NTP Working Group D. Franke
Internet-Draft Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track D. Sibold
Expires: May 4, 2017 K. Teichel
PTB
October 31, 2016
Using the Network Time Security Specification to Secure the Network Time
Protocol
draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-07
Abstract
This document describes how to reach the objectives described in the
Network Time Security (NTS) specification when securing time
synchronization with servers using the Network Time Protocol (NTP).
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Overview of NTS-Secured NTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Client-Server Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Symmetric/Peer Mode and Control Modes . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Employing DTLS for NTP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. DTLS profile for Network Time Security . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Transport mechanisms for DTLS records . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.1. Transport via NTS port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.2. Transport via NTP extension field . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. The NTS-encapsulated NTPv4 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. The NTS Key Establishment protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4.1. NTS-KE record types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4.2. Key Extraction (generally) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5. NTS Extensions for NTPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5.1. Key Extraction (for NTPv4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5.2. Packet structure overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5.3. The Unique Identifier extension . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.5.4. The NTS Cookie extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.5.5. The NTS Cookie Placeholder extension . . . . . . . . 16
5.5.6. The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions
extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.5.7. Protocol details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.6. Recommended format for NTS cookies . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Field Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . . . . 21
6.3. DTLS-Based Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.1. Usage of NTP Pools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.2. Initial Verification of the Server Certificates . . . . . 26
7.3. Treatment of Initial Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.4. DTLS-Related Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.5. Delay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.2. Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix A. Flow Diagrams of Client Behaviour . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction
The Network Time Security (NTS) draft
[I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security] specifies security measures
which can be used to enable time synchronization protocols to verify
authenticity of the time server and integrity of the time
synchronization protocol packets.
This document provides detail on how to specifically use those
measures to secure time synchronization between NTP clients and
servers. In particular, it describes a mechanism for using Datagram
Transport Layer Security [RFC6347] (DTLS) to provide cryptographic
security for NTP. Certain sections, are not inherently NTP-specific
and can be taken as guidance on how future work may apply the
described techniques to other time synchronization protocols such as
the Precision Time Protocol [IEC.61588_2009].
2. Objectives
The specific objectives for applying the NTS specification to the NTP
are as follows:
o Authenticity: NTS enables an NTP client to authenticate its time
server(s).
o Integrity: NTS protects the integrity of NTP time synchronization
protocol packets via a message authentication code (MAC).
o Authorization: NTS optionally enables the server to verify the
client's authorization.
o Confidentiality: NTS does not provide confidentiality protection
of the time synchronization data.
o Privacy: NTS preserves unlinkability, i. e. it does not leak data
that would allow a passive attacker to track mobile NTP clients
when they move between networks.
o Request-Response-Consistency: NTS enables a client to match an
incoming response to a request it has sent. NTS also enables the
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client to deduce from the response whether its request to the
server has arrived without alteration.
o Modes of operation: Both the client-server mode and the symmetric
peer mode of NTP are supported. The broadcast mode of NTP can NOT
be secured with measures within this document.
o Hybrid mode: Both secure and insecure communication modes are
possible for both NTP servers and clients.
o Compatibility:
* NTP associations which are not secured by NTS are not affected
by NTS-secured communication.
* An NTP server that does not support NTS is not affected by NTS-
secured authentication requests.
3. Terms and Abbreviations
MAC Message Authentication Code
NTP Network Time Protocol (RFC 5905 [RFC5905])
NTS Network Time Security
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (RFC 5116
[RFC5116])
4. Overview of NTS-Secured NTP
The Network Time Protocol includes many different operating modes to
support various network topologies. In addition to its best-known
and most-widely-used client-server mode, it also includes modes for
synchronization between symmetric peers, a control mode for server
monitoring and administration and a broadcast mode. These various
modes have differing and contradictory requirements for security and
performance. Symmetric and control modes demand mutual
authentication and mutual replay protection, and for certain message
types control mode may require confidentiality as well as
authentication. Client-server mode places more stringent
requirements on resource utilization than other modes, because
servers may have vast number of clients and be unable to afford to
maintain per-client state. However, client-server mode also has more
relaxed security needs, because only the client requires replay
protection: it is harmless for servers to process replayed packets.
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The security demands of symmetric and control modes, on the other
hand, are in conflict with the resource-utilization demands of
client-server mode: any scheme which provides replay protection
inherently involves maintaining some state to keep track of what
messages have already been seen.
This document does not discuss how to add security to NTP's broadcast
mode.
4.1. Client-Server Mode
The server does not keep a long-term state of the client. NTS
initially verifies the authenticity of the time server and exchanges
one or more symmetric keys. The DTLS-based key exchange procedure
described in Section 5 can be used for this exchange. An
implementation MUST support the use of this procedure. It MAY
additionally support the use of any alternative secure communication
for this purpose, as long as it fulfills the preconditions given in
[I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security], Section 6.1.1.
After the keys have been exchanged, the participants then use them to
protect the authenticity and the integrity of subsequent unicast-type
time synchronization packets. In order to do this, the server
attaches a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to each time
synchronization packet. The calculation of the MAC includes the
whole time synchronization packet and the symmetric key which is
stored on the client side. Therefore, the client can perform a
validity check for this MAC on reception of a time synchronization
packet.
4.2. Symmetric/Peer Mode and Control Modes
In the symmetric ("peer") mode as well as in control modes, there is
no requirement for statelessness on either side. Both sides exchange
and memorize one or more shared secrets. The shared secrets
exchanged are then used to secure NTP peer mode or control packets by
providing at least authenticity and integrity protection and possibly
also confidentiality. The DTLS-based key exchange procedure
described in Section 5.3 can be used for such communication. An
implementation MUST support the use of this procedure.
