Network Working Group S. Hartman
Internet-Draft Painless Security
Intended status: Experimental D. Zhang
Expires: April 25, 2014 Huawei
M. Wasserman
Painless Security
October 22, 2013
Security Requirements of NVO3
draft-ietf-nvo3-security-requirements-01
Abstract
The draft provides a list of security requirements to benefit the
design of NOV3 security mechanisms. In addition, this draft
introduces the candidate techniques which could be used to fulfill
such security requirements.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. NVO3 Overlay Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Outsider Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Insider Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Security Issues In Scope and Out of Scope . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Requirements and Candidate Approaches . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Control/Data Traffic within Overlay . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.1. Control Plane Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.2. Data Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Control/Data Traffic between NVEs and Hypervisors . . . . 10
5.2.1. Distributed Deployment of NVE and Hypervisor . . . . 11
5.3. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
Security is a key issue which needs to be considered in the design of
a data center network. This document discusses the security risks
that a NVO3 network may encounter and the security requirements that
a NVO3 network needs to fulfill. In addition, this draft attempts to
discuss the security techniques which could be applied to fulfill
such requirements.
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The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the terms used in this memo. Section 3 gives a briefly
introduction of the NVO3 network architecture. Section 4 discusses
the attack model of this work. Section 5 describes the essential
security requirements which should be fulfilled in the generation of
a NVO3 network.
2. Terminology
This document uses the same terminology as found in the NVO3
Framework document [I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework] and
[I-D.kreeger-nvo3-hypervisor-nve-cp]. Some of the terms defined in
the framework document have been repeated in this section for the
convenience of the reader, along with additional terminology that is
used by this document.
Tenant System (TS): A physical or virtual system that can play the
role of a host, or a forwarding element such as a router, switch,
firewall, etc. It belongs to a single tenant and connects to one or
more VNs of that tenant.
End System (ES): An end system of a tenant, which can be, e.g., a
virtual machine(VM), a non-virtualized server, or a physical
appliance. A TS is attached to a Network Virtualization Edge(NVE)
node.
Network Virtualization Edge (NVE): An NVE implements network
virtualization functions that allow for L2/L3 tenant separation and
tenant-related control plane activity. An NVE contains one or more
tenant service instances whereby a TS interfaces with its associated
instance. The NVE also provides tunneling overlay functions.
Virtual Network (VN): This is a virtual L2 or L3 domain that belongs
to a tenant.
Network Virtualization Authority (NVA). A back-end system that is
responsible for distributing and maintaining the mapping information
for the entire overlay system. Note that the WG never reached
consensus on what to call this architectural entity within the
overlay system, so this term is subject to change.
NVO3 device: In this memo, the devices (e.g., NVE and NVA) work
cooperatively to provide NVO3 overlay functionalities are called as
NOV3 devices.
3. NVO3 Overlay Architecture
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..................................
. .
. .
. .
+-+--+ +--+-++--------+
+--------+ | NV | | NV || Tenant |
| Tenant +------+Edge| L3 Overlay |Edge|| System |
| System | +-+--+ Network +--+-++--------+
+--------+ . .
. .
. .
..................................
This figure illustrates a simple nov3 overlay example where NVEs
provide a logical L2/L3 interconnect for the TSes that belong to a
specific tenant network over L3 networks. A packet from a tenant
system is encapsulated when they reach the egress NVE. Then
encapsulated packet is then sent to the remote NVE through a proper
tunnel. When reaching the ingress NVE, the packet is decapsulated
and forwarded to the target tenant system. The address
advertisements and tunnel mappings are distributed among the NVEs
through either distributed control protocols or by certain
centralized servers (called NVAs).
4. Threat Model
To benefit the discussion, in this analysis work, attacks are
classified into two categories: inside attacks and outside attacks.
An attack is considered as an inside attack if the adversary
performing the attack (inside attacker or insider) has got certain
privileges in changing the configuration or software of a NVO3 device
and initiates the attack within the overlay security perimeter. In
contrast, an attack is referred to as an outside attack if the
adversary performing the attack (outside attacker or outsider) has no
such privilege and can only initiate the attacks from compromised
TSes (or the network devices of the underlying network which the
overlay is located upon). Note that in a complex attack inside and
outside attacking operations may be performed in a well organized way
to expand the damages caused by the attack.
4.1. Outsider Capabilities
The following capabilities of outside attackers MUST be considered in
the design of a NOV3 security mechanism:
1. Eavesdropping on the packets,
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2. Replaying the intercepted packets, and
3. Generating illegal packets and injecting them into the network.
With a successful outside attack, an attacker may be able to:
1. Analyze the traffic pattern within the network,
2. Disrupt the network connectivity or degrade the network service
quality, or
3. Access the contents of the data/control packets if they are not
properly encrypted.
