PKIX Working Group                                    Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft                                   Daniel Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Standard Track                   Kelvin Yiu, Microsoft
Expires: July 2, 2008                      Russ Housley, Vigil Security
                                                         Tim Polk, NIST
                                                       22 January, 2008

        Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information
                 draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo-01.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This document specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject
   Public Key Information field in certificates that support Elliptic
   Curve Cryptography.  This document updates [RFC3279].






Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 1]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


Table of Contents

   1. Introduction......................................... 2
      1.1. Terminology..................................... 3
   2. Subject Public Key Information Fields.................... 3
      2.1. Elliptic Curve Public Key Algorithm Identifier......... 4
         2.1.1. Unrestricted Identifiers and Parameters.......... 5
            2.1.1.1. Named Curve............................. 5
            2.1.1.2. Specified Curve.......................... 7
               2.1.1.2.1. Specified Curve Version............... 8
               2.1.1.2.2. Field Identifiers.................... 9
                  2.1.1.2.2.1. Prime-p........................ 9
                  2.1.1.2.2.2. Characteristic-two.............. 10
               2.1.1.2.3. Curve............................. 12
               2.1.1.2.4. Base.............................. 12
               2.1.1.2.5. Hash.............................. 12
         2.1.2. Restricted Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters... 14
      2.2. Subject Public Key............................... 15
   3. KeyUsage Bits....................................... 15
   4. Security Considerations............................... 16
   5. IANA Considerations.................................. 16
   6. References......................................... 16
      6.1. Normative References............................. 16
      6.2. Informative References........................... 17
   Appendix A. ASN.1 Module................................ 17

1. Introduction

   This document specifies the format of the subjectPublicKeyInfo field
   in X.509 certificates [RFC3280] that use Elliptic Curve Cryptography
   (ECC).  This document specifies the encoding formats for public keys
   used with the following ECC algorithms:

      Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA);

      Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) family schemes; and,

      Elliptic Curve Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) family
      schemes.

   Two methods for specifying the algorithms that can be used with the
   subjectPublicKey are defined.  One method does not restrict the
   algorithms the key can be used with while the other method does
   restrict the algorithms the key can be used with.  To promote
   interoperability, this document indicates which is required.




Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 2]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   Three methods for specifying the algorithm's parameters are also
   defined.  One allows for complete specification of the Elliptic Curve
   (EC), one allows for the EC to be identified by an object identifier,
   and one allows for the EC to be inherited from the issuer's
   certificate. To promote interoperability, this document indicates
   which options are required.

   Specification of all EC parameters is complicated with many options.
   To promote interoperability, this document indicates which options
   are required.

1.1. Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Subject Public Key Information Fields

   In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublilcKeyInfo field has the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:

     SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
       algorithm         AlgorithmIdentifier {{ECPKAlgorithms}},
       subjectPublicKey  BIT STRING
     }

   The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:

      algorithm is the algorithm identifier and algorithm parameters
      for the ECC public key.  See paragraph 2.1.

      subjectPublicKey is the ECC public key.  See paragraph 2.2.

   The class ALGORITHM parameterizes the AlgorithmIdentifier type with
   sets of legal values (this class is used in many places in this
   document):

     ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
       &id     OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
       &Type   OPTIONAL
     }
      WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] }

   The type AlgorithmIdentifier is parameterized to allow legal sets of
   values to be specified by constraining the type with an information
   object set. There are two parameterized types for AlgorithmIdentifier


Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 3]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   are defined in this document: ECPKAlgorithms (see paragraph 2.1) and
   HashFunctions (see paragraph 2.1.1.2.5).

     AlgorithmIdentifier {ALGORITHM:IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
       algorithm   ALGORITHM.&id({IOSet}),
       parameters  ALGORITHM.&Type({IOSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
     }

   The fields in AlgorithmIdentifier have the following meaning:

      algorithm identifies a cryptographic algorithm.  The OBJECT
      IDENTIFIER component identifies the algorithm.  The contents of
      the optional parameters field will vary according to the
      algorithm identified.

      parameters, which is optional, varies based on the algorithm
      identified.