5. Employing DTLS for NTP Security
Since (as discussed in Section 4.1) no single approach can
simultaneously satisfy the needs of all modes, this specification
consists of not one protocol but a suite of them:
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o The "NTS-encapsulated NTPv4" protocol is little more than "NTP
over DTLS": the two endpoints perform a DTLS handshake and then
exchange NTP packets encapsulated as DTLS Application Data. It is
suitable for symmetric and control modes, and is also secure for
client/server mode but relatively wasteful of server resources.
o The "NTS Key Establishment" protocol (NTS-KE) uses DTLS to
establish key material and negotiate some additional protocol
options, but then quickly closes the DTLS channel and does not use
it for the exchange of time packets. NTS-KE is designed to be
extensible, and might be extended to support key establishment for
other protocols such as PTP.
o The "NTS extensions for NTPv4" are a collection of NTP extension
fields for cryptographically securing NTPv4 using key material
previously negotiated using NTS-KE. They are suitable for
securing client/server mode because the server can implement them
without retaining per-client state, but on the other hand are
suitable *only* for client/server mode because only the client,
and not the server, is protected from replay.
5.1. DTLS profile for Network Time Security
Since securing time protocols is (as of 2016) a novel application of
DTLS, no backward-compatibility concerns exist to justify using
obsolete, insecure, or otherwise broken DTLS features or versions.
We therefore put forward the following requirements and guidelines,
roughly representing 2016's best practices.
Implementations MUST NOT negotiate DTLS versions earlier than 1.2.
Implementations willing to negotiate more than one possible version
of DTLS SHOULD NOT respond to handshake failures by retrying with a
downgraded protocol version. If they do, they MUST implement
[RFC7507].
DTLS clients MUST NOT offer, and DTLS servers MUST not select, RC4
cipher suites. [RFC7465]
DTLS clients SHOULD offer, and DTLS servers SHOULD accept, the TLS
Renegotiation Indication Extension [RFC5746]. Regardless, they MUST
NOT initiate or permit insecure renegotiation. (*)
DTLS clients SHOULD offer, and DTLS servers SHOULD accept, the TLS
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension [RFC7627]. (*)
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Use of the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension [RFC7301]
is integral to NTS and support for it is REQUIRED for
interoperability.
(*): Note that DTLS 1.3 or beyond may render the indicated
recommendations inapplicable.
5.2. Transport mechanisms for DTLS records
This section specifies two mechanisms, one REQUIRED and one OPTIONAL,
for exchanging NTS-related DTLS records. It is intended that the
choice of transport mechanism be orthogonal to any concerns at the
application layer: DTLS records SHOULD receive identical disposition
regardless of which mechanism they arrive by.
5.2.1. Transport via NTS port
In this transport mechanism, DTLS records, formatted according to RFC
6347 [RFC6347] or a subsequent revision thereof, are exchanged
directly on UDP port [[TBD]], with one DTLS record per UDP packet and
no additional layer of encapsulation between the UDP header and the
DTLS record. Servers which implement NTS MUST support this
mechanism.
5.2.2. Transport via NTP extension field
In this transport mechanism, DTLS records are exchanged within
extension fields of specially-formed NTP packets, which are
themselves exchanged via the usual NTP service port (123/udp). NTP
packets conveying DTLS records SHALL be formatted as in Figure 1.
They MUST NOT contain any other extensions or a legacy MAC field.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. NTP Header (48 octets) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Extension Type | Extension Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. DTLS Record (variable) .
. .
| |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| |
. .
. Padding (1-24 octets) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Format of NTP packets conveying DTLS records
Within the NTP header,
o The Leap Indicator field SHALL be set to 3 (unsynchronized).
o The Version Number field SHALL be set to 4.
o DTLS clients SHALL set the Mode field to 3, and DTLS servers SHALL
set the Mode field to 4, even if the DTLS record is being used (in
the full-encapsulation protocol) to protect some NTP mode other
than client/server.
o The Stratum field SHALL be set to 0 (unspecified or invalid).
o The Reference ID field (conveying a kiss code) SHALL be set to
"DTLS"
o DTLS servers SHALL set the origin timestamp field from the
transmit timestamp field of the packet most recently received from
the client.
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o All other header fields MUST be ignored by the receiver, and MAY
contain arbitrary or bogus values.
The Extension Type field SHALL be set to [[TBD]]. The Extension
Length field SHALL be computed and set as per RFC 7822 [RFC7822].
The DTLS Record field SHALL contain a DTLS Record formatted as per
RFC 6347 [RFC6347] or a subsequent revision thereof.
The Padding field SHALL contain between 1 and 24 octets of padding,
with every octet set to the number of padding octets included, e.g.,
"01", "02 02", or "03 03 03". The number of padding bytes should be
chosen in order to comply with the RFC 7822 [RFC7822] requirement
that (in the absence of a legacy MAC) extensions have a total length
in octets (including the four octets for the type and length fields)
which is at least 28 and divisible by 4. Furthermore, since future
revisions of DTLS may employ record formats that are not self-
delimiting, at least one octet of padding MUST be included so that
receivers can unambiguously determine where the DTLS record ends and
the padding begins. If the length of the DTLS record is already at
least 24 and a multiple of 4, then the correct amount of padding to
include is 4 octets.
The NTP header values specified above are selected such that NTP
implementations which do not understand NTS will interpret the packet
as an innocuous no-op and not attempt to use it for time
synchronization. To NTS-aware implementations, however, these
packets are best understood as not being NTP packets at all, but
simply a means of "smuggling" arbitrary DTLS records across port 123/
udp. Indeed, these records need not be pertinent to NTP at all --
for example, they could be NTS-KE messages eventually intended for
securing PTP traffic.
This transport mechanism is intended for use as a fallback in
situations where firewalls or other middleboxes are preventing
communication on the NTS port. Support for it is OPTIONAL.
