PKIX WG S. Farrell
Internet-Draft Trinity College Dublin
Intended status: Experimental September 29, 2008
Expires: April 2, 2009
Other Certificates Extension
draft-ietf-pkix-other-certs-01
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Abstract
Some applications that associate state information with public key
certificates can benefit from a way to link together a set of
certificates belonging to the same end entity that can safely be
considered to be equivalent for the purposes of referencing that
application state information. This memo defines a certificate
extension that allows applications to establish the required linkage
without introducing a new application protocol data unit.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. A Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Other Certificates Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Another Approach using Permanent Identifiers . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
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1. Introduction
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
RFC 5280 [RFC5280] defines a profile for the use of public key
certificates for Internet applications. If an application associates
application state information with a public key certificate, then
that association may be disrupted if the end entity changes its
public key certificate. Such disruption can occur due to renewals or
if the end entity changes its certificate issuer. Similarly, if the
end entity is actually a distributed system, where each instance has
a different private key, then the relying party (RP) has no way to
assoicate the different public key certificates with the relevant
application state information.
For example, assume a web browser retains state information (perhaps
passwords) about a web site, indexed (possibly indirectly) via values
contained in the web server's public key certificate (perhaps a DNS
name). When the web server certificate expires, and a new certifiate
is acquired (perhaps with a different DNS name), then the browser
cannot safely map the new certificate to the relevant state
information.
This memo defines a new public key certificate extension that
supports such linkage.
Other than the issuer asserting that the set of certificates belong
to the same end entity for use with the same application, the fine-
detail of the semantics of the linkage of certifcates is not defined
here, since that is a matter for application developers and the
operators of certification authorities (CAs). In particular we do
not define how a CA can validate that the same end entity is the
holder of the various private keys, nor how the application should
make use of this information. Nor do we define what kinds of state
information may be shared.
2. A Use Case
Public key certificates expire, typically about a year after they are
created. Some applications might need to know that the same entity
is the subject of this certificate and a previously used certificate.
For example, if a web server certificate expires, it could be useful
for a web browser to know that the server currently presenting a
certificate in a TLS [RFC5246] handshake represents the same web
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server that previously presented a certificate. This could be used
for example to allow the browser to automatically fill in form fields
for the server in question, even if the server certificate has been
replaced. While the same effect can be achieved based on the use of
the same issuer and subject fields in a certificate there could be
security issues involved in such comparisons, e.g. if the subject
name includes a DNS name and the ownership of that DNS domain has
changed.
The use of the new extension provides a way for the CA to signal to
the application that the same end entity is involved, regardless of
name changes. The new extension could also allow the web site
operator to more easily change CA when renewing its certificate.
3. Other Certificates Extension
This section defines the syntax for the other certificates extension.
The new extension is simply a list of references to the linked
certificates. The references make use of the SCVPCertID structure
from the SCVP [RFC5055] protocol which contains a hash over the
relevant certificate and the certificate's issuer and serial number.
When this extension is present the CA is asserting that the same end
entity is the subject of the relevant certificates.
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
id-pe-otherCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::== { id-pe 19 }
OtherCertificates ::= SEQUENCE OF SCVPCertID
CAs MUST only issue certificates containing this extension where the
links created are such that the relevant consumers of the
certificates can safely make use of those links. This will typically
be the case where the certificates are only used by a single
application. CAs MUST NOT issue certificates that link to
certificates issued for a different purpose, for example, a CA SHOULD
NOT link a web server certificate to a VPN gateway certificate
(unless those can be the same, which might occur for some embedded
devices).
Applications MUST validate certificates according to the rules
specified in RFC 5280 [RFC5280], and MUST NOT assume that because
certficates are linked, that they are therefore valid. This means of
course that both certificates must chain up to some local trust
point(s).
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If an application imposes further checks on certificate validity
(e.g. as is done in RFC 2818 [RFC2818] for web server certificates),
then both certificates MUST be valid according to those application
specific rules.
