Network Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track T. Hardjono
Expires: May 9, 2013 MIT
M. Machulak
Newcastle University
E. Maler
XMLgrrl.com
C. Scholz
COM.lounge GmbH
N. Sakimura
NRI
J. Bradley
Ping Identity
M. Jones
Microsoft
November 5, 2012
OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-01
Abstract
This specification proposes an OAuth Dynamic Client Registration
protocol.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 9, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.1. The client needs to be uniquely identifiable by
the authorization server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.2. The authorization server must collect metadata
about a client for later user interaction . . . . . . 4
1.3.3. The authorization server should have the option of
strongly authenticating the client and its metadata . 4
1.3.4. Dynamic client registration must be possible from
both web-server applications and applications with
other capabilities and limitations, such as native
applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3.5. Transaction integrity must be ensured . . . . . . . . 5
2. Client Registration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Client Association Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Client Association Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. Client Update Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5. Rotate Secret Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6. Rotate Secret Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.7. Client Registration Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Client Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. Non-Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow
OAuth clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth authorization
server without the two parties having previously interacted.
Nevertheless, in order for the authorization server to accurately
represent to end-users which client is seeking authorization to
access the end-user's resources, a method for automatic and unique
registration of clients is needed. The OAuth2 authorization
framework does not define how the relationship between the Client and
the Authorization Server is initialized, or how a given client is
assigned a unique Client Identifier. Historically, this has happened
out-of-band from the OAuth protocol. This draft provides a mechanism
for a client to register itself with the Authorization Server, which
can be used to dynamically provision a Client Identifier, and
optionally a Client Secret.
As part of the registration process, this specification also defines
a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a
set of meta information, such as a display name and icon to be
presented to the user during the authorization step. This draft
provides a method for the client to register and update this
information over time.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token",
"Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client
Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server",
and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 [OAuth2.0].
This specification defines the following additional terms:
o Client Registration Endpoint: The OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through which
a Client can request new registration and manage the metadata
associated with it.
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o Registration Access Token: An OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token issued by the
Authorization Server through the Client Registration Endpoint
which is used by the Client to authenticate itself during update
and secret rotation operations.
1.3. Requirements
[[ Following are proposed requirements for dynamic client
registration. This section is intended for discussion and will
likely be removed in the final draft. ]]
1.3.1. The client needs to be uniquely identifiable by the
authorization server
In order for an authorization server to do proper user-delegated
authorization and prevent unauthorized access it must be able to
identify clients uniquely. As is done today in OAuth, the client
identifier (and optional secret) should thus be issued by the
authorization server and not simply accepted as proposed by the
client.
1.3.2. The authorization server must collect metadata about a client
for later user interaction
In order for the authorization server to describe a client to an end-
user in an authorization step it needs information about the client.
This can be the client name at a minimum, but today servers usually
request at least a description, a homepage URL, and an icon when
doing manual registration.
1.3.3. The authorization server should have the option of strongly
authenticating the client and its metadata
In order to prevent spoofing of clients and enable dynamic building
of strong trust relationships, the authorization server should have
the option to verify the provided information. This might be solved
using message signature verification.
1.3.4. Dynamic client registration must be possible from both web-
server applications and applications with other capabilities and
limitations, such as native applications
Each instance of a native application (that is, the specific instance
running on each device) that is installed and run by the same user
may need the option of getting a unique client identifier. In this
case, there are implications around gathering and displaying enough
information to ensure that the end-user is delegating authorization
to the intended application. The registration protocol should be
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simple and flexible enough to allow for multiple types of
applications.
1.3.5. Transaction integrity must be ensured
When a client sends information to a server endpoint, it might take
time for this data to propagate through big server installations that
spread across various data centers. Care needs to be taken that
subsequent interactions with the user after the registration process,
such as an authorization request, show the correct data.
2. Client Registration Endpoint
The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in
this document that is designed to allow a Client to register itself
with the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST
accept HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the
entity body using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format.
The Client Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-
layer security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration
Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or
TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125].
