Network Working Group                                           P. Jones
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Informational                             P. Ellenbogen
Expires: 28 March 2022                              Princeton University
                                                             N. Ohlmeier
                                                               8x8, Inc.
                                                       24 September 2021


     DTLS Tunnel between a Media Distributor and Key Distributor to
                        Facilitate Key Exchange
                     draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-10

Abstract

   This document defines a protocol for tunneling DTLS traffic in
   multimedia conferences that enables a Media Distributor to facilitate
   key exchange between an endpoint in a conference and the Key
   Distributor.  The protocol is designed to ensure that the keying
   material used for hop-by-hop encryption and authentication is
   accessible to the Media Distributor, while the keying material used
   for end-to-end encryption and authentication is inaccessible to the
   Media Distributor.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 March 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.






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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Tunneling Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Example Message Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Tunneling Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Endpoint Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  Tunnel Establishment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.3.  Media Distributor Tunneling Procedures  . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.4.  Key Distributor Tunneling Procedures  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.5.  Versioning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Tunneling Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  TunnelMessage Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  SupportedProfiles Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.3.  UnsupportedVersion Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.4.  MediaKeys Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.5.  TunneledDtls Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.6.  EndpointDisconnect Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Example Binary Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   11. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   12. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   An objective of Privacy-Enhanced RTP Conferencing (PERC) [RFC8871] is
   to ensure that endpoints in a multimedia conference have access to
   the end-to-end (E2E) and hop-by-hop (HBH) keying material used to
   encrypt and authenticate Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550]
   packets, while the Media Distributor has access only to the HBH
   keying material for encryption and authentication.

   [RFC EDITOR: References to RFC 6347 can be changed to the RFC for
   DTLS 1.3 if available.]




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   This specification defines a tunneling protocol that enables the
   Media Distributor to tunnel DTLS [RFC6347] messages between an
   endpoint and a Key Distributor, thus allowing an endpoint to use
   DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] for establishing encryption and authentication
   keys with the Key Distributor.

   The tunnel established between the Media Distributor and Key
   Distributor is a TLS [RFC8446] connection that is established before
   any messages are forwarded by the Media Distributor on behalf of
   endpoints.  DTLS packets received from an endpoint are encapsulated
   by the Media Distributor inside this tunnel as data to be sent to the
   Key Distributor.  Likewise, when the Media Distributor receives data
   from the Key Distributor over the tunnel, it extracts the DTLS
   message inside and forwards the DTLS message to the endpoint.  In
   this way, the DTLS association for the DTLS-SRTP procedures is
   established between an endpoint and the Key Distributor, with the
   Media Distributor forwarding DTLS messages between the two entities
   via the established tunnel to the Key Distributor and having no
   visibility into the confidential information exchanged.

   Following the existing DTLS-SRTP procedures, the endpoint and Key
   Distributor will arrive at a selected cipher and keying material,
   which are used for HBH encryption and authentication by both the
   endpoint and the Media Distributor.  However, since the Media
   Distributor would not have direct access to this information, the Key
   Distributor explicitly shares the HBH key information with the Media
   Distributor via the tunneling protocol defined in this document.
   Additionally, the endpoint and Key Distributor will agree on a cipher
   for E2E encryption and authentication.  The Key Distributor will
   transmit keying material to the endpoint for E2E operations, but will
   not share that information with the Media Distributor.

   By establishing this TLS tunnel between the Media Distributor and Key
   Distributor and implementing the protocol defined in this document,
   it is possible for the Media Distributor to facilitate the
   establishment of a secure DTLS association between an endpoint and
   the Key Distributor in order for the endpoint to generate E2E and HBH
   keying material.  At the same time, the Key Distributor can securely
   provide the HBH keying material to the Media Distributor.

2.  Conventions Used In This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.




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   This document uses the terms "endpoint", "Media Distributor", and
   "Key Distributor" defined in [RFC8871].

