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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05                                             
OPSEC Working Group                                             G. Jones
Internet-Draft                                     The MITRE Corporation
Expires: April 20, 2006                                        R. Callon
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                                 M. Kaeo
                                                    Double Shot Security
                                                        October 17, 2005

     Framework for Operational Security Capabilities for IP Network

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).


   This document outlines work to be done and documents to be produced
   by the Operational Security Capabilities (OPSEC) Working Group.  The
   goal of the working group is to codify knowledge gained through
   operational experience about feature sets that are needed to securely

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   deploy and operate managed network elements providing transit
   services at the data link and IP layers.  The intent is to provide
   clear, concise documentation of capabilities necessary for operating
   networks securely, to assist network operators in communicating their
   requirements to vendors, and to provide vendors with input that is
   useful for building more secure devices.  The working group will
   produce a list of capabilities appropriate for large Internet Service
   Provider (ISP) and Enterprise Networks.  This work is intended to
   refine [RFC3871].

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       1.3.1.  Threats Addressed, Threats Not Addressed . . . . . . .  4
       1.3.2.  Active, Passive and Combined Attacks . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.3.3.  Categories of Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.3.4.  Threat Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.4.  Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       1.4.1.  Passive attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       1.4.2.  Eavesdropping/Sniffing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       1.4.3.  Off-line Cryptographic Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       1.4.4.  Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       1.4.5.  Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       1.4.6.  Message Insertion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       1.4.7.  Message Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       1.4.8.  Message Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       1.4.9.  Man-In-The-Middle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       1.4.10. Invalid Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     1.5.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     1.6.  Intended Audience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     1.7.  Format and Definition of Capabilities  . . . . . . . . . . 10
     1.8.  Applicability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     1.9.  Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     1.10. Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   2.  Documents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     2.1.  Framework Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     2.2.  Operator Practices Survey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     2.3.  Standards Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     2.4.  Capabilities Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     2.5.  Profile Documents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     2.6.  Deliberations Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   3.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   4.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 22

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1.  Introduction

1.1.  Goals

   The goal of the Operational Security Working Group is to codify
   knowledge gained through operational experience about feature sets
   that are needed to securely deploy and operate managed network
   elements providing transit services at the data link and IP layers.

   It is anticipated that the codification of this knowledge will be an
   aid to vendors in producing more securable network elements, and an
   aid to operators in increasing security by deploying and configuring
   more secure network elements.

   This framework document provides an overview of the work to be done
   by the working group, and describes the documents to be produced in
   this effort.

1.2.  Motivation

   Network operators need the appropriate feature sets and tools on
   their infrastructure devices to ensure that they can effectively
   deploy and manage their networks securely while maintaining the
   ability to provide reliable service to their customers.  Vendors need
   guidelines on which security features and functionality are critical
   for operators to be able to reach that goal.

1.3.  Threat Model

1.3.1.  Threats Addressed, Threats Not Addressed

   This section describes the general classes of threats that this work
   intends to address.  Specific threats and attacks will be discussed
   in the documents which are referred to in this framework.  Each of
   those documents will enumerate the capabilities which are required to
   mitigate the risk of these specific threats.

   The intent is to address real-world threats to and attacks on network
   infrastructure devices which have severely impacted network
   operations or have immediate potential to do so.  The intent is NOT
   to build a complete theoretical threat model or list every possible

   The threats will be limited to those that affect the management of
   network infrastructure and its ability to transit traffic.  Threats
   to the confidentiality and integrity of transit traffic will not be

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1.3.2.  Active, Passive and Combined Attacks

   [RFC3552] describes a general Internet threat model which readers of
   this document should be familiar with.  It defines a threat model to
   describes the capabilities that an attacker is assumed to be able to
   deploy against a resource.  [RFC3552] classifies attacks into two
   main categories: passive attacks and active attacks.  Passive attacks
   are ones where an attacker simply reads information off the network
   and obtains confidential and/or private information which can be used
   to compromise network systems.  Active attacks are ones where the
   attacker writes data to the network and can include replay attacks,
   message insertion, message deletion, message modification and man-in-
   the-middle attacks.  Often, these passive and active attacks are
   combined.  For example, routing information is diverted via a man-in-
   the-middle attack to force confidential information to transit a
   network path on which the attacker is able to perform eavesdropping.

