Network Working Group Vishwas Manral
Internet-Draft IP Infusion
Expires: March 2010 Manav Bhatia
Intended Status: Informational Alcatel-Lucent
Joel Jaeggli
Checkpoint Software
Russ White
Cisco Systems
Issues with existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols
draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-01.txt
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Abstract
Routing protocols have over time been extended to use cryptographic mechanisms to validate data being received from a neighboring router to ensure that:
o it has not been modified in transit.
o actually originated from an authorized neighboring router .
The cryptographic mechanisms defined to date and described in this document rely on a digest produced with a hash algorithm applied to the payload encapsulated in the routing protocol packet.
This document outlines some of the limitations of the current mechanism, problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms, and possible vectors for the exploitation of these limitations.
Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]
Table of Contents
1. Problem Statement 2
1.1 MD5 Pre-Image vs Collision Attacks 3
2. Open Shortest Path First (OSPFv2) 4
2.1 Management Issues with OSPF 4
2.2 Technical Issues with OSPF 4
3. Open Shortest Path First (OSPFv3) 6
3.1 Management Issues with OSPFv3 6
3.2 Technical Issues with OSPFv3 7
4. Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing Protocol (IS-IS) 8
4.1 Management Issues with IS-IS 8
4.2 Technical Issues with IS-IS 8
5. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4) 10
5.1 Management Issues with BGP-4 10
5.2 Technical Issues with BGP-4 11
6. The Routing Information Protocol (RIP) 11
6.1 Technical Issues with RIP 11
7. Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) 13
7.1 Technical Issues with BFD 13
8. Security Considerations 14
9. Acknowledgements 14
10. IANA Considerations 14
11. References 14
11.1 Normative References 14
11.2 Informative References 15
12. Contributor's Address 16
13. Author's Addresses 16
1. Problem Statement
Routing protocols, such as OSPF version 2 [RFC2328], version 3 [RFC5340], IS-IS [RFC1195], and BGP-4 [RFC4271], employ various mechanisms to create a cryptographic digest of each transmitted routing protocol. Traditionally, these digests are the results of a one-way hash algorithm, such as MD5 [RFC1321], across the contents of the packet being transmitted. A secret key is used as the hash base (or seed). The digest is then recomputed by the receiving router, using the same key as the original router used to create the hash, then compared with the transmitted digest to verify:
o That the router originating this packet is authorized via the
shared key mechanism to peer with the local router, and exchange
routing data. The implicit trust of routing protocol exchange
protected by a shared secret is intended to protect against the
injection of falsely generated routing data being injected into
the routing system by unauthorized systems.
o That the data has not been altered in transit between the
two neighboring routers.
Digest verification schemes are not intended to protect the confidentiality of information being exchanged between routers. The information (entries in the routing table) is potentially available through other mechanisms ; Morever, access to the physical media between two routers exchanging routing data, will confer the ability to capture or otherwise discover the contents of the routing tables in those routers.
Authentication mechanisms defined today have notable limitations:
o Manual configuration of shared secret keys, especially in large
networks and between networks, poses a major management problem.
In many cases it is challenging to replace keys without significant
coordination or disruption.
o In some cases, when manual keys are configured, some forms of
replay protection are no longer possible , allowing the routing
protocol to be attacked though the replay of captured routing
messages.
o The MD5 digest algorithm was not designed to be used in the way
most routing protocols are using it. which has potentially serious
future implications.
This document outlines some of the problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
1.1 MD5 Pre-Image vs Collision Attacks
A preimage attack (An attempt to find new data with the same hash value) would enable someone to find an input message that
causes a hash function to produce a particular output. In contrast, a collision attack finds two messages with the same hash, but the attacker can't pick what the message will be. Feasible collision attacks against MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD were found by the Chinese researcher Xiaoyun Wang with co-authors Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai, and Hongbo Yu.
The ability to produce a collision does not currently introduce any obvious or known attacks on routing protocols. Pre-image attacks have the potential to cause problems in the future albiet due to the message length there are serious limitations to the feasibility of mounting such an attack.
Protocols themselves have some built-in protection against collision.
A lot of values for fields in a protocol are invalid or will produce an unusable packet. For example, in OSPF the LSA type can be from 1 to 11. Any other value in the field will result in the packet being discarded.
