PKIX Working Group S. Santesson (Accurata)
INTERNET-DRAFT W. Polk (NIST)
Expires April, 2000 P. Barzin (SECUDE)
M. Nystrom (RSA Laboratories)
October, 1999
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Qualified Certificates Profile
<draft-ietf-pkix-qc-02.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document forms a certificate profile for Qualified Certificates,
based on RFC 2459, for use in the Internet. The term Qualified
Certificate is used to describe a certificate with a certain
qualified status within applicable governing law. Further, Qualified
Certificates are issued exclusively to physical persons represented
by a registered unmistakable identity.
The goal of this document is to define a general syntax independent
of local legal requirements. The profile is however designed to allow
further profiling in order to meet specific local needs.
It is important to note that the profile does not define any legal
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requirements for Qualified Certificates.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Please send comments on this document to the ietf-pkix@imc.org
mailing list.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ................................................ 3
2 Requirements and Assumptions ................................ 3
2.1 Properties ................................................ 4
2.2 Statement of Purpose ...................................... 5
2.3 Policy Issues ............................................. 5
2.4 Uniqueness of names ....................................... 5
3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile .............. 6
3.1 Basic Certificate Fields .................................. 6
3.1.1 Issuer .................................................. 6
3.1.2 Subject ................................................. 7
3.2 Certificate Extensions .................................... 9
3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name ................................ 9
3.2.2 Certificate Policies .................................... 13
3.2.3 Key Usage ............................................... 13
3.2.4 Biometric Information ................................... 13
3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements ........................ 14
4 Security Considerations ..................................... 15
5 References .................................................. 16
6 Intellectual Property Right ................................. 17
Appendices
A ASN.1 definitions ........................................... 18
A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module ......................................... 18
A.2 1993 ASN.1 Module ......................................... 21
B A Note on Attributes ........................................ 26
C. Example Certificate ........................................ 26
C.1 ASN.1 Structure ........................................... 27
C.2 Structured Hex Dump ....................................... 29
C.3 Unstructured Hex Dump ..................................... 33
D. Author Addresses ........................................... 34
E. Full Copyright Statement ................................... 35
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1 Introduction
This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. The standard is
based on RFC 2459, which defines underlying certificate formats and
semantics needed for full implementation of this standard.
The standard profiles the format for a specific type of certificates
named Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates and the
assumptions that affects the scope of this document are discussed in
Section 2.
Section 3 defines requirements on information content in Qualified
Certificates. This profile addresses two fields in the basic
certificate as well as five certificate extensions. The certificate
fields are the subject and issuer fields. The certificate extensions
are subject alternative name, certificate policies, key usage, a
private extension for storage of biometric data and a private
extension for storage of statements related to Qualified
Certificates.
In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to
clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are
assumed to be utilized. Section 5 contains the references.
Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 [X.680] structures that are
not already defined in RFC 2459. Appendix B contains an example
certificate. Appendix C contains Authors Addresses and Appendix D
contains the IETF Copyright Statement.
It should be noted that this specification does not define the
specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and does not define the
policies that should be used with them. That is, this document
defines what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but
not what that information means. A system that uses Qualified
Certificates must define its own semantics for the information in
Qualified Certificates. It is expected that laws and corporate
policies will make these definitions.
2 Requirements and Assumptions
The term "Qualified Certificate" has been used by the European
Commission to describe a certain type of certificates with specific
relevance for European legislation. This specification is intended
to support this class of certificates, but its scope is not limited
to this application.
Within this standard the term "Qualified Certificate" is used more
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generally, describing the format for a certificate whose primary
purpose is identifying a person with high level of assurance in
public non-repudiation services. The actual mechanisms that will
decide whether a certificate should or should not be considered to be
a "Qualified Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside
the scope of this standard.
Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential
within several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 2459. The
most important aspects that affect the scope of this specification
are:
- Definition of names and identity information in order to identify
the associated subject in a uniform way.
- Definition of information which identifies the CA and the
jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular
certificate.
- Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified
Certificates.
- Definition of information structure for storage of biometric
information.
- Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements
with relevance for Qualified Certificates.
- Requirements for critical extensions.
2.1 Properties
A Qualified Certificate as defined in this standard is assumed to
have the following properties:
- The certificate is issued by a CA that makes a public statement
that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified
Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2
- The certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with
liabilities, practices and procedures undertaken by the CA, as
discussed in 2.3
- The certificate is issued to a natural person (living human being).
- The certificate contains an unmistakable identity based on a
pseudonym or a real name of the subject.
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2.2 Statement of Purpose
For a certificate to serve the purpose of being a Qualified
Certificate, it is assumed that the CA will have to include in the
certificate a public statement that explicitly defines this intent.
The function of this statement is thus to assist any concerned entity
in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting
signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate.
2.3 Policy Issues
Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to
be understood and used. It is however outside the scope of this
profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern
services that issue or utilize certificates according to this
profile.
It is however assumed that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a
publicly available certificate policy that is consistent with its
liabilities, practices and procedures.
2.4 Uniqueness of names
In this draft requirements on name uniqueness are specified by the
terms "distinguished name" and "unmistakable identity", having the
following meaning:
Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a
representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that
identifies a particular object from among the set of all objects. An
object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented
by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its
object entry could have had if it were represented in the Directory.
In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name
denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is
unambiguous within a certain domain that forms either a real or a
virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree)[X.501]. In the case of
subject names the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain
of the CA.
An unmistakable identity denotes a set of attributes and/or data
elements, which forms an identity that by unmistakable means relates
to a specific entity. The unmistakable connection between the
identity and the entity may be dependent on the context within which
the name is formed. This context should however be evident for any
relying party given the information in the certificate. Some
contexts, such as when identities are based on pseudonyms, may
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require assistance from the CA or a registration authority, to obtain
a corresponding officially registered identity under some predefined
circumstances, such as investigation of criminal offence.
3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile
This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates. The
profile is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459 which
in turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format. For full
implementation of this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult
the underlying formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459.
ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by
RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix A.
3.1 Basic Certificate Fields
This specification provides additional details regarding the contents
of two fields in the basic certificate. These fields are the issuer
and subject fields.
3.1.1 Issuer
The issuer field SHALL contain an unmistakable identity of the
organization responsible for the certificate, and SHALL include a
registered name of the organization.
The unmistakable identity of the issuer SHALL be specified using an
appropriate subset of the following attributes:
domainComponent;
countryName;
stateOrProvinceName;
organizationName;
localityName;
commonName and
dnQualifier.
Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary
to identify the issuing organization.
Many client implementations presuppose presence of a commonName
attribute value in the issuer field, containing relevant information
about the Issuer and the scope of the certificate. Certificates aimed
for public use SHOULD therefore always use the commonName attribute
to store information, which gives users reasonable guidance on the
nature of the certificate.
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The legal jurisdiction for the issuing CA SHOULD be consistent with
the issuer name.
It should be noted, however, that a relying party MAY have to consult
associated certificate policies and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to
determine the semantics of name fields and legal jurisdiction.
3.1.2 Subject
The subject field SHALL contain a distinguished name of the subject
(see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name).
An unmistakable identity (see 2.4) of the subject (based on a
registered name or a pseudonym) SHALL be present in the certificate
in the subject field and/or the personalData object in the
subjectAltName extension (see 3.2.1.). If a personalData object is
not present in the subjectAltName extension, the unmistakable
identity of the subject is determined solely by the subject field. If
a personalData object is present in the subjectAltName extension, it
SHALL contain a complete unmistakable identity of the subject. In
this case the subject field SHALL still contain a complete
distinguished name.
The distinguished name of the subject MAY contain the following
attributes:
countryName;
commonName;
surname;
givenName;
pseudonym;
dnQualifier;
organizationName;
organizationalUnitName;
title;
localityName and
postalAddress.
Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of
the following:
Choice I: commonName
Choice II: givenName
Choice III: pseudonym
Other attributes may be present but MUST NOT be necessary to
distinguish the subject name from other subject names within the
issuer domain.
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The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not
necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country
of residence, nor does it have to indicate the country of issuance.
Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName
in the DIT. In cases where the subject name, as specified in the
subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the
countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.
The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name of
the subject. This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation
format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some other format.
Pseudonyms, nicknames and names with spelling other than defined by
the registered name MAY be used. To understand the nature of the name
presented in commonName, complying applications MAY have to examine
present values of the givenName and surname attributes, or the
pseudonym attribute, and if necessary, the personalData object in the
subjectAltName extension.
Note: Many client implementations presuppose presence of the
commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to
display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname
or pseudonym attribute values. Certificates aimed for public use
SHOULD therefore always include the commonName attribute even if
givenName, surname or pseudonym attributes are present.
The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
the registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which
the CA prepares the certificate. These attributes SHALL be used in
the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present. In
cases where the subject only has a single name registered, the
givenName attribute SHALL be used and the surname attribute SHALL be
omitted.
The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym
of the subject, which SHALL be part of the subject's unmistakable
identity (as defined in Section 2.4). Use of the pseudonym attribute
MUST NOT be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or
givenName.
The dnQualifier attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to
differentiate between names where the subject field would otherwise
be identical. This qualifier has no defined semantics beyond
ensuring uniqueness of subject names. It MAY contain a number or
code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a government or
civil authority. It is the CA's responsibility to ensure that the
dnQualifier is sufficient to resolve any subject name collisions.
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The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute types
SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant
information of an organization with which the subject is associated.
The type of association between the organization and the subject is
beyond the scope of this document.
The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a
designated position or function of the subject within the
organization specified by present organizational attributes. The
association between the title, the subject and the organization is
beyond the scope of this document.
The postalAddress and the localityName attribute types SHALL, when
present, be used to store address and geographical information with
which the subject is associated. If an organizationName value also is
present then the postalAddress and localityName attribute values
SHALL be associated with the specified organization. The type of
association between the postalAddress and the localityName and either
the subject or the organizationName is beyond the scope of this
document.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes
named in this section.
3.2 Certificate Extensions
This specification provides additional details regarding the contents
of five certificate extensions. These extensions are the subject
alternative name, certificate policies, key usage extension, private
extension for biometric information and private extension for Quali-
fied Certificate statements.
3.2.1 Subject Alternative Name
This section defines a new OTHER-NAME object, personalData, to be
contained in the OtherName choice of the subjectAltName extension.
Instances of this object may be used to construct unique names from
personal attributes of the subject. This data may be useful to a
relying party in identifying the person that is the subject of the
certificate.
If the subjectAltName extension contains an instance of a
personalData object, it SHALL contain an unmistakable identity of the
subject of the certificate (see 2.4). The subject field is still
required to contain a distinguished name (within issuer domain) as
defined in Section 3.1.2.
-- OtherName is reproduced here (from RFC 2459) for clarity
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-- only. It does not appear in the ASN.1 modules at the end
-- of this specification.
-- 1988 ASN.1 Syntax:
-- OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
-- type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
-- value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
-- 1993 ASN.1 Syntax:
-- OtherName ::= INSTANCE OF TYPE-IDENTIFIER
personalData OTHER-NAME ::= {
PersonalDataSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-on-personalData }
id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-on 1}
PersonalDataSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecords SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }
PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF
Attribute {{PersonalDataAttributeSet}} }
PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { countryName | givenName |
surname | pseudonym | dnQualifier | dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth
| gender | postalAddress | countryOfCitizenship |
countryOfResidence,... }
The optional nameRegistrationAuthority component SHALL, when present,
contain a name of an authority within which associated attribute
values are registered.
The registrationAuthority component in the PersonalDataSyntax and the
PersonalDataRecord type allow specifying multiple name registration
authorities, responsible for different attributes. If the
registrationAuthority field of the PersonalDataSyntax type is
present, it serves as the default value for subordinate
PersonalDataRecord structures with an absent registrationAuthority
value.
