIT, LAYOUTGET, |
| | LAYOUTRETURN |
| NFS4ERR_UNSAFE_COMPOUND | ACCESS, CB_GETATTR, CLOSE, |
| | COMMIT, CREATE, DELEGPURGE, |
| | DELEGRETURN, GETATTR, GETFH, |
| | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOCK, LOCKT, LOCKU, LOOKUP, |
| | LOOKUPP, NVERIFY, OPEN, |
| | OPENATTR, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, |
| | PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, |
| | READ, READDIR, READLINK, |
| | RELEASE_LOCKOWNER, REMOVE, |
| | RENAME, RESTOREFH, SAVEFH, |
| | SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME, |
| | SETATTR, VERIFY, WRITE |
| NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC | GET_DIR_DELEGATION, LINK, |
| | LOOKUP, LOOKUPP, OPEN, PUTFH, |
| | PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, RENAME, |
| | RESTOREFH |
| NFS4ERR_XDEV | LINK, RENAME |
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------------+
Table 11
16. NFS version 4.1 Procedures
16.1. Procedure 0: NULL - No Operation
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16.1.1. SYNOPSIS
16.1.2. ARGUMENTS
void;
16.1.3. RESULTS
void;
16.1.4. DESCRIPTION
Standard NULL procedure. Void argument, void response. This
procedure has no functionality associated with it. Because of this
it is sometimes used to measure the overhead of processing a service
request. Therefore, the server should ensure that no unnecessary
work is done in servicing this procedure.
16.1.5. ERRORS
None.
16.2. Procedure 1: COMPOUND - Compound Operations
16.2.1. SYNOPSIS
compoundargs -> compoundres
16.2.2. ARGUMENTS
union nfs_argop4 switch (nfs_opnum4 argop) {
case <OPCODE>: <argument>;
...
};
struct COMPOUND4args {
utf8str_cs tag;
uint32_t minorversion;
nfs_argop4 argarray<>;
};
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16.2.3. RESULTS
union nfs_resop4 switch (nfs_opnum4 resop){
case <OPCODE>: <result>;
...
};
struct COMPOUND4res {
nfsstat4 status;
utf8str_cs tag;
nfs_resop4 resarray<>;
};
16.2.4. DESCRIPTION
The COMPOUND procedure is used to combine one or more of the NFS
operations into a single RPC request. The main NFS RPC program has
two main procedures: NULL and COMPOUND. All other operations use the
COMPOUND procedure as a wrapper.
The COMPOUND procedure is used to combine individual operations into
a single RPC request. The server interprets each of the operations
in turn. If an operation is executed by the server and the status of
that operation is NFS4_OK, then the next operation in the COMPOUND
procedure is executed. The server continues this process until there
are no more operations to be executed or one of the operations has a
status value other than NFS4_OK.
In the processing of the COMPOUND procedure, the server may find that
it does not have the available resources to execute any or all of the
operations within the COMPOUND sequence. See Section 2.10.5.4 for a
more detailed discussion.
The server will generally choose between two methods of decoding the
client's request. The first would be the traditional one pass XDR
decode. If there is an XDR decoding error in this case, the RPC XDR
decode error would be returned. The second method would be to make
an initial pass to decode the basic COMPOUND request and then to XDR
decode the individual operations; the most interesting is the decode
of attributes. In this case, the server may encounter an XDR decode
error during the second pass. In this case, the server would return
the error NFS4ERR_BADXDR to signify the decode error.
The COMPOUND arguments contain a "minorversion" field. For NFSv4.1,
the value for this field is 1. If the server receives a COMPOUND
procedure with a minorversion field value that it does not support,
the server MUST return an error of NFS4ERR_MINOR_VERS_MISMATCH and a
zero length resultdata array.
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Contained within the COMPOUND results is a "status" field. If the
results array length is non-zero, this status must be equivalent to
the status of the last operation that was executed within the
COMPOUND procedure. Therefore, if an operation incurred an error
then the "status" value will be the same error value as is being
returned for the operation that failed.
Note that operations, 0 (zero) and 1 (one) are not defined for the
COMPOUND procedure. Operation 2 is not defined but reserved for
future definition and use with minor versioning. If the server
receives a operation array that contains operation 2 and the
minorversion field has a value of 0 (zero), an error of
NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL, as described in the next paragraph, is returned
to the client. If an operation array contains an operation 2 and the
minorversion field is non-zero and the server does not support the
minor version, the server returns an error of
NFS4ERR_MINOR_VERS_MISMATCH. Therefore, the
NFS4ERR_MINOR_VERS_MISMATCH error takes precedence over all other
errors.
It is possible that the server receives a request that contains an
operation that is less than the first legal operation (OP_ACCESS) or
greater than the last legal operation (OP_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER). In
this case, the server's response will encode the opcode OP_ILLEGAL
rather than the illegal opcode of the request. The status field in
the ILLEGAL return results will set to NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL. The
COMPOUND procedure's return results will also be NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL.
The definition of the "tag" in the request is left to the
implementor. It may be used to summarize the content of the compound
request for the benefit of packet sniffers and engineers debugging
implementations. However, the value of "tag" in the response SHOULD
be the same value as provided in the request. This applies to the
tag field of the CB_COMPOUND procedure as well.
16.2.4.1. Current File Handle and Stateid
The COMPOUND procedure offers a simple environment for the execution
of the operations specified by the client. The first two relate to
the file handle while the second two relate to the current stateid.
16.2.4.1.1. Current File Handle
The current and saved file handle are used throughout the protocol.
Most operations implicitly use the current file handle as a argument
and many set the current file handle as part of the results. The
combination of client specified sequences of operations and current
and saved file handle arguments and results allows for greater
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protocol flexibility. The best or easiest example of current file
handle usage is a sequence like the following:
PUTFH fh1 {fh1}
LOOKUP "compA" {fh2}
GETATTR {fh2}
LOOKUP "compB" {fh3}
GETATTR {fh3}
LOOKUP "compC" {fh4}
GETATTR {fh4}
GETFH
Figure 77
In this example, the PUTFH operation explicitly sets the current file
handle value while the result of each LOOKUP operation sets the
current file handle value to the resultant file system object. Also,
the client is able to insert GETATTR operations using the current
file handle as an argument.
Along with the current file handle, there is a saved file handle.
While the current file handle is set as the result of operations like
LOOKUP, the saved file handle must be set directly with the use of
the SAVEFH operation. The SAVEFH operations copies the current file
handle value to the saved value. The saved file handle value is used
in combination with the current file handle value for the LINK and
RENAME operations. The RESTOREFH operation will copy the saved file
handle value to the current file handle value; as a result, the saved
file handle value may be used a sort of "scratch" area for the
client's series of operations.
16.2.4.1.2. Current Stateid
With NFSv4.1, additions of a current stateid and a saved stateid have
been made to the COMPOUND processing environment; this allows for the
passing of stateids between operations. There are no changes to the
syntax of the protocol, only changes to the semantics of a few
operations.
A "current stateid" is the stateid that is associated with the
current file handle. The current stateid may only be changed by an
operation that modifies the current file handle or returns a stateid.
If an operation returns a stateid it MUST set the current stateid to
the returned value. If an operation sets the current file handle but
does not return a stateid, the current stateid MUST be set to the
all-zeros special stateid. As an example, PUTFH will change the
current server state from {ocfh, osid} to {cfh, 0} while LOCK will
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change the current state from {cfh, osid} to {cfh, nsid}. The SAVEFH
and RESTOREFH operations will save and restore both the file handle
and the stateid as a set.
Any operation which takes as an argument a stateid that is not the
special all-zeros stateid MUST set the current stateid to the all-
zeros value before evaluating the operation. If the argument is the
special all-zeros stateid, the operation is evaluated using the
current stateid.
The following example is the common case of a simple READ operation
with a supplied stateid showing that the PUTFH initializes the
current stateid to zero. The subsequent READ with stateid sid1
replaces the current stateid before evaluating the operation.
PUTFH fh1 - -> {fh1, 0}
READ sid1,0,1024 {fh1, sid1} -> {fh1, sid1}
Figure 78
This next example performs an OPEN with the client provided stateid
sid1 and as a result generates stateid sid2. The next operation
specifies the READ with the special all-zero stateid but the current
stateid set by the previous operation is actually used when the
operation is evaluated, allowing correct interaction with any
existing, potentially conflicting, locks.
PUTFH fh1 - -> {fh1, 0}
OPEN R,sid1,"compA" {fh1, sid1} -> {fh2, sid2}
READ 0,0,1024 {fh2, sid2} -> {fh2, sid2}
CLOSE 0 {fh2, sid2} -> {fh2, sid3}
Figure 79
The final example is similar to the second in how it passes the
stateid sid2 generated by the LOCK operation to the next READ
operation. This allows the client to explicitly surround a single
I/O operation with a lock and its appropriate stateid to guarantee
correctness with other client locks.
PUTFH fh1 - -> {fh1, 0}
LOCK W,0,1024,sid1 {fh1, sid1} -> {fh1, sid2}
READ 0,0,1024 {fh1, sid2} -> {fh1, sid2}
LOCKU W,0,1024,0 {fh1, sid2} -> {fh1, sid3}
Figure 80
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16.2.5. IMPLEMENTATION
16.2.6. ERRORS
All errors defined in the protocol
17. NFS version 4.1 Operations
17.1. Operation 3: ACCESS - Check Access Rights
17.1.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), accessreq -> supported, accessrights
17.1.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* ACCESS: Check access permission
*/
const ACCESS4_READ = 0x00000001;
const ACCESS4_LOOKUP = 0x00000002;
const ACCESS4_MODIFY = 0x00000004;
const ACCESS4_EXTEND = 0x00000008;
const ACCESS4_DELETE = 0x00000010;
const ACCESS4_EXECUTE = 0x00000020;
struct ACCESS4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: object */
uint32_t access;
};
17.1.3. RESULTS
struct ACCESS4resok {
uint32_t supported;
uint32_t access;
};
union ACCESS4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
ACCESS4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
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17.1.4. DESCRIPTION
ACCESS determines the access rights that a user, as identified by the
credentials in the RPC request, has with respect to the file system
object specified by the current filehandle. The client encodes the
set of access rights that are to be checked in the bit mask "access".
The server checks the permissions encoded in the bit mask. If a
status of NFS4_OK is returned, two bit masks are included in the
response. The first, "supported", represents the access rights for
which the server can verify reliably. The second, "access",
represents the access rights available to the user for the filehandle
provided. On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
Note that the supported field will contain only as many values as was
originally sent in the arguments. For example, if the client sends
an ACCESS operation with only the ACCESS4_READ value set and the
server supports this value, the server will return only ACCESS4_READ
even if it could have reliably checked other values.
The results of this operation are necessarily advisory in nature. A
return status of NFS4_OK and the appropriate bit set in the bit mask
does not imply that such access will be allowed to the file system
object in the future. This is because access rights can be revoked
by the server at any time.
The following access permissions may be requested:
ACCESS4_READ Read data from file or read a directory.
ACCESS4_LOOKUP Look up a name in a directory (no meaning for non-
directory objects).
ACCESS4_MODIFY Rewrite existing file data or modify existing
directory entries.
ACCESS4_EXTEND Write new data or add directory entries.
ACCESS4_DELETE Delete an existing directory entry.
ACCESS4_EXECUTE Execute file (no meaning for a directory).
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.1.5. IMPLEMENTATION
In general, it is not sufficient for the client to attempt to deduce
access permissions by inspecting the uid, gid, and mode fields in the
file attributes or by attempting to interpret the contents of the ACL
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attribute. This is because the server may perform uid or gid mapping
or enforce additional access control restrictions. It is also
possible that the server may not be in the same ID space as the
client. In these cases (and perhaps others), the client can not
reliably perform an access check with only current file attributes.
In the NFS version 2 protocol, the only reliable way to determine
whether an operation was allowed was to try it and see if it
succeeded or failed. Using the ACCESS operation in the NFS version 4
protocol, the client can ask the server to indicate whether or not
one or more classes of operations are permitted. The ACCESS
operation is provided to allow clients to check before doing a series
of operations which will result in an access failure. The OPEN
operation provides a point where the server can verify access to the
file object and method to return that information to the client. The
ACCESS operation is still useful for directory operations or for use
in the case the UNIX API "access" is used on the client.
The information returned by the server in response to an ACCESS call
is not permanent. It was correct at the exact time that the server
performed the checks, but not necessarily afterwards. The server can
revoke access permission at any time.
The client should use the effective credentials of the user to build
the authentication information in the ACCESS request used to
determine access rights. It is the effective user and group
credentials that are used in subsequent read and write operations.
Many implementations do not directly support the ACCESS4_DELETE
permission. Operating systems like UNIX will ignore the
ACCESS4_DELETE bit if set on an access request on a non-directory
object. In these systems, delete permission on a file is determined
by the access permissions on the directory in which the file resides,
instead of being determined by the permissions of the file itself.
Therefore, the mask returned enumerating which access rights can be
determined will have the ACCESS4_DELETE value set to 0. This
indicates to the client that the server was unable to check that
particular access right. The ACCESS4_DELETE bit in the access mask
returned will then be ignored by the client.
17.2. Operation 4: CLOSE - Close File
17.2.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), seqid, open_stateid -> open_stateid
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17.2.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* CLOSE: Close a file and release share reservations
*/
struct CLOSE4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: object */
seqid4 seqid;
stateid4 open_stateid;
};
17.2.3. RESULTS
union CLOSE4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
stateid4 open_stateid;
default:
void;
};
17.2.4. DESCRIPTION
The CLOSE operation releases share reservations for the regular or
named attribute file as specified by the current filehandle. The
share reservations and other state information released at the server
as a result of this CLOSE is only that associated with the supplied
stateid. State associated with other OPENs is not affected.
If record locks are held, the client SHOULD release all locks before
issuing a CLOSE. The server MAY free all outstanding locks on CLOSE
but some servers may not support the CLOSE of a file that still has
record locks held. The server MUST return failure if any locks would
exist after the CLOSE.
The argument seqid MAY have any value and the server MUST ignore
seqid.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
The server MAY require that the principal, security flavor, and
applicable, the GSS mechanism, combination that issued the OPEN
request also be the one to CLOSE the file. This might not be
possible if credentials for the principal are no longer available.
The server MAY allow the machine credential or SSV credential (see
Section 17.35) to issue CLOSE.
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17.2.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Even though CLOSE returns a stateid, this stateid is not useful to
the client and should be treated as deprecated. CLOSE "shuts down"
the state associated with all OPENs for the file by a single
open_owner. As noted above, CLOSE will either release all file
locking state or return an error. Therefore, the stateid returned by
CLOSE is not useful for operations that follow.
17.3. Operation 5: COMMIT - Commit Cached Data
17.3.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), offset, count -> verifier
17.3.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* COMMIT: Commit cached data on server to stable storage
*/
struct COMMIT4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
offset4 offset;
count4 count;
};
17.3.3. RESULTS
struct COMMIT4resok {
verifier4 writeverf;
};
union COMMIT4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
COMMIT4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.3.4. DESCRIPTION
The COMMIT operation forces or flushes data to stable storage for the
file specified by the current filehandle. The flushed data is that
which was previously written with a WRITE operation which had the
stable field set to UNSTABLE4.
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The offset specifies the position within the file where the flush is
to begin. An offset value of 0 (zero) means to flush data starting
at the beginning of the file. The count specifies the number of
bytes of data to flush. If count is 0 (zero), a flush from offset to
the end of the file is done.
The server returns a write verifier upon successful completion of the
COMMIT. The write verifier is used by the client to determine if the
server has restarted or rebooted between the initial WRITE(s) and the
COMMIT. The client does this by comparing the write verifier
returned from the initial writes and the verifier returned by the
COMMIT operation. The server must vary the value of the write
verifier at each server event or instantiation that may lead to a
loss of uncommitted data. Most commonly this occurs when the server
is rebooted; however, other events at the server may result in
uncommitted data loss as well.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.3.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The COMMIT operation is similar in operation and semantics to the
POSIX fsync(2) system call that synchronizes a file's state with the
disk (file data and metadata is flushed to disk or stable storage).
COMMIT performs the same operation for a client, flushing any
unsynchronized data and metadata on the server to the server's disk
or stable storage for the specified file. Like fsync(2), it may be
that there is some modified data or no modified data to synchronize.
The data may have been synchronized by the server's normal periodic
buffer synchronization activity. COMMIT should return NFS4_OK,
unless there has been an unexpected error.
COMMIT differs from fsync(2) in that it is possible for the client to
flush a range of the file (most likely triggered by a buffer-
reclamation scheme on the client before file has been completely
written).
The server implementation of COMMIT is reasonably simple. If the
server receives a full file COMMIT request, that is starting at
offset 0 and count 0, it should do the equivalent of fsync()'ing the
file. Otherwise, it should arrange to have the cached data in the
range specified by offset and count to be flushed to stable storage.
In both cases, any metadata associated with the file must be flushed
to stable storage before returning. It is not an error for there to
be nothing to flush on the server. This means that the data and
metadata that needed to be flushed have already been flushed or lost
during the last server failure.
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The client implementation of COMMIT is a little more complex. There
are two reasons for wanting to commit a client buffer to stable
storage. The first is that the client wants to reuse a buffer. In
this case, the offset and count of the buffer are sent to the server
in the COMMIT request. The server then flushes any cached data based
on the offset and count, and flushes any metadata associated with the
file. It then returns the status of the flush and the write
verifier. The other reason for the client to generate a COMMIT is
for a full file flush, such as may be done at close. In this case,
the client would gather all of the buffers for this file that contain
uncommitted data, do the COMMIT operation with an offset of 0 and
count of 0, and then free all of those buffers. Any other dirty
buffers would be sent to the server in the normal fashion.
After a buffer is written by the client with the stable parameter set
to UNSTABLE4, the buffer must be considered as modified by the client
until the buffer has either been flushed via a COMMIT operation or
written via a WRITE operation with stable parameter set to FILE_SYNC4
or DATA_SYNC4. This is done to prevent the buffer from being freed
and reused before the data can be flushed to stable storage on the
server.
When a response is returned from either a WRITE or a COMMIT operation
and it contains a write verifier that is different than previously
returned by the server, the client will need to retransmit all of the
buffers containing uncommitted cached data to the server. How this
is to be done is up to the implementor. If there is only one buffer
of interest, then it should probably be sent back over in a WRITE
request with the appropriate stable parameter. If there is more than
one buffer, it might be worthwhile retransmitting all of the buffers
in WRITE requests with the stable parameter set to UNSTABLE4 and then
retransmitting the COMMIT operation to flush all of the data on the
server to stable storage. The timing of these retransmissions is
left to the implementor.
The above description applies to page-cache-based systems as well as
buffer-cache-based systems. In those systems, the virtual memory
system will need to be modified instead of the buffer cache.
17.4. Operation 6: CREATE - Create a Non-Regular File Object
17.4.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), name, type, attrs -> (cfh), change_info, attrs_set
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17.4.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* CREATE: Create a non-regular file
*/
union createtype4 switch (nfs_ftype4 type) {
case NF4LNK:
linktext4 linkdata;
case NF4BLK:
case NF4CHR:
specdata4 devdata;
case NF4SOCK:
case NF4FIFO:
case NF4DIR:
void;
default:
void; /* server should return NFS4ERR_BADTYPE */
};
struct CREATE4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: directory for creation */
createtype4 objtype;
component4 objname;
fattr4 createattrs;
};
17.4.3. RESULTS
struct CREATE4resok {
change_info4 cinfo;
bitmap4 attrset; /* attributes set */
};
union CREATE4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
CREATE4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.4.4. DESCRIPTION
The CREATE operation creates a non-regular file object in a directory
with a given name. The OPEN operation MUST be used to create a
regular file.
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The objname specifies the name for the new object. The objtype
determines the type of object to be created: directory, symlink, etc.
If an object of the same name already exists in the directory, the
server will return the error NFS4ERR_EXIST.
For the directory where the new file object was created, the server
returns change_info4 information in cinfo. With the atomic field of
the change_info4 struct, the server will indicate if the before and
after change attributes were obtained atomically with respect to the
file object creation.
If the objname has a length of 0 (zero), or if objname does not obey
the UTF-8 definition, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL will be returned.
The current filehandle is replaced by that of the new object.
The createattrs specifies the initial set of attributes for the
object. The set of attributes may include any writable attribute
valid for the object type. When the operation is successful, the
server will return to the client an attribute mask signifying which
attributes were successfully set for the object.
If createattrs includes neither the owner attribute nor an ACL with
an ACE for the owner, and if the server's file system both supports
and requires an owner attribute (or an owner ACE) then the server
MUST derive the owner (or the owner ACE). This would typically be
from the principal indicated in the RPC credentials of the call, but
the server's operating environment or file system semantics may
dictate other methods of derivation. Similarly, if createattrs
includes neither the group attribute nor a group ACE, and if the
server's file system both supports and requires the notion of a group
attribute (or group ACE), the server MUST derive the group attribute
(or the corresponding owner ACE) for the file. This could be from
the RPC call's credentials, such as the group principal if the
credentials include it (such as with AUTH_SYS), from the group
identifier associated with the principal in the credentials (for
e.g., POSIX systems have a passwd database that has the group
identifier for every user identifier), inherited from directory the
object is created in, or whatever else the server's operating
environment or file system semantics dictate. This applies to the
OPEN operation too.
Conversely, it is possible the client will specify in createattrs an
owner attribute or group attribute or ACL that the principal
indicated the RPC call's credentials does not have permissions to
create files for. The error to be returned in this instance is
NFS4ERR_PERM. This applies to the OPEN operation too.
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17.4.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the client desires to set attribute values after the create, a
SETATTR operation can be added to the COMPOUND request so that the
appropriate attributes will be set.
17.5. Operation 7: DELEGPURGE - Purge Delegations Awaiting Recovery
17.5.1. SYNOPSIS
client ID ->
17.5.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* DELEGPURGE: Purge Delegations Awaiting Recovery
*/
struct DELEGPURGE4args {
clientid4 clientid;
};
17.5.3. RESULTS
struct DELEGPURGE4res {
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.5.4. DESCRIPTION
Purges all of the delegations awaiting recovery for a given client.
This is useful for clients which do not commit delegation information
to stable storage to indicate that conflicting requests need not be
delayed by the server awaiting recovery of delegation information.
This operation should be used by clients that record delegation
information on stable storage on the client. In this case,
DELEGPURGE should be issued immediately after doing delegation
recovery on all delegations known to the client. Doing so will
notify the server that no additional delegations for the client will
be recovered allowing it to free resources, and avoid delaying other
clients who make requests that conflict with the unrecovered
delegations. The set of delegations known to the server and the
client may be different. The reason for this is that a client may
fail after making a request which resulted in delegation but before
it received the results and committed them to the client's stable
storage.
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The server MAY support DELEGPURGE, but if it does not, it MUST NOT
support CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV.
17.6. Operation 8: DELEGRETURN - Return Delegation
17.6.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), stateid ->
17.6.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* DELEGRETURN: Return a delegation
*/
struct DELEGRETURN4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: delegated file */
stateid4 deleg_stateid;
};
17.6.3. RESULTS
struct DELEGRETURN4res {
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.6.4. DESCRIPTION
Returns the delegation represented by the current filehandle and
stateid.
Delegations may be returned when recalled or voluntarily (i.e. before
the server has recalled them). In either case the client must
properly propagate state changed under the context of the delegation
to the server before returning the delegation.
The server MAY require that the principal, security flavor, and
applicable, the GSS mechanism, combination that acquired the
delegation also be the one to issue DELEGRETURN on the file. This
might not be possible if credentials for the principal are no longer
available. The server MAY allow the machine credential or SSV
credential (see Section 17.35) to issue DELEGRETURN.
17.7. Operation 9: GETATTR - Get Attributes
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17.7.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), attrbits -> attrbits, attrvals
17.7.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* GETATTR: Get file attributes
*/
struct GETATTR4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: directory or file */
bitmap4 attr_request;
};
17.7.3. RESULTS
struct GETATTR4resok {
fattr4 obj_attributes;
};
union GETATTR4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
GETATTR4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.7.4. DESCRIPTION
The GETATTR operation will obtain attributes for the file system
object specified by the current filehandle. The client sets a bit in
the bitmap argument for each attribute value that it would like the
server to return. The server returns an attribute bitmap that
indicates the attribute values which it was able to return, which
will include all attributes requested by the client which are
attributes supported by the server for the target file system. This
bitmap is followed by the attribute values ordered lowest attribute
number first.
The server must return a value for each attribute that the client
requests if the attribute is supported by the server for the target
file system. If the server does not support a particular attribute
on the target file system then it must not return the attribute value
and must not set the attribute bit in the result bitmap. The server
must return an error if it supports an attribute on the target but
cannot obtain its value. In that case, no attribute values will be
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returned.
File systems which are absent should be treated as having support for
a very small set of attributes as described in GETATTR Within an
Absent File System (Section 5), even if previously, when the file
system was present, more attributes were supported.
All servers must support the mandatory attributes as specified in
File Attributes (Section 10.3.1), for all file systems, with the
exception of absent file systems.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.7.5. IMPLEMENTATION
17.8. Operation 10: GETFH - Get Current Filehandle
17.8.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) -> filehandle
17.8.2. ARGUMENTS
/* CURRENT_FH: */
void;
17.8.3. RESULTS
/*
* GETFH: Get current filehandle
*/
struct GETFH4resok {
nfs_fh4 object;
};
union GETFH4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
GETFH4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.8.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation returns the current filehandle value.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
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17.8.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Operations that change the current filehandle like LOOKUP or CREATE
do not automatically return the new filehandle as a result. For
instance, if a client needs to lookup a directory entry and obtain
its filehandle then the following request is needed.
PUTFH (directory filehandle)
LOOKUP (entry name)
GETFH
17.9. Operation 11: LINK - Create Link to a File
17.9.1. SYNOPSIS
(sfh), (cfh), newname -> (cfh), change_info
17.9.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* LINK: Create link to an object
*/
struct LINK4args {
/* SAVED_FH: source object */
/* CURRENT_FH: target directory */
component4 newname;
};
17.9.3. RESULTS
struct LINK4resok {
change_info4 cinfo;
};
union LINK4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
LINK4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
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17.9.4. DESCRIPTION
The LINK operation creates an additional newname for the file
represented by the saved filehandle, as set by the SAVEFH operation,
in the directory represented by the current filehandle. The existing
file and the target directory must reside within the same file system
on the server. On success, the current filehandle will continue to
be the target directory. If an object exists in the target directory
with the same name as newname, the server must return NFS4ERR_EXIST.
For the target directory, the server returns change_info4 information
in cinfo. With the atomic field of the change_info4 struct, the
server will indicate if the before and after change attributes were
obtained atomically with respect to the link creation.
If the newname has a length of 0 (zero), or if newname does not obey
the UTF-8 definition, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL will be returned.
17.9.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Changes to any property of the "hard" linked files are reflected in
all of the linked files. When a link is made to a file, the
attributes for the file should have a value for numlinks that is one
greater than the value before the LINK operation.
The statement "file and the target directory must reside within the
same file system on the server" means that the fsid fields in the
attributes for the objects are the same. If they reside on different
file systems, the error, NFS4ERR_XDEV, is returned. On some servers,
the filenames, "." and "..", are illegal as newname.
In the case that newname is already linked to the file represented by
the saved filehandle, the server will return NFS4ERR_EXIST.
Note that symbolic links are created with the CREATE operation.
17.10. Operation 12: LOCK - Create Lock
17.10.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) locktype, reclaim, offset, length, locker -> stateid
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17.10.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* For LOCK, transition from open_stateid and lock_owner
* to a lock stateid.
*/
struct open_to_lock_owner4 {
seqid4 open_seqid;
stateid4 open_stateid;
seqid4 lock_seqid;
lock_owner4 lock_owner;
};
/*
* For LOCK, existing lock stateid continues to request new
* file lock for the same lock_owner and open_stateid.
*/
struct exist_lock_owner4 {
stateid4 lock_stateid;
seqid4 lock_seqid;
};
union locker4 switch (bool new_lock_owner) {
case TRUE:
open_to_lock_owner4 open_owner;
case FALSE:
exist_lock_owner4 lock_owner;
};
/*
* LOCK/LOCKT/LOCKU: Record lock management
*/
struct LOCK4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
nfs_lock_type4 locktype;
bool reclaim;
offset4 offset;
length4 length;
locker4 locker;
};
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17.10.3. RESULTS
struct LOCK4denied {
offset4 offset;
length4 length;
nfs_lock_type4 locktype;
lock_owner4 owner;
};
struct LOCK4resok {
stateid4 lock_stateid;
};
union LOCK4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
LOCK4resok resok4;
case NFS4ERR_DENIED:
LOCK4denied denied;
default:
void;
};
17.10.4. DESCRIPTION
The LOCK operation requests a record lock for the octet range
specified by the offset and length parameters. The lock type is also
specified to be one of the nfs_lock_type4s. If this is a reclaim
request, the reclaim parameter will be TRUE;
Bytes in a file may be locked even if those octets are not currently
allocated to the file. To lock the file from a specific offset
through the end-of-file (no matter how long the file actually is) use
a length field with all bits set to 1 (one). If the length is zero,
or if a length which is not all bits set to one is specified, and
length when added to the offset exceeds the maximum 64-bit unsigned
integer value, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL will result.
Some servers may only support locking for octet offsets that fit
within 32 bits. If the client specifies a range that includes an
octet beyond the last octet offset of the 32-bit range, but does not
include the last octet offset of the 32-bit and all of the octet
offsets beyond it, up to the end of the valid 64-bit range, such a
32-bit server MUST return the error NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE.
In the case that the lock is denied, the owner, offset, and length of
a conflicting lock are returned.
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The locker argument specifies the lock_owner that is associated with
the LOCK request. The locker4 structure is a switched union that
indicates whether the client has already created record locking state
associated with the current open file and lock owner. In the case in
which it has, the argument is just a stateid for the set of locks
associated with that open file and lock owner, together with a
lock_seqid value which MAY be any value and MUST be ignored by the
server. In the case where no such state has been established, or the
client does not have the stateid available, the argument contains the
stateid of the open file with which this lock is to be associated,
together with the lock_owner which which the lock is to be
associated. The open_to_lock_owner case covers the very first lock
done by a lock_owner for a given open file and offers a method to use
the established state of the open_stateid to transition to the use of
a lock stateid.
