Web Authorization Protocol (oauth) T. Lodderstedt, Ed.
Internet-Draft Deutsche Telekom AG
Intended status: Standards Track M. McGloin
Expires: January 2, 2012 IBM
P. Hunt
Oracle Corporation
July 01, 2011
OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-00
Abstract
This document gives security considerations based on a comprehensive
threat model for the OAuth 2.0 Protocol.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Attack Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Architectural assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1. Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2. Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.3. Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.3.1. Web Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3.2. Native Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3.3. User-agent-based Applications . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.3.4. Autonomous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.2. Expires_In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3. Refresh Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Authorization Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5. Redirect-URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.6. State parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7. Client Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Security Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1. Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.1. Threat: Obtain Client Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.2. Threat: Obtain Refresh Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1.3. Threat: Obtain Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.4. Threat: End-user credentials phished using
compromised or embedded browser . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2. Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.1. Threat: Password phishing by counterfeit
authorization server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.2. Threat: User unintentionally grants too much
access scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.3. Threat: Malicious client obtains existing
authorization by fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.4. Threat: Open redirector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3. Token endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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4.3.1. Threat: Eavesdropping access tokens . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3.2. Threat: Obtain access tokens from authorization
server database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3.3. Threat: Obtain client credentials over non secure
transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3.4. Threat: Obtain client secret from authorization
server database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3.5. Threat: Obtain client secret by online guessing . . . 24
4.3.6. Threat: DoS on dynamic client secret creation . . . . 24
4.4. Obtaining Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4.1. Authorization Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4.1.1. Threat: Eavesdropping or leaking authorization
codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4.1.2. Threat: Obtain authorization codes from
authorization server database . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4.1.3. Threat: Online guessing of authorization codes . . 27
4.4.1.4. Threat: Malicious client obtains authorization . . 27
4.4.1.5. Threat: Authorization code phishing . . . . . . . 28
4.4.1.6. Threat: User session impersonation . . . . . . . . 29
4.4.1.7. Threat: Authorization code leakage through
counterfeit client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4.1.8. Threat: CSRF attack against redirect-uri . . . . . 31
4.4.1.9. Threat: Clickjacking attack against
authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4.1.10. Threat: DoS, Exhaustion of resources attacks . . . 32
4.4.1.11. Threat: DoS using manufactured authorization
codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4.2. Implicit Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4.2.1. Threat: Access token leak in
transport/end-points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4.2.2. Threat: Access token leak in browser history . . . 35
4.4.2.3. Threat: Malicious client obtains authorization . . 35
4.4.2.4. Threat: Manipulation of scripts . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4.2.5. Threat: CSRF attack against redirect-uri . . . . . 36
4.4.3. Resource Owner Password Credentials . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.3.1. Threat: Accidental exposure of passwords at
client site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.3.2. Threat: Client obtains scopes without end-user
authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.3.3. Threat: Client obtains refresh token through
automatic authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.3.4. Threat: Obtain user passwords on transport . . . . 39
4.4.3.5. Threat: Obtain user passwords from
authorization server database . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.3.6. Threat: Online guessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.4. Client Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5. Refreshing an Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5.1. Threat: Eavesdropping refresh tokens from
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authorization server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5.2. Threat: Obtaining refresh token from authorization
server database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5.3. Threat: Obtain refresh token by online guessing . . . 41
4.5.4. Threat: Obtain refresh token phishing by
counterfeit authorization server . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.6. Accessing Protected Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.6.1. Threat: Eavesdropping access tokens on transport . . . 41
4.6.2. Threat: Replay authorized resource server requests . . 42
4.6.3. Threat: Guessing access tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.6.4. Threat: Access token phishing by counterfeit
resource server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.6.5. Threat: Abuse of token by legitimate resource
server or client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.6.6. Threat: Leak of confidential data in HTTP-Proxies . . 44
4.6.7. Threat: Token leakage via logfiles and HTTP
referrers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.1. Confidentiality of Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.2. Server authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.3. Always keep the resource owner informed . . . . . . . 46
5.1.4. Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.4.1. Credential storage protection . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.4.2. Online attacks on secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1.5. Tokens (access, refresh, code) . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1.5.1. Limit token scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1.5.2. Expiration time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.1.5.3. Short expiration time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.1.5.4. Limit number of usages/ One time usage . . . . . . 50
5.1.5.5. Bind tokens to a particular resource server
(Audience) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.1.5.6. Use endpoint address as token audience . . . . . . 50
5.1.5.7. Audience and Token scopes . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.1.5.8. Bind token to client id . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.5.9. Signed tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.5.10. Encryption of token content . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.5.11. Random token value with high entropy . . . . . . . 51
5.1.5.12. Assertion formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.6. Access tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2. Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2.1. Authorization Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2.1.1. Automatic revocation of derived tokens if
abuse is detected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2.2. Refresh tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.2.2.1. Restricted issuance of refresh tokens . . . . . . 52
5.2.2.2. Binding of refresh token to client_id . . . . . . 52
5.2.2.3. Refresh Token Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
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5.2.2.4. Refresh Token Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2.2.5. Combine refresh token requests with
user-provided secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2.2.6. Device identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2.2.7. X-FRAME-OPTION header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2.3. Client authentication and authorization . . . . . . . 54
5.2.3.1. Don't issue secrets to clients with
inappropriate security policy . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2.3.2. Clients without secret require user consent . . . 55
5.2.3.3. Client_id only in combination with redirect_uri . 55
5.2.3.4. Deployment-specific client secrets . . . . . . . . 55
5.2.3.5. Validation of pre-registered redirect_uri . . . . 56
5.2.3.6. Client secret revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2.3.7. Use strong client authentication (e.g.
client_assertion / client_token) . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2.4. End-user authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2.4.1. Automatic processing of repeated
authorizations requires client validation . . . . 57
5.2.4.2. Informed decisions based on transparency . . . . . 58
5.2.4.3. Validation of client properties by end-user . . . 58
5.2.4.4. Binding of authorization code to client_id . . . . 58
5.2.4.5. Binding of authorization code to redirect_uri . . 58
5.3. Client App Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.1. Don't store credentials in code or resources
bundled with software packages . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.2. Standard web server protection measures (for
config files and databases) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.3. Store secrets in a secure storage . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.4. Utilize device lock to prevent unauthorized device
access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.5. Platform security measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4. Resource Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4.1. Authorization headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4.2. Authenticated requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.4.3. Signed requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
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1. Introduction
This document gives security considerations based on a comprehensive
threat model for the OAuth 2.0 Protocol [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. It
contains the following content:
o Documents any assumptions and scope considered when creating the
threat model.
o Describes the security features in-built into the OAuth protocol
and how they are intended to thwart attacks.
o Gives a comprehensive threat model for OAuth and describes the
respective counter measures to thwart those threats.
Threats include any intentional attacks on OAuth tokens and resources
protected by OAuth tokens as well as security risks introduced if the
proper security measures are not put in place. Threats are
structured along the lines of the protocol structure to aid
development teams implement each part of the protocol securely. For
example all threats for granting access or all threats for a
particular client profile or all threats for protecting the resource
server.
2. Overview
2.1. Scope
The security considerations document only considers clients bound to
a particular deployment as supported by [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]. Such
deployments have the following characteristics:
o Resource server URLs are static and well-known at development
time, authorization server URLs can be static or discovered.
o Token scope values (e.g. applicable URLs and methods) are well-
known at development time.
o Client registration: Since registration of clients is out of scope
of the current core spec, this document assumes a broad variety of
options from static registration during development time to
dynamic registration at runtime.
The following are considered out of scope :
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o Communication between authorization server and resource server
o Token formats
o Except for "Resource Owner Password Credentials" (see
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], section 4.3), the mechanism used by
authorization servers to authenticate the user
o Mechanism by which a user obtained an assertion and any resulting
attacks mounted as a result of the assertion being false.
o Clients are not bound to a specific deployment: An example could
by a mail client with support for contact list access via the
portable contacts API (see [portable-contacts]). Such clients
cannot be registered upfront with a particular deployment and must
dynamically discover the URLs relevant for the Oauth protocol.
2.2. Attack Assumptions
The following assumptions relate to an attacker and resources
available to an attacker:
o It is assumed the attacker has full access to the network between
the client and authorization servers and the client and the
resource server, respectively. The attacker may eaves drop on any
communications between those parties. He is not assumed to have
access to communication between authorization and resource server.
o It is assumed an attacker has unlimited resources to mount an
attack.
o It is assumed that 2 of the 3 parties involved in the OAuth
protocol may collude to mount an attack against the 3rd party.
For example, the client and authorization server may be under
control of an attacker and collude to trick a user to gain access
to resources.
2.3. Architectural assumptions
This section documents the assumptions about the features,
limitations and design options of the different entities of a OAuth
deployment along with the security-sensitive data-elements managed by
those entity. These assumptions are the foundation of the treat
analysis.
The OAuth protocol leaves deployments with a certain degree of
freedom how to implement and apply the standard. The core
specification defines the core concepts of an authorization server
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and a resource server. Both servers can be implemented in the same
server entity, or they may also be different entities. The later is
typically the case for multi-service providers with a single
authentication and authorization system, and are more typical in
middleware architectures.
2.3.1. Authorization Servers
The following data elements MAY be stored or accessible on the
authorization server:
o user names and passwords
o client ids and secrets
o client-specific refresh tokens
o client-specific access tokens (in case of handle-based design)
o HTTPS certificate/key
o per authorization process (in case of handle-based design):
redirect_uri, client_id, authorization code
2.3.2. Resource Server
The following data elements MAY be stored or accessible on the
resource server:
o user data (out of scope)
o HTTPS certificate/key
o authz server credentials (handle-based design), or
o authz server shared secret/public key (assertion-based design)
o access tokens (per request)
It is assumed that a resource server has no knowledge of refresh
tokens, user passwords, or client secrets.
2.3.3. Client
The following data elements are stored or accessible on the client:
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o client id (and client secret or corresponding client credential)
o one or more refresh tokens (persistent) and access tokens
(transient) per end-user or other security-context or delegation
context
o trusted CA certs (HTTPS)
o per authorization process: redirect_uri, authorization code
2.3.3.1. Web Application
A web application is a client running on a web server, typically with
its own user management. End-users access the client via an HTML
user interface rendered in a user- agent on the end-user's device.
The client credentials as well as any token issued to the client are
stored on the web server and are not exposed to or accessible by the
end-user. Tokens are bound to a single user identity at the site.
The potential number of tokens affected by a security breach depends
on number of site users.
Such clients are implemented using the authorization code grant type
(see Section 4.4.1).
2.3.3.2. Native Applications
A native application is a client which is installed and executes on
the end-user's device, such as a notebook, PC, Tablet, Smartphone, or
Gaming Console. The OAuth protocol data and credentials are
accessible to the end-user. It is assumed that such an application
can protect dynamically issued credentials, such as refresh tokens,
from eavesdropping by other applications residing on the same device.
Massively distributed applications such as these cannot reliably keep
secrets confidential, which are issued per software package. This is
because such secrets would need to be transferred to the user device
as part of the installation process. An attacker could reverse
engineer any secret from the binary or accompanying resources.