The Endpoint defines three operations that a client can take on it,
switched by the "operation" parameter:
o client_associate: generate a new Client Identifier (and optionally
a Client Secret) and associate it with the set of presented
metadata (Section 3)
o client_update: update the metadata (Section 3) associated with a
Client Identifier
o rotate_secret: issue a new Registration Access Token and, if
applicable, a Client Secret for a Client
In order to facilitate registered clients updating their information,
the Client Registration Endpoint issues a request_access_token for
clients to securely identify themselves in future connections. As
such, the Endpoint MUST accept requests with OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens
[OAuth.Bearer] for these operations.
In order to support open registration and facilitate wider
interoperability, the Client Registration Endpoint SHOULD allow
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client_associate requests with no further authentication. These
requests MAY be rate-limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack on
the Client Registration Endpoint.
In addition, the Client Registration Endpoint MAY accept an initial
authorization credential in the form of an OAuth 2.0 [OAuth2.0]
access token in order to limit registration to only previously
authorized parties. The method by which this access token is
obtained by the registrant is generally out-of-band and is out of
scope of this specification.
These two aspects, operation selection and client authentication, are
represented by two parameters common to all operations:
operation REQUIRED. Values are "client_associate" (for new
registrations), "rotate_secret" to request rotation of the
"client_secret", and "client_update" (for updating parameters of
an existing "client_id").
access_token OPTIONAL. An OAuth2 Bearer token used to access the
Client Registration Endpoint, as defined in OAuth2 Bearer. This
parameter MUST NOT be sent if the Access Token is sent in the HTTP
Authorization header as described in Section 7.1 of OAuth 2.0
[OAuth2.0]. Access Tokens sent in the authorization header must
be OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens [OAuth.Bearer].
Each operation takes a different parameter set, and all operations
are described below.
The Client Registration Endpoint MUST ignore all parameters it does
not understand.
2.1. Client Association Request
This operation registers a new client to the Authorization Server.
The Authorization Server assigns this client a unique Client
Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the
metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The
request includes the two parameters described above as well as any
parameters described in Client Metadata (Section 3).
operation REQUIRED, MUST have the value "client_associate"
access_token OPTIONAL, used to restrict new client registration
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redirect_uris
REQUIRED
client_name RECOMMENDED
client_url
RECOMMENDED
logo_url OPTIONAL
contacts OPTIONAL
tos_url OPTIONAL
token_endpoint_auth_method OPTIONAL
policy_url OPTIONAL
jwk_url OPTIONAL
jwk_encryption_url OPTIONAL
x509_url OPTIONAL
x509_encryption_url OPTIONAL
require_signed_request_object OPTIONAL
default_max_age OPTIONAL
default_acr OPTIONAL
For example, a client could send the following registration request
to the Client Registration Endpoint:
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Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJ ... fQ.8Gj_-sj ... _X
operation=client_associate
&redirect_uris=https://client.example.org/callback
%20https://client.example.org/callback2
&client_name=My%20Example%20
&logo_url=https://client.example.org/logo.png
&token_endpoint_auth_type=client_secret_basic
&jwk_url=https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk
2.2. Client Association Response
Upon successful association, the Client Registration Endpoint returns
the newly-created Client Identifier and, optionally, a Client Secret.
The response also contains a Registration Access Token that is to be
used by the client to perform subsequent operations at this endpoint.
These items are returned as a JSON document with the following fields
as top-level members of the root JSON object.
client_id REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST NOT be
currently valid for any other registered Client.
client_secret OPTIONAL. The Client secret. This MUST be unique for
each "client_id". This value us used by confidential clients. It
is not required for clients selecting a token_endpoint_auth_type
of "private_key_jwt"
registration_access_token REQUIRED The Access token to be used by
the client to perform "client_update" and "rotate_secret"
requests.
issued_at
OPTIONAL. Specifies the timestamp when the identifier was issued.
The timestamp value MUST be a positive integer. The value is
expressed in the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00
GMT.
expires_at OPTIONAL. The number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
as measured in UTC that the "client_secret" will expire or "0" if
they do not expire. See RFC 3339 [RFC3339] for details regarding
date/times in general and UTC in particular.