The client field of the lock owner, and all seqid values in the
arguments MAY be any value and MUST be ignored by the server. The
client ID with which all owners and stateids are associated is the
client ID associated with the session on which the request was
issued. The client ID appearing in a LOCK4denied structure is the
actual client associated with the conflicting lock, whether this is
the client ID associated with the current session, or a different
one.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.10.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the server is unable to determine the exact offset and length of
the conflicting lock, the same offset and length that were provided
in the arguments should be returned in the denied results. The File
Locking section contains a full description of this and the other
file locking operations.
LOCK operations are subject to permission checks and to checks
against the access type of the associated file. However, the
specific right and modes required for various type of locks, reflect
the semantics of the server-exported file system, and are not
specified by the protocol. For example, Windows 2000 allows a write
lock of a file open for READ, while a POSIX-compliant system does
not.
When the client makes a lock request that corresponds to a range that
the lockowner has locked already (with the same or different lock
type), or to a sub-region of such a range, or to a region which
includes multiple locks already granted to that lockowner, in whole
or in part, and the server does not support such locking operations
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(i.e. does not support POSIX locking semantics), the server will
return the error NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE. In that case, the client may
return an error, or it may emulate the required operations, using
only LOCK for ranges that do not include any octets already locked by
that lock_owner and LOCKU of locks held by that lock_owner
(specifying an exactly-matching range and type). Similarly, when the
client makes a lock request that amounts to upgrading (changing from
a read lock to a write lock) or downgrading (changing from write lock
to a read lock) an existing record lock, and the server does not
support such a lock, the server will return NFS4ERR_LOCK_NOTSUPP.
Such operations may not perfectly reflect the required semantics in
the face of conflicting lock requests from other clients.
17.11. Operation 13: LOCKT - Test For Lock
17.11.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) locktype, offset, length owner -> {void, NFS4ERR_DENIED ->
owner}
17.11.2. ARGUMENTS
struct LOCKT4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
nfs_lock_type4 locktype;
offset4 offset;
length4 length;
lock_owner4 owner;
};
17.11.3. RESULTS
union LOCKT4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4ERR_DENIED:
LOCK4denied denied;
case NFS4_OK:
void;
default:
void;
};
17.11.4. DESCRIPTION
The LOCKT operation tests the lock as specified in the arguments. If
a conflicting lock exists, the owner, offset, length, and type of the
conflicting lock are returned. The owner field in the results
includes the client ID of the owner of conflicting lock, whether this
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is the client ID associated with the current session or a different
client ID. If no lock is held, nothing other than NFS4_OK is
returned. Lock types READ_LT and READW_LT are processed in the same
way in that a conflicting lock test is done without regard to
blocking or non-blocking. The same is true for WRITE_LT and
WRITEW_LT.
The ranges are specified as for LOCK. The NFS4ERR_INVAL and
NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE errors are returned under the same circumstances as
for LOCK.
The client ID field of the owner should be specified as zero. The
client ID used for ownership comparisons is that associated with the
session on which the request is issued. If the client ID field is
other than zero, the server MUST return the error NFS4ERR_INVAL.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.11.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the server is unable to determine the exact offset and length of
the conflicting lock, the same offset and length that were provided
in the arguments should be returned in the denied results. The File
Locking section contains further discussion of the file locking
mechanisms.
LOCKT uses a lock_owner4 rather a stateid4, as is used in LOCK to
identify the owner. This is because the client does not have to open
the file to test for the existence of a lock, so a stateid may not be
available.
The test for conflicting locks should exclude locks for the current
lockowner. Note that since such locks are not examined the possible
existence of overlapping ranges may not affect the results of LOCKT.
If the server does examine locks that match the lockowner for the
purpose of range checking, NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE may be returned.. In
the event that it returns NFS4_OK, clients may do a LOCK and receive
NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE on the LOCK request because of the flexibility
provided to the server.
17.12. Operation 14: LOCKU - Unlock File
17.12.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) type, seqid, stateid, offset, length -> stateid
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17.12.2. ARGUMENTS
struct LOCKU4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
nfs_lock_type4 locktype;
seqid4 seqid;
stateid4 lock_stateid;
offset4 offset;
length4 length;
};
17.12.3. RESULTS
union LOCKU4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
stateid4 lock_stateid;
default:
void;
};
17.12.4. DESCRIPTION
The LOCKU operation unlocks the record lock specified by the
parameters. The client may set the locktype field to any value that
is legal for the nfs_lock_type4 enumerated type, and the server MUST
accept any legal value for locktype. Any legal value for locktype
has no effect on the success or failure of the LOCKU operation.
The ranges are specified as for LOCK. The NFS4ERR_INVAL and
NFS4ERR_BAD_RANGE errors are returned under the same circumstances as
for LOCK.
The seqid parameter MAY be any value and the server MUST ignore it.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
The server MAY require that the principal, security flavor, and
applicable, the GSS mechanism, combination that issued a LOCK request
also be the one to issue LOCKU on the file. This might not be
possible if credentials for the principal are no longer available.
The server MAY allow the machine credential or SSV credential (see
Section 17.35) to issue LOCKU.
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17.12.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the area to be unlocked does not correspond exactly to a lock
actually held by the lockowner the server may return the error
NFS4ERR_LOCK_RANGE. This includes the case in which the area is not
locked, where the area is a sub-range of the area locked, where it
overlaps the area locked without matching exactly or the area
specified includes multiple locks held by the lockowner. In all of
these cases, allowed by POSIX locking semantics, a client receiving
this error, should if it desires support for such operations,
simulate the operation using LOCKU on ranges corresponding to locks
it actually holds, possibly followed by LOCK requests for the sub-
ranges not being unlocked.
17.13. Operation 15: LOOKUP - Lookup Filename
17.13.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), component -> (cfh)
17.13.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* LOOKUP: Lookup filename
*/
struct LOOKUP4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
component4 objname;
};
17.13.3. RESULTS
struct LOOKUP4res {
/* CURRENT_FH: object */
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.13.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation LOOKUPs or finds a file system object using the
directory specified by the current filehandle. LOOKUP evaluates the
component and if the object exists the current filehandle is replaced
with the component's filehandle.
If the component cannot be evaluated either because it does not exist
or because the client does not have permission to evaluate the
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component, then an error will be returned and the current filehandle
will be unchanged.
If the component is a zero length string or if any component does not
obey the UTF-8 definition, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL will be returned.
17.13.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the client wants to achieve the effect of a multi-component
lookup, it may construct a COMPOUND request such as (and obtain each
filehandle):
PUTFH (directory filehandle)
LOOKUP "pub"
GETFH
LOOKUP "foo"
GETFH
LOOKUP "bar"
GETFH
NFS version 4 servers depart from the semantics of previous NFS
versions in allowing LOOKUP requests to cross mountpoints on the
server. The client can detect a mountpoint crossing by comparing the
fsid attribute of the directory with the fsid attribute of the
directory looked up. If the fsids are different then the new
directory is a server mountpoint. UNIX clients that detect a
mountpoint crossing will need to mount the server's file system.
This needs to be done to maintain the file object identity checking
mechanisms common to UNIX clients.
Servers that limit NFS access to "shares" or "exported" file systems
should provide a pseudo file system into which the exported file
systems can be integrated, so that clients can browse the server's
name space. The clients view of a pseudo file system will be limited
to paths that lead to exported file systems.
Note: previous versions of the protocol assigned special semantics to
the names "." and "..". NFS version 4 assigns no special semantics
to these names. The LOOKUPP operator must be used to lookup a parent
directory.
Note that this operation does not follow symbolic links. The client
is responsible for all parsing of filenames including filenames that
are modified by symbolic links encountered during the lookup process.
If the current filehandle supplied is not a directory but a symbolic
link, the error NFS4ERR_SYMLINK is returned as the error. For all
other non-directory file types, the error NFS4ERR_NOTDIR is returned.
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17.14. Operation 16: LOOKUPP - Lookup Parent Directory
17.14.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) -> (cfh)
17.14.2. ARGUMENTS
/* CURRENT_FH: object */
void;
17.14.3. RESULTS
/*
* LOOKUPP: Lookup parent directory
*/
struct LOOKUPP4res {
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.14.4. DESCRIPTION
The current filehandle is assumed to refer to a regular directory or
a named attribute directory. LOOKUPP assigns the filehandle for its
parent directory to be the current filehandle. If there is no parent
directory an NFS4ERR_NOENT error must be returned. Therefore,
NFS4ERR_NOENT will be returned by the server when the current
filehandle is at the root or top of the server's file tree.
As for LOOKUP, LOOKUPP will also cross mountpoints.
If the current filehandle is not a directory or named attribute
directory, the error NFS4ERR_NOTDIR is returned.
If the requester's security flavor does not match that configured for
the parent directory, then the server SHOULD return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC
(a future minor revision of NFSv4 may upgrade this to MUST) in the
LOOKUPP response. However, if the server does so, it MUST support
the new SECINFO_NO_NAME operation, so that the client can gracefully
determine the correct security flavor. See the discussion of the
SECINFO_NO_NAME operation for a description.
If the current filehandle is a named attribute directory that is
associated with a file system object via OPENATTR (i.e. not a sub-
directory of a named attribute directory) LOOKUPP SHOULD return the
filehandle of the associated file system object.
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17.14.5. IMPLEMENTATION
17.15. Operation 17: NVERIFY - Verify Difference in Attributes
17.15.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), fattr -> -
17.15.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* NVERIFY: Verify attributes different
*/
struct NVERIFY4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: object */
fattr4 obj_attributes;
};
17.15.3. RESULTS
struct NVERIFY4res {
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.15.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation is used to prefix a sequence of operations to be
performed if one or more attributes have changed on some file system
object. If all the attributes match then the error NFS4ERR_SAME must
be returned.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.15.5. IMPLEMENTATION
This operation is useful as a cache validation operator. If the
object to which the attributes belong has changed then the following
operations may obtain new data associated with that object. For
instance, to check if a file has been changed and obtain new data if
it has:
PUTFH (public)
LOOKUP "foobar"
NVERIFY attrbits attrs
READ 0 32767
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In the case that a recommended attribute is specified in the NVERIFY
operation and the server does not support that attribute for the file
system object, the error NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP is returned to the
client.
When the attribute rdattr_error or any write-only attribute (e.g.
time_modify_set) is specified, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL is returned to
the client.
17.16. Operation 18: OPEN - Open a Regular File
17.16.1. SYNOPSIS
<cfh>, share_access, share_deny, owner, openhow, claim
-> (cfh), stateid, cinfo, rflags, attrset, delegation
17.16.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* Various definitions for OPEN
*/
enum createmode4 {
UNCHECKED4 = 0,
GUARDED4 = 1,
EXCLUSIVE4 = 2
};
union createhow4 switch (createmode4 mode) {
case UNCHECKED4:
case GUARDED4:
fattr4 createattrs;
case EXCLUSIVE4:
verifier4 createverf;
};
enum opentype4 {
OPEN4_NOCREATE = 0,
OPEN4_CREATE = 1
};
union openflag4 switch (opentype4 opentype) {
case OPEN4_CREATE:
createhow4 how;
default:
void;
};
/* Next definitions used for OPEN delegation */
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enum limit_by4 {
NFS_LIMIT_SIZE = 1,
NFS_LIMIT_BLOCKS = 2
/* others as needed */
};
struct nfs_modified_limit4 {
uint32_t num_blocks;
uint32_t bytes_per_block;
};
union nfs_space_limit4 switch (limit_by4 limitby) {
/* limit specified as file size */
case NFS_LIMIT_SIZE:
uint64_t filesize;
/* limit specified by number of blocks */
case NFS_LIMIT_BLOCKS:
nfs_modified_limit4 mod_blocks;
} ;
/*
* Share Access and Deny constants for open argument
*/
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ = 0x00000001;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE = 0x00000002;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_BOTH = 0x00000003;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_NONE = 0x00000000;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_READ = 0x00000001;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_WRITE = 0x00000002;
const OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_BOTH = 0x00000003;
/* new flags for share_access field of OPEN4args */
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_DELEG_MASK = 0xFF00;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_NO_PREFERENCE = 0x0000;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_READ_DELEG = 0x0100;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_WRITE_DELEG = 0x0200;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_ANY_DELEG = 0x0300;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_NO_DELEG = 0x0400;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_CANCEL = 0x0500;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_SIGNAL_DELEG_WHEN_RESRC_AVAIL = 0x10000;
const OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_PUSH_DELEG_WHEN_UNCONTENDED = 0x20000;
enum open_delegation_type4 {
OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE = 0,
OPEN_DELEGATE_READ = 1,
OPEN_DELEGATE_WRITE = 2,
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OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE_EXT = 3 /* new to v4.1 */
};
enum open_claim_type4 {
CLAIM_NULL = 0,
CLAIM_PREVIOUS = 1,
CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR = 2,
CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV = 3,
/*
* Like CLAIM_NULL, but object identified
* by the current filehandle.
*/
CLAIM_FH = 4, /* new to v4.1 */
/*
* Like CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR, but object identified
* by current filehandle.
*/
CLAIM_DELEG_CUR_FH = 5, /* new to v4.1 */
/*
* Like CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV, but object identified
* by current filehandle.
*/
CLAIM_DELEG_PREV_FH = 6 /* new to v4.1 */
};
struct open_claim_delegate_cur4 {
stateid4 delegate_stateid;
component4 file;
};
union open_claim4 switch (open_claim_type4 claim) {
/*
* No special rights to file. Ordinary OPEN of the specified file.
*/
case CLAIM_NULL:
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
component4 file;
/*
* Right to the file established by an open previous to server
* reboot. File identified by filehandle obtained at that time
* rather than by name.
*/
case CLAIM_PREVIOUS:
/* CURRENT_FH: file being reclaimed */
open_delegation_type4 delegate_type;
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/*
* Right to file based on a delegation granted by the server.
* File is specified by name.
*/
case CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR:
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
open_claim_delegate_cur4 delegate_cur_info;
/* Right to file based on a delegation granted to a previous boot
* instance of the client. File is specified by name.
*/
case CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV:
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
component4 file_delegate_prev;
/*
* Like CLAIM_NULL. No special rights to file. Ordinary OPEN of the
* specified file by current filehandle.
*/
case CLAIM_FH: /* new to v4.1 */
/* CURRENT_FH: regular file to open */
void;
/*
* Like CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV. Right to file based on a
* delegation granted to a previous boot
* instance of the client. File is identified by
* by file handle.
*/
case CLAIM_DELEG_PREV_FH: /* new to v4.1 */
/* CURRENT_FH: file being opened */
void;
/*
* Like CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR. Right to file based on
* a delegation granted by the server.
* File is identified by filehandle.
*/
case CLAIM_DELEG_CUR_FH: /* new to v4.1 */
/* CURRENT_FH: file being opened */
stateid4 oc_delegate_stateid;
};
/*
* OPEN: Open a file, potentially receiving an open delegation
*/
struct OPEN4args {
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seqid4 seqid;
uint32_t share_access;
uint32_t share_deny;
open_owner4 owner;
openflag4 openhow;
open_claim4 claim;
};
17.16.3. RESULTS
struct open_read_delegation4 {
stateid4 stateid; /* Stateid for delegation*/
bool recall; /* Pre-recalled flag for
delegations obtained
by reclaim
(CLAIM_PREVIOUS) */
nfsace4 permissions; /* Defines users who don't
need an ACCESS call to
open for read */
};
struct open_write_delegation4 {
stateid4 stateid; /* Stateid for delegation */
bool recall; /* Pre-recalled flag for
delegations obtained
by reclaim
(CLAIM_PREVIOUS) */
nfs_space_limit4 space_limit; /* Defines condition that
the client must check to
determine whether the
file needs to be flushed
to the server on close.
*/
nfsace4 permissions; /* Defines users who don't
need an ACCESS call as
part of a delegated
open. */
};
enum why_no_delegation4 { /* new to v4.1 */
WND4_NOT_WANTED = 0,
WND4_CONTENTION = 1,
WND4_RESOURCE = 2,
WND4_NOT_SUPP_FTYPE = 3,
WND4_WRITE_DELEG_NOT_SUPP_FTYPE = 4,
WND4_NOT_SUPP_UPGRADE = 5,
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WND4_NOT_SUPP_DOWNGRADE = 6,
WND4_CANCELED = 7,
WND4_IS_DIR = 8
};
union open_none_delegation4 /* new to v4.1 */
switch (why_no_delegation4 ond_why) {
case WND4_CONTENTION:
bool ond_server_will_push_deleg;
case WND4_RESOURCE:
bool ond_server_will_signal_avail;
default:
void;
};
union open_delegation4
switch (open_delegation_type4 delegation_type) {
case OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE:
void;
case OPEN_DELEGATE_READ:
open_read_delegation4 read;
case OPEN_DELEGATE_WRITE:
open_write_delegation4 write;
case OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE_EXT: /* new to v4.1 */
open_none_delegation4 od_whynone;
};
/*
* Result flags
*/
/* Client must confirm open */
const OPEN4_RESULT_CONFIRM = 0x00000002;
/* Type of file locking behavior at the server */
const OPEN4_RESULT_LOCKTYPE_POSIX = 0x00000004;
/* Server will preserve file if removed while open */
const OPEN4_RESULT_PRESERVE_UNLINKED = 0x00000008;
/* Server may use CB_NOTIFY_LOCK on locks derived from this open */
const OPEN4_RESULT_MAY_NOTIFY_LOCK = 0x00000020;
struct OPEN4resok {
stateid4 stateid; /* Stateid for open */
change_info4 cinfo; /* Directory Change Info */
uint32_t rflags; /* Result flags */
bitmap4 attrset; /* attribute set for create*/
open_delegation4 delegation; /* Info on any open
delegation */
};
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union OPEN4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
/* CURRENT_FH: opened file */
OPEN4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.16.4. DESCRIPTION
The OPEN operation creates and/or opens a regular file in a directory
with the provided name. If the file does not exist at the server and
creation is desired, specification of the method of creation is
provided by the openhow parameter. The client has the choice of
three creation methods: UNCHECKED, GUARDED, or EXCLUSIVE.
If the current filehandle is a named attribute directory, OPEN will
then create or open a named attribute file. Note that exclusive
create of a named attribute is not supported. If the createmode is
EXCLUSIVE4 and the current filehandle is a named attribute directory,
the server will return EINVAL.
UNCHECKED means that the file should be created if a file of that
name does not exist and encountering an existing regular file of that
name is not an error. For this type of create, createattrs specifies
the initial set of attributes for the file. The set of attributes
may include any writable attribute valid for regular files. When an
UNCHECKED create encounters an existing file, the attributes
specified by createattrs are not used, except that when an size of
zero is specified, the existing file is truncated. If GUARDED is
specified, the server checks for the presence of a duplicate object
by name before performing the create. If a duplicate exists, an
error of NFS4ERR_EXIST is returned as the status. If the object does
not exist, the request is performed as described for UNCHECKED. For
each of these cases (UNCHECKED and GUARDED) where the operation is
successful, the server will return to the client an attribute mask
signifying which attributes were successfully set for the object.
EXCLUSIVE specifies that the server is to follow exclusive creation
semantics, using the verifier to ensure exclusive creation of the
target. The server should check for the presence of a duplicate
object by name. If the object does not exist, the server creates the
object and stores the verifier with the object. If the object does
exist and the stored verifier matches the client provided verifier,
the server uses the existing object as the newly created object. If
the stored verifier does not match, then an error of NFS4ERR_EXIST is
returned. No attributes may be provided in this case, since the
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server may use an attribute of the target object to store the
verifier. If the server uses an attribute to store the exclusive
create verifier, it will signify which attribute by setting the
appropriate bit in the attribute mask that is returned in the
results.
For the target directory, the server returns change_info4 information
in cinfo. With the atomic field of the change_info4 struct, the
server will indicate if the before and after change attributes were
obtained atomically with respect to the link creation.
Upon successful creation, the current filehandle is replaced by that
of the new object.
The OPEN operation provides for Windows share reservation capability
with the use of the share_access and share_deny fields of the OPEN
arguments. The client specifies at OPEN the required share_access
and share_deny modes. For clients that do not directly support
SHAREs (i.e. UNIX), the expected deny value is DENY_NONE. In the
case that there is a existing SHARE reservation that conflicts with
the OPEN request, the server returns the error NFS4ERR_SHARE_DENIED.
For each OPEN, the client must provide a value for the owner field
for the OPEN argument. The client ID associated with the owner is
not derived from the client field of the owner parameter but is
instead the client ID associated with the session on which the
request is issued. If the client ID field of the owner parameter is
not zero, the server MUST return an NFS4ERR_INVAL error. For
additional discussion of SHARE semantics see Section 8.8.
The seqid value is not used in NFSv4.1, but it MAY be any value and
the server MUST ignore it.
In the case that the client is recovering state from a server
failure, the claim field of the OPEN argument is used to signify that
the request is meant to reclaim state previously held.
The "claim" field of the OPEN argument is used to specify the file to
be opened and the state information which the client claims to
possess. There are seven claim types as follows:
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+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| open type | description |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| CLAIM_NULL CLAIM_FH | For the client, this is a new OPEN request |
| | and there is no previous state associate |
| | with the file for the client. With |
| | CLAIM_NULL the file is identified by the |
| | current filehandle and the specified |
| | component name. With CLAIM_FH (new to |
| | v4.1) the file is identified by just the |
| | current filehandle. |
| CLAIM_PREVIOUS | The client is claiming basic OPEN state for |
| | a file that was held previous to a server |
| | reboot. Generally used when a server is |
| | returning persistent filehandles; the |
| | client may not have the file name to |
| | reclaim the OPEN. |
| CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR | The client is claiming a delegation for |
| CLAIM_DELEG_PREV_FH | OPEN as granted by the server. Generally |
| | this is done as part of recalling a |
| | delegation. With CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR, the |
| | file is identified by the current |
| | filehandle and the specified component |
| | name. With CLAIM_DELEG_PREV_FH (new to |
| | v4.1), the file is identified by just the |
| | current filehandle. |
| CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV | The client is claiming a delegation granted |
| CLAIM_DELEG_PREV_FH | to a previous client instance; used after |
| | the client reboots. The server MAY support |
| | CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV or CLAIM_DELEG_PREV_FH. |
| | If it does support either open type, |
| | CREATE_SESSION MUST NOT remove the client's |
| | delegation state, and the server MUST |
| | support the DELEGPURGE operation. |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
For OPEN requests whose claim type is other than CLAIM_PREVIOUS (i.e.
requests other than those devoted to reclaiming opens after a server
reboot) that reach the server during its grace or lease expiration
period, the server returns an error of NFS4ERR_GRACE.
For any OPEN request, the server may return an open delegation, which
allows further opens and closes to be handled locally on the client
as described in the section Open Delegation. Note that delegation is
up to the server to decide. The client should never assume that
delegation will or will not be granted in a particular instance. It
should always be prepared for either case. A partial exception is
the reclaim (CLAIM_PREVIOUS) case, in which a delegation type is
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claimed. In this case, delegation will always be granted, although
the server may specify an immediate recall in the delegation
structure.
The rflags returned by a successful OPEN allow the server to return
information governing how the open file is to be handled.
o OPEN4_RESULT_CONFIRM is deprecated and MUST not be returned by an
NFSv4.1 server.
o OPEN4_RESULT_LOCKTYPE_POSIX indicates the server's file locking
behavior supports the complete set of Posix locking techniques.
From this the client can choose to manage file locking state in a
way to handle a mis-match of file locking management.
o OPEN4_RESULT_PRESERVE_UNLINKED indicates the server will preserve
the open file if the client (or any other client) removes the file
as long as it is open. Furthermore, the server promises to
preserve the file through the grace period after server reboot,
thereby giving the client the opportunity to reclaim his open.
o OPEN4_RESULT_MAY_NOTIFY_LOCK indicates that the server may attempt
CB_NOTIFY_LOCK callbacks for locks on this file. This flag is a
hint only, and may be safely ignored by the client.
If the component is of zero length, NFS4ERR_INVAL will be returned.
The component is also subject to the normal UTF-8, character support,
and name checks. See the section "UTF-8 Related Errors" for further
[[Comment.12: add an xref to the UTD-8 section]]. discussion.
When an OPEN is done and the specified lockowner already has the
resulting filehandle open, the result is to "OR" together the new
share and deny status together with the existing status. In this
case, only a single CLOSE need be done, even though multiple OPENs
were completed. When such an OPEN is done, checking of share
reservations for the new OPEN proceeds normally, with no exception
for the existing OPEN held by the same lockowner.
If the underlying file system at the server is only accessible in a
read-only mode and the OPEN request has specified ACCESS_WRITE or
ACCESS_BOTH, the server will return NFS4ERR_ROFS to indicate a read-
only file system.
As with the CREATE operation, the server MUST derive the owner, owner
ACE, group, or group ACE if any of the four attributes are required
and supported by the server's file system. For an OPEN with the
EXCLUSIVE4 createmode, the server has no choice, since such OPEN
calls do not include the createattrs field. Conversely, if
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createattrs is specified, and includes owner or group (or
corresponding ACEs) that the principal in the RPC call's credentials
does not have authorization to create files for, then the server may
return NFS4ERR_PERM.
In the case of a OPEN which specifies a size of zero (e.g.
truncation) and the file has named attributes, the named attributes
are left as is. They are not removed.
NFSv4.1 gives more precise control to clients over acquisition of
delegations via the following new flags for the share_access field of
OPEN4args:
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_READ_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_WRITE_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_ANY_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_NO_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_CANCEL
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_SIGNAL_DELEG_WHEN_RESRC_AVAIL
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_PUSH_DELEG_WHEN_UNCONTENDED
If (share_access & OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_DELEG_MASK) is not zero,
then the client will have specified one and only one of:
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_READ_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_WRITE_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_ANY_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_NO_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_CANCEL
Otherwise the client is indicating no desire for a delegation and the
server MAY or MAY not return a delegation in the OPEN response.
If the server supports the new _WANT_ flags and the client issues one
or more of the new flags, then in the event the server does not
return a delegation, it MUST return a delegation type of
OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE_EXT. od_whynone indicates why no delegation was
returned and will be one of:
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WND4_NOT_WANTED The client specified
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_NO_DELEG.
WND4_CONTENTION There is a conflicting delegation or open on the
file.
WND4_RESOURCE Resource limitations prevent the server from granting
a delegation.
WND4_NOT_SUPP_FTYPE The server does not support delegations on this
file type.
WND4_WRITE_DELEG_NOT_SUPP_FTYPE The server does not support write
delegations on this file type.
WND4_NOT_SUPP_UPGRADE The server does not support atomic upgrade of
a read delegation to a write delegation.
WND4_NOT_SUPP_DOWNGRADE The server does not support atomic downgrade
of a write delegation to a read delegation.
WND4_CANCELED The client specified OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_CANCEL
and now any "want" for this file object is cancelled.
WND4_IS_DIR The specified file object is a directory, and the
operation is OPEN or WANT_DELEGATION which do not support
delegations on directories.
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_READ_DELEG,
OPEN_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_WRITE_DELEG, or
OPEN_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_ANY_DELEG mean, respectively, the client wants
a read, write, or any delegation regardless which of
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ, OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE, or
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_BOTH is set. If the client has a read delegation
on a file, and requests a write delegation, then the client is
requesting atomic upgrade of its read delegation to a write
delegation. If the client has a write delegation on a file, and
requests a read delegation, then the client is requesting atomic
downgrade to a read delegation. A server MAY support atomic upgrade
or downgrade. If it does, then the returned delegation_type of
OPEN_DELEGATE_READ or OPEN_DELEGATE_WRITE that is different than the
delegation type the client currently has, indicates successful
upgrade or downgrade. If it does not support atomic delegation
upgrade or downgrade, then od_whynone will be WND4_NOT_SUPP_UPGRADE
or WND4_NOT_SUPP_DOWNGRADE.
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_NO_DELEG means the client wants no
delegation.
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OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_CANCEL means the client wants no delegation
and wants to cancel any previously registered "want" for a
delegation.
The client may set one or both of
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_SIGNAL_DELEG_WHEN_RESRC_AVAIL and
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_PUSH_DELEG_WHEN_UNCONTENDED. However, they
will have no effect unless one of following are set:
o OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_READ_DELEG
o OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_WRITE_DELEG
o OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_ANY_DELEG
If the client specifies
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_SIGNAL_DELEG_WHEN_RESRC_AVAIL, then it wishes
to register a "want" for a delegation, in the event the OPEN results
do not include a delegation. If so and the server denies the
delegation due to insufficient resources, the server MAY later inform
the client, via the CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL operation, that the
resource limitation condition has eased. The server will tell the
client that it intends to send a future CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL
operation by setting delegation_type in the results to
OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE_EXT, ond_why to WND4_RESOURCE, and
ond_server_will_signal_avail set to TRUE. If
ond_server_will_signal_avail is set to TRUE, the server MUST later
send a CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL operation.
If the client specifies
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_SIGNAL_DELEG_WHEN_UNCONTENDED, then it wishes
to register a "want" for a delegation, in the event the OPEN results
do not include a delegation. If so and the server denies the
delegation due to insufficient resources, the server MAY later inform
the client, via the CB_PUSH_DELEG operation, that the resource
limitation condition has eased. The server will tell the client that
it intends to send a future CB_PUSH_DELEG operation by setting
delegation_type in the results to OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE_EXT, ond_why to
WND4_CONTENTION, and ond_server_will_push_deleg to TRUE. If
ond_server_will_push_deleg is TRUE, the server MUST later send a
CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL operation.
If the client has previously registered a want for a delegation on a
file, and then sends a request to register a want for a delegation on
the same file, the server MUST return a new error:
NFS4ERR_DELEG_ALREADY_WANTED. If the client wishes to register a
different type of delegation want for the same file, it MUST cancel
the existing delegation WANT.
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17.16.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The OPEN operation contains support for EXCLUSIVE create. The
mechanism is similar to the support in NFS version 3 [22]. However,
this mechanism is not needed if a server stores its reply cache in
stable storage. If the server indicates (via the csr_persist field
in the response to CREATE_SESSION) the client SHOULD NOT use OPEN's
approach to exclusive create.
In absence of csr_persist being TRUE, the client invokes exclusive
create by setting the how parameter is EXCLUSIVE. In this case, the
client provides a verifier that can reasonably be expected to be
unique. A combination of a client identifier, perhaps the client
network address, and a unique number generated by the client, perhaps
the RPC transaction identifier, may be appropriate. This mechanism
allows reliable exclusive create semantics even when the server does
not support the storing session reply information in stable storage.
