Network Working Group E. Lear
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track R. Droms
Expires: April 27, 2018
D. Romascanu
October 24, 2017
Manufacturer Usage Description Specification
draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-13
Abstract
This memo specifies a component-based architecture for manufacturer
usage descriptions (MUD). The goal of MUD is to provide a means for
Things to signal to the network what sort of access and network
functionality they require to properly function. The initial focus
is on access control. Later work can delve into other aspects.
This memo specifies two YANG modules, IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP options, an
LLDP TLV, a URL suffix specification, an X.509 certificate extension
and a means to sign and verify the descriptions.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. What MUD doesn't do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. A Simple Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Determining Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Finding A Policy: The MUD URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5. Types of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.6. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.7. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture . . . . . 9
1.8. Order of operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1. The IETF-MUD YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Data Node Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1. to-device-policy and from-device-policy containers . . . 13
3.2. last-update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3. cache-validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4. is-supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5. systeminfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.6. extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7. manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.8. same-manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.9. model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.10. local-networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.11. controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.12. my-controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.13. direction-initiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Processing of the MUD file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. What does a MUD URL look like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. The MUD YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. source-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2. destination-dnsname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3. The ietf-acldns Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. MUD File Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. The MUD URL DHCP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.1. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.2. Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9.3. Relay Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension 29
11. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension . . . . . . 31
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12. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files . . . . . . . . . 33
12.1. Creating a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12.2. Verifying a MUD file signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
13. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
14. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
16.1. YANG Module Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
16.2. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
16.3. PKIX Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
16.4. Well Known URI Suffix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
16.5. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files . . . . . . . 38
16.6. LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
16.7. The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs) . . . 40
16.8. Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
17. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix B. Default MUD nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix C. A Sample Extension: DETNET-indicator . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1. Introduction
The Internet has largely been constructed on general purpose
computers, those devices that may be used for a purpose that is
specified by those who buy the device. [RFC1984] presumed that an
end device would be most capable of protecting itself. This made
sense when the typical device was a workstation or a mainframe, and
it continues to make sense for general purpose computing devices
today, including laptops, smart phones, and tablets.
[RFC7452] discusses design patterns for, and poses questions about,
smart objects. Let us then posit a group of objects that are
specifically NOT general purpose computers. These devices have a
specific purpose. By definition, therefore, all other uses are NOT
intended. The combination of these two statements can be restated as
a manufacturer usage description (MUD) that can be applied at various
points within a network. Although this memo may seem to stress
access requirements, usage intent also consists of quality of service
needs a device may have.
We use the notion of "manufacturer" loosely in this context to refer
to the entity or organization that will state how a device is
intended to be used. In the context of a lightbulb, this might
indeed be the lightbulb manufacturer. In the context of a smarter
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device that has a built in Linux stack, it might be an integrator of
that device. The key points are that the device itself is expected
to serve a limited purpose, and that there may exist an organization
in the supply chain of that device that will take responsibility for
informing the network about that purpose.
The intent of MUD is to solve for the following problems:
o Substantially reduce the threat surface on a device entering a
network to those communications intended by the manufacturer.
o Provide for a means to scale network policies to the ever-
increasing number types of devices in the network.
o Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in a way
that is faster than it might take to update systems. This will be
particularly true for systems that are no longer supported by
their manufacturer.
o Keep the cost of implementation of such a system to the bare
minimum.
o Provide a means of extensibility for manufacturers to express
other device capabilities or requirements.
MUD consists of three architectural building blocks:
o A classifier that a device emits that can be used to locate a
description;
o The description itself, including how it is interpreted, and;
o A means for local network management systems to retrieve the
description.
In this specification we describe each of these building blocks and
how they are intended to be used together. However, they may also be
used separately, independent of this specification, by local
deployments for their own purposes.
1.1. What MUD doesn't do
MUD is not intended to address network authorization of general
purpose computers, as their manufacturers cannot envision a specific
communication pattern to describe. In addition, even those devices
that have a single or small number of uses might have very broad
communication patterns. MUD on its own is not for them either.
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No matter how good a MUD-enabled network is, it will never replace
the need for manufacturers to patch vulnerabilities. It may,
however, provide network administrators with some additional
protection when those vulnerabilities exist.
Finally, no matter what the manufacturer specifies in a MUD file,
these are not directives, but suggestions. How they are instantiated
locally will depend on many factors and will be ultimately up to the
local network administrator, who must decide what is appropriate in a
given circumstances.
1.2. A Simple Example
A light bulb is intended to light a room. It may be remotely
controlled through the network, and it may make use of a rendezvous
service of some form that an app on smart phone accesses. What we
can say about that light bulb, then, is that all other network access
is unwanted. It will not contact a news service, nor speak to the
refrigerator, and it has no need of a printer or other devices. It
has no social networking friends. Therefore, an access list applied
to it that states that it will only connect to the single rendezvous
service will not impede the light bulb in performing its function,
while at the same time allowing the network to provide both it and
other devices an additional layer of protection.
1.3. Determining Intended Use
The notion of intended use is in itself not new. Network
administrators apply access lists every day to allow for only such
use. This notion of white listing was well described by Chapman and
Zwicky in [FW95]. Profiling systems that make use of heuristics to
identify types of systems have existed for years as well.
A Thing could just as easily tell the network what sort of access it
requires without going into what sort of system it is. This would,
in effect, be the converse of [RFC7488]. In seeking a general
purpose solution, however, we assume that a device has so few
capabilities that it will implement the least necessary capabilities
to function properly. This is a basic economic constraint. Unless
the network would refuse access to such a device, its developers
would have no reason to provide the network any information. To
date, such an assertion has held true.
1.4. Finding A Policy: The MUD URL
Our work begins with the device emitting a Universal Resource Locator
(URL) [RFC3986]. This URL serves both to classify the device type
and to provide a means to locate a policy file.
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In this memo three means are defined to emit the MUD URL. One is a
DHCP option[RFC2131],[RFC3315] that the DHCP client uses to inform
the DHCP server. The DHCP server may take further actions, such as
retrieve the URL or otherwise pass it along to network management
system or controller. The second method defined is an X.509
constraint. The IEEE has developed [IEEE8021AR] that provides a
certificate-based approach to communicate device characteristics,
which itself relies on [RFC5280]. The MUD URL extension is non-
critical, as required by IEEE 802.1AR. Various means may be used to
communicate that certificate, including Tunnel Extensible
Authentication Protocol (TEAP) [RFC7170]. Finally, a Link Layer
Discovery Protocol (LLDP) frame is defined [IEEE8021AB].
It is possible that there may be other means for a MUD URL to be
learned by a network. For instance, some devices may already be
fielded or have very limited ability to communicate a MUD URL, and
yet can be identified through some means, such as a serial number or
a public key. In these cases, manufacturers may be able to map those
identifiers to particular MUD URLs (or even the files themselves).
Similarly, there may be alternative resolution mechanisms available
for situations where Internet connectivity is limited or does not
exist. Such mechanisms are not described in this memo, but are
possible. Implementors should allow for this sort of flexibility of
how MUD URLs may be learned.
1.5. Types of Policies
When the MUD URL is resolved, the MUD controller retrieves a file
that describes what sort of communications a device is designed to
have. The manufacturer may specify either specific hosts for cloud
based services or certain classes for access within an operational
network. An example of a class might be "devices of a specified
manufacturer type", where the manufacturer type itself is indicated
simply by the authority component (e.g, the domain name) of the MUD
URL. Another example might be to allow or disallow local access.