4.2. Insider Capabilities
It is assumed that an inside attacker can perform any types of
outside attacks from the inside or outside of the overlay perimeter.
In addition, in an inside attack, an attacker may use already
obtained privilege to, for instance,
1. Interfere with the normal operations of the overlay as a legal
entity, by sending packets containing invalid information or with
improper frequencies,
2. Perform spoofing attacks and impersonate another legal device to
communicate with victims using the cryptographic information it
obtained, and
3. Access the contents of the data/control packets if they are
encrypted with the keys held by the attacker.
4.3. Security Issues In Scope and Out of Scope
During the specification of security requirements, the following
security issues needs to be considered:
1. Insecure underlying network. It is normally assumed that a
underlying network connecting NOV3 devices (NVEs and NVAs) is
secure if it is located within a data center and cannot be
directly accessed by tenants. However, in a virtual data center
scenario, a NVO3 overlay scatters across different sites which
are connected through the public network. Outside attacks may be
raised from the underlying network.
2. Insider attacker. During the design of a security solution for a
NVO3 network, the inside attacks raised from compromised NVO3
devices (NVEs and NVAs) needs to be considered.
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3. Insecure tenant network. It is reasonable to consider the
conditions where the network connecting TSes and NVEs is
accessible to outside attackers.
The following issues are out of scope of cosideration in this
document:
1. In this memo it is assumed that security protocols, algorithms,
and implementations provide the security properties for which
they are designed; attacks depending on a failure of this
assumption are out of scope. As an example, an attack caused by
a weakness in a cryptographic algorithm is out of scope, while an
attack caused by failure to use confidentiality when
confidentiality is a security requirement is in scope.
2. In practice an attacker controlling an underlying network device
may break the communication of the overlays by discarding or
delaying the delivery of the packets passing through it.
However, this type of attack is out of scope.
5. Security Requirements and Candidate Approaches
This section introduces the security requirements and candidate
solutions.
5.1. Control/Data Traffic within Overlay
This section analyzes the security issues in the control and data
plans of a NVO3 overlay.
5.1.1. Control Plane Security
REQ1: A NVO3 security solution MUST enable two NOV3 devices (NVE or
NVA) to perform mutual authentication before exchanging control
packets.
This requirement is used to prevent an attacker from impersonating
a legal NVO3 device and sending out bogus control packets without
being detected.
The authentication between devices can be performed as a part of
automated key management protocols (e.g., IKEv2[RFC5996],
EAP[RFC4137], etc.). After such an authentication procedure, an
device can find out whether its peer holds valid security
credentials and is the one who it has claimed. Additionally, the
keys shared between the devices can be also used for the
authentication purpose. For instance, assumed a NVE and a NVA
have shared a secret key without known by any other third parties.
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The NVE can ensure that a device that it is communicating with is
the NVA if the device can prove that it possesses the shared key.
a: The identity of the network devices SHOULD be verified during
authentication.
In some authentication mechanisms, instead of verifying the peers'
identities, the authentication result can only prove that a device
joining the authentication is a legal member of a group. However,
for a better damage confining capability to insider attacker, it
is recommended to verify the devices' identities during
authentication. Therefore, an insider attacker cannot impersonate
others, even when it holds legal credentials or keys.
REQ2: Before accepting a control packet, the device receiving the
packet MUST verify whether the packet comes from one which has the
privilege to send that packet.
This is an authorization requirement. A device needs to clarify
the roles (e.g., a NVE or a NVA) that its authentication peer acts
as in the overlay. Therefore, if a compromised NVE uses it
credentials to impersonate a NVA to communicate with other NVEs,
it will be detected. In addition, authorization is important for
enforcing the VN isolation, a device only can distribute control
packets within the VNs it is involved within. If a control packet
about a VN is sent from a NVE which is not authorized to support
the VN, the packet will not be accepted
Normally, it is assumed that the access control operations are
based on the authentication results. The simple authorization
mechanisms (such as ACLs which filters packets based on the packet
addresses) can be used as auxiliary approaches since they are
relatively easy to bypass if attackers can access to the network
and modify packets.
REQ3: Integrity, confidentiality, and origin Authentication
protection for Control traffics
It is the responsibility of a NVO3 overlay to protect the control
packets transported over the overlay against the attacks raised
from the underlying network.
a: The integrity and origin authentication of the packets MUST be
guaranteed.
