C. Mortimore, Ed.
Internet-Draft Salesforce
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: November 3, 2012 Microsoft
B. Campbell
Ping
Y. Goland
Microsoft
May 2, 2012
OAuth 2.0 Assertion Profile
draft-ietf-oauth-assertions-03
Abstract
This specification provides a general framework for the use of
assertions as client credentials and/or authorization grants with
OAuth 2.0. It includes a generic mechanism for transporting
assertions during interactions with a token endpoint, as wells as
rules for the content and processing of those assertions. The intent
is to provide an enhanced security profile by using derived values
such as signatures or HMACs, as well as facilitate the use of OAuth
2.0 in client-server integration scenarios where the end-user may not
be present.
This specification only defines abstract message flow and assertion
content. Actual use requires implementation of a companion protocol
binding specification. Additional profile documents provide standard
representations in formats such as SAML and JWT.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 3, 2012.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Authentication vs. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Transporting Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Using Assertions for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.1. Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Using Assertions as Authorization Grants . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Assertion Content and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Assertion Metamodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. General Assertion Format and Processing Rules . . . . . . 8
6. Specific Assertion Format and Processing Rules . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Client Acting on Behalf of Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. Client Acting on Behalf of a User . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.4. Client Acting on Behalf of an Anonymous User . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. assertion Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. client_assertion Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . 14
8.3. client_assertion_type Parameter Registration . . . . . . . 14
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
Throughout this document, values are quoted to indicate that they are
to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages,
the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.
2. Overview
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] provides a
method for making authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an
access token. Access tokens are issued to clients by an
authorization server with the (sometimes implicit) approval of the
resource owner. These access tokens are typically obtained by
exchanging an authorization grant representing authorization by the
resource owner or privileged administrator. Several authorization
grant types are defined to support a wide range of client types and
user experiences. OAuth also allows for the definition of new
extension grant types to support additional clients or to provide a
bridge between OAuth and other trust frameworks. Finally, OAuth
allows the definition of additional authentication mechanisms to be
used by clients when interacting with the authorization server.
In scenarios where security is at a premium one wants to avoid
sending secrets across the Internet, even on encrypted connections.
Instead one wants to send values derived from the secret that prove
to the receiver that the sender is in possession of the secret
without actually sending the secret. Typically the way derived
values are created is by generating an assertion that is then either
HMAC'ed or digitally signed using an agreed upon secret. By
validating the HMAC or digital signature on the assertion, the
receiver can prove to themselves that the entity that generated the
assertion was in possession of the secret without actually
communicating the secret directly.
This specification provides a general framework for the use of
assertions as client credentials and/or authorization grants with
OAuth 2.0. It includes a generic mechanism for transporting
assertions during interactions with a token endpoint, as wells as
rules for the content and processing of those assertions. The intent
is to provide an enhanced security profile by using derived values
such as signatures or HMACs, as well as facilitate the use of OAuth
2.0 in client-server integration scenarios where the end-user may not
be present.
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This specification only defines abstract message flow and assertion
content. Actual use requires implementation of a companion protocol
binding specification. Additional profile documents provide standard
representations in formats such as SAML and JWT.
3. Authentication vs. Authorization
This specification provides a model for using assertions for
authentication of an OAuth client during interactions with an
Authorization Server, as well as the use of assertions as
authorization grants. It is important to note that the use of
assertions for client authentication is orthogonal and separable from
using assertions as an authorization grant and can be used either in
combination or in isolation. In addition, in scenarios when
assertion based authentication and authorization are used in
combination, the assertion format and processing may be redundant;
under such circumstances, the protocol may be optimized to present a
single assertion.
4. Transporting Assertions
This section defines generic HTTP parameters for transporting
assertions during interactions with a token endpoint.
4.1. Using Assertions for Client Authentication
In scenarios where one wants to avoid sending secrets, one wants to
send values derived from the secret that prove to the receiver that
the sender is in possession of the secret without actually sending
the secret.