Native Applications are able to protect per installation/instance
secrets (e.g. refresh tokens) to some extent.
Device platforms typically allow users to lock the device with a PIN
code and to segregate different apps or users (multi-user operation
systems).
Some devices can be identified/authenticated (to varying degrees of
assurance):
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o Handsets and smart phones by its International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI)
o Set top boxes, gaming consoles, others by using certificates and
TPM module - Note: This does not help to identify client apps but
may be used to bound tokens to devices and to detect token theft
Mobile devices, such as handsets or smart phones have the following
special characteristics:
o Limited input capabilities, therefore such clients typically
obtain a refresh token in order to provide automatic login for
sub-sequent application sessions
o As mobile and small devices, they can get cloned, stolen or lost
easier than other devices.
o Security breach will affect single user (or a few users) only.
For the purposes of this document, the scenario of attackers who
control a smartphone device entirely is out of scope.
There are several implementation options for native applications:
o The authorization code grant type in combination with an embedded
or external browser (Section 4.4.1)
o The implict grant type in combination with an embedded or external
browser (Section 4.4.2)
o The resource owner password credentials grant type can be used as
well (Section 4.4.3)
Different threats exists for those implementation options, which are
discussed in the respective sections of the threat model.
2.3.3.3. User-agent-based Applications
A user-agent-based application is a client in which the client code
is downloaded from a web server and executes within a user-agent on
the end-user's device. The OAuth protocol data and credentials are
accessible to the end-user. Since such applications directly reside
within the user-agent, they can make seamless use of the user-agent
capabilities in the end-user authorization process.
Such client are implemented using the implicit grant grant type
(Section 4.4.2).
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2.3.3.4. Autonomous
Autonomous clients access resource services using rights grants by
client credentials only. Thus the autonomous client becomes the
"user". Authenticating autonomous clients is conceptually similar to
end-user authentication since the issued tokens refer to the client's
identity. Autonomous clients shall always be required to use a
secret or some other form of authentication (e.g. client assertion in
the form of a SAML assertion or STS token) acceptable to the
authorization/token services. The client must ensure the
confidentiality of client_secret or other credential.
Such client are implemented using the client credentials grant type.
3. Security Features
These are some of the security features which have been built into
the OAuth 2.0 protocol to mitigate attacks and security issues.
3.1. Tokens
OAuth makes extensive use of all kinds of tokens (access tokens,
refresh tokens, authorization codes). The information content of a
token can be represented in two ways as follows:
Handle (or artifact) a reference to some internal data structure
within the authorization server, the internal data structure
contains the attributes of the token, such as user id, scope, etc.
Handles enable simple revocation and do not require cryptographic
mechanisms to protected token content from being modified. On the
other hand, handles require communication between issuing and
consuming entity (e.g. authorization and resource server) in order
to validate the token and obtain token-bound data. This
communication might have an negative impact on performance and
scalability if both entities reside on different system. Handles
are therefore typically used if the issuing and consuming entity
are the same. A 'handle' token is often referred to as an
'opaque' token because the resource server does not need to be
able to interpret the token directly, it simply uses the token.
Assertions (aka self-contained token) a parseable token. An
assertion typically has a duration, an audience, and is digitally
signed containing information about the user and the client.
Examples of assertion formats are SAML assertions and Kerberos
tickets. Assertions can typically directly be validated and used
by a resource server without interactions with the authorization
server. This results in better performance and scalability in
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deployment where issuing and consuming entity reside on different
systems. Implementing token revocation is more difficult with
assertions than with handles.
Tokens can be used in two ways to invoke requests on resource servers
as follows:
bearer token A 'bearer token' is a token that can be used by any
client who has received the token (e.g.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer]). Because mere possession is enough to
use the token it is important that communication between end-
points be secured to ensure that only authorized end-points may
capture the token. The bearer token is convenient to client
applications as it does not require them to do anything to use
them (such as a proof of identity). Bearer tokens have similar
characteristics to web SSO cookies used in browsers.
proof token A 'proof token' is a token that can only be used by a
specific client. Each use of the token, requires the client to
perform some action that proves that it is the authorized user of
the token. Examples of this are MAC tokens, which require the
client to digitally sign the resource request with a secret
corresponding to the particular token send with the request
(e.g.[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]).
3.1.1. Scope
A Scope represents the access authorization associated with a
particular token with respect to resource servers, resources and
methods on those resources. Scopes are the OAuth way to explicitly
manage the power associated with an access token. A scope can be
controlled by the authorization server and/or the end-user in order
to limit access to resources for OAuth clients these parties deem
less secure or trustworthy. Optionally, the client can request the
scope to apply to the token but only for lesser scope than would
otherwise be granted, e.g. to reduce the potential impact if this
token is sent over non secure channels. A scope is typically
complemented by a restriction on a token's lifetime.
3.1.2. Expires_In
Expires_In allows an authorization server (based on its policies or
on behalf of the end-user) to limit the lifetime of the access token.
This mechanisms can be used to issue short-living tokens to OAuth
clients the authorization server deems less secure or where sending
tokens over non secure channels.
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3.2. Access Token
An access token is used by a client to access a resource. Access
tokens typically have short life-spans (minutes or hours) that cover
typical session lifetimes. An access token may be refreshed through
the use of a refresh token. The short lifespan of an access token in
combination with the usage of refresh tokens enables the possibility
of passive revocation of access authorization on the expiry of the
current access token.
3.3. Refresh Token
A refresh token represents a long-lasting authorization of a certain
client to access resources on behalf of a resource owner. Such
tokens are exchanged between client and authorization server, only.
Clients use this kind of token to obtain ("refresh") new access
tokens used for resource server invocations.
A refresh token, coupled with a short access token lifetime, can be
used to grant longer access to resources without involving end user
authorization. This offers an advantage where resource servers and
authorization servers are not the same entity, e.g. in a distributed
environment, as the refresh token must always be exchanged at the
authorization server. The authorization server can revoke the
refresh token at any time causing the granted access to be revoked
once the current access token expires. Because of this, a short
access token lifetime is important if timely revocation is a high
priority.
The refresh token is also a secret bound to the client identifier and
_instance_ which originally requested the authorization and
representing the original resource owner grant. This is ensured by
the authorization process as follows:
1. The resource owner and user-agent safely deliver the
authorization code to the client instance in first place.
2. The client uses it immediately in secure transport-level
communications to the authorization server and then securely
stores the long-lived refresh token.
3. The client always uses the refresh token in secure transport-
level communications to the authorization server to get an access
token (and optionally rollover the refresh token).
So as long as the confidentiality of the particular token can be
ensured by the client, a refresh tokens can also be used as an
alternative mean to authenticate the client instance itself.
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3.4. Authorization Code
An Authorization Code represents the intermediary result of a
successful end-user authorization process and is used by the client
to obtain access and refresh token. Authorization codes are sent to
the client's redirect_uri instead of tokens for two purposes.
1. Instead of (longer-lasting) tokens, the short-living
authorization code is exposed to potential attackers via URI
query parameters (HTTP referrer), browser cacher or log file
entries.
2. It is much simpler to authenticate clients during the direct
request between client and authorization server than in the
context of the indirect authorization request. The later would
require digital signatures.
3.5. Redirect-URI
A Redirect-uri helps to identify clients and prevents phishing
attacks from other clients attempting to trick the user into
believing the phisher is the client. The value of the actual
redirect_uri used in the authorization request has to be presented
and is verified when an authorization code is exchanged for tokens.
This helps to prevent attacks, where the authorization code is
revealed through redirectors and counterfeit web app clients.
Moreover, the authorization server may require clients to pre-
register their redirect URIs and validate the redirect_uri in the
authorization request in order to detect malicious clients.
3.6. State parameter
The state parameter is used to link requests and callbacks to prevent
CSRF attacks where an attacker authorizes access to his own resources
and then tricks a users into following a redirect with the attacker's
token.
3.7. Client Identity
Authentication protocols have typically not taken into account the
identity of the software component acting on behalf of the end-user.
OAuth does this in order to increase the security level in delegated
authorization scenarios and because the client will be able to act
without the user's presence. Depending on the client type, the
client identity can and should be authenticated (see below).
OAuth uses the _client_id_ (client identity) to collate associated
request to the same originator, such as
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o a particular end-user authorization process and the corresponding
request on the tokens endpoint to exchange the authorization code
for tokens or
o the initial authorization and issuance of a tokens by an end-user
to a particular client and sub-sequent requests by this client to
obtain tokens w/o user consent (automatic processing of repeated
authorization)
The client identity may also be used by the authorization server to
display relevant registration information to a user when requesting
consent for scope requested by a particular client. The client
identity may be used to limit the number of request for a particular
client or to charge the client per request. Client Identity may
furthermore be useful to differentiate access by different clients,
e.g. in server log files.
The _client_secret_ is used to verify the client identifier. The
authorization server should only rely on this form of client
authentication where these secrets can be deployed to the clients in
a secure manner and the client is capable of keeping its secret
confidential. Alternatively, the client identity can also be
verified using the _redirect_uri_ or by the _end-user_.
Clients (and the trustworthiness of its identity) can be classifed by
using the following parameters:
o Deployment-specific or -independent client_id (Note: for native
apps, every installation of a particular app on a certain device
is considered a deployment.)
o Validated properties, such as app name or redirect_uri
o Client_secret available
Typical client categories are:
Deployment-independent client_id with pre-registered redirect_uri and
without client_secret Such an identity is used by multiple
installations of the same software package. The identity of such
a client can only be validated with the help of the end-user.
This is a viable option for native apps in order to identify the
client for the purpose of displaying meta information about the
client to the user and to differentiate clients in log files.
Revocation of such an identity will affect ALL deployments of the
respective software.
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Deployment-independent client_id with pre-registered redirect_uri and
with client_secret This is an option for native applications only,
since web application would require different redirect URIs. This
category is not advisable because the client secret cannot be
protected appropriately (see Section 4.1.1). Due to its security
weaknesses, such client identities have the same trustlevel as
deployment-independent clients without secret. Revocation will
affect ALL deployments.
Deployment-specific client_id with pre-registered redirect_uri and
with client_secret The client registration process insures the
validation of the client's properties, such as redirect_uri,
website address, web site name, contacts. Such a client identity
can be utilized for all relevant use cases cited above. This
level can be achieved for web applications in combination with a
manual or user-bound registration process. Achieving this level
for native applications is much more difficult. Either the
installation of the app is conducted by an administrator, who
validates the clients authenticity, or the process from validating
the app to the installation of the app on the device and the
creation of the client credentials is controlled end-to-end by a
single entity (e.g. app market provider). Revocation will affect
a single deployment only.
Deployment-specific client_id with client_secret without validated
properties Such a client can be recognized by the authorization
server in transactions with subsequent requests (e.g.
authorization and token issuance, refresh token issuance and
access token refreshment). The authorization server cannot assure
any property of the client to end-users. Automatic processing of
re-authorizations could be allowed as well. Such client
credentials can be generated automatically without any validation
of client properties, which makes it another option especially for
native apps. Revocation will affect a single deployment only.