1.3.3.  Categories of Threats

   The following sections provide a model that can be used to further
   categorize attacks on infrastructure devices and/or the operating
   behavior of these devices, and also gives some examples of attacks
   which fall into each classification.

   It is common to categorize threats based on the effects or damage
   caused by associated attacks.  For example, threats generally fall
   under one of the three categories as defined in [RFC2196]:

   o  Unauthorized access to resources and/or information

   o  Unintended and/or unauthorized disclosure of information

   o  Denial of service

   There are a number of attacks, any one of which, if exploited, can
   lead to any of the above mentioned threats.  As one example, if an
   intruder has taken control of a router (for example by guessing the
   password) then he could potentially obtain unauthorized access to
   resources, could gain unauthorized disclosure of information, and
   could also deny service to legitimate users.  This method of
   categorizing threats based on the result of the threat therefore
   results in categories which are orthogonal to the cause of the
   effect, and thus orthogonal to the device capabilities which are

   Categorization of attacks based on the capabilities required to mount
   the attack will allow the analysis and description of the attacks to
   be more closely aligned with the product capabilities required to

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   defeat or mitigate the attack.

1.3.4.  Threat Sources

   The sources of threats in an operational network take many forms.
   Some sources can be intentional, such as a malicious intruder
   actively gaining access to an unauthorized resource or causing a
   denial of service attack.  Other sources can be unintentional but
   still render the network unusable, such as software bugs or
   configuration mistakes.  Many of the unintentional threat sources can
   be difficult to recognize or prevent.  However wherever possible,
   capabilities and functionality will be defined which minimize the
   extent of the damage done under these circumstances.

   Threats can originate from outside or inside and can be due to
   vulnerabilities in a device or weaknesses in operational processes.
   Inside threats pertain to an authorized participant in the operation
   of the network performing unauthorized actions.  Outside threats
   pertain to any unauthorized network devices or person causing havoc
   with normal network operations.

   On Path network devices are able to read, modify, or remove any
   datagram transmitted along a given path.  Off-path hosts can transmit
   arbitrary datagrams that appear to come from any hosts but cannot
   necessarily receive datagrams intended for other hosts.

1.4.  Attacks

   This section specifies attack categories based on the capabilities
   required to mount the attack and provides more granular detail of
   many of the identifiable and recognized threats to which network
   infrastructure devices are susceptible.

1.4.1.  Passive attacks

   Passive attacks are ones where an attacker simply reads information
   off the network and obtains confidential and/or private information
   which can be used to compromise network systems.

1.4.2.  Eavesdropping/Sniffing

   The most common form of passive attack is eavesdropping, where the
   attacker is able to read the data which is being transmitted from the
   sender to the receiver.  In any operational network, the entire data
   path and every device involved in the data path must be considered
   for this type of attack.  Any information which could be used to
   potentially gain unauthorized access to a device or is private must
   be protected.  This includes passwords, configuration files and log

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   files.  It is common to think only of protecting the data path and to
   make sure that data is not diverted along a different path which may
   be easier to eavesdrop on, such as a wireless network.  In many
   instances it would be wise to consider cryptographically protecting
   data confidentiality wherever sensitive information is involved.