Just like other policies, these may be combined. For example:
o Allow access to devices of the same manufacturer
o Allow access to and from controllers via Constrained Application
Protocol (COAP)[RFC7252]
o Allow access to local DNS/NTP
o Deny all other access
A printer might have a description that states:
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o Allow access for port IPP or port LPD
o Allow local access for port HTTP
o Deny all other access
In this way anyone can print to the printer, but local access would
be required for the management interface.
The files that are retrieved are intended to be closely aligned to
existing network architectures so that they are easy to deploy. We
make use of YANG [RFC7950] because of the time and effort spent to
develop accurate and adequate models for use by network devices.
JSON is used as a serialization for compactness and readability,
relative to XML. Other formats may be chosen with later versions of
MUD.
While the policy examples given here focus on access control, this is
not intended to be the sole focus. By structuring the model
described in this document with clear extension points, other
descriptions could be included. One that often comes to mind is
quality of service.
The YANG modules specified here are extensions of
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. The extensions to this model allow for
a manufacturer to express classes of systems that a manufacturer
would find necessary for the proper function of the device. Two
modules are specified. The first module specifies a means for domain
names to be used in ACLs so that devices that have their controllers
in the cloud may be appropriately authorized with domain names, where
the mapping of those names to addresses may rapidly change.
The other module abstracts away IP addresses into certain classes
that are instantiated into actual IP addresses through local
processing. Through these classes, manufacturers can specify how the
device is designed to communicate, so that network elements can be
configured by local systems that have local topological knowledge.
That is, the deployment populates the classes that the manufacturer
specifies. The abstractions below map to zero or more hosts, as
follows:
Manufacturer: A device made by a particular manufacturer, as
identified by the authority component of its MUD URL
same-manufacturer: Devices that have the same authority component of
their MUD URL.
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Controller: Devices that the local network administrator admits to
the particular class.
my-controller: Devices associated with the MUD URL of a device that
the administrator admits.
local: The class of IP addresses that are scoped within some
administrative boundary. By default it is suggested that this be
the local subnet.
The "manufacturer" classes can be easily specified by the
manufacturer, whereas controller classes are initially envisioned to
be specified by the administrator.
Because manufacturers do not know who will be using their devices, it
is important for functionality referenced in usage descriptions to be
relatively ubiquitous and mature. For these reasons only a limited
subset YANG-based configuration of is permitted in a MUD file.
1.6. Terminology
MUD: manufacturer usage description.
MUD file: a file containing YANG-based JSON that describes a Thing
and associated suggested specific network behavior.
MUD file server: a web server that hosts a MUD file.
MUD controller: the system that requests and receives the MUD file
from the MUD server. After it has processed a MUD file, it may
direct changes to relevant network elements.
MUD URL: a URL that can be used by the MUD controller to receive the
MUD file.
Thing: the device emitting a MUD URL.
Manufacturer: the entity that configures the Thing to emit the MUD
URL and the one who asserts a recommendation in a MUD file. The
manufacturer might not always be the entity that constructs a
Thing. It could, for instance, be a systems integrator, or even a
component provider.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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1.7. The Manufacturer Usage Description Architecture
With these components laid out we now have the basis for an
architecture. This leads us to ASCII art.
.......................................
. ____________ . _____________
. | | . | |
. | MUD |-->get URL-->| MUD |
. | Controller | .(https) | File Server |
. End system network |____________|<-MUD file<-<|_____________|
. . .
. . .
. _______ _________ .
.| | (dhcp et al) | router | .
.| Thing |---->MUD URL-->| or | .
.|_______| | switch | .
. |_________| .
.......................................
Figure 1: MUD Architecture
In the above diagram, the switch or router collects MUD URLs and
forwards them to the network management system for processing. This
happens in different ways, depending on how the URL is communicated.
For instance, in the case of DHCP, the DHCP server might receive the
URL and then process it. In the case of IEEE 802.1X, the switch
would carry the URL via a certificate to the authentication server
via EAP over Radius[RFC3748], which would then process it. One
method to do this is TEAP, described in [RFC7170]. The certificate
extension is described below.
The information returned by the web site is valid for the duration of
the Thing's connection, or as specified in the description. Thus if
the Thing is disconnected, any associated configuration in the switch
can be removed. Similarly, from time to time the description may be
refreshed, based on new capabilities or communication patterns or
vulnerabilities.
The web site is typically run by or on behalf of the manufacturer.
Its domain name is that of the authority found in the MUD URL. For
legacy cases where Things cannot emit a URL, if the switch is able to
determine the appropriate URL, it may proxy it, the trivial cases
being a hardcoded MUD-URL on a switch port, or a mapping from some
available identifier such as an L2 address or certificate hash to a
MUD-URL.
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The role of the MUD controller in this environment is to do the
following:
o receive MUD URLs,
o retrieve MUD files,
o translate abstractions in the MUD files to specific network
element configuration,
o maintain and update any required mappings of the abstractions, and
o update network elements with appropriate configuration.
A MUD controller may be a component of a AAA or network management
system. Communication within those systems and from those systems to
network elements is beyond the scope of this memo.
1.8. Order of operations
As mentioned above, MUD contains architectural building blocks, and
so order of operation may vary. However, here is one clear intended
example:
1. Thing emits URL.
2. That URL is forwarded to a MUD controller by the nearest switch
(how this happens depends on the way in which the MUD URL is
emitted).
3. The MUD controller retrieves the MUD file and signature from the
MUD file server, assuming it doesn't already have copies. After
validating the signature, it may test the URL against a web or
domain reputation service, and it may test any hosts within the
file against those reputation services, as it deems fit.
4. The MUD controller may query the administrator for permission to
add the Thing and associated policy. If the Thing is known or
the Thing type is known, it may skip this step.
5. The MUD controller instantiates local configuration based on the
abstractions defined in this document.
6. The MUD controller configures the switch nearest the Thing.
Other systems may be configured as well.
7. When the Thing disconnects, policy is removed.
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2. The MUD Model and Semantic Meaning
A MUD file consists of a YANG model that has been serialized in JSON
[RFC7951]. For purposes of MUD, the nodes that can be modified are
access lists as augmented by this model. The MUD file is limited to
the serialization of only the following YANG schema:
o ietf-access-control-list [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
o ietf-mud (this document)
o ietf-acldns (this document)
Extensions may be used to add additional schema. This is described
further on.
To provide the widest possible deployment, publishers of MUD files
SHOULD make use of the abstractions in this memo and avoid the use of
IP addresses. A MUD controller SHOULD NOT automatically implement
any MUD file that contains IP addresses, especially those that might
have local significance. The addressing of one side of an access
list is implicit, based on whether it is applied as to-device-policy
or from-device-policy.
With the exceptions of "acl-name", "acl-type", "rule-name", and TCP
and UDP source and destination port information, publishers of MUD
files SHOULD limit the use of ACL model leaf nodes expressed to those
found in this specification. Absent any extensions, MUD files are
assumed to implement only the following ACL model features:
o any-acl, mud-acl, icmp-acl, ipv6-acl, tcp-acl, any-acl, udp-acl,
ipv4-acl, and ipv6-acl
Furthermore, only"accept" or "drop" actions SHOULD be included. A
MUD controller MAY choose to interpret "reject" as "drop". A MUD
controller SHOULD ignore all other actions.
In fact, MUD controllers MAY ignore any particular component of a
description or MAY ignore the description in its entirety, and SHOULD
carefully inspect all MUD descriptions. Publishers of MUD files MUST
NOT include other nodes except as described in Section 3.6. See that
section for more information.
2.1. The IETF-MUD YANG Module
This module is structured into three parts:
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o The first container "mud" holds information that is relevant to
retrieval and validity of the MUD file itself, as well as policy
intended to and from the Thing.
o The second component augments the matching container of the ACL
model to add several nodes that are relevant to the MUD URL, or
otherwise abstracted for use within a local environment.
o The third component augments the tcp-acl container of the ACL
model to add the ability to match on the direction of initiation
of a TCP connection.