Assume two packets M and M' are generated which have the same hash. The above condition will further reduce the ability to produce a message which is also a correct message from the protocol perspective, as a lot of potential values are themselves not valid.
2. Open Shortest Path First (OSPFv2)
OSPF [RFC2328] describes the use of an MD5 digest with OSPF packets.
MD5 keys are manually configured. The OSPF packet Header includes an authentication type field as well as 64 bits of data for use by the
appropriate authentication scheme. OSPF also provides for a non- decreasing sequence number to be included in each OSPF protocol packet to protect against replay attacks.
2.1 Management Issues with OSPF
According to the OSPF specification [RFC2328], digests are applied
to packets transmitted between adjacent neighbors, rather than being applied to the routing information originated by a router (digests
are not applied at the LSA level, but rather at the packet level).
[RFC2328] states that any set of OSPF routers adjacent across a
single link may use a different key to build MD5 digests than the key
used to build MD5 digests on any other link. Thus, MD5 keys may be
configured, and changed, on a per-link basis in an OSPF network.
OSPF does not specify a mechanisms to negotiate keys, nor does it
specify any mechanism to negotiate the hash algorithms to be used.
With the proliferation of the number of hash algorithms, as well as
the need to continuously upgrade the algorithms, manually configuring
the information becomes very tedious. It should also be noted that rekeying OSFP requires coordination among the adjacent routers.
2.2 Technical Issues with OSPF
While OSPF provides relatively strong protection through the
inclusion of MD5 signatures, with additional data and a sequence
numbers in transmitted packets, there are still attacks against OSPF:
o The sequence number is initialized to zero when forming an
adjacency with a newly discovered neighbor. When an adjacency is
brought down the sequence number is also set to zero. If the
cryptographically protected packets of a router that is brought
down (for administrative or other reasons) are replayed by a
malicious router traffic could be forced through the malicious
router. A malicious router might then induce routing loops,
intercept or blackhole the traffic.
o OSPF allows multiple packets with the same sequence number.
This means that the possibility exists to replay the same packet
many times before the next legitimate packet is sent. An attacker
may resend the same packet repeatedly until the next hello packet
is transmitted and received. The Hello interval which is unknown
determines the attack window.
o OSPF does not require the use of any particular hash algorithm,
however the use of only MD5 digests for authentication and replay
protection is specified in the document. Most OSPF implementations
only support MD5 in addition to Null and Simple Password
authentication.
Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the
MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [RFC4270]
summarizes the discoveries. Attacks on many applications of MD5
are practical on modern computers. For this reason the general use
of these algorithms should to be discouraged.
o OSPF on a broadcast network shares the same key between all
neighbors on that broadcast network. Some OSPF packets are sent to
a multicast address.
Spoofing by any malicious neighbor possessing credentials or
replayable packets is therefore very easy. Possession of the key
itself is used as an identity validation and no other identity
check is used. A malicious neighbor could send a packet forging
the identity as being from an other neighbor. There would be no
way in which the victim could distinguish the identity of the
packet sender.
o OSPF neighbors on broadcast, NBMA and point-to-multipoint
networks are identified by the IP address in the IP header.
The IP header is not covered by the MAC in the cryptographic
authentication scheme as described in RFC 2328, and an attack can
be made to exploit this omission.
Assume the following scenario.
R1 sends an authenticated HELLO to R2. This HELLO is captured
and replayed back to R1. The source IP in the IP header of the
replayed packet is changed to that of R2.
R1, not finding itself in HELLO would deduce that the connection
is not bidirectional and would bring down the adjacency.
3. Open Shortest Path First (OSPFv3)
OSPFv3 [RFC5340] relies on the IP Authentication Header [RFC4302]
and the IP Encapsulating Payload [RFC4303] to cryptographically sign routing information passed between routers.
When using ESP, the null encryption algorithm [RFC2410] is used, so the data carried in the OSPFv3 packets is signed, but not encrypted. This provides data origin authentication for adjacent routers, and data integrity which gives the assurance data transmitted by a router has not changed in transit.
However it does not provide confidentiality of the information transmitted. [RFC4552] mandates the use of ESP with null encryption for authentication and also does encourage the use of confidentiality to protect the privacy of the routing information transmitted, using ESP encryption.
Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3 [RFC4552] mandates the use of ESP with null encryption for authentication and also does encourage the use of confidentiality to protect the privacy of the routing information transmitted, using ESP encryption. It however only specifies the use of manual keying of routing information as discussed in the following section.