1.4.3.  Off-line Cryptographic Attacks

   These attacks typically capture some data which has been
   cryptographically protected and then use varying means to try and
   recover the original data.  Poor password protection protocols can
   easily be reverse engineered and poorly chosen passwords can also be
   easily deciphered.  As described in [RFC3552], a number of popular
   password-based challenge response protocols are vulnerable to a
   dictionary attack.  The attacker captures a challenge-response pair
   and then proceeds to try entries from a list of common words (such as
   a dictionary file) until he finds a password that produces the right

1.4.4.  Active Attacks

   Active attacks are ones where the attacker writes data to the
   network.  Generally, any part of a data packet can be forged.  When
   the source IP address is forged, the attack is generally referred to
   as a spoofing attack.  These attacks can be mitigated by filtering
   traffic based on IP addresses to only allow legitimate traffic to/
   from a network.

   Not all active attacks require forged addresses and most systems are
   susceptible to a number of common attack patterns which are described
   in the next sections.  Note that any type of active attack can be
   used for Denial of Service if the traffic is sent at such a rate that
   it exceeds a networks link capacity or exhausts device resources.

1.4.5.  Replay Attacks

   A replay attack is a combination of a passive and an active attack.
   In this type of attack, the attacker records some number of messages
   off of the wire and then plays them back to the original recipient.
   Note that the attacker does not need to be able to understand the
   messages.  He merely needs to capture and re-transmit them.

1.4.6.  Message Insertion

   In a message insertion attack, the attacker forges one or more
   messages and injects them into the network.  Often these messages
   will have a forged source address in order to disguise the identity
   of the attacker.

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   Message insertion attacks can be used to exploit known
   vulnerabilities in protocol software.  Routers and switches implement
   protocols which in some cases make use of software which is well
   known and widely deployed.  Malicious attackers therefore may be
   familiar with the protocol software and be able to exploit known

1.4.7.  Message Modification

   In a message modification attack, the attacker removes a message from
   the wire, modifies it, and then resends it.  The contents of the
   message may be modified and/or the intended recipient. [need example
   specific to network operations where this would be harmful]

1.4.8.  Message Deletion

   In a message deletion attack, the attacker simply removes a message
   from the wire. [need example specific to network operations where
   this is harmful]

1.4.9.  Man-In-The-Middle

   A Man-In-The-Middle attack combines the above techniques in a special
   form: The attacker subverts the communication stream in order to pose
   as the sender to receiver and the receiver to the sender.  This
   differs fundamentally from the above forms of attack because it
   attacks the identity of the communicating parties, rather than the
   data stream itself.  Consequently, many techniques which provide
   integrity of the communications stream are insufficient to protect
   against man-in-the-middle attacks.

   Man-in-the-middle attacks are possible whenever peer entity
   authentication is not used.  For example, it is trivial to mount man-
   in-the-middle attacks on local networks via ARP spoofing where the
   attacker forges an ARP with the victim's IP address and his own MAC
   address to gain access to a network.  The attacker can then do
   further damage by sending forged messages.  Imagine if the victim^Os
   IP address was that of a TFTP server.  The attacker could potentially
   download invalid system images or configuration files to a network
   device and subsequently compromise that network device.

1.4.10.  Invalid Message

   An invalid message attack refers to situations which can be either
   deliberately invoked or are due to some non-malicious software or
   configuration error.  This attack can be realized if vendors do not
   conform to standards and send inappropriate control packets which can
   cause routing loops or neighboring routers to go down.  Also, a

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   malicious individual may launch DoS attacks which flood a device's
   control plane with enough messages that the device becomes inoperable
   due to resource starvation.

   [Ed. - Need to review existing capabilities.  Do the threats and
   attack types listed above cover them all ?  Are there capabilities
   that imply threats and attack classes not listed above]

1.5.  Scope

   The working group will produce a list of capabilities appropriate

   o  Internet Service Provider (ISP) Networks

   o  Enterprise Networks

   The following are explicitly out of scope:

   o  general purpose hosts that do not transit traffic including
      infrastructure hosts such as name/time/log/AAA servers, etc.,

   o  unmanaged devices,

   o  customer managed devices (e.g. firewalls, Intrusion Detection
      System, dedicated VPN devices, etc.),

   o  SOHO (Small Office, Home Office) devices (e.g. personal firewalls,
      Wireless Access Points, Cable Modems, etc.),

   o  confidentiality of customer data,

   o  integrity of customer data,

   o  physical security.