For example, a client can establish a secret using an out-of-band
mechanism with a resource server. As part of this out-of-band
communication the client and resource server agree that the client
will authenticate itself using an assertion with agreed upon
parameters that will be signed by the provisioned secret. Later on,
the client might send an access token request to the token endpoint
for the resource server that includes an authorization code, as well
as a "client_assertion" that is signed with the previously agreed key
and parameters. The "client_assertion" proves to the token endpoint
the identity of the client and the authorization code provides the
link to the end-user authorization.
The following section defines the use of assertions as client
credentials as an extension of Section 2.3 of OAuth 2.0
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. When using assertions as client credentials,
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the client includes the assertion and related information using the
following HTTP request parameters:
client_id OPTIONAL. The client identifier as described in Section
2.2 of OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. When present, the
"client_id" MUST identify the client to the authorization server.
client_assertion_type REQUIRED. The format of the assertion as
defined by the authorization server. The value MUST be an
absolute URI.
client_assertion REQUIRED. The assertion being used to authenticate
the client. Specific serialization of the assertion is defined by
profile documents. The serialization MUST be encoded for
transport within HTTP forms. It is RECOMMENDED that base64url be
used.
The following non-normative example demonstrates a client
authenticating using an assertion during an Authorization Code Access
Token Request as defined in Section 4.1.3 of OAuth 2.0
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] (with line breaks for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code&
code=i1WsRn1uB1&
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth
%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
client_assertion=PHNhbW...[omitted for brevity]...ZT
Token endpoints can differentiate between assertion based credentials
and other client credential types by looking for the presence of the
"client_assertion" and "client_assertion_type" parameters, which will
only be present when using assertions for client authentication.
4.1.1. Error Responses
If an assertion is invalid for any reason or if more than one client
authentication mechanism is used, the Authorization Server MUST
construct an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. The value of the "error" parameter MUST be the
"invalid_client" error code. The authorization server MAY include
additional information regarding the reasons the client assertion was
considered invalid using the "error_description" or "error_uri"
parameters.
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For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"invalid_client"
"error_description":"Multiple Credentials Not Allowed"
}
4.2. Using Assertions as Authorization Grants
An assertion can be used to request an access token when a client
wishes to utilize an existing trust relationship. This may be done
through the semantics of (and a digital signature/HMAC calculated
over) the assertion, and expressed to the authorization server
through an extension authorization grant type. The processes by
which authorization is previously granted, and by which the client
obtains the assertion prior to exchanging it with the authorization
server, are out of scope.
The following defines the use of assertions as authorization grants
as an extension of OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 4.5. When
using assertions as authorization grants, the client includes the
assertion and related information using the following HTTP request
parameters:
grant_type REQUIRED. The format of the assertion as defined by the
authorization server. The value MUST be an absolute URI.
assertion REQUIRED. The assertion being used as an authorization
grant. Specific serialization of the assertion is defined by
profile documents. The serialization MUST be encoded for
transport within HTTP forms. It is RECOMMENDED that base64url be
used.
scope OPTIONAL. The requested scope as described in Section 3.3 of
OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. When exchanging assertions for
access tokens, the authorization for the token has been previously
granted through some other mechanism. As such, the requested
scope SHOULD be equal or lesser than the scope originally granted
to the authorized accessor. If the scope parameter and/or value
is omitted, the scope SHOULD be treated as equal to the scope
originally granted to the authorized accessor. The Authorization
Server SHOULD limit the scope of the issued access token to be
equal or lesser than the scope originally granted to the
authorized accessor.
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The following non-normative example demonstrates an assertion being
used as an authorization grant (with line breaks for display purposes
only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
assertion=PHNhbWxwOl...[omitted for brevity]...ZT4
An assertion used in this context is generally a short lived
representation of the authorization grant and authorization servers
SHOULD NOT issue tokens that exceed that lifetime by a significant
period. In practice, that will usually mean that refresh tokens are
not issued in response to assertion grant requests and access tokens
will be issued with a reasonably limited lifetime. Clients can
refresh an expired access token by requesting a new one using the
same assertion, if it is still valid, or with a new assertion.
4.2.1. Error Responses
If an assertion is not valid or has expired, the Authorization Server
MUST construct an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. The value of the "error" parameter MUST be the
"invalid_grant" error code. The authorization server MAY include
additional information regarding the reasons the assertion was
considered invalid using the "error_description" or "error_uri"
parameters.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"invalid_grant",
"error_description":"Audience validation failed"
}
5. Assertion Content and Processing
This section provides a general content and processing model for the
use of assertions in OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].