Use of the client secret is considered a relatively weak form of
credential for the client. Use of stronger mechanisms such as a
client assertion (e.g. SAML), key cryptography, are preferred.
4. Security Threat Model
This sections gives a comprehensive threat model of OAuth 2.0.
Threats are grouped first by attackes directed against an OAuth
component, which are client, authorization server, and resource
server. Subsequently, they are grouped by flow, e.g. obtain token or
access protected resources. Every countermeasure description refers
to a detailed description in Section 5.
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4.1. Clients
This section describes possible threats directed to OAuth clients.
4.1.1. Threat: Obtain Client Secrets
The attacker could try to get access to the secret of a particular
client in order to:
o replay its refresh tokens and authorization codes, or
o obtain tokens on behalf of the attacked client with the privileges
of that client.
The resulting impact would be:
o Client authentication of access to authorization server can be
bypassed
o Stolen refresh tokens or authorization codes can be replayed
Depending on the client category, there are the following approaches
an attacker could utilize to obtain the client secret.
*Attack: Obtain Secret From Source Code or Binary.* This applies for
all client profiles. For open source projects, secrets can be
extracted directly from source code in their public repositories.
Secrets can be extracted from application binaries just as easily
when published source is not available to the attacker. Even if an
application takes significant measures to obfuscate secrets in their
application distribution one should consider that the secret can
still be reverse-engineered by anyone with access to a complete
functioning application bundle or binary.
_Countermeasures:_
o Don't issue secrets to clients with inappropriate security policy
- Section 5.2.3.1
o Clients without secrect require user consent - Section 5.2.3.2
o Use deployment-specific client secrets - Section 5.2.3.4
o Client secret revocation - Section 5.2.3.6
__
*Attack: Obtain a Deployment-Specific Secret.* An attacker may try to
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obtain the secret from a client installation, either from a web site
(web server) or a particular devices (native app).
_Countermeasures:_
o Web server: apply standard web server protection measures (for
config files and databases) - Section 5.3.2
o Native apps: Store secrets in a secure local storage -
Section 5.3.3
o Client secret revocation - Section 5.2.3.6
4.1.2. Threat: Obtain Refresh Tokens
Depending on the client type, there are different ways refresh tokens
may be revealed to an attacker. The following sub-sections give a
more detailed description of the different attacks with respect to
different client types and further specialized countermeasures. Some
generally applicable countermeasure to mitigate such attacks shall be
given in advance:
o The authorization server must validate the client id associated
with the particular refresh token with every refresh request-
Section 5.2.2.2
o Limited scope tokens - Section 5.1.5.1
o Refresh token revocation - Section 5.2.2.4
o Client secret revocation - Section 5.2.3.6
o Refresh tokens can automatically be replaced in order to detect
unauthorized token usage by another party (Refresh Token
Replacement) - Section 5.2.2.3
**
*Attack: Obtain Refresh Token from Web application.* An attack may
obtain the refresh tokens issued to a web server client. Impact:
Exposure of all refresh tokens on that side.
_Countermeasures:_
o Standard web server protection measures - Section 5.3.2
o Use strong client authentication (e.g. client_assertion /
client_token), so the attacker cannot obtain the client secret
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required to exchange the tokens - Section 5.2.3.7
**
*Attack: Obtain Refresh Token from Native clients.* On native
clients, leakage of a refresh token typically affects a single user,
only.
_Read from local filesystem:_ The attacker could try get file system
access on the device and read the refresh tokens. The attacker could
utilize a malicious app for that purpose.
_Countermeasures:_
o Store secrets in a secure storage - Section 5.3.3
o Utilize device lock to prevent unauthorized device access -
Section 5.3.4
__
_Steal device_: The host device (e.g. mobile phone) may be stolen.
In that case, the attacker gets access to all apps under the identity
of the legitimate user.
_Countermeasures:_
o Utilize device lock to prevent unauthorized device access -
Section 5.3.4
o Combine refresh token requests with user-provided secret -
Section 5.2.2.5
o Where a user knows the device has been stolen, they can revoke the
affected tokens - Section 5.2.2.4
__
_Clone device: _All device data and applications are copied to
another device. Applications are used as-is on the target device.
_Countermeasures:_
o Combine refresh token request with device identification -
Section 5.2.2.6
o Combine refresh token requests with user-provided secret -
Section 5.2.2.5
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o Refresh Token Replacement - Section 5.2.2.3
o Where a user knows the device has been cloned, they can use this
countermeasure - Refresh Token Revocation - Section 5.2.2.4
__
_Obtain refresh tokens from backup:_ A refresh token could be
obtained from the backup of a client application, or device.
_Countermeasures:_
o tbd
4.1.3. Threat: Obtain Access Tokens
Depending on the client type, there are different ways access tokens
may be revealed to an attacker. Access tokens could be stolen from
the device if the app stores them in a storage, which is accessible
to other applications.
Impact: Where the token is a bearer token and no additional mechanism
is used to identify the client, the attacker can access all resources
associated with the token and its scope.
Countermeasures:
o Keep access tokens in transient memory and limit grants:
Section 5.1.6
o Limited scope tokens - Section 5.1.5.1
o Keep access tokens in private memory or apply same protection
means as for refresh tokens - Section 5.2.2
o Keep access token lifetime short - Section 5.1.5.3
4.1.4. Threat: End-user credentials phished using compromised or
embedded browser
A malicious app could attempt to phish end-user passwords by misusing
an embedded browser in the end-user authorization process, or by
presenting its own user-interface instead of allowing trusted system
browser to render the authorization UI. By doing so, the usual
visual trust mechanisms may be bypassed (e.g. TLS confirmation, web
site mechanisms). By using an embedded or internal client app UI,
the client app has access to additional information it should not
have access to (e.g. uid/password).
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Impact: If the client app or the communication is compromised, the
user would not be aware and all information in the authorization
exchange could be captured such as username and password.
Countermeasures:
o Client developers and end-user can be educated to trust an
external System-Browser only.
o Client apps could be validated prior publication in a app market.
o Client developers should not collect authentication information
directly from users and should instead use redirects to and back
from a trusted external system-browser.
4.2. Authorization Endpoint
4.2.1. Threat: Password phishing by counterfeit authorization server
OAuth makes no attempt to verify the authenticity of the
Authorization Server. A hostile party could take advantage of this
by intercepting the Client's requests and returning misleading or
otherwise incorrect responses. This could be achieved using DNS or
ARP spoofing. Wide deployment of OAuth and similar protocols may
cause Users to become inured to the practice of being redirected to
websites where they are asked to enter their passwords. If Users are
not careful to verify the authenticity of these websites before
entering their credentials, it will be possible for attackers to
exploit this practice to steal Users' passwords.
Countermeasures:
o Authorization servers should consider such attacks when developing
services based on OAuth, and should require transport-layer
security for any requests where the authenticity of the
authorization server or of request responses is an issue (see
Section 5.1.2).
o Authorization servers should attempt to educate Users about the
risks phishing attacks pose, and should provide mechanisms that
make it easy for users to confirm the authenticity of their sites.
4.2.2. Threat: User unintentionally grants too much access scope
When obtaining end user authorization, the end-user may not
understand the scope of the access being granted and to whom or they
may end up providing a client with access to resources which should
not be permitted.
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Countermeasures:
o Explain the scope (resources and the permissions) the user is
about to grant in a understandable way - Section 5.2.4.2
o Narrow scope based on client-specific policy - When obtaining end
user authorization and where the client requests scope, the
authorization server may want to consider whether to honour that
scope based on who the client is. That decision is between the
client and authorization server and is outside the scope of this
spec. The authorization server may also want to consider what
scope to grant based on the profile used, e.g. providing lower
scope where no client secret is provided from a native
application. - Section 5.1.5.1
4.2.3. Threat: Malicious client obtains existing authorization by fraud
Authorization servers may wish to automatically process authorization
requests from clients which have been previously authorized by the
user. When the user is redirected to the authorization server's end-
user authorization endpoint to grant access, the authorization server
detects that the user has already granted access to that particular
client. Instead of prompting the user for approval, the
authorization server automatically redirects the user back to the
client.
A malicious client may exploit that feature and try to obtain such an
authorization code instead of the legimate client.
Countermeasures:
o Authorization servers should not automatically process repeat
authorizations where the client is not authenticated through a
client secret or some other authentication mechanism such as
signing with security certs (see Section 5.2.3.7) or validation of
a pre-registered redirect uri (Section 5.2.3.5 )
o Authorization servers can mitigate the risks associated with
automatic processing by limiting the scope of Access Tokens
obtained through automated approvals - Section 5.1.5.1
4.2.4. Threat: Open redirector
An attacker could use the end-user authorization endpoint and the
redirect_uri parameter to abuse the authorization server as
redirector.
Impact?
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Countermeasure
o don't redirect to redirect_uri, if client identity or redirect_uri
could not be verified
4.3. Token endpoint
4.3.1. Threat: Eavesdropping access tokens
Attackers may attempts to eaversdrop access token on transit from the
authorization server to the client.
Impact: The attacker is able to access all resources with the
permissions covered by the scope of the particular access token.
Countermeasures:
o Authorization servers MUST ensure that these transmissions are
protected using transport-layer mechanisms such as TLS or SSL (see
Section 5.1.1).
o If end-to-end confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, reducing scope
(see Section 5.1.5.1) and expiry time (Section 5.1.5.3) for access
tokens can be used to reduce the damage in case of leaks.
4.3.2. Threat: Obtain access tokens from authorization server database
This threat is applicable if the authorization server stores access
tokens as handles in a database. An attacker may obtain access
tokens from the authorization server's database by gaining access to
the database or launching a SQL injection attack. Impact: disclosure
of all access tokens
Countermeasures:
o System security measures - Section 5.1.4.1.1
o Store access token hashes only - Section 5.1.4.1.3
o Standard SQL inj. Countermeasures - Section 5.1.4.1.2
4.3.3. Threat: Obtain client credentials over non secure transport
An attacker could attempt to eavesdrop the transmission of client
credentials between client and server during the client
authentication process or during Oauth token requests. Impact:
Revelation of a client credential enabling the possibility for
phishing or immitation of a client service.
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Countermeasures:
o Implement transport security through Confidentiality of Requests
o Alternative authentication means, which do not require to send
plaintext credentials over the wire (Examples: Digest
authentication)
4.3.4. Threat: Obtain client secret from authorization server database
An attacker may obtain valid client_id/secret combinations from the
authorization server's database by gaining access to the database or
launching a SQL injection attack. Impact: disclosure of all
client_id/secret combinations. This allows the attacker to act on
behalf of legitimate clients.
Countermeasures:
o Ensure proper handling of credentials as per Credential storage
protection.
4.3.5. Threat: Obtain client secret by online guessing
An attacker may try to guess valid client_id/secret pairs. Impact:
disclosure of single client_id/secret pair.
Countermeasures:
o High entropy of secrets - Section 5.1.4.2.2
o Lock accounts - Section 5.1.4.2.3
4.3.6. Threat: DoS on dynamic client secret creation
If an authorization servers includes a nontrivial amount of entropy
in client secrets and if the authorization server automatically
grants them, an attacker could exhaust the pool by repeatedly
applying for them.