If the object does not exist, the server creates the object and
stores the verifier in stable storage. For file systems that do not
provide a mechanism for the storage of arbitrary file attributes, the
server may use one or more elements of the object meta-data to store
the verifier. The verifier must be stored in stable storage to
prevent erroneous failure on retransmission of the request. It is
assumed that an exclusive create is being performed because exclusive
semantics are critical to the application. Because of the expected
usage, exclusive CREATE does not rely solely on the normally volatile
duplicate request cache for storage of the verifier. The duplicate
request cache in volatile storage does not survive a crash and may
actually flush on a long network partition, opening failure windows.
In the UNIX local file system environment, the expected storage
location for the verifier on creation is the meta-data (time stamps)
of the object. For this reason, an exclusive object create may not
include initial attributes because the server would have nowhere to
store the verifier.
If the server can not support these exclusive create semantics,
possibly because of the requirement to commit the verifier to stable
storage, it should fail the OPEN request with the error,
NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP.
During an exclusive CREATE request, if the object already exists, the
server reconstructs the object's verifier and compares it with the
verifier in the request. If they match, the server treats the
request as a success. The request is presumed to be a duplicate of
an earlier, successful request for which the reply was lost and that
the server duplicate request cache mechanism did not detect. If the
verifiers do not match, the request is rejected with the status,
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NFS4ERR_EXIST.
Once the client has performed a successful exclusive create, it must
issue a SETATTR to set the correct object attributes. Until it does
so, it should not rely upon any of the object attributes, since the
server implementation may need to overload object meta-data to store
the verifier. The subsequent SETATTR must not occur in the same
COMPOUND request as the OPEN. This separation will guarantee that
the exclusive create mechanism will continue to function properly in
the face of retransmission of the request.
Use of the GUARDED attribute does not provide exactly-once semantics.
In particular, if a reply is lost and the server does not detect the
retransmission of the request, the operation can fail with
NFS4ERR_EXIST, even though the create was performed successfully.
The client would use this behavior in the case that the application
has not requested an exclusive create but has asked to have the file
truncated when the file is opened. In the case of the client timing
out and retransmitting the create request, the client can use GUARDED
to prevent against a sequence like: create, write, create
(retransmitted) from occurring.
For SHARE reservations, the client must specify a value for
share_access that is one of READ, WRITE, or BOTH. For share_deny,
the client must specify one of NONE, READ, WRITE, or BOTH. If the
client fails to do this, the server must return NFS4ERR_INVAL.
Based on the share_access value (READ, WRITE, or BOTH) the client
should check that the requester has the proper access rights to
perform the specified operation. This would generally be the results
of applying the ACL access rules to the file for the current
requester. However, just as with the ACCESS operation, the client
should not attempt to second-guess the server's decisions, as access
rights may change and may be subject to server administrative
controls outside the ACL framework. If the requester is not
authorized to READ or WRITE (depending on the share_access value),
the server must return NFS4ERR_ACCESS. Note that since the NFS
version 4 protocol does not impose any requirement that READs and
WRITEs issued for an open file have the same credentials as the OPEN
itself, the server still must do appropriate access checking on the
READs and WRITEs themselves.
If the component provided to OPEN is a symbolic link, the error
NFS4ERR_SYMLINK will be returned to the client. If the current
filehandle is not a directory, the error NFS4ERR_NOTDIR will be
returned.
The use of the OPEN4_RESULT_PRESERVE_UNLINKED result flag allows a
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client avoid the common implementation practice of renaming an open
file to ".nfs<unique value>" after it removes the file. After the
server returns OPEN4_RESULT_PRESERVE_UNLINKED, if a client issues a
REMOVE operation that would reduce the file's link count to zero, the
server SHOULD report a value of zero for the FATTR4_NUMLINKS
attribute on the file.
17.16.5.1. WARNING TO CLIENT IMPLEMENTORS
OPEN resembles LOOKUP in that it generates a filehandle for the
client to use. Unlike LOOKUP though, OPEN creates server state on
the filehandle. In normal circumstances, the client can only release
this state with a CLOSE operation. CLOSE uses the current filehandle
to determine which file to close. Therefore the client MUST follow
every OPEN operation with a GETFH operation in the same COMPOUND
procedure. This will supply the client with the filehandle such that
CLOSE can be used appropriately.
Simply waiting for the lease on the file to expire is insufficient
because the server may maintain the state indefinitely as long as
another client does not attempt to make a conflicting access to the
same file.
17.17. Operation 19: OPENATTR - Open Named Attribute Directory
17.17.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) createdir -> (cfh)
17.17.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* OPENATTR: open named attributes directory
*/
struct OPENATTR4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: object */
bool createdir;
};
17.17.3. RESULTS
struct OPENATTR4res {
/* CURRENT_FH: named attr directory */
nfsstat4 status;
};
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17.17.4. DESCRIPTION
The OPENATTR operation is used to obtain the filehandle of the named
attribute directory associated with the current filehandle. The
result of the OPENATTR will be a filehandle to an object of type
NF4ATTRDIR. From this filehandle, READDIR and LOOKUP operations can
be used to obtain filehandles for the various named attributes
associated with the original file system object. Filehandles
returned within the named attribute directory will have a type of
NF4NAMEDATTR.
The createdir argument allows the client to signify if a named
attribute directory should be created as a result of the OPENATTR
operation. Some clients may use the OPENATTR operation with a value
of FALSE for createdir to determine if any named attributes exist for
the object. If none exist, then NFS4ERR_NOENT will be returned. If
createdir has a value of TRUE and no named attribute directory
exists, one is created. The creation of a named attribute directory
assumes that the server has implemented named attribute support in
this fashion and is not required to do so by this definition.
17.17.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the server does not support named attributes for the current
filehandle, an error of NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP will be returned to the
client.
17.18. Operation 21: OPEN_DOWNGRADE - Reduce Open File Access
17.18.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), stateid, seqid, access, deny -> stateid
17.18.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* OPEN_DOWNGRADE: downgrade the access/deny for a file
*/
struct OPEN_DOWNGRADE4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: opened file */
stateid4 open_stateid;
seqid4 seqid;
uint32_t share_access;
uint32_t share_deny;
};
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17.18.3. RESULTS
struct OPEN_DOWNGRADE4resok {
stateid4 open_stateid;
};
union OPEN_DOWNGRADE4res switch(nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
OPEN_DOWNGRADE4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.18.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation is used to adjust the share_access and share_deny bits
for a given open. This is necessary when a given lockowner opens the
same file multiple times with different share_access and share_deny
flags. In this situation, a close of one of the opens may change the
appropriate share_access and share_deny flags to remove bits
associated with opens no longer in effect.
The share_access and share_deny bits specified in this operation
replace the current ones for the specified open file. The
share_access and share_deny bits specified must be exactly equal to
the union of the share_access and share_deny bits specified for some
subset of the OPENs in effect for current openowner on the current
file. If that constraint is not respected, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL
should be returned. Since share_access and share_deny bits are
subsets of those already granted, it is not possible for this request
to be denied because of conflicting share reservations.
The seqid argument is not used in NFSv4.1, MAY be any value, and MUST
be ignored by the server.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.19. Operation 22: PUTFH - Set Current Filehandle
17.19.1. SYNOPSIS
filehandle -> (cfh)
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17.19.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* PUTFH: Set current filehandle
*/
struct PUTFH4args {
nfs_fh4 object;
};
17.19.3. RESULTS
struct PUTFH4res {
/* CURRENT_FH: */
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.19.4. DESCRIPTION
Replaces the current filehandle with the filehandle provided as an
argument.
If the security mechanism used by the requester does not meet the
requirements of the filehandle provided to this operation, the server
MUST return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC.
17.19.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Commonly used as the first operator in an NFS request to set the
context for following operations.
17.20. Operation 23: PUTPUBFH - Set Public Filehandle
17.20.1. SYNOPSIS
- -> (cfh)
17.20.2. ARGUMENT
void;
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17.20.3. RESULT
/*
* PUTPUBFH: Set public filehandle
*/
struct PUTPUBFH4res {
/* CURRENT_FH: public fh */
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.20.4. DESCRIPTION
Replaces the current filehandle with the filehandle that represents
the public filehandle of the server's name space. This filehandle
may be different from the "root" filehandle which may be associated
with some other directory on the server.
The public filehandle represents the concepts embodied in RFC2054
[31], RFC2055 [32], RFC2224 [38]. The intent for NFS version 4 is
that the public filehandle (represented by the PUTPUBFH operation) be
used as a method of providing WebNFS server compatibility with NFS
versions 2 and 3.
The public filehandle and the root filehandle (represented by the
PUTROOTFH operation) should be equivalent. If the public and root
filehandles are not equivalent, then the public filehandle MUST be a
descendant of the root filehandle.
17.20.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Used as the first operator in an NFS request to set the context for
following operations.
With the NFS version 2 and 3 public filehandle, the client is able to
specify whether the path name provided in the LOOKUP should be
evaluated as either an absolute path relative to the server's root or
relative to the public filehandle. RFC2224 [38] contains further
discussion of the functionality. With NFS version 4, that type of
specification is not directly available in the LOOKUP operation. The
reason for this is because the component separators needed to specify
absolute vs. relative are not allowed in NFS version 4. Therefore,
the client is responsible for constructing its request such that the
use of either PUTROOTFH or PUTPUBFH are used to signify absolute or
relative evaluation of an NFS URL respectively.
Note that there are warnings mentioned in RFC2224 [38] with respect
to the use of absolute evaluation and the restrictions the server may
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place on that evaluation with respect to how much of its namespace
has been made available. These same warnings apply to NFS version 4.
It is likely, therefore that because of server implementation
details, an NFS version 3 absolute public filehandle lookup may
behave differently than an NFS version 4 absolute resolution.
There is a form of security negotiation as described in RFC2755 [39]
that uses the public filehandle a method of employing SNEGO. This
method is not available with NFS version 4 as filehandles are not
overloaded with special meaning and therefore do not provide the same
framework as NFS versions 2 and 3. Clients should therefore use the
security negotiation mechanisms described in this RFC.
17.20.6. ERRORS
17.21. Operation 24: PUTROOTFH - Set Root Filehandle
17.21.1. SYNOPSIS
- -> (cfh)
17.21.2. ARGUMENTS
void;
17.21.3. RESULTS
/*
* PUTROOTFH: Set root filehandle
*/
struct PUTROOTFH4res {
/* CURRENT_FH: root fh */
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.21.4. DESCRIPTION
Replaces the current filehandle with the filehandle that represents
the root of the server's name space. From this filehandle a LOOKUP
operation can locate any other filehandle on the server. This
filehandle may be different from the "public" filehandle which may be
associated with some other directory on the server.
17.21.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Commonly used as the first operator in an NFS request to set the
context for following operations.
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17.22. Operation 25: READ - Read from File
17.22.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), stateid, offset, count -> eof, data
17.22.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* READ: Read from file
*/
struct READ4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
stateid4 stateid;
offset4 offset;
count4 count;
};
17.22.3. RESULTS
struct READ4resok {
bool eof;
opaque data<>;
};
union READ4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
READ4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.22.4. DESCRIPTION
The READ operation reads data from the regular file identified by the
current filehandle.
The client provides an offset of where the READ is to start and a
count of how many bytes are to be read. An offset of 0 (zero) means
to read data starting at the beginning of the file. If offset is
greater than or equal to the size of the file, the status, NFS4_OK,
is returned with a data length set to 0 (zero) and eof is set to
TRUE. The READ is subject to access permissions checking.
If the client specifies a count value of 0 (zero), the READ succeeds
and returns 0 (zero) bytes of data again subject to access
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permissions checking. The server may choose to return fewer bytes
than specified by the client. The client needs to check for this
condition and handle the condition appropriately.
The stateid value for a READ request represents a value returned from
a previous record lock or share reservation request. The stateid is
used by the server to verify that the associated share reservation
and any record locks are still valid and to update lease timeouts for
the client.
If the read ended at the end-of-file (formally, in a correctly formed
READ request, if offset + count is equal to the size of the file), or
the read request extends beyond the size of the file (if offset +
count is greater than the size of the file), eof is returned as TRUE;
otherwise it is FALSE. A successful READ of an empty file will
always return eof as TRUE.
If the current filehandle is not a regular file, an error will be
returned to the client. In the case the current filehandle
represents a directory, NFS4ERR_ISDIR is return; otherwise,
NFS4ERR_INVAL is returned.
For a READ with a stateid value of all bits 0, the server MAY allow
the READ to be serviced subject to mandatory file locks or the
current share deny modes for the file. For a READ with a stateid
value of all bits 1, the server MAY allow READ operations to bypass
locking checks at the server.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.22.5. IMPLEMENTATION
It is possible for the server to return fewer than count bytes of
data. If the server returns less than the count requested and eof is
set to FALSE, the client should issue another READ to get the
remaining data. A server may return less data than requested under
several circumstances. The file may have been truncated by another
client or perhaps on the server itself, changing the file size from
what the requesting client believes to be the case. This would
reduce the actual amount of data available to the client. It is
possible that the server may back off the transfer size and reduce
the read request return. Server resource exhaustion may also occur
necessitating a smaller read return.
If mandatory file locking is on for the file, and if the region
corresponding to the data to be read from file is write locked by an
owner not associated the stateid, the server will return the
NFS4ERR_LOCKED error. The client should try to get the appropriate
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read record lock via the LOCK operation before re-attempting the
READ. When the READ completes, the client should release the record
lock via LOCKU.
17.23. Operation 26: READDIR - Read Directory
17.23.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), cookie, cookieverf, dircount, maxcount, attr_request ->
cookieverf { cookie, name, attrs }
17.23.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* READDIR: Read directory
*/
struct READDIR4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
nfs_cookie4 cookie;
verifier4 cookieverf;
count4 dircount;
count4 maxcount;
bitmap4 attr_request;
};
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17.23.3. RESULTS
struct entry4 {
nfs_cookie4 cookie;
component4 name;
fattr4 attrs;
entry4 *nextentry;
};
struct dirlist4 {
entry4 *entries;
bool eof;
};
struct READDIR4resok {
verifier4 cookieverf;
dirlist4 reply;
};
union READDIR4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
READDIR4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.23.4. DESCRIPTION
The READDIR operation retrieves a variable number of entries from a
file system directory and returns client requested attributes for
each entry along with information to allow the client to request
additional directory entries in a subsequent READDIR.
The arguments contain a cookie value that represents where the
READDIR should start within the directory. A value of 0 (zero) for
the cookie is used to start reading at the beginning of the
directory. For subsequent READDIR requests, the client specifies a
cookie value that is provided by the server on a previous READDIR
request.
The cookieverf value should be set to 0 (zero) when the cookie value
is 0 (zero) (first directory read). On subsequent requests, it
should be a cookieverf as returned by the server. The cookieverf
must match that returned by the READDIR in which the cookie was
acquired. If the server determines that the cookieverf is no longer
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valid for the directory, the error NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME must be returned.
The dircount portion of the argument is a hint of the maximum number
of bytes of directory information that should be returned. This
value represents the length of the names of the directory entries and
the cookie value for these entries. This length represents the XDR
encoding of the data (names and cookies) and not the length in the
native format of the server.
The maxcount value of the argument is the maximum number of bytes for
the result. This maximum size represents all of the data being
returned within the READDIR4resok structure and includes the XDR
overhead. The server may return less data. If the server is unable
to return a single directory entry within the maxcount limit, the
error NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL will be returned to the client.
Finally, attr_request represents the list of attributes to be
returned for each directory entry supplied by the server.
On successful return, the server's response will provide a list of
directory entries. Each of these entries contains the name of the
directory entry, a cookie value for that entry, and the associated
attributes as requested. The "eof" flag has a value of TRUE if there
are no more entries in the directory.
The cookie value is only meaningful to the server and is used as a
"bookmark" for the directory entry. As mentioned, this cookie is
used by the client for subsequent READDIR operations so that it may
continue reading a directory. The cookie is similar in concept to a
READ offset but should not be interpreted as such by the client.
Ideally, the cookie value should not change if the directory is
modified since the client may be caching these values.
In some cases, the server may encounter an error while obtaining the
attributes for a directory entry. Instead of returning an error for
the entire READDIR operation, the server can instead return the
attribute 'fattr4_rdattr_error'. With this, the server is able to
communicate the failure to the client and not fail the entire
operation in the instance of what might be a transient failure.
Obviously, the client must request the fattr4_rdattr_error attribute
for this method to work properly. If the client does not request the
attribute, the server has no choice but to return failure for the
entire READDIR operation.
For some file system environments, the directory entries "." and ".."
have special meaning and in other environments, they may not. If the
server supports these special entries within a directory, they should
not be returned to the client as part of the READDIR response. To
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enable some client environments, the cookie values of 0, 1, and 2 are
to be considered reserved. Note that the UNIX client will use these
values when combining the server's response and local representations
to enable a fully formed UNIX directory presentation to the
application.
For READDIR arguments, cookie values of 1 and 2 should not be used
and for READDIR results cookie values of 0, 1, and 2 should not be
returned.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.23.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The server's file system directory representations can differ
greatly. A client's programming interfaces may also be bound to the
local operating environment in a way that does not translate well
into the NFS protocol. Therefore the use of the dircount and
maxcount fields are provided to allow the client the ability to
provide guidelines to the server. If the client is aggressive about
attribute collection during a READDIR, the server has an idea of how
to limit the encoded response. The dircount field provides a hint on
the number of entries based solely on the names of the directory
entries. Since it is a hint, it may be possible that a dircount
value is zero. In this case, the server is free to ignore the
dircount value and return directory information based on the
specified maxcount value.
The cookieverf may be used by the server to help manage cookie values
that may become stale. It should be a rare occurrence that a server
is unable to continue properly reading a directory with the provided
cookie/cookieverf pair. The server should make every effort to avoid
this condition since the application at the client may not be able to
properly handle this type of failure.
The use of the cookieverf will also protect the client from using
READDIR cookie values that may be stale. For example, if the file
system has been migrated, the server may or may not be able to use
the same cookie values to service READDIR as the previous server
used. With the client providing the cookieverf, the server is able
to provide the appropriate response to the client. This prevents the
case where the server may accept a cookie value but the underlying
directory has changed and the response is invalid from the client's
context of its previous READDIR.
Since some servers will not be returning "." and ".." entries as has
been done with previous versions of the NFS protocol, the client that
requires these entries be present in READDIR responses must fabricate
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them.
17.24. Operation 27: READLINK - Read Symbolic Link
17.24.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) -> linktext
17.24.2. ARGUMENTS
/* CURRENT_FH: symlink */
void;
17.24.3. RESULTS
/*
* READLINK: Read symbolic link
*/
struct READLINK4resok {
linktext4 link;
};
union READLINK4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
READLINK4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.24.4. DESCRIPTION
READLINK reads the data associated with a symbolic link. The data is
a UTF-8 string that is opaque to the server. That is, whether
created by an NFS client or created locally on the server, the data
in a symbolic link is not interpreted when created, but is simply
stored.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.24.5. IMPLEMENTATION
A symbolic link is nominally a pointer to another file. The data is
not necessarily interpreted by the server, just stored in the file.
It is possible for a client implementation to store a path name that
is not meaningful to the server operating system in a symbolic link.
A READLINK operation returns the data to the client for
interpretation. If different implementations want to share access to
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symbolic links, then they must agree on the interpretation of the
data in the symbolic link.
The READLINK operation is only allowed on objects of type NF4LNK.
The server should return the error, NFS4ERR_INVAL, if the object is
not of type, NF4LNK.
17.25. Operation 28: REMOVE - Remove File System Object
17.25.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), filename -> change_info
17.25.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* REMOVE: Remove filesystem object
*/
struct REMOVE4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
component4 target;
};
17.25.3. RESULTS
struct REMOVE4resok {
change_info4 cinfo;
};
union REMOVE4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
REMOVE4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.25.4. DESCRIPTION
The REMOVE operation removes (deletes) a directory entry named by
filename from the directory corresponding to the current filehandle.
If the entry in the directory was the last reference to the
corresponding file system object, the object may be destroyed.
For the directory where the filename was removed, the server returns
change_info4 information in cinfo. With the atomic field of the
change_info4 struct, the server will indicate if the before and after
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change attributes were obtained atomically with respect to the
removal.
If the target has a length of 0 (zero), or if target does not obey
the UTF-8 definition, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL will be returned.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.25.5. IMPLEMENTATION
NFS versions 2 and 3 required a different operator RMDIR for
directory removal and REMOVE for non-directory removal. This allowed
clients to skip checking the file type when being passed a non-
directory delete system call (e.g. unlink() in POSIX) to remove a
directory, as well as the converse (e.g. a rmdir() on a non-
directory) because they knew the server would check the file type.
NFS version 4 REMOVE can be used to delete any directory entry
independent of its file type. The implementor of an NFS version 4
client's entry points from the unlink() and rmdir() system calls
should first check the file type against the types the system call is
allowed to remove before issuing a REMOVE. Alternatively, the
implementor can produce a COMPOUND call that includes a LOOKUP/VERIFY
sequence to verify the file type before a REMOVE operation in the
same COMPOUND call.
The concept of last reference is server specific. However, if the
numlinks field in the previous attributes of the object had the value
1, the client should not rely on referring to the object via a
filehandle. Likewise, the client should not rely on the resources
(disk space, directory entry, and so on) formerly associated with the
object becoming immediately available. Thus, if a client needs to be
able to continue to access a file after using REMOVE to remove it,
the client should take steps to make sure that the file will still be
accessible. The usual mechanism used is to RENAME the file from its
old name to a new hidden name.
If the server finds that the file is still open when the REMOVE
arrives:
o The server SHOULD NOT delete the file's directory entry if the
file was opened with OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_WRITE or
OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_BOTH.
o If the file was not opened with OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_WRITE or
OPEN4_SHARE_DENY_BOTH, the server SHOULD delete the file's
directory entry. However, until last CLOSE of the file, the
server MAY continue to allow access to the file via its
filehandle.
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17.26. Operation 29: RENAME - Rename Directory Entry
17.26.1. SYNOPSIS
(sfh), oldname, (cfh), newname -> source_change_info,
target_change_info
17.26.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* RENAME: Rename directory entry
*/
struct RENAME4args {
/* SAVED_FH: source directory */
component4 oldname;
/* CURRENT_FH: target directory */
component4 newname;
};
17.26.3. RESULTS
struct RENAME4resok {
change_info4 source_cinfo;
change_info4 target_cinfo;
};
union RENAME4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
RENAME4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.26.4. DESCRIPTION
The RENAME operation renames the object identified by oldname in the
source directory corresponding to the saved filehandle, as set by the
SAVEFH operation, to newname in the target directory corresponding to
the current filehandle. The operation is required to be atomic to
the client. Source and target directories must reside on the same
file system on the server. On success, the current filehandle will
continue to be the target directory.
If the target directory already contains an entry with the name,
newname, the source object must be compatible with the target: either
both are non-directories or both are directories and the target must
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be empty. If compatible, the existing target is removed before the
rename occurs (See the IMPLEMENTATION subsection of the section
"Operation 28: REMOVE - Remove File System Object" for client and
server actions whenever a target is removed). If they are not
compatible or if the target is a directory but not empty, the server
will return the error, NFS4ERR_EXIST.
If oldname and newname both refer to the same file (they might be
hard links of each other), then RENAME should perform no action and
return success.
For both directories involved in the RENAME, the server returns
change_info4 information. With the atomic field of the change_info4
struct, the server will indicate if the before and after change
attributes were obtained atomically with respect to the rename.
If the oldname refers to a named attribute and the saved and current
filehandles refer to different file system objects, the server will
return NFS4ERR_XDEV just as if the saved and current filehandles
represented directories on different file systems.
If the oldname or newname has a length of 0 (zero), or if oldname or
newname does not obey the UTF-8 definition, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL
will be returned.
17.26.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The RENAME operation must be atomic to the client. The statement
"source and target directories must reside on the same file system on
the server" means that the fsid fields in the attributes for the
directories are the same. If they reside on different file systems,
the error, NFS4ERR_XDEV, is returned.
Based on the value of the fh_expire_type attribute for the object,
the filehandle may or may not expire on a RENAME. However, server
implementors are strongly encouraged to attempt to keep filehandles
from expiring in this fashion.
On some servers, the file names "." and ".." are illegal as either
oldname or newname, and will result in the error NFS4ERR_BADNAME. In
addition, on many servers the case of oldname or newname being an
alias for the source directory will be checked for. Such servers
will return the error NFS4ERR_INVAL in these cases.
If either of the source or target filehandles are not directories,
the server will return NFS4ERR_NOTDIR.
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17.27. Operation 31: RESTOREFH - Restore Saved Filehandle
17.27.1. SYNOPSIS
(sfh) -> (cfh)
17.27.2. ARGUMENTS
/* SAVED_FH: */
void;
17.27.3. RESULTS
/*
* RESTOREFH: Restore saved filehandle
*/
struct RESTOREFH4res {
/* CURRENT_FH: value of saved fh */
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.27.4. DESCRIPTION
Set the current filehandle to the value in the saved filehandle. If
there is no saved filehandle then return the error NFS4ERR_RESTOREFH.
17.27.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Operations like OPEN and LOOKUP use the current filehandle to
represent a directory and replace it with a new filehandle. Assuming
the previous filehandle was saved with a SAVEFH operator, the
previous filehandle can be restored as the current filehandle. This
is commonly used to obtain post-operation attributes for the
directory, e.g.
PUTFH (directory filehandle)
SAVEFH
GETATTR attrbits (pre-op dir attrs)
CREATE optbits "foo" attrs
GETATTR attrbits (file attributes)
RESTOREFH
GETATTR attrbits (post-op dir attrs)
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17.27.6. ERRORS
17.28. Operation 32: SAVEFH - Save Current Filehandle
17.28.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh) -> (sfh)
17.28.2. ARGUMENTS
/* CURRENT_FH: */
void;
17.28.3. RESULTS
/*
* SAVEFH: Save current filehandle
*/
struct SAVEFH4res {
/* SAVED_FH: value of current fh */
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.28.4. DESCRIPTION
Save the current filehandle. If a previous filehandle was saved then
it is no longer accessible. The saved filehandle can be restored as
the current filehandle with the RESTOREFH operator.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.28.5. IMPLEMENTATION
17.29. Operation 33: SECINFO - Obtain Available Security
17.29.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), name -> { secinfo }
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17.29.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* SECINFO: Obtain Available Security Mechanisms
*/
struct SECINFO4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: directory */
component4 name;
};
17.29.3. RESULTS
/*
* From RFC 2203
*/
enum rpc_gss_svc_t {
RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE = 1,
RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY = 2,
RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY = 3
};
struct rpcsec_gss_info {
sec_oid4 oid;
qop4 qop;
rpc_gss_svc_t service;
};
/* RPCSEC_GSS has a value of '6' - See RFC 2203 */
union secinfo4 switch (uint32_t flavor) {
case RPCSEC_GSS:
rpcsec_gss_info flavor_info;
default:
void;
};
typedef secinfo4 SECINFO4resok<>;
union SECINFO4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
SECINFO4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
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17.29.4. DESCRIPTION
The SECINFO operation is used by the client to obtain a list of valid
RPC authentication flavors for a specific directory filehandle, file
name pair. SECINFO should apply the same access methodology used for
LOOKUP when evaluating the name. Therefore, if the requester does
not have the appropriate access to LOOKUP the name then SECINFO must
behave the same way and return NFS4ERR_ACCESS.
The result will contain an array which represents the security
mechanisms available, with an order corresponding to the server's
preferences, the most preferred being first in the array. The client
is free to pick whatever security mechanism it both desires and
supports, or to pick in the server's preference order the first one
it supports. The array entries are represented by the secinfo4
structure. The field 'flavor' will contain a value of AUTH_NONE,
AUTH_SYS (as defined in RFC1831 [4]), or RPCSEC_GSS (as defined in
RFC2203 [5]). The field flavor can also any other security flavor
registered with IANA.
For the flavors AUTH_NONE and AUTH_SYS, no additional security
information is returned. The same is true of many (if not most)
other security flavors, including AUTH_DH. For a return value of
RPCSEC_GSS, a security triple is returned that contains the mechanism
object id (as defined in RFC2743 [8]), the quality of protection (as
defined in RFC2743 [8]) and the service type (as defined in RFC2203
[5]). It is possible for SECINFO to return multiple entries with
flavor equal to RPCSEC_GSS with different security triple values.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
If the name has a length of 0 (zero), or if name does not obey the
UTF-8 definition, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL will be returned.
17.29.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The SECINFO operation is expected to be used by the NFS client when
the error value of NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC is returned from another NFS
operation. This signifies to the client that the server's security
policy is different from what the client is currently using. At this
point, the client is expected to obtain a list of possible security
flavors and choose what best suits its policies.
As mentioned, the server's security policies will determine when a
client request receives NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC. The operations which may
receive this error are: LINK, LOOKUP, LOOKUPP, OPEN, PUTFH, PUTPUBFH,
PUTROOTFH, RESTOREFH, RENAME, and indirectly READDIR. LINK and
RENAME will only receive this error if the security used for the
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operation is inappropriate for saved filehandle. With the exception
of READDIR, these operations represent the point at which the client
can instantiate a filehandle into the "current filehandle" at the
server. The filehandle is either provided by the client (PUTFH,
PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH) or generated as a result of a name to filehandle
translation (LOOKUP and OPEN). RESTOREFH is different because the
filehandle is a result of a previous SAVEFH. Even though the
filehandle, for RESTOREFH, might have previously passed the server's
inspection for a security match, the server will check it again on
RESTOREFH to ensure that the security policy has not changed.
If the client wants to resolve an error return of NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC,
the following will occur:
o For LOOKUP and OPEN, the client will use SECINFO with the same
current filehandle and name as provided in the original LOOKUP or
OPEN to enumerate the available security triples.
o For LINK, PUTFH, PUTROOTFH, PUTPUBFH, RENAME, and RESTOREFH, the
client will use SECINFO_NO_NAME { style =
SECINFO_STYLE4_CURRENT_FH }. The client will prefix the
SECINFO_NO_NAME operation with the appropriate PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, or
PUTROOTFH operation that provides the filehandle originally
provided by the PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, PUTROOTFH, or RESTOREFH, or for
the failed LINK or RENAME, the SAVEFH.
o NOTE: In NFSv4.0, the client was required to use SECINFO, and had
to reconstruct the parent of the original file handle, and the
component name of the original filehandle.
o For LOOKUPP, the client will use SECINFO_NO_NAME { style =
SECINFO_STYLE4_PARENT } and provide the filehandle with equals the
filehandle originally provided to LOOKUPP.