A valid MUD file will contain two root objects, a "mud" container and
an "access-lists" container. Extensions may add additional root
objects as required. As a reminder, when parsing access-lists,
elements within a "match" block are logically ANDed. In general, a
single abstraction in a match statement should be used. For
instance, it makes little sense to match both "my-controller" and
"controller" with an argument, since they are highly unlikely to be
the same value.
A simplified graphical representation of the data models is used in
this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is
explained in [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis].
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module: ietf-mud
+--rw mud!
+--rw mud-url inet:uri
+--rw last-update yang:date-and-time
+--rw cache-validity? uint8
+--rw is-supported boolean
+--rw systeminfo? inet:uri
+--rw extensions* string
+--rw from-device-policy
| +--rw access-lists
| +--rw access-list* [acl-name acl-type]
| +--rw acl-name -> /acl:access-lists/acl/acl-name
| +--rw acl-type identityref
+--rw to-device-policy
+--rw access-lists
+--rw access-list* [acl-name acl-type]
+--rw acl-name -> /acl:access-lists/acl/acl-name
+--rw acl-type identityref
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:aces/
acl:ace/acl:matches:
+--rw mud-acl
+--rw manufacturer? inet:host
+--rw same-manufacturer? empty
+--rw model? inet:uri
+--rw local-networks? empty
+--rw controller? inet:uri
+--rw my-controller? empty
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:aces/
acl:ace/acl:matches/acl:tcp-acl:
+--rw direction-initiated? direction
3. Data Node Definitions
Note that in this section, when we use the term "match" we are
referring to the ACL model "matches" node, and thus returns positive
such that an action should be applied.
The following nodes are defined.
3.1. to-device-policy and from-device-policy containers
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] describes access-lists but does not
attempt to indicate where they are applied as that is handled
elsewhere in a configuration. However, in this case, a MUD file must
be explicit in describing the communication pattern of a Thing, and
that includes indicating what is to be permitted or denied in either
direction of communication. Hence each of these containers indicate
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the appropriate direction of a flow in association with a particular
Thing. They contain references to specific access-lists.
3.2. last-update
This is a date-and-time value of when the MUD file was generated.
This is akin to a version number. Its form is taken from [RFC6991]
which, for those keeping score, in turn was taken from Section 5.6 of
[RFC3339], which was taken from [ISO.8601.1988].
3.3. cache-validity
This uint8 is the period of time in hours that a network management
station MUST wait since its last retrieval before checking for an
update. It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24 and
MUST NOT be more than 168 for any Thing that is supported. This
period SHOULD be no shorter than any period determined through HTTP
caching directives (e.g., "cache-control" or "Expires"). N.B.,
expiring of this timer does not require the MUD controller to discard
the MUD file, nor terminate access to a Thing. See Section 15 for
more information.
3.4. is-supported
This boolean is an indication from the manufacturer to the network
administrator as to whether or not the Thing is supported. In this
context a Thing is said to NOT be supported if the manufacturer
intends never to issue an update to the Thing or never update the MUD
file. A MUD controller MAY still periodically check for updates.
3.5. systeminfo
This is a URL that points to a description of the Thing to be
connected. The intent is for administrators to be able to see a
localized name associated with the Thing. The referenced URL SHOULD
be a localized display string, and MAY be in either HTML or a raw
UTF-8 text file. It SHOULD NOT exceed 60 characters worth of display
space (that is- what the administrator actually sees), but it MAY
contain links to other documents (presumably product documentation).
3.6. extensions
This optional leaf-list names MUD extensions that are used in the MUD
file. Note that NO MUD extensions may be used in a MUD file prior to
the extensions being declared. Implementations MUST ignore any node
in this file that they do not understand.
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Note that extensions can either extend the MUD file as described in
the previous paragraph, or they might reference other work. An
extension example can be found in Appendix C.
3.7. manufacturer
This node consists of a hostname that would be matched against the
authority component of another Thing's MUD URL. In its simplest form
"manufacturer" and "same-manufacturer" may be implemented as access-
lists. In more complex forms, additional network capabilities may be
used. For example, if one saw the line "manufacturer" :
"flobbidy.example.com", then all Things that registered with a MUD
URL that contained flobbity.example.com in its authority section
would match.
3.8. same-manufacturer
This is an equivalent for when the manufacturer element is used to
indicate the authority that is found in another Thing's MUD URL
matches that of the authority found in this Thing's MUD URL. For
example, if the Thing's MUD URL were https://b1.example.com/.well-
known/mud/v1/ThingV1, then all devices that had MUD URL with an
authority section of b1.example.com would match.
3.9. model
This string matches the entire MUD URL, thus covering the model that
is unique within the context of the authority. It may contain not
only model information, but versioning information as well, and any
other information that the manufacturer wishes to add. The intended
use is for devices of this precise class to match, to permit or deny
communication between one another.
3.10. local-networks
This null-valued node expands to include local networks. Its default
expansion is that packets must not traverse toward a default route
that is received from the router. However, administrators may expand
the expression as is appropriate in their deployments.
3.11. controller
This URI specifies a value that a controller will register with the
mud controller. The node then is expanded to the set of hosts that
are so registered. This node may also be a URN. In this case, the
URN describes a well known service, such as DNS or NTP.
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Great care should be used when invoking the controller class. For
one thing, it requires some understanding by the administrator as to
when it is appropriate. Classes that are standardized may make it
possible to easily name devices that support standard functions. For
instance, the MUD controller could have some knowledge of which DNS
servers should be used for any particular group of Things. Non-
standard classes will likely require some sort of administrator
interaction. Pre-registration in such classes by controllers with
the MUD server is encouraged. The mechanism to do that is beyond the
scope of this work.
Controller URIs MAY take the form of a URL (e.g. "http[s]://").
However, MUD controllers MUST NOT resolve and retrieve such files,
and it is RECOMMENDED that there be no such file at this time, as
their form and function may be defined at a point in the future. For
now, URLs should serve simply as class names and be populated by the
local deployment administrator.
3.12. my-controller
This null-valued node signals to the MUD controller to use whatever
mapping it has for this MUD URL to a particular group of hosts. This
may require prompting the administrator for class members. Future
work should seek to automate membership management.
3.13. direction-initiated
When applied this matches packets when the flow was initiated in the
corresponding direction. [RFC6092] specifies IPv6 guidance best
practices. While that document is scoped specifically to IPv6, its
contents are applicable for IPv4 as well. When this flag is set, and
the system has no reason to believe a flow has been initiated it MUST
drop the packet. This node may be implemented in its simplest form
by looking at naked SYN bits, but may also be implemented through
more stateful mechanisms.
4. Processing of the MUD file
To keep things relatively simple in addition to whatever definitions
exist, we also apply two additional default behaviors:
o Anything not explicitly permitted is denied.
o Local DNS and NTP are, by default, permitted to and from the
Thing.
An explicit description of the defaults can be found in Appendix B.
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5. What does a MUD URL look like?
To begin with, MUD takes full advantage of both the https: scheme and
the use of .well-known. HTTPS is important in this case because a
man in the middle attack could otherwise harm the operation of a
class of Things. .well-known is used because we wish to add
additional structure to the URL, and want to leave open for future
versions both the means by which the URL is processed and the format
of the MUD file retrieved (there have already been some discussions
along these lines). The URL appears as follows:
mud-url = "https://" authority "/.well-known/mud/" mud-rev
"/" modelinfo ( "?" extras )
; authority is from RFC3986
mud-rev = "v1"
modelinfo = segment ; from RFC3986
extras = query ; from RFC3986
mud-rev signifies the version of the manufacturer usage description
file. This memo specifies "v1" of that file. Later versions may
permit additional schemas or modify the format. In order to provide
for the broadest compatibility for the various transmission
mechanisms, the length of the URL for v1 MUST NOT exceed 255 octets.
