Network Working Group                                      J. Gross, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track                           I. Ganga, Ed.
Expires: April 10, 2019                                            Intel
                                                         T. Sridhar, Ed.
                                                        October 07, 2018

          Geneve: Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation


   Network virtualization involves the cooperation of devices with a
   wide variety of capabilities such as software and hardware tunnel
   endpoints, transit fabrics, and centralized control clusters.  As a
   result of their role in tying together different elements in the
   system, the requirements on tunnels are influenced by all of these
   components.  Flexibility is therefore the most important aspect of a
   tunnel protocol if it is to keep pace with the evolution of the
   system.  This draft describes Geneve, a protocol designed to
   recognize and accommodate these changing capabilities and needs.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 10, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

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   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Design Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Control Plane Independence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Data Plane Extensibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.1.  Efficient Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Use of Standard IP Fabrics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Geneve Encapsulation Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Geneve Packet Format Over IPv4  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Geneve Packet Format Over IPv6  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  UDP Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.4.  Tunnel Header Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.5.  Tunnel Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.5.1.  Options Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  Implementation and Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . .  17
     4.1.  Encapsulation of Geneve in IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.1.1.  IP Fragmentation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.1.2.  DSCP and ECN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.1.3.  Broadcast and Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       4.1.4.  Unidirectional Tunnels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.2.  Constraints on Protocol Features  . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       4.2.1.  Constraints on Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.3.  NIC Offloads  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.4.  Inner VLAN Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   5.  Interoperability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.1.  Data Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       6.1.1.  Inter-data center traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.2.  Data Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.3.  Authentication of NVE peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     6.4.  Multicast/Broadcast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     6.5.  Control plane communications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

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     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29

1.  Introduction

   Networking has long featured a variety of tunneling, tagging, and
   other encapsulation mechanisms.  However, the advent of network
   virtualization has caused a surge of renewed interest and a
   corresponding increase in the introduction of new protocols.  The
   large number of protocols in this space, ranging all the way from
   VLANs [IEEE.802.1Q_2014] and MPLS [RFC3031] through the more recent
   VXLAN [RFC7348], NVGRE [RFC7637], often leads to questions about the
   need for new encapsulation formats and what it is about network
   virtualization in particular that leads to their proliferation.

   While many encapsulation protocols seek to simply partition the
   underlay network or bridge between two domains, network
   virtualization views the transit network as providing connectivity
   between multiple components of a distributed system.  In many ways
   this system is similar to a chassis switch with the IP underlay
   network playing the role of the backplane and tunnel endpoints on the
   edge as line cards.  When viewed in this light, the requirements
   placed on the tunnel protocol are significantly different in terms of
   the quantity of metadata necessary and the role of transit nodes.

   Current work such as VL2 [VL2] and the NVO3 working group
   [I-D.ietf-nvo3-dataplane-requirements] have described some of the
   properties that the data plane must have to support network
   virtualization.  However, one additional defining requirement is the
   need to carry system state along with the packet data.  The use of
   some metadata is certainly not a foreign concept - nearly all
   protocols used for virtualization have at least 24 bits of identifier
   space as a way to partition between tenants.  This is often described
   as overcoming the limits of 12-bit VLANs, and when seen in that
   context, or any context where it is a true tenant identifier, 16
   million possible entries is a large number.  However, the reality is
   that the metadata is not exclusively used to identify tenants and
   encoding other information quickly starts to crowd the space.  In
   fact, when compared to the tags used to exchange metadata between
   line cards on a chassis switch, 24-bit identifiers start to look
   quite small.  There are nearly endless uses for this metadata,
   ranging from storing input ports for simple security policies to
   service based context for interposing advanced middleboxes.

   Existing tunnel protocols have each attempted to solve different
   aspects of these new requirements, only to be quickly rendered out of
   date by changing control plane implementations and advancements.
   Furthermore, software and hardware components and controllers all

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   have different advantages and rates of evolution - a fact that should
   be viewed as a benefit, not a liability or limitation.  This draft
   describes Geneve, a protocol which seeks to avoid these problems by
   providing a framework for tunneling for network virtualization rather
   than being prescriptive about the entire system.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
   only when in ALL CAPS.  Lower case uses of these words are not to be
   interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

1.2.  Terminology

   The NVO3 framework [RFC7365] defines many of the concepts commonly
   used in network virtualization.  In addition, the following terms are
   specifically meaningful in this document:

   Checksum offload.  An optimization implemented by many NICs which
   enables computation and verification of upper layer protocol
   checksums in hardware on transmit and receive, respectively.  This
   typically includes IP and TCP/UDP checksums which would otherwise be
   computed by the protocol stack in software.

   Clos network.  A technique for composing network fabrics larger than
   a single switch while maintaining non-blocking bandwidth across
   connection points.  ECMP is used to divide traffic across the
   multiple links and switches that constitute the fabric.  Sometimes
   termed "leaf and spine" or "fat tree" topologies.

   ECMP.  Equal Cost Multipath.  A routing mechanism for selecting from
   among multiple best next hop paths by hashing packet headers in order
   to better utilize network bandwidth while avoiding reordering a
   single stream.

   Geneve.  Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation.  The tunnel
   protocol described in this draft.

   LRO.  Large Receive Offload.  The receive-side equivalent function of
   LSO, in which multiple protocol segments (primarily TCP) are
   coalesced into larger data units.

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   NIC.  Network Interface Card.  A NIC could be part of a tunnel
   endpoint or transit device and can either process Geneve packets or
   aid in the processing of Geneve packets.

   OAM.  Operations, Administration, and Management.  A suite of tools
   used to monitor and troubleshoot network problems.

   Transit device.  A forwarding element along the path of the tunnel
   making up part of the Underlay Network.  A transit device MAY be
   capable of understanding the Geneve packet format but does not
   originate or terminate Geneve packets.

