PKIX Working Group S. Santesson (Accurata)
Internet Draft W. Polk (NIST)
P. Gloeckner (GMD)
expires August 3, 1999 February 3, 1999
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Qualified Certificates
<draft-ietf-pkix-qc-00.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This Internet-Draft forms a certificate profile for Qualified
Certificates, based on RFC 2459, for use in the Internet. In this
document the term Qualified Certificate is used to describe a
certificate which is aimed to support digital signatures in a context
which is considered functionally equivalent to the use of handwritten
signatures.
This is the first official PKIX WG draft; two unofficial drafts
labeled <draft-ietf-santesson-qc-0x.txt> were previously distributed
on the list for comments.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org mail
list.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................ 4
2 Requirements and Assumptions ................................ 4
2.1 Properties ................................................ 5
2.2 Legal Framework ........................................... 5
2.3 Statement of Purpose ...................................... 6
2.4 Policy Issues ............................................. 6
2.5 Uniqueness of names ........................................ 7
3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile .............. 7
3.1 Basic Certificate Fields .................................. 7
3.1.1 Issuer .................................................. 8
3.1.2 Subject ................................................. 8
3.2 Certificate Fields ........................................ 10
3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name ................................ 10
3.2.2 Certificate Policies .................................... 13
3.2.3 Key Usage ............................................... 13
4 Security Considerations ..................................... 13
5 References .................................................. 14
6 Intellectual Property Right .................................. 14
Appendix A. ASN.1 definitions ................................. 15
A.1 1988 ASN.1 definitions .................................... 15
A.2 1998 ASN.1 definitions .................................... 17
Appendix B. Author Addresses .................................. 19
Appendix C. Full Copyright Statement .......................... 20
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1 Introduction
This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. The standard is
based on RFC 2459, which defines underlying certificate formats and
semantics needed for full implementation of this standard.
The standard profiles the format for a specific type of certificates
named Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates, its
functional relations to legal frameworks and the assumptions that
affects the scope of this document are defined in section 2.
Section 3 defines requirements on information content in Qualified
Certificates. This profile addresses two fields in the basic certi-
ficate as well as three certificate extensions. The certificate
fields are the subject and issuer fields. The certificate extensions
are subject alternative name, certificate policies, and key usage.
In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to
clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are
assumed to be utilized. Section 5 contains the references.
Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 structures which are not
already defined in RFC 2459. Appendix B contains Authors Addresses
and Appendix C contains the IETF Copyright Statement.
It should be noted that this specification does not define the
specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and does not define the
policies that should be used with them. That is, this document
defines what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but
not what that information means. A system that uses Qualified Certi-
ficates must define its own semantics for the information in Quali-
fied Certificates. It is expected that laws and corporate policies
will make these definitions.
2 Requirements and Assumptions
The term Qualified Certificates is defined in this section with the
only purpose to clarify the scope of this standard. The actual
mechanisms that will decide whether a certificate should or should
not be considered qualified to meet this definition or whether this
definition is relevant for a particular certificate or service, are
outside the scope of this standard.
In this context the term Qualified Certificate defines a certificate
which has the properties defined in section 2.1, fall within the
legal assumptions in section 2.2, and have the primary purpose of
identifying a person with high level of assurance in non-repudiation
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services, which may protect considerable values.
Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential
within several aspects that falls outside the scope of RFC 2459. The
most important aspects that affects the scope of this specification
are:
- Definition of names and identity information in order to identify
the associated subject in a uniform way.
- Definition of information which identifies the jurisdiction under
which the CA operates when issuing a particular certificate.
- Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified Certificates.
- Requirements for critical extensions.
2.1 Properties
A Qualified Certificate as defined in this standard is assumed to
have the following properties:
- Issued by a CA that makes a public statement that the certificate
serves the purpose of a Qualified Certificate, as discussed in sec-
tion 2.3
- Indicate a certificate policy consistent with liabilities, prac-
tices and procedures undertaken by the CA, as discussed in 2.4
- Be issued to a natural person (living human being).
- Contain an unmistakable identity based on a pseudonym name or a
real name of the subject.
- Exclusively indicates non-repudiation key usage for the certified
public key.