Countermeasures:
o The authorization server should consider some verification step
for new clients. The authorization server should include a
nontrivial amount of entropy in client secrets.
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4.4. Obtaining Authorization
This section covers threats which are specific to certain flows
utilized to obtain access tokens. Each flow is characterized by
response types and/or grant types on the end-user authorization and
tokens endpoint, respectively.
4.4.1. Authorization Code
4.4.1.1. Threat: Eavesdropping or leaking authorization codes
An attacker could try to eavesdrop transmission of the authorization
code between authorization server and client. Furthermore,
authorization codes are passed via the browser which may
unintentionally leak those codes to untrusted web sites and attackers
by different ways:
o Referer headers: browsers frequently pass a "referer" header when
a web page embeds content, or when a user travels from one web
page to another web page. These referer headers may be sent even
when the origin site does not trust the destination site. The
referer header is commonly logged for traffic analysis purposes.
o Request logs: web server request logs commonly include query
parameters on requests.
o Open redirectors: web sites sometimes need to send users to
another destination via a redirector. Open redirectors pose a
particular risk to web-based delegation protocols because the
redirector can leak verification codes to untrusted destination
sites.
o Browser history: web browsers commonly record visited URLs in the
browser history. Another user of the same web browser may be able
to view URLs that were visited by previous users.
Note: A description of a similar attacks on the SAML protocol can be
found at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/3405/
oasis-sstc-saml-bindings-1.1.pdf (S.4.1.1.9.1), http://
www.thomasgross.net/publications/papers/
GroPfi2006-SAML2_Analysis_Janus.WSSS_06.pdf and http://
www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/11191/
sstc-gross-sec-analysis-response-01.pdf.
Countermeasures:
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o Authorization server as well as the client MUST ensure that these
transmissions are protected using transport-layer mechanisms such
as TLS or SSL (see Section 5.1.1).
o The authorization server shall require the client to authenticate
wherever possible, so the binding of the authorization code to a
certain client can be validated in a reliable way (see
Section 5.2.4.4).
o Limited duration of authorization codes - Section 5.1.5.3
o The authorization server SHOULD enforce a one time usage
restriction (see Section 5.1.5.4).
o If an Authorization Server observes multiple attempts to redeem a
authorization code, the Authorization Server may want to revoke
all tokens granted based on the authorization code (see
Section 5.2.1.1).
o In the absence of these countermeasures, reducing scope
(Section 5.1.5.1) and expiry time (Section 5.1.5.3) for access
tokens can be used to reduce the damage in case of leaks.
o The client server may reload the target page of the redirect_uri
in order to automatically cleanup the browser cache.
4.4.1.2. Threat: Obtain authorization codes from authorization server
database
This threat is applicable if the authorization server stores
authorization codes as handles in a database. An attacker may obtain
authorization codes from the authorization server's database by
gaining access to the database or launching a SQL injection attack.
Impact: disclosure of all authorization codes, most likely along with
the respective redirect_uri and client_id values.
Countermeasures:
o Credential storage protection can be employed - Section 5.1.4.1
o System security measures - Section 5.1.4.1.1
o Store access token hashes only - Section 5.1.4.1.3
o Standard SQL inj. Countermeasures - Section 5.1.4.1.2
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4.4.1.3. Threat: Online guessing of authorization codes
An attacker may try to guess valid authorization code values and send
it using the grant type "code" in order to obtain a valid access
token. Impact: disclosure of single access token (+probably refresh
token)
Countermeasures:
o For handle-based designs: Section 5.1.5.11
o For assertion-based designs: Section 5.1.5.9
o Authenticate the client, adds another value the attacker has to
guess - Section 5.2.3.4
o Binding of authorization code to redirect_uri, adds another value
the attacker has to guess - Section 5.2.4.5
o Short expiration time - Section 5.1.5.3
4.4.1.4. Threat: Malicious client obtains authorization
A malicious client could counterfeit a valid client and obtain an
access authorization that way. The malicious client could even
utilize screen scraping techniques in order to simulate the user
consent in the authorization flow.
Assumption: It is not the task of the authorization server to protect
the end-user's device from malicious software. This is the
responsibility of the platform running on the particular device
probably in cooperation with other components of the respective
ecosystem (e.g. an application management infrastructure). The sole
responsibility of the authorization server is to control access to
the end-user's resources living in resource servers and to prevent
unauthorized access to them. Based on this assumption, the following
countermeasures are available to cope with the threat.
Countermeasures:
o The authorization server should authentication the client, if
possible (see Section 5.2.3.4). Note: the authentication takes
place after the end-user has authorized the access.
o The authorization server should validate the client's redirect_uri
against the pre-registered redirect_uri, if one exists (see
Section 5.2.3.5). Note: The validation of the redirect_uri is the
only technical mean to recognize a malicious client id in advance
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of the authorization process. Further note this does not work for
native applications because in contrast to web applications this
URI is not bound to a single communication endpoint. The valid
client's redirect_uri (typically with custom scheme) can be used
by a malicious on any device.
o After authenticating the end-user, the authorization server should
ask him/her for consent. In this context, the user shall be
explained the purpose, scope, and duration of the authorization.
Moreover, the authorization server must view to the end-user the
meta data it associates with the particular client. It is up to
the user to validate the binding of this data to the particular
application (e.g. Name) and to approve the authorization request.
(see Section 5.2.4.3).
o The authorization server must not perform automatic re-
authorizations for clients it is unable to reliably authenticate
or validate (see Section 5.2.4.1).
o If the authorization server automatically authenticates the end-
user, it may nevertheless require some user input in order to
prevent screen scraping. Examples are CAPTCHAs or user-specific
secret like PIN codes.
o The authorization server may also limit the scope of tokens it
issues to clients it cannot reliably authenticate (see
Section 5.1.5.1).
4.4.1.5. Threat: Authorization code phishing
A hostile party could impersonate the client site and get access to
the authorization code. This could be achieved using DNS or ARP
spoofing. This applies to clients, which are web applications, thus
the redirect URI is not local to the host where the user's browser is
running.
Impact: This affects web applications and may lead to a disclosure of
authorization codes and, potentially, the corresponding access and
refresh tokens.
Countermeasures:
o The authorization server MUST require the client to authenticate
with a secret, so the binding of the authorization code to a
certain client can be validated in a reliable way (see
Section 5.2.4.4).
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o The redirect_uri of the client SHOULD point to a HTTPS protected
endpoint and the browser shall be utilized to authenticate this
redirect_uri using server authentication (see Section 5.1.2).
4.4.1.6. Threat: User session impersonation
A hostile party could impersonate the client site and impersonate the
user's session on this client. This could be achieved using DNS or
ARP spoofing. This applies to clients, which are web applications,
thus the redirect URI is not local to the host where the user's
browser is running.
Impact: An attacker who intercepts the authorization code as it is
sent by the browser to the callback endpoint can gain access to
protected resources by submitting the authorization code to the
client. The client will exchange the authorization code for an
access token and use the access token to access protected resources
for the benefit of the attacker, delivering protected resources to
the attacker, or modifying protected resources as directed by the
attacker. If OAuth is used by the client to delegate authentication
to a social site (e.g. as in the implementation of the "Facebook
Login" button), the attacker can use the intercepted authorization
code to log in to the client as the user.
Note: Authenticating the client during authorization code exchange
will not help to detect such an attack as it is the legitimate client
that obtains the tokens.
Countermeasures:
o In order to prevent an attacker from impersonating the end-users
session, the redirect_uri of the client MUST point to a HTTPS
protected endpoint and the browser shall be utilized to
authenticate this redirect_uri using server authentication (see
Section 5.1.2)
4.4.1.7. Threat: Authorization code leakage through counterfeit client
The attack leverages the authorization code grant type in an attempt
to get another user (victim) to log-in, authorize access to his/her
resources, and sub-sequently obtain the authorization code and inject
it into a client application using the attacker's account. The goal
is to associate an access authorization for resources of the victim
with the user account of the attacker on a client site.
The attacker abuses an existing client application and combines it
with his own counterfeit client web site. The attack depends on the
victim expecting the client application to request access to a
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certain resource server. The victim, seeing only a normal request
from an expected application, approves the request. The attacker
then uses the victim's authorization to gain access to the
information unknowingly authorized by the victim.
The attacker conducts the following flow:
1. The attacker accesses the client web site (or application) and
initates data access to a particular resource server. The client
web site in turn initiates an authorization request to the
resource server's authorization server. Instead of proceeding
with the authorization process, the attacker modifies the
authorization server end-user authorization URL as constructed by
the client to include a redirect_uri parameter refering to a web
site under his control (attacker's web site).
2. The attacker tricks another user (the victim) to open that
modified end-user authorization URI and to authorize access (e.g.
an email link, or blog link). The way the attacker achieve that
goal is out of scope.
3. Having clicked the link, the victim is requested to authenticate
and authorize the client site to have access.
4. After completion of the authorization process, the authorization
server redirects the user agent to the attacker's web site
instead of the original client web site.
5. The attacker obtains the authorization code from his web site by
means out of scope of this document.
6. He then constructs a redirect_uri to the target web site (or app)
based on the original authorization request's redirect_uri and
the newly obtained authorization code and directs his user agent
to this URL. The authorization code is injected into the
original client site (or application).
7. The client site uses the authorization code to fetch a token from
the authorization server and associates this token with the
attacker's user account on this site.
8. The attacker may now access the victims resources using the
client site.
Impact: The attackes gains access to the victim's resources as
associated with his account on the client site.
Countermeasures:
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o The attacker must use another redirect_uri for its authorization
process than the target web site because it needs to intercept the
flow. So if the authorization server associates the authorization
code with the redirect_uri of a particular end-user authorization
and validates this redirect_uri with the redirect_uri passed to
the tokens endpount, such an attack is detected (see
Section 5.2.4.5).
o The authorization server may also enforce the usage and validation
of pre-registered redirect URIs (see Section 5.2.3.5). This will
allow for an early recognition of sesssion fixation attempts.
o For native apps, one could also consider to use deployment-
specific client ids and secrets (see Section 5.2.3.4, along with
the binding of authorization code to client_id (see
Section 5.2.4.4), to detect such an attack because the attacker
does not have access the deployment-specific secret. Thus he will
not be able to exchange the authorization code.
o The client may consider to use other flows, which are not
vulnerable to this kind of attacks such as "Implicit Grant" or
"Resource Owner Password Credentials" (see Section 4.4.2 or
Section 4.4.3).
4.4.1.8. Threat: CSRF attack against redirect-uri
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web-based attack whereby HTTP
requests are transmitted from a user that the website trusts or has
authenticated (e.g., via HTTP redirects or HTML forms). CSRF attacks
on OAuth approvals can allow an attacker to obtain authorization to
OAuth protected resources without the consent of the User.