   LSO.  Large Segmentation Offload.  A function provided by many
   commercial NICs that allows data units larger than the MTU to be
   passed to the NIC to improve performance, the NIC being responsible
   for creating smaller segments of size less than or equal to the MTU
   with correct protocol headers.  When referring specifically to TCP/
   IP, this feature is often known as TSO (TCP Segmentation Offload).

   Tunnel endpoint.  A component performing encapsulation and
   decapsulation of packets, such as Ethernet frames or IP datagrams, in
   Geneve headers.  As the ultimate consumer of any tunnel metadata,
   endpoints have the highest level of requirements for parsing and
   interpreting tunnel headers.  Tunnel endpoints may consist of either
   software or hardware implementations or a combination of the two.
   Endpoints are frequently a component of an NVE but may also be found
   in middleboxes or other elements making up an NVO3 Network.

   VM.  Virtual Machine.

2.  Design Requirements

   Geneve is designed to support network virtualization use cases, where
   tunnels are typically established to act as a backplane between the
   virtual switches residing in hypervisors, physical switches, or
   middleboxes or other appliances.  An arbitrary IP network can be used
   as an underlay although Clos networks composed using ECMP links are a
   common choice to provide consistent bisectional bandwidth across all
   connection points.  Figure 1 shows an example of a hypervisor, top of
   rack switch for connectivity to physical servers, and a WAN uplink
   connected using Geneve tunnels over a simplified Clos network.  These
   tunnels are used to encapsulate and forward frames from the attached
   components such as VMs or physical links.

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     +---------------------+           +-------+  +------+
     | +--+  +-------+---+ |           |Transit|--|Top of|==Physical
     | |VM|--|       |   | | +------+ /|Router |  | Rack |==Servers
     | +--+  |Virtual|NIC|---|Top of|/ +-------+\/+------+
     | +--+  |Switch |   | | | Rack |\ +-------+/\+------+
     | |VM|--|       |   | | +------+ \|Transit|  |Uplink|   WAN
     | +--+  +-------+---+ |           |Router |--|      |=========>
     +---------------------+           +-------+  +------+

                         Switch-Switch Geneve Tunnels

                    Figure 1: Sample Geneve Deployment

   To support the needs of network virtualization, the tunnel protocol
   should be able to take advantage of the differing (and evolving)
   capabilities of each type of device in both the underlay and overlay
   networks.  This results in the following requirements being placed on
   the data plane tunneling protocol:

   o  The data plane is generic and extensible enough to support current
      and future control planes.

   o  Tunnel components are efficiently implementable in both hardware
      and software without restricting capabilities to the lowest common

   o  High performance over existing IP fabrics.

   These requirements are described further in the following

2.1.  Control Plane Independence

   Although some protocols for network virtualization have included a
   control plane as part of the tunnel format specification (most
   notably, the original VXLAN spec prescribed a multicast learning-
   based control plane), these specifications have largely been treated
   as describing only the data format.  The VXLAN packet format has
   actually seen a wide variety of control planes built on top of it.

   There is a clear advantage in settling on a data format: most of the
   protocols are only superficially different and there is little
   advantage in duplicating effort.  However, the same cannot be said of
   control planes, which are diverse in very fundamental ways.  The case
   for standardization is also less clear given the wide variety in
   requirements, goals, and deployment scenarios.

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   As a result of this reality, Geneve aims to be a pure tunnel format
   specification that is capable of fulfilling the needs of many control
   planes by explicitly not selecting any one of them.  This
   simultaneously promotes a shared data format and increases the
   chances that it will not be obsoleted by future control plane

2.2.  Data Plane Extensibility

   Achieving the level of flexibility needed to support current and
   future control planes effectively requires an options infrastructure
   to allow new metadata types to be defined, deployed, and either
   finalized or retired.  Options also allow for differentiation of
   products by encouraging independent development in each vendor's core
   specialty, leading to an overall faster pace of advancement.  By far
   the most common mechanism for implementing options is Type-Length-
   Value (TLV) format.

   It should be noted that while options can be used to support non-
   wirespeed control packets, they are equally important on data packets
   as well to segregate and direct forwarding (for instance, the
   examples given before of input port based security policies and
   service interposition both require tags to be placed on data
   packets).  Therefore, while it would be desirable to limit the
   extensibility to only control packets for the purposes of simplifying
   the datapath, that would not satisfy the design requirements.

2.2.1.  Efficient Implementation

   There is often a conflict between software flexibility and hardware
   performance that is difficult to resolve.  For a given set of
   functionality, it is obviously desirable to maximize performance.
   However, that does not mean new features that cannot be run at that
   speed today should be disallowed.  Therefore, for a protocol to be
   efficiently implementable means that a set of common capabilities can
   be reasonably handled across platforms along with a graceful
   mechanism to handle more advanced features in the appropriate

   The use of a variable length header and options in a protocol often
   raises questions about whether it is truly efficiently implementable
   in hardware.  To answer this question in the context of Geneve, it is
   important to first divide "hardware" into two categories: tunnel
   endpoints and transit devices.

   Endpoints must be able to parse the variable header, including any
   options, and take action.  Since these devices are actively
   participating in the protocol, they are the most affected by Geneve.

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   However, as endpoints are the ultimate consumers of the data,
   transmitters can tailor their output to the capabilities of the
   recipient.  As new functionality becomes sufficiently well defined to
   add to endpoints, supporting options can be designed using ordering
   restrictions and other techniques to ease parsing.

   Transit devices MAY be able to interpret the options, however, as
   non-terminating devices, transit devices do not originate or
   terminate the Geneve packet, hence MUST NOT insert or delete options,
   which is the responsibility of Geneve endpoints.  The participation
   of transit devices in interpreting options is OPTIONAL.

   Further, either tunnel endpoints or transit devices MAY use offload
   capabilities of NICs such as checksum offload to improve the
   performance of Geneve packet processing.  The presence of a Geneve
   variable length header SHOULD NOT prevent the tunnel endpoints and
   transit devices from using such offload capabilities.