- Fully complies with the certificate profile defined in RFC 2459
2.2 Legal framework
The evidence value and thereby the expected legal status of a digital
signature is highly dependent on the quality of the signers certifi-
cate as well as the properties of the signature service used to
create and verify the signature.
Current national and local laws in general covers the area of agree-
ments and signatures, regardless of whether they appear in a physical
or digital context. There is however a great uncertainty how tradi-
tional law will be applied to the relatively new digital techniques.
A key factor for the legal status of digital signatures is whether
they are used in a context where they are to be considered "function-
ally equivalent" to handwritten signatures.
A common characteristic for emerging legal frameworks regarding digi-
tal signatures is thus to identify some minimum requirements on
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certificates which are qualified to support digital signatures in a
context which is considered to be "functional equivalent" with
handwritten signatures. These requirements may emphasize different
aspects of certificate issuance and maintenance such as the routines
for identifying the key holder, revocation routines, liabilities of
key holders and CAs, accreditation of CAs and information content in
certificates.
2.3 Statement of Purpose
For a certificate to serve the purpose of supporting digital signa-
tures that are legally compatible with handwritten signatures, it is
assumed that the CA will have to make a public statement which states
this purpose, presumably published in a CPS.
The shape of this statement may depend on the governing law under
which the CA is operating but in general it is assumed that the CA at
least will have to include in its statement that the certificate:
- is aimed to be used for verification of digital signatures in a
context where they are considered "functional equivalent" to hand
written signatures and;
- meets all requirements, according to the law under which the CA is
operating, necessary to support this "functional equivalence".
The legal effects of this statement will be dependent on the applica-
ble governing law under which the CA is operating. Within locales
with no specific regulations concerning digital signatures, the
statement will only be a declaration of the suitable area of use of
the certificate. In locales where regulations are extensive and
specific the statement will be a declaration that the certificate
complies with all these regulations.
The function of the statement is thus to assist any concerned entity
in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting signa-
tures based on a particular certificate.
2.4 Policy Issues
Certain policy aspects defines the context in which the profile is to
be understood and used. It is however outside the scope of this pro-
file to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern ser-
vices that issues or utilizes certificates according to this profile.
It is however assumed that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a
publicly available certificate policy which is consistent with its
liabilities, practices and procedures.
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2.5 Uniqueness of names
In this draft requirements on name uniqueness are specified by the
terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the
following meaning:
Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a
representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that iden-
tifies a particular object from among the set of all objects. An
object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented
by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its
object entry would have had if it were represented in the Directory.
In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name
denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is
unambiguous within a certain domain that forms either a real or a
virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree)[X.501]. In the case of sub-
ject names the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain of
the CA.
An unmistakable identity denotes a set of attributes and/or data ele-
ments which forms an identity which by unmistakable means relates to
a specific entity. The unmistakable connection between the identity
and the entity may be dependent on the context within which the name
is formed. This context should though be evident for any relying
party given the information in the certificate. Some contexts, such
as when identities are based on pseudonym names, may require assis-
tance from the CA or a registration authority, to obtain a
corresponding officially registered identity under some predefined
circumstances, such as investigation of criminal offence.
3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile
This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates. The pro-
file is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459 which in
turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format. For full implementation
of this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying
formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459.
ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by
RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix B.
3.1 Basic Certificate Fields
This specification provides additional detail regarding the contents
of two fields in the basic certificate. These fields are the issuer
and subject fields.
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3.1.1 Issuer
The issuer field SHALL contain an unmistakable identity of the organ-
ization responsible for the certificate which SHALL include a
registered name of the organization.
The unmistakable identity SHOULD be evident through examination of
the present values of the following attribute types:
domainComponent;
countryName;
stateOrProvinceName;
organizationName;
commonName; and
dNQualifier.
Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary
to identify the issuing organization.
The legal jurisdiction for the issuing CA SHOULD be consistent with
the issuer name.
It should be noted, however, that a relying party MAY have to consult
identified certificate policies and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to
determine semantics of name fields and legal jurisdiction.