3.  Tunneling Concept

   A TLS connection (tunnel) is established between the Media
   Distributor and the Key Distributor.  This tunnel is used to relay
   DTLS messages between the endpoint and Key Distributor, as depicted
   in Figure 1:

                              +-------------+
                              |     Key     |
                              | Distributor |
                              +-------------+
                                  # ^ ^ #
                                  # | | # <-- TLS Tunnel
                                  # | | #
     +----------+             +-------------+             +----------+
     |          |     DTLS    |             |    DTLS     |          |
     | Endpoint |<------------|    Media    |------------>| Endpoint |
     |          |    to Key   | Distributor |   to Key    |          |
     |          | Distributor |             | Distributor |          |
     +----------+             +-------------+             +----------+

                  Figure 1: TLS Tunnel to Key Distributor

   The three entities involved in this communication flow are the
   endpoint, the Media Distributor, and the Key Distributor.  The
   behavior of each entity is described in Section 5.

   The Key Distributor is a logical function that might be co-resident
   with a key management server operated by an enterprise, reside in one
   of the endpoints participating in the conference, or elsewhere that
   is trusted with E2E keying material.

4.  Example Message Flows

   This section provides an example message flow to help clarify the
   procedures described later in this document.  It is necessary that
   the Key Distributor and Media Distributor establish a mutually
   authenticated TLS connection for the purpose of sending tunneled
   messages, though the complete TLS handshake for the tunnel is not
   shown in Figure 2 since there is nothing new this document introduces
   with regard to those procedures.

   Once the tunnel is established, it is possible for the Media
   Distributor to relay the DTLS messages between the endpoint and the
   Key Distributor.  Figure 2 shows a message flow wherein the endpoint



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   uses DTLS-SRTP to establish an association with the Key Distributor.
   In the process, the Media Distributor shares its supported SRTP
   protection profile information (see [RFC5764]) and the Key
   Distributor shares HBH keying material and selected cipher with the
   Media Distributor.

     Endpoint              Media Distributor          Key Distributor
         |                         |                         |
         |                         |<=======================>|
         |                         |    TLS Connection Made  |
         |                         |                         |
         |                         |========================>|
         |                         | SupportedProfiles       |
         |                         |                         |
         |------------------------>|========================>|
         | DTLS handshake message  | TunneledDtls            |
         |                         |                         |
         |                         |<========================|
         |                         |               MediaKeys |
         |                         |                         |
              .... may be multiple handshake messages ...
         |                         |                         |
         |<------------------------|<========================|
         | DTLS handshake message  |            TunneledDtls |
         |                         |                         |

             Figure 2: Sample DTLS-SRTP Exchange via the Tunnel

   After the initial TLS connection has been established each of the
   messages on the right-hand side of Figure 2 is a tunneling protocol
   message as defined in Section 6.

   SRTP protection profiles supported by the Media Distributor will be
   sent in a "SupportedProfiles" message when the TLS tunnel is
   initially established.  The Key Distributor will use that information
   to select a common profile supported by both the endpoint and the
   Media Distributor to ensure that HBH operations can be successfully
   performed.

   As DTLS messages are received from the endpoint by the Media
   Distributor, they are forwarded to the Key Distributor encapsulated
   inside a "TunneledDtls" message.  Likewise, as "TunneledDtls"
   messages are received by the Media Distributor from the Key
   Distributor, the encapsulated DTLS packet is forwarded to the
   endpoint.






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   The Key Distributor will provide the SRTP [RFC3711] keying material
   to the Media Distributor for HBH operations via the "MediaKeys"
   message.  The Media Distributor will extract this keying material
   from the "MediaKeys" message when received and use it for HBH
   encryption and authentication.

5.  Tunneling Procedures

   The following sub-sections explain in detail the expected behavior of
   the endpoint, the Media Distributor, and the Key Distributor.