2.3.  Use of Standard IP Fabrics

   IP has clearly cemented its place as the dominant transport mechanism
   and many techniques have evolved over time to make it robust,
   efficient, and inexpensive.  As a result, it is natural to use IP
   fabrics as a transit network for Geneve.  Fortunately, the use of IP
   encapsulation and addressing is enough to achieve the primary goal of
   delivering packets to the correct point in the network through
   standard switching and routing.

   In addition, nearly all underlay fabrics are designed to exploit
   parallelism in traffic to spread load across multiple links without
   introducing reordering in individual flows.  These equal cost
   multipathing (ECMP) techniques typically involve parsing and hashing
   the addresses and port numbers from the packet to select an outgoing
   link.  However, the use of tunnels often results in poor ECMP
   performance without additional knowledge of the protocol as the
   encapsulated traffic is hidden from the fabric by design and only
   endpoint addresses are available for hashing.

   Since it is desirable for Geneve to perform well on these existing
   fabrics, it is necessary for entropy from encapsulated packets to be
   exposed in the tunnel header.  The most common technique for this is
   to use the UDP source port, which is discussed further in
   Section 3.3.

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3.  Geneve Encapsulation Details

   The Geneve packet format consists of a compact tunnel header
   encapsulated in UDP over either IPv4 or IPv6.  A small fixed tunnel
   header provides control information plus a base level of
   functionality and interoperability with a focus on simplicity.  This
   header is then followed by a set of variable options to allow for
   future innovation.  Finally, the payload consists of a protocol data
   unit of the indicated type, such as an Ethernet frame.  Section 3.1
   and Section 3.2 illustrate the Geneve packet format transported (for
   example) over Ethernet along with an Ethernet payload.

3.1.  Geneve Packet Format Over IPv4

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   Outer Ethernet Header:
      |                 Outer Destination MAC Address                 |
      | Outer Destination MAC Address |   Outer Source MAC Address    |
      |                   Outer Source MAC Address                    |
      |Optional Ethertype=C-Tag 802.1Q|  Outer VLAN Tag Information   |
      |       Ethertype=0x0800        |

   Outer IPv4 Header:
      |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
      |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
      |  Time to Live |Protocol=17 UDP|         Header Checksum       |
      |                     Outer Source IPv4 Address                 |
      |                   Outer Destination IPv4 Address              |

   Outer UDP Header:
      |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 6081        |
      |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |

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   Geneve Header:
      |Ver|  Opt Len  |O|C|    Rsvd.  |          Protocol Type        |
      |        Virtual Network Identifier (VNI)       |    Reserved   |
      |                    Variable Length Options                    |

   Inner Ethernet Header (example payload):
      |                 Inner Destination MAC Address                 |
      | Inner Destination MAC Address |   Inner Source MAC Address    |
      |                   Inner Source MAC Address                    |
      |Optional Ethertype=C-Tag 802.1Q|  Inner VLAN Tag Information   |

      | Ethertype of Original Payload |                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
      |                                  Original Ethernet Payload    |
      |                                                               |
      | (Note that the original Ethernet Frame's FCS is not included) |

   Frame Check Sequence:
      |   New FCS (Frame Check Sequence) for Outer Ethernet Frame     |

3.2.  Geneve Packet Format Over IPv6

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   Outer Ethernet Header:
      |                 Outer Destination MAC Address                 |
      | Outer Destination MAC Address |   Outer Source MAC Address    |
      |                   Outer Source MAC Address                    |
      |Optional Ethertype=C-Tag 802.1Q|  Outer VLAN Tag Information   |

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      |       Ethertype=0x86DD        |

   Outer IPv6 Header:
      |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
      |         Payload Length        | NxtHdr=17 UDP |   Hop Limit   |
      |                                                               |
      +                                                               +
      |                                                               |
      +                     Outer Source IPv6 Address                 +
      |                                                               |
      +                                                               +
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      +                                                               +
      |                                                               |
      +                  Outer Destination IPv6 Address               +
      |                                                               |
      +                                                               +
      |                                                               |

   Outer UDP Header:
      |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 6081        |
      |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |

   Geneve Header:
      |Ver|  Opt Len  |O|C|    Rsvd.  |          Protocol Type        |
      |        Virtual Network Identifier (VNI)       |    Reserved   |
      |                    Variable Length Options                    |

   Inner Ethernet Header (example payload):
      |                 Inner Destination MAC Address                 |
      | Inner Destination MAC Address |   Inner Source MAC Address    |

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      |                   Inner Source MAC Address                    |
      |Optional Ethertype=C-Tag 802.1Q|  Inner VLAN Tag Information   |

      | Ethertype of Original Payload |                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
      |                                  Original Ethernet Payload    |
      |                                                               |
      | (Note that the original Ethernet Frame's FCS is not included) |

   Frame Check Sequence:
      |   New FCS (Frame Check Sequence) for Outer Ethernet Frame     |

3.3.  UDP Header

   The use of an encapsulating UDP [RFC0768] header follows the
   connectionless semantics of Ethernet and IP in addition to providing
   entropy to routers performing ECMP.  The header fields are therefore
   interpreted as follows:

   Source port:  A source port selected by the originating tunnel
      endpoint.  This source port SHOULD be the same for all packets
      belonging to a single encapsulated flow to prevent reordering due
      to the use of different paths.  To encourage an even distribution
      of flows across multiple links, the source port SHOULD be
      calculated using a hash of the encapsulated packet headers using,
      for example, a traditional 5-tuple.  Since the port represents a
      flow identifier rather than a true UDP connection, the entire
      16-bit range MAY be used to maximize entropy.

   Dest port:  IANA has assigned port 6081 as the fixed well-known
      destination port for Geneve.  Although the well-known value should
      be used by default, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations make
      this configurable.  The chosen port is used for identification of
      Geneve packets and MUST NOT be reversed for different ends of a
      connection as is done with TCP.