3.1.2 Subject
The subject field SHALL contain a distinguished name of the subject
(see 2.5 for definition of distinguished name)
An unmistakable identity (see 2.5) of the subject(based on registered
name or a pseudonym name) SHALL be present in the certificate in the
subject field and/or the PersonalData field in the subjectAltName
extension (see 3.2.1.)
If the PersonalData field is empty, the unmistakable identity of the
subject is determined by just the subject field. If the PersonalData
field is present, it SHALL contain a complete unmistakable identity
of the subject. In this case the subject field SHALL still contain a
complete distinguished name.
The subject field SHALL include one of the following choices of sets
of mandatory attributes:
Choice I: countryName commonName
Choice II: countryName givenName surname
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The distinguished name of the subject MAY also be specified by the
following attributes: dNQualifier; organizationName; organiza-
tionalUnitName; and postalAddress. Other attributes may be present
but MUST NOT be necessary to distinguish the subject name from other
subject names within the issuer domain.
The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not
necessarily match the subject's country of citizenship or country of
residence, nor does it have to match the country of issuance.
The commonName attribute value when present, SHALL contain a name of
the subject. This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation for-
mat, or a format preferred by the CA, or some other format. Pseu-
donyms, nicknames and names with spelling other than defined by the
registered name MAY be used. To understand the nature of the name
presented in commonName, complying applications may have to examine
present values of the givenName and surname attributes and if neces-
sary, the personal data field in the subjectAltName extension.
The givenName and surname attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
the registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which
the CA prepares the certificate. These attributes SHALL be present in
the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present.
The organizationName attribute type and the organizationalUnitName
attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and
relevant information of an organization with which the subject is
associated. The association between the organization and the subject
is beyond the scope of this document.
The postalAddress attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to
store an address with which the subject is associated. If an organ-
izationName value also is present then the postalAddress attribute
value SHALL be associated with the specified organization. The asso-
ciation between the postalAddress and either the subject or the
organizationName is beyond the scope of this document.
The dNQualifier attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to dif-
ferentiate between two people where the subject field would otherwise
be identical. This qualifier has no defined semantics beyond ensur-
ing uniqueness of subject names. It MAY contain a number or code
assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a government or civil
authority. It is the CA's responsibility to ensure that the dNQual-
ifier is sufficient to resolve any subject name ambiguities.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes
named in this section.
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3.2 Certificate Extensions
This specification provides additional detail regarding the contents
of three certificate extensions. These extensions are the subject
alternative name, certificate policies, and key usage extensions.
3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name
This section defines a new Object Identifier and data structure in
the form of a PersonalData field to be in the OtherName subfield of
the subjectAltName extension. This field may be used to construct a
unique name from personal attributes of the subject. This data may
be useful to a relying party in identifying the person that is the
subject of the certificate.
If the subjectAltName extension contain this PersonalData field, it
SHALL contain the unmistakable identity of the subject (see 2.5). The
subject field is still required to hold a distinguished name (within
issuer domain) as defined in section 3.1.2.
PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecord SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }
PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute}
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType,
values SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeType ::= ATTRIBUTE.&id
AttributeValue ::= ATTRIBUTE.&Type
ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS {
&derivation ATTRIBUTE OPTIONAL,
&single-valued BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type }
WITH SYNTAX {
SUBTYPE OF &derivation
WITH SYNTAX &Type
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SINGLE VALUE &single-valued
ID &id }
The optional registrationAuthority component SHALL when present, be
used to hold at least one name of the authority within which attri-
bute values are registered.
The registrationAuthority component in the PersonalData and the Per-
sonalDataRecord structure allow to specify multiple registration
authorities, responsible for different attributes. If the registra-
tionAuthority field of the PersonalData structure is set, it serves
as the default value for subordinate PersonalDataRecord structures
with an empty registrationAuthority value.
The optional attributeSemantics component SHALL when present, be used
to hold at least one OID which defines the semantics of present
attribute values. Each OID may define any set of rules and semantics
for any set of attributes. The attributeSemantics value may guide
applications how to understand and present different attribute
values. This value may also serve to provide the context within which
certain attribute values are meant to be unique, thereby providing a
guaranteed uniqueness for the whole PersonalData structure.
