Internet Draft Hemma Prafullchandra (XETI)
Expires in 6 months Jim Schaad (Microsoft)
August 12, 1999
Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms
<draft-ietf-pkix-dhpop-01.txt>
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This document describes two methods for producing a signature from a
Diffie-Hellman key pair. This behavior is needed for such
operations as creating a signature of a PKCS #10 certification
request. These algorithms are designed to provide a proof-of-
possession rather than general purpose signing.
1. Introduction
PKCS #10 [RFC2314] defines a syntax for certification requests. It
assumes that the public key being requested for certification
corresponds to an algorithm that is capable of signing/encrypting.
Diffie-Hellman (DH) is a key agreement algorithm and as such cannot
be directly used for signing or encryption.
This document describes two new signing algorithms using the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement process to provide a shared secret as the
basis of the signature. In the first signature algorithm, the
signature is constructed for a specific recipient/verifier by using
a public key of that verifier. In the second signature algorithm,
the signature is constructed for arbitrary verifiers. This is done
by creating an appropriate D-H key pair and encoding them as part of
the signature value.
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2. Terminology
The following definitions will be used in this document
DH certificate = a certificate whose SubjectPublicKey is a DH public
value and is signed with any signature algorithm (e.g. rsa or dsa).
3. DH Signature Process
The steps for creating a DH signature are:
1. An entity (E) chooses the group parameters for a DH key
agreement.
In many cases this is done simply by selecting the group
parameters from a certificate for the recipient of the signature
process (static DH signatures) but they may be computed for other
methods (ephemeral DH signatures).
In the ephemeral DH signature scheme, a temporary DH key-pair is
generated using the group parameters, which may be computed or
acquired by some out-of-band means. In the static DH signature
scheme, a certificate with the correct group parameters has to be
available. Let these common DH parameters be g and p; and let
this DH key-pair be known as the Recipient key pair (Rpub and
Rpriv).
Rpub = g^x mod p (where x=Rpriv, the private DH value and
^ denotes exponentiation)
2. The entity generates a DH public/private key-pair using the
parameters from step 1.
For an entity E:
Epriv = DH private value = y
Epub = DH public value = g^y mod p
3. The signature computation process will then consist of:
a) The value to be signed is obtained. (For a RFC2314 object, the
value is the DER encoded certificationRequestInfo field
represented as an octet string.) This will be the `text'
referred to in [RFC2104], the data to which HMAC-SHA1 is
applied.
b) A shared DH secret is computed, as follows,
shared secret = ZZ = g^xy mod p
[This is done by the entity E as g^(y.Rpub) and by the
Recipient as g^(x.Epub), where Rpub is retrieved from the
Recipient's DH certificate (or is the one that was locally
Prafullchandra, Schaad 2
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generated by the Entity) and Epub is retrieved from the actual
certification request. ]
c) A temporary key K is derived from the shared secret ZZ as
follows:
K = SHA1(LeadingInfo | ZZ | TrailingInfo),
where "|" means concatenation.
d) Compute HMAC-SHA1 over the data `text' as per [RFC2104] as:
SHA1(K XOR opad, SHA1(K XOR ipad, text))
where,
opad (outer pad) = the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times and
ipad (inner pad) = the byte 0x5C repeated 64 times.
Namely,
(1) Append zeros to the end of K to create a 64 byte string
(e.g., if K is of length 16 bytes it will be appended with
48 zero bytes 0x00).
(2) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the 64 byte string computed
in step (1) with ipad.
(3) Append the data stream `text' to the 64 byte string
resulting from step (2).
(4) Apply SHA1 to the stream generated in step (3).
(5) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the 64 byte string computed
in step (1) with opad.
(6) Append the SHA1 result from step (4) to the 64 byte
string resulting from step (5).
(7) Apply SHA1 to the stream generated in step (6) and
output the result.
Sample code is also provided in [RFC2104].
e) The output of (d) is encoded as a BIT STRING (the Signature
value).
The signature verification process requires the Recipient to carry
out steps (a) through (d) and then simply compare the result of step
(d) with what it received as the signature component. If they match
then the following can be concluded:
a) The Entity possesses the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certification request because it needed the
private key to calculate the shared secret; and
b) For the static signature scheme, that only the Recipient that
the entity sent the request to could actually verify the
request because they would require their own private key to
compute the same shared secret. In the case where the
recipient is a Certification Authority, this protects the
Entity from rogue CAs.
4. Static DH Signature
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In the static DH Signature scheme, the public key used in the key
agreement process of step 2 is obtained from the entity that will be
verifying the signature (i.e. the recipient). In the case of a
certification request, the public key would normally be extracted
from a certificate issued to the CA with the appropriate key
parameters.
The values used in step 3c for "LeadingInfo" and the "TrailingInfo"
are:
LeadingInfo ::= Subject Distinguished Name from certificate
TrailingInfo ::= Issuer Distinguished Name from certificate
The ASN.1 structures associated with the static Diffie-Hellman
signature algorithms are:
id-dhPop-static-HMAC-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix
id-alg(6) 3}
DhPopStatic ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerAndSerial IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
hashValue MessageDigest
}
issuerAndSerial is the issuer name and serial number of the
certificate from which the public key was obtained. The
issuerAndSerial field is omitted if the public key did not come
from a certificate.
hashValue contains the result of the SHA-1 HMAC operation in step
3d.
DhPopStatic is encoded as a BIT STRING and is the signature value
(i.e. encodes the above sequence instead of the raw output from 3d).
5. Discrete Logarithm Signature
The use of a single set of parameters for an entire public key
infrastructure allows all keys in the group to be attacked together.
For this reason we need to create a proof of possession for Diffie-
Hellman keys that does not require the use of a common set of
parameters.