   It is important to note that the tunneling protocol described in this
   document is not an extension to TLS [RFC8446] or DTLS [RFC6347].
   Rather, it is a protocol that transports DTLS messages generated by
   an endpoint or Key Distributor as data inside of the TLS connection
   established between the Media Distributor and Key Distributor.

5.1.  Endpoint Procedures

   The endpoint follows the procedures outlined for DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764]
   in order to establish the cipher and keys used for encryption and
   authentication, with the endpoint acting as the client and the Key
   Distributor acting as the server.  The endpoint does not need to be
   aware of the fact that DTLS messages it transmits toward the Media
   Distributor are being tunneled to the Key Distributor.

   The endpoint MUST include a unique identifier in the "tls-id" SDP
   [RFC4566] attribute in all offer and answer messages [RFC3264] that
   it generates as per [RFC8842].  Further, the endpoint MUST include
   this same unique identifier in the "external_session_id" extension
   [RFC8844] in the "ClientHello" message when establishing a DTLS
   association.

   When receiving a "external_session_id" value from the Key
   Distributor, the client MUST check to ensure that value matches the
   "tls-id" value received in SDP.  If the values do not match, the
   endpoint MUST consider any received keying material to be invalid and
   terminate the DTLS association.

5.2.  Tunnel Establishment Procedures

   Either the Media Distributor or Key Distributor initiates the
   establishment of a TLS tunnel.  Which entity acts as the TLS client
   when establishing the tunnel and what event triggers the
   establishment of the tunnel are outside the scope of this document.
   Further, how the trust relationships are established between the Key
   Distributor and Media Distributor are also outside the scope of this
   document.



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   A tunnel MUST be a mutually authenticated TLS connection.

   The Media Distributor or Key Distributor MUST establish a tunnel
   prior to forwarding tunneled DTLS messages.  Given the time-sensitive
   nature of DTLS-SRTP procedures, a tunnel SHOULD be established prior
   to the Media Distributor receiving a DTLS message from an endpoint.

   A single tunnel MAY be used to relay DTLS messages between any number
   of endpoints and the Key Distributor.

   A Media Distributor MAY have more than one tunnel established between
   itself and one or more Key Distributors.  When multiple tunnels are
   established, which tunnel or tunnels to use to send messages for a
   given conference is outside the scope of this document.

5.3.  Media Distributor Tunneling Procedures

   The first message transmitted over the tunnel is the
   "SupportedProfiles" (see Section 6).  This message informs the Key
   Distributor about which DTLS-SRTP profiles the Media Distributor
   supports.  This message MUST be sent each time a new tunnel
   connection is established or, in the case of connection loss, when a
   connection is re-established.  The Media Distributor MUST support the
   same list of protection profiles for the duration of any endpoint-
   initiated DTLS association and tunnel connection.

   The Media Distributor MUST assign a unique association identifier for
   each endpoint-initiated DTLS association and include it in all
   messages forwarded to the Key Distributor.  The Key Distributor will
   subsequently include this identifier in all messages it sends so that
   the Media Distributor can map messages received via a tunnel and
   forward those messages to the correct endpoint.  The association
   identifier MUST be randomly assigned UUID value as described
   Section 4.4 of [RFC4122].

   When a DTLS message is received by the Media Distributor from an
   endpoint, it forwards the UDP payload portion of that message to the
   Key Distributor encapsulated in a "TuneledDtls" message.  The Media
   Distributor is not required to forward all messages received from an
   endpoint for a given DTLS association through the same tunnel if more
   than one tunnel has been established between it and a Key
   Distributor.

   When a "MediaKeys" message is received, the Media Distributor MUST
   extract the cipher and keying material conveyed in order to
   subsequently perform HBH encryption and authentication operations for
   RTP and RTCP packets sent between it and an endpoint.  Since the HBH
   keying material will be different for each endpoint, the Media



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   Distributor uses the association identifier included by the Key
   Distributor to ensure that the HBH keying material is used with the
   correct endpoint.