With this requirement, the receiver can ensure that the packets
are from the legitimate sender, not replayed, and not modified
during the transportation.
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b: The signaling packets SHOULD be encrypted.
On many occasions, the signaling packets can be transported in
plaintext. However, In the cases where the information contained
within the signaling packets are sensitive or valuable to
attackers , the signaling packets related with that tenant need be
encrypted.
To achieve such objectives, when the network devices exchange
control plane packets, integrated security mechanisms or
underlying security protocols need to provided. In addition,
cryptographic keys need to be deployed manually in advance or
dynamically generated by using certain automatic key management
protocols (e.g., TLS [RFC5246]). The keys are used to generate
digests for or encrypt control packets.
REQ4: The toleration of DOS attacks
a: Frequency in distributing control packets within in the overlay
MUST be limited.
The issues within DOS attacks also need to be considered in
designing the overlay control plane. For instance, in the VXLAN
solution[I-D.mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan], an attacker attached to
a NVE can try to manipulate the NVE to keep multicasting control
packets by sending a large amount of ARP packets to query the
inexistent VMs. In order to mitigate this type of attack, the
NVEs SHOULD be only allowed to send signaling packet in the
overlay with a limited frequency. When there are centralized
servers (e.g., the backend oracles providing mapping information
for NVEs[I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement], or the SDN
controllers) are located within the overlay, the potential
security risks caused by DDOS attack on such servers can be more
serious.
b: Mitigation of amplification attacks SHOULD be provided.
During the design of the control plane, it is important to
consider the amplification effects. For instance, if NVEs may
generate a large response to a short request, an attacker may send
spoofed requests to the NVEs with the source address of a victim.
Then the NVEs will send the response to the victim and result in
DDOS attacks.
If the amplification effect cannot be avoided in the control
protocol, the requirements 1,2,3, and 4a can all be used to
benefit the mitigation of this type of attacks.
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REQ5: The key management solution MUST be able to confine the scope
of key distribution and provide different keys to isolate the
control traffic according to different security requirements.
a: It SHOULD be guaranteed that different keys are used to secure
the control packets exchanged within different tenant networks.
This requirement can be used to provide a basic attack confinement
capability. The compromise of a NVE working within a tenant will
not result in the key leakage of other tenant networks.
b: It SHOULD be guaranteed that different keys are used to secure
the control packets exchanges with different VNs.
This requirement can be used to provide a better attack
confinement capability for the control plane. The compromise of a
NVE working within a VN will not result in the key leakage of
other VNs. However, since there is only a single key used for
securing the data traffic within a VN, an attacker which has
compromised a NVE within the VN may be able to impersonate any
other NVEs within the VN to send out bogus control packets. In
addition, the key management overheads introduced by key
revocation also need to be considered[RFC4046]. When a NVE stops
severing a VN, the key used for the VN needs to be revoked, and a
new key needs to be distributed for the NVO3 devices still within
the VN.
If we expect to provide a even stronger confinement capability and
prevent a compromised NVE from impersonating other NVEs even when
they are in the same VN, different NVEs working inside a VN need
to secure their signaling packets with different keys.
If there is automated key management deployed, the authentication
and authorization can be used to largely mitigate the isolation
issues. When a NVE attempts to join a VN, the NVE needs to be
authenticated and prove that it have sufficient privileges. Then,
a new key (or a set of keys) will be generated to secure its
control packet exchanged with this VN.
5.1.2. Data Plane
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework] specifies a NVO3 overlay needs to generate
tunnels between NVEs for data transportation. When a data packet
reaches the boundary of a overlay, it will be encapsulated and
forwarded to the destination NVE through a proper tunnel.
REQ6: Integrity, confidentiality, and origin authentication
protection for data traffics
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a: The integrity and origin authentication of data traffics MUST
be guaranteed when the underlying network is not secure.
During the transportation of data packets, it is the
responsibility of the NVO3 overlay to deal with the attacks from
the underlying network. For instance, an inside attacker
compromising a underlying network device may intercept an
encapsulated data packet transported within a tunnel, modify the
contents in the encapsulating tunnel packet and, transfer it into
another tunnel without being detected. When the modified packet
reaches a NVE, the NVE may decapsulated the data packet and
forward it into a VN according to the information within the
encapsulating header generated by the attacker. Similarly, a
compromised NVE may try to redirect the data packets within a VN
into another VN by adding improper encapsulating tunnel headers to
the data packets.
Under such circumstances, in order to enforce the VN isolation
property, underlying security protocols need to provided.