The READDIR operation will not directly return the NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC
error. However, if the READDIR request included a request for
attributes, it is possible that the READDIR request's security triple
did not match that of a directory entry. If this is the case and the
client has requested the rdattr_error attribute, the server will
return the NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC error in rdattr_error for the entry.
See the section "Security Considerations" for a discussion on the
recommendations for security flavor used by SECINFO and
SECINFO_NO_NAME.
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17.30. Operation 34: SETATTR - Set Attributes
17.30.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), stateid, attrmask, attr_vals -> attrsset
17.30.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* SETATTR: Set attributes
*/
struct SETATTR4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: target object */
stateid4 stateid;
fattr4 obj_attributes;
};
17.30.3. RESULTS
struct SETATTR4res {
nfsstat4 status;
bitmap4 attrsset;
};
17.30.4. DESCRIPTION
The SETATTR operation changes one or more of the attributes of a file
system object. The new attributes are specified with a bitmap and
the attributes that follow the bitmap in bit order.
The stateid argument for SETATTR is used to provide file locking
context that is necessary for SETATTR requests that set the size
attribute. Since setting the size attribute modifies the file's
data, it has the same locking requirements as a corresponding WRITE.
Any SETATTR that sets the size attribute is incompatible with a share
reservation that specifies DENY_WRITE. The area between the old end-
of-file and the new end-of-file is considered to be modified just as
would have been the case had the area in question been specified as
the target of WRITE, for the purpose of checking conflicts with
record locks, for those cases in which a server is implementing
mandatory record locking behavior. A valid stateid should always be
specified. When the file size attribute is not set, the special
stateid consisting of all bits zero should be passed.
On either success or failure of the operation, the server will return
the attrsset bitmask to represent what (if any) attributes were
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successfully set. The attrsset in the response is a subset of the
bitmap4 that is part of the obj_attributes in the argument.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.30.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the request specifies the owner attribute to be set, the server
should allow the operation to succeed if the current owner of the
object matches the value specified in the request. Some servers may
be implemented in a way as to prohibit the setting of the owner
attribute unless the requester has privilege to do so. If the server
is lenient in this one case of matching owner values, the client
implementation may be simplified in cases of creation of an object
followed by a SETATTR.
The file size attribute is used to request changes to the size of a
file. A value of 0 (zero) causes the file to be truncated, a value
less than the current size of the file causes data from new size to
the end of the file to be discarded, and a size greater than the
current size of the file causes logically zeroed data bytes to be
added to the end of the file. Servers are free to implement this
using holes or actual zero data bytes. Clients should not make any
assumptions regarding a server's implementation of this feature,
beyond that the bytes returned will be zeroed. Servers must support
extending the file size via SETATTR.
SETATTR is not guaranteed atomic. A failed SETATTR may partially
change a file's attributes.
Changing the size of a file with SETATTR indirectly changes the
time_modify. A client must account for this as size changes can
result in data deletion.
The attributes time_access_set and time_modify_set are write-only
attributes constructed as a switched union so the client can direct
the server in setting the time values. If the switched union
specifies SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME4, the client has provided an nfstime4 to
be used for the operation. If the switch union does not specify
SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME4, the server is to use its current time for the
SETATTR operation.
If server and client times differ, programs that compare client time
to file times can break. A time maintenance protocol should be used
to limit client/server time skew.
Use of a COMPOUND containing a VERIFY operation specifying only the
change attribute, immediately followed by a SETATTR, provides a means
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whereby a client may specify a request that emulates the
functionality of the SETATTR guard mechanism of NFS version 3. Since
the function of the guard mechanism is to avoid changes to the file
attributes based on stale information, delays between checking of the
guard condition and the setting of the attributes have the potential
to compromise this function, as would the corresponding delay in the
NFS version 4 emulation. Therefore, NFS version 4 servers should
take care to avoid such delays, to the degree possible, when
executing such a request.
If the server does not support an attribute as requested by the
client, the server should return NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP.
A mask of the attributes actually set is returned by SETATTR in all
cases. That mask must not include attributes bits not requested to
be set by the client, and must be equal to the mask of attributes
requested to be set only if the SETATTR completes without error.
17.31. Operation 37: VERIFY - Verify Same Attributes
17.31.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), fattr -> -
17.31.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* VERIFY: Verify attributes same
*/
struct VERIFY4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: object */
fattr4 obj_attributes;
};
17.31.3. RESULTS
struct VERIFY4res {
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.31.4. DESCRIPTION
The VERIFY operation is used to verify that attributes have a value
assumed by the client before proceeding with following operations in
the compound request. If any of the attributes do not match then the
error NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME must be returned. The current filehandle
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retains its value after successful completion of the operation.
17.31.5. IMPLEMENTATION
One possible use of the VERIFY operation is the following compound
sequence. With this the client is attempting to verify that the file
being removed will match what the client expects to be removed. This
sequence can help prevent the unintended deletion of a file.
PUTFH (directory filehandle)
LOOKUP (file name)
VERIFY (filehandle == fh)
PUTFH (directory filehandle)
REMOVE (file name)
This sequence does not prevent a second client from removing and
creating a new file in the middle of this sequence but it does help
avoid the unintended result.
In the case that a recommended attribute is specified in the VERIFY
operation and the server does not support that attribute for the file
system object, the error NFS4ERR_ATTRNOTSUPP is returned to the
client.
When the attribute rdattr_error or any write-only attribute (e.g.
time_modify_set) is specified, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL is returned to
the client.
17.32. Operation 38: WRITE - Write to File
17.32.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), stateid, offset, stable, data -> count, committed, writeverf
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17.32.2. ARGUMENTS
/*
* WRITE: Write to file
*/
enum stable_how4 {
UNSTABLE4 = 0,
DATA_SYNC4 = 1,
FILE_SYNC4 = 2
};
struct WRITE4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
stateid4 stateid;
offset4 offset;
stable_how4 stable;
opaque data<>;
};
17.32.3. RESULTS
struct WRITE4resok {
count4 count;
stable_how4 committed;
verifier4 writeverf;
};
union WRITE4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
WRITE4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.32.4. DESCRIPTION
The WRITE operation is used to write data to a regular file. The
target file is specified by the current filehandle. The offset
specifies the offset where the data should be written. An offset of
0 (zero) specifies that the write should start at the beginning of
the file. The count, as encoded as part of the opaque data
parameter, represents the number of bytes of data that are to be
written. If the count is 0 (zero), the WRITE will succeed and return
a count of 0 (zero) subject to permissions checking. The server may
choose to write fewer bytes than requested by the client.
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Part of the write request is a specification of how the write is to
be performed. The client specifies with the stable parameter the
method of how the data is to be processed by the server. If stable
is FILE_SYNC4, the server must commit the data written plus all file
system metadata to stable storage before returning results. This
corresponds to the NFS version 2 protocol semantics. Any other
behavior constitutes a protocol violation. If stable is DATA_SYNC4,
then the server must commit all of the data to stable storage and
enough of the metadata to retrieve the data before returning. The
server implementor is free to implement DATA_SYNC4 in the same
fashion as FILE_SYNC4, but with a possible performance drop. If
stable is UNSTABLE4, the server is free to commit any part of the
data and the metadata to stable storage, including all or none,
before returning a reply to the client. There is no guarantee
whether or when any uncommitted data will subsequently be committed
to stable storage. The only guarantees made by the server are that
it will not destroy any data without changing the value of verf and
that it will not commit the data and metadata at a level less than
that requested by the client.
The stateid value for a WRITE request represents a value returned
from a previous record lock or share reservation request. The
stateid is used by the server to verify that the associated share
reservation and any record locks are still valid and to update lease
timeouts for the client.
Upon successful completion, the following results are returned. The
count result is the number of bytes of data written to the file. The
server may write fewer bytes than requested. If so, the actual
number of bytes written starting at location, offset, is returned.
The server also returns an indication of the level of commitment of
the data and metadata via committed. If the server committed all
data and metadata to stable storage, committed should be set to
FILE_SYNC4. If the level of commitment was at least as strong as
DATA_SYNC4, then committed should be set to DATA_SYNC4. Otherwise,
committed must be returned as UNSTABLE4. If stable was FILE4_SYNC,
then committed must also be FILE_SYNC4: anything else constitutes a
protocol violation. If stable was DATA_SYNC4, then committed may be
FILE_SYNC4 or DATA_SYNC4: anything else constitutes a protocol
violation. If stable was UNSTABLE4, then committed may be either
FILE_SYNC4, DATA_SYNC4, or UNSTABLE4.
The final portion of the result is the write verifier. The write
verifier is a cookie that the client can use to determine whether the
server has changed instance (boot) state between a call to WRITE and
a subsequent call to either WRITE or COMMIT. This cookie must be
consistent during a single instance of the NFS version 4 protocol
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service and must be unique between instances of the NFS version 4
protocol server, where uncommitted data may be lost.
If a client writes data to the server with the stable argument set to
UNSTABLE4 and the reply yields a committed response of DATA_SYNC4 or
UNSTABLE4, the client will follow up some time in the future with a
COMMIT operation to synchronize outstanding asynchronous data and
metadata with the server's stable storage, barring client error. It
is possible that due to client crash or other error that a subsequent
COMMIT will not be received by the server.
For a WRITE with a stateid value of all bits 0, the server MAY allow
the WRITE to be serviced subject to mandatory file locks or the
current share deny modes for the file. For a WRITE with a stateid
value of all bits 1, the server MUST NOT allow the WRITE operation to
bypass locking checks at the server and are treated exactly the same
as if a stateid of all bits 0 were used.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.32.5. IMPLEMENTATION
It is possible for the server to write fewer bytes of data than
requested by the client. In this case, the server should not return
an error unless no data was written at all. If the server writes
less than the number of bytes specified, the client should issue
another WRITE to write the remaining data.
It is assumed that the act of writing data to a file will cause the
time_modified of the file to be updated. However, the time_modified
of the file should not be changed unless the contents of the file are
changed. Thus, a WRITE request with count set to 0 should not cause
the time_modified of the file to be updated.
The definition of stable storage has been historically a point of
contention. The following expected properties of stable storage may
help in resolving design issues in the implementation. Stable
storage is persistent storage that survives:
1. Repeated power failures.
2. Hardware failures (of any board, power supply, etc.).
3. Repeated software crashes, including reboot cycle.
This definition does not address failure of the stable storage module
itself.
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The verifier is defined to allow a client to detect different
instances of an NFS version 4 protocol server over which cached,
uncommitted data may be lost. In the most likely case, the verifier
allows the client to detect server reboots. This information is
required so that the client can safely determine whether the server
could have lost cached data. If the server fails unexpectedly and
the client has uncommitted data from previous WRITE requests (done
with the stable argument set to UNSTABLE4 and in which the result
committed was returned as UNSTABLE4 as well) it may not have flushed
cached data to stable storage. The burden of recovery is on the
client and the client will need to retransmit the data to the server.
A suggested verifier would be to use the time that the server was
booted or the time the server was last started (if restarting the
server without a reboot results in lost buffers).
The committed field in the results allows the client to do more
effective caching. If the server is committing all WRITE requests to
stable storage, then it should return with committed set to
FILE_SYNC4, regardless of the value of the stable field in the
arguments. A server that uses an NVRAM accelerator may choose to
implement this policy. The client can use this to increase the
effectiveness of the cache by discarding cached data that has already
been committed on the server.
Some implementations may return NFS4ERR_NOSPC instead of
NFS4ERR_DQUOT when a user's quota is exceeded. In the case that the
current filehandle is a directory, the server will return
NFS4ERR_ISDIR. If the current filehandle is not a regular file or a
directory, the server will return NFS4ERR_INVAL.
If mandatory file locking is on for the file, and corresponding
record of the data to be written file is read or write locked by an
owner that is not associated with the stateid, the server will return
NFS4ERR_LOCKED. If so, the client must check if the owner
corresponding to the stateid used with the WRITE operation has a
conflicting read lock that overlaps with the region that was to be
written. If the stateid's owner has no conflicting read lock, then
the client should try to get the appropriate write record lock via
the LOCK operation before re-attempting the WRITE. When the WRITE
completes, the client should release the record lock via LOCKU.
If the stateid's owner had a conflicting read lock, then the client
has no choice but to return an error to the application that
attempted the WRITE. The reason is that since the stateid's owner
had a read lock, the server either attempted to temporarily
effectively upgrade this read lock to a write lock, or the server has
no upgrade capability. If the server attempted to upgrade the read
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lock and failed, it is pointless for the client to re-attempt the
upgrade via the LOCK operation, because there might be another client
also trying to upgrade. If two clients are blocked trying upgrade
the same lock, the clients deadlock. If the server has no upgrade
capability, then it is pointless to try a LOCK operation to upgrade.
17.33. Operation 40: BACKCHANNEL_CTL - Backchannel control
Control aspects of the backchannel
17.33.1. SYNOPSIS
callback program number, credentials -> -
17.33.2. ARGUMENT
typedef opaque gsshandle4_t<>;
struct gss_cb_handles4 {
rpc_gss_svc_t gcbp_service; /* RFC 2203 */
gsshandle4_t gcbp_handle_from_server;
gsshandle4_t gcbp_handle_from_client;
};
union callback_sec_parms4 switch (uint32_t cb_secflavor) {
case AUTH_NONE:
void;
case AUTH_SYS:
authsys_parms cbsp_sys_cred; /* RFC 1831 */
case RPCSEC_GSS:
gss_cb_handles4 cbsp_gss_handles;
};
struct BACKCHANNEL_CTL4args {
uint32_t bca_cb_program;
callback_sec_parms4 bca_sec_parms<>;
};
17.33.3. RESULT
struct BACKCHANNEL_CTL4res {
nfsstat4 bcr_status;
};
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17.33.4. DESCRIPTION
The BACKCHANNEL_CTL operation replaces the backchannel's callback
program number and adds (not replaces) RPCSEC_GSS contexts for use by
the backchannel.
The arguments and results of the BACKCHANNEL_CTL call are a subset of
the CREATE_SESSION parameters and have the same meaning. See the
descriptions of csa_cb_program and csa_cb_sec_parms in
Section 17.36.5.
BACKCHANNEL_CTL MUST appear in a COMPOUND that starts with SEQUENCE.
17.34. Operation 41: BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION
17.34.1. SYNOPSIS
sessionid, channel directions -> channel directions
17.34.2. ARGUMENT
enum channel_dir_from_client4 {
CDFC4_FORE = 0x1,
CDFC4_BACK = 0x2,
CDFC4_FORE_OR_BOTH = 0x3,
CDFC4_BACK_OR_BOTH = 0x7
};
struct BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION4args {
sessionid4 bctsa_sessid;
channel_dir_from_client4 bctsa_dir;
bool bctsa_use_conn_in_rdma_mode;
};
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17.34.3. RESULT
enum channel_dir_from_server4 {
CDFS4_FORE = 0x1,
CDFS4_BACK = 0x2,
CDFS4_BOTH = 0x3
};
struct BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION4resok {
sessionid4 bctsr_sessid;
channel_dir_from_server4 bctsr_dir;
bool bctsr_use_conn_in_rdma_mode;
};
union BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION4res switch (nfsstat4 bctsr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION4resok bctsr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.34.4. DESCRIPTION
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION is used to associate additional connections with
a session. It MUST be used on the connection being associated with
the session. It MUST be the only operation in the COMPOUND
procedure. If SP4_NONE (Section 17.35) state protection is used, any
principal, security flavor, or RPCSEC_GSS context can invoke the
operation. If SP4_MACH_CRED is used, RPCSEC_GSS must be used with
the integrity or privacy services, using the principal that created
the client ID. If SP4_SSV is used, RPCSEC_GSS with the SSV GSS
mechanism (Section 2.10.7.4) and integrity or privacy MUST be used.
If when the client ID was created, the client opted for SP4_NONE
state protection, the client is not required to use
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION to associate the connection with the session,
unless the client wishes to associate the connection with the
backchannel. When SP4_NONE protection is used, simply sending a
COMPOUND with a SEQUENCE operation that is sufficient to associate
the connnection with the session specified in SEQUENCE.
The field bctsa_dir indicates whether the client wants to associate
the connection with the fore channel or the backchannel or both
channels. The value CDFC4_FORE_OR_BOTH indicates the client wants to
associate with both the fore channel and backchannel, but will accept
the connection being associated to just the fore channel. The value
CDFC4_BACK_OR_BOTH indicates the client wants to associate with both
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the fore and backchannel, but will accept the connection being
associated with the backchannel. The server replies in bctsr_dir
which channel(s) the connection is associated with. If the client
specified CDFC4_FORE, the server MUST return CDFS4_FORE. If the
client specified CDFC4_BACK, the server MUST return CDFS4_BACK. If
the client specified CDFC4_FORE_OR_BOTH, the server MUST return
CDFS4_FORE or CDFS4_BOTH. If the client specified
CDFC4_BACK_OR_BOTH, the server MUST return CDFS4_BACK or CDFS4_BOTH.
See the CREATE_SESSION operation (Section 17.36), and the description
of the argument csa_use_conn_in_rdma_mode to understand
bctsa_use_conn_in_rdma_mode, and the description of
csr_use_conn_in_rdma_mode to understand bctsr_use_conn_in_rdma_mode.
17.34.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If a session's channel loses all connections, the client needs to use
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION to associate a new connection. If the server
rebooted and does not keep the reply cache in stable storage, the
server will not recognize the sessionid. The client will ultimately
have to invoke EXCHANGE_ID to create a new client ID and session.
Assuming SP4_SSV state protection is being used, there is an issue if
SET_SSV is sent, no response is returned, and the last connection
associated with the client ID disconnects. The client, per the
sessions model, needs to retry the SET_SSV. But it needs a new
connection to do so, and needs to associate that connection with the
session via a BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION authenticated with the SSV GSS
mechanism. The problem is that the RPCSEC_GSS message integrity
codes use the SSV as key and the SSV may have changed. While there
are multiple recovery strategies, a single, general strategy is
described here. First the client reconnects. The client assumes the
SET_SSV was executed, and so issues BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION with the new
SSV used as key for the message integrity code in the RPCSEC_GSS
credential message integrity codes. If the server returns an RPC
authentication error, this means the server's current SSV was not
changed, and the SET_SSV was not executed. The client then tries
BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION with the old SSV as the key for the RPCSEC_GSS
message integrity code. This should not return an RPC authentication
error. If it does, an implementation error has occurred on either
the client or server, and the client has to create a new client ID.
17.35. Operation 42: EXCHANGE_ID - Instantiate Client ID
Exchange long hand client and server identifiers (owners), and create
a client ID
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17.35.1. SYNOPSIS
client owner, flags, state protection, implementation ID ->
client ID, flags, [SSV info], server owner/scope,
implementation ID
17.35.2. ARGUMENT
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const EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER = 0x00000001;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_MIGR = 0x00000002;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID = 0x00000100;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS = 0x00010000;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS = 0x00020000;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS = 0x00040000;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_MASK_PNFS = 0x00070000;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A = 0x40000000;
const EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R = 0x80000000;
struct state_protect_ops4 {
bitmap4 spo_must_enforce;
bitmap4 spo_must_allow;
};
struct ssv_sp_parms4 {
state_protect_ops4 ssp_ops;
sec_oid4 ssp_hash_algs<>;
sec_oid4 ssp_encr_algs<>;
uint32_t ssp_window;
uint32_t ssp_num_gss_handles;
};
enum state_protect_how4 {
SP4_NONE = 0,
SP4_MACH_CRED = 1,
SP4_SSV = 2
};
union state_protect4_a switch(state_protect_how4 spa_how) {
case SP4_NONE:
void;
case SP4_MACH_CRED:
state_protect_ops4 spa_mach_ops;
case SP4_SSV:
ssv_sp_parms4 spa_ssv_parms;
};
struct EXCHANGE_ID4args {
client_owner4 eia_clientowner;
uint32_t eia_flags;
state_protect4_a eia_state_protect;
nfs_impl_id4 eia_client_impl_id<1>;
};
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17.35.3. RESULT
struct ssv_prot_info4 {
state_protect_ops4 spi_ops;
uint32_t spi_hash_alg;
uint32_t spi_encr_alg;
uint32_t spi_ssv_len;
uint32_t spi_window;
gsshandle4_t spi_handles<>;
};
struct server_owner4 {
uint64_t so_minor_id;
opaque so_major_id<NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT>;
};
union state_protect4_r switch(state_protect_how4 spr_how) {
case SP4_NONE:
void;
case SP4_MACH_CRED:
state_protect_ops4 spr_mach_ops;
case SP4_SSV:
ssv_prot_info4 spr_ssv_info;
};
struct EXCHANGE_ID4resok {
clientid4 eir_clientid;
sequenceid4 eir_sequenceid;
uint32_t eir_flags;
state_protect4_r eir_state_protect;
server_owner4 eir_server_owner;
opaque eir_server_scope<NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT>;
nfs_impl_id4 eir_server_impl_id<1>;
};
union EXCHANGE_ID4res switch (nfsstat4 eir_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
EXCHANGE_ID4resok eir_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.35.4. DESCRIPTION
The client uses the EXCHANGE_ID operation to register a particular
client owner with the server. The client ID returned from this
operation will be necessary for requests that create state on the
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server and will serve as a parent object to sessions created by the
client. In order to confirm the client ID it must first be used,
along with the the returned eir_sequenceid, as arguments to
CREATE_SESSION.
The eia_clientowner field is composed of a co_verifier field and a
co_ownerid string. As noted in Section 2.4, the co_ownerid describes
the client, and the co_verifier is the incarnation of the client. An
EXCHANGE_ID issued with a new incarnation of the client will lead to
the server removing lock state of the old incarnation. Whereas an
EXCHANGE_ID issued with the current incarnation and co_ownerid will
result in an error or an update of the client ID's properties,
depending on the arguments to EXCHANGE_ID.
In addition to the client ID and sequence id, the server returns a
server owner (eir_server_owner) and eir_server_scope. The former
field is used for network trunking as described in Section 2.10.4.
The latter field is used to allow clients to determine when clientids
issued by one server may be recognized by another in the event of
file system migration (see Section 10.6.7).
The client ID returned by EXCHANGE_ID is only unique relative to the
combination of eir_server_owner.so_major_id and eir_server_scope.
Thus if two servers return the same client ID, the onus is on the
client to distinguish the client IDs on the basis of
eir_server_owner.so_major_id and eir_server_scope. In the event two
different server's claim matching server_owner.so_major_id and
eir_server_scope, the client can use the verification techniques
discussed in Section 2.10.4 to determine the server's are distinct.
If they are distinct, then the client will need to note the
destination network addresses of the connections used with each
server, and use network address as the final discriminator.
The server, as defined by the unique identity expressed in the
so_major_id of the server owner and the server scope, needs to track
several properties of each client ID it hands out. The properties
apply to the client ID and all except as noted, sessions associated
with the client ID. The properties are derived from the the
arguments and results of EXCHANGE_ID. The client ID properties
include:
o The capabilities expressed by the following bits, which come from
the results of EXCHANGE_ID:
* EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER
* EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_MIGR
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* EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID
* EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS
* EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS
* EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS
These properties may be updated by subsequent EXCHANGE_ID requests
though the server MAY refuse to change them if the client ID is
confirmed.
o The state protection method used, one of SP4_NONE, SP4_MACH_CRED,
or SP4_SSV, as set by the spa_how field of the arguments to
EXCHANGE_ID. Once the client ID is confirmed, this property
cannot be updated by subsequent EXCHANGE_ID requests.
o For SP4_MACH_CRED or SP4_SSV state protection:
* The list of operations that MUST use the specified state
protection: spo_must_enforce, which come from the results of
EXCHANGE_ID.
* The list of operations that MAY use the specified state
protection: spo_must_allow, which come from the results of
EXCHANGE_ID.
Once the client ID is confirmed, these properties cannot be
updated by subsequent EXCHANGE_ID requests.
o For SP4_SSV protection:
* The OID of the hash algorithm. This property is represented by
the one of the algorithms in the ssp_hash_algs field of the
EXCHANGE_ID arguments. Once the client ID is confirmed, this
property cannot be updated by subsequent EXCHANGE_ID requests.
* The OID of the encryption algorithm. This property is
represented by the one of the algorithms in the ssp_encr_algs
field of the EXCHANGE_ID arguments. Once the client ID is
confirmed, this property cannot be updated by subsequent
EXCHANGE_ID requests.
* The length of the SSV. This property is represented by the
spi_ssv_len in the EXCHANGE_ID results. Once the client ID is
confirmed, this property cannot be updated by subsequent
EXCHANGE_ID requests.
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* Number of concurrent versions of the the SSV the client and
server will support. This property is represented by
spi_window, in the EXCHANGE_ID results. The property may be
updated by subsequent EXCHANGE_ID requests.
* The client's implementation ID as represented by the
eia_client_impl_id field of the arguments. The property may be
updated by subsequent EXCHANGE_ID requests.
The eia_flags passed as part of the arguments and the eir_flags
results allow the client and server to inform each other of their
capabilities as well as indicate how the client ID will be used.
Whether a bit is set or cleared on the arguments' flags does not
force the server to set or clear the same bit on the results' side.
Bits not defined above should not be set in the eia_flags field. If
they are, the server MUST reject the operation with NFS4ERR_INVAL.
The EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A bit can only be set in eia_flags; it is
always off in eir_flags. The EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R bit can only
be set in eir_flags; it is always off in eia_flags. If the server
recognizes the co_ownerid and co_verifier as mapping to a confirmed
client ID, it sets EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R in eir_flags. The
EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R flag allows a client to tell if the client
ID it is trying to create already exists and is confirmed.
If EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is set in eia_flags, this means the client
is updating properties of an existing confirmed client ID. If so, it
is RECOMMENDED the client issue the update EXCHANGE_ID operation in
the same COMPOUND as a SEQUENCE so that the EXCHANGE_ID is executed
exactly once. Whether the client can update the properties of client
ID depends on the state protection it selected when the client ID was
created, and the principal and security flavor it uses when sending
the EXCHANGE_ID request. If EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is set in
eia_flags, but there is no confirmed client ID for the the
co_ownerid, then the server returns NFS4ERR_ENOENT.
If EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is not set in eia_flags, and the co_ownerid
and co_verifier correspond to an existing confirmed client ID, the
server MUST NOT change any properties of the client ID. The server
ignores all other parameters, and returns the confirmed client ID
with the existing properties populated in the results (where the
results have a place for the properties), and
EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R bit in eir_flags. Note that if the
co_ownerid and co_verifier correspond to an existing client ID the
client is probably attempting to trunk data communication to the
server (Section 2.10.4).
If EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is not set in eia_flags, the co_ownerid
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corresponds to an existing confirmed client ID, and the co_verifier
does not match that of the confirmed client ID's verifier, the client
is trying to create a new client ID for the co_ownerid, with
different properties. The server returns the properties in the
results for the provisionally new client ID and waits for
CREATE_SESSION to confirm the client ID properties.
If EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is not set in eia_flags, and the co_ownerid
does not match a confirmed client ID, the client is trying to create
a new client ID for the new co_ownerid. The server returns the
properties in the results for the provisionally new client ID and
waits for CREATE_SESSION to confirm the client ID.
When the EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER flag bit is set, the client
indicates that it is capable of dealing with an NFS4ERR_MOVED error
as part of a referral sequence. When this bit is not set, it is
still legal for the server to perform a referral sequence. However,
a server may use the fact that the client is incapable of correctly
responding to a referral, by avoiding it for that particular client.
It may, for instance, act as a proxy for that particular file system,
at some cost in performance, although it is not obligated to do so.
If the server will potentially perform a referral, it MUST set
EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER in eir_flags.
When the EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_MIGR is set, the client indicates
that it is capable of dealing with an NFS4ERR_MOVED error as part of
a file system migration sequence. When this bit is not set, it is
still legal for the server to indicate that a file system has moved,
when this in fact happens. However, a server may use the fact that
the client is incapable of correctly responding to a migration in its
scheduling of file systems to migrate so as to avoid migration of
file systems being actively used. It may also hide actual migrations
from clients unable to deal with them by acting as a proxy for a
migrated file system for particular clients, at some cost in
performance, although it is not obligated to do so. If the server
will potentially perform a migration, it MUST set
EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_MIGR in eir_flags.
When EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID is set, the client indicates it
wants to server to bind the stateid to the principal. This means
that when a principal creates a stateid, it has to be the one to use
the stateid. If the server will performing binding it will return
EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID. The server MAY return
EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID even if the client does not send it.
When EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS is set in eia_flags, the client
indicates it wants to use the server in a conventional, non-parallel
NFS mode of operation. When EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS is set in
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eir_flags, the server is indicating it supports a conventional mode
of operation.
When EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS is set in eia_flags, the client
indicates it wants to use the server as a metadata server of a
parallel NFS cluster. When EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS is set in
eir_flags, the server is indicating it supports a metadata server.
Note that if the metadata server returns EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS
and not EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS nothing prevents the client from
using the metadata server as a conventional, non-pNFS server.
When EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS is set in eia_flags, the client
indicates it wants to use the server as a data server of a parallel
NFS cluster. When EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_DS is set in eir_flags, the
server is indicating it supports a data server.
A client SHOULD indicate at least one of EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_NON_PNFS,
EXCHGID4_FLAG_USE_PNFS_MDS, and EXCHGID4_USE_PNFS_DS so that a server
willing to meet the client's desires can indicate it is doing so. A
server MUST return at least one of the three bits, even if the bit is
not among the flag bits sent from the client.
The spa_how field of the eia_state_protect field specifies how the
client wants to protect its client, locking and session state from
unauthorized changes (Section 2.10.7.3):
o SP4_NONE. The client does not request the NFSv4.1 server to
enforce state protection. The NFSv4.1 server MUST NOT enforce
state protection.
o SP4_MACH_CRED. This choice is only valid if the client sent the
request with RPCSEC_GSS as the security flavor, and with a service
of RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY or RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY. The client wants
to use an RPCSEC_GSS-based machine credential to protect its
state. The server MUST note the principal the EXCHANGE_ID
operation was issued with, and the GSS mechanism used. These
notes collectively comprise the machine credential. The server
also notes the eia_clientowner and eia_flags &
EXCHGID4_FLAG_MASK_PNFS (let us call this the "pNFS use profile").