   The Media Distributor MUST forward all DTLS messages received from
   either the endpoint or the Key Distributor (via the "TunneledDtls"
   message) to ensure proper communication between those two entities.

   When the Media Distributor detects an endpoint has disconnected or
   when it receives conference control messages indicating the endpoint
   is to be disconnected, the Media Distributors MUST send an
   "EndpointDisconnect" message with the association identifier assigned
   to the endpoint to the Key Distributor.  The Media Distributor SHOULD
   take a loss of all RTP and RTCP packets as an indicator that the
   endpoint has disconnected.  The particulars of how RTP and RTCP are
   to be used to detect an endpoint disconnect, such as timeout period,
   is not specified.  The Media Distributor MAY use additional
   indicators to determine when an endpoint has disconnected.

5.4.  Key Distributor Tunneling Procedures

   Each TLS tunnel established between the Media Distributor and the Key
   Distributor MUST be mutually authenticated.

   When the Media Distributor relays a DTLS message from an endpoint,
   the Media Distributor will include an association identifier that is
   unique per endpoint-originated DTLS association.  The association
   identifier remains constant for the life of the DTLS association.
   The Key Distributor identifies each distinct endpoint-originated DTLS
   association by the association identifier.

   When processing an incoming endpoint association, the Key Distributor
   MUST extract the "external_session_id" value transmitted in the
   "ClientHello" message and match that against the "tls-id" value the
   endpoint transmitted via SDP.  If the values in SDP and the
   "ClientHello" do not match, the DTLS association MUST be rejected.

   The process through which the "tls-id" in SDP is conveyed to the Key
   Distributor is outside the scope of this document.

   The Key Distributor MUST match the certificate fingerprint [RFC4572]
   and "external_session_id" received from endpoint's "ClientHello"
   message with the values received from the SDP transmitted by the
   endpoint [RFC8122].  It is through this process that the Key
   Distributor can be sure to deliver the correct conference key to the
   endpoint.





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   When sending the "ServerHello" message, the Key Distributor MUST
   insert its own unique identifier in the "external_session_id"
   extension.  This value MUST also be conveyed back to the client via
   SDP as a "tls-id" attribute.

   The Key Distributor MUST encapsulate any DTLS message it sends to an
   endpoint inside a "TunneledDtls" message (see Section 6).  The Key
   Distributor is not required to transmit all messages for a given DTLS
   association through the same tunnel if more than one tunnel has been
   established between it and the Media Distributor.

   The Key Distributor MUST use the same association identifier in
   messages sent to an endpoint as was received in messages from that
   endpoint.  This ensures the Media Distributor can forward the
   messages to the correct endpoint.

   The Key Distributor extracts tunneled DTLS messages from an endpoint
   and acts on those messages as if that endpoint had established the
   DTLS association directly with the Key Distributor.  The Key
   Distributor is acting as the DTLS server and the endpoint is acting
   as the DTLS client.  The handling of the messages and certificates is
   exactly the same as normal DTLS-SRTP procedures between endpoints.

   The Key Distributor MUST send a "MediaKeys" message to the Media
   Distributor as soon as a HBH encryption key is computed.  The
   "MediaKeys" message includes the selected cipher (i.e. protection
   profile), MKI [RFC3711] value (if any), SRTP master keys, and SRTP
   master salt values.  The Key Distributor MUST use the same
   association identifier in the "MediaKeys" message as is used in the
   "TunneledDtls" messages for the given endpoint.

   The Key Distributor uses the certificate fingerprint of the endpoint
   along with the unique identifier received in the
   "external_session_id" extension to determine which conference a given
   DTLS association is associated.

   The Key Distributor MUST select a cipher that is supported itself,
   the endpoint, and the Media Distributor to ensure proper HBH
   operations.

   When the DTLS association between the endpoint and the Key
   Distributor is terminated, regardless of which entity initiated the
   termination, the Key Distributor MUST send an "EndpointDisconnect"
   message with the association identifier assigned to the endpoint to
   the Media Distributor.