Signatures or digests need to be generated for both data packets
and the encapsulating tunnel headers in order to provide data
origin authentication and integrity protection.
b: The confidentiality protection of data traffics SHOULD be
provided, when the underlying network is not secure.
If the data traffics from the TSes is sensitive, they needs to be
encrypted during the tunnels. However, if the data traffics is
not valuable and sensitive, the encryption is not necessary.
REQ7: Different tunnels SHOULD be secured with different keys
This requirement can be used to provide a basic attack confinement
capability. When different tunnels secured with different keys,
the compromise of a key in a tunnel will not affect the security
of others.
5.2. Control/Data Traffic between NVEs and Hypervisors
Assume there is a VNE providing a logical L2/L3 interconnect for a
set of TSes. Apart from data traffics, the NVE and certain TSes
(i.e., Hypervisors) also need to exchange signaling packets in order
to facilitate, e.g., VM online detection, VM migration detection, or
auto-provisioning/service discovery [I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework].
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The NVE and its associated TSes can be deployed in a distributed way
(e.g., a NVE is implemented in an individual device, and VMs are
located on servers) or in a co-located way (e.g., a NVE and the TSes
it serves are located on the same server).
5.2.1. Distributed Deployment of NVE and Hypervisor
In this case, the data and control traffic between the NVE and the
TSes are exchanged over network.
5.2.1.1. Control Plane
REQ8: Mutual authentication MUST be performed between a NVE and a TS
at the beginning of their communication, if the network connecting
them is not secure.
Mutual authentication is used to guarantee that an attacker cannot
impersonate a legal NVE or a hypervisor without being detected.
There are various ways to perform mutual authentication. If there
are auto key management mechanism (e.g., IKEv2, EAP), the NVE and
the TS can use their credential to perform authentication. If
there a key pre-distributed between a NVE and a TS, an entity can
also use the key verify the identity of is remote peer.
If practice, a NVE and a TS may simply use IP or MAC addresses to
identify each other. This type of technique can be used as a
complementary approach although it may becomes vulnerable if
attackers can inject bogus control packets the network and modify
the packets transported between the NVE and TS.
REQ9: Before accepting a control packet, the receiver device MUST
verify whether the packet comes from one which has the privilege
to send that packet.
This is an authorization requirement. A device needs to clarify
the roles (e.g., a TS or a NVE) of the device that it is
communicating with. Therefore, if a compromised TS attempts to
use it credentials to impersonate a NVE to communicate with other
TSes, it will be detected.
Authorization is very important to guarantee the isolation
property. For instance, if a compromised hypervisor tries to
elevate its privilege and interfere the VNs that it is not
supposed to be involved within, its attempt will be detected and
rejected.
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Normally, it is assumed that the access control operations are
based on the authentication results. The simple authorization
mechanisms (such as ACLs which filters packets based on the packet
addresses) can be used as complementary solutions.
REQ10: Integrity, Confidentiality, and Origin Authentication for
Control Packets
a:The security solution of a NVE network MUST be able to provide
integrity protection and origin authentication for the control
packets exchanged between a NVE and a TS if they have to use an
insecure network to transport their packet.
This requirement can prevent an attacker from illegally interfere
with the normal operations of NVEs and TSes by injecting bogus
control packets into the network.
b:The confidentiality protection for the control packet exchange
SHOULD be provided.
When the contents of the control packets (e.g., the location of a
ES, when a VM migration happens) are sensitive to a tenant, the
control packet needs to be encrypted.
There are various security protocols (such as IPsec, SSL, and TCP-
AO) can be used for transport control packets. In addition, it is
possible to define integrated security solutions for the control
packets.
In order to secure the control traffic, cryptographic keys need to
be distributed to generate digests or signatures for the control
packets. Such cryptographic keys can be manually deployed in
advance or dynamically generated with certain automatic key
management protocols (e.g., TLS [RFC5246]).
REQ11: The key management solution MUST be able to confine the scope
of key distribution and provide different keys to isolate the
control traffic according to different security requirements.
a: If assuming TSes (hypervisors) will not be compromised, the
TSes belonging to different Tenants MUST use different keys to
secure the control packet exchanges with their NVE.
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This requirement is used to enforce the security boundaries of
different tenant networks. Since different tenants belong to
different security domains and may be competitive to each other,
the control plane traffics need to be carefully isolated so that
an attacker from a tenant cannot affect the operations of another
tenant network.
b: If assuming the hypervisors can be compromised, the TSes
belonging to different VNs MUST use different keys to secure the
control packets exchanges with their NVE.
