[Search] [txt|pdfized|bibtex] [Tracker] [WG] [Email] [Nits]
Versions: 00 01                                                         
PANA Working Group                                    J. Bournelle (Ed.)
Internet-Draft                                    M. Laurent-Maknavicius
Expires: April 9, 2006                                           GET/INT
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                           Y. El Mghazli
                                                             G. Giaretta
                                                                R. Lopez
                                                         Univ. of Murcia
                                                                 Y. Ohba
                                                         October 6, 2005

            Use of Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP) for PANA

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 9, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005


   The PANA protocol offers a way to authenticate clients in IP based
   access networks.  However, in roaming environments, IP clients might
   change of gateways and new EAP authentication from scratch may occur.
   The present document describes a solution based on the Context
   Transfer Protocol (CXTP) to enhance IP handover in mobile
   environments.  Note that only the intra-domain case is considered.
   This protocol can recover the previously established PANA security
   context from previous PANA Authentication Agent.

Table of Contents

   1.   Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.   Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.   Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1  PANA framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2  Performance limitations in mobile environments . . . . . .   6
     3.3  CXTP protocol overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.   The PANA Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.   CXTP usage in the PANA framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.   Conditions to Perform the Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.   Security considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.   IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     10.1   Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     10.2   Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
        Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
        Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . .  19

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

1.  Introduction

   In IP based access network, PANA [I-D.ietf-pana-pana] may be used as
   a front-end to a AAA architecture in order to authenticate users
   before granting them access to the resources.  For this purpose, it
   uses EAP which offers a variety of authentication methods.  In a
   shared medium, this is typically accomplished with the help of
   cryptographic mechanisms.  Note that this type of cryptographic
   mechanism prevents a malicious node from sending packet to the
   network and thereby authenticating each data packet.  In addition,
   encryption is often enabled to prevent eavesdropping.

   While roaming, the PANA client might change its access router.  In
   some cases and without extensions to PANA, the PaC has to restart a
   new PANA protocol exchange to authenticate itself to the network.
   This authentication may need to execute the EAP exchange from

   In this document, we analyse the interaction between the framework
   defined in [RFC4067] and PANA.  In particular, we define what should
   be transferred (i.e. the PANA context).

   Rough consensus in the PANA working group leaded to the solution
   where the transfer occurs between authentication agents, according to
   the recommendations in [I-D.ietf-pana-mobopts].

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

2.  Terminology

   Most of the terms are defined in the PANA [I-D.ietf-pana-pana] and
   CXTP [RFC4067] specifications:

   nAR New Access Router.  The router to which the PaC attaches after
      the handover.

   pAR Previous Access Router.  The router to which the PaC was attached
      before the handover.

   CTAA Context Transfer Activate Acknowledge.

   CTAR Context Transfer Activate Request.

   CTD Context Transfer Data.

   CXTP Context Transfer Protocol.

   EP Enforcement Point.  (PANA term)

   FPT Feature Profile Type (CXTP term).

   PaC PANA Client.  A mobile node (MN) using a PANA protocol
      implementation to authenticate itself to the network.

   PAA PANA Authentication Agent.  The access network (server) side
      entity of the PANA protocol.  A PAA is in charge of interfacing
      with the PaCs for authenticating and authorizing them for the
      network access service.

   nPAA New PANA Authentication Agent.  The PAA in charge of the subnet
      to which the PaC is attached after the handover.

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

   pPAA Previous PANA Authentication Agent.  The PaC's default PAA prior
      to handover.

   PANA Protocol for Carrying Network Authentication for Network Access

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

3.  Background

   This section gives basic information on PANA framework and CXTP
   protocol.  The intent here is to further explain the context being
   referred to and the terminology used in the remaining of the

3.1  PANA framework

   PANA is a protocol that carries EAP over IP/UDP to authenticate
   users.  The PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) is the endpoint of the
   PANA protocol at the access network.  The PAA itself might not be
   able to authenticate the user by terminating the EAP protocol.
   Instead the PAA might forward the EAP payloads to the backend AAA

   The Enforcement Point (EP) is an entity which enforces the result of
   the PANA protocol exchange.  The EP might be co-located with the PAA
   or separated as a stand-alone device.  In the latter case, the SNMPv3
   protocol [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used to communicate between PAA and

   A successful EAP authentication exchange results in a PANA security
   association (PANA SA) if the EAP method was able to derive session
   keys.  In this case, all further PANA messages between PaC and PAA
   will be authenticated, replay and integrity protected thanks to the

3.2  Performance limitations in mobile environments

                 PaC ------------ pEP ---- pPAA
                  |                |
                  |                |
                  |                +------ pAR
   (IP handover)  |
                 PaC------------ nEP ---- nPAA
                                  +------ nAR

                        Figure 1: Example Scenario

   Figure 1 shows an example scenario with a roaming PaC which has been
   previously authenticated.  The PAA is at one IP hop away from PaC;
   this means that a specific PANA module on a PAA is in charge of one

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 6]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

   IP network.  After a PaC's IP handover, the PaC changes of IP subnet
   and of PAA accordingly.  The new PAA (nPAA) does not share any
   context with the PaC.  The new EP (nEP) will detect the PaC and will
   trigger a new PANA authentication phase from scratch.  A new
   authentication phase involving the AAA infrastructure will then
   occur.  Such a signaling can seriously degrade handover performance
   in term of latency.