3.1 Management Issues with OSPFv3
The OSPFv3 security document - Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3 [RFC4552] discusses, at length, the reasoning behind using manually configured keys, rather than some automated key management protocol such as IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The primary problem is that all current key management mechanisms are designed for a one-to-one correlation of keys, while OSPF adjacencies are formed on a one-to-many basis. This forces the system administrator to use manually configured SAs and cryptographic keys to provide the authentication and, if desired, confidentiality services.
Regarding replay protection [RFC4552] states that:
As it is not possible as per the current standards to provide
complete replay protection while using manual keying, the proposed
solution will not provide protection against replay attacks.
The primary administrative issue with manually configured SAs and keys in the OSPFv3 case is the management issues, maintaining shared
sets of keys on all routers within a network. As with OSPFv2
rekeying is an infrequent event requiring coordination. [RFC4552] does not require that all OSPFv3 routers have the same key configured for every neighbor, so each set of neighbors connected to a given link could have a different key configured. While this makes it easier to change the keys, by forcing the system administrator to only change the keys on the routers on a single link, the process of manual configuration for all the routers in a network to change the keys used for OSPFv3 digests and confidentiality on a periodic basis can be difficult.
3.2 Technical Issues with OSPFv3
The primary technical concern with the current specifications for
OSPFv3 is that when manual SA and key management is used as [RFC4302] specifies, in section 3.3.2, Sequence Number Generation: "The sender assumes anti-replay is enabled as a default, unless otherwise notified by the receiver (see 3.4.3) or if the SA was configured using manual key management." Replaying OSPFv3 packets can induce several failures in a network, including:
o Replaying hello packets with an empty neighbor list can cause all
the neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset,
disrupting network communications.
o Replaying hello packets from early in the designated router
election process on broadcast links can cause all the neighbor
adjacencies with the sending router to be reset, disrupting
network communications.
o Replaying database description (DB-Description) packets can cause
all FULL neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset,
disrupting network communications.
o Replaying link state request (LS-Request) packets can cause all
FULL neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset,
disrupting network communications.
o Capturing a full adjacency process (from two-way all the way to
FULL state), and then replaying this process when the router is no
longer attached can cause a false adjacency to be formed, allowing
an attacker to attract traffic.
o OSPFv3 on a broadcast network shares the same key between all
neighbors on that network. Some OSPF packets are sent to a
multicast address.
Spoofing by a malicious neighbor is very easy. Possession of the
key itself is used as an identity check. There is no other
identity check used. A neighbor could send a packet specifying the
packet came from some other neighbor and there would be no way in
which the attacked router could figure out the identity of the
packet sender.
4. Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing Protocol (IS-IS)
Integrated IS-IS [RFC1195] uses HMAC-MD5 (Hashed Message Authentication Code MD5) authentication with manual keying, as described in [RFC5304] and has recently been extended to provide support for using the HMAC construct along with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [RFC5310] family of cryptographic hash functions. There is no provision within IS-IS to encrypt the body of a routing protocol message.
4.1 Management Issues with IS-IS
[RFC5304] states that each LSP generated by an intermediate system is
signed with the HMAC-MD5 algorithm using a key manually defined by
the network administrator. Since authentication is performed on the
LSPs transmitted by an intermediate system, rather than on the
packets transmitted to a specific neighbor, it is implied that all
the intermediate systems within a single flooding domain must be
configured with the same key for authentication to work correctly.
The initial configuration of manual keys for authentication within an
IS-IS network is simplified by a state where LSPs containing HMAC-MD5
authentication TLVs are accepted by internmediate systems without the keys, but the digest is not validated. Once keys are configured on
all routers, changing those keys becomes much more difficult.
IS-IS [RFC1195] does not specify a mechanism to negotiate keys, nor does it specify any mechanism to negotiate the hash algorithms to be used.
With the proliferation of available hash algorithms, as well as
the need to upgrade the algorithms, manually configuration requires coordination among intermediate systems which can become tedious.
4.2 Technical Issues with IS-IS
[RFC5304] states: "This mechanism does not prevent replay attacks,
however, in most cases, such attacks would trigger existing
mechanisms in the IS-IS protocol that would effectively reject old
information."
There are a few cases where existing mechanisms in the IS-IS
protocol would not effectively reject old information is the case of
hello packets (IIHs) used to discover neighbors, and SNP packets.