The method outlined in this document is the same as used by the
Digital Signature Algorithm, but we have removed the restrictions
imposed by the [FIPS-186] standard. The use of this method does
impose some additional restrictions on the set of keys that may be
used, however if the key generation algorithm documented in [DH-
X9.42] is used the required restrictions are met. The additional
restrictions are the requirement for the existence of a q parameter.
Adding the q parameter is generally accepted as a good practice as
it allows for checking of small group attacks.
Prafullchandra, Schaad 4
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The following definitions are used in the rest of this section:
p is a large prime
g = h(p-1)/q mod p ,
where h is any integer 1 < h < p-1 such that h(p-1) mod q > 1
(g has order q mod p)
q is a large prime
j is a large integer such that p = qj + 1
x is a randomly or pseudo-randomly generated integer with
1 < x < q
y = g^x mod p
Note: These definitions match the ones in [DH-X9.42].
5.1 Expanding the Digest Value
Besides the addition of a q parameter, [FIPS-186] also imposes size
restrictions on the parameters. The length of q must be 160-bits
(matching output of the SHA-1 digest algorithm) and length of p must
be 1024-bits. The size restriction on p is eliminated in this
document, but the size restriction on q is replaced with the
requirement that q must be at least 160-bits. (The size restriction
on q is identical with that in [DH-X9.42].)
Given that there is not a random length-hashing algorithm, a hash
value of the message will need to be derived such that the hash is
in the range from 0 to q-1. If the length of q is greater than 160-
bits then a method must be provided to expand the hash length.
The method for expanding the digest value used in this section does
not add any additional security beyond the 160-bits provided by SHA.
The value being signed is increased mainly to enhance the difficulty
of reversing the signature process.
This algorithm produces m the value to be signed.
Let L = the size of q (i.e. 2^L <= q < 2^(L+1)).
Let M be the original message to be signed.
1. Compute d = SHA-1(M), the SHA-1 digest of the original message.
2. If L == 160 then m = d.
3. If L @ 160 then follow steps (a) through (d) below.
a) Set n = L / 160, where / represents integer division,
consequently, if L = 200, n = 1.
b) Set m = d, the initial computed digest value.
c) For i = 0 to n - 1
m = m | SHA(m), where "|" means concatenation.
d) m = LEFTMOST(m, L-1), where LEFTMOST returns the L-1 left most
bits of m.
Prafullchandra, Schaad 5
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Thus the final result of the process meets the criteria that 0 <= m
< q.
5.2 Signature Computation Algorithm
The signature algorithm produces the pair of values (r, s), which is
the signature. The signature is computed as follows:
Given m, the value to be signed, as well as the parameters defined
earlier in section 5.
1. Generate a random or pseudorandom integer k, such that 0 < k^-1 <
q.
2. Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q.
3. If r is zero, repeat from step 1.
4. Compute s = (k^-1 (m + xr)) mod q.
5. If s is zero, repeat from step 1.
5.3 Signature Verification Algorithm
The signature verification process is far more complicated than is
normal for the Digital Signature Algorithm, as some assumptions
about the validity of parameters cannot be taken for granted.
Given a message m to be validated, the signature value pair (r, s)
and the parameters for the key.
1. Perform a strong verification that p is a prime number.
2. Perform a strong verification that q is a prime number.
3. Verify that q is a factor of p-1, if any of the above checks fail
then the signature cannot be verified and must be considered a
failure.
4. Verify that r and s are in the range [1, q-1].
5. Compute w = (s^-1) mod q.
6. Compute u1 = m*w mod q.
7. Compute u2 = r*w mod q.
8. Compute v = ((g^u1 * y^u2) mod p) mod q.
9. Compare v and r, if they are the same then the signature verified
correctly.
5.4 ASN Encoding
Prafullchandra, Schaad 6
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The signature is encoded using
id-alg-dhPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 4}
The parameters for id-alg-dhPOP are encoded as DomainParameters
(imported from [PROFILE]). The parameters may be omitted in the
signature, as they must exist in the associated key request.
The signature value pair r and s are encoded using Dss-Sig-Value
(imported from [PROFILE]).
5. Security Considerations
All the security in this system is provided by the secrecy of the
private keying material. If either sender or recipient private keys
are disclosed, all messages sent or received using that key are
compromised. Similarly, loss of the private key results in an
inability to read messages sent using that key.
Selection of parameters can be of paramount importance. In the
selection of parameters one must take into account the community/
group of entities that one wishes to be able to communicate with.
In choosing a set of parameters one must also be sure to avoid small
groups. [FIPS-186] Appendixes 2 and 3 contain information on the
selection of parameters. The practices outlined in this document
will lead to better selection of parameters.
6. References
[FIPS-186] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
(FIPS PUB) 186, "Digital Signature Standard",
1994 May 19.
[RFC2314] B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
v1.5", RFC 2314, October 1997
[RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[PROFILE] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL
Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[DH-X9.42] E. Rescorla, "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method".
RFC 2631, June 1999.
7. Author's Addresses
Hemma Prafullchandra
XETI Inc.
5150 El Camino Real, #A-32
Los Altos, CA 94022
Prafullchandra, Schaad 7
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(640) 694-6812
hemma@xeti.com
Jim Schaad
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399
(425) 936-3101
jimsch@microsoft.com
Prafullchandra, Schaad 8
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Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
DH-Sign DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
--EXPORTS ALL
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
in
-- the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them for
their
-- own purposes.