Thereafter, as long as the lease associated with the client ID is
unexpired, a subsequent EXCHANGE_ID operation that uses the same
eia_clientowner.co_owner and the same or partially matching pNFS
use profile (where partially matching means that the use profile
of the first EXCHANGE_ID logically ANDed with that of the
subsequent EXCHANGE_ID is non-zero) as the first EXCHANGE_ID, MUST
also use the same machine credential as the first EXCHANGE_ID.
The server of course returns the same client ID from the
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subsequent EXCHANGE_ID as that returned from the first
EXCHANGE_ID.
o SP4_SSV. This choice is only valid if the client sent the request
with RPCSEC_GSS as the security flavor, and with a service of
RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY or RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY. This choice
indicates the client wants to use the SSV to protect state. The
server records the credential used in the request as the machine
credential (as defined above) for the combination of
eia_clientowner.co_owner, and the pNFS use profile. The
CREATE_SESSION operation that confirms the client ID MUST use the
same machine credential.
When a client specifies SP4_MACH_CRED or SP4_SSV, it also provides
two lists of operations (each expressed as a bit map). The first
list is spo_must_enforce and consists of those operations the client
MUST issue with the machine credential (if SP4_MACH_CRED protection
is specified) or the SSV-based credential (if SP4_SSV protection is
used). The client MUST issue the operations with RPCSEC_GSS
credentials that specify the RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY or
RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY security service. Typically the first list of
operations includes EXCHANGE_ID, CREATE_SESSION, DELEGPURGE,
DESTROY_SESSION, BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, and DESTROY_CLIENTID. The
client SHOULD NOT specify in this list any operations that require a
filehandle because the server's access policies MAY conflict with the
client's choice, and thus the client would then be unable to access a
subset of the server's namespace. Note that if SP4_SSV protection is
specified, and the client indicates that CREATE_SESSION must be
protected with SP4_SSV, because the SSV cannot exist without a
confirmed client ID, the first CREATE_SESSION MUST instead be issued
using the machine credential, and the server MUST accept the machine
credential. There is a corresponding result, also called
spo_must_enforce, of the operations the server will require
SP4_MACH_CRED or SP4_SSV protection for. Normally the server's
result equals the client's argument, but the result MAY be different.
The second list is spo_must_allow and consists of those operations
the client wants to have the option issuing with the machine
credential or the SSV-based credential, even if the object the
operations are performed on is not owned by the machine or SSV
credential. The corresponding result, also called spo_must_allow,
consists of the operations the server will allow the client to uses
SP4_SSV or SP4_MACH_CRED credentials with. Normally the server's
result equals the client's argument, but the result MAY be different.
The purpose of spo_must_allow is to allow clients to solve the
following conundrum. Suppose the client ID is confirmed with
EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID, and it calls OPEN with the
RPCSEC_GSS credentials of normal user. Now suppose the user's
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credentials expire, and cannot be renewed (e.g. a Kerberos ticket
granting ticket expires, and the user has logged off and will not be
acquiring a new ticket granting ticket). The client will be unable
to issue CLOSE without user's credentials, which is to say the client
has to either leave the state on the server, or it has to re-issue
EXCHANGE_ID with a new verifier to clear all state. That is, unless
the client includes CLOSE on the list of operations in spo_must_allow
and the server agrees.
The SP4_SSV protection parameters also have:
ssp_hash_algs:
This is the set of algorithms the client supports for the purpose
of computing the digests needed for the internal SSV GSS mechanism
and for the SET_SSV operation. Each algorithm is specified as an
object identifier (OID). The REQUIRED algorithms for a server are
id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-sha512 [18]. The
algorithm the server selects among the set is indicated as
spi_hash_alg, a field of eir_ssv_prot_info. The field
spi_hash_alg is an index into the array ssp_hash_algs. If the
server does not support any of the offered algorithms, it returns
NFS4ERR_HASH_ALG_UNSUPP.
ssp_encr_algs:
This is the set of algorithms the client supports for the purpose
of providing privacy protection for the internal SSV GSS
mechanism. Each algorithm is specified as an OID. The REQUIRED
algorithm for a server is id-aes256-CBC. The RECOMMENDED
algorithms are id-aes192-CBC and id-aes128-CBC [19]. The selected
algorithm is returned in spi_encr_alg, an index into
ssp_encr_algs. If the server does not support any of the offered
algorithms, it returns NFS4ERR_ENCR_ALG_UNSUPP.
ssp_window:
This is the number of SSV versions the client wants the server to
maintain (i.e. each call to SET_SSV produces a new version of the
SSV). The server responds with spi_window, which MUST NOT exceed
ssp_window. Any requests on the backchannel or forechannel that
are using SSVs that are outside the window will fail with an ONC
RPC authentication error, and the requester will have to retry
them with the same slot id and sequence id.
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ssp_num_gss_handles:
This is the number of RPCSEC_GSS handles the server should create
that are based on the GSS SSV mechanism (Section 2.10.7.4). The
server responds with a list of handles in spi_handles. If the
client asks for at least one handle and the server cannot create
it, the server MUST return an error. The handles in spi_handlles
are not available for use until the client ID is confirmed, which
could be immediately if EXCHANGE_ID returns
EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R, or upon successful confirmation from
CREATE_SESSION. While a client ID can span all the connections
that are connected to a server sharing the same
eir_server_owner.so_major_id, the RPCSEC_GSS handles returned in
spi_handles can only be used on connections connected to a server
the returns the same the eir_server_owner.so_major_id and
eir_server_owner.so_minor_id on each connection.
The arguments include an array of up to one element in length called
eia_client_impl_id. If eia_client_impl_id is present it contains the
information identifying the implementation of the client. Similarly,
the results include an array of up to one element in length called
eir_server_impl_id that identifies the implementation of the server.
Servers MUST accept a zero length eia_client_impl_id array, and
clients MUST accept a zero length eir_server_impl_id array.
An example use for implementation identifiers would be diagnostic
software that extract this information in an attempt to identify
interoperability problems, performance workload behaviors or general
usage statistics. Since the intent of having access to this
information is for planning or general diagnosis only, the client and
server MUST NOT interpret this implementation identity information in
a way that affects interoperational behavior of the implementation.
The reason is that if clients and servers did such a thing, they
might use fewer capabilities of the protocol than the peer can
support, or the client and server might refuse to interoperate.
Because it is possible some implementations will violate the protocol
specification and interpret the identity information, implementations
MUST allow the users of the NFSv4 client and server to set the
contents of the sent nfs_impl_id structure to any value.
17.35.5. IMPLEMENTATION
A server's client record is a 5-tuple:
1. co_ownerid
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The client identifier string, from the eia_clientowner
structure of the EXCHANGE_ID4args structure
2. co_verifier:
A client-specific value used to indicate reboots, from the
eia_clientowner structure of the EXCHANGE_ID4args structure
3. principal:
The principal defined by the RPC header.
4. client ID:
The shorthand client identifier, generated by the server and
returned via the eir_clientid field in the EXCHANGE_ID4resok
structure
5. confirmed:
A private field on the server indicating whether or not a
client record has been confirmed. A client record is
confirmed if there has been a successful CREATE_SESSION
operation to confirm it. Otherwise it is unconfirmed. An
unconfirmed record is established by a EXCHANGE_ID call. Any
unconfirmed record that is not confirmed within a lease period
may be removed.
The following identifiers represent special values for the fields in
the records.
ownerid_arg:
The value of the eia_clientowner.co_ownerid subfield of the
EXCHANGE_ID4args structure of the current request.
verifier_arg:
The value of the eia_clientowner.co_verifier subfield of the
EXCHANGE_ID4args structure of the current request.
old_verifier_arg:
A value of the eia_clientowner.co_verifier field of a client
record received in a previous request; this is distinct from
verifier_arg.
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principal_arg:
The value of the RPCSEC_GSS principal for the current request.
old_principal_arg:
A value of the RPCSEC_GSS principal received for a previous
request. This is distinct from principal_arg.
clientid_ret:
The value of the eir_clientid field the server will return in the
EXCHANGE_ID4resok structure for the current request.
old_clientid_ret:
The value of the eir_clientid field the server returned in the
EXCHANGE_ID4resok structure for a previous request. This is
distinct from clientid_ret.
confirmed:
The client ID has been confirmed.
unconfirmed:
The client ID has not been confirmed.
Since EXCHANGE_ID is a non-idempotent operation, we must consider the
possibility that retries occur as a result of a client reboot,
network partition, malfunctioning router, etc. Retries are
identified by the value of the eia_clientowner field of
EXCHANGE_ID4args and the method for dealing with them is outlined in
the scenarios below.
The scenarios are described in terms of the client record(s) a server
has for a given co_ownerid.
1. New Owner ID
* If the server has no client records with
eia_clientowner.co_ownerid matching ownerid_arg, and
EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is not set in the EXCHANGE_ID, then a
new shorthand client ID (let us call it clientid_ret) is
generated, and the following unconfirmed record is added to
the server's state.
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, principal_arg, clientid_ret,
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unconfirmed }
Subsequently, the server returns clientid_ret.
* If the server has no client records with
eia_clientowner.co_ownerid matching ownerid_arg, and
EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is set in the EXCHANGE_ID, then
NFS4ERR_ENOENT is returned.
2. Non-Update on Existing Client ID
If the server has the following confirmed record, and the
request does not have EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A set, then the
request is the result of a retried request due to a faulty
router or lost connection, or the client is trying to
determine if can perform trunking.
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, principal_arg, clientid_ret,
confirmed }
Since the record has been confirmed, the client must have
received the server's reply from the initial EXCHANGE_ID
request. Since the server has a confirmed record, and since
EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A is not set, the server returns the same
result it did when the client ID's properties were last
updated (or if never updated, the result when the client ID
was created). The confirmed record is unchanged.
3. Update
If the server has the following confirmed record, and the
request does have EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A set, then this
request is an attempt at an update.
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, principal_arg, clientid_ret,
confirmed }
Since the record has been confirmed, the client must have
received the server's reply from the initial EXCHANGE_ID
request. The server allows the update.
4. Client Collision
If the server has the following confirmed record, then this
request is likely the result of a chance collision between the
values of the eia_clientowner.co_ownerid subfield of
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EXCHANGE_ID4args for two different clients.
{ ownerid_arg, *, old_principal_arg, clientid_ret, confirmed }
Since the value of the eia_clientowner.co_ownerid subfield of
each client record must be unique, there is no modification of
the server's state. The server returns NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE to
indicate the client should retry with a different value for
the eia_clientowner.co_ownerid subfield of EXCHANGE_ID4args.
This scenario may also represent a malicious attempt to
destroy a client's state on the server. For security reasons,
the server MUST NOT remove the client's state when there is a
principal mismatch.
5. Retry
* If the EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A flag is not set, and the server
has the following unconfirmed record then this request is
likely the result of a retry due to a network partition or
some other connection failure.
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, principal_arg, old_clientid_ret,
unconfirmed }
It is possible the client did retry the EXCHANGE_ID but also
changed the client ID's properties. While the client is not
supposed to do that, the simplest thing for the server to do
is deletes the unconfirmed record and replaces it with the
following unconfirmed record:
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, principal_arg, clientid_ret,
unconfirmed }
* If the EXCHGID4_FLAG_UPDATE_A flag is set and the server has
the unconfirmed record described above, the server returns
NFS4ERR_ENOENT and leaves the record intact.
6. Change of Principal
If the server has the following unconfirmed record then this
request is likely the result of a client which has for
whatever reasons changed principals (possibly to change
security flavor) after calling EXCHANGE_ID, but before calling
CREATE_SESSION.
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{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, old_principal_arg, clientid_ret,
unconfirmed}
Since the client has not changed, the principal field of the
unconfirmed record is updated to principal_arg and
clientid_ret is again returned. There is a small possibility
that this is merely a collision on the client field of
EXCHANGE_ID4args between unrelated clients, but since that is
unlikely, and an unconfirmed record does not have any file
system pertinent state, we can assume it is the same client
without risking loss of any important state.
After processing, the following record will exist on the
server.
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, principal_arg, clientid_ret,
unconfirmed}
7. Client Reboot
If the server has the following confirmed client record, then
this request is likely from a previously confirmed client
which has rebooted.
{ ownerid_arg, old_verifier_arg, principal_arg,
old_clientid_ret, confirmed }
Since the previous incarnation of the same client will no
longer be making requests, once the new client ID is confirmed
by CREATE_SESSION, lock and share reservations should be
released immediately rather than forcing the new incarnation
to wait for the lease time on the previous incarnation to
expire. Furthermore, session state should be removed since if
the client had maintained that information across reboot, this
request would not have been issued. If the server does not
support the CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV claim type, associated
delegations should be purged as well; otherwise, delegations
are retained and recovery proceeds according to the section
Delegation Recovery (Section 9.2.1).
After processing, clientid_ret is returned to the client and
the following record will exist on the server.
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, principal_arg, clientid_ret,
unconfirmed }
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8. Client restart before confirmation
If the server has the following unconfirmed record, then this
request is likely from a client which restart before sending a
CREATE_SESSION request.
{ ownerid_arg, old_verifier_arg, *, clientid_ret, unconfirmed
}
Since this is believed to be a request from a new incarnation
of the original client, the server updates the value of
eia_clientowner.co_verifier and returns the original
clientid_ret. After processing, the following state exists on
the server.
{ ownerid_arg, verifier_arg, *, clientid_ret, unconfirmed }
17.36. Operation 43: CREATE_SESSION - Create New Session and Confirm
Client ID
Start up session and confirm client ID.
17.36.1. SYNOPSIS
client ID, session attributes, channel attributes,
callback parameters ->
sessionid, session attributes, channel attributes,
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17.36.2. ARGUMENT
struct channel_attrs4 {
count4 ca_headerpadsize;
count4 ca_maxrequestsize;
count4 ca_maxresponsesize;
count4 ca_maxresponsesize_cached;
count4 ca_maxoperations;
count4 ca_maxrequests;
uint32_t ca_rdma_ird<1>;
};
const CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_PERSIST = 0x00000001;
const CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_BACK_CHAN = 0x00000002;
const CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_RDMA = 0x00000004;
struct CREATE_SESSION4args {
clientid4 csa_clientid;
sequenceid4 csa_sequence;
uint32_t csa_flags;
channel_attrs4 csa_fore_chan_attrs;
channel_attrs4 csa_back_chan_attrs;
uint32_t csa_cb_program;
callback_sec_parms4 csa_sec_parms<>;
};
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17.36.3. RESULT
struct CREATE_SESSION4resok {
sessionid4 csr_sessionid;
sequenceid4 csr_sequence;
uint32_t csr_flags;
channel_attrs4 csr_fore_chan_attrs;
channel_attrs4 csr_back_chan_attrs;
};
union CREATE_SESSION4res switch (nfsstat4 csr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
CREATE_SESSION4resok csr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.36.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation is used by the client to create new session objects on
the server.
CREATE_SESSION can be issued with or without a preceding SEQUENCE
operation in the same COMPOUND procedure. If CREATE_SESSION is
issued with a preceding SEQUENCE operation, any session created by
CREATE_SESSION has no direct relation to the session specified in the
SEQUENCE operation, although the two sessions might be associated
with the same client ID.
In addition to creating a session, CREATE_SESSION has the following
effects:
o The first session created with a new client ID serves to confirm
the creation of that client's state on the server. The server
returns the parameter values for the new session.
o The connection CREATE_SESSION is issued over is associated with
the session's fore channel.
The arguments and results of CREATE_SESSION are described as follows:
csa_clientid:
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This is the client ID the new session will be associated with.
The corresponding result is csr_sessionid, sessionid of the new
session.
csa_sequence:
Each client ID serializes CREATE_SESSION via a per client ID
sequence number. See Section 17.36.5. The corresponding result
is csr_sequence, which MUST be equal to to csa_sequence.
In the next three arguments, the client offers a value that is to be
a property of the session. It is RECOMMENDED that the server accept
the value. If it is not acceptable, the server MAY use a different
value. Regardless, the server MUST return the value the session will
uses (which will be either what the client offered, or what the
server is insisting on). return the value used to the client. These
parameters have the following interpretation.
csa_flags:
The csa_flags field contains a list of the following flag bits:
CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_PERSIST:
If CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_PERSIST is set, the client desires
server support for persistent reply cache. For sessions in
which only idempotent operations will be used (e.g. a read-only
session), clients SHOULD NOT set CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_PERSIST.
If the server does not or cannot provide a persistent reply
cache, the server MUST NOT set CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_PERSIST in
the field csr_flags.
If the server is a pNFS metadata server, for reasons described
in Section 12.5.2 it SHOULD support
CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_PERSIST if it supports the layout_hint
(Section 5.13.4) attribute.
CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_BACK_CHAN:
If CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_BACK_CHAN is set in csa_flags, the
client is requesting that the server use the connection
CREATE_SESSION is called over for the backchannel as well as
the fore channel. The server sets
CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_BACK_CHAN in the result field
csr_flags if it agrees. If CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_BACK_CHAN
is not set in csa_flags, then
CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_BACK_CHAN MUST NOT be set in
csr_flags.
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CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_RDMA:
If CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_RDMA is set in csa_flags, the
connection CREATE_SESSION is called over is currently in non-
RDMA mode, but has the capability to operate in RDMA mode, then
client is requesting the server agree to "step up" to RDMA mode
on the connection. The server sets
CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_RDMA in the result field csr_flags if
it agrees. If CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_RDMA is not set in
csa_flags, then CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_RDMA MUST NOT be set
in csr_flags. Note that once the server agrees to step up, it
and the client MUST exchange all future traffic on the
connection with RPC RDMA framing and not Record Marking ([9]).
csa_fore_chan_attrs:
csa_back_chan_attrs:
The csa_fore_char_attrs and csa_back_chan_attrs fields apply to
attributes of the fore channel (which conveys requests originating
from the client to the server), and the backchannel (the channel
that conveys callback requests originating from the server to the
client), respectively. The results are in corresponding
structures called csr_fore_chan_attrs and csr_back_chan_attrs.
The results establish attributes for each channel, and on all
subsequent use of each channel of the session. Each structure has
the following fields:
ca_headerpadsize:
The maximum amount of padding the requester is willing to apply
to ensure that write payloads are aligned on some boundary at
the replier. The replier should reply in ca_headerpadsize with
its preferred value, or zero if padding is not in use. The
replier may decrease this value but MUST NOT increase it.
ca_maxrequestsize:
The maximum size of a COMPOUND or CB_COMPOUND request that will
be sent. This size represents the XDR encoded size of the
request, including the RPC headers (including security flavor
credentials and verifiers) but excludes any RPC transport
framing headers. Imagine a request coming over a non-RDMA
TCP/IP connection, and that it has a single Record Marking
header preceding it. The maximum allowable count encoded in
the header will be ca_maxrequestsize. If a requester sends a
request that exceeds ca_maxrequestsize, the error
NFS4ERR_REQ_TOO_BIG will be returned per the description in
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Section 2.10.5.4.
ca_maxresponsesize:
The maximum size of a COMPOUND or CB_COMPOUND reply that the
replier will accept from the requester including RPC headers
(see the ca_maxrequestsize definition). The NFSv4.1 server
MUST NOT increase the value of this parameter in the
CREATE_SESSION results. However, if the client selects a value
for ca_maxresponsesize such that a replier on a channel could
never send a response, the server SHOULD return
NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL to in the CREATE_SESSION reply. If a
requester sends a request for which the size of the reply would
exceed this value, the replier will return NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG,
per the description in Section 2.10.5.4.
ca_maxresponsesize_cached:
Like ca_maxresponsesize, but the maximum size of a reply that
will be stored in the reply cache (Section 2.10.5.1). If the
reply to CREATE_SESSION has ca_maxresponsesize_cached less than
ca_maxresponsesize, then this is an indication to the requester
on the channel that it needs to be selective about which
replies it directs the replier to cache; for example large
replies from nonidempotent operations (e.g. COMPOUND requests
with a READ operation), should not be cached. The requester
decides which replies to cache via an argument to the SEQUENCE
(the sa_cachethis field, see Section 17.46) or CB_SEQUENCE (the
csa_cachethis field, see Section 19.9) operations. If a
requester sends a request for which the size of the reply would
exceed this value, the replier will return
NFS4ERR_REP_TOO_BIG_TO_CACHE, per the description in
Section 2.10.5.4.
ca_maxoperations:
The maximum number of operations the replier will accept in a
COMPOUND or CB_COMPOUND. The server MUST NOT increase
ca_maxoperations in the reply to CREATE_SESSION. If the
requester issues a COMPOUND or CB_COMPOUND with more operations
than ca_maxoperations, the replier MUST return
NFS4ERR_TOO_MANY_OPS.
ca_maxrequests:
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The maximum number of concurrent COMPOUND or CB_COMPOUND
requests the requester will issue on the session. Subsequent
requests will each be assigned a slot identifier by the
requester within the range 0 to ca_maxrequests - 1 inclusive.
ca_rdma_ird:
This array has a maximum of one element. If this array has one
element, then the element contains the inbound RDMA read queue
depth (IRD).
csa_cb_program
This is the ONC RPC program number the server must use in any
callbacks sent through the backchannel to the client. The server
MUST specify an ONC RPC program number equal to csa_cb_program and
an ONC RPC version number of 4 in callbacks sent to the client.
If a CB_COMPOUND is sent to the client, the server MUST use a
minor version number of 1. There is no corresponding result.
csa_sec_parms
The field csa_sec_parms is an array of acceptable security
credentials the server can use on the session's backchannel.
Three security flavors are supported: AUTH_NONE, AUTH_SYS, and
RPCSEC_GSS. If AUTH_NONE is specified for a credential, then this
says the client is authorizing the server to use AUTH_NONE on all
callbacks for the session. If AUTH_SYS is specified, then the
client is authorizing the server to use AUTH_SYS on all callbacks,
using the credential specified cbsp_sys_cred. If RPCSEC_GSS is
specified, then the server is allowed to use the RPCSEC_GSS
context specified in cbsp_gss_parms as the RPCSEC_GSS context in
the credential of the RPC header of callbacks to the client.
There is no corresponding result.
The RPCSEC_GSS context is specified with two RPCSEC_GSS handles.
The first handle, gcbp_handle_from_server, is the fore handle the
server returned to the client when the RPCSEC_GSS context was
created on the server. The second handle, gcbp_handle_from_client
is the back handle the client will map the RPCSEC_GSS context to.
The server can immediately use the RPCSEC_GSS context using
gcbp_handle_from_client as the value for "handle" in the structure
rpc_gss_cred_vers_1_t of the RPCSEC_GSS handle, and gss_proc set
to RPCSEC_GSS_DATA. Note that while the GSS context state is
shared between the fore and back RPCSEC_GSS contexts, the fore and
back RPCSEC_GSS context state are independent of each other as far
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as the RPCSEC_GSS sequence number.
Once the session is created, the first SEQUENCE or CB_SEQUENCE
received on a slot MUST have a sequence id equal to 1; if not the
server MUST return NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED.
17.36.5. IMPLEMENTATION
To describe a possible implementation, the same notation for client
records introduced in the description of EXCHANGE_ID is used with the
following addition:
clientid_arg: The value of the csa_clientid field of the
CREATE_SESSION4args structure of the current request.
Since CREATE_SESSION is a non-idempotent operation, we must consider
the possibility that retries may occur as a result of a client
reboot, network partition, malfunctioning router, etc. For each
client ID created by EXCHANGE_ID, the server maintains a separate
reply cache similar to the session reply cache used for SEQUENCE
operations, with two distinctions.
o First this is a reply cache just for detecting and processing
CREATE_SESSION requests for a given client ID.
o Second, the size of the client ID reply cache is of one slot (and
as a result, the CREATE_SESSION request does not carry a slot
number). This means that at most one CREATE_SESSION request for a
given client ID can be outstanding.
When a client issues a successful EXCHANGE_ID it is returned
eir_sequenceid, and the client is expected to set the value of
csa_sequenceid in the next CREATE_SESSION it sends with that client
ID to the value of eir_sequenceid. After EXCHANGE_ID, the server
initializes the client ID slot to be equal to eir_sequenceid - 1
(accounting for underflow), and records a contrived CREATE_SESSION
result with a "cached" result of NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED. With the
slot thus initialized, the processing of the CREATE_SESSION operation
is divided into four phases:
1. Client record lookup. The server looks up the client ID in its
client record table. If the server contains no records with
client ID equal to clientid_arg, then most likely the client's
state has been purged during a period of inactivity, possibly due
to a loss of connectivity. NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID is returned,
and no changes are made to any client records on the server.
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Otherwise, the server goes to phase 2.
2. Sequence id processing. If csa_sequenceid is equal to the
sequence id in the client's slot, then this is a reply of the
previous CREATE_SESSION request, and the server returns the
cached result. If csa_sequenceid is not equal to the sequence id
in the slot, and is more than one greater (accounting for
wraparound), then the server returns the error
NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED, and does not change the slot. If
csa_sequenceid is equal to the slot's sequence id + 1 (accounting
for wraparound), then the slot's sequence id is set to
csa_sequenceid, and the CREATE_SESSION processing goes to the
next phase. A subsequent new CREATE_SESSION call MUST use a
csa_sequence that is one greater than last successfully used.
3. Client ID confirmation. If this would be the first session for
the client ID, the CREATE_SESSION operation serves to confirm the
client ID. Otherwise the client ID confirmation phase is skipped
and only the session creation phase occurs. Any case in which
there is more than one record with identical values for client ID
represents a server implementation error. Operation in the
potential valid cases is summarized as follows.
* Successful Confirmation
If the server has the following unconfirmed record, then
this is the expected confirmation of an unconfirmed record.
{ *, *, principal_arg, clientid_arg, unconfirmed }
The record is replaced with:
{ *, *, principal_arg, clientid_arg, unconfirmed }
The processing of the operation continues to session
creation.
* Unsuccessful Confirmation
If the server has the following record, then the client has
changed principals after the previous EXCHANGE_ID request,
or there has been a chance collision between shorthand
client identifiers.
{ *, *, old_principal_arg, clientid_arg, * }
Neither of these cases are permissible. Processing stops
and NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE is returned to the client. No
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changes are made to any client records on the server.
4. Session creation. The server confirmed the client ID, either in
this CREATE_SESSION operation, or a previous CREATE_SESSION
operation. The server examines the remaining fields of the
arguments.
5. The server creates the session by recording the parameter values
used (including whether the CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_PERSIST flag is
set and has been accepted by the server) and allocating space for
the session reply cache. For each slot in the reply cache, the
server sets the sequence id to zero (0), and records an entry
containing a COMPOUND reply with a zero operations and the error
of NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED. The client initializes its reply
cache for receiving callbacks in the same way, and similarly, the
first CB_SEQUENCE operation on a slot after session creation must
have a sequence id of one.
6. If the session state is created successfully, the server
associates the session with the client ID provided by the client.
7. When a request that had CREATE_SESSION4_FLAG_CONN_RDMA set needs
to be retried, the retry MUST be done on a new connection that is
in non-RDMA mode. If properties of the new connection are
different enough that the arguments to CREATE_SESSION must
change, then a non-retry MUST be sent. The server will
eventually dispose of any session that was created.
On the backchannel, the client and server might wish to have many
slots, in some cases perhaps more that the fore channel in to deal
with the situations where the network link has high latency and is
the primary bottleneck for response to recalls. If so, and if the
client provides too few slots to the backchannel, the server might
limit the number of recallable objects it gives to the server.
Implementing RPCSEC_GSS callback support requires the client and
server change their RPCSEC_GSS implementations. One possible set of
changes includes:
o Adding a data structure that wraps the GSS-API context with a
reference count.
o New functions to increment and decrement the reference count. If
the reference count is decremented to zero, the wrapper data
structure and the GSS-API context it refers to would be freed.
o Change RPCSEC_GSS to create the wrapper data structure upon
receiving GSS-API context from gss_accept_sec_context() and
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gss_init_sec_context(). The reference count would be initialized
to 1.
o Adding a function to map an existing RPCSEC_GSS handle to a
pointer to the wrapper data structure. The reference count would
be incremented.
o Adding a function to create a new RPCSEC_GSS handle from a pointer
to the wrapper data structure. The reference count would be
incremented.
o Replacing calls from RPCSEC_GSS that free GSS-API contexts, with
calls to decrement the reference count on the wrapper data
structure.
17.37. Operation 44: DESTROY_SESSION - Destroy existing session
Destroy existing session.
17.37.1. SYNOPSIS
sessionid -> -
17.37.2. ARGUMENT
struct DESTROY_SESSION4args {
sessionid4 dsa_sessionid;
};
17.37.3. RESULT
struct DESTROY_SESSION4res {
nfsstat4 dsr_status;
};
17.37.4. DESCRIPTION
The DESTROY_SESSION operation closes the session and discards the
session's its reply cache, if any. Any remaining connections
associated with the session are immediately disassociated and it not
associated with out sessions, MAY be closed by the server. Locks,
delegations, layouts, wants, and the lease, which are all tied to the
client ID, are not affected by DESTROY_SESSION.
DESTROY_SESSION MUST be invoked on a connection that is associated
with the session being destroyed. In addition if SP4_MACH_CRED state
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protection was specified when the client ID was created, the
RPCSEC_GSS principal that created the session MUST be the one that
destroys the session, using RPCSEC_GSS privacy or integrity. If
SP4_SSV state protection was specified when the client ID was
created, RPCSEC_GSS using the SSV mechanism (Section 2.10.7.4) MUST
be used, with integrity or privacy.
If the COMPOUND request starts with SEQUENCE, and if the sessions
referred to by SEQUENCE and DESTROY_SESSION are the same, then
o DESTROY_SESSION MUST be the final operation in the COMPOUND
request.
o It is advisable to not place DESTROY_SESSION in a COMPOUND request
with other state-modifying operations, because the DESTROY_SESSION
will destroy reply cache.
DESTROY_SESSION MAY be the only operation in a COMPOUND request.
Because the session is destroyed, a client that retries the request
may receive an error in reply to the retry, even though the original
request was successful.
If there is a backchannel on the session and the server has
outstanding CB_SEQUENCE operations, then the server MAY refuse to
destroy the session and return NFS4ERR_BACK_CHAN_BUSY. In the event
the backchannel is down, the server should instead return
NFS4ERR_CB_PATH_DOWN to inform the client that the backchannel needs
to repaired before the server will allow the session to be destroyed.