The optional attributeSemantics component in the PersonalData and the
PersonalDataRecord structure allow to specify multiple object iden-
tifiers, describing the semantics for different attribute values. If
the attributeSemantics field of the PersonalData structure is set, it
serves as the default value for subordinate PersonalData structures
with an empty attributeSemantics value.
Complying applications SHALL expect any subset of the following
defined attribute types within a PersonalDataRecord:
countryName;
givenName;
surname;
pseudonym;
dNQualifier;
dateOfBirth;
placeOfBirth;
gender;
postalAddress;
countryOfCitizenship; and
countryOfResidence.
The PersonalData field may also contain any additional attributes,
subject to local definitions, but they shall not be necessary to
determine an unmistakable identity of the subject.
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Attribute values SHALL be consistent with attribute values stored in
the subject field. (I.e., the subject field and the PersonalData
field may contain different values as long as these values are not in
conflict.)
The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not
necessarily match the subject's country of citizenship or country of
residence, nor does it have to match the country of issuance.
The givenName and surname attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
a registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which
the CA prepares the certificate.
The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym
name of the subject. The pseudonym name SHALL be a registered by a
registration authority, responsible for holding the identity of the
real physical person related to the pseudonym. When this attribute is
used the CA is the default registration authority if no other regis-
trationAuthority value, related to the pseudonym attribute, is
present in the PersonalData field.
The dNQualifier attribute SHALL, when present, be used to store a
local registration identifier of the subject, such as a drivers
license or government aid registration. Note that the value of this
field may contain digits, alphabetic characters, and punctuation.
The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, hold the value of the
date of birth of the subject. The manner in which the date of birth
is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, hold the value of the
place of birth of the subject. The manner in which the place of birth
is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The gender attribute SHALL, when present, hold the value of the
gender of the subject. For females the value "F" and for males the
value "M" have to be used. The manner in which the gender is associ-
ated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The postalAddress attribute SHALL, when present, hold the value of an
address with which the subject is associated. This value SHALL be
associated with the subject as a private address even if the pos-
talAddress attribute value in the subject field is associated with an
organization. The manner in which the postalAddress is associated
with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, be used to
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hold the identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed country
of citizenship at the time that the certificate is created. If the
subject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country
MAY be present. Determination of citizenship is a matter of law and
is outside the scope of this document.
The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, hold the value
of at least one country in which the subject is resident. If the sub-
ject is a resident of more than one country, more than one country
MAY be present. Determination of residence is a matter of law and is
outside the scope of this document.
3.2.2 Certificate Policies
The certificate policies extension SHALL contain at least one certi-
ficate policy which reflects the practices and procedures undertaken
by the CA. The certificate policy extension MAY be marked critical.
A statement by the issuer stating the purpose of the certificate as
discussed in 2.3 SHOULD be evident through an indicated policy or
through its associated CPS.
3.2.3 Key usage extension
The key usage extension SHALL be present and SHALL exclusively assert
the key usage nonRepudiation (1). No other key usage values are
allowed to be asserted. The key usage extension MAY be marked criti-
cal.
4 Security Considerations
The legal value of a digital signature which is validated with a
Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy
governing the use of the associated private key. Both the private key
holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the private
key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key holder and
only after the key holders conscious acceptance of the signed message
content.
Since the public keys will be used to verify digital signatures as a
substitute for handwritten signatures, certain conditions should
exist before CAs recognize certificates as qualified certificates.
The signatures must be unique to the signer, and must be generated
under the signer's sole control. That is, a CA should not issue a
qualified certificate if the private key is shared among entities, or
the signature generation is not performed under the subject's con-
trol. This implies the CA must perform proof-of-possession. In addi-
tion, the CA should have some knowledge about the subject's
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cryptographic module.
CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
indicating a CA may issue qualified certificates unless these condi-
tions are met.
Finally, matching rules are not specified for the new attrributes
defined for use in the PersonalData field. It is not expected that
two qualified certificates would be compared to determine if they
represent the same physical entity. Such a comparison may provide
misleading results and should not be performed.
This specification is a profile of RFC 2459. The security considera-
tions section of that document applies to this specification as well.
5 References
[RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC 2459] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and D.Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL
Profile", January 1999.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (1997 E): Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
Directory: Models, June 1997.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The
Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 1993.