The optional attributeSemantics component SHALL, when present,
contain an object identifier that defines semantics for associated
attributes. The object identifier MAY define any set of rules and
semantics for any set of attributes. The attributeSemantics value MAY
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guide applications how to understand and display different attribute
values. This value MAY also define the context within which certain
attribute values are unique and thereby provide means to achieve
guaranteed uniqueness for the present set of attribute values
The optional attributeSemantics component in the PersonalDataSyntax
and the PersonalDataRecord type allows specifying multiple object
identifiers, describing the semantics for different attribute values.
If the attributeSemantics field of the PersonalDataSyntax type is
set, it serves as the default value for subordinate
PersonalDataRecord types with an absent attributeSemantics value.
Complying applications SHALL expect any subset of the following
defined attribute types within a PersonalDataRecord:
countryName;
givenName;
surname;
pseudonym;
dnQualifier;
dateOfBirth;
placeOfBirth;
gender;
postalAddress;
countryOfCitizenship; and
countryOfResidence.
An instance of a personalData object may also contain any additional
attributes, subject to local definitions, but they SHALL not be
necessary to specify the unmistakable identity of the subject.
Attribute values SHALL be consistent with attribute values stored in
the subject field. (I.e., the subject field and the personalData
object may contain different values as long as these values are not
in conflict.)
The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
other attributes are to be understood. The country attribute does not
necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country
of residence, nor does it have to indicate the country of issuance.
The givenName and surname attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
a registered name of the subject, depending on the laws under which
the CA prepares the certificate.
The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym
of the subject. The pseudonym SHALL be registered by a registration
authority, responsible for holding the identity of the real physical
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person related to the pseudonym. When this attribute is used the CA
is the default registration authority if no other
registrationAuthority value, related to the pseudonym attribute, is
present in the personalData object.
The dnQualifier attribute SHALL, when present, contain a local
registration identifier of the subject, such as an identifier
assigned by the CA, a drivers license number or any type of
government aid registration or civic registration code. Note that the
value of this field may contain digits, alphabetic characters, and
punctuation.
The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
the date of birth of the subject. The manner in which the date of
birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
document.
The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
the place of birth of the subject. The manner in which the place of
birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
document.
The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the
gender of the subject. For females the value "F" and for males the
value "M" have to be used. The manner in which the gender is
associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The postalAddress attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
an address with which the subject is associated. This value SHALL be
associated with the subject as a private address even if the
postalAddress attribute value in the subject field is associated with
an organization. The manner in which the postalAddress is associated
with the subject is outside the scope of this document.
The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed country of
citizenship at the time that the certificate was issued. If the
subject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country
MAY be present. Determination of citizenship is a matter of law and
is outside the scope of this document.
The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
value of at least one country in which the subject is resident. If
the subject is a resident of more than one country, more than one
country MAY be present. Determination of residence is a matter of
law and is outside the scope of this document.
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3.2.2 Certificate Policies
The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at
least one certificate policy which reflects the practices and
procedures undertaken by the CA. The certificate policy extension
MAY be marked critical.
A statement by the issuer stating the purpose of the certificate as
discussed in Section 2.2 SHOULD be evident through indicated
policies.
In order to enhance path validation based on policy object
identifiers any statement related to Qualified Certificates, as
defined in 3.2.5, SHOULD also be defined by included certificate
policies.
Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in
RFC 2459.
3.2.3 Key Usage
The key usage extension SHALL be present. If the key usage
nonRepudiation bit is asserted then it SHALL NOT be combined with any
other key usage , i.e. if set, the key usage non-repudiation SHALL be
set exclusively.
The key usage extension MAY be marked critical.
3.2.4 Biometric Information
This section defines an extension for storage of biometric
information. Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash of
a biometric template.