IMPORTS
IssuerAndSerialNumber, MessageDigest
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
modules(0) cms(1) }
Dss-Sig-Value, DomainParameters
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)};
id-dh-sig-hmac-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 3}
DhSigStatic ::= SEQUENCE {
IssuerAndSerial IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
hashValue MessageDigest
}
id-alg-dh-pop OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 4}
END
Prafullchandra, Schaad 9
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Appendix B. Example of Static DH Signature
The following example follows the steps described earlier in section
3.
Step 1: Establishing common Diffie-Hellman parameters. Assume the
parameters are as in the DER encoded certificate. The certificate
contains a DH public key signed by a CA with a DSA signing key.
0 30 792: SEQUENCE {
4 30 725: SEQUENCE {
8 A0 3: [CONTEXT-SPECIFIC 0] {
10 2 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 2 6: INTEGER
: 00 D9 AD EE 9C FC
21 30 11: SEQUENCE {
23 6 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10040 4 3'
32 5 0: NULL
: }
34 30 72: SEQUENCE {
36 31 11: SET {
38 30 9: SEQUENCE {
40 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
45 13 2: PrintableString 'US'
: }
: }
49 31 17: SET {
51 30 15: SEQUENCE {
53 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
58 13 8: PrintableString 'XETI Inc'
: }
: }
68 31 12: SET {
70 30 10: SEQUENCE {
72 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4
11)
77 13 3: PrintableString 'JSD'
: }
: }
82 31 24: SET {
84 30 22: SEQUENCE {
86 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
91 13 15: PrintableString 'Root DSA TestCA'
: }
: }
: }
Prafullchandra, Schaad 10
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108 30 30: SEQUENCE {
110 17 13: UTCTime '990817213959Z'
125 17 13: UTCTime '000816213959Z'
: }
140 30 82: SEQUENCE {
142 31 11: SET {
144 30 9: SEQUENCE {
146 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
151 13 2: PrintableString 'US'
: }
: }
155 31 17: SET {
157 30 15: SEQUENCE {
159 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
164 13 8: PrintableString 'XETI Inc'
: }
: }
174 31 12: SET {
176 30 10: SEQUENCE {
178 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4
11)
183 13 3: PrintableString 'JSD'
: }
: }
188 31 34: SET {
190 30 32: SEQUENCE {
192 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
197 13 25: PrintableString 'JKIX DiffieHellman TestCA'
: }
: }
: }
224 30 421: SEQUENCE {
228 30 282: SEQUENCE {
232 6 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dhKeyAgreement (1 2 840 113549 1
3 1)
243 30 267: SEQUENCE {
247 2 129: INTEGER
: 00 88 E1 F2 64 6D 5D F2 97 5E 86 00 DF BD 1F B8
: E1 07 B5 27 42 C1 6A 02 C5 26 74 F0 A6 53 BF 8C
: 58 1C B6 77 C0 59 6B 3E A5 E8 7C 64 25 0E B3 FC
: 29 EE C4 1A 93 F3 48 76 7B C5 DA F7 E5 02 29 11
: E8 83 AD A6 A0 AE A4 EA 0F 3A EB 3A 35 67 62 30
: 7F EE 22 55 18 41 1F 28 25 8D 87 15 68 4B C4 BC
: B7 15 1C 4E 78 11 D8 30 2B 0B 54 47 18 1F AA 4E
: DC 65 FE FB 21 A6 2F 94 03 EA B6 13 82 A5 22 07
: C9
379 2 128: INTEGER
Prafullchandra, Schaad 11
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: 38 7B DB FC 78 24 71 C9 2E 04 BA 71 67 07 8B 29
: BA 7C E0 2E 66 C9 CB 5A 20 51 01 17 0B D3 E8 4A
: 2B 00 DA 8D C7 A1 E3 90 A4 86 3C F6 E5 5E 0B 6C
: 49 6A C2 9B A5 A8 21 4E 08 01 21 3C B2 70 FD C1
: 0E 94 0D 66 83 0C 77 7E 62 29 16 82 C7 77 F5 6D
: 2E 0B 70 D5 52 E5 3A 66 B7 D0 6A AA 21 2A C4 23
: A5 52 5D D9 D4 D3 EC 9B FE C1 36 90 E7 35 11 0E
: A7 02 ED CC B4 F2 98 3D 3B BC 30 44 27 BF D8 52
510 2 2: INTEGER 256
: }
: }
514 3 132: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 02 81 80 51 7C DA 1D AB 78 53 3A 0E E9 D3 D2 8F
: 50 1F 13 B0 C7 14 DA 5C E3 46 7F 3C 67 D5 BA 52
: 1D 11 91 26 9B 8D 5A 12 82 B1 9A 09 C9 14 4B 9B
: 03 EE A0 10 A2 5B 74 FC C6 51 43 77 0C F6 6D 21
: 67 72 5D 37 BD 3B 69 FB 1F 80 B0 E3 10 AB 8B 19
: 7B 62 C6 08 20 FD 97 2F 9A D6 16 CC 29 D4 39 36
: E3 B5 5B C1 8F 4D F3 CE 47 2E A1 43 A1 39 6D E7
: 72 B7 7E B5 9D 32 78 F4 26 3D C2 E1 C8 B3 56 A7
: 79 60 D1
: }
649 A3 82: [CONTEXT-SPECIFIC 3] {
651 30 80: SEQUENCE {
653 30 29: SEQUENCE {
655 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29
14)
660 4 22: OCTET STRING
: 04 14 81 B3 74 2E F3 40 F4 71 A9 7A FA FF 5A 99
: E8 6A 70 8E 02 D6
: }
684 30 31: SEQUENCE {
686 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29
35)
691 4 24: OCTET STRING
: 30 16 80 14 62 D9 21 FE E9 78 ED CA 33 06 A0 52
: A3 47 7B 8C D1 78 E9 35
: }
717 30 14: SEQUENCE {
719 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
724 1 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
727 4 4: OCTET STRING
: 03 02 01 06
: }
: }
: }
: }
Prafullchandra, Schaad 12
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733 30 11: SEQUENCE {
735 6 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10040 4 3'
744 5 0: NULL
: }
746 3 48: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 30 2D 02 15 00 85 21 8B 45 F0 EC 4A 5F 45 5A 0C
: C0 C5 A7 1A 2B B8 AB 5C 78 02 14 40 C1 E9 A5 86
: 6E 61 51 0E FB 5D E0 9C 75 66 CD CF AE FD B2
: }
Step 2. End Entity/User generates a Diffie-Hellman key-pair using
the parameters from the CA certificate.