5.3. The NTS-encapsulated NTPv4 protocol
The NTS-encapsulated NTPv4 protocol proceeds in two parts. First,
DTLS handshake records are exchanged using one of the two transport
mechanisms specified in Section 5.2. The two endpoints carry out a
DTLS handshake in conformance with Section 5.1, with the client
offering (via an ALPN [RFC7301] extension), and the server accepting,
an application-layer protocol of "ntp/4". Second, once the handshake
is successfully completed, the two endpoints use the established
channel to exchange arbitrary NTPv4 packets as DTLS-protected
Application Data.
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In addition to the requirements specified in Section 5.1,
implementations MUST enforce the anti-replay mechanism specified in
Section 4.1.2.6 of RFC 6347 [RFC6347] (or an equivalent mechanism
specified in a subsequent revision of DTLS). Servers wishing to
enforce access control SHOULD either demand a client certificate or
use a PSK-based handshake in order to establish the client's
identity.
The NTS-encapsulated NTPv4 protocol is the RECOMMENDED mechanism for
cryptographically securing mode 1 (symmetric active), 2 (symmetric
passive), and 6 (control) NTPv4 traffic. It is equally safe for mode
3/4 (client/server) traffic, but is NOT RECOMMENDED for this purpose
because it scales poorly compared to using NTS Extensions for NTPv4
(Section 5.5).
5.4. The NTS Key Establishment protocol
The NTS Key Establishment (NTS-KE) protocol is carried out by
exchanging DTLS records using one of the two transport mechanisms
specified in Section 5.2. The two endpoints carry out a DTLS
handshake in conformance with Section 5.1, with the client offering
(via an ALPN [RFC7301] extension), and the server accepting, an
application-layer protocol of "ntske/1". Immediately following a
successful handshake, the client SHALL send a single request (as
Application Data encapsulated in the DTLS-protected channel), then
the server SHALL send a single response followed by a "Close notify"
alert and then discard the channel state.
The client's request and the server's response each SHALL consist of
a sequence of records formatted according to Figure 2. The sequence
SHALL be terminated by a "End of Message" record, which has a Record
Type of zero and a zero-length body. Furthermore, requests and non-
error responses each SHALL include exactly one NTS Next Protocol
Negotiation record.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|C| Record Type | Body Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. Record Body .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2
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[[Ed. Note: this ad-hoc binary format should be fine as long as we
continue to keep things very simple. However, if we think there's
any reasonable probability of wanting to include more complex data
structures, we should consider using some semi-structured data format
such as JSON, Protocol Buffers, or (ugh) ASN.1]]
The requirement that all NTS-KE messages be terminated by an End of
Message record makes them self-delimiting. One DTLS record MAY, and
typically will, contain multiple NTS-KE records. NTS-KE records MAY
be split across DTLS record boundaries. If, likely due to packet
loss, an incomplete NTS-KE message is received, implementations MUST
treat this an error, which clients SHOULD handle by restarting with a
fresh DTLS handshake and trying again.
The fields of an NTS-KE record are defined as follows:
o C (Critical Bit): Determines the disposition of unrecognized
Record Types. Implementations which receive a record with an
unrecognized Record Type MUST ignore the record if the Critical
Bit is 0, and MUST treat it as an error if the Critical Bit is 1.
o Record Type: A 15-bit integer in network byte order (from most-to-
least significant, its bits are record bits 7-1 and then 15-8).
The semantics of record types 0-5 are specified in this memo;
additional type numbers SHALL be tracked through the IANA Network
Time Security Key Establishment Record Types registry.
o Body Length: the length of the Record Body field, in octets, as a
16-bit integer in network byte order. Record bodies may have any
representable length and need not be aligned to a word boundary.
o Record Body: the syntax and semantics of this field shall be
determined by the Record Type.
5.4.1. NTS-KE record types
The following NTS-KE Record Types are defined.
5.4.1.1. End of Message
The End of Message record has a Record Type number of 0 and an zero-
length body. It MUST occur exactly once as the final record of every
NTS-KE request and response. The Critical Bit MUST be set.
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5.4.1.2. NTS Next Protocol Negotiation
The NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record has a record type of 1. It
MUST occur exactly once in every NTS-KE request and response. Its
body consists of a sequence of 16-octet strings. Each 16-octet
string represents a Protocol Name from the IANA Network Time Security
Next Protocols registry. The Critical Bit MUST be set.
The Protocol Names listed in the client's NTS Next Protocol
Negotiation record denote those protocols which the client wishes to
speak using the key material established through this NTS-KE session.
The Protocol Names listed in the server's response MUST comprise a
subset of those listed in the request, and denote those protocols
which the server is willing and able to speak using the key material
established through this NTS-KE session. The client MAY proceed with
one or more of them. The request MUST list at least one protocol,
but the response MAY be empty.
5.4.1.3. Error
The Error record has a Record Type number of 2. Its body is exactly
two octets long, consisting of an unsigned 16-bit integer in network
byte order, denoting an error code. The Critical Bit MUST be set.
Clients MUST NOT include Error records in their request. If clients
receive a server response which includes an Error record, they MUST
discard any negotiated key material and MUST NOT proceed to the Next
Protocol.
The following error code are defined.
o Error code 0 means "Unrecognized Critical Record". The server
MUST respond with this error code if the request included a record
which the server did not understand and which had its Critical Bit
set. The client SHOULD NOT retry its request without
modification.
o Error code 1 means "Bad Request". The server MUST respond with
this error if, upon the expiration of an implementation-defined
timeout, it has not yet received a complete and syntactically
well-formed request from the client. This error is likely to be
the result of a dropped packet, so the client SHOULD start over
with a new DTLS handshake and retry its request.
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5.4.1.4. Warning
The Warning record has a Record Type number of 3. Its body is
exactly two octets long, consisting of an unsigned 16-bit integer in
network byte order, denoting a warning code. The Critical Bit MUST
be set.
Clients MUST NOT include Warning records in their request. If
clients receive a server response which includes an Warning record,
they MAY discard any negotiated key material and abort without
proceeding to the Next Protocol. Unrecognized warning codes MUST be
treated as errors.
This memo defines no warning codes.