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Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret":
"cf136dc3c1fd9153029bb9c6cc9ecead918bad9887fce6c93f31185e5885805d",
"registration_access_token": "this.is.a.access.token.value.ffx83",
"expires_at":2893276800
}
2.3. Client Update Request
This operation updates a previously-registered client with new
metadata at the Authorization Server. This request MUST be protected
by the Registration Authorization Token associated with the Client
Identifier. This request MAY include any fields described in Client
Metadata (Section 3). The values of Client Metadata fields in this
request MUST replace (not augment) the values previously associated
with this client_identifier. Empty values in Client Metadata SHOULD
be taken as a request to clear any existing value of that field.
operation REQUIRED, MUST have the value "client_update"
access_token REQUIRED, unless presented in the Authorization Header
as in OAuth2 Bearer [OAuth.Bearer]. The Registration Access Token
that was issued during the client_associate step, or previous
client_update or rotate_secret calls.
redirect_uris
REQUIRED
client_name RECOMMENDED
client_url
RECOMMENDED
logo_url OPTIONAL
contacts OPTIONAL
tos_url OPTIONAL
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token_endpoint_auth_method OPTIONAL
policy_url OPTIONAL
jwk_url OPTIONAL
jwk_encryption_url OPTIONAL
x509_url OPTIONAL
x509_encryption_url OPTIONAL
require_signed_request_object OPTIONAL
default_max_age OPTIONAL
default_acr OPTIONAL
For example, a client could send the following registration request
to the Client Registration Endpoint:
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJ ... fQ.8Gj_-sj ... _X
operation=client_update
&redirect_uris=https://client.example.org/callback
%20https://client.example.org/callback2
&client_name=My%20Example%20
&logo_url=https://client.example.org/logo.png
&token_endpoint_auth_type=client_secret_basic
&jwk_url=https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk
2.4. Client Update Response
Upon successful update, the Client Registration Endpoint returns a
JSON document with the following fields as top-level members of the
root JSON object.
client_id REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST NOT be
currently valid for any other registered Client.
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Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
}
[[ Editor's note: should this return the entire client data object,
for confirmation and review, including any fields that may have been
asserted by the AS? ]]
2.5. Rotate Secret Request
This operation allows the client to rotate its current Client Secret,
if it has one. If the client has not been issued a Client Secret,
this operation is an error. [[ Editor's note: could this request be
used to rotate the Registration Access Token, even when there's not a
client_secret? Should something else be used to rotate the token
independently? This is an open issue. ]]
operation REQUIRED. MUST have the value rotate_secret
access_token REQUIRED. The Registration Access Token that was
issued during the client_associate step, or previous client_update
or rotate_secret calls.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
POST /register HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJ ... fQ.8Gj_-sj ... _X
operation=rotate_secret
2.6. Rotate Secret Response
Upon successful rotation of the client secret, the Client
Registration Endpoint returns a JSON document with the following
fields as top-level members of the root JSON object.
client_id REQUIRED. The unique Client identifier, MUST NOT be
currently valid for any other registered Client.
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client_secret REQUIRED. The Client secret. This MUST be unique for
each "client_id".
registration_access_token REQUIRED The Access token to be used by
the client to perform subsequent "client_update" and
"rotate_secret" requests.
issued_at
OPTIONAL. Specifies the timestamp when the identifier was issued.
The timestamp value MUST be a positive integer. The value is
expressed in the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00
GMT.
expires_at OPTIONAL. The number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z
as measured in UTC that the "client_secret" will expire or "0" if
they do not expire. See RFC 3339 [RFC3339] for details regarding
date/times in general and UTC in particular.
Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret":
"cf136dc3c1fd9153029bb9c6cc9ecead918bad9887fce6c93f31185e5885805d",
"registration_access_token": "this.is.a.access.token.value.ffx83",
"expires_at":2893276800
}
2.7. Client Registration Error Response
When an OAuth error condition occurs, the Client Registration
Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of the
OAuth 2.0 specification.
When a registration error condition occurs, the Client Registration
Endpoint returns a HTTP 400 status code including a JSON object
describing the error in the response body.