EE DH public key: SunJCE Diffie-Hellman Public Key:
y:
07a52fbf b2e5d03a e60b0de4 6f60b9c0
123d4572 7752c36e e498652a b39b0923
f5332495 8b5b007d 79b6690c 93625288
d92d9db0 f60f2325 659a5d58 945c9757
da92af59 794514b4 a03b5cda 8c288b18
0447c7aa 3724cffd 3f51f2a8 abe3453a
c64ca006 8194f868 4be5d008 06b34bbc
8dd6afe6 89ec5735 821ff9ed 4eccd34a
p:
88e1f264 6d5df297 5e8600df bd1fb8e1
07b52742 c16a02c5 2674f0a6 53bf8c58
1cb677c0 596b3ea5 e87c6425 0eb3fc29
eec41a93 f348767b c5daf7e5 022911e8
83ada6a0 aea4ea0f 3aeb3a35 6762307f
ee225518 411f2825 8d871568 4bc4bcb7
151c4e78 11d8302b 0b544718 1faa4edc
65fefb21 a62f9403 eab61382 a52207c9
g:
387bdbfc 782471c9 2e04ba71 67078b29
ba7ce02e 66c9cb5a 20510117 0bd3e84a
2b00da8d c7a1e390 a4863cf6 e55e0b6c
496ac29b a5a8214e 0801213c b270fdc1
0e940d66 830c777e 62291682 c777f56d
2e0b70d5 52e53a66 b7d06aaa 212ac423
a5525dd9 d4d3ec9b fec13690 e735110e
a702edcc b4f2983d 3bbc3044 27bfd852
l:
256
EE DH private key: SunJCE Diffie-Hellman Private Key:
Prafullchandra, Schaad 13
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x:
a41aa1b0 a8b60012 b296d9e4 fa280942
b20b226f 29140796 ffb095e1 bfd6e269
p:
88e1f264 6d5df297 5e8600df bd1fb8e1
07b52742 c16a02c5 2674f0a6 53bf8c58
1cb677c0 596b3ea5 e87c6425 0eb3fc29
eec41a93 f348767b c5daf7e5 022911e8
83ada6a0 aea4ea0f 3aeb3a35 6762307f
ee225518 411f2825 8d871568 4bc4bcb7
151c4e78 11d8302b 0b544718 1faa4edc
65fefb21 a62f9403 eab61382 a52207c9
g:
387bdbfc 782471c9 2e04ba71 67078b29
ba7ce02e 66c9cb5a 20510117 0bd3e84a
2b00da8d c7a1e390 a4863cf6 e55e0b6c
496ac29b a5a8214e 0801213c b270fdc1
0e940d66 830c777e 62291682 c777f56d
2e0b70d5 52e53a66 b7d06aaa 212ac423
a5525dd9 d4d3ec9b fec13690 e735110e
a702edcc b4f2983d 3bbc3044 27bfd852
l:
256
Step 3. Compute K and the signature.
LeadingInfo: DER encoded Subject/Requestor DN (as in the generated
Certificate Signing Request)
30 4A 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31
11 30 0F 06 03 55 04 0A 13 08 58 45 54 49 20 49
6E 63 31 0C 30 0A 06 03 55 04 0B 13 03 4A 53 44
31 1A 30 18 06 03 55 04 03 13 11 50 4B 49 58 20
45 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 55 73 65 72
TrailingInfo: DER encoded Issuer/Recipient DN (from the certificate
described in step 1)
30 52 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31
11 30 0F 06 03 55 04 0A 13 08 58 45 54 49 20 49
6E 63 31 0C 30 0A 06 03 55 04 0B 13 03 4A 53 44
31 22 30 20 06 03 55 04 03 13 19 4A 4B 49 58 20
44 69 66 66 69 65 48 65 6C 6C 6D 61 6E 20 54 65
73 74 43 41
Prafullchandra, Schaad 14
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K:
B4 4C 51 FF 73 00 FF 6D 7A 88 EB 45 82 42 05 34
11 F9 BE 73
TBS: the "text" for computing the SHA-1 HMAC.