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5.1. Assertion Metamodel
The following are entities and metadata involved in the issuance,
exchange and processing of assertions in OAuth 2.0. These are
general terms, abstract from any particular assertion format.
Mappings of these terms into specific representations are provided by
profiles of this specification.
Issuer The unique identifier for the entity that issued the
assertion. Generally this is the entity that holds the keying
material used to generate the assertion. In some use cases
Issuers may be either OAuth Clients (when assertions are self-
asserted) or a Security Token Service (STS) (an entity capable of
issuing, renewing, transforming and validating of security
tokens).
Principal A unique identifier for the subject of the assertion.
When using assertions for client authentication, the Principal
SHOULD be the "client_id" of the OAuth client. When using
assertions as an authorization grant, the Principal MUST identify
an authorized accessor for whom the access token is being
requested (typically the resource owner, or an authorized
delegate).
Audience A URI that identifies the party intended to process the
assertion. The audience SHOULD be the URL of the Token Endpoint
as defined in Section 3.2 of OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2].
Issued At The time at which the assertion was issued. While the
serialization may differ by assertion format, this is always
expressed in UTC with no time zone component.
Expires At The time at which the assertion expires. While the
serialization may differ by assertion format, this is always
expressed in UTC with no time zone component.
Assertion ID A nonce or unique identifier for the assertion. The
Assertion ID may be used by implementations requiring message de-
duplication for one-time use assertions. Any entity that assigns
an identifier MUST ensure that there is negligible probability
that that entity or any other entity will accidentally assign the
same identifier to a different data object.
5.2. General Assertion Format and Processing Rules
The following are general format and processing rules for the use of
assertions in OAuth:
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o The assertion MUST contain an Issuer. The Issuer MUST identify
the entity that issued the assertion as recognized by the
Authorization Server. If an assertion is self-asserted, the
Issuer SHOULD be the "client_id".
o The assertion SHOULD contain a Principal. The Principal MUST
identify an authorized accessor for whom the access token is being
requested (typically the resource owner, or an authorized
delegate). When the client is acting on behalf of itself, the
Principal SHOULD be the "client_id".
o The assertion MUST contain an Audience that identifies the
Authorization Server as the intended audience. The Authorization
Server MUST verify that it is an intended audience for the
assertion. The Audience SHOULD be the URL of the Authorization
Server's Token Endpoint.
o The assertion MUST contain an Expires At entity that limits the
time window during which the assertion can be used. The
authorization server MUST verify that the expiration time has not
passed, subject to allowable clock skew between systems. The
authorization server SHOULD reject assertions with an Expires At
attribute value that is unreasonably far in the future.
o The assertion MAY contain an Issued At entity containing the UTC
time at which the assertion was issued.
o The assertion MAY contain an Assertion ID. An Authorization
Server MAY dictate that Assertion ID is mandatory.
o The Authorization Server MUST validate the assertion's signature
in order to verify the Issuer of the assertion. The algorithm
used to validate the assertion, and the mechanism for designating
the secret used to generate the assertion, are beyond the scope of
this specification.
6. Specific Assertion Format and Processing Rules
The following clarifies the format and processing rules defined in
Section 4 and Section 5 for a number of common use cases:
6.1. Client Authentication
When a client authenticates to a token service using an assertion, it
SHOULD do so according to Section 4.1. The following format and
processing rules apply.
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o The "client_assertion_type" HTTP parameter MUST identify the
assertion format being used for authentication.
o The "client_assertion" HTTP parameter MUST contain the serialized
assertion in a format indicated by the "client_assertion_type"
parameter.
o The Principal SHOULD be the "client_id".
o The Issuer of the assertion MUST identify the entity that issued
the assertion as recognized by the Authorization Server. If the
assertion is self-asserted, the Issuer SHOULD be the "client_id".
o The Audience of the assertion MUST identify the Authorization
Server and SHOULD be the URL of the Token Endpoint.
o The Authorization Server MUST validate the assertion's signature
in order to verify the Issuer of the assertion.