   These limitations have been made to keep the amount of work and size
   of documents manageable.  While the capabilities listed here may
   apply to systems outside the scope, no capabilities have been added
   to account for their unique needs.

   While the examples given are written with IPv4 in mind, most of the
   capabilities are general enough to apply to IPv6.

1.6.  Intended Audience

   There are two intended audiences: the network operator who selects,
   purchases, and operates IP network equipment, and the vendors who

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   create these devices.

1.7.  Format and Definition of Capabilities

   A separate document will be created for specific categories of
   capabilities.  Each individual capability will have the following

   Capability (what)

      The capability describes a policy to be supported by the device.

      Capabilities should not refer to specific technologies.  It is
      expected that desired capability will change little over time.

   Supported Practices (why)

      The Supported Practice section cites practices described in CITE-
      OPERATOR-SURVEY-RFC that are supported by this capability.  The
      need to support the cited practices provides the justification for
      the feature.

      In a few cases, practices not listed in CITE-OPERATOR-SURVEY-RFC
      may be listed at the end of the capability document and cited as
      justification for a capability.  This may be necessary if a
      practice becomes common after CITE-OPERATOR-SURVEY-RFC is finished
      or if there is widespread consensus that the practice would
      improve security but it is not, for whatever reason, in widespread

   Current Implementations (how)

      The Current Implementation section is intended to give examples of
      implementations of the capability, citing technology and standards
      current at the time of writing.  Examples of configuration and
      usage may also be given.

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      The Considerations section lists operational and resource
      constraints, limitations of current implementations, tradeoffs,

1.8.  Applicability

   These capabilities are intended to give guidance on how best to
   protect communications infrastructure.  Service Providers, Network
   Operators, and Equipment Suppliers are encouraged to study these
   capabilities, and prioritize the extent and manner in which they may
   implement and/or deploy equipment supporting these capabilities.

   Decisions of whether or not to support a specific capabilities are
   intended to be left with the responsible organization (e.g., Service
   Provider, Network Operator, or Equipment Supplier).  Due to the
   continuously evolving nature of security threats to networks, and due
   to significant variations in the specific security threats and
   requirements in different network environments, it is not appropriate
   to mandate implementation of these capabilities through legislation
   or regulation, nor would any mandate be consistent with their intent.

1.9.  Intended Use

   It is anticipated that the capabilities in these documents will be
   used for the following purposes:

   o  as a checklist when evaluating networked products,

   o  to create profiles of different subsets of the capabilities which
      describe the needs of different devices, organizations, and
      operating environments,

   o  to assist operators in clearly communicating their security

   o  as high level guidance for the creation of detailed test plans.

   o  as guidance for vendors to make appropriate decisions for
      engineering feature roadmaps.

1.10.  Definitions

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   RFC 2119 Keywords

      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
      in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   NOTE: The following definitions are take from RFC3871.  Unless
   otherwise stated, the working group documents will use these terms as
   defined below.


      A "Bogon" (plural: "bogons") is a packet with an IP source address
      in an address block not yet allocated by IANA or the Regional
      Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC...) as well as all
      addresses reserved for private or special use by RFCs.  See
      [RFC3330] and [RFC1918].


      Several capabilities refer to a Command Line Interface (CLI).
      While this refers at present to a classic text oriented command
      interface, it is not intended to preclude other mechanisms which
      may provide all the capabilities that reference "CLI".


      Adherence to proposed standards.


      Several capabilities refer to a "Console".  The model for this is
      the classic RS232 serial port which has, for the past 30 or more
      years, provided a simple, stable, reliable, well-understood and
      nearly ubiquitous management interface to network devices.  Again,
      these capabilities are intended primarily to codify the benefits
      provided by that venerable interface, not to preclude other
      mechanisms that provide the same capabilities.