   For this reason, we propose to use the Context Transfer Protocol
   (CXTP) to transfer the PANA context established between the PaC and
   pPAA to the nPAA.

3.3  CXTP protocol overview

   Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP) [RFC4067] enables context transfers
   between access routers (ARs).  The context transfer can be either
   initiated by a request from the mobile node ("mobile initiated") or
   at the initiative of either the new or the previous access router
   ("network initiated").  Furthermore it can be performed prior to
   handover ("predictive mode") or after the handover ("reactive mode").

   In reactive mode, the MN sends a CT Activate Request (CTAR) to the
   new AR (nAR) (cf. Figure 2).  In this message the MN includes an
   authorization token: this token is calculated based on a secret
   shared between the MN and the previous AR (pAR) and it is used in
   order to authorize the transfer.  This means that the MN and the pAR
   must share a secret.  The definition of this secret is out of scope
   of CXTP.  As soon as the nAR receives a CTAR message, it generates a
   CT-Request message which includes the authorization token and the
   context to be transferred (i.e.  Feature Profile Types).  This
   message is received by the pAR that verifies the authorization token
   and sends a Context Transfer Data (CTD) message including the
   requested context.

         MN             nAR            pAR
         --             ---            ---
          |              |              |
          |    CTAR      |              |
          +------------->|              |
          |              |   CT-Request |
          |              +------------->|
          |              |              |
          |              |      CTD     |
          |              |<-------------+
          |    CTAA      |              |
          |<-------------+              |

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 7]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

                      Figure 2: CXTP in reactive mode

   In the predictive case, the pAR receives a CTAR message from the MN
   whose feature contexts are to be transferred.  This message provides
   the IP address of the nAR and an authorization token.  The pAR
   predictively transmits to the nAR a Context Transfer Data (CTD) that
   contains feature contexts.  This message contains also parameters for
   the nAR to compute an authorization token in order to verify the MN's
   token.  Regardless the MN sent the CTAR to the pAR, it sends another
   CTAR message to the nAR in order to ascertain that the context
   transfer reliably took place.  Furthermore in this CTAR the MN
   includes the authorization token so that the nAR verifies it.

   CXTP messages use Feature Profile Types (FPTs) to identify the way
   data is organized for a particular feature context.  The FPTs are
   registered in a number space that allows a node to unambiguously
   determine the type of context and the context parameters present in
   the protocol messages.

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 8]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

4.  The PANA Context

   The PANA Context is what should be transferred between the two PAAs
   to avoid re-authentication from scratch.  The attributes described in
   [I-D.ietf-pana-pana] list elements that could constitute the PANA
   context at PAA.  However some of these data are PAA specific and as
   such does not need to be transferred.

   Figure 3 summarizes the PANA Context.

    | Data             | Type       |         Length             |
    | Session-Lifetime | Unsigned32 |          Fixed             |
    |   Elapsed        |            |                            |
    | AAA-Key-int      | UTF8String |         Fixed (64 octets)  |

                        Figure 3: The PANA Context

   Data have the following meanings:

   Session-Lifetime: The authentication phase also determines the PANA
      session lifetime when authorization succeeds.  This value is
      included in Session-Lifetime AVP.  In Diameter [RFC3588], this AVP
      (Session-Timeout) is of type Unsigned32 and contains the maximum
      number of seconds of service to be provided to the user before
      session termination.  Note that the value forwarded to the new PAA
      needs to reflect the already 'consumed' session lifetime.  This
      helps to avoid problems where roaming is used to reset the
      lifetime when re-attaching at a new PAA.  It must be assured that
      the sum of the individual session lifetimes is never greater than
      the initially communicated lifetime (type: Unsigned32, length: 4)

   AAA-Key-int: cf.  [I-D.ietf-pana-mobopts].

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006                [Page 9]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

5.  CXTP usage in the PANA framework

   The transfer may occur either after or before the handover.  From
   this standpoint, we only consider the reactive mode.  This means that
   the PaC has already performed the handover.  Predictive mode is left
   for further study.

   The solution described here is based on [I-D.ietf-pana-mobopts]: the
   transfer is triggered using the PANA signalling and CTD message is
   used to carry the PANA context.

   The CTD message is described in the following figure (ABNF notation):

         CTD-PANA ::= < CTD-Header>
         < Context Data Block, Ctx-Type: PANA-Context-Transfer, FPT>

            { Session-Lifetime-Elapsed }
         { AAA-Key-int }

                        Figure 4: CTD-PANA message

   where FPT (Feature Profile Type) identifies the way the particular
   feature context is organized.