30 82 01 F8 02 01 00 30 4A 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55
04 06 13 02 55 53 31 11 30 0F 06 03 55 04 0A 13
08 58 45 54 49 20 49 6E 63 31 0C 30 0A 06 03 55
04 0B 13 03 4A 53 44 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55 04 03
13 11 50 4B 49 58 20 45 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 55
73 65 72 30 82 01 A5 30 82 01 1A 06 09 2A 86 48
86 F7 0D 01 03 01 30 82 01 0B 02 81 81 00 88 E1
F2 64 6D 5D F2 97 5E 86 00 DF BD 1F B8 E1 07 B5
27 42 C1 6A 02 C5 26 74 F0 A6 53 BF 8C 58 1C B6
77 C0 59 6B 3E A5 E8 7C 64 25 0E B3 FC 29 EE C4
1A 93 F3 48 76 7B C5 DA F7 E5 02 29 11 E8 83 AD
A6 A0 AE A4 EA 0F 3A EB 3A 35 67 62 30 7F EE 22
55 18 41 1F 28 25 8D 87 15 68 4B C4 BC B7 15 1C
4E 78 11 D8 30 2B 0B 54 47 18 1F AA 4E DC 65 FE
FB 21 A6 2F 94 03 EA B6 13 82 A5 22 07 C9 02 81
80 38 7B DB FC 78 24 71 C9 2E 04 BA 71 67 07 8B
29 BA 7C E0 2E 66 C9 CB 5A 20 51 01 17 0B D3 E8
4A 2B 00 DA 8D C7 A1 E3 90 A4 86 3C F6 E5 5E 0B
6C 49 6A C2 9B A5 A8 21 4E 08 01 21 3C B2 70 FD
C1 0E 94 0D 66 83 0C 77 7E 62 29 16 82 C7 77 F5
6D 2E 0B 70 D5 52 E5 3A 66 B7 D0 6A AA 21 2A C4
23 A5 52 5D D9 D4 D3 EC 9B FE C1 36 90 E7 35 11
0E A7 02 ED CC B4 F2 98 3D 3B BC 30 44 27 BF D8
52 02 02 01 00 03 81 84 00 02 81 80 07 A5 2F BF
B2 E5 D0 3A E6 0B 0D E4 6F 60 B9 C0 12 3D 45 72
77 52 C3 6E E4 98 65 2A B3 9B 09 23 F5 33 24 95
8B 5B 00 7D 79 B6 69 0C 93 62 52 88 D9 2D 9D B0
F6 0F 23 25 65 9A 5D 58 94 5C 97 57 DA 92 AF 59
79 45 14 B4 A0 3B 5C DA 8C 28 8B 18 04 47 C7 AA
37 24 CF FD 3F 51 F2 A8 AB E3 45 3A C6 4C A0 06
81 94 F8 68 4B E5 D0 08 06 B3 4B BC 8D D6 AF E6
89 EC 57 35 82 1F F9 ED 4E CC D3 4A
Certification Request:
0 30 633: SEQUENCE {
4 30 504: SEQUENCE {
8 2 1: INTEGER 0
11 30 74: SEQUENCE {
Prafullchandra, Schaad 15
Internet Draft August 1999
13 31 11: SET {
15 30 9: SEQUENCE {
17 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
22 13 2: PrintableString 'US'
: }
: }
26 31 17: SET {
28 30 15: SEQUENCE {
30 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
35 13 8: PrintableString 'XETI Inc'
: }
: }
45 31 12: SET {
47 30 10: SEQUENCE {
49 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4
11)
54 13 3: PrintableString 'JSD'
: }
: }
59 31 26: SET {
61 30 24: SEQUENCE {
63 6 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
68 13 17: PrintableString 'PKIX Example User'
: }
: }
: }
87 30 421: SEQUENCE {
91 30 282: SEQUENCE {
95 6 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dhKeyAgreement (1 2 840 113549 1
3 1)
106 30 267: SEQUENCE {
110 2 129: INTEGER
: 00 88 E1 F2 64 6D 5D F2 97 5E 86 00 DF BD 1F B8
: E1 07 B5 27 42 C1 6A 02 C5 26 74 F0 A6 53 BF 8C
: 58 1C B6 77 C0 59 6B 3E A5 E8 7C 64 25 0E B3 FC
: 29 EE C4 1A 93 F3 48 76 7B C5 DA F7 E5 02 29 11
: E8 83 AD A6 A0 AE A4 EA 0F 3A EB 3A 35 67 62 30
: 7F EE 22 55 18 41 1F 28 25 8D 87 15 68 4B C4 BC
: B7 15 1C 4E 78 11 D8 30 2B 0B 54 47 18 1F AA 4E
: DC 65 FE FB 21 A6 2F 94 03 EA B6 13 82 A5 22 07
: C9
242 2 128: INTEGER
: 38 7B DB FC 78 24 71 C9 2E 04 BA 71 67 07 8B 29
: BA 7C E0 2E 66 C9 CB 5A 20 51 01 17 0B D3 E8 4A
: 2B 00 DA 8D C7 A1 E3 90 A4 86 3C F6 E5 5E 0B 6C
: 49 6A C2 9B A5 A8 21 4E 08 01 21 3C B2 70 FD C1
: 0E 94 0D 66 83 0C 77 7E 62 29 16 82 C7 77 F5 6D
Prafullchandra, Schaad 16
Internet Draft August 1999
: 2E 0B 70 D5 52 E5 3A 66 B7 D0 6A AA 21 2A C4 23
: A5 52 5D D9 D4 D3 EC 9B FE C1 36 90 E7 35 11 0E
: A7 02 ED CC B4 F2 98 3D 3B BC 30 44 27 BF D8 52
373 2 2: INTEGER 256
: }
: }
377 3 132: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 02 81 80 07 A5 2F BF B2 E5 D0 3A E6 0B 0D E4 6F
: 60 B9 C0 12 3D 45 72 77 52 C3 6E E4 98 65 2A B3
: 9B 09 23 F5 33 24 95 8B 5B 00 7D 79 B6 69 0C 93
: 62 52 88 D9 2D 9D B0 F6 0F 23 25 65 9A 5D 58 94
: 5C 97 57 DA 92 AF 59 79 45 14 B4 A0 3B 5C DA 8C
: 28 8B 18 04 47 C7 AA 37 24 CF FD 3F 51 F2 A8 AB
: E3 45 3A C6 4C A0 06 81 94 F8 68 4B E5 D0 08 06
: B3 4B BC 8D D6 AF E6 89 EC 57 35 82 1F F9 ED 4E
: CC D3 4A
: }
: }
512 30 12: SEQUENCE {
514 6 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 3'
524 5 0: NULL
: }
526 3 109: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 30 6A 30 52 30 48 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13
: 02 55 53 31 11 30 0F 06 03 55 04 0A 13 08 58 45
: 54 49 20 49 6E 63 31 0C 30 0A 06 03 55 04 0B 13
: 03 4A 53 44 31 18 30 16 06 03 55 04 03 13 0F 52
: 6F 6F 74 20 44 53 41 20 54 65 73 74 43 41 02 06
: 00 D9 AD EE 9C FC 04 14 5F B4 B7 DA 2E 00 80 30
: C8 30 9B 5D AA 81 C3 83 6B 30 87 6B
: }
Signature verification requires CA's private key, the CA certificate
and the generated Certification Request.