The client SHOULD reply to all outstanding CB_COMPOUNDs before re-
issuing DESTROY_SESSION.
17.38. Operation 45: FREE_STATEID - Free stateid with no locks
Test a series of stateids for validity.
17.38.1. SYNOPSIS
stateid ->
17.38.2. ARGUMENT
struct FREE_STATEID4args {
stateid4 fsa_stateid;
};
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17.38.3. RESULT
struct FREE_STATEID4res {
nfsstat4 fsr_status;
};
17.38.4. DESCRIPTION
The FREE_STATEID operation is used to free a stateid which no longer
has any associated locks (including opens, record locks, delegations,
layouts). This may be cause of client unlock operations or because
of server revocation. If there are valid locks (of any kind)
associated with the stateid in question, the error NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD
will be returned, and the associated stateid will not be freed.
When a stateid is freed which had been associated with revoked locks,
the client, by doing the FREE_STATEID acknowledges the loss of those
locks, allowing the server, once all such revoked state, is
acknowledged to allow that client again to reclaim locks, without
encountering the edge conditions discussed in Section 8.6.2.
Once a successful FREE_STATEID is done for a given stateid, any
subsequent use of that stateid will result in an NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID
error.
17.38.5. IMPLEMENTATION
No discussion at this time.
17.39. Operation 46: GET_DIR_DELEGATION - Get a directory delegation
Obtain a directory delegation.
17.39.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), requested notification ->
(cfh), cookieverf, stateid, supported notification
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17.39.2. ARGUMENT
/*
* Notification types.
*/
const DIR_NOTIFICATION4_NONE = 0x00000000;
const DIR_NOTIFICATION4_CHANGE_CHILD_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000001;
const DIR_NOTIFICATION4_CHANGE_DIR_ATTRIBUTES = 0x00000002;
const DIR_NOTIFICATION4_REMOVE_ENTRY = 0x00000004;
const DIR_NOTIFICATION4_ADD_ENTRY = 0x00000008;
const DIR_NOTIFICATION4_RENAME_ENTRY = 0x00000010;
const DIR_NOTIFICATION4_CHANGE_COOKIE_VERIFIER = 0x00000020;
typedef uint32_t dir_notification_type4;
typedef nfstime4 attr_notice4;
struct GET_DIR_DELEGATION4args {
bool gdda_signal_deleg_avail;
dir_notification_type4 gdda_notification_type;
attr_notice4 gdda_child_attr_delay;
attr_notice4 gdda_dir_attr_delay;
bitmap4 gdda_child_attributes;
bitmap4 gdda_dir_attributes;
};
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17.39.3. RESULT
struct GET_DIR_DELEGATION4resok {
verifier4 gddr_cookieverf;
/* Stateid for get_dir_delegation */
stateid4 gddr_stateid;
/* Which notifications can the server support */
dir_notification_type4 gddr_notification;
bitmap4 gddr_child_attributes;
bitmap4 gddr_dir_attributes;
};
enum gddrnf4_status {
GDD4_OK = 0,
GDD4_UNAVAIL = 1
};
union GET_DIR_DELEGATION4res_non_fatal
switch (gddrnf4_status gddrnf_status) {
case GDD4_OK:
GET_DIR_DELEGATION4resok gddrnf_resok4;
case GDD4_UNAVAIL:
bool gddrnf_will_signal_deleg_avail;
};
union GET_DIR_DELEGATION4res
switch (nfsstat4 gddr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
/* CURRENT_FH: delegated dir */
GET_DIR_DELEGATION4res_non_fatal gddr_res_non_fatal4;
default:
void;
};
17.39.4. DESCRIPTION
The GET_DIR_DELEGATION operation is used by a client to request a
directory delegation. The directory is represented by the current
filehandle. The client also specifies whether it wants the server to
notify it when the directory changes in certain ways by setting one
or more bits in a bitmap. The server may also choose not to grant
the delegation. In that case the server will return
NFS4ERR_DIRDELEG_UNAVAIL. If the server decides to hand out the
delegation, it will return a cookie verifier for that directory. If
the cookie verifier changes when the client is holding the
delegation, the delegation will be recalled unless the client has
asked for notification for this event. In that case a notification
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will be sent to the client.
The server will also return a directory delegation stateid in
addition to the cookie verifier as a result of the GET_DIR_DELEGATION
operation. This stateid will appear in callback messages related to
the delegation, such as notifications and delegation recalls. The
client will use this stateid to return the delegation voluntarily or
upon recall. A delegation is returned by calling the DELEGRETURN
operation.
The server may not be able to support notifications of certain
events. If the client asks for such notifications, the server must
inform the client of its inability to do so as part of the
GET_DIR_DELEGATION reply by not setting the appropriate bits in the
supported notifications bitmask contained in the reply.
The GET_DIR_DELEGATION operation can be used for both normal and
named attribute directories. It covers all the entries in the
directory except the ".." entry. That means if a directory and its
parent both hold directory delegations, any changes to the parent
will not cause a notification to be sent for the child even though
the child's ".." entry points to the parent.
If client sets gdda_signal_deleg_avail to TRUE, then it is
registering with the client a "want" for a directory delegation. If
the server supports and will honor the "want", the results will have
gddrnf_will_signal_deleg_avail set to TRUE. If so the client should
expect a future CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL operation to indicate that a
directory delegation is available.
17.39.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Directory delegation provides the benefit of improving cache
consistency of namespace information. This is done through
synchronous callbacks. A server must support synchronous callbacks
in order to support directory delegations. In addition to that,
asynchronous notifications provide a way to reduce network traffic as
well as improve client performance in certain conditions.
Notifications would not be requested when the goal is just cache
consistency.
Notifications are specified in terms of potential changes to the
directory. A client can ask to be notified of events by setting one
or more flags in gdda_notification_type. The client can ask for
notifications on addition of entries to a direction (by setting the
DIR_NOTIFICATION4_ADD_ENTRY in gdda_notification_type), notifications
on entry removal (DIR_NOTIFICATION4_REMOVE_ENTRY), renames
(DIR_NOTIFICATION4_RENAME_ENTRY), directory attribute changes
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(DIR_NOTIFICATION4_CHANGE_DIR_ATTRIBUTES), and cookie verifier
changes (DIR_NOTIFICATION4_CHANGE_COOKIE_VERIFIER) by setting one
more corresponding flags in the gdda_notification_type field.
The client can also ask for notifications of changes to attributes of
directory entries (DIR_NOTIFICATION4_CHANGE_CHILD_ATTRIBUTES) in
order to keep its attribute cache up to date. However any changes
made to child attributes do not cause the delegation to be recalled.
If a client is interested in directory entry caching, or negative
name caching, it can set the gdda_notification_type appropriately and
the server will notify it of all changes that would otherwise
invalidate its name cache. The kind of notification a client asks
for may depend on the directory size, its rate of change and the
applications being used to access that directory. However, the
conditions under which a client might ask for a notification, is out
of the scope of this specification.
For attribute notifications, the client will set bits in the
gdda_dir_attributes bitmap to indicate which attributes it wants to
be notified of. If the server does not support notifications for
changes to a certain attribute, it should not set that attribute in
the supported attribute bitmap specified in the reply
(gddr_dir_attributes). The client will also set in the
gdda_child_attributes bitmap the attributes of directory entries it
wants to be notified of, and the server will indicate in
gddr_child_attributes which attributes of directory entries it will
notify the client of.
The client will also let the server know if it wants to get the
notification as soon as the attribute change occurs or after a
certain delay by setting a delay factor; gdda_child_attr_delay is for
attribute changes to directory entries and gdda_dir_attr_delay is for
attribute changes to the directory. If this delay factor is set to
zero, that indicates to the server that the client wants to be
notified of any attribute changes as soon as they occur. If the
delay factor is set to N seconds, the server will make a best effort
guarantee that attribute updates are not out of sync by more than
that. If the client asks for a delay factor that the server does not
support or that may cause significant resource consumption on the
server by causing the server to send a lot of notifications, the
server should not commit to sending out notifications for attributes
and therefore must not set the appropriate bit in the
gddr_child_attributes and gddr_dir_attributes bitmaps in the
response.
The client should use a security flavor that the file system is
exported with. If it uses a different flavor, the server should
return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC to the operation that precedes
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GET_DIR_DELEGATION and sets the current filehandle.
17.40. Operation 47: GETDEVICEINFO - Get Device Information
17.40.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), device_id, layout_type, maxcount -> device_addr
17.40.2. ARGUMENT
struct GETDEVICEINFO4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
deviceid4 gdia_device_id;
layouttype4 gdia_layout_type;
count4 gdia_maxcount;
};
17.40.3. RESULT
struct GETDEVICEINFO4resok {
device_addr4 gdir_device_addr;
};
union GETDEVICEINFO4res switch (nfsstat4 gdir_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
GETDEVICEINFO4resok gdir_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.40.4. DESCRIPTION
Returns device address information for a specified device. The
device address MUST correspond to the layout type specified by the
GETDEVICEINFO4args. The current filehandle (cfh) is used to identify
the file system; device IDs are unique per file system (FSID) and are
qualified by the layout type.
See Section 12.2.12 for more details on device ID assignment.
If the size of the device address exceeds gdia_maxcount bytes, the
metadata server will return the error NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL. If an
invalid device ID is given, the metadata server will respond with
NFS4ERR_INVAL.
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17.40.5. IMPLEMENTATION
17.41. Operation 48: GETDEVICELIST
17.41.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), layout_type, maxcount, cookie, cookieverf ->
cookie, cookieverf, device info list<>
17.41.2. ARGUMENT
struct GETDEVICELIST4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
layouttype4 gdla_layout_type;
count4 gdla_maxcount;
nfs_cookie4 gdla_cookie;
verifier4 gdla_cookieverf;
};
17.41.3. RESULT
struct GETDEVICELIST4resok {
nfs_cookie4 gdlr_cookie;
verifier4 gdlr_cookieverf;
devlist_item4 gdlr_devinfo_list<>;
bool gdlr_eof;
};
union GETDEVICELIST4res switch (nfsstat4 gdlr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
GETDEVICELIST4resok gdlr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.41.4. DESCRIPTION
In some applications, especially SAN environments, it is convenient
to find out about all the devices associated with a file system.
This lets a client determine if it has access to these devices, e.g.,
at mount time.
This operation returns an array of items (devlist_item4) that
establish the association between the short deviceid4 and the
addressing information for that device, for a particular layout type.
This operation may not be able to fetch all device information at
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once, thus it uses a cookie based approach, similar to READDIR, to
fetch additional device information (see Section 17.23). The "eof"
flag has a value of TRUE if there are no more entries to fetch. As
in GETDEVICEINFO, the current filehandle (cfh) is used to identify
the file system.
As in GETDEVICEINFO, gdla_maxcount specifies the maximum number of
bytes to return. If the metadata server is unable to return a single
device address, it will return the error NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL. If an
invalid device ID is given, the metadata server will respond with
NFS4ERR_INVAL.
17.41.5. IMPLEMENTATION
17.42. Operation 49: LAYOUTCOMMIT - Commit writes made using a layout
17.42.1. SYNOPSIS
(client ID), (cfh), offset, length, reclaim, last_write_offset,
time_modify, time_access, layoutupdate -> newsize
17.42.2. ARGUMENT
union newtime4 switch (bool nt_timechanged) {
case TRUE:
nfstime4 nt_time;
case FALSE:
void;
};
union newoffset4 switch (bool no_newoffset) {
case TRUE:
offset4 no_offset;
case FALSE:
void;
};
struct LAYOUTCOMMIT4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
offset4 loca_offset;
length4 loca_length;
bool loca_reclaim;
newoffset4 loca_last_write_offset;
newtime4 loca_time_modify;
newtime4 loca_time_access;
layoutupdate4 loca_layoutupdate;
};
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17.42.3. RESULT
union newsize4 switch (bool ns_sizechanged) {
case TRUE:
length4 ns_size;
case FALSE:
void;
};
struct LAYOUTCOMMIT4resok {
newsize4 locr_newsize;
};
union LAYOUTCOMMIT4res switch (nfsstat4 locr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
LAYOUTCOMMIT4resok locr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.42.4. DESCRIPTION
Commits changes in the layout segment represented by the current file
handle, client ID (derived from the sessionid in the preceding
SEQUENCE operation), and octet range. Since layout segments are sub-
dividable, a smaller portion of a layout segment, retrieved via
LAYOUTGET, may be committed. The region being committed is specified
through the octet range (loca_offset and loca_length).
The LAYOUTCOMMIT operation indicates that the client has completed
writes using a layout obtained by a previous LAYOUTGET. The client
may have only written a subset of the data range it previously
requested. LAYOUTCOMMIT allows it to commit or discard provisionally
allocated space and to update the server with a new end of file. The
layout segment referenced by LAYOUTCOMMIT is still valid after the
operation completes and can be continued to be referenced by the
client ID, filehandle, octet range, and layout type.
If the loca_reclaim field is set to TRUE, this indicates that the
client is attempting to commit changes to a layout after the reboot
of the metadata server during the metadata server's recovery grace
period. This type of request may be necessary when the client has
uncommitted writes to provisionally allocated regions of a file which
were sent to the storage devices before the reboot of the metadata
server. In this case the layout provided by the client MUST be a
subset of a writable layout that the client held immediately before
the reboot of the metadata server. The metadata server is free to
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accept or reject this request based on its own internal metadata
consistency checks. If the metadata server finds that the layout
provided by the client does not pass its consistency checks, it MUST
reject the request with the status NFS4ERR_RECLAIM_BAD. The
successful completion of the LAYOUTCOMMIT request with loca_reclaim
set to TRUE does NOT provide the client with a layout segment for the
file. It simply commits the changes to the layout segment specified
in the loca_layoutupdate field. To obtain a layout segment for the
file the client must issue a LAYOUTGET request to the server after
the server's grace period has expired. If the metadata server
receives a LAYOUTCOMMIT request with loca_reclaim set to TRUE when
the metadata server is not in its recovery grace period, it MUST
reject the request with the status NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE.
Setting the loca_reclaim field to TRUE is required if and only if the
committed layout was acquired before the metadata server reboot. If
the client is committing a layout segment that was acquired during
the metadata server's grace period, it MUST set the "reclaim" field
to FALSE.
The loca_last_write_offset field specifies the offset of the last
octet written by the client previous to the LAYOUTCOMMIT. Note: this
value is never equal to the file's size (at most it is one octet less
than the file's size). The metadata server may use this information
to determine whether the file's size needs to be updated. If the
metadata server updates the file's size as the result of the
LAYOUTCOMMIT operation, it must return the new size
(locr_newsize.ns_size) as part of the results.
The loca_time_modify and loca_time_access [[Comment.13: If
LAYOUTCOMMIT is only for writes, then why update access time?]]
fields allow the client to suggest times it would like the metadata
server to set. The metadata server may use these time values or it
may use the time of the LAYOUTCOMMIT operation to set these time
values. If the metadata server uses the client provided times, it
should ensure time does not flow backwards. If the client wants to
force the metadata server to set an exact time, the client should use
a SETATTR operation in a compound right after LAYOUTCOMMIT. See
Section 12.5.3 for more details. If the new client desires the
resultant mtime or atime, it should construct the COMPOUND so that a
GETATTR follows the LAYOUTCOMMIT.
The loca_layoutupdate argument to LAYOUTCOMMIT provides a mechanism
for a client to provide layout specific updates to the metadata
server. For example, the layout update can describe what regions of
the original layout have been used and what regions can be
deallocated. There is no NFSv4.1 file layout-specific layoutupdate4
structure.
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The layout information is more verbose for block devices than for
objects and files because the latter two hide the details of block
allocation behind their storage protocols. At the minimum, the
client needs to communicate changes to the end of file location back
to the server, and, if desired, its view of the file modify and
access time. For block/volume layouts, it needs to specify precisely
which blocks have been used.
If the layout segment identified in the arguments does not exist, the
error NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT is returned. The layout segment being
committed may also be rejected if it does not correspond to an
existing layout with an iomode of LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.42.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Optionally, the client can also use LAYOUTCOMMIT with the
loca_reclaim field set to TRUE to convey hints to modified file
attributes or to report layout-type specific information such as I/O
errors for object-based storage layouts, as normally done during
normal operation. Doing so may help the metadata server to recover
files more efficiently after reboot. For example, some file system
implementations may require expansive recovery of file system objects
if the metadata server does not get a positive indication from all
clients holding a write layout that they have successfully completed
all their writes. Sending a LAYOUTCOMMIT (if required) and then
following with LAYOUTRETURN can provide such an indication and allow
for graceful and efficient recovery.
17.43. Operation 50: LAYOUTGET - Get Layout Information
17.43.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), signal_avail, layout_type, iomode, offset,
length, minlength, maxcount -> layout example synopsis
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17.43.2. ARGUMENT
struct LAYOUTGET4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
bool loga_signal_layout_avail;
layouttype4 loga_layout_type;
layoutiomode4 loga_iomode;
offset4 loga_offset;
length4 loga_length;
length4 loga_minlength;
count4 loga_maxcount;
};
17.43.3. RESULT
struct LAYOUTGET4resok {
bool logr_return_on_close;
layout4 logr_layout;
};
union LAYOUTGET4res switch (nfsstat4 logr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
LAYOUTGET4resok logr_resok4;
case NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER:
bool logr_will_signal_layout_avail;
default:
void;
};
17.43.4. DESCRIPTION
Requests a layout segment from the metadata server for reading or
writing (and reading) the file given by the filehandle at the octet
range specified by offset and length. Layouts are identified by the
client ID (derived from the sessionid in the preceding SEQUENCE
operation), current filehandle, and layout type (loga_layout_type).
The use of the loga_iomode depends upon the layout type, but should
reflect the client's data access intent.
If the metadata server is in a grace period, and does not persist
layout segments and device ID to device address mappings, then it
MUST return NFS4ERR_GRACE (see Section 8.6.2.1).
The LAYOUTGET operation returns layout information for the specified
octet range: a layout segment. To get a layout segment from a
specific offset through the end-of-file, regardless of the file's
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length, a loga_length field with all bits set to 1 (one) should be
used. If loga_length is zero, or if a loga_length which is not all
bits set to one is specified, and loga_length when added to
loga_offset exceeds the maximum 64-bit unsigned integer value, the
error NFS4ERR_INVAL will result.
The loga_minlength field specifies the minimum size overlap with the
requested offset and length that is to be returned. If this
requirement cannot be met, no layout must be returned; the error
NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER can be returned.
The loga_maxcount field specifies the maximum layout size (in octets)
that the client can handle. If the size of the layout structure
exceeds the size specified by maxcount, the metadata server will
return the NFS4ERR_TOOSMALL error.
As well, the metadata server may adjust the range of the returned
layout segment based on striping patterns and usage implied by the
loga_iomode. The client must be prepared to get a layout segment
that does not line up exactly with its request; there MUST be at
least an overlap of loga_minlength between the layout returned by the
server and the client's request, or the server SHOULD reject the
request. See Section 12.5.2 for more details.
The metadata server may also return a layout segment with an
lo_iomode other than that requested by the client. If it does so, it
must ensure that the lo_iomode is more permissive than the
loga_iomode requested. E.g., this allows an implementation to
upgrade read-only requests to read/write requests at its discretion,
within the limits of the layout type specific protocol. A lo_iomode
of either LAYOUTIOMODE4_READ or LAYOUTIOMODE4_RW must be returned.
The logr_return_on_close result field is a directive to return the
layout before closing the file. When the server sets this return
value to TRUE, it must be prepared to recall the layout in the case
the client fails to return the layout before close. For the server
that knows a layout must be returned before a close of the file, this
return value can be used to communicate the desired behavior to the
client and thus removing one extra step from the client and server's
interaction.
The format of the returned layout (lo_content) is specific to the
underlying file system. Layout types other than the NFSv4.1 file
layout type are specified outside this document.
If layouts are not supported for the requested file or its containing
file system the server SHOULD return NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE. If
the layout type is not supported, the metadata server should return
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NFS4ERR_UNKNOWN_LAYOUTTYPE. If layouts are supported but no layout
matches the client provided layout identification, the server should
return NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT. If an invalid loga_iomode is specified, or
a loga_iomode of LAYOUTIOMODE4_ANY is specified, the server should
return NFS4ERR_BADIOMODE.
If the layout for the file is unavailable due to transient
conditions, e.g. file sharing prohibits layouts, the server must
return NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER.
If the layout request is rejected due to an overlapping layout
recall, the server must return NFS4ERR_RECALLCONFLICT. See
Section 12.5.4.2 for details.
If the layout conflicts with a mandatory octet range lock held on the
file, and if the storage devices have no method of enforcing
mandatory locks, other than through the restriction of layouts, the
metadata server should return NFS4ERR_LOCKED.
If client sets loga_signal_layout_avail to TRUE, then it is
registering with the client a "want" for a layout in the event the
layout cannot be obtained due to resource exhaustion. If the server
supports and will honor the "want", the results will have
logr_will_signal_layout_avail set to TRUE. If so the client should
expect a CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL operation to indicate that a layout
is available.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
17.43.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Typically, LAYOUTGET will be called as part of a compound RPC after
an OPEN operation and results in the client having location
information for the file; a client may also hold a layout across
multiple OPENs. The client specifies a layout type that limits what
kind of layout the server will return. This prevents servers from
issuing layouts that are unusable by the client.
17.44. Operation 51: LAYOUTRETURN - Release Layout Information
17.44.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), layout_type, iomode, layoutreturn, reclaim -> -
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17.44.2. ARGUMENT
struct LAYOUTRETURN4args {
/* CURRENT_FH: file */
bool lora_reclaim;
layouttype4 lora_layout_type;
layoutiomode4 lora_iomode;
layoutreturn4 lora_layoutreturn;
};
17.44.3. RESULT
struct LAYOUTRETURN4res {
nfsstat4 lorr_status;
};
17.44.4. DESCRIPTION
Returns one or more layouts or layout segments represented by the
client ID (derived from the sessionid in the preceding SEQUENCE
operation), lora_layout_type, and lora_iomode. When layoutreturn is
LAYOUTRETURN4_FILE the returned layout segment is further identified
by the current filehandle, lrf_offset, and lrf_length. When
layoutreturn is LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID the current filehandle is used to
identify the file system and all layouts or layout segments matching
the client ID, lora_layout_type, and lora_iomode are returned. When
layoutreturn is LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL all layouts or layout segments
matching the client ID, lora_layout_type, and lora_iomode are
returned and the current filehandle is not used. After this call,
the client MUST NOT use the returned layout segment(s) or layout(s)
and the associated storage protocol to access the file data. A
layout segment being returned may be a subdivision of a layout
segment previously fetched through LAYOUTGET. As well, it may be a
subset or superset of a layout segment specified by CB_LAYOUTRECALL.
However, if it is a subset, the recall is not complete until the full
recalled scope (LAYOUTRETURN4_FILE octet range, LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID,
or LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL) has been returned. It is also permissible, and
no error should result, for a client to return a octet range covering
a layout it does not hold. If the lrf_length is all 1s, the layout
covers the range from lrf_offset to EOF. An iomode of
LAYOUTIOMODE4_ANY specifies that all layouts that match the other
arguments to LAYOUTRETURN (i.e., client ID, lora_layout_type, and one
of current filehandle and range; fsid derived from current
filehandle; or LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL) are being returned.
When lr_returntype is set to LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID or LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL
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the client also invalidates all the storage device ID to storage
device address in the affected file system(s). Any device ID
returned by a subsequent LAYOUTGET in the affected file system(s)
will have to be resolved using either GETDEVICEINFO or GETDEVICELIST.
The lora_reclaim field set to TRUE in a LAYOUTRETURN request
specifies that the client is attempting to return a layout that was
acquired before the reboot of the metadata server during the metadata
server's grace period. When returning layouts that were acquired
during the metadata server's grace period MUST set the lora_reclaim
field to FALSE. The lora_reclaim field MUST be set to FALSE also
when lr_layoutreturn is LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID or LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL. See
LAYOUTCOMMIT (Section 17.42) for more details.
Layouts may be returned when recalled or voluntarily (i.e., before
the server has recalled them). In either case the client must
properly propagate state changed under the context of the layout to
the storage device(s)or to the metadata server before returning the
layout.
If a client fails to return a layout in a timely manner, then the
metadata server should use its control protocol with the storage
devices to fence the client from accessing the data referenced by the
layout. See Section 12.5.4 for more details.
If the layout identified in the arguments does not exist, the error
NFS4ERR_BADLAYOUT is returned. If a layout exists, but the iomode
does not match, NFS4ERR_BADIOMODE is returned.
If the LAYOUTRETURN request sets the lora_reclaim field to TRUE after
the metadata server's grace period, NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE is returned.
If the LAYOUTRETURN request sets the lora_reclaim field to TRUE and
lr_returntype is set to LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID or LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL,
NFS4ERR_INVAL is returned.
On success, the current filehandle retains its value.
[[Comment.14: Should LAYOUTRETURN be modified to handle FSID
callbacks?]]
The server MAY require that the principal, security flavor, and
applicable, the GSS mechanism, combination that acquired the layout
also be the one to issue LAYOUTRETURN. This might not be possible if
credentials for the principal are no longer available. The server
MAY allow the machine credential or SSV credential (see
Section 17.35) to issue DELEGRETURN.
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17.44.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The final LAYOUTRETURN operation in response to a CB_LAYOUTRECALL
callback MUST be serialized with any outstanding, intersecting
LAYOUTRETURN operations. Note that it is possible that while a
client is returning the layout for some recalled range the server may
recall a superset of that range (e.g. LAYOUTRECALL4_ALL); the final
return operation for the latter must block until the former layout
recall is done - when its corresponding final return operation is
replied.
Returning all layouts in a file system using LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID is
typically done in response to a CB_LAYOUTRECALL for that file system
as the final return operation. Similarly, LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL is used
in response to a recall callback for all layouts. It is possible
that the client already returned some outstanding layouts via
individual LAYOUTRETURN calls and the call for LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID or
LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL marks the end of the LAYOUTRETURN sequence. See
Section 12.5.4.1 for more details.
17.45. Operation 52: SECINFO_NO_NAME - Get Security on Unnamed Object
Obtain available security mechanisms with the use of the parent of an
object or the current filehandle.
17.45.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), secinfo_style -> { secinfo }
17.45.2. ARGUMENT
enum secinfo_style4 {
SECINFO_STYLE4_CURRENT_FH = 0,
SECINFO_STYLE4_PARENT = 1
};
typedef secinfo_style4 SECINFO_NO_NAME4args;
17.45.3. RESULT
typedef SECINFO4res SECINFO_NO_NAME4res;
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17.45.4. DESCRIPTION
Like the SECINFO operation, SECINFO_NO_NAME is used by the client to
obtain a list of valid RPC authentication flavors for a specific file
object. Unlike SECINFO, SECINFO_NO_NAME only works with objects are
accessed by filehandle.
There are two styles of SECINFO_NO_NAME, as determined by the value
of the secinfo_style4 enumeration. If SECINFO_STYLE4_CURRENT_FH is
passed, then SECINFO_NO_NAME is querying for the required security
for the current filehandle. If SECINFO_STYLE4_PARENT is passed, then
SECINFO_NO_NAME is querying for the required security of the current
filehandles's parent. If the style selected is
SECINFO_STYLE4_PARENT, then SECINFO should apply the same access
methodology used for LOOKUPP when evaluating the traversal to the
parent directory. Therefore, if the requester does not have the
appropriate access to LOOKUPP the parent then SECINFO_NO_NAME must
behave the same way and return NFS4ERR_ACCESS.
Note that if PUTFH, PUTPUBFH, or PUTROOTFH return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC,
this is tantamount to the server asserting that the client will have
to guess what the required security is, because there is no way to
query. Therefore, the client must iterate through the security
triples available at the client and reattempt the PUTFH, PUTROOTFH or
PUTPUBFH operation. In the unfortunate event none of the MANDATORY
security triples are supported by the client and server, the client
SHOULD try using others that support integrity. Failing that, the
client can try using other forms (e.g. AUTH_SYS and AUTH_NONE), but
because such forms lack integrity checks, this puts the client at
risk.
The server implementor should pay particular attention to Section 2.6
for instructions on avoiding NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC error returns from
PUTFH, PUTROOTFH, PUTPUBFH, or RESTOREFH.
Everything else about SECINFO_NO_NAME is the same as SECINFO. See
the discussion on SECINFO (Section 17.29.4).
17.45.5. IMPLEMENTATION
See the discussion on SECINFO (Section 17.29.5).
17.46. Operation 53: SEQUENCE - Supply per-procedure sequencing and
control
Supply per-procedure sequencing and control
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17.46.1. SYNOPSIS
session, sequence, slot ->
session, sequence, slot, slot table size, session/state status
17.46.2. ARGUMENT
struct SEQUENCE4args {
sessionid4 sa_sessionid;
sequenceid4 sa_sequenceid;
slotid4 sa_slotid;
slotid4 sa_highest_slotid;
bool sa_cachethis;
};
17.46.3. RESULT
const SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN = 0x00000001;
const SEQ4_STATUS_CB_GSS_CONTEXTS_EXPIRING = 0x00000002;
const SEQ4_STATUS_CB_GSS_CONTEXTS_EXPIRED = 0x00000004;
const SEQ4_STATUS_EXPIRED_ALL_STATE_REVOKED = 0x00000008;
const SEQ4_STATUS_EXPIRED_SOME_STATE_REVOKED = 0x00000010;
const SEQ4_STATUS_ADMIN_STATE_REVOKED = 0x00000020;
const SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED = 0x00000040;
const SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED = 0x00000080;
const SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED = 0x00000100;
const SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN_SESSION = 0x00000200;
const SEQ4_STATUS_BACKCHANNEL_FAULT = 0x00000400;
struct SEQUENCE4resok {
sessionid4 sr_sessionid;
sequenceid4 sr_sequenceid;
slotid4 sr_slotid;
slotid4 sr_highest_slotid;
slotid4 sr_target_highest_slotid;
uint32_t sr_status_flags;
};
union SEQUENCE4res switch (nfsstat4 sr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
SEQUENCE4resok sr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
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17.46.4. DESCRIPTION
The SEQUENCE operation is used by the server to implement session
request control and the reply cache semantics.
This operation MUST appear as the first operation of any COMPOUND in
which it appears. The error NFS4ERR_SEQUENCE_POS will be returned
when it is found in any position in a COMPOUND beyond the first.