Taken together with the mud-url, "modelinfo" represents a Thing model
as the manufacturer wishes to represent it. It could be a brand name
or something more specific. It also may provide a means to indicate
what version the product is. Specifically if it has been updated in
the field, this is the place where evidence of that update would
appear. The field should be changed when the intended communication
patterns of a Thing change. While from a controller standpoint, only
comparison and matching operations are safe, it is envisioned that
updates will require some administrative review. Processing of this
URL occurs as specified in [RFC2818] and [RFC3986].
"extras" is intended for use by the MUD controller to provide
additional information such as posture about the Thing to the MUD
file server. This field MUST NOT be configured on the Thing itself
by a manufacturer - that is what "modelinfo" is for. It is left as
future work to define the full semantics of this field.
6. The MUD YANG Model
<CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud@2017-10-07.yang"
module ietf-mud {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud";
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prefix ietf-mud;
import ietf-access-control-list {
prefix acl;
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
}
organization
"IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/
WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
Author: Eliot Lear
lear@cisco.com
Author: Ralph Droms
rdroms@gmail.com
Author: Dan Romascanu
dromasca@gmail.com
";
description
"This YANG module defines a component that augments the
IETF description of an access list. This specific module
focuses on additional filters that include local, model,
and same-manufacturer.
This module is intended to be serialized via JSON and stored
as a file, as described in RFC XXXX [RFC Editor to fill in with
this document #].
Copyright (c) 2016,2017 IETF Trust and the persons
identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2017-10-07 {
description
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"Initial proposed standard.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description
Specification";
}
typedef direction {
type enumeration {
enum "to-device" {
description
"packets or flows destined to the target
Thing";
}
enum "from-device" {
description
"packets or flows destined from
the target Thing";
}
}
description
"Which way are we talking about?";
}
container mud {
presence "Enabled for this particular MUD URL";
description
"MUD related information, as specified
by RFC-XXXX [RFC Editor to fill in].";
uses mud-grouping;
}
grouping mud-grouping {
description
"Information about when support end(ed), and
when to refresh";
leaf mud-url {
type inet:uri;
mandatory true;
description
"This is the MUD URL associated with the entry found
in a MUD file.";
}
leaf last-update {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"This is intended to be when the current MUD file
was generated. MUD Controllers SHOULD NOT check
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for updates between this time plus cache validity";
}
leaf cache-validity {
type uint8 {
range "1..168";
}
units "hours";
default "48";
description
"The information retrieved from the MUD server is
valid for these many hours, after which it should
be refreshed. N.B. MUD controller implementations
need not discard MUD files beyond this period.";
}
leaf is-supported {
type boolean;
mandatory true;
description
"This boolean indicates whether or not the Thing is
currently supported by the manufacturer.";
}
leaf systeminfo {
type inet:uri;
description
"A URL to a description of this Thing. This
should be a brief localized description. The
reference text should be no more than octets.
systeminfo may be displayed to the user to
determine whether to allow the Thing on the
network.";
}
leaf-list extensions {
type string {
length "1..40";
}
description
"A list of extension names that are used in this MUD
file. Each name is registered with the IANA and
described in an RFC.";
}
container from-device-policy {
description
"The policies that should be enforced on traffic
coming from the device. These policies are not
necessarily intended to be enforced at a single
point, but may be rendered by the controller to any
relevant enorcement points in the network or
elsewhere.";
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uses access-lists;
}
container to-device-policy {
description
"The policies that should be enforced on traffic
going to the device. These policies are not
necessarily intended to be enforced at a single
point, but may be rendered by the controller to any
relevant enorcement points in the network or
elsewhere.";
uses access-lists;
}
}
grouping access-lists {
description
"A grouping for access lists in the context of device
policy.";
container access-lists {
description
"The access lists that should be applied to traffic
to or from the device.";
list access-list {
key "acl-name acl-type";
description
"Each entry on this list refers to an ACL that
should be present in the overall access list
data model. Each ACL is identified by name and
type.";
leaf acl-name {
type leafref {
path "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:acl-name";
}
description
"The name of the ACL for this entry.";
}
leaf acl-type {
type identityref {
base acl:acl-base;
}
description
"The type of the ACL for this entry. The name is
scoped ONLY to the MUD file, and may not be unique
in any other circumstance.";
}
}
}
}
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augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches" {
description
"adding abstractions to avoid need of IP addresses";
container mud-acl {
description
"MUD-specific matches.";
leaf manufacturer {
type inet:host;
description
"A domain that is intended to match the authority
section of the MUD URL. This node is used to specify
one or more manufacturers a device should
be authorized to access.";
}
leaf same-manufacturer {
type empty;
description
"This node matches the authority section of the MUD URL
of a Thing. It is intended to grant access to all
devices with the same authority section.";
}
leaf model {
type inet:uri;
description
"Devices of the specified model type will match if
they have an identical MUD URL.";
}
leaf local-networks {
type empty;
description
"IP addresses will match this node if they are
considered local addresses. A local address may be
a list of locally defined prefixes and masks
that indicate a particular administrative scope.";
}
leaf controller {
type inet:uri;
description
"This node names a class that has associated with it
zero or more IP addresses to match against. These
may be scoped to a manufacturer or via a standard
URN.";
}
leaf my-controller {
type empty;
description
"This node matches one or more network elements that
have been configured to be the controller for this
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Thing, based on its MUD URL.";
}
}
}
augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:aces/" +
"acl:ace/acl:matches/acl:tcp-acl" {
description
"Adding domain names to matching";
leaf direction-initiated {
type direction;
description
"This node matches based on which direction a
connection was initiated. The means by which that
is determined is discussed in this document.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
7. The Domain Name Extension to the ACL Model
This module specifies an extension to IETF-ACL model such that domain
names may be referenced by augmenting the "matches" node. Different
implementations may deploy differing methods to maintain the mapping
between IP address and domain name, if indeed any are needed.
However, the intent is that resources that are referred to using a
name should be authorized (or not) within an access list.
The structure of the change is as follows:
module: ietf-acldns
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/
acl:matches/acl:ipv4-acl:
+--rw src-dnsname? inet:host
+--rw dst-dnsname? inet:host
augment /acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/
acl:matches/acl:ipv6-acl:
+--rw src-dnsname? inet:host
+--rw dst-dnsname? inet:host
The choice of these particular points in the access-list model is
based on the assumption that we are in some way referring to IP-
related resources, as that is what the DNS returns. A domain name in
our context is defined in [RFC6991]. The augmentations are
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replicated across IPv4 and IPv6 to allow MUD file authors the ability
to control the IP version that the Thing may utilize.
The following node are defined.
7.1. source-dnsname
The argument corresponds to a domain name of a source as specified by
inet:host. A number of means may be used to resolve hosts. What is
important is that such resolutions be consistent with ACLs required
by Things to properly operate.
7.2. destination-dnsname
The argument corresponds to a domain name of a destination as
specified by inet:host See the previous section relating to
resolution.