5.4.1.5. AEAD Algorithm Negotiation
The AEAD Algorithm Negotiation record has a Record Type number of 4.
Its body consists of a sequence of unsigned 16-bit integers in
network byte order, denoting Numeric Identifiers from the IANA AEAD
registry [RFC5116]. The Critical Bit MAY be set.
If the NTS Next Protocol Negotiation record offers "ntp/4",this
record MUST be included exactly once. Other protocols MAY require it
as well.
When included in a request, this record denotes which AEAD algorithms
the client is willing to use to secure the Next Protocol, in
decreasing preference order. When included in a response, this
record denotes which algorithm the server chooses to use, or is empty
if the server supports none of the algorithms offered.. In requests,
the list MUST include at least one algorithm. In responses, it MUST
include at most one. Honoring the client's preference order is
OPTIONAL: servers may select among any of the client's offered
choices, even if they are able to support some other algorithm which
the client prefers more.
Server implementations of NTS extensions for NTPv4 (Section 5.5) MUST
support AEAD_AES_128_GCM (Numeric Identifier 1). That is, if the
client includes AEAD_AES_128_GCM in its AEAD Algorithm Negotiation
record, and the server accepts the "ntp/4" protocol in its NTS Next
Protocol Negotiation record, then the server's AEAD Algorithm
Negotiation record MUST NOT be empty.
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5.4.1.6. New Cookie for NTPv4
The New Cookie for NTPv4 record has a Record Type number of 5. The
contents of its body SHALL be implementation-defined and clients MUST
NOT attempt to interpret them. See [[TODO]] for a RECOMMENDED
construction.
Clients MUST NOT send records of this type. Servers MUST send at
least one record of this type, and SHOULD send eight of them, if they
accept "ntp/4" as a Next Protocol. The Critical Bit SHOULD NOT be
set.
5.4.2. Key Extraction (generally)
Following a successful run of the NTS-KE protocol, key material SHALL
be extracted according to RFC 5705 [RFC5705]. Inputs to the exporter
function are to be constructed in a manner specific to the negotiated
Next Protocol. However, all protocols which utilize NTS-KE MUST
conform to the following two rules:
o The disambiguating label string MUST be "EXPORTER-network-time-
security/1".
o The per-association context value MUST be provided, and MUST begin
with the 16-octet Protocol Name which was negotiated as a Next
Protocol.
5.5. NTS Extensions for NTPv4
5.5.1. Key Extraction (for NTPv4)
Following a successful run of the NTS-KE protocol wherein "ntp/4" is
selected as a Next Protocol, two AEAD keys SHALL be extracted: a
client-to-server (C2S) key and a server-to-client (S2C) key. These
keys SHALL be computed according to RFC 5705 [RFC5705], using the
following inputs.
The disambiguating label string SHALL be "EXPORTER-network-time-
security/1".
The per-association context value SHALL consist of the following
19 octets:
The first 16 octets SHALL be (in hexadecimal):
6E 74 70 2F 34 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
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The next two octets SHALL be the Numeric Identifier of the
negotiated AEAD Algorithm, in network byte order.
The final octet SHALL be 0x00 for the C2S key and 0x01 for the
S2C key.
Implementations wishing to derive additional keys for private or
experimental use MUST NOT do so by extending the above-specified
syntax for per-association context values. Instead, they SHOULD use
their own disambiguating label string. Note that RFC 5705 provides
that disambiguating label strings beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" MAY
be used without IANA registration.
5.5.2. Packet structure overview
In general, an NTS-protected NTPv4 packet consists of:
The usual 48-octet NTP header, which is authenticated but not
encrypted.
Some extensions which are authenticated but not encrypted.
An NTS extension which contains AEAD output (i.e., an
authentication tag and possible ciphertext). The corresponding
plaintext, if non-empty, consists of some extensions which benefit
from both encryption and authentication.
Possibly, some additional extensions which are neither encrypted
nor authenticated. These are discarded by the receiver. [[Ed.
Note: right now there's no good reason for the sender to include
anything here, but eventually there might be. We've seen Checksum
Complement [RFC7821] and LAST-EF as two examples of semantically-
void extensions that are included to satsify constraints imposed
lower on the protocol stack, and while there's no reason to use
either of these on NTS-protected packets, I think we could see
similar examples in the future. So, rejecting packets with
unauthenticated extensions could cause interoperability problems,
while accepting and processing those extensions would of course be
a security risk. Thus, I think "allow and discard" is the correct
policy.]]
Always included among the authenticated or authenticated-and-
encrypted extensions are a cookie extension and a unique-identifier
extension. The purpose of the cookie extension is to enable the
server to offload storage of session state onto the client. The
purpose of the unique-identifier extension is to protect the client
from replay attacks.
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5.5.3. The Unique Identifier extension
The Unique Identifier extension has a Field Type of [[TBD]]. When
the extension is included in a client packet (mode 3), its body SHALL
consist of a string of octets generated uniformly at random. The
string SHOULD be 32 octets long. When the extension is included in a
server packet (mode 4), its body SHALL contain the same octet string
as was provided in the client packet to which the server is
responding. Its use in modes other than client/server is not
defined.
The Unique Identifier extension provides the client with a
cryptographically strong means of detecting replayed packets. It may
also be used standalone, without NTS, in which case it provides the
client with a means of detecting spoofed packets from off-path
attackers. Historically, NTP's origin timestamp field has played
both these roles, but for cryptographic purposes this is suboptimal
because it is only 64 bits long and, depending on implementation
details, most of those bits may be predictable. In contrast, the
Unique Identifier extension enables a degree of unpredictability and
collision-resistance more consistent with cryptographic best
practice.
[[TODO: consider using separate extension types for request and
response, thus allowing for use in symmetric mode. But proper
handling in the presence of dropped packets needs to be documented
and involves a lot of subtlety.]]