CA DH private key: SunJCE Diffie-Hellman Private Key:
x:
ed182221 639fce64 484ccd8b bfda23b1
b75185b9 83aba49e f43b63e8 7abecfe0
p:
88e1f264 6d5df297 5e8600df bd1fb8e1
07b52742 c16a02c5 2674f0a6 53bf8c58
1cb677c0 596b3ea5 e87c6425 0eb3fc29
eec41a93 f348767b c5daf7e5 022911e8
Prafullchandra, Schaad 17
Internet Draft August 1999
83ada6a0 aea4ea0f 3aeb3a35 6762307f
ee225518 411f2825 8d871568 4bc4bcb7
151c4e78 11d8302b 0b544718 1faa4edc
65fefb21 a62f9403 eab61382 a52207c9
g:
387bdbfc 782471c9 2e04ba71 67078b29
ba7ce02e 66c9cb5a 20510117 0bd3e84a
2b00da8d c7a1e390 a4863cf6 e55e0b6c
496ac29b a5a8214e 0801213c b270fdc1
0e940d66 830c777e 62291682 c777f56d
2e0b70d5 52e53a66 b7d06aaa 212ac423
a5525dd9 d4d3ec9b fec13690 e735110e
a702edcc b4f2983d 3bbc3044 27bfd852
l:
256
Prafullchandra, Schaad 18
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Appendix C. Example of Discrete Log Signature
Step 1. Generate a Diffie-Hellman Key with length of q being 256-
bits.
p:
94 84 E0 45 6C 7F 69 51 62 3E 56 80 7C 68 E7 C5
A9 9E 9E 74 74 94 ED 90 8C 1D C4 E1 4A 14 82 F5
D2 94 0C 19 E3 B9 10 BB 11 B9 E5 A5 FB 8E 21 51
63 02 86 AA 06 B8 21 36 B6 7F 36 DF D1 D6 68 5B
79 7C 1D 5A 14 75 1F 6A 93 75 93 CE BB 97 72 8A
F0 0F 23 9D 47 F6 D4 B3 C7 F0 F4 E6 F6 2B C2 32
E1 89 67 BE 7E 06 AE F8 D0 01 6B 8B 2A F5 02 D7
B6 A8 63 94 83 B0 1B 31 7D 52 1A DE E5 03 85 27
q:
E8 72 FA 96 F0 11 40 F5 F2 DC FD 3B 5D 78 94 B1
85 01 E5 69 37 21 F7 25 B9 BA 71 4A FC 60 30 FB
g:
26 A6 32 2C 5A 2B D4 33 2B 5C DC 06 87 53 3F 90
06 61 50 38 3E D2 B9 7D 81 1C 12 10 C5 0C 53 D4
64 D1 8E 30 07 08 8C DD 3F 0A 2F 2C D6 1B 7F 57
86 D0 DA BB 6E 36 2A 18 E8 D3 BC 70 31 7A 48 B6
4E 18 6E DD 1F 22 06 EB 3F EA D4 41 69 D9 9B DE
47 95 7A 72 91 D2 09 7F 49 5C 3B 03 33 51 C8 F1
39 9A FF 04 D5 6E 7E 94 3D 03 B8 F6 31 15 26 48
95 A8 5C DE 47 88 B4 69 3A 00 A7 86 9E DA D1 CD
j:
A3 91 01 C0 A8 6E A4 4D A0 56 FC 6C FE 1F A7 B0
CD 0F 94 87 0C 25 BE 97 76 8D EB E5 A4 09 5D AB
83 CD 80 0B 35 67 7F 0C 8E A7 31 98 32 85 39 40
9D 11 98 D8 DE B8 7F 86 9B AF 8D 67 3D B6 76 B4
61 2F 21 E1 4B 0E 68 FF 53 3E 87 DD D8 71 56 68
47 DC F7 20 63 4B 3C 5F 78 71 83 E6 70 9E E2 92
y:
5F CF 39 AD 62 CF 49 8E D1 CE 66 E2 B1 E6 A7 01
4D 05 C2 77 C8 92 52 42 A9 05 A4 DB E0 46 79 50
A3 FC 99 3D 3D A6 9B A9 AD BC 62 1C 69 B7 11 A1
C0 2A F1 85 28 F7 68 FE D6 8F 31 56 22 4D 0A 11
6E 72 3A 02 AF 0E 27 AA F9 ED CE 05 EF D8 59 92
C0 18 D7 69 6E BD 70 B6 21 D1 77 39 21 E1 AF 7A
3A CF 20 0A B4 2C 69 5F CF 79 67 20 31 4D F2 C6
ED 23 BF C4 BB 1E D1 71 40 2C 07 D6 F0 8F C5 1A
seed:
1C D5 3A 0D 17 82 6D 0A 81 75 81 46 10 8E 3E DB
09 E4 98 34
C:
00000037
Prafullchandra, Schaad 19
Internet Draft August 1999
x:
3E 5D AD FD E5 F4 6B 1B 61 5E 18 F9 0B 84 74 a7
52 1E D6 92 BC 34 94 56 F3 0C BE DA 67 7A DD 7D
Step 2. Form the value to be signed and hash with SHA1. The result
of the hash for this example is:
5f a2 69 b6 4b 22 91 22 6f 4c fe 68 ec 2b d1 c6
d4 21 e5 2c
Step 3. The hash value needs to be expanded since |q| = 256. This
is done by hashing the hash with SHA1 and appending it to the