7.3. The ietf-acldns Model
<CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-acldns@2017-10-07.yang"
module ietf-acldns {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns";
prefix "ietf-acldns";
import ietf-access-control-list {
prefix "acl";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet";
}
organization
"IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/
WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
Author: Eliot Lear
lear@cisco.com
Author: Ralph Droms
rdroms@gmail.com
Author: Dan Romascanu
dromasca@gmail.com
";
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description
"This YANG module defines a component that augments the
IETF description of an access list to allow dns names
as matching criteria.";
revision "2017-10-07" {
description "Base version of dnsname extension of ACL model";
reference "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description
Specification";
}
grouping dns-matches {
description "Domain names for matching.";
leaf src-dnsname {
type inet:host;
description "domain name to be matched against";
}
leaf dst-dnsname {
type inet:host;
description "domain name to be matched against";
}
}
augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/" +
"acl:matches/acl:ipv4-acl" {
description "Adding domain names to matching";
uses dns-matches;
}
augment "/acl:access-lists/acl:acl/" +
"acl:aces/acl:ace/" +
"acl:matches/acl:ipv6-acl" {
description "Adding domain names to matching";
uses dns-matches;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
8. MUD File Example
This example contains two access lists that are intended to provide
outbound access to a cloud service on TCP port 443.
{
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"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-url":
"https://bms.example.com/.well-known/mud/v1/lightbulb2000",
"last-update": "2017-10-07T12:16:24+02:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo":
"https://bms.example.com/descriptions/lightbulb2000",
"from-device-policy": {
"access-lists": {
"access-list": [
{
"acl-name": "mud-14377-v6fr",
"acl-type": "ietf-access-control-list:ipv6-acl"
}
]
}
},
"to-device-policy": {
"access-lists": {
"access-list": [
{
"acl-name": "mud-14377-v6to",
"acl-type": "ietf-access-control-list:ipv6-acl"
}
]
}
}
},
"ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": {
"acl": [
{
"acl-name": "mud-14377-v6to",
"acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "cl0-todev",
"matches": {
"ipv6-acl": {
"ietf-acldns:src-dnsname":
"service.bms.example.com",
"protocol": 6,
"source-port-range": {
"lower-port": 443,
"upper-port": 443
}
},
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"tcp-acl": {
"ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"acl-name": "mud-14377-v6fr",
"acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "cl0-frdev",
"matches": {
"ipv6-acl": {
"ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname":
"service.bms.example.com",
"protocol": 6,
"destination-port-range": {
"lower-port": 443,
"upper-port": 443
}
},
"tcp-acl": {
"ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
In this example, two policies are declared, one from the Thing and
the other to the Thing. Each policy names an access list that
applies to the Thing, and one that applies from. Within each access
list, access is permitted to packets flowing to or from the Thing
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that can be mapped to the domain name of "service.bms.example.com".
For each access list, the enforcement point should expect that the
Thing initiated the connection.
9. The MUD URL DHCP Option
The IPv4 MUD URL client option has the following format:
+------+-----+------------------------------
| code | len | MUD URL
+------+-----+------------------------------
Code OPTION_MUD_URL_V4 (161) is assigned by IANA. len is a single
octet that indicates the length of the URL in octets. MUD URL is a
URL. MUD URLs MUST NOT exceed 255 octets.
The IPv6 MUD URL client option has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 | option-length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MUD URL |
| ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
OPTION_MUD_URL_V6 (112; assigned by IANA).
option-length contains the length of the URL in octets.
The intent of this option is to provide both a new Thing classifier
to the network as well as some recommended configuration to the
routers that implement policy. However, it is entirely the purview
of the network system as managed by the network administrator to
decide what to do with this information. The key function of this
option is simply to identify the type of Thing to the network in a
structured way such that the policy can be easily found with existing
toolsets.
9.1. Client Behavior
A DHCPv4 client MAY emit a DHCPv4 option and a DHCPv6 client MAY emit
DHCPv6 option. These options are singletons, as specified in
[RFC7227]. Because clients are intended to have at most one MUD URL
associated with them, they may emit at most one MUD URL option via
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DHCPv4 and one MUD URL option via DHCPv6. In the case where both v4
and v6 DHCP options are emitted, the same URL MUST be used.
Clients SHOULD log or otherwise report improper acknowledgments from
servers, but they MUST NOT modify their MUD URL configuration based
on a server's response. The server's response is only an
acknowledgment that the server has processed the option, and promises
no specific network behavior to the client. In particular, it may
not be possible for the server to retrieve the file associated with
the MUD URL, or the local network administration may not wish to use
the usage description. Neither of these situations should be
considered in any way exceptional.
9.2. Server Behavior
A DHCP server may ignore these options or take action based on
receipt of these options. If a server successfully parses the option
and the URL, it MUST return the option with length field set to zero
and a corresponding null URL field as an acknowledgment. Even in
this circumstance, no specific network behavior is guaranteed. When
a server consumes this option, it will either forward the URL and
relevant client information (such as the gateway address or giaddr)
to a network management system, or it will retrieve the usage
description itself by resolving the URL.
DHCP servers may implement MUD functionality themselves or they may
pass along appropriate information to a network management system or
MUD controller. A DHCP server that does process the MUD URL MUST
adhere to the process specified in [RFC2818] and [RFC5280] to
validate the TLS certificate of the web server hosting the MUD file.
Those servers will retrieve the file, process it, create and install
the necessary configuration on the relevant network element. Servers
SHOULD monitor the gateway for state changes on a given interface. A
DHCP server that does not provide MUD functionality and has forwarded
a MUD URL to a MUD controller MUST notify the MUD controller of any
corresponding change to the DHCP state of the client (such as
expiration or explicit release of a network address lease).
9.3. Relay Requirements
There are no additional requirements for relays.
10. The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URL X.509 Extension
This section defines an X.509 non-critical certificate extension that
contains a single Uniform Resource Locator (URL) that points to an
on-line Manufacturer Usage Description concerning the certificate
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subject. URI must be represented as described in Section 7.4 of
[RFC5280].
Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to
URIs as specified in Section 3.1 of [RFC3987] before they are placed
in the certificate extension.
The semantics of the URL are defined Section 5 of this document.
The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in Section 4.2.2 of
[RFC5280]:
These extensions may be used to direct applications to on-line
information about the issuer or the subject.
The MUD URL is precisely that: online information about the
particular subject.
The new extension is identified as follows:
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<CODE BEGINS>
MUDURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-mudURLExtn2016(88) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
id-pe
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;
MUDCertExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-MUDURL, ... }
ext-MUDURL EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX MUDURLSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-mud-url }
id-pe-mud-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 25 }
MUDURLSyntax ::= IA5String
END
<CODE ENDS>
While this extension can appear in either an 802.AR manufacturer
certificate (IDevID) or deployment certificate (LDevID), of course it
is not guaranteed in either, nor is it guaranteed to be carried over.
It is RECOMMENDED that MUD controller implementations maintain a
table that maps a Thing to its MUD URL based on IDevIDs.
11. The Manufacturer Usage Description LLDP extension
The IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) is a one hop
vendor-neutral link layer protocol used by end hosts network Things
for advertising their identity, capabilities, and neighbors on an
IEEE 802 local area network. Its Type-Length-Value (TLV) design
allows for 'vendor-specific' extensions to be defined. IANA has a
registered IEEE 802 organizationally unique identifier (OUI) defined
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as documented in [RFC7042]. The MUD LLDP extension uses a subtype
defined in this document to carry the MUD URL.
The LLDP vendor specific frame has the following format:
+--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------
|TLV Type| len | OUI |subtype | MUD URL
| =127 | |= 00 00 5E| = 1 |
|(7 bits)|(9 bits)|(3 octets)|(1 octet)|(1-255 octets)
+--------+--------+----------+---------+--------------
where:
o TLV Type = 127 indicates a vendor-specific TLV
o len - indicates the TLV string length
o OUI = 00 00 5E is the organizationally unique identifier of IANA
o subtype = 1 (to be assigned by IANA for the MUD URL)
o MUD URL - the length MUST NOT exceed 255 octets
The intent of this extension is to provide both a new Thing
classifier to the network as well as some recommended configuration
to the routers that implement policy. However, it is entirely the
purview of the network system as managed by the network administrator
to decide what to do with this information. The key function of this
extension is simply to identify the type of Thing to the network in a
structured way such that the policy can be easily found with existing
toolsets.