5.5.4. The NTS Cookie extension
The NTS Cookie extension has a Field Type of [[TBD]]. Its purpose is
to carry information which enables the server to recompute keys and
other session state without having to store any per-client state.
The contents of its body SHALL be implementation-defined and clients
MUST NOT attempt to interpret them. See [[TODO]] for a RECOMMENDED
construction. The NTS Cookie extension MUST NOT be included in NTP
packets whose mode is other than 3 (client) or 4 (server).
5.5.5. The NTS Cookie Placeholder extension
The NTS Cookie Placeholder extension has a Field Type of [[TBD]].
When this extension is included in a client packet (mode 3), it
communicates to the server that the client wishes it to send
additional cookies in its response. This extension MUST NOT be
included in NTP packets whose mode is other than 3.
Whenever an NTS Cookie Placeholder extension is present, it MUST be
accompanied by an NTS Cookie extension, and the body length of the
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NTS Cookie Placeholder extension MUST be the same as the body length
of the NTS Cookie Extension. (This length requirement serves to
ensure that the response will not be larger than the request, in
order to improve timekeeping precision and prevent DDoS
amplification). The contents of the NTS Cookie Placeholder
extension's body are undefined and, aside from checking its length,
MUST be ignored by the server.
5.5.6. The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions extension
The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions extension is the
central cryptographic element of an NTS-protected NTP packet. Its
Field Type is [[TBD]] and the format of its body SHALL be as follows:
Nonce length: two octets in network byte order, giving the length
of the Nonce field.
Nonce: a nonce as required by the negotiated AEAD Algorithm.
Ciphertext: the output of the negotiated AEAD Algorithm. The
structure of this field is determined by the negotiated algorithm,
but it typically contains an authentication tag in addition to the
actual ciphertext.
Padding: between 1 and 24 octets of padding, with every octet set
to the number of padding octets included, e.g., "01", "02 02", or
"03 03 03". The number of padding bytes should be chosen in order
to comply with the RFC 7822 [RFC7822] requirement that (in the
absence of a legacy MAC) extensions have a total length in octets
(including the four octets for the type and length fields) which
is at least 28 and divisible by 4. At least one octet of padding
MUST be included, so that implementations can unambiguously
delimit the end of the ciphertext from the start of the padding.
The Ciphertext field SHALL be formed by providing the following
inputs to the negotiated AEAD Algorithm:
K: For packets sent from the client to the server, the C2S key
SHALL be used. For packets sent from the server to the client,
the S2C key SHALL be used.
A: The associated data SHALL consist of the portion of the NTP
packet beginning from the start of the NTP header and ending at
the end of the last extension which precedes the NTS Authenticator
and Encrypted Extensions extension.
P: The plaintext SHALL consist of all (if any) extensions to be
encrypted.
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N: The nonce SHALL be formed however required by the negotiated
AEAD Algorithm.
The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions extension MUST NOT be
included in NTP packets whose mode is other than 3 (client) or 4
(server).
5.5.7. Protocol details
A client sending an NTS-protected request SHALL include the following
extensions:
Exactly one Unique Identifier extension, which MUST be
authenticated and MUST NOT be encrypted [[Ed. Note: so that if
the server can't decrypt the request, it can still echo back the
Unique Identifier in the NTS NAK it sends]]. MUST NOT duplicate
those of any previous request.
Exactly one NTS Cookie extension, which MUST be authenticated and
MUST NOT be encrypted. The cookie MUST be one which the server
previously provided the client; it may have been provided during
the NTS-KE handshake or in response to a previous NTS-protected
NTP request. To protect client's privacy, the same cookie SHOULD
NOT be included in multiple requests. If the client does not have
any cookies that it has not already sent, it SHOULD re-run the
NTS-KE protocol before continuing.
Exactly one NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions extension,
generated using an AEAD Algorithm and C2S key established through
NTS-KE.
The client MAY include one or more NTS Cookie Placeholder extensions,
which MUST be authenticated and MAY be encrypted. The number of NTS
Cookie Placeholder extensions that the client includes SHOULD be such
that if the client includes N placeholders and the server sends back
N+1 cookies, the number of unused cookies stored by the client will
come to eight. When both the client and server adhere to all cookie-
management guidance provided in this memo, the number of placeholder
extensions will equal the number of dropped packets since the last
successful volley.
The client MAY include additional (non-NTS-related) extensions, which
MAY appear prior to the NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions
extension (therefore authenticated but not encrypted), within it
(therefore encrypted and authenticated), or after it (therefore
neither encrypted nor authenticated). In general, however, the
server MUST discard any unauthenticated extensions and process the
packet as though they were not present. Servers MAY implement
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exceptions to this requirement for particular extensions if their
specification explicitly provides for such.
Upon receiving an NTS-protected request, the server SHALL (through
some implementation-defined mechanism) use the cookie to recover the
AEAD Algorithm, C2S key, and S2C key associated with the request, and
then use the C2S key to authenticate the packet and decrypt the
ciphertext. If the cookie is valid and authentication and decryption
succeed, then the server SHALL include the following extensions in
its response:
Exactly one Unique Identifier extension, which MUST be
authenticated, MUST NOT be encrypted, and whose contents SHALL
echo those provided by the client.
Exactly one NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions extension,
generated using the AEAD algorithm and S2C key recovered from the
cookie provided by the client.
One or more NTS Cookie extensions, which MUST be authenticated and
encrypted. The number of NTS Cookie extensions included SHOULD be
equal to, and MUST NOT exceed, one plus the number of valid NTS
Cookie Placeholder extensions included in the request.
The server MAY include additional (non-NTS-related) extensions, which
MAY appear prior to the NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions
extension (therefore authenticated but not encrypted), within it
(therefore encrypted and authenticated), or after it (therefore
neither encrypted nor authenticated). In general, however, the
client MUST discard any unauthenticated extensions and process the
packet as though they were not present. Clients MAY implement
exceptions to this requirement for particular extensions if their
specification explicitly provides for such.