Operations other than SEQUENCE, BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, EXCHANGE_ID,
CREATE_SESSION, and DESTROY_SESSION, may not appear as the first
operation in a COMPOUND. Such operations MUST yield the error
NFS4ERR_OP_NOT_IN_SESSION if they do appear at the start of a
COMPOUND.
If SEQUENCE is received on a connection not associated with the
session via CREATE_SESSION or BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION, and the client
specified connecting association enforcement when the session was
created (see Section 17.36), then the server returns
NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION.
The sa_sessionid argument identifies the session this request applies
to. The sr_sessionid result MUST equal sa_sessionid.
The sa_slotid argument is the index in the reply cache for the
request. The sa_sequenceid field is the sequence number of the
request for the reply cache entry (slot). The sr_slotid result MUST
equal sa_slotid. The sr_sequenceid result MUST equal sa_sequenceid.
The sa_highest_slotid argument is the highest slot id the client has
a request outstanding for; it could be equal to sa_slotid. The
server returns two "highest_slotid" values: sr_highest_slotid, and
sr_target_highest_slotid. The former is the highest slot id the
server will accept in future SEQUENCE operation, and SHOULD NOT be
less than the the value of sa_highest_slotid. (but see
Section 2.10.5.1 for an exception). The latter is the highest slot
id the server would prefer the client use on a future SEQUENCE
operation.
If sa_cachethis is TRUE, then the client is requesting that the
server cache the entire reply in the server's reply cache; therefore
the server MUST cache the reply (see Section 2.10.5.1.2). The server
MAY cache the reply if sa_cachethis is FALSE. If the server does not
cache the entire reply, it MUST still record that it executed the
request at the specified slot and sequence id.
The response to the SEQUENCE operation contains a word of status
flags (sr_status_flags) that can provide to the client information
related to the status of the client's lock state and communications
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paths. Note that any status bits relating to lock state MAY be reset
when lock state is lost due to a server reboot (even if the session
is persistent across reboots; session persistence does not imply lock
state persistence) or the establishment of a new client instance.
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN
When set, indicates that the client has no operational backchannel
path for any session associated with the client ID, making it
necessary for the client to re-establish one. This bit remains
set on all SEQUENCE responses on all sessions associated with the
client ID until at least one backchannel is available on any
session associated with the client ID. If the client fails to re-
establish a a backchannel for the client ID, it is subject to
having recallable state revoked.
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN_SESSION
When set, indicates that the session has no operational
backchannel. There are two reasons why
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN_SESSION may be set and not
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN. First is that a callback operation that
applies specifically to the session (e.g. CB_RECALL_SLOT, see
Section 19.8) needs to be sent. Second is that the server did
send a callback operation, but the connection was lost before the
reply. The server cannot be sure whether the client received the
callback operation or not, and so, per rules on request retry, the
server MUST retry the callback operation over the same session.
The SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN_SESSION bit is the indication to the
client that it needs to associate a connection to the session's
backchannel. This bit remains set on all SEQUENCE responses on
the session until a backchannel on the session the path is
available. If the client fails to re-establish a a backchannel
for the session, it is subject to having recallable state revoked.
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_GSS_CONTEXTS_EXPIRING
When set, indicates that all GSS contexts assigned to the
session's backchannel will expire within a period equal to the
lease time. This bit remains set on all SEQUENCE replies until
the expiration time of at least one context is beyond the lease
period from the current time (relative to the time of when a
SEQUENCE response was sent) or until all GSS contexts for the
session's backchannel have expired.
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_GSS_CONTEXTS_EXPIRED
When set, indicates all GSS contexts assigned to the session's
backchannel have expired. This bit remains set on all SEQUENCE
replies until at least one non-expired context for the session's
backchannel has been established.
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SEQ4_STATUS_EXPIRED_ALL_STATE_REVOKED
When set, indicates that the lease has expired and as a result the
server released all of the client's locking state. This status
bit remains set on all SEQUENCE replies until the loss of all such
locks has been acknowledged by use of FREE_BADLOCK, or by
establishing a new client instance by destroying all sessions (via
DESTROY_SESSION), the client ID (via DESTROY_CLIENTID), and then
invoking EXCHANGE_ID and CREATE_SESSION to establish a new client
ID.
SEQ4_STATUS_EXPIRED_SOME_STATE_REVOKED
When set indicates that some subset of the client's locks have
been revoked due to expiration of the lease period followed by
another client's conflicting lock request. This status bit
remains set on all SEQUENCE replies until the loss of all such
locks has been acknowledged by use of FREE_BADLOCK.
SEQ4_STATUS_ADMIN_STATE_REVOKED
When set indicates that one or more locks have been revoked
without expiration of the lease period, due to administrative
action. This status bit remains set on all SEQUENCE replies until
the loss of all such locks has been acknowledged by use of
FREE_BADLOCK.
SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED
When set indicates that one or more recallable objects have been
revoked without expiration of the lease period, due to the
client's failure to return them when recalled which may be a
consequence of there being no working backchanel and the client
failing to reestablish a backchannel per the
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN, SEQ4_STATUS_CB_PATH_DOWN_SESSION, or
SEQ4_STATUS_CB_GSS_CONTEXTS_EXPIRED status flags. This status bit
remains set on all SEQUENCE replies until the loss of all such
locks has been acknowledged by use of FREE_BADLOCK.
SEQ4_STATUS_LEASE_MOVED
When set indicates that responsibility for lease renewal has been
transferred to one or more new servers. This condition will
continue until the client receives an NFS4ERR_MOVED error and the
server receives the subsequent GETATTR for the fs_locations or
fs_locations_info attribute for an access to each file system for
which a lease has been moved to a new server. See
Section 10.6.7.1.
SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED
When set indicates that due to server restart or reboot the client
must reclaim locking state. Until the client issues a
RECLAIM_COMPLETE (Section 17.51, every SEQUENCE operation will
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return SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED.
SEQ4_STATUS_BACKCHANNEL_FAULT
The server has encountered an unrecoverable fault with the
backchannel (e.g. it has lost track of the sequence id for a slot
in the backchannel). The client MUST stop sending more requests
on the session's fore channel, wait for all outstanding requests
to complete on the fore and back channel, and then destroy the
session.
The value of sa_sequenceid argument relative to to the cached
sequence id on the slot falls into one of three cases.
o If the difference between sa_sequenceid and the server's cached
sequence id at the slot id is two (2) or more, or if sa_sequenceid
is less than the cached sequence id (accounting for wraparound of
the unsigned sequence id value), then the server MUST return
NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED.
o If sa_sequenceid and the cached sequence id are the same, this is
a retry, and the server replies with the COMPOUND reply that is
stored the reply cache.
o If sa_sequenceid is one greater (accounting for wraparound) than
the cached sequence id, then this is a new request, and the slot's
sequence id is incremented. The operations subsequent to
SEQUENCE, if any, are processed. If there are no other
operations, the only other effects are to cache the SEQUENCE reply
in the slot, maintain the session's activity, and renew the lease
of state related to the client ID.
If the client reuses a slot id and sequence id for a completely
different request, the server MAY treat the request as if it is retry
of what it has already executed. The server MAY however detect the
client's illegal reuse and return NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY.
If SEQUENCE returns an error, then the state of the slot (sequence
id, cached reply) MUST NOT change, and the associated lease MUST NOT
be renewed.
If SEQUENCE returns NFS4_OK, then the associated lease is renewed,
except if SEQ4_STATUS_EXPIRED_ALL_STATE_REVOKED is returned in the
status word.
17.46.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The server MUST maintain a mapping of sessionid to client ID in order
to validate any operations that follow SEQUENCE that take a stateid
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as an argument and/or result.
If the client establishes a persistent session, then the server MUST
also persist the client ID, such that it is valid through server
reboot or restart (Section 2.10.5.5). If the session and client ID
are not persistent, then in the event of server reboot or restart, if
the client ID is no longer valid, upon encountering an sa_sessionid
that maps to a stale client ID, the server SHOULD return
NFS4ERR_STATE_CLIENTID, which indicates that both the client ID and
sessionid are stale.
If the session is persistent, but the locking state associated with
the persistent client ID is not persistent, then any operation in a
COMPOUND procedure that change or use locking state and takes a
stateid will return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID or NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID.
However the OPEN operation changes lock state but does not have a
stateid among its arguments. This would seemingly allow the OPEN to
succeed since the client ID is valid; a situation that could not
occur with NFSv4.0. The issue is that the client might be issuing
the OPEN to upgrade existing open state, but because the server has
no open state for the file from the client, the client and server
would not agree on the open state of the file if the OPEN were to
succeed. Also, before the server restarted, another client might
have had a conflicting OPEN, and so the OPEN from this client needs
to fail until the other client has had a chance to reclaim (i.e.
while the server is in grace period). Additional explanation is
needed.
o If the OPEN operation (or any other operation that uses or changes
locking state) was sent and executed before the server restarted,
and the server receives the retry after it restarts, server MUST
return the reply that it has in its persistent reply cache. While
the client now mistakenly believes it has an open on the file,
this is not a problem, because the client will eventually issue an
operation on the file that takes a stateid as an argument. This
state using operation will return NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID or
NFS4ERR_STATE_STATEID, and in the same COMPOUND reply the SEQUENCE
operation will return SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED in the
sr_status_flag result. Both the stateid error and the status
result are sufficient to tell the client it needs to reclaim
state, including
o If the server does not have a reply for the OPEN in its reply
cache, then:
* If the OPEN is a non-reclaim, then until the client issues a
RECLAIM_COMPLETE, the OPEN MUST be rejected with
NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE. Again, SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED in
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the SEQUENCE reply provides definitive information that the
client needs to reclaim any open state on the file that the
attempted OPEN would have upgraded.
* If the OPEN is a reclaim there is problematic scenario.
Suppose the client issues multiple reclaim OPENs on the same
open owner and file during the server's grace period. (While
this is inefficient, it was permitted in NFSv4.0's reclaim
phase.) Let us say at server restart X, the client issues a
OPEN and then before the client issues RECLAIM_COMPLETE, the
server restarts again (restart Y). The client does not know
the server restarted again, and issues another reclaim OPEN on
the same open owner and file. While the client now thinks the
open state on the file has been upgraded (Section 8.10), the
server does not think so. Therefore, special handling by the
client of OPEN reclaims is mandated, which is specified in
Section 8.6.2.1.
The server's implementation constraints may require constructing a
sessionid such that it is impossible to discern a sessionid that is
invalid due to malformation from one that is invalid due to server
restart. In that event, when the client receives NFS4ERR_BADSESSION,
it may check for stale client ID by issuing a CREATE_SESSION with the
client ID. If CREATE_SESSION succeeds, the client has a session to
use, and it MAY retry the original COMPOUND with the new sessionid
(unless SEQ4_STATUS_RESTART_RECLAIM_NEEDED is returned in
sr_status_flags; in which case the client MUST first reclaim state as
described in Section 8.6.2.1).
17.47. Operation 54: SET_SSV
17.47.1. SYNOPSIS
ssv, digest -> digest
17.47.2. ARGUMENT
struct ssa_digest_input4 {
SEQUENCE4args sdi_seqargs;
};
struct SET_SSV4args {
opaque ssa_ssv<>;
opaque ssa_digest<>;
};
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17.47.3. RESULT
struct ssr_digest_input4 {
SEQUENCE4res sdi_seqres;
};
struct SET_SSV4resok {
opaque ssr_digest<>;
};
union SET_SSV4res switch (nfsstat4 ssr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
SET_SSV4resok ssr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.47.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation is used to set or update the SSV for a session. It
MUST be preceded by a SEQUENCE operation in the same COMPOUND. It
MUST NOT be used if the client did not opt for SP4_SSV state
protection when the client ID was created (see Section 17.35); the
server returns NFS4ERR_CONN_BINDING_NOT_ENFORCED in that case.
ssa_digest is computed as the output of the HMAC RFC2104 [12] using
the current SSV as the key, and an XDR encoded value of data type
ssa_digest_input4. The field sdi_seqargs is equal to the arguments
of the SEQUENCE operation for the COMPOUND procedure that SET_SSV is
within.
The ssa_ssv is XORed with the current SSV to produce the new SSV.
In the response, ssr_digest is the output of the HMAC using the new
SSV as the key, and an XDR encoded value of data type
ssr_digest_input4. The field sdi_seqres is equal to the results of
the SEQUENCE operation for the COMPOUND procedure that SET_SSV is
within.
17.47.5. IMPLEMENTATION
When the server receives ssa_digest, it MUST verify the digest by
computing the digest the same way the client did and comparing it
with ssa_digest. If the server gets a different result, this is an
error, NFS4ERR_BAD_SESSION_DIGEST. Generally, in order to change the
SSV or associate new connections to the session, the client has no
recourse but to recreate the session with CREATE_SESSION. However,
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the IMPLEMENTATION section BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION describes a scenario
where a client can legitimately get NFS4ERR_BAD_SESSION_DIGEST for a
SET_SSV, and how to recover from it.
Clients SHOULD NOT send an ssa_ssv that is equal to a previous
ssa_ssv, nor equal to a previous SSV.
Clients SHOULD issue SET_SSV with RPCSEC_GSS privacy. Servers MUST
support RPCSEC_GSS with privacy for any COMPOUND that has { SEQUENCE,
SET_SSV }.
If a client issues SET_SSV with the SSV GSS mechanism's credential,
note that current SSV is used in credential of the request, and the
modified SSV (if SET_SSV is successful), is used in the verifier of
the response. However issuing SET_SSV that way makes little sense,
since the point of SET_SSV is to use the multiple users to seed the
SSV, where each seed acdtion is encrypted with each user's GSS
context's session key.
The client and server each maintain an internal counter, which is set
to one (1) the first time SET_SSV executes on the server and the
client receives the first SET_SSV reply. Each subsequent SET_SSV
increases the SSV by one.
17.48. Operation 55: TEST_STATEID - Test stateids for validity
Test a series of stateids for validity.
17.48.1. SYNOPSIS
stateids<> -> error_codes<>
17.48.2. ARGUMENT
struct TEST_STATEID4args {
stateid4 ts_stateids<>;
};
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17.48.3. RESULT
struct TEST_STATEID4resok {
nfsstat4 tsr_status_codes<>;
};
union TEST_STATEID4res switch (nfsstat4 tsr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
TEST_STATEID4resok tsr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
17.48.4. DESCRIPTION
The TEST_STATEID operation is used to check the validity of a set of
stateids. It is intended to be used when the client receives an
indication that one or more of its stateids have been invalidated due
to lock revocation. TEST_STATEID allows a large set of such stateids
to be tested and allows problems with earlier stateids not to
interfere with checking of subsequent ones as would happen if
individual stateids are tested by operation in a COMPOUND.
For each stateid, the server provides the status code that would be
returned if that stateid were to be used in normal operation.
Returning such an status indication is not an error and does not
cause processing to terminate. Checks for the validity of the
stateid proceed as they would for normal operations with two
exceptions. There is no check for the type of stateid object, as
would be the case for normal and there is no reference to the current
filehandle.
The errors which are validly returned within the status_code array
are: NFS4ERR_OK, NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID, NFS4ERR_EXPIRED,
NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED, and NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED.
17.48.5. IMPLEMENTATION
No discussion at this time.
17.49. Operation 56: WANT_DELEGATION
17.49.1. SYNOPSIS
(cfh), (client ID) -> stateid, delegation
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17.49.2. ARGUMENT
union deleg_claim4 switch (open_claim_type4 dc_claim) {
/*
* No special rights to object. Ordinary delegation
* request of the specified object. Object identified
* by filehandle.
*/
case CLAIM_FH: /* new to v4.1 */
void;
/*
* Right to file based on a delegation granted to a previous boot
* instance of the client. File is specified by filehandle.
*/
case CLAIM_DELEG_PREV_FH: /* new to v4.1 */
/* CURRENT_FH: file being opened */
void;
/*
* Right to the file established by an open previous to server
* reboot. File identified by filehandle.
* Used during server reclaim grace period.
*/
case CLAIM_PREVIOUS:
/* CURRENT_FH: file being reclaimed */
open_delegation_type4 dc_delegate_type;
};
struct WANT_DELEGATION4args {
uint32_t wda_want;
deleg_claim4 wda_claim;
};
17.49.3. RESULT
union WANT_DELEGATION4res switch (nfsstat4 wdr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
open_delegation4 wdr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
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17.49.4. DESCRIPTION
Where this description mandates the return of a specific error code
for a specific condition, and where multiple conditions apply, the
server MAY return any of the mandated error codes.
This operation allows a client to get a delegation on all types of
files except directories. The server MAY support this operation. If
the server does not support this operation, it MUST return
NFS4ERR_NOTSUPP. This operation also allows the client to register a
"want" for a delegation for the specified file object, and be
notified via a callback when the delegation is available. The server
MAY support notifications of availability via callbacks. If the
server does not support registration of wants it MUST NOT return an
error to indicate that.
The client SHOULD NOT set OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_READ and SHOULD NOT set
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE in wda_want. If it does, the server MUST
ignore them.
The meanings of the following flags in wda_want are the same as they
are in OPEN:
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_READ_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_WRITE_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_ANY_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_NO_DELEG
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_CANCEL
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_SIGNAL_DELEG_WHEN_RESRC_AVAIL
OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_PUSH_DELEG_WHEN_UNCONTENDED
The handling of the above flags in WANT_DELEGATION is the same as in
OPEN.
A request for a conflicting delegation MUST NOT trigger the recall of
the existing delegation.
The successful results of WANT_DELEG are of type open_delegation4
which is the same type as the "delegation" field in the results of
the OPEN operation. The server constructs wdr_resok4 the same way it
constructs OPEN's "delegation" with one differences: WANT_DELEGATION
MUST NOT return a delegation type of OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE. As with
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OPEN, if (wda_want & OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WANT_DELEG_MASK) is zero then
the client is indicating no desire for a delegation and the server
MAY or MAY not return a delegation in the WANT_DELEG response.
17.49.5. IMPLEMENTATION
TBD
17.50. Operation 57: DESTROY_CLIENTID - Destroy existing client ID
Destroy existing client ID.
17.50.1. SYNOPSIS
client ID -> -
17.50.2. ARGUMENT
struct DESTROY_CLIENTID4args {
clientid4 dca_clientid;
};
17.50.3. RESULT
struct DESTROY_CLIENTID4res {
nfsstat4 dcr_status;
};
17.50.4. DESCRIPTION
The DESTROY_CLIENTID operation destroys the client ID if there are no
sessions, opens, locks, delegations, layouts, and wants associated
with the client ID. DESTROY_CLIENTID MUST be the only operation in
the COMPOUND request. Note that because the operation is sent
without a SEQUENCE preceding it, a client that retransmits the
request may receive an error in response, because the original
request MAY have been successfully executed.
17.50.5. IMPLEMENTATION
DESTROY_CLIENTID allows a server to immediately reclaim the resources
consumed by an unsued client ID, and also to forget that it ever
generated the client ID. By forgetting it ever generated the the
client ID the server can safely reuse the client ID on a future
EXCHANGE_ID operation.
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17.51. Operation 58: RECLAIM_COMPLETE - Indicates Reclaims Finished
17.51.1. SYNOPSIS
-> ()
17.51.2. ARGUMENT
void;
17.51.3. RESULTS
/*
* RECLAIM_COMPLETE: Client indicates done reclaiming locking state.
*/
struct RECLAIM_COMPLETE4res {
nfsstat4 rcr_status;
};
17.51.4. DESCRIPTION
A RECLAIM_COMPLETE operation is used to indicate that the client has
reclaimed all of the locking state from a previous server instance
that it will recover. Once the client does a RECLAIM_COMPLETE, the
server will not allow that client to do subsequent reclaims of
locking state and will return NFS4ERR_NO_GRACE, if these are
attempted.
Whenever a client establishes a new client ID and before it does the
first non-reclaim operation that obtains a lock, it must do a
RECLAIM_COMPLETE, even if there are no locks to reclaim. If non-
reclaim locking operations are done before the RECLAIM_COMPLETE, a
NFS4ERR_GRACE will be returned.
Any locks not reclaimed at the point at which RECLAIM_COMPLETE is
done become non-reclaimable. The client MUST NOT attempt to reclaim
them, either during the current server instance or in any subsequent
server instance. If the client were to do so, it would be violating
the protocol by representing itself as owning locks that it does not
own, and so has no right to reclaim.
17.51.5. IMPLEMENTATION
Servers will typically use the information as to when reclaim
activity is complete to reduce the length of the grace period. When
the server maintains a list of clients that may have locks in
persistent storage, it is in a position to use the fact that all such
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clients have done a RECLAIM_COMPLETE to terminate the grace period
and begin normal operations (i.e. grant requests for new locks)
sooner than it might otherwise.
Latency can be minimized by doing a RECLAIM_COMPLETE as part of the
COMPOUND request in which the last lock-reclaiming operation is done.
When there are no reclaims to be done, RECLAIM_COMPLETE should be
done immediately in order to allow the grace period to end as soon as
possible.
RECLAIM_COMPLETE should only be done once for each server instance.
If it is done a second time, an NFS4ERR_COMPLETE_ALREADY will result.
Note that because of the session feature's retry protection, retries
of COMPOUND requests containing RECLAIM_COMPLETE operation will not
result in this error.
When a RECLAIM_COMPLETE is done, the client effectively acknowledges
any locks not yet reclaimed as lost. This allows the server to again
mark this client as able to subsequently recover locks if it had been
prevented from doing so, be by logic to prevent the occurrence of
edge conditions, as described in Section 8.6.3.
17.52. Operation 10044: ILLEGAL - Illegal operation
17.52.1. SYNOPSIS
-> ()
17.52.2. ARGUMENTS
void;
17.52.3. RESULTS
/*
* ILLEGAL: Response for illegal operation numbers
*/
struct ILLEGAL4res {
nfsstat4 status;
};
17.52.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation is a placeholder for encoding a result to handle the
case of the client sending an operation code within COMPOUND that is
not supported. See the COMPOUND procedure description for more
details.
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The status field of ILLEGAL4res MUST be set to NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL.
17.52.5. IMPLEMENTATION
A client will probably not send an operation with code OP_ILLEGAL but
if it does, the response will be ILLEGAL4res just as it would be with
any other invalid operation code. Note that if the server gets an
illegal operation code that is not OP_ILLEGAL, and if the server
checks for legal operation codes during the XDR decode phase, then
the ILLEGAL4res would not be returned.
18. NFS version 4.1 Callback Procedures
The procedures used for callbacks are defined in the following
sections. In the interest of clarity, the terms "client" and
"server" refer to NFS clients and servers, despite the fact that for
an individual callback RPC, the sense of these terms would be
precisely the opposite.
18.1. Procedure 0: CB_NULL - No Operation
18.1.1. SYNOPSIS
18.1.2. ARGUMENTS
void;
18.1.3. RESULTS
void;
18.1.4. DESCRIPTION
Standard NULL procedure. Void argument, void response. Even though
there is no direct functionality associated with this procedure, the
server will use CB_NULL to confirm the existence of a path for RPCs
from server to client.
18.1.5. ERRORS
None.
18.2. Procedure 1: CB_COMPOUND - Compound Operations
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18.2.1. SYNOPSIS
compoundargs -> compoundres
18.2.2. ARGUMENTS
enum nfs_cb_opnum4 {
OP_CB_GETATTR = 3,
OP_CB_RECALL = 4,
OP_CB_ILLEGAL = 10044
};
union nfs_cb_argop4 switch (unsigned argop) {
case OP_CB_GETATTR: CB_GETATTR4args opcbgetattr;
case OP_CB_RECALL: CB_RECALL4args opcbrecall;
case OP_CB_ILLEGAL: void opcbillegal;
};
struct CB_COMPOUND4args {
utf8str_cs tag;
uint32_t minorversion;
nfs_cb_argop4 argarray<>;
};
18.2.3. RESULTS
union nfs_cb_resop4 switch (unsigned resop){
case OP_CB_GETATTR: CB_GETATTR4res opcbgetattr;
case OP_CB_RECALL: CB_RECALL4res opcbrecall;
};
struct CB_COMPOUND4res {
nfsstat4 status;
utf8str_cs tag;
nfs_cb_resop4 resarray<>;
};
18.2.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_COMPOUND procedure is used to combine one or more of the
callback procedures into a single RPC request. The main callback RPC
program has two main procedures: CB_NULL and CB_COMPOUND. All other
operations use the CB_COMPOUND procedure as a wrapper.
In the processing of the CB_COMPOUND procedure, the client may find
that it does not have the available resources to execute any or all
of the operations within the CB_COMPOUND sequence. This is discussed
in Section 2.10.5.4.
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The minorversion field of the arguments MUST be the same as the
minorversion of the COMPOUND procedure used to created the client ID
and session. For NFSv4.1, minorversion MUST be set to 1.
Contained within the CB_COMPOUND results is a 'status' field. This
status must be equivalent to the status of the last operation that
was executed within the CB_COMPOUND procedure. Therefore, if an
operation incurred an error then the 'status' value will be the same
error value as is being returned for the operation that failed.
For the definition of the "tag" field, see the section "Procedure 1:
COMPOUND - Compound Operations". [[Comment.15: Need an xref.]]
Illegal operation codes are handled in the same way as they are
handled for the COMPOUND procedure.
18.2.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The CB_COMPOUND procedure is used to combine individual operations
into a single RPC request. The client interprets each of the
operations in turn. If an operation is executed by the client and
the status of that operation is NFS4_OK, then the next operation in
the CB_COMPOUND procedure is executed. The client continues this
process until there are no more operations to be executed or one of
the operations has a status value other than NFS4_OK.
18.2.6. ERRORS
NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID NFS4ERR_BADXDR
NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL NFS4ERR_RESOURCE NFS4ERR_SERVERFAULT
19. NFS version 4.1 Callback Operations
19.1. Operation 3: CB_GETATTR - Get Attributes
19.1.1. SYNOPSIS
fh, attr_request -> attrmask, attr_vals
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19.1.2. ARGUMENT
/*
* NFS4 Callback Procedure Definitions and Program
*/
/*
* CB_GETATTR: Get Current Attributes
*/
struct CB_GETATTR4args {
nfs_fh4 fh;
bitmap4 attr_request;
};
19.1.3. RESULT
struct CB_GETATTR4resok {
fattr4 obj_attributes;
};
union CB_GETATTR4res switch (nfsstat4 status) {
case NFS4_OK:
CB_GETATTR4resok resok4;
default:
void;
};
19.1.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_GETATTR operation is used by the server to obtain the current
modified state of a file that has been write delegated. The
attributes size and change are the only ones guaranteed to be
serviced by the client. See the section "Handling of CB_GETATTR" for
a full description of how the client and server are to interact with
the use of CB_GETATTR.
If the filehandle specified is not one for which the client holds a
write open delegation, an NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE error is returned.
19.1.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The client returns attrmask bits and the associated attribute values
only for the change attribute, and attributes that it may change
(time_modify, and size).
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19.2. Operation 4: CB_RECALL - Recall an Open Delegation
19.2.1. SYNOPSIS
stateid, truncate, fh -> ()
19.2.2. ARGUMENT
/*
* CB_RECALL: Recall an Open Delegation
*/
struct CB_RECALL4args {
stateid4 stateid;
bool truncate;
nfs_fh4 fh;
};
19.2.3. RESULT
struct CB_RECALL4res {
nfsstat4 status;
};
19.2.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_RECALL operation is used to begin the process of recalling an
open delegation and returning it to the server.
The truncate flag is used to optimize recall for a file which is
about to be truncated to zero. When it is set, the client is freed
of obligation to propagate modified data for the file to the server,
since this data is irrelevant.
If the handle specified is not one for which the client holds an open
delegation, an NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE error is returned.
If the stateid specified is not one corresponding to an open
delegation for the file specified by the filehandle, an
NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID is returned.
19.2.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The client should reply to the callback immediately. Replying does
not complete the recall except when an error was returned. The
recall is not complete until the delegation is returned using a
DELEGRETURN.
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19.3. Operation 5: CB_LAYOUTRECALL
19.3.1. SYNOPSIS
layout_type, iomode, layoutchanged, layoutrecall -> -
19.3.2. ARGUMENT
/*
* NFSv4.1 callback arguments and results
*/
enum layoutrecall_type4 {
LAYOUTRECALL4_FILE = 1,
LAYOUTRECALL4_FSID = 2,
LAYOUTRECALL4_ALL = 3
};
struct layoutrecall_file4 {
nfs_fh4 lor_fh;
offset4 lor_offset;
length4 lor_length;
};
union layoutrecall4 switch(layoutrecall_type4 recalltype) {
case LAYOUTRECALL4_FILE:
layoutrecall_file4 lor_layout;
case LAYOUTRECALL4_FSID:
fsid4 lor_fsid;
case LAYOUTRECALL4_ALL:
void;
};
struct CB_LAYOUTRECALL4args {
layouttype4 clora_type;
layoutiomode4 clora_iomode;
bool clora_changed;
layoutrecall4 clora_recall;
};
19.3.3. RESULT
struct CB_LAYOUTRECALL4res {
nfsstat4 clorr_status;
};
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19.3.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_LAYOUTRECALL operation is used to begin the process of
recalling layout segments, a layout, all layouts pertaining to a
particular file system (FSID), or layouts in all file systems (ALL).
If LAYOUTRECALL4_FILE is specified, the lrf_offset and lrf_length
fields specify the layout segments. If a lrf_length of all ones is
specified then all layout segments identified by the current file
handle, clora_type, clora_iomode, and corresponding to the octet
range from lrf_offset to the end-of-file MUST be returned (via
LAYOUTRETURN, see Section 17.44). The clora_iomode specifies the set
of layouts to be returned. An clora_iomode of LAYOUTIOMODE4_ANY
specifies that all matching layout segments regardless of iomode,
must be returned; otherwise, only layout segments that exactly match
the iomode must be returned. If clora_iomode is LAYOUTIOMODE4_ANY,
lo_offset is zero, and lo_length is all ones, then the entire layout
is to be returned.
If the clora_changed field is TRUE, then the client SHOULD not write
and commit its modified data to the storage devices specified by the
layout being recalled. Instead, it is preferable for the client to
write and commit the modified data through the metadata server.
Alternatively, the client may attempt to obtain a new layout. Note:
in order to obtain a new layout the client must first return the old
layout. Since obtaining a new layout is not guaranteed to succeed,
the client must be ready to write and commit its modified data
through the metadata server.