As described in IS-IS [RFC1195], a list of known neighbors is
included in each hello transmitted by an intermediate system, to
ensure two-way communications with any specific neighbor before
exchanging link state databases.
IS-IS does not provide a sequence number. IS-IS packets are
vulnerable to replay attacks; any packet can be replayed at any point
of time. So long as the keys used are the same, protocol elements that would not be rejected will affect existing sessions.
A hello packet containing a digest within a TLV, and an empty
neighbor list, could be replayed, resulting in all adjacencies with
the original transmitting intermediate system to be restarted.
A replay of an old CSNP packets could cause LSPs to be flooded, thus
causing an LSP storm.
IS-IS specifies the use of the hash algorithm HMAC-MD5 to protect
IS-IS PDUs.
IS-IS does not have a notion of Key ID. During key rollover, each
message received has to be checked for integrity against all keys that are valid. A DoS attack may be induced by sending IS-IS packets with random hashes. This will cause the IS-IS packet to be checked for authentication with all possible keys, increasing the amount of processing required.
Recently, attacks on the collision-resistance property of the MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [RFC4270] summarizes the
discoveries. The attacks on MD5 are practical on any modern computer. For this reason, the use of these algorithms should be deprecated.
HMACs are not susceptible to known collision-reduction attacks.
IS-IS implementations should provide a way to upgrade to other
algorithms should the need arise.
IS-IS on a broadcast network shares the same key between all neighbors on that network.
This makes spoofing by a malicious neighbor easy since IS-IS PDUs are sent to a link layer multicast address. Possession of the key itself is used as an authorization check. A neighbor could send a packet spoofing the identity of a neighbor and there would be no way in which the attacked router could discern the identity of the malicious packet sender.
The Remaining Lifetime field in the LSP is not covered by the authentication. An IS-IS router can receive its own self generated LSP segment with zero lifetime remaining. In that case, if it has a copy with non-zero lifetime, it purges that LSP i.e., it increments the current sequence number and floods all the segments again. This is much worse in IS-IS compared to OSPF, because there is only one LSP other than the pseudonode LSPs for the LANs on which it is the Designated Intermediate System (DIS).
This way an attacker can force the router to flood all segments, potentially a large number if the number of routes is large. It also causes the sequence number of all the LSPs to increase fast. If the sequence number increases to the maximum (0xFFFFFFFF), the IS-IS process must shut down for around 20+ minutes (the product of MaxAge + ZeroAgeLifetime) to allow the old LSPs to age out of all the router databases.
5. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)
BGP-4 [RFC4271] uses TCP [RFC0793] for transporting routing information between BGP speakers which have formed an adjacency.
[RFC2385] describes the use of TCP MD5 signature option for providing packet origin authentication and data integrity protection of BGP packets. [RFC3562] provides suggestions for choosing the key length of the ad-hoc keyed-MD5 mechanism specified in [RFC2385]. There is no provision for confidentiality for any of these BGP messages.
BGP relative to previously described IGP protocols has additional exposure due to the nature of the environment where it is typically used, namely between autonomous networks (under different
administrative control). While routers running interior gateway protocols may all be configured with the same administrative authority, two BGP peers may be in different administrative domains, having different policies for key strength, rollover frequency, etc. An autonomous system must often support a large number of keys at different BGP boundries, as each connecting AS represents a different administrative entity. In practice once set, shared secrets between BGP peers are rarely if ever changed.
5.1 Management Issues with BGP-4
Each pair of BGP speakers forming an adjacency may have a different
MD5 shared key facilitating the independent configuration and changing of keys across a large scale network. Manual configuration and maintenance of cryptographic keys across all BGP sessions is a challenge in any large scale environment.
Most BGP implementations will accept BGP packets with a bad digest up to the hold interval negotiated between BGP peers at peering startup, in order to allow for MD5 keys to be changed with minimal impact on operation of the network. This technique does, however, allow some short period of time, during which an attacker may inject BGP packets with false MD5 digests into the network and can expect those packets to be accepted, even though the MD5 digest is not valid.
5.2 Technical Issues with BGP-4
BGP relies on TCP [RFC0793] for transporting data between BGP
speakers. BGP can rely on TCP's protections against data corruption
and replay to preclude replay attacks against BGP sessions. A great
deal of research has gone into the feasibility of an attacker overcoming these protections, including [TCP-WINDOW] and
[BGP-ATTACK]. Most router and Operating System (OS) vendors have modified their TCP implementations to resolve the security vulnerabilities described in these references, where possible.