This attack works against the redirect-uri used in the authorization
code flow. An attacker could authorize an authorization code to
their own protected resources on an authorization server. He then
aborts the redirect flow back to the client on his device and tricks
the victim into executing the redirect back to the client. The
client receives the redirect, fetches the token(s) from the
authorization server and asscociates the victim's client session with
the resources accessible using the token.
Impact: The user accesses resources on behalf of the attacker. The
effective impact depends on the type of resource accessed. For
example, the user may upload private items to an attacker's
resources. Or when using OAuth in 3rd party login scenarios, the
user may associate his client account with the attacker's idenity at
the external identity provider. This way the attacker could easily
accces the victim's data at the client by logging in from another
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device with his credentials at the external identity provider.
Countermeasures:
o The state parameter should be used to link the authorization
request with the redirect-uri used deliver the access token. This
will ensure the client is not tricked into completing any redirect
callback unless it is linked to an authorization request the
client initiated. The state parameter should be unguessable and
the client should be capable of keeping the state parameter
secret.
o Client developers and end-user can be educated not follow
untrusted urls.
4.4.1.9. Threat: Clickjacking attack against authorization
With Clickjacking, a malicious site loads the target site in a
transparent iframe overlaid on top of a set of dummy buttons which
are carefully constructed to be placed directly under important
buttons on the target site. When a user clicks a visible button,
they are actually clicking a button (such as an "Authorize" button)
on the hidden page.
Impact: An attacker can steal a user's authentication credentials and
access their resources
Countermeasure
o Native applications SHOULD use external browsers instead of
embedding browsers in an iFrame when requesting end-user
authorization
o For newer browsers, avoidance of iFrames can be enforced server
side by using the X-FRAME-OPTION header - Section 5.2.2.7
o For older browsers, javascript framebusting techniques can be used
but may not be effective in all browsers.
4.4.1.10. Threat: DoS, Exhaustion of resources attacks
If an authorization server includes a nontrivial amount of entropy in
authorization codes or access tokens (limiting the number of possible
codes/tokens) and automatically grants either without user
intervention and has no limit on code or access tokens per user, an
attacker could exhaust the pool by repeatedly directing user(s)
browser to request code or access tokens. This is because more
entropy means a larger number of tokens can be issued.
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Countermeasures:
o The authorization server should consider limiting the number of
access tokens granted per user. The authorization server should
include a nontrivial amount of entropy in authorization codes.
4.4.1.11. Threat: DoS using manufactured authorization codes
An attacker who owns a botnet can locate the redirect URIs of clients
that listen on HTTP, access them with random authorization codes, and
cause a large number of HTTPS connections to be concentrated onto the
authorization server. This can result in a DoS attack on the
authorization server.
This attack can still be effective even when CSRF defense/the 'state'
parameter are deployed on the client side. With such a defense, the
attacker might need to incur an additional HTTP request to obtain a
valid CSRF code/ state parameter. This apparently cuts down the
effectiveness of the attack by a factor of 2. However, if the HTTPS/
HTTP cost ratio is higher than 2 (the cost factor is estimated to be
around 3.5x at
http://www.semicomplete.com/blog/geekery/ssl-latency.html), the
attacker still achieves a magnification of resource utilization at
the expense of the authorization server.
Impact: There are a few effects that the attacker can accomplish with
this OAuth flow that they cannot easily achieve otherwise.
1. Connection laundering: With the clients as the relay between the
attacker and the authorization server, the authorization server
learns little or no information about the identity of the
attacker. Defenses such rate limiting on the offending attacker
machines are less effective due to the difficulty to identify the
attacking machines. Although an attacker could also launder its
connections through an anonymizing systems such as Tor, the
effectiveness of that approach depends on the capacity of the
anonyming system. On the other hand, a potentially large number
of OAuth clients could be utilized for this attack.
2. Asymmetric resource utilization: The attacker incurs the cost of
an HTTP connection and causes an HTTPS connection to be made on
the authorization server; and the attacker can co-ordinate the
timing of such HTTPS connections across multiple clients
relatively easily. Although the attacker could achieve something
similar, say, by including an iframe pointing to the HTTPS URL of
the authorization server in an HTTP web page and lure web users
to visit that page, timing attacks using such a scheme may be
more difficult as it seems nontrivial to synchronize a large
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number of users to simultaneously visit a particular site under
the attacker's control.
Countermeasures
o Though not a complete countermeasure by themselves, CSRF defense
and the 'state' parameter created with secure random codes SHOULD
be deployed on the client side. The client SHOULD forward the
authorization code to the authorization server only after both the
CSRF token and the 'state' parameter are validated.
o If the client authenticates the user, either through a single sign
on protocol ( such as OpenID / Facebook Connect ) or through local
authentication, the client SHOULD suspend the access by a user
account if the number of invalid authorization codes submitted by
this user exceeds a certain threshold.
o The authorization server SHOULD send an error response to the
client reporting an invalid authorization code and rate limit or
disallow connections from clients whose number of invalid requests
exceeds a threshold.
o The authorization server MAY in addition sign the authorization
code using the public key from its SSL certificate, and require
the client to validate the signature. To enhance interoperability
between multiple clients and authorization servers, a standard
procedure to create and validate the signature (including what
attributes to sign) MAY be developed and agreed between the
clients and the servers.
4.4.2. Implicit Grant
he implict grant flow, the access token is directly returned to the
client as fragment part of the redirect_uri. It is assumed that the
token is not send to the redirect_uri target since HTTP user agents
do not send fragments server requests. Thus an attacker cannot
eavesdrop the access token on this communication path and It cannot
leak through HTTP referer headers.
4.4.2.1. Threat: Access token leak in transport/end-points
This token might be eavesdropped by an attacker. The token is sent
from server to client via a URI fragment of the redirect_uri. If the
communication is not secured or the end-point is not secured, the
token could be leaked by parsing the returned URI.
Impact: the attacker would be able to assume the same rights granted
by the token.
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Countermeasures:
o The authorization server must ensure confidentialty of the
response from the authorizaton server to the client (see
Section 5.1.1).
4.4.2.2. Threat: Access token leak in browser history
An attacker could obtain the token from the browsers history. Note
this means the attacker needs access to the particular device.
Countermeasures:
o Shorten token duration (see Section 5.1.5.3) and reduced scope of
the token may reduce the impact of that attack (see
Section 5.1.5.1).
o Make these requests non-cachable
o Native apps can directly embedd a browser widget and therewith
gain full control of the cache. So the app can cleanup browser
history after authorization process.
4.4.2.3. Threat: Malicious client obtains authorization
An malicious client could attempt to obtain a token by fraud.
The same countermeasures as for Section 4.4.1.4 are applicable,
except client authentication.
4.4.2.4. Threat: Manipulation of scripts
A hostile party could act as the client web server and replace or
modify the actual implementation of the client (script). This could
be achieved using DNS or ARP spoofing. This applies to clients
implemented within the Web Browser in a scripting language.
Impact: The attacker could obtain user credential information and
assume the full identity of the user.
Countermeasures:
o The authorization server must authenticate the server from which
scripts are obtained (see Section 5.1.2).
o The client must ensure that scripts obtained have not been altered
in transport (see Section 5.1.1).
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o Introduce one time per-use secrets (e.g. client_secret) values
that can only be used by scripts in a small time window once
loaded from a server. The intention would be to reduce the
effectiveness of copying client-side scripts for re-use in an
attackers modified code. [[pending discussion]]
4.4.2.5. Threat: CSRF attack against redirect-uri
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web-based attack whereby HTTP
requests are transmitted from a user that the website trusts or has
authenticated (e.g., via HTTP redirects or HTML forms). CSRF attacks
on OAuth approvals can allow an attacker to obtain authorization to
OAuth protected resources without the consent of the User.
This attack works against the redirect-uri used in the implicit grant
flow. An attacker could acquire an access token to their own
protected resources. He could then construct a redirect-uri and
embed their access token in that uri. If he can trick the user into
following the redirect-uri and the client does not have protection
against this attack, the user may have the attacker's access token
authorized within their client.
Impact: The user accesses resources on behalf of the attacker. The
effective impact depends on the type of resource accessed. For
example, the user may upload private items to an attacker's
resources. Or when using OAuth in 3rd party login scenarios, the
user may associate his client account with the attacker's idenity at
the external identity provider. This way the attacker could easily
accces the victim's data at the client by logging in from another
device with his credentials at the external identity provider.
Countermeasures:
o The state parameter should be used to link the authorization
request with the redirect-uri used deliver the access token. This
will ensure the client is not tricked into completing any redirect
callback unless it is linked to an authorization request the
client initiated. The state parameter should be unguessable and
the client should be capable of keeping the state parameter
secret.
o Client developers and end-user can be educated not follow
untrusted urls.
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4.4.3. Resource Owner Password Credentials
The "Resource Owner Password Credentials" grant type (see
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 4.3), often used for legacy/migration
reasons, allows a client to request an access token using an end-
users user-id and password along with its own credential. This grant
type has higher risk because it maintains the uid/password anti-
pattern. Additionally, because the user does not have control over
the authorization process, clients using this grant type are not
limited by scope, but instead have potentially the same capabilities
as the user themselves. As there is no authorization step, the
ability to offer token revocation is bypassed.
Impact: The resource server can only differentiate scope based on the
access token being associated with a particular client. The client
could also acquire long-living tokens and pass them up to a attacker
web service for further abuse. The client, eavesdroppers, or end-
points could eavesdrop user id and password.
Countermeasures:
o Except for migration reasons, minimize use of this grant type
o The authorization server must validate the client id associated
with the particular refresh token with every refresh request -
Section 5.2.2.2
o Authorization server MUST ensure that these transmissions are
protected using transport-layer mechanisms such as TLS or SSL (see
Section 5.1.1).
4.4.3.1. Threat: Accidental exposure of passwords at client site
If the client does not provide enough protection, an attacker or
disgruntled employee could retrieve the passwords for a user.
Countermeasures:
o Use other flows, which do not rely on the client's cooperation for
secure resource owner credential handling
o Use digest authentication instead of plaintext credential
processing
o Obfuscation of passwords in logs
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4.4.3.2. Threat: Client obtains scopes without end-user authorization
All interaction with the resource owner is performed by the client.
Thus it might, intentionally or unintentionally, happen that the
client obtains a token with scope unknown for or unintended by the
resource owner. For example, the resource owner might think the
client needs and acquires read-only access to its media storage only
but the client tries to acquire an access token with full access
permissions.
Countermeasures:
o Use other flows, which do not rely on the client's cooperation for
resource owner interaction
o The authorization server may generally restrict the scope of
access tokens (Section 5.1.5.1) issued by this flow. If the
particular client is trustworthy and can be authenticated in a
reliable way, the authorization server could relax that
restriction. Resource owners may prescribe (e.g. in their
preferences) what the maximum permission for client using this
flow shall be.
o The authorization server could notify the resource owner by an
appropriate media, e.g. e-Mail, of the grant issued (see
Section 5.1.3).
4.4.3.3. Threat: Client obtains refresh token through automatic
authorization
All interaction with the resource owner is performed by the client.
Thus it might, intentionally or unintentionally, happen that the
client obtains a long-term authorization represented by a refresh
token even if the resource owner did not intend so.