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5.5.  Versioning Considerations

   Since the Media Distributor sends the first message over the tunnel,
   it effectively establishes the version of the protocol to be used.
   If that version is not supported by the Key Distributor, the Key
   Distributor MUST transmit an "UnsupportedVersion" message containing
   the highest version number supported, and close the TLS connection.

   The Media Distributor MUST take note of the version received in an
   "UnsupportedVersion" message and use that version when attempting to
   re-establish a failed tunnel connection.  Note that it is not
   necessary for the Media Distributor to understand the newer version
   of the protocol to understand that the first message received is
   "UnsupportedVersion".  The Media Distributor can determine from the
   first four octets received what the version number is and that the
   message is "UnsupportedVersion".  The rest of the data received, if
   any, would be discarded and the connection closed (if not already
   closed).

6.  Tunneling Protocol

   Tunneled messages are transported via the TLS tunnel as application
   data between the Media Distributor and the Key Distributor.  Tunnel
   messages are specified using the format described in [RFC8446]
   section 3.  As in [RFC8446], all values are stored in network byte
   (big endian) order; the uint32 represented by the hex bytes 01 02 03
   04 is equivalent to the decimal value 16909060.

   This protocol defines several different messages, each of which
   contains the following information:

   *  Message type identifier

   *  Message body length

   *  The message body

   Each of the tunnel messages is a "TunnelMessage" structure with the
   message type indicating the actual content of the message body.

6.1.  TunnelMessage Structure

   The "TunnelMessage" defines the structure of all messages sent via
   the tunnel protocol.  That structure includes a field called
   "msg_type" that identifies the specific type of message contained
   within "TunnelMessage".





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   enum {
       supported_profiles(1),
       unsupported_version(2),
       media_keys(3),
       tunneled_dtls(4),
       endpoint_disconnect(5),
       (255)
   } MsgType;

   opaque uuid[16];

   struct {
       MsgType msg_type;
       uint16 length;
       select (MsgType) {
           case supported_profiles:  SupportedProfiles;
           case unsupported_version: UnsupportedVersion;
           case media_keys:          MediaKeys;
           case tunneled_dtls:       TunneledDtls;
           case endpoint_disconnect: EndpointDisconnect;
     } body;
   } TunnelMessage;

   The elements of "TunnelMessage" include:

   *  "msg_type": the type of message contained within the structure
      "body".

   *  "length": the length in octets of the following "body" of the
      message.

   *  "body": the actual message being conveyed within this
      "TunnelMessage" structure.

6.2.  SupportedProfiles Message

   The "SupportedProfiles" message is defined as:

   uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; /* from RFC5764 */

   struct {
       uint8 version;
       SRTPProtectionProfile protection_profiles<2..2^16-1>;
   } SupportedProfiles;

   This message contains this single element:

   *  "version": This document specifies version 0x00.



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   *  "protection_profiles": The list of two-octet SRTP protection
      profile values as per [RFC5764] supported by the Media
      Distributor.

6.3.  UnsupportedVersion Message

   The "UnsupportedVersion" message is defined as follows:

   struct {
       uint8 highest_version;
   } UnsupportedVersion;

   The elements of "UnsupportedVersion" include:

   *  "highest_version": indicates the highest version of the protocol
      supported by the Key Distributor.

6.4.  MediaKeys Message

   The "MediaKeys" message is defined as:

   struct {
       uuid association_id;
       SRTPProtectionProfile protection_profile;
       opaque mki<0..255>;
       opaque client_write_SRTP_master_key<1..255>;
       opaque server_write_SRTP_master_key<1..255>;
       opaque client_write_SRTP_master_salt<1..255>;
       opaque server_write_SRTP_master_salt<1..255>;
   } MediaKeys;

   The fields are described as follows:

   *  "association_id": A value that identifies a distinct DTLS
      association between an endpoint and the Key Distributor.