If the server is unable to validate the cookie or authenticate the
request, it SHOULD respond with a Kiss-o'-Death packet (see RFC 5905,
Section 7.4) [RFC5905]) with kiss code "NTSN" (meaning "NTS NAK").
Such a response MUST include exactly one Unique Identifier extension
whose contents SHALL echo those provided by the client. It MUST NOT
include any NTS Cookie or NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extensions
extension. [[Ed. Note: RFC 5905 already provides the kiss code
"CRYP" meaning "Cryptographic authentication or identification
failed" but I think this is meant to be Autokey-specific.]]
Upon receiving an NTS-protected response, the client MUST verify that
the Unique Identifier matches that of an outstanding request, and
that the packet is authentic under the S2C key associated with that
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request. If either of these checks fails, the packet MUST be
discarded without further processing.
Upon receiving an NTS NAK, the client MUST verify that the Unique
Identifier matches that of an outstanding request. If this check
fails, the packet MUST be discarded without further processing. If
this check passes, the client SHOULD discard all cookies and AEAD
keys associated with the server which sent the NAK and initiate a
fresh NTS-KE handshake.
5.6. Recommended format for NTS cookies
This section provides a RECOMMENDED way for servers to construct NTS
cookies. Clients MUST NOT examine the cookie under the assumption
that it is constructed according to this section.
The role of cookies in NTS is closely analagous to that of session
cookies in TLS. Accordingly, the thematic resemblance of this
section to RFC 5077 [RFC5077] is deliberate, and the reader should
likewise take heed of its security considerations.
Servers should select an AEAD algorithm which they will use to
encrypt and authenticate cookies. The chosen algorithm should be one
such as AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256 [RFC5297] which resists accidential
nonce reuse, and it need not be the same as the one that was
negotiated with the client. Servers should randomly generate and
store a master AEAD key `K`. Servers should additionally choose a
non-secret, unique value `I` as key-identifier for `K`.
Servers should periodically (e.g., once daily) generate a new pair
(I,K) and immediately switch to using these values for all newly-
generated cookies. Immediately following each such key rotation,
servers should securely erase any keys generated two or more rotation
periods prior. Servers should continue to accept any cookie
generated using keys that they have not yet erased, even if those
keys are no longer current. Erasing old keys provides for forward
secrecy, limiting the scope of what old information can be stolen if
a master key is somehow compromised. Holding on to a limited number
of old keys allows clients to seamlessly transition from one
generation to the next without having to perform a new NTS-KE
handshake.
[[TODO: discuss key management considerations for load-balanced
servers]]
To form a cookie, servers should first form a plaintext `P`
consisting of the following fields:
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The AEAD algorithm negotiated during NTS-KE
The S2C key
The C2S key
Servers should the generate a nonce `N` uniformly at random, and form
AEAD output `C` by encrypting `P` under key `K` with nonce `N` and no
associated data.
The cookie should consist of the tuple `(I,N,C)`.
[[TODO: explicitly specify how to verify and decrypt a cookie, not
just how to form one]]
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. Field Type Registry
Within the "NTP Extensions Field Types" registry table, add the field
types:
Field Type Meaning References
---------- ------------------------------------ ----------
TBD1 NTS-Related Content [this doc]
TBD2 NTS-Related Content [this doc]
TBD3 NTS-Related Content [this doc]
6.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry
Within the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" table, add one content type identifier:
Decimal Description References
------- -------------------------------------------- ----------
TBD4 id-ct-nts-ntsForNtpMessageAuthenticationCode [this doc]
6.3. DTLS-Based Key Exchange
IANA is requested to allocate an entry in the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry as follows:
Service Name: nts
Transport Protocol: udp
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: Network Time Security
Reference: [[this memo]]
Port Number: selected by IANA from the user port range
IANA is requested to allocate the following two entries in the
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs registry:
Protocol: Network Time Security Key Establishment, version 1
Identification Sequence:
0x6E 0x74 0x73 0x6B 0x65 0x2F 0x31 ("ntske/1")
Reference: [[this memo]]
Protocol: Network Time Protocol, version 4
Identification Sequence:
0x6E 0x74 0x70 0x2F 0x34 ("ntp/4")
Reference: [[this memo]]
IANA is requested to allocate the following entry in the TLS Exporter
Label Registry:
+----------------------------------+---------+---------------+------+
| Value | DTLS-OK | Reference | Note |
+----------------------------------+---------+---------------+------+
| EXPORTER-network-time-security/1 | Y | [[this memo]] | |
+----------------------------------+---------+---------------+------+
IANA is requested to allocate the following entries in the registry
of NTP Kiss-o'-Death codes:
+------+------------------------------+
| Code | Meaning |
+------+------------------------------+
| DTLS | Packet conveys a DTLS record |
| NTSN | NTS NAK |
+------+------------------------------+
IANA is requested to allocate the following entries in the NTP
Extensions Field Types registry:
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+------------+---------------------------------------+--------------+
| Field Type | Meaning | Reference |
+------------+---------------------------------------+--------------+
| [[TBD]] | DTLS Record | [[this |
| | | memo]] |
| [[TBD]] | Unique Identifier | [[this |
| | | memo]] |
| [[TBD]] | NTS Cookie | [[this |
| | | memo]] |
| [[TBD]] | NTS Authenticator and Encrypted | [[this |
| | Extensions | memo]] |
+------------+---------------------------------------+--------------+
IANA is requested to create a new registry entitled "Network Time
Security Key Establishment Record Types". Entries SHALL have the
following fields:
Type Number (REQUIRED): An integer in the range 0-32767 inclusive
Description (REQUIRED): short text description of the purpose of
the field
Set Critical Bit (REQUIRED): One of "MUST", "SHOULD", "MAY",
"SHOULD NOT", or "MUST NOT"
Reference (REQUIRED): A reference to a document specifying the
semantics of the record.