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      In this document, a "filter" is defined as a group of one or more
      rules where each rule specifies one or more match criteria.

   In-Band management.

      "In-Band management" is defined as any management done over the
      same channels and interfaces used for user/customer data.
      Examples would include using SSH for management via customer or
      Internet facing network interfaces.

   High Resolution Time.

      "High resolution time" is defined in this document as "time having
      a resolution greater than one second" (e.g. milliseconds).


      Unless otherwise indicated, "IP" refers to IPv4.


      This document uses a broad definition of the term "management".
      In this document, "management" refers to any authorized
      interaction with the device intended to change its operational
      state or configuration.  Data/Forwarding plane functions (e.g. the
      transit of customer traffic) are not considered management.
      Control plane functions such as routing, signaling and link
      management protocols and management plane functions such as remote
      access, configuration and authentication are considered to be


      Per [RFC1208] "Martian: Humorous term applied to packets that turn
      up unexpectedly on the wrong network because of bogus routing
      entries.  Also used as a name for a packet which has an altogether
      bogus (non-registered or ill-formed) Internet address."  For the
      purposes of this document Martians are defined as "packets having
      a source address that, by application of the current forwarding
      tables, would not have its return traffic routed back to the
      sender."  "Spoofed packets" are a common source of martians.

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      Note that in some cases, the traffic may be asymmetric, and a
      simple forwarding table check might produce false positives.  See

   Out-of-Band (OoB) management.

      "Out-of-Band management" is defined as any management done over
      channels and interfaces that are separate from those used for
      user/customer data.  Examples would include a serial console
      interface or a network interface connected to a dedicated
      management network that is not used to carry customer traffic.

   Open Review.

      "Open review" refers to processes designed to generate public
      discussion and review of technical solutions such as data
      communications protocols and cryptographic algorithms with the
      goals of improving and building confidence in the final solutions.

      For the purposes of this document "open review" is defined by
      [RFC2026].  All standards track documents are considered to have
      been through an open review process.

      It should be noted that organizations may have local requirements
      that define what they view as acceptable "open review".  For
      example, they may be required to adhere to certain national or
      international standards.  Such modifications of the definition of
      the term "open review", while important, are considered local
      issues that should be discussed between the organization and the

      It should also be noted that section 7 of [RFC2026] permits
      standards track documents to incorporate other "external standards
      and specifications".


      Policy Based Routing.

   Resource Starvation.

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      A condition where resources necessary for communication and proper
      functioning of a network element are unavailable.  Such resources
      might include Bandwidth of a link, memory of a routing device, or
      CPU time on a routing processor.

   Secure Channel.

      A "secure channel" is a mechanism that ensures end-to-end
      integrity and confidentiality of communications.  Examples include
      TLS [RFC2246] and IPsec [RFC2401].  Connecting a terminal to a
      console port using physically secure, shielded cable would provide
      confidentiality but possibly not integrity.


      A number of capabilities refer to "services".  For the purposes of
      this document a "service" is defined as "any process or protocol
      running in the control or management planes to which non-transit
      packets may be delivered".  Examples might include an SSH server,
      a BGP process or an NTP server.  It would also include the
      transport, network and link layer protocols since, for example, a
      TCP packet addressed to a port on which no service is listening
      will be "delivered" to the IP stack, and possibly result in an
      ICMP message being sent back.


      An instance of protocol establishment, e.g. telnet, BGP, OSPF,

   Single-Homed Network.

      A "single-homed network" is defined as one for which

      *  There is only one upstream connection

      *  Routing is symmetric.

      See [RFC3704] for a discussion of related issues and mechanisms
      for multi-homed networks.

   Spoofed Packet.

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      A "spoofed packet" is defined as a packet that has a source
      address that does not correspond to any address assigned to the
      system which sent the packet.  Spoofed packets are often "bogons"
      or "martians".