   *  "protection_profiles": The value of the two-octet SRTP protection
      profile value as per [RFC5764] used for this DTLS association.

   *  "mki": Master key identifier [RFC3711].  A zero-length field
      indicates that no MKI value is present.

   *  "client_write_SRTP_master_key": The value of the SRTP master key
      used by the client (endpoint).

   *  "server_write_SRTP_master_key": The value of the SRTP master key
      used by the server (Media Distributor).




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   *  "client_write_SRTP_master_salt": The value of the SRTP master salt
      used by the client (endpoint).

   *  "server_write_SRTP_master_salt": The value of the SRTP master salt
      used by the server (Media Distributor).

6.5.  TunneledDtls Message

   The "TunneledDtls" message is defined as:

   struct {
       uuid association_id;
       opaque dtls_message<0..2^16-1>;
   } TunneledDtls;

   The fields are described as follows:

   *  "association_id": A value that identifies a distinct DTLS
      association between an endpoint and the Key Distributor.

   *  "dtls_message": the content of the DTLS message received by the
      endpoint or to be sent to the endpoint.

6.6.  EndpointDisconnect Message

   The "EndpointDisconnect" message is defined as:

   struct {
       uuid association_id;
   } EndpointDisconnect;

   The fields are described as follows:

   *  "association_id": An value that identifies a distinct DTLS
      association between an endpoint and the Key Distributor.

7.  Example Binary Encoding

   The "TunnelMessage" is encoded in binary following the procedures
   specified in [RFC8446].  This section provides an example of what the
   bits on the wire would look like for the "SupportedProfiles" message
   that advertises support for both
   "DOUBLE_AEAD_AES_128_GCM_AEAD_AES_128_GCM" and
   "DOUBLE_AEAD_AES_256_GCM_AEAD_AES_256_GCM" [RFC8723].







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   TunnelMessage:
            message_type: 0x01
                  length: 0x0007
       SupportedProfiles:
                      version:  0x00
          protection_profiles:  0x0004 (length)
                                0x0009000A (value)

   Thus, the encoding on the wire presented here in network bytes order
   would be this stream of octets:

   0x0100070000040009000A

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document establishes a new registry to contain message type
   values used in the DTLS Tunnel protocol.  These message type values
   are a single octet in length.  This document defines the values shown
   in Table 1 below, leaving the balance of possible values reserved for
   future specifications:

             +=========+====================================+
             | MsgType | Description                        |
             +=========+====================================+
             |   0x01  | Supported SRTP Protection Profiles |
             +---------+------------------------------------+
             |   0x02  | Unsupported Version                |
             +---------+------------------------------------+
             |   0x03  | Media Keys                         |
             +---------+------------------------------------+
             |   0x04  | Tunneled DTLS                      |
             +---------+------------------------------------+
             |   0x05  | Endpoint Disconnect                |
             +---------+------------------------------------+

                Table 1: Message Type Values for the DTLS
                             Tunnel Protocol

   The value 0x00 is reserved and all values in the range 0x06 to 0xFF
   are available for allocation.  The procedures for updating this table
   are those defined as "IETF Review" in section 4.8 of [RFC8126].

   The name for this registry is "Datagram Transport Layer Security
   (DTLS) Tunnel Protocol Message Types for Privacy Enhanced
   Conferencing".






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9.  Security Considerations

   Since the procedures in this document relies on TLS [RFC8446] for
   transport security, the security considerations for TLS should be
   reviewed when implementing the protocol defined in this document.

   While the tunneling protocol defined in this document does not use
   DTLS-SRTP [[RFC5764] directly, it does convey and negotiate some of
   the same information (e.g., protection profile data).  As such, a
   review of the security considerations found in that document may be
   useful.