   UDP length:  The length of the UDP packet including the UDP header.

   UDP checksum:  The checksum MAY be set to zero on transmit for

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      packets encapsulated in both IPv4 and IPv6 [RFC6935].  When a
      packet is received with a UDP checksum of zero it MUST be accepted
      and decapsulated.  If the originating tunnel endpoint optionally
      encapsulates a packet with a non-zero checksum, it MUST be a
      correctly computed UDP checksum.  Upon receiving such a packet,
      the egress endpoint MUST validate the checksum.  If the checksum
      is not correct, the packet MUST be dropped, otherwise the packet
      MUST be accepted for decapsulation.  It is RECOMMENDED that the
      UDP checksum be computed to protect the Geneve header and options
      in situations where the network reliability is not high and the
      packet is not protected by another checksum or CRC.

3.4.  Tunnel Header Fields

   Ver (2 bits):  The current version number is 0.  Packets received by
      an endpoint with an unknown version MUST be dropped.  Non-
      terminating devices processing Geneve packets with an unknown
      version number MUST treat them as UDP packets with an unknown

   Opt Len (6 bits):  The length of the options fields, expressed in
      four byte multiples, not including the eight byte fixed tunnel
      header.  This results in a minimum total Geneve header size of 8
      bytes and a maximum of 260 bytes.  The start of the payload
      headers can be found using this offset from the end of the base
      Geneve header.

   O (1 bit):  OAM packet.  This packet contains a control message
      instead of a data payload.  Control messages are sent between
      Geneve endpoints.  Endpoints MUST NOT forward the payload and
      transit devices MUST NOT attempt to interpret or process it.
      Since these are infrequent control messages, it is RECOMMENDED
      that endpoints direct these packets to a high priority control
      queue (for example, to direct the packet to a general purpose CPU
      from a forwarding ASIC or to separate out control traffic on a
      NIC).  Transit devices MUST NOT alter forwarding behavior on the
      basis of this bit, such as ECMP link selection.

   C (1 bit):  Critical options present.  One or more options has the
      critical bit set (see Section 3.5).  If this bit is set then
      tunnel endpoints MUST parse the options list to interpret any
      critical options.  On endpoints where option parsing is not
      supported the packet MUST be dropped on the basis of the 'C' bit
      in the base header.  If the bit is not set tunnel endpoints MAY
      strip all options using 'Opt Len' and forward the decapsulated
      packet.  Transit devices MUST NOT drop packets on the basis of
      this bit.

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      The critical bit allows hardware implementations the flexibility
      to handle options processing in the hardware fastpath or in the
      exception (slow) path without the need to process all the options.
      For example, a critical option such as secure hash to provide
      Geneve header integrity check must be processed by tunnel
      endpoints and typically processed in the hardware fastpath.

   Rsvd. (6 bits):  Reserved field which MUST be zero on transmission
      and ignored on receipt.

   Protocol Type (16 bits):  The type of the protocol data unit
      appearing after the Geneve header.  This follows the EtherType
      [ETYPES] convention with Ethernet itself being represented by the
      value 0x6558.

   Virtual Network Identifier (VNI) (24 bits):  An identifier for a
      unique element of a virtual network.  In many situations this may
      represent an L2 segment, however, the control plane defines the
      forwarding semantics of decapsulated packets.  The VNI MAY be used
      as part of ECMP forwarding decisions or MAY be used as a mechanism
      to distinguish between overlapping address spaces contained in the
      encapsulated packet when load balancing across CPUs.

   Reserved (8 bits):  Reserved field which MUST be zero on transmission
      and ignored on receipt.

   Transit devices MUST maintain consistent forwarding behavior
   irrespective of the value of 'Opt Len', including ECMP link
   selection.  These devices SHOULD be able to forward packets
   containing options without resorting to a slow path.

3.5.  Tunnel Options

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   |          Option Class         |      Type     |R|R|R| Length  |
   |                      Variable Option Data                     |

                               Geneve Option

   The base Geneve header is followed by zero or more options in Type-
   Length-Value format.  Each option consists of a four byte option
   header and a variable amount of option data interpreted according to
   the type.

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   Option Class (16 bits):  Namespace for the 'Type' field.  IANA will
      be requested to create a "Geneve Option Class" registry to
      allocate identifiers for organizations, technologies, and vendors
      that have an interest in creating types for options.  Each
      organization may allocate types independently to allow
      experimentation and rapid innovation.  It is expected that over
      time certain options will become well known and a given
      implementation may use option types from a variety of sources.  In
      addition, IANA will be requested to reserve specific ranges for
      standardized and experimental options.

   Type (8 bits):  Type indicating the format of the data contained in
      this option.  Options are primarily designed to encourage future
      extensibility and innovation and so standardized forms of these
      options will be defined in a separate document.

      The high order bit of the option type indicates that this is a
      critical option.  If the receiving endpoint does not recognize
      this option and this bit is set then the packet MUST be dropped.
      If the critical bit is set in any option then the 'C' bit in the
      Geneve base header MUST also be set.  Transit devices MUST NOT
      drop packets on the basis of this bit.  The following figure shows
      the location of the 'C' bit in the 'Type' field:

      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
      |C|    Type     |

      The requirement to drop a packet with an unknown critical option
      applies to the entire tunnel endpoint system and not a particular
      component of the implementation.  For example, in a system
      comprised of a forwarding ASIC and a general purpose CPU, this
      does not mean that the packet must be dropped in the ASIC.  An
      implementation may send the packet to the CPU using a rate-limited
      control channel for slow-path exception handling.

   R (3 bits):  Option control flags reserved for future use.  MUST be
      zero on transmission and ignored on receipt.