   In the solution proposed by PANA [I-D.ietf-pana-mobopts], the PaC
   does not use CTAR message to request and activate the context.
   Instead, it replies to PSR message with a PSA message containing the
   unexpired previous PANA session identifier and a MAC AVP (cf.
   Figure 5).  This AVP is computed using the PANA_MAC_KEY shared
   between the PaC and its pPAA.

      PaC           nPAA              pPAA
      ---           ----              ----


                        CT-Request [PSA]
          PBA [MAC]

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 10]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

                        Figure 5: The PANA approach

   The nPAA receives this PSA message and it deduces that it must
   perform CXTP (because of the Session-Id AVP).  It determines the
   identity of pPAA by looking at the DiameterIdentity part of the PANA
   session identifier.  It sends a CT-Request to the pPAA containing the
   PSA message.  The pPAA checks the validity of the PSA message and
   transfers the PANA context in the CTD message.  Then the PANA session
   continues with a PANA-Bind exchange.

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 11]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

6.  Conditions to Perform the Transfer

   In this section, we list conditions and recommendations to perform a
   PANA context transfer between two PAAs.  This list is mostly
   inherited from [I-D.aboba-802-context]:

   o  Homogeneous PAA's device deployment within a single administrative

   o  This solution only consider intradomain scenario.

   o  Entities engaged in the context transfer should authenticate each
      other.  For this purpose, CXTP indicates that IPsec ESP must be
      used in order to provide connectionless integrity, data origin
      authentication and confidentiality protection.  Thus pPAA and nPAA
      should have IPsec SAs to protect CXTP messages.

   o  The nPAA should not obtain keys used to encrypt traffic between
      PaC and pEP.  This traffic may be encrypted at layer 2 or at layer

   o  The new key (AAA-Key-new) derived between PaC and nPAA is based on
      Nonces exchanged during PANA-Start-Exchange.  For this reason, the
      proposed solution only work with PANA Stateful Discovery

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 12]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

7.  Security considerations

   This document deals with interaction between the Seamoby Context
   Transfer Protocol and PANA.  Therefore, all security considerations
   described in [RFC4067], in [I-D.ietf-pana-pana] and in [I-D.ietf-
   pana-mobopts] also apply here.

   The approach described in this document considers only the intra-
   domain scenario.  This means that the PAAs involved in the context
   transfer belong to the same administrative domain.  Therefore, at
   this stage the inter-domain scenario is out of scope.

   As described in [RFC4067] IPsec ESP must be used to protect CXTP
   messages between PAAs.  In order to avoid the introduction of
   additional latency due to the need for establishment of a secure
   channel between the context transfer peers, the two PAAs should
   establish such a secure channel in advance.  The mechanism used by
   the PAAs to establish such a channel is out of the scope of this
   draft: for example, IKE [RFC2409] with pre-shared key authentication
   might be used.

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 13]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

8.  IANA Considerations

   TBD for FPT

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 14]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Vijay Devarapalli, James Kempf,
   Rajeev Koodli, Nakhjiri Madjid-MNAKHJI, Jean-Jacques Puig, Rene
   Soltwitsch and Alper Yegin for their valuable comments.

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 15]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

10.  References

10.1  Normative References

              Forsberg, D., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
              Network Access (PANA)", draft-ietf-pana-pana-10 (work in
              progress), July 2005.

              Forsberg, D., "PANA Mobility Optimizations",
              draft-ietf-pana-mobopts-00 (work in progress),
              January 2005.

   [RFC4067]  Loughney, J., Nakhjiri, M., Perkins, C., and R. Koodli,
              "Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP)", RFC 4067, July 2005.

10.2  Informative References

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

              Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface",
              draft-ietf-pana-snmp-04 (work in progress), July 2005.

   [RFC3588]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
              Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

              Aboba, B. and T. Moore, "A Model for Context Transfer in
              IEEE 802", draft-aboba-802-context-02 (work in progress),
              April 2002.

Authors' Addresses

   Julien Bournelle
   9 rue Charles Fourier
   Evry  91011

   Email: julien.bournelle@int-evry.fr

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 16]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

   Maryline Laurent-Maknavicius
   9 rue Charles Fourier
   Evry  91011

   Email: maryline.maknavicius@int-evry.fr

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Siemens Corporate Technology
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   81739 Munich

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com

   Yacine El Mghzali
   Route de Nozay
   Marcoussis  91460

   Email: yacine.el_mghazli@alcatel.fr

   Gerardo Giaretta
   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274
   TORINO  10148

   Email: gerardo.giaretta@telecomitalia.it

   Rafa Marin Lopez
   University of Murcia
   30071 Murcia

   Email: rafa@dif.um.es

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 17]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

   Yoshihiro Ohba
   Toshiba America Research, Inc.
   1 Telcordia Drive
   Piscateway, NJ  08854

   Phone: +1 732 699 5365
   Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 18]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005

Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at

   The IETF has been notified of intellectual property rights claimed in
   regard to some or all of the specification contained in this
   document.  For more information consult the online list of claimed

Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an

Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 19]

Internet-Draft                CXTP for PANA                 October 2005


   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

Bournelle (Ed.), et al.    Expires April 9, 2006               [Page 20]