original hash. The value after this step is:
5f a2 69 b6 4b 22 91 22 6f 4c fe 68 ec 2b d1 c6
d4 21 e5 2c 64 92 8b c9 5e 34 59 70 bd 62 40 ad
6f 26 3b f7 1c a3 b2 cb
Next the first 255 bits of this value are taken to be the resulting
"hash" value. Note in this case a shift of one bit right is done
since the result is to be treated as an integer:
2f d1 34 db 25 91 48 91 37 a6 7f 34 76 15 e8 e3
6a 10 f2 96 32 49 45 e4 af 1a 2c b8 5e b1 20 56
Step 4. The signature value is computed. In this case you get the
values
R:
A1 B5 B4 90 01 34 6B A0 31 6A 73 F5 7D F6 5C 14
43 52 D2 10 BF 86 58 87 F7 BC 6E 5A 77 FF C3 4B
S:
59 40 45 BC 6F 0D DC FF 9D 55 40 1E C4 9E 51 3D
66 EF B2 FF 06 40 9A 39 68 75 81 F7 EC 9E BE A1
The encoded signature values is then:
30 45 02 21 00 A1 B5 B4 90 01 34 6B A0 31 6A 73
F5 7D F6 5C 14 43 52 D2 10 BF 86 58 87 F7 BC 6E
5A 77 FF C3 4B 02 20 59 40 45 BC 6F 0D DC FF 9D
55 40 1E C4 9E 51 3D 66 EF B2 FF 06 40 9A 39 68
75 81 F7 EC 9E BE A1
Result:
30 82 02 c2 30 82 02 67 02 01 00 30 1b 31 19 30
17 06 03 55 04 03 13 10 49 45 54 46 20 50 4b 49
58 20 53 41 4d 50 4c 45 30 82 02 41 30 82 01 b6
06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3e 02 01 30 82 01 a9 02 81 81
00 94 84 e0 45 6c 7f 69 51 62 3e 56 80 7c 68 e7
c5 a9 9e 9e 74 74 94 ed 90 8c 1d c4 e1 4a 14 82
f5 d2 94 0c 19 e3 b9 10 bb 11 b9 e5 a5 fb 8e 21
51 63 02 86 aa 06 b8 21 36 b6 7f 36 df d1 d6 68
5b 79 7c 1d 5a 14 75 1f 6a 93 75 93 ce bb 97 72
Prafullchandra, Schaad 20
Internet Draft August 1999
8a f0 0f 23 9d 47 f6 d4 b3 c7 f0 f4 e6 f6 2b c2
32 e1 89 67 be 7e 06 ae f8 d0 01 6b 8b 2a f5 02
d7 b6 a8 63 94 83 b0 1b 31 7d 52 1a de e5 03 85
27 02 81 80 26 a6 32 2c 5a 2b d4 33 2b 5c dc 06
87 53 3f 90 06 61 50 38 3e d2 b9 7d 81 1c 12 10
c5 0c 53 d4 64 d1 8e 30 07 08 8c dd 3f 0a 2f 2c
d6 1b 7f 57 86 d0 da bb 6e 36 2a 18 e8 d3 bc 70
31 7a 48 b6 4e 18 6e dd 1f 22 06 eb 3f ea d4 41
69 d9 9b de 47 95 7a 72 91 d2 09 7f 49 5c 3b 03
33 51 c8 f1 39 9a ff 04 d5 6e 7e 94 3d 03 b8 f6
31 15 26 48 95 a8 5c de 47 88 b4 69 3a 00 a7 86
9e da d1 cd 02 21 00 e8 72 fa 96 f0 11 40 f5 f2
dc fd 3b 5d 78 94 b1 85 01 e5 69 37 21 f7 25 b9
ba 71 4a fc 60 30 fb 02 61 00 a3 91 01 c0 a8 6e
a4 4d a0 56 fc 6c fe 1f a7 b0 cd 0f 94 87 0c 25
be 97 76 8d eb e5 a4 09 5d ab 83 cd 80 0b 35 67
7f 0c 8e a7 31 98 32 85 39 40 9d 11 98 d8 de b8
7f 86 9b af 8d 67 3d b6 76 b4 61 2f 21 e1 4b 0e
68 ff 53 3e 87 dd d8 71 56 68 47 dc f7 20 63 4b
3c 5f 78 71 83 e6 70 9e e2 92 30 1a 03 15 00 1c
d5 3a 0d 17 82 6d 0a 81 75 81 46 10 8e 3e db 09
e4 98 34 02 01 37 03 81 84 00 02 81 80 5f cf 39
ad 62 cf 49 8e d1 ce 66 e2 b1 e6 a7 01 4d 05 c2
77 c8 92 52 42 a9 05 a4 db e0 46 79 50 a3 fc 99
3d 3d a6 9b a9 ad bc 62 1c 69 b7 11 a1 c0 2a f1
85 28 f7 68 fe d6 8f 31 56 22 4d 0a 11 6e 72 3a
02 af 0e 27 aa f9 ed ce 05 ef d8 59 92 c0 18 d7
69 6e bd 70 b6 21 d1 77 39 21 e1 af 7a 3a cf 20
0a b4 2c 69 5f cf 79 67 20 31 4d f2 c6 ed 23 bf
c4 bb 1e d1 71 40 2c 07 d6 f0 8f c5 1a a0 00 30
0c 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 06 04 05 00 03 47 00
30 44 02 20 54 d9 43 8d 0f 9d 42 03 d6 09 aa a1