   Length (5 bits):  Length of the option, expressed in four byte
      multiples excluding the option header.  The total length of each
      option may be between 4 and 128 bytes.  A value of 0 in the Length
      field implies an option with only the option header without the
      variable option data.  Packets in which the total length of all
      options is not equal to the 'Opt Len' in the base header are
      invalid and MUST be silently dropped if received by an endpoint.

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   Variable Option Data:  Option data interpreted according to 'Type'.

3.5.1.  Options Processing

   Geneve options are intended to be originated and processed by tunnel
   endpoints.  However, options MAY be interpreted by transit devices
   along the tunnel path.  Transit devices not processing Geneve headers
   SHOULD process Geneve packets as any other UDP packet and maintain
   consistent forwarding behavior.

   In tunnel endpoints, the generation and interpretation of options is
   determined by the control plane, which is out of the scope of this
   document.  However, to ensure interoperability between heterogeneous
   devices some requirements are imposed on options and the devices that
   process them:

   o  Receiving endpoints MUST drop packets containing unknown options
      with the 'C' bit set in the option type.  Conversely, transit
      devices MUST NOT drop packets as a result of encountering unknown
      options, including those with the 'C' bit set.

   o  Some options may be defined in such a way that the position in the
      option list is significant.  Options or their ordering, MUST NOT
      be changed by transit devices.

   o  An option MUST NOT affect the parsing or interpretation of any
      other option.

   When designing a Geneve option, it is important to consider how the
   option will evolve in the future.  Once an option is defined it is
   reasonable to expect that implementations may come to depend on a
   specific behavior.  As a result, the scope of any future changes must
   be carefully described upfront.

   Unexpectedly significant interoperability issues may result from
   changing the length of an option that was defined to be a certain
   size.  A particular option is specified to have either a fixed
   length, which is constant, or a variable length, which may change
   over time or for different use cases.  This property is part of the
   definition of the option and conveyed by the 'Type'.  For fixed
   length options, some implementations may choose to ignore the length
   field in the option header and instead parse based on the well known
   length associated with the type.  In this case, redefining the length
   will impact not only parsing of the option in question but also any
   options that follow.  Therefore, options that are defined to be fixed
   length in size MUST NOT be redefined to a different length.  Instead,
   a new 'Type' should be allocated.

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4.  Implementation and Deployment Considerations

4.1.  Encapsulation of Geneve in IP

   As an IP-based tunnel protocol, Geneve shares many properties and
   techniques with existing protocols.  The application of some of these
   are described in further detail, although in general most concepts
   applicable to the IP layer or to IP tunnels generally also function
   in the context of Geneve.

4.1.1.  IP Fragmentation

   To prevent fragmentation and maximize performance, the best practice
   when using Geneve is to ensure that the MTU of the physical network
   is greater than or equal to the MTU of the encapsulated network plus
   tunnel headers.  Manual or upper layer (such as TCP MSS clamping)
   configuration can be used to ensure that fragmentation never takes
   place, however, in some situations this may not be feasible.

   It is strongly RECOMMENDED that Path MTU Discovery ([RFC1191],
   [RFC1981]) be used by setting the DF bit in the IP header when Geneve
   packets are transmitted over IPv4 (this is the default with IPv6).
   The use of Path MTU Discovery on the transit network provides the
   encapsulating endpoint with soft-state about the link that it may use
   to prevent or minimize fragmentation depending on its role in the
   virtualized network.  For example, recommendations/guidance for
   handling fragmenation in similar overlay encapsulation services like
   PWE3 are provided in section 5.3 of [RFC3985].

   Note that some implementations may not be capable of supporting
   fragmentation or other less common features of the IP header, such as
   options and extension headers.

4.1.2.  DSCP and ECN

   When encapsulating IP (including over Ethernet) packets in Geneve,
   there are several considerations for propagating DSCP and ECN bits
   from the inner header to the tunnel on transmission and the reverse
   on reception.

   [RFC2983] provides guidance for mapping DSCP between inner and outer
   IP headers.  Network virtualization is typically more closely aligned
   with the Pipe model described, where the DSCP value on the tunnel
   header is set based on a policy (which may be a fixed value, one
   based on the inner traffic class, or some other mechanism for
   grouping traffic).  Aspects of the Uniform model (which treats the
   inner and outer DSCP value as a single field by copying on ingress
   and egress) may also apply, such as the ability to remark the inner

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   header on tunnel egress based on transit marking.  However, the
   Uniform model is not conceptually consistent with network
   virtualization, which seeks to provide strong isolation between
   encapsulated traffic and the physical network.

   [RFC6040] describes the mechanism for exposing ECN capabilities on IP
   tunnels and propagating congestion markers to the inner packets.
   This behavior MUST be followed for IP packets encapsulated in Geneve.

4.1.3.  Broadcast and Multicast

   Geneve tunnels may either be point-to-point unicast between two
   endpoints or may utilize broadcast or multicast addressing.  It is
   not required that inner and outer addressing match in this respect.
   For example, in physical networks that do not support multicast,
   encapsulated multicast traffic may be replicated into multiple
   unicast tunnels or forwarded by policy to a unicast location
   (possibly to be replicated there).

   With physical networks that do support multicast it may be desirable
   to use this capability to take advantage of hardware replication for
   encapsulated packets.  In this case, multicast addresses may be
   allocated in the physical network corresponding to tenants,
   encapsulated multicast groups, or some other factor.  The allocation
   of these groups is a component of the control plane and therefore
   outside of the scope of this document.  When physical multicast is in
   use, the 'C' bit in the Geneve header may be used with groups of
   devices with heterogeneous capabilities as each device can interpret
   only the options that are significant to it if they are not critical.

4.1.4.  Unidirectional Tunnels

   Generally speaking, a Geneve tunnel is a unidirectional concept.  IP
   is not a connection oriented protocol and it is possible for two
   endpoints to communicate with each other using different paths or to
   have one side not transmit anything at all.  As Geneve is an IP-based
   protocol, the tunnel layer inherits these same characteristics.