Hosts, routers, or other network elements that implement this option
are intended to have at most one MUD URL associated with them, so
they may transmit at most one MUD URL value.
Hosts, routers, or other network elements that implement this option
may ignore these options or take action based on receipt of these
options. For example they may fill in information in the respective
extensions of the LLDP Management Information Base (LLDP MIB). LLDP
operates in a one-way direction. LLDPDUs are not exchanged as
information requests by one Thing and response sent by another Thing.
The other Things do not acknowledge LLDP information received from a
Thing. No specific network behavior is guaranteed. When a Thing
consumes this extension, it may either forward the URL and relevant
remote Thing information to a MUD controller, or it will retrieve the
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usage description by resolving the URL in accordance with normal HTTP
semantics.
12. Creating and Processing of Signed MUD Files
Because MUD files contain information that may be used to configure
network access lists, they are sensitive. To insure that they have
not been tampered with, it is important that they be signed. We make
use of DER-encoded Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] for
this purpose.
12.1. Creating a MUD file signature
A MUD file MUST be signed using CMS as an opaque binary object. In
order to make successful verification more likely, intermediate
certificates SHOULD be included. The signature is stored at the same
location as the MUD URL but with the suffix of ".p7s". Signatures
are transferred using content-type "application/pkcs7-signature".
For example:
% openssl cms -sign -signer mancertfile -inkey mankey \
-in mudfile -binary -outform DER - \
-certfile intermediatecert -out mudfile.p7s
Note: A MUD file may need to be re-signed if the signature expires.
12.2. Verifying a MUD file signature
Prior to retrieving a MUD file the MUD controller SHOULD retrieve the
MUD signature file using the MUD URL with a suffix of ".p7s". For
example, if the MUD URL is "https://example.com/.well-known/v1/
modela", the MUD signature URL will be "https://example.com/.well-
known/v1/modela.p7s".
Upon retrieving a MUD file, a MUD controller MUST validate the
signature of the file before continuing with further processing. A
MUD controller MUST cease processing of that file it cannot validate
the chain of trust to a known trust anchor until an administrator has
given approval.
The purpose of the signature on the file is to assign accountability
to an entity, whose reputation can be used to guide administrators on
whether or not to accept a given MUD file. It is already common
place to check web reputation on the location of a server on which a
file resides. While it is likely that the manufacturer will be the
signer of the file, this is not strictly necessary, and may not be
desirable. For one thing, in some environments, integrators may
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install their own certificates. For another, what is more important
is the accountability of the recommendation, and not the
cryptographic relationship between the device and the file.
An example:
% openssl cms -verify -in mudfile.p7s -inform DER -content mudfile
Note the additional step of verifying the common trust root.
13. Extensibility
One of our design goals is to see that MUD files are able to be
understood by as broad a cross-section of systems as is possible.
Coupled with the fact that we have also chosen to leverage existing
mechanisms, we are left with no ability to negotiate extensions and a
limited desire for those extensions in any event. A such, a two-tier
extensibility framework is employed, as follows:
1. At a coarse grain, a protocol version is included in a MUD URL.
This memo specifies MUD version 1. Any and all changes are
entertained when this version is bumped. Transition approaches
between versions would be a matter for discussion in future
versions.
2. At a finer grain, only extensions that would not incur additional
risk to the Thing are permitted. Specifically, adding nodes to
the mud container is permitted with the understanding that such
additions will be ignored by unaware implementations. Any such
extensions SHALL be standardized through the IETF process, and
MUST be named in the "extensions" list. MUD controllers MUST
ignore YANG nodes they do not understand and SHOULD create an
exception to be resolved by an administrator, so as to avoid any
policy inconsistencies.
14. Deployment Considerations
Because MUD consists of a number of architectural building blocks, it
is possible to assemble different deployment scenarios. One key
aspect is where to place policy enforcement. In order to protect the
Thing from other Things within a local deployment, policy can be
enforced on the nearest switch or access point. In order to limit
unwanted traffic within a network, it may also be advisable to
enforce policy as close to the Internet as possible. In some
circumstances, policy enforcement may not be available at the closest
hop. At that point, the risk of so-called east-west infection is
increased to the number of Things that are able to communicate
without protection.
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A caution about some of the classes: admission of a Thing into the
"manufacturer" and "same-manufacturer" class may have impact on
access of other Things. Put another way, the admission may grow the
access-list on switches connected to other Things, depending on how
access is managed. Some care should be given on managing that
access-list growth. Alternative methods such as additional network
segmentation can be used to keep that growth within reason.
Because as of this writing MUD is a new concept, one can expect a
great many devices to not have implemented it. It remains a local
deployment decision as to whether a device that is first connected
should be alloewed broad or limited access. Furthermore, as
mentioned in the introduction, a deployment may choose to ignore a
MUD policy in its entirety, but simply taken into account the MUD URL
as a classifier to be used as part of a local policy decision.
15. Security Considerations
Based on how a MUD URL is emitted, a Thing may be able to lie about
what it is, thus gaining additional network access. There are
several means to limit risk in this case. The most obvious is to
only believe Things that make use of certificate-based authentication
such as IEEE 802.1AR certificates. When those certificates are not
present, Things claiming to be of a certain manufacturer SHOULD NOT
be included in that manufacturer grouping without additional
validation of some form. This will occur when it makes use of
primitives such as "manufacturer" for the purpose of accessing Things
of a particular type. Similarly, network management systems may be
able to fingerprint the Thing. In such cases, the MUD URL can act as
a classifier that can be proven or disproven. Fingerprinting may
have other advantages as well: when 802.1AR certificates are used,
because they themselves cannot change, fingerprinting offers the
opportunity to add artificats to the MUD URL. The meaning of such
artifacts is left as future work.
Network management systems SHOULD NOT accept a usage description for
a Thing with the same MAC address that has indicated a change of
authority without some additional validation (such as review by a
network administrator). New Things that present some form of
unauthenticated MUD URL SHOULD be validated by some external means
when they would be otherwise be given increased network access.
It may be possible for a rogue manufacturer to inappropriately
exercise the MUD file parser, in order to exploit a vulnerability.
There are three recommended approaches to address this threat. The
first is to validate the signature of the MUD file. The second is to
have a system do a primary scan of the file to ensure that it is both
parseable and believable at some level. MUD files will likely be
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relatively small, to start with. The number of ACEs used by any
given Thing should be relatively small as well. It may also be
useful to limit retrieval of MUD URLs to only those sites that are
known to have decent web or domain reputations.
Use of a URL necessitates the use of domain names. If a domain name
changes ownership, the new owner of that domain may be able to
provide MUD files that MUD controllers would consider valid. There
are a few approaches that can mitigate this attack. First, MUD
controllers SHOULD cache certificates used by the MUD file server.
When a new certificate is retrieved for whatever reason, the MUD
controller should check to see if ownership of the domain has
changed. A fair programmatic approximation of this is when the name
servers for the domain have changed. If the actual MUD file has
changed, the controller MAY check the WHOIS database to see if
registration ownership of a domain has changed. If a change has
occured, or if for some reason it is not possible to determine
whether ownership has changed, further review may be warranted.
Note, this remediation does not take into account the case of a Thing
that was produced long ago and only recently fielded, or the case
where a new MUD controller has been installed.
It may not be possible for a MUD controller to retrieve a MUD file at
any given time. Should a MUD controller fail to retrieve a MUD file,
it SHOULD consider the existing one safe to use, at least for a time.