   Secure Network

      For the purposes of these documents, a secure network is one in

      *  The network keeps passing legitimate customer traffic

      *  Traffic goes where it is supposed to go, and only where it is
         supposed to go (availability, confidentiality).

      *  The network elements remain manageable (availability).

      *  Only authorized users can manage network elements

      *  There is a record of all security related events

      *  The network operator has the necessary tools to detect and
         respond to illegitimate traffic.

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2.  Documents

   The following describes the types of documents to be produced by the
   OPSEC working group.  Each document is intended to cover an area
   important to secure operation of large network infrastructure.  See
   the working group charter for a complete list of individual

2.1.  Framework Document


      This document.

2.2.  Operator Practices Survey


      This document is intended to provide a survey of current operator
      practices in the area of securing networks.  It lists current
      practices that will be cited as justification for capabilities.
      It defines a general threat model and classes of attacks.

2.3.  Standards Survey


      This document provides an overview of other efforts in developing
      standards, guidelines, best practices, or other information
      intended to facilitate improvement in network security.  Any
      effort which is known, such as the ANSI T1.276, the NRIC V "Best
      Practices", ITU-T M.3016 and X.805, the T1S1 effort on securing
      signalling will be included.  The intent is to provide a clear
      understanding of which efforts are complementary and/or
      contradictory such that any efforts of future cross-certification
      of standards may be facilitated.

2.4.  Capabilities Documents


      Capability documents list capabilities needed to support security
      practices.  Each capability document lists capabilities of one
      logical group of functions (e.g. logging, filtering, etc.).  They
      define a threat model, list individual capabilities, cite
      practices supported in the Operator Practices Survey and in few
      cases may define additional practices.

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2.5.  Profile Documents


      Profile documents list capabilities appropriate to different
      operating environments such as large Network Service Provider
      (NSP) core or edge devices or enterprise networks.  These profiles
      MAY provide a good starting point for organizations to generate
      their own list of requirements.

2.6.  Deliberations Document


      The deliberations document is intended to capture discussion, list
      reasons for choices made, and give reasons for the inclusion and
      exclusion of certain capabilities form the documents.  This is
      intended to provide insight to future work.

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3.  Security Considerations

   Security is the entire focus of this document.

4.  Normative References

   [RFC1208]  Jacobsen, O. and D. Lynch, "Glossary of networking terms",
              RFC 1208, March 1991.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
              3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2196]  Fraser, B., "Site Security Handbook", RFC 2196,
              September 1997.

   [RFC2246]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
              RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [RFC2401]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC3330]  IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330,
              September 2002.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              July 2003.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.

   [RFC3871]  Jones, G., "Operational Security Requirements for Large
              Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network
              Infrastructure", RFC 3871, September 2004.

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Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of:

   o  Acknowledgments to be determined.

   o  The MITRE Corporation for supporting development of this document.
      NOTE: The author's affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is
      provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended to
      convey or imply MITRE's concurrence with, or support for, the
      positions, opinions or viewpoints expressed by the author.

   o  This listing is intended to acknowledge contributions, not to
      imply that the individual or organizations approve the content of
      this document.

   o  Apologies to those who commented on/contributed to the document
      and were not listed.

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Authors' Addresses

   George M. Jones
   The MITRE Corporation
   7515 Colshire Drive, M/S WEST
   McLean, Virginia  22102-7508

   Phone: +1 703 488 9740
   Email: gmjones@mitre.org

   Ross Callon
   Juniper Networks
   10 Technology Park Drive
   Westford, MA  01886

   Phone: +1 978 692 6724
   Email: rcallon@juniper.net

   Merike Kaeo
   Double Shot Security
   520 Washington Blvd. #363
   Marina Del Rey, CA  90292

   Phone: +1 310 866 0165
   Email: kaeo@merike.com

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