The following non-normative example demonstrates the use of a client
authentication using an assertion during an Authorization Code Access
Token Request as defined in Section 4.1.3 of OAuth 2.0
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] (with line breaks for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code&
code=i1WsRn1uB1&
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth
%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
client_assertion=PHNhb...[omitted for brevity]...ZT4
6.2. Client Acting on Behalf of Itself
When a client is accessing resources on behalf of itself, it SHOULD
do so in a manner analogous to the Client Credentials flow defined in
Section 4.4 of OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. This is a special case
that combines both the authentication and authorization grant usage
patterns. In this case, the interactions with the authorization
server SHOULD be treated as using an assertion for Client
Authentication according to Section 4.1, with the addition of a
grant_type parameter. The following format and processing rules
apply.
o The grant_type HTTP request parameter MUST be
"client_credentials".
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o The "client_assertion_type" HTTP parameter MUST identify the
assertion format.
o The "client_assertion" HTTP parameter MUST contain the serialized
assertion as in a format indicated by the "client_assertion_type"
parameter.
o The Issuer of the assertion MUST identify the entity that issued
the assertion as recognized by the Authorization Server. If the
assertion is self-asserted, the Issuer SHOULD be the "client_id".
If the assertion was issued by a Security Token Service (STS), the
Issuer SHOULD identify the STS as recognized by the Authorization
Server.
o The Principal SHOULD be the "client_id".
o The Audience of the assertion MUST identify the Authorization
Server and SHOULD be the URL of the Token Endpoint.
o The Authorization Server MUST validate the assertion's signature
in order to verify the Issuer of the assertion.
The following non-normative example demonstrates the use of a sample
assertion being used for a Client Credentials Access Token Request as
defined in Section 4.4.2 of OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] (with line
breaks for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
grant_type=client_credentials&
client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth
%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
client_assertion=PHNhbW...[omitted for brevity]...ZT
6.3. Client Acting on Behalf of a User
When a client is accessing resources on behalf of a user, it SHOULD
be treated as using an assertion as an Authorization Grant according
to Section 4.2. The following format and processing rules apply.
o The grant_type HTTP request parameter MUST indicate the assertion
format.
o The assertion HTTP parameter MUST contain the serialized assertion
as in a format indicated by the grant_type parameter.
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o The Issuer of the assertion MUST identify the entity that issued
the assertion as recognized by the Authorization Server. If the
assertion is self-asserted, the Issuer SHOULD be the "client_id".
If the assertion was issued by a Security Token Service (STS), the
Issuer SHOULD identify the STS as recognized by the Authorization
Server.
o The Principal MUST identify an authorized accessor for whom the
access token is being requested (typically the resource owner, or
an authorized delegate).
o The Audience of the assertion MUST identify the Authorization
Server and MAY be the URL of the Token Endpoint.
o The Authorization Server MUST validate the assertion's signature
in order to verify the Issuer of the assertion.
The following non-normative example demonstrates the use of a client
authenticating using an assertion during an Authorization Code Access
Token Request as defined in Section 4.1.3 of OAuth 2.0
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] (with line breaks for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
assertion=PHNhbWxwOl...[omitted for brevity]...ZT
6.4. Client Acting on Behalf of an Anonymous User
When a client is accessing resources on behalf of an anonymous user,
the following format and processing rules apply.
o The grant_type HTTP request parameter MUST indicate the assertion
format.
o The assertion HTTP parameter MUST contain the serialized assertion
as in a format indicated by the grant_type parameter.
o The Issuer of the assertion MUST identify the entity that issued
the assertion as recognized by the Authorization Server. If the
assertion is self-asserted, the Issuer SHOULD be the "client_id".
If the assertion was issued by a Security Token Service (STS), the
Issuer SHOULD identify the STS as recognized by the Authorization
Server.
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o The Principal SHOULD indicate to the Authorization Server that the
client is acting on-behalf of an anonymous user as defined by the
Authorization Server. It is implied that authorization is based
upon additional criteria, such as additional attributes or claims
provided in the assertion. For example, a client may present an
assertion from a trusted issuer asserting that the bearer is over
18 via an included claim. In this case, no additional information
about the user's identity is included yet all the data needed to
issue an access token is present.
o The Audience of the assertion MUST identify the Authorization
Server and MAY be the URL of the Token Endpoint.
o The Authorization Server MUST validate the assertion's signature
in order to verify the Issuer of the assertion.