   It is possible for a tunnel to encapsulate a protocol, such as TCP,
   which is connection oriented and maintains session state at that
   layer.  In addition, implementations MAY model Geneve tunnels as
   connected, bidirectional links, such as to provide the abstraction of
   a virtual port.  In both of these cases, bidirectionality of the
   tunnel is handled at a higher layer and does not affect the operation
   of Geneve itself.

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4.2.  Constraints on Protocol Features

   Geneve is intended to be flexible to a wide range of current and
   future applications.  As a result, certain constraints may be placed
   on the use of metadata or other aspects of the protocol in order to
   optimize for a particular use case.  For example, some applications
   may limit the types of options which are supported or enforce a
   maximum number or length of options.  Other applications may only
   handle certain encapsulated payload types, such as Ethernet or IP.
   This could be either globally throughout the system or, for example,
   restricted to certain classes of devices or network paths.

   These constraints may be communicated to tunnel endpoints either
   explicitly through a control plane or implicitly by the nature of the
   application.  As Geneve is defined as a data plane protocol that is
   control plane agnostic, the exact mechanism is not defined in this

4.2.1.  Constraints on Options

   While Geneve options are more flexible, a control plane may restrict
   the number of option TLVs as well as the order and size of the TLVs,
   between tunnel endpoints, to make it simpler for a data plane
   implementation in software or hardware to handle
   [I-D.ietf-nvo3-encap].  For example, there may be some critical
   information such as a secure hash that must be processed in a certain
   order to provide lowest latency.

   A control plane may negotiate a subset of option TLVs and certain TLV
   ordering, as well may limit the total number of option TLVs present
   in the packet, for example, to accommodate hardware capable of
   processing fewer options [I-D.ietf-nvo3-encap].  Hence, a control
   plane needs to have the ability to describe the supported TLVs subset
   and their order to the tunnel end points.  In the absence of a
   control plane, alternative configuration mechanisms may be used for
   this purpose.  The exact mechanism is not defined in this document.

4.3.  NIC Offloads

   Modern NICs currently provide a variety of offloads to enable the
   efficient processing of packets.  The implementation of many of these
   offloads requires only that the encapsulated packet be easily parsed
   (for example, checksum offload).  However, optimizations such as LSO
   and LRO involve some processing of the options themselves since they
   must be replicated/merged across multiple packets.  In these
   situations, it is desirable to not require changes to the offload
   logic to handle the introduction of new options.  To enable this,

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   some constraints are placed on the definitions of options to allow
   for simple processing rules:

   o  When performing LSO, a NIC MUST replicate the entire Geneve header
      and all options, including those unknown to the device, onto each
      resulting segment.  However, a given option definition may
      override this rule and specify different behavior in supporting
      devices.  Conversely, when performing LRO, a NIC MAY assume that a
      binary comparison of the options (including unknown options) is
      sufficient to ensure equality and MAY merge packets with equal
      Geneve headers.

   o  Options MUST NOT be reordered during the course of offload
      processing, including when merging packets for the purpose of LRO.

   o  NICs performing offloads MUST NOT drop packets with unknown
      options, including those marked as critical.

   There is no requirement that a given implementation of Geneve employ
   the offloads listed as examples above.  However, as these offloads
   are currently widely deployed in commercially available NICs, the
   rules described here are intended to enable efficient handling of
   current and future options across a variety of devices.

4.4.  Inner VLAN Handling

   Geneve is capable of encapsulating a wide range of protocols and
   therefore a given implementation is likely to support only a small
   subset of the possibilities.  However, as Ethernet is expected to be
   widely deployed, it is useful to describe the behavior of VLANs
   inside encapsulated Ethernet frames.

   As with any protocol, support for inner VLAN headers is OPTIONAL.  In
   many cases, the use of encapsulated VLANs may be disallowed due to
   security or implementation considerations.  However, in other cases
   trunking of VLAN frames across a Geneve tunnel can prove useful.  As
   a result, the processing of inner VLAN tags upon ingress or egress
   from a tunnel endpoint is based upon the configuration of the
   endpoint and/or control plane and not explicitly defined as part of
   the data format.

5.  Interoperability Issues

   Viewed exclusively from the data plane, Geneve does not introduce any
   interoperability issues as it appears to most devices as UDP packets.
   However, as there are already a number of tunnel protocols deployed
   in network virtualization environments, there is a practical question
   of transition and coexistence.

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   Since Geneve is a superset of the functionality of the most common
   protocols used for network virtualization (VXLAN, NVGRE ) it should
   be straightforward to port an existing control plane to run on top of
   it with minimal effort.  With both the old and new packet formats
   supporting the same set of capabilities, there is no need for a hard
   transition - endpoints directly communicating with each other use any
   common protocol, which may be different even within a single overall
   system.  As transit devices are primarily forwarding packets on the
   basis of the IP header, all protocols appear similar and these
   devices do not introduce additional interoperability concerns.

   To assist with this transition, it is strongly suggested that
   implementations support simultaneous operation of both Geneve and
   existing tunnel protocols as it is expected to be common for a single
   node to communicate with a mixture of other nodes.  Eventually, older
   protocols may be phased out as they are no longer in use.

6.  Security Considerations

   As encapsulated within an UDP/IP packet, Geneve does not have any
   inherent security mechanisms.  As a result, an attacker with access
   to the underlay network transporting the IP packets has the ability
   to snoop or inject packets.  Legitimate but malicious tunnel
   endpoints may also spoof identifiers in the tunnel header to gain
   access to networks owned by other tenants.

   Within a particular security domain, such as a data center operated
   by a single service provider, the most common and highest performing
   security mechanism is isolation of trusted components.  Tunnel
   traffic can be carried over a separate VLAN and filtered at any
   untrusted boundaries.  In addition, tunnel endpoints should only be
   operated in environments controlled by the service provider, such as
   the hypervisor itself rather than within a customer VM.