The policy for allocation of new entries in this registry SHALL vary
by the Type Number, as follows:
0-1023: Standards Action
1024-16383: Specification Required
16384-32767: Private and Experimental Use
Applications for new entries SHALL specify the contents of the
Description, Set Critical Bit and Reference fields and which of the
above ranges the Type Number should be allocated from. Applicants
MAY request a specific Type Number, and such requests MAY be granted
at the registrar's discretion.
The initial contents of this registry SHALL be as follows:
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+-------------+-----------------------------+----------+------------+
| Field | Description | Critical | Reference |
| Number | | | |
+-------------+-----------------------------+----------+------------+
| 0 | End of message | MUST | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 1 | NTS next protocol | MUST | [[this |
| | negotiation | | memo]] |
| 2 | Error | MUST | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 3 | Warning | MUST | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 4 | AEAD algorithm negotation | MAY | [[this |
| | | | memo]] |
| 5 | New cookie for NTPv4 | SHOULD | [[this |
| | | NOT | memo]] |
| 16384-32767 | Reserved for Private & | MAY | [[this |
| | Experimental Use | | memo]] |
+-------------+-----------------------------+----------+------------+
IANA is requested to create a new registry entitled "Network Time
Security Next Protocols". Entries SHALL have the following fields:
Protocol Name (REQUIRED): a sequence of 16 octets. Shorter
sequences SHALL implicitly be right-padded with null octets
(0x00).
Human-Readable Name (OPTIONAL): if the sequence of octets making
up the protocol name intentionally represent a valid UTF-8
[RFC3629] string, this field SHALL consist of that string.
Reference (RECOMMENDED): a reference to a relevant specification
document. If no relevant document exists, a point-of-contact for
questions regarding the entry SHOULD be listed here in lieu.
Applications for new entries in this registry SHALL specify all
desired fields, and SHALL be granted on a First Come, First Serve
basis. Protocol Names beginning with 0x78 0x2D ("x-") SHALL be
reserved for Private or Experimental Use, and SHALL NOT be
registered. The reserved entry "ptp/2" may be updated or released by
a future Standards Action.
The initial contents of this registry SHALL be as follows:
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+---------------------------+-----------------+---------------------+
| Protocol Name | Human-Readable | Reference |
| | Name | |
+---------------------------+-----------------+---------------------+
| 0x6E 0x74 0x70 0x2F 0x34 | ntp/4 | [[this memo]] |
| 0x70 0x74 0x70 0x2F 0x32 | ptp/2 | Reserved by [[this |
| | | memo]] |
+---------------------------+-----------------+---------------------+
IANA is requested to create two new registries entitled "Network Time
Security Error Codes" and "Network Time Security Warning Codes".
Entries in each SHALL have the following fields:
Number (REQUIRED): a 16-bit unsigned integer
Description (REQUIRED): a short text description of the condition.
Reference (REQUIRED): a reference to a relevant specification
document.
The policy for allocation of new entries in these registries SHALL
vary by their Number, as follows:
0-1023: Standards Action
1024-32767: Specification Required
32768-65535: Private and Experimental Use
The initial contents of the Network Time Security Error Codes
Registry SHALL be as follows:
+--------+---------------------------------+---------------+
| Number | Description | Reference |
+--------+---------------------------------+---------------+
| 0 | Unrecognized Critical Extension | [[this memo]] |
| 1 | Bad Request | [[this memo]] |
+--------+---------------------------------+---------------+
The Network Time Security Warning Codes Registry SHALL initially be
empty.
7. Security Considerations
All security considerations described in
[I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security] have to be taken into account.
The application of NTS to NTP requires the following additional
considerations.
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7.1. Usage of NTP Pools
The certification-based authentication scheme described in
[I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security] is not applicable to the concept
of NTP pools. Therefore, NTS is unable to provide secure usage of
NTP pools.
7.2. Initial Verification of the Server Certificates
The client may wish to verify the validity of certificates during the
initial association phase. Since it generally has no reliable time
during this initial communication phase, it is impossible to verify
the period of validity of the certificates.
7.3. Treatment of Initial Messages
NTP packets which contains extension fields with key exchange
messages do not provide integrity and authenticity protection of the
included time stamps. Therefore these NTP packets MUST NOT be used
for clock synchronization. Otherwise an initial attack on the
client's clock [attacking-ntp] can potentially circumvent the
employed security measures of later messages [delorean].
7.4. DTLS-Related Issues
... TBD
7.5. Delay Attack
In a packet delay attack, an adversary with the ability to act as a
MITM delays time synchronization packets between client and server
asymmetrically [RFC7384]. This prevents the client from accurately
measuring the network delay, and hence its time offset to the server
[Mizrahi]. The delay attack does not modify the content of the
exchanged synchronization packets. Therefore, cryptographic means do
not provide a feasible way to mitigate this attack. However, the
maximum error that an adversary can introduced is bounded by half of
the round trip delay. Also, several non-cryptographic precautions
can be taken in order to detect this attack.
1. Usage of multiple time servers: this enables the client to detect
the attack, provided that the adversary is unable to delay the
synchronization packets between the majority of servers. This
approach is commonly used in NTP to exclude incorrect time
servers [RFC5905].
2. Multiple communication paths: The client and server utilize
different paths for packet exchange as described in the I-D
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[I-D.ietf-tictoc-multi-path-synchronization]. The client can
detect the attack, provided that the adversary is unable to
manipulate the majority of the available paths [Shpiner]. Note
that this approach is not yet available, neither for NTP nor for
PTP.
3. Usage of an encrypted connection: the client exchanges all
packets with the time server over an encrypted connection (e.g.
IPsec). This measure does not mitigate the delay attack, but it
makes it more difficult for the adversary to identify the time
synchronization packets.
4. Introduction of a threshold value for the delay time of the
synchronization packets. The client can discard a time server if
the packet delay time of this time server is larger than the
threshold value.