As mentioned earlier, MD5 is vulnerable to collision attacks, and can be attacked through several means, such as those explored in [MD5-ATTACK].
Though it can be argued that the collision attacks do not have a practical application in this scenario, the use of MD5 should be discouraged.
Routers performing cryptographic processing of packets in software may be exposed to additional opportunities for DoS attacks. An attacker may be able to transmit enough spoofed traffic with false digests that the router's processor and memory resources are consumed, causing the router to be unable to perform normal processing. This exposure is particularly problematic between routers not under unified administrative control.
6. The Routing Information Protocol (RIP)
The initial version of RIP was specified in STD34 [RFC1058]. This version did not provide for any authentication or authorization of routing data, and thus was vulnerable to any of a number of attacks against routing protocols. This limitation was one reason why this protocol was moved to Historic status [RFC1923].
RIPv2, originally specified in [RFC1388], then [RFC1723], was finalized in STD56 [RFC2453]. This version of the protocol provides for authenticating packets with a digest. The details thereof
have initially been provided in "RIP-2 MD5 Authentication" [RFC2082];
"RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" [RFC4822] obsoletes [RFC2082]
and adds details of how the SHA family of hash algorithms can be used
to protect RIPv2. [RFC2082] only specified the use of Keyed MD5.
6.1 Technical Issues with RIP
o The sequence number used by a router is initialized to zero, at
startup, and is also set to zero whenever the neighbor is brought
down. If the cryptographically protected packets of a router that
is brought down (for administrative or other reasons) are stored
by a malicious router, the new router could replay the packets
from the previous session thus forcing traffic through the
malicious router. Dropping of such packets by the router could
result in blackholes. Also forwarding wrong packets could
result in routing loops.
o RIPv2 allows multiple packets with the same sequence number.
This could mean the same packet may be replayed many times before
the next legitimate packet is sent. An attacker may resend the
same packet repeatedly until the next hello packet is transmitted
and received, which means the hello interval therefore determines
the attack window.
o RIPv2 [RFC2453] does not specify the use of any particular hash
algorithm. Currently, RIP implementations only support keyed MD5
[RFC2082].
o RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication [RFC4822] does not cover the
UDP and the IP headers. It is therefore possible for an attacker
to modify some fields in the above headers without routers
becoming aware of it.
There is limited exposure to modification of the UDP header as
the RIP protocol uses only it to compute the length of the RIP
packet. Changes introduced in the UDP header would cause RIP
authentication to fail the RIP authentication, limiting exposure.
RIP uses the source IP address from the IP header to determine
which RIP neighbor it has learnt the RIP Update from. Changing
the source IP address can be used by an attacker to disrupt the
RIP routing sessions between two routers R1 and R2, as shown in
the following examples:
Scenario 1:
R1 sends an authenticated RIP message to R2 with a cryptographic
sequence num X.
The attacker then needs a higher sequence number packet from the
LAN. It could also be a packet originated by R2 either from this
session, or from some earlier session.
The attacker can then replay this packet to R2 by changing the
source IP to that of R1.
R2 would then no longer accept any more RIP Updates from R1 as
those would have a lower cryptographic sequence number. After 180
seconds (or less), R2 would consider R1 timed out and bring down
the RIP session.
Scenario 2:
R1 announces a route with cost C1 to R2. This packet can be
captured by an attacker. Later, if this cost changes and R1
announces this with a different cost C2, the attacker can replay
the captured packet, modifying the source IP to a new
arbitrary IP address thereby masquerading as a different router.
R2 will accept this route and the router as a new gateway, and
R2 would then use the non existent router as a next hop for that
network. This would only be effective if the cost C1 is less than
C2.
7. Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
BFD is specified in the document [BFD-BASE]. Extensions to BFD for Multi-hop [BFD-MULTI] and single hop [BFD-1HOP] are defined for IPv4 and IPv6. It is designed to detect failure with the forwarding plane nexthop.
BFD base specifies an optional authentication mechanism which can be used by receiver of a packet to be able to authenticate the source of the packet. It relies on the fact that the keys are shared between the peers and no mechanism is defined for the actual Key generation.