2.1. Elliptic Curve Public Key Algorithm Identifier

   The algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure indicates
   the algorithms and any associated parameters for the ECC public key
   (see paragraph 2.2).   The algorithms are restricted to the
   ECPKCAlgorithms parameterized type, which uses the following ASN.1
   structure:

     ECPKAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
       ecPublicKeyType |
       ecDH |
       ecMQV
     }

   The algorithms defined are as follows:

      ecPublicKeyType indicates that the algorithms that can be used
      with the subject public key are not restricted (i.e., they are
      unrestricted).   The key is only restricted by the values
      indicated in the key usage certificate extension.  The
      ecPublicKeyType MUST be supported.  See paragraph 2.1.1. This
      value is also used when a key is used with ECDSA.

      ecDH and ecMQV MAY be supported.  See paragraph 2.1.2.







Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 4]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


2.1.1. Unrestricted Identifiers and Parameters

   The "unrestricted" algorithm is defined as follows:

    ecPublicKeyType ALGORITHM ::= {
       OID id-ecPublicKey PARMS ECParameters }

   The algorithm identifier is:

     id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }

   The parameters for id-ecPublicKey are as follows:

     ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
       namedCurve      CURVE.&id({NamedCurve}),
       specifiedCuve   SpecifiedCurve,
       implicitCurve   NULL
     }

   The fields in ECParameters have the following meanings:

      namedCurve allows all the required values for a particular set of
      elliptic curve domain parameters to be represented by an object
      identifier.  This choice MUST be supported. See paragraph
      2.1.1.1.

      specifiedCurve allows all of the required values to be explicitly
      specified.  This choice MAY be supported, and if it is
      implicitCurve MUST also be supported.  See paragraph 2.1.1.2.

      implicitCurve allows the elliptic curve parameters to be
      inherited from the issuer's certificate.  This choice MAY be
      supported, but if subordinate certificates use the same
      namedCurve as their superior, then the subordinate certificate
      MUST use the namedCurve option. That is implicitCurve is only
      supported if the superior doesn't use the namedCurve option.

2.1.1.1. Named Curve

   The namedCurve field in ECParamaters uses the class CURVE to
   constrain the set of legal values from NamedCurve, which are object
   identifiers:

     CURVE ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE }
       WITH SYNTAX { ID &id }



Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 5]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   The NamedCurve parameterized type is defined as follows:

     NamedCurve CURVE ::= {
      { ID secp192r1 } | { ID sect163k1 } | { ID sect163r2 } |
      { ID secp224r1 } | { ID sect233k1 } | { ID sect233r1 } |
      { ID secp256r1 } | { ID sect283k1 } | { ID sect283r1 } |
      { ID secp384r1 } | { ID sect409k1 } | { ID sect409r1 } |
      { ID secp521r1 } | { ID sect571k1 } | { ID sect571r1 } |
      ... -- Extensible
     }

   The curve identifiers are the fifteen NIST recommended curves:

   secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     ansi-x9-62 curves(3) prime(1) 1 }

   sect163k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 1 }

   sect163r2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 15 }

   secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 }

   sect233k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 26 }

   sect233r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 27 }

   secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     ansi-x9-62 curves(3) prime(1) 7 }

   sect283k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 16 }

   sect283r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 17 }

   secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 }

   sect409k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 36 }




Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 6]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   sect409r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 37 }

   secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 }

   sect571k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 38 }

   sect571r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 39 }

2.1.1.2. Specified Curve

   The specified field in ECParameters is the SpecifiedCurve type.
   SpecifiedCurve uses the following ASN.1 structure:

     SpecifiedCurve ::= SEQUENCE {
       version  SpecifiedCurveVersion
                      ( ecpVer1 | ecpVer2 | ecpVer3 ),
       fieldID  FieldID {{FieldTypes}},
       curve    Curve,            -- Curve E
       base     ECPoint,          -- Base point P
       order    INTEGER,          -- Order n of the base point
       cofactor INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- The integer h = #E(Fq)/n
       hash     HashAlgorithm OPTIONAL,
       ...                        -- Extensible
     }

   The fields in SpecifiedCurve have the following meaning:

      version specifies the version number of the elliptic curve
      parameters.  See paragraph 2.1.1.2.1.

      fieldID identifies the finite field over which the elliptic
      curve, specified in the curve field, is defined.  See paragraph
      2.1.1.2.2.

      curve specifies the elliptic curve E.  See paragraph 2.1.1.2.3.

      base specifies the base point P of the elliptic curve E,
      specified in the curve field.  See paragraph 2.1.1.2.4.

      order specifies the order n of the base point P, specified in
      base.




Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 7]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


      cofactor is the order of the curve, specified in the curve field,
      divided by the order, specified in the order field, of the base
      point, specified in the base field (i.e., h = #E(Fq)/n).
      Inclusion of the cofactor is optional; however, it is strongly
      RECOMMENDED that that the cofactor be included in order to
      facilitate interoperability between implementations.

      hash is the hash algorithm used to generate the elliptic curve E,
      specified in the curve field, and/or base point P, specified in
      the base field, verifiably psuedorandomly.  If the hash field is
      omitted, then the hash algorithm shall be SHA1.  See paragraph
      2.1.1.2.5.

   SpecifiedCurve is extensible and other documents may specify
   additional fields for this ASN.1 structure.

2.1.1.2.1. Specified Curve Version

   The version field in SpecifiedCurve is the SpecifiedCurveVersion
   type.  SpecifiedCurveVersion uses the following ASN.1 structure:

     SpecifiedCurveVersion ::= INTEGER {
       ecpVer1(1),
       ecpVer2(2),
       ecpVer3(3),
       ... -- Extensible
     }

   SpecfifiedCurveVersion is ecdpVer1, ecdpVer2, or ecdpVer3.  If
   version is ecdpVer1, then the elliptic curve may or may not be
   verifiably psuedorandomly according to whether curve.seed (see
   paragraph 2.1.1.2.3) is present, and the base point G (see paragraph
   2.1.1.2.4) is not generated verifiably psuedorandomly. If version is
   ecdpVer2, then the curve and the base point G shall be generated
   verifiably psuedorandomly, and curve.seed shall be present. If
   version is ecdpVer3, then the curve is not generated verifiably
   psuedorandomly but the base point G shall be generated verifiably
   psuedorandomly from curve.seed, which shall be present.

   SpecifiedCurveVersion is extensible and other documents can specify
   additional values for SpecifiedCurveVersion.

   Implementations of this document MUST support ecpVer1.






Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 8]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


2.1.1.2.2. Field Identifiers

   The fieldID field in SpecifiedCurve is the FieldID type. Finite
   fields are represented by values of the parameterized type FieldID,
   constrained to the values of the objects defined in the information
   object set FieldTypes.

   The type FIELD-ID is defined by the following:

     FIELD-ID ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

   The FieldID parameterized type is defined as follows:

     FieldID { FIELD-ID:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
       fieldType FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}),
       parameters FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType})
     }

   Field types are given in the following information object set:

     FieldTypes FIELD-ID ::= {
       { Prime-p IDENTIFIED BY prime-field } |
       { Characteristic-two IDENTIFIED BY characteristic-two-field } |
       ... -- Extensible
     }

   Two FieldTypes defined herein: prime-p (see paragraph 2.1.1.2.2.1)
   and characteristic-two (see paragraph 2.1.1.2.2.2).  Implementations
   claiming conformance to this specification MUST support the prime-p
   field type and MAY support the characteristic-two field type.
   FieldTypes is extensible and other documents can specify additional
   values for FieldTypes.

2.1.1.2.2.1. Prime-p

   A prime finite field is specified in FieldID.fieldType by the
   following object identifier:

     prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) fieldType(1) 1 }

   The prime finite field parameters specified in FIELD-ID parameters
   has the following ASN.1 structure:

     Prime-p ::= INTEGER

   Prime-p is an integer which is the size of the field.


Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                  [Page 9]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


2.1.1.2.2.2. Characteristic-two

   A characteristic-two finite field is specified in FieldID.fieldType
   by the following object identifier:

     characteristic-two-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) fieldType(1) 2 }

   The characteristic-two finite field parameters specified in
   FieldID.parameters have the following ASN.1 structure:

     Characteristic-two ::= SEQUENCE {
       m INTEGER, -- Field size 2^m
       basis CHARACTERISTIC-TWO.&id({BasisTypes}),
       parameters CHARACTERISTIC-TWO.&Type({BasisTypes}{@basis})
     }

   The fields in Characteristic-two have the following meanings:

      m is the size of the field.

      basis is the type of basis used to express elements of the field.

      parameters is the polynomial used to generate the field.  The
      parameters vary based on the basis.

   The type CHARACTERISTIC-TWO is defined by the following:

     CHARACTERISTIC-TWO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

   The characteristic-two field basis types are given in the following
   information object set:

     BasisTypes CHARACTERISTIC-TWO ::= {
       { NULL        IDENTIFIED BY gnBasis } |
       { Trinomial   IDENTIFIED BY tpBasis } |
       { Pentanomial IDENTIFIED BY ppBasis } |
       ...  -- Extensible
     }

   Three basis types are defined herein: normal bases, trinomial bases,
   and pentanomial bases.  Implementation claiming conformance to this
   document MUST support normal basis and MAY support trimonial and
   pentanomial bases.  BasisTypes is extensible and other documents can
   specify additional values for BasisTypes.




Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 10]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   Normal bases are specified in the basis field by the object
   identifier:

     gnBasis OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) fieldType(2)
       characteristic-two-basis(2) 1 }

   A normal base has NULL parameters.

   A trinomial base specifies the degree of the middle term in the
   defining trinomial. A trinomial base is identified in the basis field
   by the object identifier:

     tpBasis OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) fieldType(2)
       characteristic-two-basis(2) 2 }

   A trinomial base has the following parameters:

     Trinomial ::= INTEGER

   A pentanomial base specifies the degrees of the three middle terms in
   the defining pentanomial.  A pentaomial base is identified in the
   basis field by the object identifier:

     ppBasis OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) fieldType(2)
       characteristic-two-basis(2) 3 }

   A pentanomial base has the following parameters:

     Pentanomial ::= SEQUENCE {
       k1 INTEGER, -- k1 > 0
       k2 INTEGER, -- k2 > k1
       k3 INTEGER  -- k3 > k2
     }













Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 11]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


2.1.1.2.3. Curve

   The curve field in SpecifiedCurve is the Curve type.  Curve uses the
   following ASN.1 structure:

     Curve ::= SEQUENCE {
       a     FieldElement,
       b     FieldElement,
       seed  BIT STRING OPTIONAL
       -- Shall be present if used in SpecifiedCurve
       -- with version of ecdpVer2 or ecdpVer3
     }

     FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING

   The fields in Curve have the following meanings:

      a and b are the coefficients a and b, respectively, of the
      elliptic curve E. Each coefficient, a and b, shall be represented
      as a value of type FieldElement.  Conversion routines for field
      element to octet string are found in [SEC1]. Note that these
      octet strings may represent an elliptic curve point in compressed
      or uncompressed form.  Implementations that support elliptic
      curve according to this document MUST support the uncompressed
      form and MAY support the compressed form.

      seed is an optional parameter that is used to derive the
      coefficients of a randomly generated elliptic curve.  seed MUST
      be present if SpecifiedECDomain is either ecdpVer2 or ecdpVer3.

2.1.1.2.4. Base

   The base field in SpecifiedCurve is the ECPoint type.  ECPoint uses
   the following ASN.1 syntax:

     ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

   The contents of ECPoint is the octet string representation of an
   elliptic curve point.  Conversion routines for point to octet string
   are found in [SEC1].

2.1.1.2.5. Hash

   The hash field in SpecifiedCurve is the HashAlgorithm type.
   HashAlgorithm use the following ASN.1 syntax:

     HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{HashFunctions}}


Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 12]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   HashAlgorithm is restricted to the HashFunctions parameterized type,
   which uses the following ASN.1 structure:

     HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
       sha1   |
       sha224 |
       sha256 |
       sha384 |
       sha512 |
       ... -- Extensible
     }

   The SHA1 [SHA2] algorithm is defined as follows:

     sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {
       OID id-sha1 PARMS NULL }

   The algorithm identifier is:

      id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
        algorithm(2) 26 }

   The SHA224 [SHA2] algorithm is defined as follows:

     sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {
       OID id-sha224 PARMS NULL }

   It has the following object identifier:

     id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
       csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }

   The SHA256 [SHA2] algorithm is defined as follows:

     sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-sha256 PARMS NULL }

   The algorithm identifier is:

     id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
       csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }





Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 13]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   The SHA384 [SHA2] algorithm is defined as follows:

     sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {
       OID id-sha384 PARMS NULL }

   The algorithm identifier is:

     id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
       csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }

   The SHA512 [SHA2] algorithm is defined as follows:

     sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {
       OID id-sha512 PARMS NULL }

   The algorithm identifier is:

     id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
        csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }

   An implementation of this document SHOULD accept values of the
   parameterized type HashAlgorithm that have no parameters (also called
   absent) and values that have NULL parameters. These values SHALL be
   treated equally. (Of course, future extensions to the type parameter
   HashFunctions might include information objects whose parameters
   field is more meaningful.) An implementation of this document SHOULD
   omit (leave absent) the parameters unless the recipient
   implementation is unable to process absent parameters correctly.