Countermeasures:
o Use other flows, which do not rely on the client's cooperation for
resource owner interaction
o The authorization server may generally refuse to issue refresh
tokens in this flow (see Section 5.2.2.1). If the particular
client is trustworthy and can be authenticated in a reliable way
(see client authentication), the authorization server could relax
that restriction. Resource owners may allow or deny (e.g. in
their preferences) to issue refresh tokens using this flow as
well.
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o The authorization server could notify the resource owner by an
appropriate media, e.g. e-Mail, of the refresh token issued (see
Section 5.1.3).
4.4.3.4. Threat: Obtain user passwords on transport
An attacker could attempt to eavesdrop the transmission of end-user
credentials with the grant type "password" between client and server.
Impact: disclosure of a single end-users password.
Countermeasures:
o Confidentiality of Requests - Section 5.1.1
o alternative authentication means, which do not require to send
plaintext credentials over the wire (Examples: Digest
authentication)
4.4.3.5. Threat: Obtain user passwords from authorization server
database
An attacker may obtain valid username/password combinations from the
authorization server's database by gaining access to the database or
launching a SQL injection attack.
Impact: disclosure of all username/password combinations. The impact
may exceed the domain of the authorization server since many users
tend to use the same credentials on different services.
Countermeasures:
o Credential storage protection can be employed - Section 5.1.4.1
4.4.3.6. Threat: Online guessing
An attacker may try to guess valid username/password combinations
using the grant type "password".
Impact: Revelation of a single username/password combination.
Countermeasures:
o Password policy - Section 5.1.4.2.1
o Lock accounts - Section 5.1.4.2.3
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o Tar pit - Section 5.1.4.2.4
o CAPTCHA - Section 5.1.4.2.5
o Abandon on grant type "password"
o Client authentication (see Section 5.2.3) will provide another
authentication factor and thus hinder the attack.
4.4.4. Client Credentials
Client credentials (see [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2], Section 3) consist of an
identifier (not secret) combined with an additional means (such as a
matching client secret) of authenticating a client.
[[Threats seem to be covered elsewhere such as Section 4.4.1.1]]
4.5. Refreshing an Access Token
4.5.1. Threat: Eavesdropping refresh tokens from authorization server
dAn attacker may eavesdrop refresh tokens when they are transmitted
from the authorization server to the client.
Countermeasures:
o Authorization servers MUST ensure that these transmissions are
protected using transport-layer mechanisms such as TLS or SSL (see
Section 5.1.1).
o If end-to-end confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, reducing scope
(see Section 5.1.5.1) and expiry time (see Section 5.1.5.3) for
issued access tokens can be used to reduce the damage in case of
leaks.
4.5.2. Threat: Obtaining refresh token from authorization server
database
This threat is applicable if the authorization server stores refresh
tokens as handles in a database. An attacker may obtain refresh
tokens from the authorization server's database by gaining access to
the database or launching a SQL injection attack.
Impact: disclosure of all refresh tokens
Countermeasures:
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o Credential storage protection - Section 5.1.4.1
o Bind token to client id, if the attacker cannot obtain the
required id and secret - Section 5.1.5.8
4.5.3. Threat: Obtain refresh token by online guessing
An attacker may try to guess valid refresh token values and send it
using the grant type "refresh_token" in order to obtain a valid
access token.
Impact: exposure of single refresh token and derivable access tokens.
Countermeasures:
o For handle-based designs - Section 5.1.5.11
o For assertion-based designs - Section 5.1.5.9
o Bind token to client id, because the attacker would guess the
matching client id, too (see Section 5.1.5.8)
o Authenticate the client, adds another element the attacker has to
guess (see Section 5.2.3.4)
4.5.4. Threat: Obtain refresh token phishing by counterfeit
authorization server
An attacker could try to obtain valid refresh tokens by proxying
requests to the authorization server. Given the assumption that the
authorization server URL is well-known at development time or can at
least be obtained from a well-known resource server, the attacker
must utilize some kind of spoofing in order to suceed.
Countermeasures:
o Server authentication (as described in Section 5.1.2)
4.6. Accessing Protected Resources
4.6.1. Threat: Eavesdropping access tokens on transport
An attacker could try to obtain a valid access token on transport
between client and resource server. As access tokens are shared
secrets between authorization and resource server, they MUST by
treated with the same care as other credentials (e.g. end-user
passwords).
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Countermeasures:
o Access tokens sent as bearer tokens, SHOULD NOT be sent in the
clear over an insecure channel. Instead transport protection
means shall be utilized to prevent eavesdropping by an attacker
(see Section 5.1.1).
o A short lifetime reduces impact in case tokens are compromised
(see Section 5.1.5.3).
o The access token can be bound to a client's identity and require
the client to authenticate with the resource server (see
Section 5.4.2). Client authentication MUST be performed without
exposing the required secret to the transport channel.
4.6.2. Threat: Replay authorized resource server requests
An attacker could attempt to replay valid requests in order to obtain
or to modify/destroy user data.
Countermeasures:
o The resource server should utilize transport security measure in
order to prevent such attacks (see Section 5.1.1). This would
prevent the attacker from capturing valid requests.
o Alternatively, the resource server could employ signed requests
(see Section 5.4.3) along with nounces and timestamps in order to
uniquely identify requests. The resource server MUST detect and
refuse every replayed request.
4.6.3. Threat: Guessing access tokens
Where the token is a handle, the attacker may use attempt to guess
the access token values based on knowledge they have from other
access tokens.
Impact: Access to a single user's data.
Countermeasures:
o Handle Tokens should have a reasonable entropy (see
Section 5.1.5.11) in order to make guessing a valid token value
difficult.
o Assertion (or self-contained token ) tokens contents SHALL be
protected by a digital signature (see Section 5.1.5.9).
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o Security can be further strengthened by using a short access token
duration (see Section 5.1.5.2 and Section 5.1.5.3).
4.6.4. Threat: Access token phishing by counterfeit resource server
An attacker may pretend to be a particular resource server and to
accept tokens from a particular authorization server. If the client
sends a valid access tokens to this counterfeit resource server, the
server in turn may use that token to access other services on behalf
of the resource owner.
Countermeasures:
o Clients SHOULD not make authenticated requests with an access
token to unfamiliar resource servers, regardless of the presence
of a secure channel. If the resource server address is well-known
to the client, it may authenticate the resource servers (see
Section 5.1.2).
o Associate the endpoint address of the resource server the client
talked to with the access token (e.g. in an audience field) and
validate association at legitimate resource server. The endpoint
address validation policy may be strict (exact match) or more
relaxed (e.g. same host). This would require to tell the
authorization server the resource server endpoint address in the
authorization process.
o Associate an access token with a client and authenticate the
client with resource server requests (typically via signature in
order to not disclose secret to a potential attacker). This
prevents the attack because the counterfeit server is assumed to
miss the capabilities to correctly authenticate on behalf of the
legitimate client to the resource server (Section 5.4.2).
o Restrict the token scope (see Section 5.1.5.1) and or limit the
token to a certain resource server (Section 5.1.5.5).
4.6.5. Threat: Abuse of token by legitimate resource server or client
A legitimate resource server could attempt to use an access token to
access another resource servers. Similarily, a client could try to
use a token obtained for one server on another resource server.
Countermeasures:
o Tokens should be restricted to particular resource servers (see
Section 5.1.5.5).
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4.6.6. Threat: Leak of confidential data in HTTP-Proxies
The HTTP Authorization scheme (OAuth HTTP Authorization Scheme) is
optional. However, [RFC2616](Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J.,
Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1," .) relies on the Authorization and
WWW-Authenticate headers to distinguish authenticated content so that
it can be protected. Proxies and caches, in particular, may fail to
adequately protect requests not using these headers. For example,
private authenticated content may be stored in (and thus retrievable
from) publicly-accessible caches.
CounterMeasures:
o Resource servers not using the HTTP Authorization scheme (OAuth
HTTP Authorization Scheme - see Section 5.4.1) should take care to
use other mechanisms, such as the Cache-Control header, to ensure
that authenticated content is protected.
o Reducing scope (see Section 5.1.5.1) and expiry time
(Section 5.1.5.3) for access tokens can be used to reduce the
damage in case of leaks.
4.6.7. Threat: Token leakage via logfiles and HTTP referrers
If access tokens are sent via URI query parameters, such tokens may
leak to log files and HTTP referrers.
Countermeasures:
o Use authorization headers or POST parameters instead of URI
request parameters (see Section 5.4.1).
o Set logging configuration appropriately
o Prevent unauthorized persons from access to system log files (see
Section 5.1.4.1.1)
o HTTP referrers can be prevented by reloading the target page again
without URI parameters
o Abuse of leaked access tokens can be prevented by enforcing
authenticated requests (see Section 5.4.2).
o The impact of token leakage may be reduced by limiting scope (see
Section 5.1.5.1) and duration (see Section 5.1.5.3) and enforcing
one time token usage (see Section 5.1.5.4).
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5. Security Considerations
This section describes the countermeasures as recommended to mitigate
the threats as described in Section 4.
5.1. General
5.1.1. Confidentiality of Requests
This is applicable to all requests sent from client to authorization
server or resource server. While OAuth provides a mechanism for
verifying the integrity of requests, it provides no guarantee of
request confidentiality. Unless further precautions are taken,
eavesdroppers will have full access to request content and may be
able to mount attacks through using content of request, e.g. secrets
or tokens, or mount replay attacks.
Attacks can be mitigated by using transport-layer mechanisms such as
TLS or SSL. VPN may considered as well.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
o Replay of access tokens obtained on tokens endpoint or resource
server's endpoint
o Replay of refresh tokens obtained on tokens endpoint
o Replay of authorization codes obtained on tokens endpoint
(redirect?)
o Replay of user passwords and client secrets
5.1.2. Server authentication
HTTPS server authentication or similar means can be used to
authenticate the identity of a server. The goal is to reliably bind
the DNS name of the server to the public key presented by the server
during connection establishment.
The client MUST validate the binding of the server to its domain
name. If the server fails to prove that binding, it is condered a
men-in-the-middle. The security measure depends on the certification
authorities the client trusts for that purpose. Clients should
carefully select those trusted CAs and protect the storage for
trusted CA certificates from modifications.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
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o Spoofing
o Proxying
o Phishing by conterfeit servers
5.1.3. Always keep the resource owner informed
Transparency to the resource owner is a key element of the OAuth
protocol. The user shall always be in control of the authorization
processes and get the necessary information to meet informed
decisions. Moreover, user involvement is a further security
countermeasure. The user can probably recognize certain kinds of
attacks better than the authorization server. Information can be
presented/exchanged during the authorization process, after the
authorization process, and every time the user wishes to get informed
by using techniques such as:
o User consent forms
o Notification messages (e-Mail, SMS, ...)
o Activity/Event logs
o User self-care apps or portals
5.1.4. Credentials
This sections describes countermeasures used to protect all kind of
credentials from unauthorized access and abuse. Credentials are long
term secrets, such as client secrets and user passwords as well as
all kinds of tokens (refresh and access token) or authorization
codes.