7. Security Considerations
Authorization Providers concerned with preventing replay attacks may
choose to implement using replay detection using a combination of the
Assertion ID and Issued At/Expires At attributes. Previously
processed assertions MAY be de-duped and rejected based on the
Assertion ID. The addition of the validity window relieves the
authorization server from maintaining an infinite state table of
processed assertion IDs.
Authorization Servers SHOULD consider the amount of information
exposed in error responses, and the risk associated with exposing
details of specific processing errors. In addition, Authorization
Servers SHOULD prevent timing attacks related to cryptographic
processing of the assertion.
There are no additional security considerations beyond those
described within OAuth 2.0 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 11.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. assertion Parameter Registration
The following is the parameter registration request, as defined in
The OAuth Parameters Registry of The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], for the "assertion" parameter:
o Parameter name: assertion
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o Parameter usage location: client authentication, token request
o Change controller: IETF
o Specification document(s): [[this document]]
8.2. client_assertion Parameter Registration
The following is the parameter registration request, as defined in
The OAuth Parameters Registry of The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], for the "client_assertion" parameter:
o Parameter name: "client_assertion"
o Parameter usage location: client authentication, token request
o Change controller: IETF
o Specification document(s): [[this document]]
8.3. client_assertion_type Parameter Registration
The following is the parameter registration request, as defined in
The OAuth Parameters Registry of The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], for the "client_assertion_type" parameter:
o Parameter name: "client_assertion_type"
o Parameter usage location: client authentication, token request
o Change controller: IETF
o Specification document(s): [[this document]]
9. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]
Hammer-Lahav, E., Recordon, D., and D. Hardt, "The OAuth
2.0 Authorization Framework", draft-ietf-oauth-v2-26 (work
in progress), May 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the following people that have influenced
or contributed this specification: Paul Madsen, Eric Sachs, Jian Cai,
Tony Nadalin, the authors of OAuth WRAP, and those in the OAuth
working group.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
draft-ietf-oauth-assertions-03
o updated reference to draft-ietf-oauth-v2 from -25 to -26
draft-ietf-oauth-assertions-02
o Added text about limited lifetime ATs and RTs per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08298.html.
o Changed the line breaks in some examples to avoid awkward
rendering to text format. Also removed encoded '=' padding from a
few examples because both known derivative specs, SAML and JWT,
omit the padding char in serialization/encoding.
o Remove section 7 on error responses and move that (somewhat
modified) content into subsections of section 4 broken up by
authn/authz per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08735.html.
o Rework the text about "MUST validate ... in order to establish a
mapping between ..." per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08872.html
and
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08749.html.
o Change "The Principal MUST identify an authorized accessor. If
the assertion is self-issued, the Principal SHOULD be the
client_id" in 6.1 per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08873.html.
o Update reference in 4.1 to point to 2.3 (rather than 3.2) of
oauth-v2 (rather than self)
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08874.html.
o Move the "Section 3 of" out of the xref to hopefully fix the link
in 4.1 and remove the client_id bullet from 4.2 per
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http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08875.html.
o Add ref to Section 3.3 of oauth-v2 for scope definition and remove
some then redundant text per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08890.html.
o Change "The following format and processing rules SHOULD be
applied" to "The following format and processing rules apply" in
sections 6.x to remove conflicting normative qualification of
other normative statements per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08892.html.
o Add text the client_id must id the client to 4.1 and remove
similar text from other places per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08893.html.
o Remove the MUST from the text prior to the HTTP parameter
definitions per
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg08920.html.
o Updated examples to use grant_type and client_assertion_type
values from the OAuth SAML Assertion Profiles spec.
Authors' Addresses
Chuck Mortimore (editor)
Salesforce.com
Email: cmortimore@salesforce.com
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity Corp.
Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com
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Yaron Y. Goland
Microsoft
Email: yarong@microsoft.com
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