6 Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to per-
tain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this
document or the extent to which any license under such rights might
or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made
any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's
procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-
related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of
rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses
to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a
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general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights
by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from
the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
Appendix A. ASN.1 definitions
As in RFC 2459, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants
of the ASN.1 syntax.
Section A.1 is basically in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros.
The ASN.1 syntax does not permit the inclusion of type statements in
the ASN.1 module, and the 1993 ASN.1 standard does not permit use of
the new UNIVERSAL types in modules using the 1988 syntax. However,
the UniversalString and UTF8String choices in DirectoryString were
defined in the 1993 and 1998 versions respectively. As a result, it
was necessary to import definitions for these UNIVERSAL types from
the PKIX1 modules. This appendix may be converted into 1988 ASN.1 by
replacing the definitions for the UNIVERSAL Types with the 1988
catch-all "ANY".
Section A.2 is in the 1998 syntax; it may be converted into the 1993
syntax by inserting a definition for the UNIVERSAL Type UTF8String.
A.1 1988 ASN.1
PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) to be assigned(?) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
Attribute, UniversalString, UTF8String, id-pkix
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(1)};
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PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecord SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }
PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute}
id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 5 4 }
id-at-countryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 6}
id-at-surname OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 4}
id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 16}
id-at-givenName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 42}
id-at-dnQualifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 46}
-- These OIDs still need to be assigned:
id-qat OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix xx}
id-qat-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
-- New Attributes for Qualified Certificates
dateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime
-- identified by id-qat-dateOfBirth --
placeOfBirth ::= DirectoryString
-- identifed by id-qat-placeOfBirth --
pseudonym ::= DirectoryString
-- identifed by id-qat-pseudonym --
gender ::= PrintableString
-- identifed by id-qat-gender --
countryOfCitizenship ::=
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes only
-- identifed by id-qat-countryOfCitizenship }
countryOfResidence ::=
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WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes only
-- identifed by id-qat-countryOfResidence --
DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..MAX))
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..MAX))
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..MAX))
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..MAX)) }
END
A.2 1998 ASN.1
PKIXqualified98 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) to be assigned(?) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
id-pkix
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit93(3)};
PersonalData ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecord SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }
PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute}
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
type AttributeType,
values SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeType ::= ATTRIBUTE.&id
AttributeValue ::= ATTRIBUTE.&Type
ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS {
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&derivation ATTRIBUTE OPTIONAL,
&single-valued BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type }
WITH SYNTAX {
SUBTYPE OF &derivation
WITH SYNTAX &Type
SINGLE VALUE &single-valued
ID &id }
id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 5 4 }
id-at-countryName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 6}
id-at-surname OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 4}
id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 16}
id-at-givenName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 42}
id-at-dnQualifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-at 46}
-- These OIDs still need to be assigned:
id-qat OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix xx}
id-qat-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
id-qat-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-qat xx}
dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
SINGLE VALUE
ID id-qat-dateOfBirth }
placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString
SINGLE VALUE
ID id-qat-placeOfBirth }
pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString
SINGLE VALUE
ID id-qat-pseudonym }
gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString
SINGLE VALUE
ID id-qat-gender }
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countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
SUBTYPE OF name
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes only
ID id-qat-countryOfCitizenship }
countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {
SUBTYPE OF name
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString(SIZE (2)) -- IS 3166 codes only
ID id-qat-countryOfResidence }
DirectoryString ::= CHOICE {
printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..maxSize))
teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..maxSize))
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..maxSize))
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..maxSize))
universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..maxSize)) }
END
Appendix B. Author Addresses
Stefan Santesson
Accurata Systems kerhet AB
Lotsgatan 27d
216 42 Malm
Sweden
stefan@accurata.se
Tim Polk
NIST
Building 820, Room 426
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
USA
wpolk@nist.gov
Petra Gloeckner
GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH
GMD-TKT, Dolivostrasse 15
D-64293 Darmstadt
Germany
gloeckner@darmstadt.gmd.de
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Appendix C. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the
ASN.1 modules presented in Appendices A and B may be used in whole or
in part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of develop-
ing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights
defined in the Internet Standards process shall be followed, or as
required to translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL
NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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