8. Privacy Considerations
8.1. Confidentiality
The actual time synchronization data in NTP packets does not involve
any information that needs to be kept secret. There also does not
seem to be any necessity to disguise the nature of an NTP
association. This is why content confidentiality is a non-objective
for this document.
8.2. Unlinkability
The scenario that is to be prevented is one where whenever a new
network address is associated with a device (e.g. because said device
moved between different networks), a passive attacker is able to link
said new address with one that was formerly used by the device,
because of recognizable data that the device persistently sends as
part of an NTS-secured NTP association. This is the justification
for continually supplying the client with fresh cookies, so that a
cookie never represents recognizable data in the sense outlined
above.
Note that the objective of NTS regarding unlinkability is merely to
not leak any additional data that would cause linkability. NTS does
not rectify legacy linkability issues that are already present in
NTP. To minimize the risk of being tracked by a passive adversary
the NTP client has to minimize the information it transmits within a
client request (mode 3 packet) as described in the draft "I-D.draft-
dfranke-ntp-data-minimization".
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Also note that normal NTP clients should not act as NTP servers.
Otherwise, an active adversary may be able to abuse the client's
server responses (mode 4 packets) for its tracking. This is done by
[tbd].
9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Richard Barnes, Steven Bellovin,
Sharon Goldberg, Russ Housley, Martin Langer, Miroslav Lichvar,
Aanchal Malhotra, Dave Mills, Danny Mayer, Karen O'Donoghue, Eric K.
Rescorla, Stephen Roettger, Kurt Roeckx, Kyle Rose, Rich Salz, Brian
Sniffen, Susan Sons, Douglas Stebila, Harlan Stenn, Martin Thomson,
and Richard Welty for contributions to this document. on the design
of NTS.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message]
Sibold, D., Teichel, K., Roettger, S., and R. Housley,
"Protecting Network Time Security Messages with the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", draft-ietf-ntp-cms-
for-nts-message-06 (work in progress), February 2016.
[I-D.ietf-ntp-extension-field]
Mizrahi, T. and D. Mayer, "The Network Time Protocol
Version 4 (NTPv4) Extension Fields", draft-ietf-ntp-
extension-field-07 (work in progress), February 2016.
[I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security]
Sibold, D., Roettger, S., and K. Teichel, "Network Time
Security", draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-13 (work
in progress), February 2016.
[I-D.ietf-tictoc-multi-path-synchronization]
Shpiner, A., Tse, R., Schelp, C., and T. Mizrahi, "Multi-
Path Time Synchronization", draft-ietf-tictoc-multi-path-
synchronization-06 (work in progress), October 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394,
September 2002, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3394>.
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[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4082] Perrig, A., Song, D., Canetti, R., Tygar, J., and B.
Briscoe, "Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
Authentication (TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication
Transform Introduction", RFC 4082, DOI 10.17487/RFC4082,
June 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4082>.
[RFC4634] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, DOI 10.17487/RFC4634, July
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4634>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5297] Harkins, D., "Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV)
Authenticated Encryption Using the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)", RFC 5297, DOI 10.17487/RFC5297, October
2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5297>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
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[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[RFC7507] Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[RFC7822] Mizrahi, T. and D. Mayer, "Network Time Protocol Version 4
(NTPv4) Extension Fields", RFC 7822, DOI 10.17487/RFC7822,
March 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7822>.
10.2. Informative References
[attacking-ntp]
"Attacking the Network Time Protocol", October 2015.
[delorean]
"Bypassing HTTP Strict Transport Security", 2014.
[IEC.61588_2009]
IEEE/IEC, "Precision clock synchronization protocol for
networked measurement and control systems",
IEEE 1588-2008(E), IEC 61588:2009(E),
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2009.4839002, February 2009,
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/
opac?punumber=4839000>.
[Mizrahi] Mizrahi, T., "A game theoretic analysis of delay attacks
against time synchronization protocols", in Proceedings
of Precision Clock Synchronization for Measurement Control
and Communication, ISPCS 2012, pp. 1-6, September 2012.
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[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC7384] Mizrahi, T., "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in
Packet Switched Networks", RFC 7384, DOI 10.17487/RFC7384,
October 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7384>.
[RFC7821] Mizrahi, T., "UDP Checksum Complement in the Network Time
Protocol (NTP)", RFC 7821, DOI 10.17487/RFC7821, March
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7821>.
[Shpiner] "Multi-path Time Protocols", in Proceedings of IEEE
International Symposium on Precision Clock Synchronization
for Measurement, Control and Communication (ISPCS),
September 2013.
Appendix A. Flow Diagrams of Client Behaviour
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+------------------------------>o
| |
| v
| +-------------+
| |Key Exchange |
| +------+------+
| |
| o<------------------------------+
| | |
| v |
| +-------------------+ |
| |Time Sync. Messages| |
| +---------+---------+ |
| | |
| v |
| +-----+ |
| |Check| |
| +--+--+ |
| | |
| /------------------+------------------\ |
| v v v |
| .-----------. .-------------. .-------. |
| ( MAC Failure ) ( Nonce Failure ) ( Success ) |
| '-----+-----' '------+------' '---+---' |
| | | | |
| v v v |
| +-------------+ +-------------+ +--------------+ |
| |Discard Data | |Discard Data | |Sync. Process | |
| +-------------+ +------+------+ +------+-------+ |
| | | | |
| | | v |
+-----------+ +------------------>o-----------+
Figure 3: The client's behavior in NTS unicast mode.
Authors' Addresses
Daniel Fox Franke
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
150 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Email: dafranke@akamai.com
URI: https://www.dfranke.us
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Dieter Sibold
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8420
Fax: +49-531-592-698420
Email: dieter.sibold@ptb.de
Kristof Teichel
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
Bundesallee 100
Braunschweig D-38116
Germany
Phone: +49-(0)531-592-8421
Email: kristof.teichel@ptb.de
Franke, et al. Expires May 4, 2017 [Page 33]