   When crossing an untrusted link, such as the public Internet, IPsec
   [RFC4301] may be used to provide authentication and/or encryption of
   the IP packets formed as part of Geneve encapsulation.

   Geneve does not otherwise affect the security of the encapsulated
   packets.  As per the guidelines of BCP72 [RFC3552], the following
   sections describe potential security risks that may be applicable to
   Geneve deployments and approaches to mitigate such risks.  It is also
   noted that not all such risks are applicable to all Geneve deployment
   scenarios, i.e., only a subset may be applicable to certain
   deployments.  So an operator has to make an assessment based on their
   network environment and determine the risks that are applicable to
   their specific environment and use appropriate mitigation approaches
   as applicable.

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6.1.  Data Confidentiality

   Geneve is a network virtualization overlay encapsulation protocol
   designed to establish tunnels between network virtualization end
   points (NVE) over an existing IP network.  It can be used to deploy
   multi-tenant overlay networks over an existing IP underlay network in
   a public or private data center.  The overlay service is typically
   provided by a service provider, for example a cloud services provider
   or a private data center operator.  Due to the nature of multi-
   tenancy in such environments, a tenant system may expect data
   confidentiality to ensure its packet data is not tampered with
   (active attack) in transit or a target of unauthorized monitoring
   (passive attack).  A tenant may expect the overlay service provider
   to provide data confidentiality as part of the service or a tenant
   may bring its own data confidentiality mechanisms like IPsec or TLS
   to protect the data end to end between its tenant systems.

   If an operator determines data confidentiality is necessary in their
   environment based on their risk analysis, for example as in multi-
   tenant environments, then an encryption mechanism SHOULD be used to
   encrypt the tenant data end to end between the NVEs.  The NVEs may
   use existing well established encryption mechanisms such as IPsec,
   DTLs, etc., The operator may choose not to enable the encryption if,
   for example, the packet data is already encrypted by the tenant

6.1.1.  Inter-data center traffic

   A tenant system in a customer premises (private data center) may want
   to connect to tenant systems on their tenant overlay network in a
   public cloud data center or a tenant may want to have its tenant
   systems located in multiple geographically separated data centers for
   high availability.  Geneve data traffic between tenant systems across
   such separated networks should be protected from threats when
   traversing public networks.  Any Geneve overlay data leaving the data
   center network beyond the operator's security domain, for example
   over the public Internet, SHOULD be secured by encryption mechanisms
   such as IPsec or other VPN mechanisms to protect the communications
   between the NVEs when they are geographically separated over
   untrusted network links.  Implementation of specific data protection
   mechanisms employed between data centers is beyond the scope of this

6.2.  Data Integrity

   Geneve encapsulation is used between NVEs to establish overlay
   tunnels over an existing IP underlay network.  In a multi-tenant data
   center, a rogue or compromised tenant system may try to launch a

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   passive attack such as monitoring the traffic of other tenants, or an
   active attack such as spoofing or trying to inject unauthorized
   Geneve encapsulated traffic into the network.  To prevent such
   attacks, an NVE MUST not propagate Geneve packets beyond the NVE to
   tenant systems and SHOULD employ packet filtering mechanisms so as
   not to forward unauthorized traffic between TSs in different tenant

   A compromised network node or a transit device within a data center
   may launch an active attack trying to tamper with the Geneve packet
   data between NVEs.  Malicious tampering of Geneve header fields may
   cause the packet from one tenant to be forwarded to a different
   tenant network.  If an operator determines the possibility of such
   threat in their environment, the operator may choose to employ data
   integrity mechanisms between NVEs.  In order to prevent such risks, a
   data integrity mechanism SHOULD be used in such environments to
   protect the integrity of Geneve packets including packet headers,
   options and payload on communications between NVE pairs.  A
   cryptographic data protection mechanism such as IPsec may be used to
   provide data integrity protection.  A data center operator may choose
   to deploy any other data integrity mechanisms as applicable and
   supported in their underlay networks.

   Geneve supports Geneve Options, so an operator may choose to use a
   Geneve option TLV to provide a cryptographic data protection
   mechanism, to verify the data integrity of the Geneve header, Geneve
   options or the entire Geneve packet including the payload.
   Implementation of such a mechanism is beyond the scope of this

6.3.  Authentication of NVE peers

   A rogue network device or a compromised NVE in a data center
   environment might be able to spoof Geneve packets as if it came from
   a legitimate NVE.  In order to mitigate such a risk, an operator
   SHOULD use an Authentication mechanism, such as IPsec to ensure that
   the Geneve packet originated from the intended NVE peer, in
   environments where the operator determines spoofing or rogue devices
   is a potential threat.  Other simpler source checks such as ingress
   filtering for VLAN/MAC/IP address, reverse path forwarding checks,
   etc., may be used in certain trusted environments to ensure Geneve
   packets originated from the intended NVE peer.

6.4.  Multicast/Broadcast

   In typical data center networks where IP multicasting is not
   supported in the underlay network, multicasting may be supported
   using multiple unicast tunnels.  The same security requirements as

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   described in the above sections can be used to protect Geneve
   communications between NVE peers.  If IP multicasting is supported in
   the underlay network and the operator chooses to use it for multicast
   traffic among Geneve endpoints, then the operator in such
   environments may use data protection mechanisms such as IPsec with
   Multicast extensions [RFC5374] to protect multicast traffic among
   Geneve NVE groups.

6.5.  Control plane communications

   A Network Virtualization Authority (NVA) as outlined in [RFC8014] may
   be used as a control plane for configuring and managing the Geneve
   NVEs.  The data center operator is expected to use security
   mechanisms to protect the communications between the NVA to NVEs and
   use authentication mechanisms to detect any rogue or compromised NVEs
   within their administrative domain.  Data protection mechanisms for
   control plane communication or authentication mechanisms between the
   NVA and the NVEs is beyond the scope of this document.