After some period, it SHOULD log that it has been unable to retrieve
the file. There may be very good reasons for such failures,
including the possibility that the MUD controller is in an off-line
environment, the local Internet connection has failed, or the remote
Internet connection has failed. It is also possible that an attacker
is attempting to prevent onboarding of a device. It is a local
deployment decision as to whether or not devices may be onboarded in
the face of such failures.
The release of a MUD URL by a Thing reveals what the Thing is, and
provides an attacker with guidance on what vulnerabilities may be
present.
While the MUD URL itself is not intended to be unique to a specific
Thing, the release of the URL may aid an observer in identifying
individuals when combined with other information. This is a privacy
consideration.
In addressing both of these concerns, implementors should take into
account what other information they are advertising through
mechanisms such as mDNS[RFC6872], how a Thing might otherwise be
identified, perhaps through how it behaves when it is connected to
the network, whether a Thing is intended to be used by individuals or
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carry personal identifying information, and then apply appropriate
data minimization techniques. One approach is to make use of TEAP
[RFC7170] as the means to share information with authorized
components in the network. Network elements may also assist in
limiting access to the MUD URL through the use of mechanisms such as
DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610].
Please note that the security considerations mentioned in Section 4.7
of [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis] are not applicable in this case
because the YANG serialization is not intended to be accessed via
NETCONF. However, for those who try to instantiate this model in a
network element via NETCONF, all objects in each model in this draft
exhibit similar security characteristics as
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. The basic purpose of MUD is to
configure access, and so by its very nature can be disruptive if used
by unauthorized parties.
16. IANA Considerations
16.1. YANG Module Registrations
The following YANG modules are requested to be registred in the "IANA
Module Names" registry:
The ietf-mud module:
o Name: ietf-mud
o XML Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud
o Prefix: ief-mud
o Reference: This memo
The ietf-acldns module:
o Name: ietf-acldns
o XML Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acldns
o Prefix: ietf-acldns
o Reference: This memo
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16.2. DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 Options
The IANA has allocated option 161 in the Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) and Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Parameters registry
for the MUD DHCPv4 option.
IANA is requested to allocated the DHCPv4 and v6 options as specified
in Section 9.
16.3. PKIX Extensions
IANA is kindly requested to make the following assignments for:
o The MUDURLExtnModule-2016 ASN.1 module in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).
o id-pe-mud-url object identifier from the "SMI Security for PKIX
Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1).
The use of these values is specified in Section 10.
16.4. Well Known URI Suffix
The IANA has allocated the URL suffix of "mud" as follows:
o URI Suffix: "mud" o Specification documents: this document o
Related information: n/a
16.5. MIME Media-type Registration for MUD files
The following media-type is defined for transfer of MUD file:
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o Type name: application
o Subtype name: mud+json
o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/mud+json values
are represented as a JSON object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be
employed.
o Security considerations: See Security Considerations
of this document.
o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: this document
o Applications that use this media type: MUD controllers as
specified by this document.
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
o Additional information:
Magic number(s): n/a
File extension(s): n/a
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information:
Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author:
Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
o Change controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No.
16.6. LLDP IANA TLV Subtype Registry
IANA is requested to create a new registry for IANA Link Layer
Discovery Protocol (LLDP) TLV subtype values. The recommended policy
for this registry is Expert Review. The maximum number of entries in
the registry is 256.
IANA is required to populate the initial registry with the value:
LLDP subtype value = 1 (All the other 255 values should be initially
marked as 'Unassigned'.)
Description = the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) Uniform
Resource Locator (URL)
Reference = < this document >
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16.7. The MUD Well Known Universal Resource Name (URNs)
The following parameter registry is requested to be added in
accordance with [RFC3553]
Registry name: "urn:ietf:params:mud" is requested.
Specification: this document
Repository: this document
Index value: Encoded identically to a TCP/UDP port service
name, as specified in Section 5.1 of [RFC6335]
The following entries should be added to the "urn:ietf:params:mud"
name space:
"urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" refers to the service specified by
[RFC1123]. "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp" refers to the service specified
by [RFC5905].
16.8. Extensions Registry
The IANA is requested to establish a registry of extensions as
follows:
Registry name: MUD extensions registry
Registry policy: Standards action
Standard reference: document
Extension name: UTF-8 encoded string, not to exceed 40 characters.
Each extension MUST follow the rules specified in this specification.
As is usual, the IANA issues early allocations based in accordance
with [RFC7120].
17. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Einar Nilsen-Nygaard, who
singlehandedly updated the model to match the updated ACL model,
Bernie Volz, Tom Gindin, Brian Weis, Sandeep Kumar, Thorsten Dahm,
John Bashinski, Steve Rich, Jim Bieda, Dan Wing, Joe Clarke, Henk
Birkholz, Adam Montville, and Robert Sparks for their valuable advice
and reviews. Russ Housley entirely rewrote Section 10 to be a
complete module. Adrian Farrel provided the basis for privacy
considerations text. Kent Watsen provided a thorough review of the
architecture and the YANG model. The remaining errors in this work
are entirely the responsibility of the authors.
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18. References
18.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
Jethanandani, M., Huang, L., Agarwal, S., and D. Blair,
"Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-14 (work in progress), October
2017.
[IEEE8021AB]
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks--
Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery",
n.d..
[RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc1123>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
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[RFC3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987,
January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120>.
[RFC7227] Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.
[RFC7610] Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
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[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
18.2. Informative References
[FW95] Chapman, D. and E. Zwicky, "Building Internet Firewalls",
January 1995.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis]
Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of YANG
Data Model Documents", draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-14
(work in progress), September 2017.
[IEEE8021AR]
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Secure Device Identity", 1998.
[ISO.8601.1988]
International Organization for Standardization, "Data
elements and interchange formats - Information interchange
- Representation of dates and times", ISO Standard 8601,
June 1988.
[RFC1984] IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc1984>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3553] Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, DOI 10.17487/RFC3553, June
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3553>.
[RFC6092] Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6092>.
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[RFC6872] Gurbani, V., Ed., Burger, E., Ed., Anjali, T., Abdelnur,
H., and O. Festor, "The Common Log Format (CLF) for the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Framework and
Information Model", RFC 6872, DOI 10.17487/RFC6872,
February 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6872>.
[RFC7042] Eastlake 3rd, D. and J. Abley, "IANA Considerations and
IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802
Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 7042, DOI 10.17487/RFC7042,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7042>.
[RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
"Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7452] Tschofenig, H., Arkko, J., Thaler, D., and D. McPherson,
"Architectural Considerations in Smart Object Networking",
RFC 7452, DOI 10.17487/RFC7452, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7452>.
[RFC7488] Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., Patil, P., and T.
Reddy, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Server Selection",
RFC 7488, DOI 10.17487/RFC7488, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7488>.
Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions
RFC Editor to remove this section prior to publication.
Draft -10 to -12:
These are based on WGLC comments:
o Correct examples based on ACL model changes.
o Change ordering nodes.
o Additional explanatory text around systeminfo.
o Change ordering in examples.
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o Make it VERY VERY VERY VERY clear that these are recommendations,
not mandates.
o DHCP -> NTP in some of the intro text.
o Remove masa-server
o "Things" to "network elements" in a few key places.
o Reference to JSON YANG RFC added.
Draft -10 to -11:
o Example corrections
o Typo
o Fix two lists.
o Addition of 'any-acl' and 'mud-acl' in the list of allowed
features.
o Clarification of what should be in a MUD file.
Draft -09 to -10:
o AD input.
o Correct dates.
o Add compliance sentence as to which ACL module features are
implemented.