   This document describes a means of securely exchanging keying
   material and cryptographic transforms for both E2E and HBH encryption
   and authentication of media between an endpoint and a Key Distributor
   via a Media Distributor.  Additionally, the procedures result in
   delivering HBH information to the intermediary Media Distributor.
   The Key Distributor and endpoint are the only two entities with
   access to both the E2E and HBH keys, while the Media Distributor has
   access to only HBH information.  Section 8.2 of [RFC8871] enumerates
   various attacks against which one must guard when implementing a
   Media Distributor and are important to note.

   A requirement in this document is that a TLS connection between the
   Media Distributor and the Key Distributor be mutually authenticated.
   The reason for this requirement is to ensure that only an authorized
   Media Distributor receives the HBH keying material.  If an
   unauthorized Media Distributor gains access to the HBH keying
   material, it can easily cause service degradation or denial by
   transmitting HBH-valid packets that ultimately fail E2E
   authentication or replay protection checks (see Section 3.3.2 of
   [RFC3711]).  Even if service does not appear degraded in any way,
   transmitting and processing bogus packets are a waste of both
   computational and network resources.

   While E2E keying material passes through the Media Distributor via
   the protocol defined in this document, the Media Distributor has no
   means of gaining access to that information and therefore cannot
   affect the E2E media processing function in the endpoint except to
   present it with invalid or replayed data.  That said, any entity
   along the path that interferes with the DTLS exchange between the
   endpoint and the Key Distributor, including a malicious Media
   Distributor that is not properly authorized, could prevent an
   endpoint from properly communicating with the Key Distributor and,
   therefore, prevent successful conference participation.






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   The Key Distributor should be aware of the possibility that a
   malicious Media Distributor might transmit an "EndpointDisconnect"
   message to the Key Distributor when the endpoint is, in fact, still
   connected.

   While the Security Considerations section of [RFC8871] describes
   various attacks one needs to consider with respect to the Key
   Distributor and denial-of-service, use of this protocol introduces
   another possible attack vector.  Consider the case where a malicious
   endpoint sends unsolicited DTLS-SRTP messages to a Media Distributor.
   The Media Distributor will normally forward those messages to the Key
   Distributor and, if found invalid, such messages only serve to
   consume resources on both the Media Distributor and Key Distributor.

10.  Acknowledgments

   The author would like to thank David Benham and Cullen Jennings for
   reviewing this document and providing constructive comments.

11.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3264]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
              with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264>.

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
              July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

   [RFC4566]  Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
              Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
              July 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>.







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   [RFC4572]  Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
              Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
              Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, July 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572>.

   [RFC5764]  McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
              Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5764, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764>.

   [RFC8122]  Lennox, J. and C. Holmberg, "Connection-Oriented Media
              Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 8122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8122, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8842]  Holmberg, C. and R. Shpount, "Session Description Protocol
              (SDP) Offer/Answer Considerations for Datagram Transport
              Layer Security (DTLS) and Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
              RFC 8842, DOI 10.17487/RFC8842, January 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8842>.

   [RFC8844]  Thomson, M. and E. Rescorla, "Unknown Key-Share Attacks on
              Uses of TLS with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)",
              RFC 8844, DOI 10.17487/RFC8844, January 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8844>.

12.  Informative References

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.



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   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC8723]  Jennings, C., Jones, P., Barnes, R., and A.B. Roach,
              "Double Encryption Procedures for the Secure Real-Time
              Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 8723,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8723, April 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8723>.

   [RFC8871]  Jones, P., Benham, D., and C. Groves, "A Solution
              Framework for Private Media in Privacy-Enhanced RTP
              Conferencing (PERC)", RFC 8871, DOI 10.17487/RFC8871,
              January 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8871>.

Authors' Addresses

   Paul E. Jones
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   7025 Kit Creek Rd.
   Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27709
   United States of America

   Phone: +1 919 476 2048
   Email: paulej@packetizer.com


   Paul M. Ellenbogen
   Princeton University

   Phone: +1 206 851 2069
   Email: pe5@cs.princeton.edu


   Nils H. Ohlmeier
   8x8, Inc.

   Phone: +1 408 659 6457
   Email: nils@ohlmeier.org












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