7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has allocated UDP port 6081 as the well-known destination port
   for Geneve.  Upon publication, the registry should be updated to cite
   this document.  The original request was:

   Service Name: geneve
   Transport Protocol(s): UDP
   Assignee: Jesse Gross <>
   Contact: Jesse Gross <>
   Description: Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation (Geneve)
   Reference: This document
   Port Number: 6081

   In addition, IANA is requested to create a "Geneve Option Class"
   registry to allocate Option Classes.  This shall be a registry of
   16-bit hexadecimal values along with descriptive strings.  The
   identifiers 0x0-0xFF are to be reserved for standardized options for
   allocation by IETF Review [RFC5226] and 0xFFF0-0xFFFF for
   Experimental Use. Otherwise, identifiers are to be assigned to any
   organization with an interest in creating Geneve options on a First
   Come First Served basis.  The registry is to be populated with the
   following initial values:

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         | Option Class   | Description                          |
         | 0x0000..0x00FF | Unassigned - IETF Review             |
         | 0x0100         | Linux                                |
         | 0x0101         | Open vSwitch                         |
         | 0x0102         | Open Virtual Networking (OVN)        |
         | 0x0103         | In-band Network Telemetry (INT)      |
         | 0x0104         | VMware                               |
         | 0x0105         | Amazon                               |
         | 0x0106         | Cisco                                |
         | 0x0107..0xFFEF | Unassigned - First Come First Served |
         | 0xFFF0..FFFF   | Experimental                         |

8.  Contributors

   The following individuals were authors of an earlier version of this
   document and made significant contributions:

   Pankaj Garg
   Microsoft Corporation
   1 Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052


   Chris Wright
   Red Hat Inc.
   1801 Varsity Drive
   Raleigh, NC  27606


   Puneet Agarwal
   Innovium, Inc.
   6001 America Center Drive
   San Jose, CA  95002


   Kenneth Duda
   Arista Networks
   5453 Great America Parkway
   Santa Clara, CA  95054

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   Dinesh G. Dutt
   Cumulus Networks
   140C S. Whisman Road
   Mountain View, CA  94041


   Jon Hudson


   Ariel Hendel
   Facebook, Inc.
   1 Hacker Way
   Menlo Park, CA  94025


9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Martin Casado, Bruce Davie and Dave Thaler
   for their input, feedback, and helpful suggestions.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0768]  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,

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10.2.  Informative References

   [ETYPES]   The IEEE Registration Authority, "IEEE 802 Numbers", 2013,

              Bitar, N., Lasserre, M., Balus, F., Morin, T., Jin, L.,
              and B. Khasnabish, "NVO3 Data Plane Requirements", draft-
              ietf-nvo3-dataplane-requirements-03 (work in progress),
              April 2014.

              Boutros, S., Ganga, I., Garg, P., Manur, R., Mizrahi, T.,
              Mozes, D., Nordmark, E., Smith, M., Aldrin, S., and I.
              Bagdonas, "NVO3 Encapsulation Considerations", draft-ietf-
              nvo3-encap-01 (work in progress), October 2017.

              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks--Bridges and Bridged Networks", IEEE 802.1Q-2014,
              DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2014.6991462, December 2014,

   [RFC1191]  Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,

   [RFC1981]  McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
              for IP version 6", RFC 1981, DOI 10.17487/RFC1981, August
              1996, <>.

   [RFC2983]  Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels",
              RFC 2983, DOI 10.17487/RFC2983, October 2000,

   [RFC3031]  Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon, "Multiprotocol
              Label Switching Architecture", RFC 3031,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3031, January 2001,

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,

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   [RFC3985]  Bryant, S., Ed. and P. Pate, Ed., "Pseudo Wire Emulation
              Edge-to-Edge (PWE3) Architecture", RFC 3985,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3985, March 2005,

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005, <>.

   [RFC5374]  Weis, B., Gross, G., and D. Ignjatic, "Multicast
              Extensions to the Security Architecture for the Internet
              Protocol", RFC 5374, DOI 10.17487/RFC5374, November 2008,

   [RFC6040]  Briscoe, B., "Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion
              Notification", RFC 6040, DOI 10.17487/RFC6040, November
              2010, <>.

   [RFC6935]  Eubanks, M., Chimento, P., and M. Westerlund, "IPv6 and
              UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets", RFC 6935,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6935, April 2013,

   [RFC7348]  Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
              L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "Virtual
              eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for
              Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3
              Networks", RFC 7348, DOI 10.17487/RFC7348, August 2014,

   [RFC7365]  Lasserre, M., Balus, F., Morin, T., Bitar, N., and Y.
              Rekhter, "Framework for Data Center (DC) Network
              Virtualization", RFC 7365, DOI 10.17487/RFC7365, October
              2014, <>.

   [RFC7637]  Garg, P., Ed. and Y. Wang, Ed., "NVGRE: Network
              Virtualization Using Generic Routing Encapsulation",
              RFC 7637, DOI 10.17487/RFC7637, September 2015,

   [RFC8014]  Black, D., Hudson, J., Kreeger, L., Lasserre, M., and T.
              Narten, "An Architecture for Data-Center Network
              Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3)", RFC 8014,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8014, December 2016,

Gross, et al.            Expires April 10, 2019                [Page 28]

Internet-Draft               Geneve Protocol                October 2018

   [VL2]      Greenberg, A., et al., "VL2: A Scalable and Flexible Data
              Center Network", ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
              Review, DOI 10.1145/1594977.1592576, 2009,

Authors' Addresses

   Jesse Gross (editor)


   Ilango Ganga (editor)
   Intel Corporation
   2200 Mission College Blvd.
   Santa Clara, CA  95054


   T. Sridhar (editor)
   VMware, Inc.
   3401 Hillview Ave.
   Palo Alto, CA  94304


Gross, et al.            Expires April 10, 2019                [Page 29]