Therefore, if a key used for a VN is compromised, other VNs will
not be affected. This requirement is used to ensure the VN
isolation property.
5.2.1.2. Data Plane
REQ12: The data traffic isolation of different VNs MUST be
guaranteed.
In [I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement], the data plane
isolation requirement amongst different VNs has been discussed.
The traffic within a virtual network can only be transited into
another one in a controlled fashion (e.g., via a configured router
and/or a security gateway). Therefore, if the NVE supports
multiple VNs concurrently, the data traffic in different VNs MUST
be isolated.
a:The security solution of a NVE network MUST be able to provide
integrity protection and origin authentication for the data
packets exchanged between a NVE and a TS if they have to use an
insecure network to transport their data packet.
In practice, the data traffics in different VNs can be isolated
physically or by using VPN technologies. If the network
connecting the NVE and the TSes is potentially accessible to
attackers, security solutions need to be considered to prevent an
attacker locating in the middle between the NVE and TS from
modifying the VN identification information in the packet headers
so as to manipulate the NVE to transport the data packets within a
VN to another. The security protocols such as IPsec and TCP-AO,
can be used to enforce the isolation property if necessary.
The key management requirement R11 can be applied here for data
traffic
5.3. Key Management
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REQ13: A security solution for NVO3 SHOULD provide automated key
management mechanisms.
In the cases where there are a large amount of NVEs working within
a NVO3 overlay, manual key management may become infeasible.
First, it could be burdensome to deploy pre-shared keys for
thousands of NVEs, not to mention that multiple keys may need to
be deployed on a single device for different purposes. Key
derivation can be used to mitigate this problem. Using key
derivation functions, multiple keys for different usages can be
derived from a pre-shared master key. However, key derivation
cannot protect against the situation where a system was
incorrectly trusted to have the key used to perform the
derivation. If the master key were somehow compromised, all the
resulting keys would need to be changed [RFC4301]. In addition,
VM migration will introduce challenges to manual key management.
The migration of a VM in a VN may cause the change of the NVEs
which are involved within the NV. When a NVE is newly involved
within a VN, it needs to get the key to join the operations within
the VN. If a NVE stops supporting a VN, it should not keep the
keys associated with that VN. All those key updates need to be
performed at run time, and difficult to be handled by human
beings. As a result, it is reasonable to introduce automated key
management solutions such as EAP [RFC4137] for NVO3 overlays.
Without the support automated key management mechanisms, some
security functions of certain security protocols cannot work
properly. For instance, the anti-replay mechanism of IPsec is
turned off without the support of automated key management
mechanisms. Therefore, if IPsec is selected to protect the
control packets. In this case, the system may suffer from the
replay attacks.
6. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
7. Security Considerations
TBD
8. Acknowledgements
Thanks a lot for the comments from Melinda Shore, and Zu Qiang.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-problem]
Manral, V. and S. Hanna, "Auto Discovery VPN Problem
Statement and Requirements", draft-ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-
problem-09 (work in progress), July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-framework]
Lasserre, M., Balus, F., Morin, T., Bitar, N., and Y.
Rekhter, "Framework for DC Network Virtualization", draft-
ietf-nvo3-framework-03 (work in progress), July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-statement]
Narten, T., Gray, E., Black, D., Fang, L., Kreeger, L.,
and M. Napierala, "Problem Statement: Overlays for Network
Virtualization", draft-ietf-nvo3-overlay-problem-
statement-04 (work in progress), July 2013.
[I-D.kreeger-nvo3-hypervisor-nve-cp]
Kreeger, L., Narten, T., and D. Black, "Network
Virtualization Hypervisor-to-NVE Overlay Control Protocol
Requirements", draft-kreeger-nvo3-hypervisor-nve-cp-01
(work in progress), February 2013.
[I-D.mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan]
Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "VXLAN: A
Framework for Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over
Layer 3 Networks", draft-mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan-05
(work in progress), October 2013.
[RFC4046] Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
"Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
Hartman, et al. Expires April 25, 2014 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft NVO3 security October 2013
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
5996, September 2010.
Authors' Addresses
Sam Hartman
Painless Security
356 Abbott Street
North Andover, MA 01845
USA
Email: hartmans@painless-security.com
URI: http://www.painless-security.com
Dacheng Zhang
Huawei
Beijing
China
Email: zhangdacheng@huawei.com
Margaret Wasserman
Painless Security
356 Abbott Street
North Andover, MA 01845
USA
Phone: +1 781 405 7464
Email: mrw@painless-security.com
URI: http://www.painless-security.com
Hartman, et al. Expires April 25, 2014 [Page 16]