9a 3c 17 09 ae bd ee b3 d1 a0 00 db 7d 8c b8 e4
56 e6 57 7b 02 20 44 89 b1 04 f5 40 2b 5f e7 9c
f9 a4 97 50 0d ad c3 7a a4 2b b2 2d 5d 79 fb 38
8a b4 df bb 88 bc
Decoded Version of result:
0 30 707: SEQUENCE {
4 30 615: SEQUENCE {
8 02 1: INTEGER 0
11 30 27: SEQUENCE {
13 31 25: SET {
15 30 23: SEQUENCE {
17 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
22 13 16: PrintableString 'IETF PKIX SAMPLE'
: }
: }
: }
40 30 577: SEQUENCE {
44 30 438: SEQUENCE {
Prafullchandra, Schaad 21
Internet Draft August 1999
48 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER dhPublicNumber (1 2 840 10046 2
1)
57 30 425: SEQUENCE {
61 02 129: INTEGER
: 00 94 84 E0 45 6C 7F 69 51 62 3E 56 80 7C 68 E7
: C5 A9 9E 9E 74 74 94 ED 90 8C 1D C4 E1 4A 14 82
: F5 D2 94 0C 19 E3 B9 10 BB 11 B9 E5 A5 FB 8E 21
: 51 63 02 86 AA 06 B8 21 36 B6 7F 36 DF D1 D6 68
: 5B 79 7C 1D 5A 14 75 1F 6A 93 75 93 CE BB 97 72
: 8A F0 0F 23 9D 47 F6 D4 B3 C7 F0 F4 E6 F6 2B C2
: 32 E1 89 67 BE 7E 06 AE F8 D0 01 6B 8B 2A F5 02
: D7 B6 A8 63 94 83 B0 1B 31 7D 52 1A DE E5 03 85
: 27
193 02 128: INTEGER
: 26 A6 32 2C 5A 2B D4 33 2B 5C DC 06 87 53 3F 90
: 06 61 50 38 3E D2 B9 7D 81 1C 12 10 C5 0C 53 D4
: 64 D1 8E 30 07 08 8C DD 3F 0A 2F 2C D6 1B 7F 57
: 86 D0 DA BB 6E 36 2A 18 E8 D3 BC 70 31 7A 48 B6
: 4E 18 6E DD 1F 22 06 EB 3F EA D4 41 69 D9 9B DE
: 47 95 7A 72 91 D2 09 7F 49 5C 3B 03 33 51 C8 F1
: 39 9A FF 04 D5 6E 7E 94 3D 03 B8 F6 31 15 26 48
: 95 A8 5C DE 47 88 B4 69 3A 00 A7 86 9E DA D1 CD
324 02 33: INTEGER
: 00 E8 72 FA 96 F0 11 40 F5 F2 DC FD 3B 5D 78 94
: B1 85 01 E5 69 37 21 F7 25 B9 BA 71 4A FC 60 30
: FB
359 02 97: INTEGER
: 00 A3 91 01 C0 A8 6E A4 4D A0 56 FC 6C FE 1F A7
: B0 CD 0F 94 87 0C 25 BE 97 76 8D EB E5 A4 09 5D
: AB 83 CD 80 0B 35 67 7F 0C 8E A7 31 98 32 85 39
: 40 9D 11 98 D8 DE B8 7F 86 9B AF 8D 67 3D B6 76
: B4 61 2F 21 E1 4B 0E 68 FF 53 3E 87 DD D8 71 56
: 68 47 DC F7 20 63 4B 3C 5F 78 71 83 E6 70 9E E2
: 92
458 30 26: SEQUENCE {
460 03 21: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 1C D5 3A 0D 17 82 6D 0A 81 75 81 46 10 8E 3E DB
: 09 E4 98 34
483 02 1: INTEGER 55
: }
: }
: }
486 03 132: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 02 81 80 5F CF 39 AD 62 CF 49 8E D1 CE 66 E2 B1
: E6 A7 01 4D 05 C2 77 C8 92 52 42 A9 05 A4 DB E0
: 46 79 50 A3 FC 99 3D 3D A6 9B A9 AD BC 62 1C 69
: B7 11 A1 C0 2A F1 85 28 F7 68 FE D6 8F 31 56 22
: 4D 0A 11 6E 72 3A 02 AF 0E 27 AA F9 ED CE 05 EF
: D8 59 92 C0 18 D7 69 6E BD 70 B6 21 D1 77 39 21
: E1 AF 7A 3A CF 20 0A B4 2C 69 5F CF 79 67 20 31
: 4D F2 C6 ED 23 BF C4 BB 1E D1 71 40 2C 07 D6 F0
: 8F C5 1A
: }
621 A0 0: [0]
Prafullchandra, Schaad 22
Internet Draft August 1999
: }
623 30 12: SEQUENCE {
625 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 4'
635 05 0: NULL
: }
637 03 72: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 30 45 02 21 00 A1 B5 B4 90 01 34 6B A0 31 6A 73
: F5 7D F6 5C 14 43 52 D2 10 BF 86 58 87 F7 BC 6E
: 5A 77 FF C3 4B 02 20 59 40 45 BC 6F 0D DC FF 9D
: 55 40 1E C4 9E 51 3D 66 EF B2 FF 06 40 9A 39 68
: 75 81 F7 EC 9E BE A1
: }
Prafullchandra, Schaad 23