If the client does not hold any layout segment either matching or
overlapping with the requested layout, it returns
NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT.
If LAYOUTRECALL4_FSID is specified, the fsid specifies the file
system for which any outstanding layouts MUST be returned. If
LAYOUTRECALL4_ALL is specified, all outstanding layouts MUST be
returned. In addition, LAYOUTRECALL4_FSID and LAYOUTRECALL4_ALL
specify that all the storage device ID to storage device address
mappings in the affected file system(s) are also recalled. The
respective LAYOUTRETURN with either LAYOUTRETURN4_FSID or
LAYOUTRETURN4_ALL acknowledges to the server that the client
invalidated the said device mappings. Device mappings are
invalidated also when no layouts are found for LAYOUTRECALL4_FSID or
LAYOUTRECALL4_ALL and NFS4ERR_NOMATCHING_LAYOUT is returned.
19.3.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The client should reply to the callback immediately. Replying does
not complete the recall except when an error is returned; otherwise
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the recall is not complete until the layout(s) are returned using a
LAYOUTRETURN operation.
The client should complete any in-flight I/O operations using the
recalled layout(s) before returning it/them via LAYOUTRETURN. If the
client has buffered modified data there are a number of options for
writing and committing that data. If clora_changed is false, the
client may choose to write modified data directly to storage before
calling LAYOUTRETURN. However, if clora_changed is true, the client
may either choose to write it later using normal NFSv4 WRITE
operations to the metadata server or it may attempt to obtain a new
layout, after first returning the recalled layout, using the new
layout to write the modified data. Regardless of whether the client
is holding a layout, it may always write data through the metadata
server.
If modified data is written while the layout is held, the client must
still issue LAYOUTCOMMIT operations at the appropriate time,
especially before issuing the LAYOUTRETURN. If a large amount of
modified data is outstanding, the client may issue LAYOUTRETURNs for
portions of the layout being recalled; this allows the server to
monitor the client's progress and adherence to the callback.
However, the last LAYOUTRETURN in a sequence of returns, MUST specify
the full range being recalled (see Section 12.5.4.1 for details).
19.4. Operation 6: CB_NOTIFY - Notify directory changes
Tell the client of directory changes.
19.4.1. SYNOPSIS
stateid, notification -> {}
19.4.2. ARGUMENT
/* Changed entry information. */
struct notify_entry4 {
component4 ne_file;
fattr4 ne_attrs;
};
/* Previous entry information */
struct prev_entry4 {
notify_entry4 pe_prev_entry;
/* what READDIR returned for this entry */
nfs_cookie4 pe_prev_entry_cookie;
};
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struct notify_add4 {
notify_entry4 nad_new_entry;
/* what READDIR would have returned for this entry */
nfs_cookie4 nad_new_entry_cookie<1>;
prev_entry4 nad_prev_entry<1>;
bool nad_last_entry;
};
struct notify_attr4 {
notify_entry4 na_changed_entry;
};
struct notify_remove4 {
notify_entry4 nrm_old_entry;
nfs_cookie4 nrm_old_entry_cookie;
};
struct notify_rename4 {
notify_entry4 nrn_old_entry;
notify_add4 nrn_new_entry;
};
struct notify_verifier4 {
verifier4 nv_old_cookieverf;
verifier4 nv_new_cookieverf;
};
enum notify_type4 {
NOTIFY4_CHANGE_CHILD_ATTRS = 0,
NOTIFY4_CHANGE_DIR_ATTRS = 1,
NOTIFY4_REMOVE_ENTRY = 2,
NOTIFY4_ADD_ENTRY = 3,
NOTIFY4_RENAME_ENTRY = 4,
NOTIFY4_CHANGE_COOKIE_VERIFIER = 5
};
/*
* Notification information sent to the client.
*/
union notify4 switch (notify_type4 n_type) {
case NOTIFY4_CHANGE_CHILD_ATTRS:
notify_attr4 n_change_child_attrs;
case NOTIFY4_CHANGE_DIR_ATTRS:
fattr4 n_change_dir_attrs;
case NOTIFY4_REMOVE_ENTRY:
notify_remove4 n_remove_notify;
case NOTIFY4_ADD_ENTRY:
notify_add4 n_add_notify;
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case NOTIFY4_RENAME_ENTRY:
notify_rename4 n_rename_notify;
case NOTIFY4_CHANGE_COOKIE_VERIFIER:
notify_verifier4 n_verf_notify;
};
struct CB_NOTIFY4args {
stateid4 cna_stateid;
nfs_fh4 cna_fh;
notify4 cna_changes<>;
};
19.4.3. RESULT
struct CB_NOTIFY4res {
nfsstat4 cnr_status;
};
19.4.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_NOTIFY operation is used by the server to send notifications
to clients about changes in a delegated directory. These
notifications are sent over the backchannel. The notification is
sent once the original request has been processed on the server. The
server will send an array of notifications for all changes that might
have occurred in the directory. The notify_type4 can only have one
bit set for each notification in the array. If the client holding
the delegation makes any changes in the directory that cause files or
sub directories to be added or removed, the server will notify that
client of the resulting change(s). If the client holding the
delegation is making attribute or cookie verifier changes only, the
server does not need to send notifications to that client. The
server will send the following information for each operation:
ADDING A FILE The server will send information about the new entry
being created along with the cookie for that entry. The entry
information (data type notify_add4) includes the component name of
the entry and attributes. If this entry is added to the end of
the directory, the server will set the nad_last_entry flag to
true. If the file is added such that there is at least one entry
before it, the server will also return the previous entry
information (nad_prev_entry, a variable length array of up to one
element. If the array is of zero length, there is no previous
entry), along with its cookie. This is to help clients find the
right location in their DNLC or directory caches where this entry
should be cached. If the new entry's cookie is available, it will
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be in nad_new_entry_cookie (another variable length array of up to
one element).
REMOVING A FILE The server will send information about the directory
entry being deleted. The server will also send the cookie value
for the deleted entry so that clients can get to the cached
information for this entry.
RENAMING A FILE The server will send information about both the old
entry and the new entry. This includes name and attributes for
each entry. This notification is only sent if both entries are in
the same directory. If the rename is across directories, the
server will send a remove notification to one directory and an add
notification to the other directory, assuming both have a
directory delegation.
FILE/DIR ATTRIBUTE CHANGE The client will use the attribute mask to
inform the server of attributes for which it wants to receive
notifications. This change notification can be requested for both
changes to the attributes of the directory as well as changes to
any file attributes in the directory by using two separate
attribute masks. The client cannot ask for change attribute
notification per file. One attribute mask covers all the files in
the directory. Upon any attribute change, the server will send
back the values of changed attributes. Notifications might not
make sense for some file system wide attributes and it is up to
the server to decide which subset it wants to support. The client
can negotiate the frequency of attribute notifications by letting
the server know how often it wants to be notified of an attribute
change. The server will return supported notification frequencies
or an indication that no notification is permitted for directory
or child attributes by setting the dir_notif_delay and
dir_entry_notif_delay attributes respectively.
COOKIE VERIFIER CHANGE If the cookie verifier changes while a client
is holding a delegation, the server will notify the client so that
it can invalidate its cookies and reissue a READDIR to get the new
set of cookies.
19.4.5. IMPLEMENTATION
19.5. Operation 7: CB_PUSH_DELEG
19.5.1. SYNOPSIS
fh, stateid -> { }
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19.5.2. ARGUMENT
struct CB_PUSH_DELEG4args {
stateid4 cpda_stateid;
nfs_fh4 cpda_fh;
open_delegation4 cpda_delegation;
};
19.5.3. RESULT
struct CB_PUSH_DELEG4res {
nfsstat4 cpdr_status;
};
19.5.4. DESCRIPTION
CB_PUSH_DELEG is used by the server to both signal to the client that
the delegation it wants is available and to simultaneously offer the
delegation to the client. The client has the choice of accepting the
delegation by returning NFS4_OK to the server, delaying the decision
to accept the offered delegation by returning NFS4ERR_DELAY or
permanently rejecting the offer of the delegation via any other error
status.
The server MUST send in cpda_delegation a delegation corresponding to
the type of what the client requested in the OPEN, WANT_DELEGATION,
or GET_DIR_DELEGATION request.
If the client does return NFS4ERR_DELAY and there is a conflicting
delegation request, the server MAY process it at the expense of the
client that returned NFS4ERR_DELAY. The client's want will not be
cancelled, but MAY processed behind other delegation requests or
registered wants.
19.5.5. IMPLEMENTATION
TBD
19.6. Operation 8: CB_RECALL_ANY - Keep any N delegations
Notify client to return delegation and keep N of them.
19.6.1. SYNOPSIS
N, type_mask -> {}
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19.6.2. ARGUMENT
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_RDATA_DLG = 0;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_WDATA_DLG = 1;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_DIR_DLG = 2;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_FILE_LAYOUT = 3;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_BLK_LAYOUT_MIN = 4;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_BLK_LAYOUT_MAX = 7;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_OBJ_LAYOUT_MIN = 8;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_OBJ_LAYOUT_MAX = 11;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_OTHER_LAYOUT_MIN = 12;
const RCA4_TYPE_MASK_OTHER_LAYOUT_MAX = 15;
struct CB_RECALL_ANY4args {
uint32_t craa_objects_to_keep;
bitmap4 craa_type_mask;
};
19.6.3. RESULT
struct CB_RECALL_ANY4res {
nfsstat4 crar_status;
};
19.6.4. DESCRIPTION
The server may decide that it cannot hold all of the state for
recallable objects, such as delegations and layouts, without running
out of resources. In such a case, it is free to recall individual
objects to reduce the load but this would be far from optimal.
Because the general purpose of such recallable objects as delegations
is to eliminate client interaction with the server, the server cannot
interpret lack of recent use as indicating that the object is no
longer useful. The absence of visible use may be the result of a
large number of potential operations eliminated. In the case of
layouts, the layout will be used explicitly but the meta-data server
does not have direct knowledge of such use.
In order to implement an effective reclaim scheme for such objects,
the server's knowledge of available resources must be used to
determine when objects must be recalled with the clients selecting
the actual objects to be returned.
Server implementations may differ in their resource allocation
requirements. For example, one server may share resources among all
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classes of recallable objects whereas another may use separate
resource pools for layouts and for delegations, or further separate
resources by types of delegations.
When a given resource pool is over-utilized, the server can issue a
CB_RECALL_ANY to clients holding recallable objects of the types
involved, allowing it to keep a certain number of such objects and
return any excess. A mask specifies which types of objects are to be
limited. The client chooses, based on its own knowledge of current
usefulness, which of the objects in that class should be returned.
For NFSv4.1, sixteen bits are defined. For some of these, ranges are
defined and it is up to the definition of the storage protocol to
specify how these are to be used. There are ranges for blocks-based
storage protocols, for object-based storage protocols and a reserved
range for other experimental storage protocols. The RFC defining
such a storage protocol needs to specify how particular bits within
its range are to be used. For example, it may specify a mapping
between attributes of the layout (read vs. write, size of area) and
the bit to be used or it may define a field in the layout where the
associated bit position is made available by the server to the
client.
When an undefined bit is set in the type mask, NFS4ERR_INVAL should
be returned. However even if a client does not support an object of
the specified type, if the bit is defined, NFS4ERR_INVAL should not
be returned. Future minor versions of NFSv4 may expand the set of
valid type mask bits.
CB_RECALL_ANY specifies a count of objects that the client may keep
as opposed to a count that the client must return. This is to avoid
potential race between a CB_RECALL_ANY that had a count of objects to
free with a set of client-originated operations to return layouts or
delegations. As a result of the race, the client and server would
have differing ideas as to how many objects to return. Hence the
client could mistakenly free too many.
If resource demands prompt it, the server may send another
CB_RECALL_ANY with a lower count, even it has not yet received an
acknowledgement from the client for a previous CB_RECALL_ANY with the
same type mask. Although the possibility exists that these will be
received by the client in a order different from the order in which
they were sent, any such permutation of the callback stream is
harmless. It is the job of the client to bring down the size of the
recallable object set in line with each CB_RECALL_ANY received and
until that obligation is met it cannot be canceled or modified by any
subsequent CB_RECALL_ANY for the same type mask. Thus if the server
sends two CB_RECALL_ANY's, the effect will be the same as if the
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lower count was sent, whatever the order of recall receipt. Note
that this means that a server may not cancel the effect of a
CB_RECALL_ANY by sending another recall with a higher count. When a
CB_RECALL_ANY is received and the count is already within the limit
set or is above a limit that the client is working to get down to,
that callback has no effect.
The client can choose to return any type of object specified by the
mask. If a server wishes to limit use of objects of a specific type,
it should only specify that type in the mask sent. The client may
not return requested objects and it is up to the server to handle
this situation, typically by doing specific recalls to properly limit
resource usage. The server should give the client enough time to
return objects before proceeding to specific recalls. This time
should not be less than the lease period.
Servers are generally free not to give out recallable objects when
insufficient resources are available. Note that the effect of such a
policy is implicitly to give precedence to existing objects relative
to requested ones, with the result that resources might not be
optimally used. To prevent this, servers are well advised to make
the point at which they start issuing CB_RECALL_ANY callbacks
somewhat below that at which they cease to give out new delegations
and layouts. This allows the client to purge its less-used objects
whenever appropriate and so continue to have its subsequent requests
given new resources freed up by object returns.
19.6.5. IMPLEMENTATION
19.7. Operation 9: CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL
19.7.1. SYNOPSIS
TBD
19.7.2. ARGUMENT
typedef CB_RECALL_ANY4args CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL4args;
19.7.3. RESULT
struct CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL4res {
nfsstat4 croa_status;
};
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19.7.4. DESCRIPTION
CB_RECALLABLE_OBJ_AVAIL is used by the server to signal the client
that the server has resources to grant recallable objects that might
previously have been denied by OPEN, WANT_DELEGATION, GET_DIR_DELEG,
or LAYOUTGET.
The argument, objects_to_keep means the total number of recallable
objects of the types indicated in the argument type_mask that the
server believes it can allow the client to have, including the number
of such objects the client already has. A client that tries to
acquire more recallable objects than the server informs it can have
runs the risk of having objects recalled.
19.7.5. IMPLEMENTATION
TBD
19.8. Operation 10: CB_RECALL_SLOT - change flow control limits
Change flow control limits
19.8.1. SYNOPSIS
target highest slot count -> status
19.8.2. ARGUMENT
struct CB_RECALL_SLOT4args {
uint32_t rsa_target_highest_slotid;
};
19.8.3. RESULT
struct CB_RECALL_SLOT4res {
nfsstat4 rsr_status;
};
19.8.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_RECALL_SLOT operation requests the client to return session
slots, and if applicable, transport credits (e.g. RDMA credits for
connections associated with the operations channel) to the server.
CB_RECALL_SLOT specifies rsa_target_highest_slotid, the target
highest_slot the server wants for the session. The client, should
then work toward reducing the highest_slot to the target.
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If the session has only non-RDMA connections associated with its
operations channel, then the client need only wait for all
outstanding requests with a slotid > rsa_target_highest_slotid to
complete, then issue a single COMPOUND consisting of a single
SEQUENCE operation, with the sa_highslot field set to
rsa_target_highest_slotid. If there are RDMA-based connections
associated with operation channel, then the client needs to also
issue enough zero-length RDMA Sends to take the total RDMA credit
count to rsa_target_highest_slotid + 1 or below.
19.8.5. IMPLEMENTATION
If the client fails to reduce highest slot it has on the fore channel
to what the server requests, the server can force the issue by
asserting flow control on the receive side of all connections bound
to the fore channel, and then finish servicing all outstanding
requests that are in slots greater than rsa_target_highest_slotid.
Once that is done, the server can then open the flow control, and any
time the client sends a new request on a slot greater than
rsa_target_highest_slotid, the server can return NFS4ERR_BADSLOT.
19.9. Operation 11: CB_SEQUENCE - Supply backchannel sequencing and
control
Sequence and control
19.9.1. SYNOPSIS
session, sequence, slot, referring calls ->
session, sequence, slot, slot table size
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19.9.2. ARGUMENT
struct referring_call4 {
sequenceid4 rc_sequenceid;
slotid4 rc_slotid;
};
struct referring_call_list4 {
sessionid4 rcl_sessionid;
referring_call4 rcl_referring_calls<>;
};
struct CB_SEQUENCE4args {
sessionid4 csa_sessionid;
sequenceid4 csa_sequenceid;
slotid4 csa_slotid;
slotid4 csa_highest_slotid;
bool csa_cachethis;
referring_call_list4 csa_referring_call_lists<>;
};
19.9.3. RESULT
struct CB_SEQUENCE4resok {
sessionid4 csr_sessionid;
sequenceid4 csr_sequenceid;
slotid4 csr_slotid;
slotid4 csr_highest_slotid;
slotid4 csr_target_highest_slotid;
};
union CB_SEQUENCE4res switch (nfsstat4 csr_status) {
case NFS4_OK:
CB_SEQUENCE4resok csr_resok4;
default:
void;
};
19.9.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_SEQUENCE operation is used to manage operational accounting
for the backchannel of the session on which a request is sent. The
contents include the session to which this request belongs, slot id
and sequence id used by the server to implement session request
control and exactly once semantics, and exchanged slot maximums which
are used to adjust the size of the reply cache. This operation MUST
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appear once as the first operation in each CB_COMPOUND request or a
protocol error must result. See Section 17.46.4 for a description of
how slots are processed.
If csa_cachethis is TRUE, then the server is requesting that the
client cache the reply in the callback reply cache. The client MUST
cache the reply (see Section 2.10.5.1.2).
The csa_referring_call_lists array is the list of COMPOUND requests,
identified by sessionid, slot id and sequencid. These are requests
that the client previously sent to the server. These previous
requests created state that some operation(s) in the in the same
CB_COMPOUND as the csa_referring_call_lists is identifying. A
sessionid is included because leased state is tied to a client ID,
and a client ID can have multiple sessions. See Section 2.10.5.3.
The value of csa_sequenceid argument relative to to the cached
sequence id on the slot falls into one of three cases.
o If the difference between csa_sequenceid and the client's cached
sequence id at the slot id is two (2) or more, or if
csa_sequenceid is less than the cached sequence id (accounting for
wraparound of the unsigned sequence id value), then the client
MUST return NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED.
o If csa_sequenceid and the cached sequence id are the same, this is
a retry, and the client returns the CB_COMPOUND request's cached
reply.
o If csa_sequenceid is one greater (accounting for wraparound) than
the cached sequence id, then this is a new request, and the slot's
sequence id is incremented. The operations subsequent to
CB_SEQUENCE, if any, are processed. If there are no other
operations, the only other effects are to cache the CB_SEQUENCE
reply in the slot, maintain the session's activity, and when the
server receives the CB_SEQUENCE reply, renew the lease of state
related to the client ID.
If the server reuses a slot id and sequence id for a completely
different request, the client MAY treat the request as if it is retry
of what it has already executed. The client MAY however detect the
server's illegal reuse and return NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY.
If CB_SEQUENCE returns an error, then the state of the slot (sequence
id, cached reply) MUST NOT change.
The client returns two "highest_slotid" values: csr_highest_slotid,
and csr_target_highest_slotid. The former is the highest slot id the
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client will accept in a future CB_SEQUENCE operation, and SHOULD NOT
be less than the value of csa_highest_slotid (but see
Section 2.10.5.1 for an exception). The latter is the highest slot
id the client would prefer the server use on a future CB_SEQUENCE
operation.
19.9.5. IMPLEMENTATION
19.10. Operation 12: CB_WANTS_CANCELLED
19.10.1. SYNOPSIS
fh, size -> -
19.10.2. ARGUMENT
struct CB_WANTS_CANCELLED4args {
bool cwca_contended_wants_cancelled;
bool cwca_resourced_wants_cancelled;
};
19.10.3. RESULT
struct CB_WANTS_CANCELLED4res {
nfsstat4 cwcr_status;
};
19.10.4. DESCRIPTION
The CB_WANTS_CANCELLED operation is used to notify the client that
the some or all wants it registered for recallable delegations and
layouts have been canceled.
If cwca_contended_wants_cancelled is TRUE, this indicates the server
will not be pushing to the client any delegations that become
available after contention passes.
If cwca_resourced_wants_cancelled is TRUE, this indicates the server
will not notify the client when there are resources on the server
grant delegations or layouts.
After receiving a CB_WANTS_CANCELLED operation, the client is free to
attempt to acquire the delegations or layouts it was waiting for, and
possibly re-register wants.
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19.10.5. IMPLEMENTATION
19.11. Operation 13: CB_NOTIFY_LOCK - Notify of possible lock
availability
19.11.1. SYNOPSIS
fh, lockowner -> ()
19.11.2. ARGUMENT
struct CB_NOTIFY_LOCK4args {
lock_owner4 cnla_lock_owner;
nfs_fh4 cnla_fh;
};
19.11.3. RESULT
struct CB_NOTIFY_LOCK4res {
nfsstat4 cnlr_status;
};
19.11.4. DESCRIPTION
The server may use this operation to indicate that a lock for the
given file and lockowner may have become available.
This callback is meant to be used by servers to help reduce the
latency of blocking locks in the case where they recognize that a
client which has been polling for a blocking lock may now be able to
acquire the lock. The notification is purely a hint, provided as a
possible performance optimization, and is not required for
correctness.
19.11.5. IMPLEMENTATION
The server must not grant the lock to the client unless and until it
receives an actual lock request from the client. Similarly, the
client receiving this callback cannot assume that it now has the
lock, or that a subsequent request for the lock will be successful.
The server is not required to implement this callback, and even if it
does, it is not required to use it in any particular case. Therefore
the client must still rely on polling for blocking locks, as
described in the "Blocking Locks" section.
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Similarly, the client is not required to implement this callback, and
even it does, is still free to ignore it. Therefore the server must
not assume that the client will act based on the callback.
If the server supports this callback for a given file, it should set
the OPEN4_RESULT_MAY_NOTIFY_LOCK flag when responding to successful
opens for that file. This does not commit the server to use of
CB_NOTIFY_LOCK, but the client may use this as a hint to decide how
frequently poll for locks derived from that open.
19.12. Operation 10044: CB_ILLEGAL - Illegal Callback Operation
19.12.1. SYNOPSIS
<null> -> ()
19.12.2. ARGUMENT
void;
19.12.3. RESULT
/*
* CB_ILLEGAL: Response for illegal operation numbers
*/
struct CB_ILLEGAL4res {
nfsstat4 status;
};
19.12.4. DESCRIPTION
This operation is a placeholder for encoding a result to handle the
case of the client sending an operation code within COMPOUND that is
not supported. See the COMPOUND procedure description for more
details.
The status field of CB_ILLEGAL4res MUST be set to NFS4ERR_OP_ILLEGAL.
19.12.5. IMPLEMENTATION
A server will probably not send an operation with code OP_CB_ILLEGAL
but if it does, the response will be CB_ILLEGAL4res just as it would
be with any other invalid operation code. Note that if the client
gets an illegal operation code that is not OP_ILLEGAL, and if the
client checks for legal operation codes during the XDR decode phase,
then the CB_ILLEGAL4res would not be returned.
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20. Security Considerations
TBD
21. IANA Considerations
21.1. Defining new layout types
New layout type numbers will be requested from IANA. IANA will only
provide layout type numbers for Standards Track RFCs approved by the
IESG, in accordance with Standards Action policy defined in RFC2434
[20].
The author of a new pNFS layout specification must follow these steps
to obtain acceptance of the layout type as a standard:
1. The author devises the new layout specification.
2. The new layout type specification MUST, at a minimum:
* Define the contents of the layout-type-specific fields of the
following data types:
+ the da_addr_body field of the device_addr4 data type;
+ the loh_body field of the layouthint4 data type;
+ the loc_body field of layout_content4 data type (which in
turn is the lo_content field of the layout4 data type);
+ the lou_body field of the layoutupdate4 data type;
* Describe or define the storage access protocol used to access
the data servers
* Describe the methods of recovery from storage device restart,
and loss of layout state on the metadata server (see
Section 12.7.3).
* Include a security considerations section
3. The author documents the new layout specification as an Internet
Draft.
4. The author submits the Internet Draft for review through the IETF
standards process as defined in "Internet Official Protocol
Standards" (STD 1). The new layout specification will be
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submitted for eventual publication as a standards track RFC.
5. The layout specification progresses through the IETF standards
process; the new option will be reviewed by the NFSv4 Working
Group (if that group still exists), or as an Internet Draft not
submitted by an IETF working group.
22. References
22.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", March 1997.
[2] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R., Beame,
C., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System (NFS)
version 4 Protocol", RFC 3530, April 2003.
[3] Eisler, M., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard",
STD 67, RFC 4506, May 2006.
[4] Srinivasan, R., "RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol
Specification Version 2", RFC 1831, August 1995.
[5] Eisler, M., Chiu, A., and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol
Specification", RFC 2203, September 1997.
[6] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC 1964,
June 1996.
[7] Eisler, M., "LIPKEY - A Low Infrastructure Public Key Mechanism
Using SPKM", RFC 2847, June 2000.
[8] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[9] Talpey, T. and B. Callaghan, "RDMA Transport for ONC RPC - A
Work in Progress", Internet Draft draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcrdma-05,
May 2007.
[10] Talpey, T. and B. Callaghan, "NFS Direct Data Placement - A
Work in Progress", Internet
Draft draft-ietf-nfsv4-nfsdirect-05, May 2007.
[11] Recio, P., Culley, P., Garcia, D., Hilland, J., and B. Metzler,
"A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol Specification - A Work
in Progress", Internet Draft draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcrdma-05,
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September 2006.
[12] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[13] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 1884, December 1995.
[14] International Organization for Standardization, "Information
Technology - Universal Multiple-octet coded Character Set (UCS)
- Part 1: Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane",
ISO Standard 10646-1, May 1993.
[15] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages",
BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.
[16] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized
Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.
[17] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile
for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)", RFC 3491,
March 2003.
[18] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms
and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
[19] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Cryptographic
Algorithm Object Registration", December 2005.
[20] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
22.2. Informative References
[21] Nowicki, B., "NFS: Network File System Protocol specification",
RFC 1094, March 1989.
[22] Callaghan, B., Pawlowski, B., and P. Staubach, "NFS Version 3
Protocol Specification", RFC 1813, June 1995.
[23] Eisler, M., "NFS Version 2 and Version 3 Security Issues and
the NFS Protocol's Use of RPCSEC_GSS and Kerberos V5",
RFC 2623, June 1999.
[24] Juszczak, C., "Improving the Performance and Correctness of an
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NFS Server", USENIX Conference Proceedings , June 1990.
[25] Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by an On-
line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002.
[26] Srinivasan, R., "Binding Protocols for ONC RPC Version 2",
RFC 1833, August 1995.
[27] Werme, R., "RPC XID Issues", USENIX Conference Proceedings ,
February 1996.
[28] Bhide, A., Elnozahy, E., and S. Morgan, "A Highly Available
Network Server", USENIX Conference Proceedings , January 1991.
[29] Zelenka, J., Welch, B., and B. Halevy, "Object-based pNFS
Operations", July 2005, <ftp://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-zelenka-pnfs-obj-01.txt>.
[30] Black, D., "pNFS Block/Volume Layout", July 2005, <ftp://
www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-black-pnfs-block-01.txt>.
[31] Callaghan, B., "WebNFS Client Specification", RFC 2054,
October 1996.
[32] Callaghan, B., "WebNFS Server Specification", RFC 2055,
October 1996.
[33] Shepler, S., "NFS Version 4 Design Considerations", RFC 2624,
June 1999.
[34] Simonsen, K., "Character Mnemonics and Character Sets",
RFC 1345, June 1992.
[35] Satran, J., Meth, K., Sapuntzakis, C., Chadalapaka, M., and E.
Zeidner, "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI)",
RFC 3720, April 2004.
[36] Snively, R., "Fibre Channel Protocol for SCSI, 2nd Version
(FCP-2)", ANSI/INCITS 350-2003, Oct 2003.
[37] Weber, R., "Object-Based Storage Device Commands (OSD)", ANSI/
INCITS 400-2004, July 2004,
<http://www.t10.org/ftp/t10/drafts/osd/osd-r10.pdf>.
[38] Callaghan, B., "NFS URL Scheme", RFC 2224, October 1997.
[39] Chiu, A., Eisler, M., and B. Callaghan, "Security Negotiation
for WebNFS", RFC 2755, January 2000.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The initial drafts for the SECINFO extensions were edited by Mike
Eisler with contributions from Peng Dai, Sergey Klyushin, and Carl
Burnett.
The initial drafts for the SESSIONS extensions were edited by Tom
Talpey, Spencer Shepler, Jon Bauman with contributions from Charles
Antonelli, Brent Callaghan, Mike Eisler, John Howard, Chet Juszczak,
Trond Myklebust, Dave Noveck, John Scott, Mike Stolarchuk and Mark
Wittle. [[Comment.16: global namespace stuff?]]
The initial drafts for the Directory Delegations support were
contributed by Saadia Khan with input from Dave Noveck, Mike Eisler,
Carl Burnett, Ted Anderson and Tom Talpey.
The initial drafts for the ACL explanations were contributed by Sam
Falkner and Lisa Week.
The initial drafts for the parallel NFS support were edited by Brent
Welch and Garth Goodson. Additional authors for those documents were
Benny Halevy, David Black, and Andy Adamson. Additional input came
from the informal group which contributed to the construction of the
initial pNFS drafts; specific acknowledgement goes to Gary Grider,
Peter Corbett, Dave Noveck, and Peter Honeyman. The pNFS work was
inspired by the NASD and OSD work done by Garth Gibson. Gary Grider
of the national labs (LANL) has also been a champion of high-
performance parallel I/O.
Fredric Isaman found several errors in draft versions of the ONC RPC
XDR description of the NFSv4.1 protocol.
Authors' Addresses
Spencer Shepler
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
7808 Moonflower Drive
Austin, TX 78750
USA
Phone: +1-512-349-9376
Email: spencer.shepler@sun.com
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Mike Eisler
Network Appliance, Inc.
5765 Chase Point Circle
Colorado Springs, CO 80919
USA
Phone: +1-719-599-9026
Email: email2mre-@yahoo.com
URI: Insert ietf2 between the - and @ symbols in the above address
David Noveck
Network Appliance, Inc.
1601 Trapelo Road, Suite 16
Waltham, MA 02454
USA
Phone: +1-781-768-5347
Email: dnoveck@netapp.com
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