The JSON object contains two members:
error The error code, a single ASCII string.
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error_description The additional text description of the error for
debugging.
This specification defines the following error codes:
invalid_operation The value of "operation" is invalid or not
supported.
invalid_redirect_uri The value of one or more "redirect_uris" is
invalid.
invalid_client_metadata The value of one of the client metadata
(Section 3) fields is invalid.
Following is a non-normative example of an error response:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"invalid_operation",
"error_description":"The value of the operation parameter must be one of client_associate, rotate_secret or client_update."
}
3. Client Metadata
Clients generally have an array of metadata associated with their
unique Client Identifier at the Authorization Server. These can
range from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to
items that impact the security of the protocol,
Extensions and profiles of this specification MAY expand this list,
but MUST at least accept all parameters on this list. The
Authorization Server MUST ignore any additional parameters sent by
the Client that it does not understand.
redirect_uris
REQUIRED A space-delimited list of redirect URIs.
client_name RECOMMENDED. Human-readable name of the Client to be
presented to the user.
client_url
RECOMMENDED. This field contains the URL of the homepage of the
client.
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logo_url OPTIONAL. A URL that references a logo for the Client
application. If present, the server SHOULD display this image to
the end user during approval.
contacts OPTIONAL. Space delimited list of email addresses for
people allowed to administer the information for this Client.
This is used by some providers to enable a web UI to modify the
Client information.
tos_url OPTIONAL. URL that points to a human-readable Terms of
Service for the Client. The Authorization Server SHOULD display
this URL to the End-User if it is given.
token_endpoint_auth_method OPTIONAL. The requested authentication
type for the Token Endpoint. The options are
"client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic", "client_secret_jwt",
and "private_key_jwt". Other Authentication methods may be
defined by extension. If unspecified or omitted, the default is
"client_secret_basic" HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme as
specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0 [OAuth2.0]. [[ this list
of terms needs to be expanded and fully defined, especially in
reference to signed-jwt client authentication ]]
policy_url OPTIONAL. A URL location that the Client provides to the
End-User to read about the how the profile data will be used. The
Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the End-User if it
is given.
jwk_url OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key [JWK] document
that is used for signing Token Endpoint Requests. If
jwk_encryption_url is not provided, the key at jwk_url is also
used as the key to encrypt responses to the Client. If the Client
registers both "x509_url" and "jwk_url", the keys contained in
both formats MUST be the same.
jwk_encryption_url OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's JSON Web Key
[JWK] that is used to encrypt any responses to the Client. If the
Client registers both "jwk_encryption_url" and
"x509_encryption_url", the keys contained in both formats MUST be
the same.
x509_url OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509
Certificate or Certificate chain that is used for signing Token
Endpoint Requests. If "x509_encryption_url" is not provided,
"x509_url" it is also used to encrypt responses to the Client. If
the Client registers both "x509_url" and "jwk_url", the keys
contained in both formats MUST be the same.
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x509_encryption_url OPTIONAL. URL for the Client's PEM encoded
X.509 Certificate or Certificate chain that is used to encrypt the
ID Token and User Info Endpoint Responses to the Client. If the
Client registers both "jwk_encryption_url" and
"x509_encryption_url", the keys contained in both formats SHOULD
be the same.
require_signed_request_object OPTIONAL. The JWS [JWS] "alg"
algorithm [JWA] that MUST be required by the Authorization Server.
The valid values are listed in Section 3.1 of JWA [JWA]. Servers
SHOULD support "RS256".
default_max_age OPTIONAL. (default max authentication age): Type:
Integer - Specifies that the End-User must be actively
authenticated if any present authentication is older than the
specified number of seconds. (The "max_age" request parameter
corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE "max_auth_age" request
parameter.) The "max_age" claim in the request object overrides
this default value.
default_acr OPTIONAL. (default authentication context class
reference): Type: String - Specifies the default value that the
Authorization server must use for processing requests from this
client. The "acrs_supported" element of discovery contains a list
of the supported "acr" values for this server. The "acr" claim in
the request object overrides this default value.
4. IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests of IANA.
5. Security Considerations
[[ Editor's note: Following are some security considerations taken
whole from the UMA and OpenID Connect source drafts. ]]
o No client authentication: The server should treat unsigned pushed
client metadata as self-asserted.
o Weak client authentication: The server should treat unsigned
pulled client metadata as self-asserted unless the domain of the
client matches the client metadata URL and the URL is well-known
and trusted.
o Strong client authentication: The server should treat signed
client metadata (pushed or pulled) and a signed metadata URL as
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self-asserted unless it can verify the signature as being from a
trusted source.
Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when sending requests to the Registration
Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and/or
TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125].
Requests to the Registration Endpoint for "client_update" MUST have
some rate limiting on failures to prevent the Client secret from
being disclosed though repeated access attempts.
A rogue RP might use the logo for the legitimate RP, which it is
trying to impersonate. An IdP needs to take steps to mitigate this
phishing risk, since the logo could confuse users into thinking
they're logging in to the legitimate RP. An IdP could also warn if
the domain/site of the logo doesn't match the domain/site of redirect
URIs. An IdP can also make warnings against untrusted RPs in all
cases, especially if they're dynamically registered, have not been
trusted by any users at the IdP before, and want to use the logo
feature.
In a situation where the Authorization Server is supporting open
Client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL
provided by the Client that will be displayed to the user (e.g.
"logo_url" and "policy_url"). A rogue Client could specify a
registration request with a reference to a drive-by download in the
"policy_url". The Authorization Server should check to see if the
"logo_url" and "policy_url" have the same host as the hosts defined
in the array of "redirect_uris".
6. Acknowledgments
The authors thank the User-Managed Access Work Group and the OpenID
Connect Working Group participants for their input to this document.
7. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
- 01
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o Merged UMA and OpenID Connect registrations into a single document
o Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint
o Removed pull-based registration
- 00
o Imported original UMA draft specification
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[JSON] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", 2006,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4627>.
[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms", May 2012.
[JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", May 2012.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", May 2012.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature", May 2012.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token",
May 2012.
[OAuth-Sig]
Balfanz, D., "OAuth Signature proposals", 2010, <http://
www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/
msg03893.html>.
[OAuth.Bearer]
Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "OAuth 2.0 Protocol: Bearer
Tokens", Aug 2012.
[OAuth2.0]
Hardt, D., "OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol", July 2012.
[OpenID.Messages]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B.,
Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Messages 1.0",
May 2012.
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[OpenID.Session]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
N. Agarwal, "OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0",
August 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the
Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
April 2010.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[USA15] Davis, M., Whistler, K., and M. Duerst, "Unicode
Normalization Forms", Unicode Standard Annex 15, 09 2009.
[hostmeta]
Hammer-Lahav, E., "Web Host Metadata", 2010, <draft-hammer-hostmeta-13.xml">http://
draft-hammer-hostmeta-13.xml">xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/
draft-hammer-hostmeta-13.xml">reference.I-D.draft-hammer-hostmeta-13.xml>.
8.2. Non-Normative References
[UMA-Core]
Scholz, C., "UMA Requirements", 2010, <http://
tools.ietf.org/id/draft-hardjono-oauth-umacore-04.txt>.
[UMA-Reqs]
Maler, E., "UMA Requirements", 2010, <http://
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kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/
UMA+Requirements>.
[UMA-UC] Akram, H., "UMA Explained", 2010, <http://
kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/
UMA+Scenarios+and+Use+Cases>.
Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer (editor)
The MITRE Corporation
Phone:
Fax:
Email: jricher@mitre.org
URI:
Thomas Hardjono
MIT
Phone:
Fax:
Email: hardjono@mit.edu
URI:
Maciej Machulak
Newcastle University
Email: m.p.machulak@ncl.ac.uk
URI: http://ncl.ac.uk/
Eve Maler
XMLgrrl.com
Email: eve@xmlgrrl.com
URI: http://www.xmlgrrl.com
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Christian Scholz
COM.lounge GmbH
Phone:
Fax:
Email:
URI:
Nat Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
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