5.1.4.1. Credential storage protection
5.1.4.1.1. Standard system security means
A server system may be locked down so that no attacker may get access
to sensible configuration files and databases.
5.1.4.1.2. Standard SQL inj. Countermeasures
If a client identifier or other authentication component is queried
or compared against a SQL Database it may become possible for an
injection attack to occur if parameters received are not validated
before submission to the database.
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o Ensure that server code is using the minimum database privileges
possible to reduce the "surface" of possible attacks.
o Avoid dynamic SQL using concatenated input. If possible, use
static SQL.
o When using dynamic SQL, parameterize queries using bind arguments.
Bind arguments eliminate possibility of SQL injections.
o Filter and sanitize the input. For example, if an identifier has
a known format, ensure that the supplied value matches the
identifier syntax rules.
5.1.4.1.3. No cleartext storage of credentials
The authorization server may consider to not store credential in
clear text. Typical approaches are to store hashes instead. If the
credential lacks a reasonable entropy level (because it is a user
password) an additional salt will harden the storage to prevent
offline dictionary attacks. Note: Some authentication protocols
require the authorization server to have access to the secret in the
clear. Those protocols cannot be implemented if the server only has
access to hashes.
5.1.4.1.4. Encryption of credentials
For client applicatinos, insecurely persisted client credentials are
easy targets for attackers to obtain. Store client credentials using
an encrypted persistence mechanism such as a keystore or database.
Note that compiling client credentials directly into client code
makes client applications vulnerable to scanning as well as difficult
to administer should client credentials change over time.
5.1.4.1.5. Use of asymmetric cryptography
Usage of asymmetric cryptography will free the authorization server
of the obligation to manage credentials. Nevertheless, it MUST
ensure the integrity of the respective public keys.
5.1.4.2. Online attacks on secrets
5.1.4.2.1. Password policy
The authorization server may decide to enforce a complex user
password policy in order to increase the user passwords' entropy.
This will hinder online password attacks.
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5.1.4.2.2. High entropy of secrets
When creating token handles or other secrets not intended for usage
by human users, the authorization server MUST include a reasonable
level of entropy in order to mitigate the risk of guessing attacks.
The token value MUST be constructed from a cryptographically strong
random or pseudo-random number sequence [RFC1750] generated by the
Authorization Server. The probability of any two Authorization Code
values being identical MUST be less than or equal to 2^(-128) and
SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-160).
5.1.4.2.3. Lock accounts
Online attacks on passwords can be mitigated by locking the
respective accounts after a certain number of failed attempts.
Note: This measure can be abused to lock down legitimate service
users.
5.1.4.2.4. Tar pit
The authorization server may react on failed attempts to authenticate
by username/password by temporarily locking the respective account
and delaying the response for a certain duration. This duration may
increase with the number of failed attempts. The objective is to
slow the attackes attempts on a certain username down.
Note: this may require a more complex and stateful design of the
authorization server.
5.1.4.2.5. Usage of CAPTCHAs
The idea is to prevent programms from automatically checkinga huge
number of passwords by requiring human interaction.
Note: this has a negative impact on user experience.
5.1.5. Tokens (access, refresh, code)
5.1.5.1. Limit token scope
The authorization server may decide to reduce or limit the scope
associated with a token. Basis of this decision is out of scope,
examples are:
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o a client-specific policy, e.g. issue only less powerful tokens to
unauthenticated clients,
o a service-specific policy, e.g. it a very sensible service,
o a resource-owner specific setting, or
o combinations of such policies and preferences.
The authorization server may allow different scopes dependent on the
grant type. For example, end-user authorization via direct
interaction with the end-user (authorization code) might be
considered more reliable than direct authorization via gran type
username/password. This means will reduce the impact of the
following threats:
o token leakage
o token issuance to malicious software
o unintended issuance of to powerful tokens with resource owner
credentials flow
5.1.5.2. Expiration time
Tokens should generally expire after a reasonable duration. This
complements and strengthens other security measures (such as
signatures) and reduces the impact of all kinds of token leaks.
5.1.5.3. Short expiration time
A short expiration time for tokens is a protection means against the
following threats:
o replay
o reduce impact of token leak
o reduce likelyhood of sucessful online guessing
Note: Short token duration requires preciser clock synchronisation
between authorization server and resource server. Furthermore,
shorter duration may require more token refreshments (access token)
or repeated end-user authorization processes (authorization code and
refresh token).
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5.1.5.4. Limit number of usages/ One time usage
The authorization server may restrict the number of request, which
can be performed with a certain token. This mechanism can be used to
mitigate the following threats:
o replay of tokens
o reduce likelyhood of sucessful online guessing
Additionally, If an Authorization Server observes multiple attempts
to redeem a authorization code, the Authorization Server may want to
revoke all tokens granted based on the authorization code.
5.1.5.5. Bind tokens to a particular resource server (Audience)
Authorization servers in multi-service environments may consider to
issue tokens with different content to different resource servers and
to explicitely indicate in the token the target server a token is
intended to be sent to (see Audience in SAML Assertions). This
countermeasure can be used in the following situations:
o It reduce the impact of a successful replay attempt, since the
token is applicable to a single resource server, only.
o It prevents abuse of a token by a rough resource server or client,
since the token can only be used on that server. It is rejected
by other servers.
o It reduce the impact of a leakage of a valid token to a conterfeit
resource server.
5.1.5.6. Use endpoint address as token audience
This may be used to indicate to a resource server, which endpoint
address has been used to obtain the token. This measure will allow
to detect requests from a counterfeit resource server, since such
token will contain the endpoint address of that server.
5.1.5.7. Audience and Token scopes
Deployments may consider to use only tokens with explicitely defined
scope, where every scope is associated with a particular resource
server. This approach can be used to mitigate attacks, where a
resource server or client uses a token for a different then the
intended purpose.
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5.1.5.8. Bind token to client id
An authorization server may bind a token to a certain client
identity. This identity match must be validated for every request
with that token. This means can be used, to
o detect token leakage and
o prevent token abuse.
Note: Validating the client identity may require the target server to
authenticate the client's identity. This authentication can be based
on secrets managed independent of the token (e.g. pre-registered
client id/secret on authorization server) or sent with the token
itself (e.g. as part of the encrypted token content).
5.1.5.9. Signed tokens
Self-contained tokens shall be signed in order to detect any attempt
to modify or produce faked tokens.
5.1.5.10. Encryption of token content
Self-contained may be encrypted for privacy reasons or to protect
system internal data.
5.1.5.11. Random token value with high entropy
When creating token handles, the authorization server MUST include a
reasonable level of entropy in order to mitigate the risk of guessing
attacks. The token value MUST be constructed from a
cryptographically strong random or pseudo-random number sequence
[RFC1750] generated by the Authorization Server. The probability of
any two token values being identical MUST be less than or equal to
2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-160).
5.1.5.12. Assertion formats
For service providers intending to implement an assertion-based token
design it is highly recommended to adopt a standard assertion format
(such as SAML or JWT).
5.1.6. Access tokens
o keep them in transient memory (accessible by the client app only)
o exposure to 3rd parties (malicious app)
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o limit number of access tokens granted to a user
5.2. Authorization Server
5.2.1. Authorization Codes
5.2.1.1. Automatic revocation of derived tokens if abuse is detected
If an Authorization Server observes multiple attempts to redeem a
authorization code, the Authorization Server may want to revoke all
tokens granted based on the authorization code.
5.2.2. Refresh tokens
5.2.2.1. Restricted issuance of refresh tokens
The authorization server may decide based on an appropriate policy
not to issue refresh tokens. Since refresh tokens areo long term
credentials, they may be subject theft. For example, if the
authorization server does not trust a client to securely store such
tokens, it may refuse to issue such a client a refresh token.
5.2.2.2. Binding of refresh token to client_id
The authorization server MUST bind every refresh token to the id of
the client such a token was originally issued to and validate this
binding for every request to refresh that token. This measure is a
countermeasure against refresh token theft or leakage.
Note: This binding MUST be protected from unauthorized modifications.
5.2.2.3. Refresh Token Replacement
Refresh token replacement is intended to automatically detect and
prevent attempts to use the same refresh token in parallel from
different apps/devices. This happens if a token gets stolen from the
client and is subsequently used by the attacker and the legitimate
client. The basic idea is to change the refresh token value with
every refresh request in order to detect attempts to obtain access
tokens using old refresh tokens. Since the authorization server
cannot determine whether the attacker or the legitimate client is
trying to access, in case of such an access attempt the valid refresh
token and the access authorization associated with it are both
revoked.
The OAuth specification supports this measure in that the tokens
response allows the authorization server to return a new refresh
token even for requests with grant type "refresh_token".
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Note: this measure may cause problems in clustered environments since
usage of the currently valid refresh token must be ensured. In such
an environment, other measures might be more appropriate.
5.2.2.4. Refresh Token Revocation
The authorization server may allow clients or end-users to
explicitely request the invalidation of refresh tokens.
This is a countermeasure againts:
o device theft
o ...
5.2.2.5. Combine refresh token requests with user-provided secret
The exchange of a refresh token can be bound to the presence of a
certain user-provided secret, such as a PIN, a password or a SIM
card. This is a kind of multi-factor authentication on the tokens
endpoint, since an attacker must possess both factors in order to be
able to obtain an access token.
5.2.2.6. Device identification
The authorization server may require to bind authentication
credentials to a device identifier or token assigned to that device.
As the IMEI can be spoofed, that is not suitable, For mobile phones,
a registration process can be used to assign a unique token to the
device using an sms message. That token or identifer can then be
validated with when authenticating user credentials.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
o phishing attacks
o ...
5.2.2.7. X-FRAME-OPTION header
For newer browsers, avoidance of iFrames can be enforced server side
by using the X-FRAME-OPTION header. This header can have two values,
deny and sameorigin, which will block any framing or framing by sites
with a different origin, respectively.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
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o clickjacking attacks
o ...
5.2.3. Client authentication and authorization
As described in Section 3 (Security Features), clients are
identified, authenticated and authorized for several purposes, such
as a
o Collate sub-sequent requests to the same client,
o Indicate the trustworthiness of a particular client to the end-
user,
o Authorize access of clients to certain features on the
authorization or resource server, and
o Log a client identity to log files for analysis or statics.
Due to the different capababilities and characterictics of the
different client types, there are different ways to support achieve
objectives, which will be described in this section. Generally
spoken, authorization server providers should be aware of the
security policy and deployment of a particular clients and adapt its
treatment accordingly. For example, one approach could be to treat
all clients as less trustworthy and unsecure. On the other extrem, a
service provider could activate every client installation by hand of
an administrator and that way gain confidence in the identity of the
software package and the security of the environment the client is
installed in. And there are several approaches in between.
5.2.3.1. Don't issue secrets to clients with inappropriate security
policy
Authorization servers should not issue secrets to clients, if these
cannot sufficiently protect it. This prevents the server from
overestimating the value of a sucessful authentication of the client.
For example, it is of limited benefit to create a single client id
and secret which is shared by all installations of a native app.