2.1.2. Restricted Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters

   Algorithms used with EC fall in to different categories: signature
   and key agreement algorithms.  ECDSA uses the ecPublicKey described
   in 2.1.1. Two sets of key agreement algorithms are identified herein:
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme and
   Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key agreement scheme. All
   algorithms are identified by an OID and have PARMS.  The OID varies
   based on the algorithm but the PARMS are always ECParameters (see
   paragraph 2.1.1).

   The ECDH is defined as follows:

     ecDH ALGORITHM ::= {
       OID TBD PARMS ECParameters }



Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 14]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   The algorithm identifier is:

     TBD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       TBD }

   The ECMQV is defined as follows:

     ecMQV ALGORITHM ::= {
       OID TBD PARMS ECParameters }

   The algorithm identifier is:

     TBD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
       TBD }

2.2. Subject Public Key

   The subjectPublicKey from SubjectPublicKeyInfo is the ECC public key.
   Implementations that support elliptic curve according to this
   document MUST support the uncompressed form and MAY support the
   compressed form of the ECC public key.  As specified in [SEC1]:

      The first two bytes of the key indicate whether the key is
      compressed or uncompressed.

      The elliptic curve public key (a value of type ECPoint which is
      an OCTET STRING) is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a value of type
      BIT STRING) as follows: the most significant bit of the OCTET
      STRING value becomes the most significant bit of the BIT STRING
      value, and so on; the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING
      becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING.

3. KeyUsage Bits

   If the keyUsage extension is present in a CA certificate that
   indicates id-ecPublicKey in subjectPublicKeyInfo, any combination of
   the following values MAY be present:

     digitalSignature;
     nonRepudiation;
     keyAgreement;
     keyCertSign; and
     cRLSign.

   If the CA certificate keyUsage extension asserts keyAgreement then it
   MAY assert either encipherOnly or decipherOnly.  However, this



Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 15]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   specification RECOMMENDS that if keyCertSign or cRLSign is present,
   keyAgreement, encipherOnly, and decipherOnly SHOULD NOT be present.

   If the keyUsage extension is present in an EE certificate that
   indicates id-ecPublicKey in subjectPublicKeyInfo, any combination of
   the following values MAY be present:

     digitalSignature;
     nonRepudiation; and
     keyAgreement.

   If the EE certificate keyUsage extension asserts keyAgreement then it
   MAY assert either encipherOnly or decipherOnly.  However, this
   specification RECOMMENDS that if cRLSign is present, then
   keyAgreement, encipherOnly, and decipherOnly SHOULD NOT be present.

   If the keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that indicates
   ecDH or ecMQV in subjectPublicKeyInfo, keyAgreement MUST be present
   and digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyTransport, keyCertSign, and
   cRLSign MUST NOT be present. If this certificate keyUsage extension
   asserts keyAgreement then it MAY assert either encipherOnly or
   decipherOnly.

4. Security Considerations

   The security considerations in [RFC3279] apply. No new security
   considerations are introduced by this document.

5. IANA Considerations

   None.  Please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
               X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
               Certification Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
               April 2002.

   [SHA2]      National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
               FIPS Publication 180-2: Secure Hash Standard, 1 August
               2002.


Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 16]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


   [SEC1]      Standards for Efficient Cryptography, "SEC 1: Elliptic
               Curve Cryptography", Version 1.0, September 2000.

   [X.680]     ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology -
               Abstract Syntax Notation One, 1997.

   [X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology - Abstract
               Syntax Notation One: Information Object Spcification,
               1997.

6.2. Informative References

   [RFC3279]   Polk, W., Housley, R. and L. Bassham, "Algorithm
               Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
               Infrastructure", RFC 3279, April 2002.

Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

   Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.680,X.681].

   To Be Supplied Later


























Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 17]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


Author's Addresses

   Sean Turner

   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA 22031
   USA

   EMail: turners@ieca.com

   Kelvin Yiu

   Microsoft
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052-6399
   USA

   Email: kelviny@microsoft.com

   Daniel R. L. Brown

   Certicom Corp
   5520 Explorer Drive #400
   Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
   CANADA

   EMail: dbrown@certicom.com

   Russ Housley

   Vigil Security, LLC
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA 20170
   USA

   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com

   Tim Polk

   NIST
   Building 820, Room 426
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899
   USA

   EMail:  wpolk@nist.gov



Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 18]


Internet-Draft      ECC SubjectPublicKeyInfo Format       January 2008


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





Turner, et al.          Expires July 22, 2008                 [Page 19]