7.1 Technical Issues with BFD
o The level of security provided is based on the Authentication Type used. However the authentication algorithms defined are MD5 or SHA-1 based. As mentioned earlier MD5 and SHA-1 are both known to be vulnerable to collision attacks.
o BFD spec mentions mechanisms to allow for the change of authentication state based on the state of a received packet. This can cause a denial of service attack where a malicious authenticated packet (stored from a past session) can be relayed over a session which does not use authentication. This causes one end to assume that authentication is enabled at the other end and hence the BFD adjacency is dropped. This would be a harder attack to put forth when meticulously keyed authentication is in use.
o BFD works on microsecond timers. When malicious packets are sent at very small duration of time, with the authentication bit set, it can cause a DoS attack.
o BFD allows a mode called the echo mode. Echo packets are not defined in the BFD specification, though they can keep the BFD session UP. There are no guidelines on the properties of the echo packets. Any security issues in the echo mode or packets will directly effect the BFD protocol and session states and hence the network stability.
o BFD packets can be sent at millisecond intervals (the protocol uses timers at microsecond intervals). When using authentication this can cause frequent Sequence Number wrap-around as a 32-bit sequence number is used, thus considerably reducing the security of the authentication algorithms.
8. Security Considerations
This draft outlines security issues arising from the current methodology for manual keying of various routing protocols. No specific changes to routing protocols are proposed in this draft, likewise no new security requirements result.
9. Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge Sam Hartman, Ran Atkinson, Steve Kent
and Brian Weis for their initial comments on this draft. Thanks to Merike Kaeo and Alfred Hoenes for reviewing many sections of the draft and providing lot of useful comments.
10. IANA Considerations
This document places no requests to IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
11. References
11.1 Normative References
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, September 1981.
[RFC1195] Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and
dual environments", RFC 1195, December 1990.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2328] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP
MD5 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998.
[RFC2453] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", RFC 2453, November 1998
[RFC5340] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and Lindem, A., "OSPF
for IPv6", RFC 5340, July 2008.
[RFC5304] Li, T. and Atkinson, R., "Intermediate System to
Intermediate System (IS-IS) Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 5304, October 2008.
[RFC5310] Bhatia, M., et. al., "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 5310, February 2009
[RFC4271] Rekhter , Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header",
RFC 4302, December 2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC4552] Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality
for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, January 2006
[RFC4822] R. Atkinson and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
Authentication", RFC 4822, February 2007
11.2 Informative References
[RFC1058] Hedrick, C., "Routing Information Protocol", RFC 1058,
June 1988.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC
1321, April 1992
[RFC1388] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional
Information", RFC 1388, January 1993.
[RFC1723] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 - Carrying Additional
Information", STD 56, RFC 1723, November 1994.
[RFC1923] Halpern, J. and Bradner, S., "RIPv1 Applicability
Statement for Historic Status", RFC 1923, March 1996
[RFC2082] Baker, F. and Atkinson, R., "RIP-2 MD5
Authentication", RFC 2082, January 1997
[RFC2410] Kent, S. and Glenn, R., "The NULL Encryption Algorithm
and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998
[RFC3562] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP
MD5 Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003.
[RFC4270] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic
Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC 4270, November 2005.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "The Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005
[BGP-ATTACK] Convery, S. and M. Franz, "BGP Vulnerability Testing:
Separating Fact from FUD v1.00", June 2003.
[TCP-WINDOW] Watson, T., "TCP Reset Spoofing", October 2003.
[MD5-ATTACK] Wang, X. et al., "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4,
MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD", August 2004,
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199
[BFD-BASE] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection", draft-ietf-bfd-base, August 2009
[BFD-1HOP] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single
Hop), draft-ietf-bfd-v4v6-1hop, August 2009
[BFD-MULTI] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "BFD for Multihop Paths",
draft-ietf-bfd-multihop, August 2009
12. Contributor's Address
Sue Hares
NextHop
USA
Email: shares@nexthop.com
13. Author's Addresses
Vishwas Manral
IP Infusion
Almora, Uttarakhand
India
Email: vishwas@ipinfusion.com
Manav Bhatia
Alcatel-Lucent
Bangalore, India
Email: manav@alcatel-lucent.com
Joel P. Jaeggli
Check Point Software
Email: jjaeggli@checkpoint.com
Russ White
Cisco Systems
RTP North Carolina
USA
Email: riw@cisco.com
Datatracker
draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-01
Internet-Draft