It is NOT REQUIRED that two linked certificates are both
simultaneously valid. For example, an application can validate
certificate1 and cache that information. When the application is
subsequently presented with certificate2 (linked back to
certificate1), if it considers the cached information about
certificate1 trustworthy, then it can validate certificate2, and use
the linkage to associate certificate2 with the relevant application
state information. (Just as it would have done had certificate1 been
re-presented.) As a second example, if certificate1 has expired, but
would otherwise be valid, then the linkage from certificate2 can also
be used once certificate2 has been validated.
If the application checks certificate status for the certificates in
question, and any of the certificates concerned has been revoked,
then the linkage MUST NOT be used.
Note that there are no constraints on the contents of the certificate
to which the link "points." The consequence is that the CA issuing
the new certificate can link back to legacy certificates of all
kinds, once the relevant RP supports this extension.
This extension MUST only be used in end-entity certificates, that is,
it MUST NOT be used in CA certificates or other similar certificates.
[Editor's note: I think this is safest, and shouldn't cause a
problem, but also think it might not be necessary. However, as an
experimental track spec. its probably best to be cautious. I'd
welcome suggestions for a better way to phrase this.]
4. Another Approach using Permanent Identifiers
RFC 4043 [RFC4043] defines a new name form (a "Permanent Identifier"
or PI) for public key certificates that supports similar
functionality to the new extension defined here. If two certificates
have the same PI and that PI form is globally unique, then the end-
entities involved can be considered to be the same.
The main difference between the PI and the other certificates
extension is that, (when more than one CA is involved), PI requires a
globally unique identifier, whereas the other certificates extension
only requires that the issuer of the new certificate be able to link
back to the old certificate(s).
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As a consequence the other certificates extension can be deployed
"reactively" to link certificates that may not match "ideal"
application naming requirements. If the old certificate did make use
of PI, then presumably application naming issues have already been
handled, and then the new certificate can contain the same PI. In
this latter case there would be no need for the other certificates
extension.
5. Acknowledgements
The use case motivating this was contributed to the W3C web security
context (WSC) working group by Tyler Close. See
http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/wiki/SafeWebFormEditor for details.
6. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
7. Security Considerations
As stated above, relying parties MUST validate any certificates per
the algorithm given in RFC 5280 [RFC5280] before making any use of
those certificates.
Relying parties similarly MUST NOT assume that any other fields in
the relevant certificates have common values. For example, linked
certificates might have non-overlapping key usage extensions.
Since the issuer of the new certificate (or some superior CA) is
trusted by the RP, and the RP has validated the new certificate, the
RP is basically as reliant on the proper operation of that CA as
always - if the CA wished to "cheat" on the RP the other certificates
extension simply provides a new way to do that, but one that is
equivalent to existing vulnerabilities. In many cases such a bad CA
could simply issue a new certificate that is identical in all
respects (other than the key pair) and the RP would accept the
identity contained in that new certificate.
[Editor's note: The NC issue below was pointed out by Steve Kent. It
probably needs to be better described, and needs more thought as
well, e.g is it a real problem? are there other constraints that
might produce similar results? is there a general way to avoid the
problem if it is one?]
However, if the issuer of the new certificate is limited in some way
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(e.g. via a name constraint in a superior CA certificate), and if the
old certificate doesn't match those limitations (e.g. the subject of
the old certificate doesn't fit under the name constraints of the
issuer of the new certificate), then the new certificate could be
linked back to an identity that doesn't meet the constraints intended
to be imposed on the issuer of the new certificate. Applications for
which this is an unacceptable risk SHOULD NOT make use of the other
certificates extension.
[Editor's note: More TBD no doubt.]
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC4043] Pinkas, D. and T. Gindin, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Permanent Identifier", RFC 4043, May 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
PKIX OID registrations may be viewed at:
http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/pkix-oid.asn
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PKIXOtherCertsModule
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 44 }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS
-- From [RFC5055]
SCVPCertID
FROM SCVP { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 21 } ;
-- The one and only new thing, a new certificate extension
id-pe-otherCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 19 }
-- The value is a sequence of cert ids.
OtherCertificates ::= SEQUENCE OF SCVPCertID
END
Author's Address
Stephen Farrell
Trinity College Dublin
Department of Computer Science
Trinity College
Dublin, 2
Ireland
Phone: +353-1-896-1761
Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
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