Draft -08 to -09:
o Resolution of Security Area review, IoT directorate review, GenART
review, YANG doctors review.
o change of YANG structure to address mandatory nodes.
o Terminology cleanup.
o specify out extra portion of MUD-URL.
o consistency changes.
o improved YANG descriptions.
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o Remove extra revisions.
o Track ACL model changes.
o Additional cautions on use of ACL model; further clarifications on
extensions.
Draft -07 to -08:
o a number of editorials corrected.
o definition of MUD file tweaked.
Draft -06 to -07:
o Examples updated.
o Additional clarification for direction-initiated.
o Additional implementation guidance given.
Draft -06 to -07:
o Update models to match new ACL model
o extract directionality from the ACL, introducing a new device
container.
Draft -05 to -06:
o Make clear that this is a component architecture (Polk and Watson)
o Add order of operations (Watson)
o Add extensions leaf-list (Pritikin)
o Remove previous-mud-file (Watson)
o Modify text in last-update (Watson)
o Clarify local networks (Weis, Watson)
o Fix contact info (Watson)
o Terminology clarification (Weis)
o Advice on how to handle LDevIDs (Watson)
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o Add deployment considerations (Watson)
o Add some additional text about fingerprinting (Watson)
o Appropriate references to 6087bis (Watson)
o Change systeminfo to a URL to be referenced (Lear)
Draft -04 to -05: * syntax error correction
Draft -03 to -04: * Re-add my-controller
Draft -02 to -03: * Additional IANA updates * Format correction in
YANG. * Add reference to TEAP.
Draft -01 to -02: * Update IANA considerations * Accept Russ Housley
rewrite of X.509 text * Include privacy considerations text * Redo
the URL limit. Still 255 bytes, but now stated in the URL
definition. * Change URI registration to be under urn:ietf:params
Draft -00 to -01: * Fix cert trust text. * change supportInformation
to meta-info * Add an informational element in. * add urn registry
and create first entry * add default elements
Appendix B. Default MUD nodes
What follows is the portion of a MUD file that permits DNS traffic to
a controller that is registered with the URN
"urn:ietf:params:mud:dns" and traffic NTP to a controller that is
registered "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp". This is considered the default
behavior and the ACEs are in effect appended to whatever other "ace"
entries that a MUD file contains. To block DNS or NTP one repeats
the matching statement but replaces the "forwarding" action "accept"
with "drop". Because ACEs are processed in the order they are
received, the defaults would not be reached. A MUD controller might
further decide to optimize to simply not include the defaults when
they are overriden.
Four of "acl" liste entries that implement default MUD nodes is
listed below. Two are for IPv4 and two are for IPv6 (one in each
direction for both versions of IP).
"ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": {
"acl": [
{
"acl-name": "mud-v4-default-to-device",
"acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
"aces": {
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"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "ent0-todev",
"matches": {
"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
},
"ipv4-acl": {
"protocol": 17,
"source-port-range": {
"lower-port": 53,
"upper-port": 53
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
},
{
"rule-name": "ent1-todev",
"matches": {
"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
},
"ipv4-acl": {
"protocol": 17,
"source-port-range": {
"lower-port": 123,
"upper-port": 123
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"acl-name": "mud-v4-default-from-device",
"acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "ent0-frdev",
"matches": {
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"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
},
"ipv4-acl": {
"protocol": 17,
"destination-port-range": {
"lower-port": 53,
"upper-port": 53
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
},
{
"rule-name": "ent1-frdev",
"matches": {
"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
},
"ipv4-acl": {
"protocol": 17,
"destination-port-range": {
"lower-port": 123,
"upper-port": 123
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"acl-name": "mud-v6-default-to-device",
"acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "ent0-todev",
"matches": {
"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
},
"ipv6-acl": {
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"protocol": 17,
"source-port-range": {
"lower-port": 53,
"upper-port": 53
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
},
{
"rule-name": "ent1-todev",
"matches": {
"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
},
"ipv6-acl": {
"protocol": 17,
"source-port-range": {
"lower-port": 123,
"upper-port": 123
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"acl-name": "mud-v6-default-from-device",
"acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "ent0-frdev",
"matches": {
"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:dns"
},
"ipv6-acl": {
"protocol": 17,
"destination-port-range": {
"lower-port": 53,
"upper-port": 53
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}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
},
{
"rule-name": "ent1-frdev",
"matches": {
"ietf-mud:mud-acl": {
"controller": "urn:ietf:params:mud:ntp"
},
"ipv6-acl": {
"protocol": 17,
"destination-port-range": {
"lower-port": 123,
"upper-port": 123
}
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
Appendix C. A Sample Extension: DETNET-indicator
In this sample extension we augment the core MUD model to indicate
whether the device implements DETNET. If a device later attempts to
make use of DETNET, an notification or exception might be generated.
Note that this example is intended only for illustrative purposes.
Extension Name: "Example-Extension" (to be used in the extensions list)
Standard: this document (but do not register the example)
This extension augments the MUD model to include a single node, using
the following sample module that has the following tree structure:
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module: ietf-mud-detext-example
augment /ietf-mud:mud:
+--rw is-detnet-required? boolean
The model is defined as follows:
<CODE BEGINS>file "ietf-mud-detext-example@2016-09-07.yang"
module ietf-mud-detext-example {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-detext-example";
prefix ietf-mud-detext-example;
import ietf-mud {
prefix ietf-mud;
}
organization
"IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/
WG List: opsawg@ietf.org
Author: Eliot Lear
lear@cisco.com
Author: Ralph Droms
rdroms@gmail.com
Author: Dan Romascanu
dromasca@gmail.com
";
description
"Sample extension to a MUD module to indicate a need
for DETNET support.";
revision 2017-09-05 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description
Specification";
}
augment "/ietf-mud:mud" {
description
"This adds a simple extension for a manufacturer
to indicate whether DETNET is required by a
device.";
leaf is-detnet-required {
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type boolean;
description
"This value will equal true if a device requires
detnet to properly function";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Using the previous example, we now show how the extension would be
expressed:
{
"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-url": "https://bms.example.com/.well-known/mud/v1/lightbulb",
"last-update": "2017-09-20T15:49:18+02:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo": "https://bms.example.com/descriptions/lightbulb",
"extensions": [
"ietf-mud-detext-example"
],
"ietf-mud-detext-example:is-detnet-required": "false",
"from-device-policy": {
"access-lists": {
"access-list": [
{
"acl-name": "mud-54684-v6fr",
"acl-type": "ietf-access-control-list:ipv6-acl"
}
]
}
},
"to-device-policy": {
"access-lists": {
"access-list": [
{
"acl-name": "mud-54684-v6to",
"acl-type": "ietf-access-control-list:ipv6-acl"
}
]
}
}
},
"ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": {
"acl": [
{
"acl-name": "mud-54684-v6to",
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"acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "cl0-todev",
"matches": {
"ipv6-acl": {
"ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "service.bms.example.com",
"protocol": 6,
"source-port-range": {
"lower-port": 443,
"upper-port": 443
}
},
"tcp-acl": {
"ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"acl-name": "mud-54684-v6fr",
"acl-type": "ipv6-acl",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "cl0-frdev",
"matches": {
"ipv6-acl": {
"ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "service.bms.example.com",
"protocol": 6,
"destination-port-range": {
"lower-port": 443,
"upper-port": 443
}
},
"tcp-acl": {
"ietf-mud:direction-initiated": "from-device"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
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}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Authors' Addresses
Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems
Richtistrasse 7
Wallisellen CH-8304
Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 878 9200
Email: lear@cisco.com
Ralph Droms
Phone: +1 978 376 3731
Email: rdroms@gmail.com
Dan Romascanu
Phone: +972 54 5555347
Email: dromasca@gmail.com
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