First of all, this secret must be somehow transmitted from the
developer via the respective distribution channel, e.g. an app
market, to all installations of the app on end-user devices. So the
secret is typically burned into the source code of the app or a
associated resource bundle, which cannot be entirely protected from
reverse engineering. Second, effectively such secrets cannot be
revoked since this would immediatly put all installations out of
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work. Moreover, since the authorization server cannot really trust
on the client's identity, it would be dangerous to indicate to end-
users the trustworthiness of the client.
There are other ways to achieve a reasonable security level, as
described in the following sections.
5.2.3.2. Clients without secret require user consent
The authorization may issue a client id, but only accept
authorization request, which are approved by the end-user. This
measure precludes automatic authorization processes. This is a
countermeasure for clients without secret against the following
threats:
o ... [[Not sure what is meant here]]
o ...
5.2.3.3. Client_id only in combination with redirect_uri
The authorization may issue a client id, but bind this client_id to a
certain pre-configured redirect_uri. So any authorization request
with another redirect_uri is refused automatically. Alternatively,
the authorization server may not accept any dynamic redirect_uri for
such a client_id and instead always redirect to the well-known pre-
configured redirect_uri. This is a countermeasure for clients
without secrets against the following threats:
o ...[[Not sure what is meant here]]
o ...
5.2.3.4. Deployment-specific client secrets
A authorization server may issue separate client ids and
corresponding secrets to the different deployments of a client.
For web applications, this could mean to create one client_id and
client_secret per web site a software package is installed on. So
the provider of that particular site could request client id and
secret from the authorization server during setup of the web site.
This would also allow to validate some of the properties of that web
site, such as redirect_uri, address, and whatever proofs useful. The
web site provider has to ensure the security of the client secret on
the site.
For native applications, things are more complicated because every
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installation of the app on any device is another deployment.
Deployment specific secrets will require
1. Either to obtain a client_id and client_secret during download
process from the app market, or
2. During installation on the device.
Either approach will require an automated mechanism for issuing
client ids and secrets, which is currently not defined by OAuth.
The first approach would allow to achieve a level where the client is
authenticated and identified, whereas the second option only allows
to authenticate the client but not to validate properties of the
client. But this would at least help to prevent several replay
attacks. Moreover, deployment-specific client_id and secret allow to
selectively revoke all refresh tokens of a specific deployment at
once.
This is a countermeasure against the following threats:
o ...
o ...
5.2.3.5. Validation of pre-registered redirect_uri
An authorization server may require clients to register their
redirect_uri or a pattern (TBD: make definition more precise)
thereof. The way this registration is performed is out of scope of
this document. Every actual redirect_uri sent with the respective
client_id to the end-user authorization endpoint must comply with
that pattern. Otherwise the authorization server must assume the
inbound GET request has been sent by an attacker and refuse it.
Note: the authorization server MUST NOT redirect the user agent back
to the redirect_uri of such an authorization request.
o Authorization code leakage through conterfeit web site: allows to
detect attack attempts already after first redirect to end-user
authorization endpoint (Section 4.4.1.7).
o For clients with validated properties, this measure also helps to
detect malicious apps early in the end-user authorization process.
This reduces the need for a interactive validation by the user
(Section 4.4.1.4, Section 4.4.2.3).
The underlying assumption of this measure is that an attacker must
use another redirect_uri in order to get access to the authorization
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code. Deployments might consider the possibility of an attacker
using spoofing attacks to a victims device to circumvent this
security measure.
Note: Pre-registering clients might not scale in some deployments
(manual process) or require dynamic client registration (not
specified yet). With the lack of dynamic client registration, it
only works for clients bound to certain deployments at development/
configuration time. As soon as dynamic resource server discovery
gets involved, that's no longer feasable.
5.2.3.6. Client secret revocation
An authorization server may revoke a client's secret in order to
prevent abuse of a revealed secret.
Note: This measure will immediately invalidate any authorization code
or refresh token issued to the respective client. This might be
unintentionally for client identifiers and secrets used across
multiple deployments of a particular native or web application.
This a countermeasure against:
o ...
o ...
5.2.3.7. Use strong client authentication (e.g. client_assertion /
client_token)
Assumption: prevents an attacker from obtaining a client secret
because this secret is kept in some hardware security module?
5.2.4. End-user authorization
5.2.4.1. Automatic processing of repeated authorizations requires
client validation
Authorization servers should not automatically process repeat
authorizations where the client is not authenticated through a client
secret or some other authentication mechanism such as signing with
security certs (5.7.2.7. Use strong client authentication (e.g.
client_assertion / client_token)) or validation of a pre-registered
redirect uri (5.7.2.5. Validation of pre-registered redirect_uri ).
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5.2.4.2. Informed decisions based on transparency
The authorization server shall intelligible explain to the end-user
what happens in the authorization process and what the consequences
are. For example, the user shall understand what access he is about
to grant to which client for what duration. It shall also be obvious
to the user, whether the server is able to reliably certify certain
client properties (web site address, security policy).
5.2.4.3. Validation of client properties by end-user
In the authorization process, the user is typically asked to approve
a client's request for authorization. This is an important security
mechanism by itself because the end-users can be involed in the
validation of client properties, such as whether the client name
known to the authorization server fits the name of the web site or
the app the end-user is using. This measure is especially helpful in
all situation where the authorization server is unable to
authenticate the client. It is a countermeasure against:
o Malicious app
o ...
5.2.4.4. Binding of authorization code to client_id
The authorization server MUST bind every authorization code to the id
of the respective client which initiated the end-user authorization
process. This measure is a countermeasure against:
o replay of authorization codes with different client credentials
since an attacker cannot use another client_id to exchange an
authorization code into a token
o Online guessing of authorization codes
Note: This binding MUST be protected from unauthorized modifications.
5.2.4.5. Binding of authorization code to redirect_uri
The authorization server MUST bind every authorization code to the
actual redirect_uri used as redirect target of the client in the end-
user authorization process. This binding MUST be validated when the
client attempts to exchange the respective authorization code for an
access token. This measure is a countermeasure against authorization
code leakage through counterfeit web sites since an attacker cannot
use another redirect_uri to exchange an authorization code into a
token.
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5.3. Client App Security
5.3.1. Don't store credentials in code or resources bundled with
software packages
[Anything more to say ? :-)]
5.3.2. Standard web server protection measures (for config files and
databases)
5.3.3. Store secrets in a secure storage
The are different way to store secrets of all kinds (tokens, client
secrets) securely on a device or server.
Most multi-user operation systems seggregate the personal storage of
the different system users. Moreover, most modern smartphone
operating systems even support to store app-specific data in separat
areas of the file systems and protect it from access by other apps.
Additionally, apps can implements confidential data itself using a
user-supplied secret, such as PIN or password.
Another option is to swap refresh token storage to a trusted backend
server. This mean in turn requires a resilient authentication
mechanisms between client and backend server. Note: Applications
must ensure that confidential data are kept confidential even after
readin from secure storage, which typically means to keep this data
in the local memory of the app.
5.3.4. Utilize device lock to prevent unauthorized device access
5.3.5. Platform security measures
o Validation process
o software package signatures
o Remote removal
5.4. Resource Servers
5.4.1. Authorization headers
Authorization headers are recognized and specially treated by HTTP
proxies and servers. Thus the usage of such headers for sending
access tokens to resource servers reduces the likelihood of leakage
or unintended storage of authenticated requests in general and
especially Authorization headers.
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5.4.2. Authenticated requests
An authorization server may bind tokens to a certain client identitiy
and encourage resource servers to validate that binding. This will
require the resource server to authenticate the originator of a
request as the legitimate owner of a particular token. There are a
couple of options to implement this countermeasure:
o The authorization server may associate the distinguished name of
the client with the token (either internally or in the payload of
an self-contained token). The client then uses client
certificate-based HTTP authentication on the resource server's
endpoint to authenticate its identity and the resource server
validates the name with the name referenced by the token.
o same as before, but the client uses his private key to sign the
request to the resource server (public key is either contained in
the token or sent along with the request)
o Alternatively, the authorization server may issue a token-bound
secret, which the client uses to sign the request. The resource
server obtains the secret either directly from the authorization
server or it is contained in an encrypted section of the token.
That way the resource server does not "know" the client but is
able to validate whether the authorization server issued the token
to that client
This mechanisms is a countermeasure against abuse of tokens by
counterfeit resource servers.
5.4.3. Signed requests
A resource server may decide to accept signed requests only, either
to replace transport level security measures or to complement such
measures. Every signed request must be uniquly identifiable and must
not be processed twice by the resource server. This countermeasure
helps to mitigate:
o modifications of the message and
o replay attempts
6. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
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RFC.
7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Hui-Lan Lu, Francisco Corella, Eric Pflam,
Shane B Weeden, Skylar Woodward and James H. Manger for their
comments and contributions.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]
Hammer-Lahav, E., Recordon, D., and D. Hardt, "The OAuth
2.0 Authorization Protocol", draft-ietf-oauth-v2-16 (work
in progress), May 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer]
Jones, M., Hardt, D., and D. Recordon, "The OAuth 2.0
Protocol: Bearer Tokens", draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-06
(work in progress), June 2011.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]
Hammer-Lahav, E., Barth, A., and B. Adida, "HTTP
Authentication: MAC Access Authentication",
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-00 (work in progress),
May 2011.
[I-D.lodderstedt-oauth-revocation]
Lodderstedt, T. and S. Dronia, "Token Revocation",
draft-lodderstedt-oauth-revocation-02 (work in progress),
March 2011.
[portable-contacts]
Smarr, J., "Portable Contacts 1.0 Draft C", August 2008.
Appendix A. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
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draft-lodderstedt-oauth-security-01
o section 4.4.1.2 - changed "resource server" to "client" in
countermeasures description.
o section 4.4.1.6 - changed "client shall authenticate the server"
to "The browser shall be utilized to authenticate the redirect_uri
of the client"
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-threatmodel-00
o section 3.4 - added the purposes for using authorization codes.
o extended section 4.4.1.1
o merged 4.4.1.5 into 4.4.1.2
o corrected some typos
o reformulated "session fixation", renamed respective sections into
"authorization code disclosure through counterfeit client"
o added new section "User session impersonation"
o worked out or reworked sections 2.3.3, 4.4.2.4, 4.4.4, 5.1.4.1.2,
5.1.4.1.4, 5.2.3.5
o added new threat "DoS using manufactured authorization codes" as
proposed by Eric Pflam
o added XSRF and clickjacking (incl. state parameter explanation)
o changed sub-section order in section 4.4.1
o incorporated feedback from Skylar Woodward (client secrets) and
Shane B Weeden (refresh tokens as client instance secret)
o aligned client section with core draft's client type definition
o converted I-D into WG document
Lodderstedt, et al. Expires January 2, 2012 [Page 62]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Security July 2011
Authors' Addresses
Torsten Lodderstedt (editor)
Deutsche Telekom AG
Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net
Mark McGloin
IBM
Email: mark.mcgloin@ie.ibm.com
Phil Hunt
Oracle Corporation
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
Lodderstedt, et al. Expires January 2, 2012 [Page 63]