The purpose of this extension is to provide means for authentication
of biometric information. The biometric information that corresponds
to the stored hash is not stored in this extension, but the extension
MAY include an URI pointing to a location where this information can
be obtained. If included, this URI does not imply that this is the
only way to access this information.
This extension SHALL only be used to store a hash of biometric
information suitable for human verification, i.e. where decision
whether this information is an accurate representation of the subject
is performed by a physical person. This implies a usage where the
biometric information is represented by for example a graphical
image, displayed to the relying party, which MAY be used by the
relying party to enhance identification of the subject.
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biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataID OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)
The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify
that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical
image of the subject. The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be
calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the
image type.
The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present,
SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable
graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature. The hash of
the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data
excluding any labels defining the image type.
3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements
This section defines an extension for inclusion of defined statements
related to Qualified Certificates.
A typical statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a
statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified
Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as
discussed in Section 2.2).
Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be
statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which
the certificate is issued. As an example this MAY include a maximum
reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's
liability.
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Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement
and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the
statementInfo parameter.
If the statementInfo parameter is included then the object identifier
of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the
semantics of this parameter. If the object identifier does not
define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant
certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.
This profile includes one predefined object identifier (id-qcs-
pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifying conformance with syntax and semantics
defined in this profile. This qualified certificate profile is
referred to as version 1.
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QcStatementsSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF QcStatement
QcStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
-- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 1)
4 Security Considerations
The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a
Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy
governing the use of the associated private key. Both the private key
holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the private
key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key holder.
Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for
involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issues
certificates as Qualified Certificates. The associated private keys
must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the
subject's sole control. That is, a CA should not issue a qualified
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certificate if the private key is shared among entities, or the means
to use the private key is not protected against unintended usage.
This implies that the CA must perform proof-of-possession of the
private key. In addition, it implies that the CA have some knowledge
about the subject's cryptographic module
CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions
are met.
Comparing two qualified certificates to determine if they represent
the same physical entity may provide misleading results and should
not be performed.
This specification is a profile of RFC 2459. The security
considerations section of that document applies to this specification
as well.
5 References
[RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC 2247] S. Kille, M. Wahl, A. Grimstad, R. Huber, S. Sataluri,
"Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", January 1998.
[RFC 2459] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and D.Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile", January
1999.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (1997 E): Information Technology
- Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, June 1997.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information Technology
- Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication
Framework, June 1997.
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information Technology - Open
Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected Attribute Types,
June 1997.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology -
Abstract Syntax Notation One, 1997.
[ISO 3166] ISO Standard 3166: Codes for the representation of names
of countries, 1993.
[PKCS 9] RSA Laboratories: PKCS #9 v2.0: Selected Object Classes and
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Attributes, 1999 (draft).
6 Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
obtain ageneral license or permission for the use of such proprietary
rights by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained
from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
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APPENDICES
A. ASN.1 definitions
As in RFC 2459, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants
of the ASN.1 syntax.
Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros. However,
since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459
which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same comments as in
RFC 2459 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e. Appendix A.1
may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the definitions for
the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC 2459's 1988
modules.
Appendix A.2 is in the 1993 syntax. However, since the module imports
type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 which are not completely in
the 1993 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459 regarding its use
applies here as well; i.e. Appendix A.2 may be parsed by an 1993
ASN.1-parser by removing the UTF8String choice from the definition of
DirectoryString in the module PKIX1Explicit93 in RFC 2459. Appendix
A.2 may be parsed "as is" by an 1997 ASN.1 parser, however.
A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module
PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert-88(10) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}
AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, Attribute, AttributeType,
id-pkix, id-pe, id-at
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)};
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-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC 'OtherName' types
id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 }
-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Attributes
id-at-postalAddress AttributeType ::= { id-at 16 }
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE OF DirectoryString
domainComponent AttributeType ::=
{ 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }
DomainComponent ::= IA5String
id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
DateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime
id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
PlaceOfBirth ::= DirectoryString
id-pda-pseudonym AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
Pseudonym ::= DirectoryString
id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
Gender ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1))
-- "M", "F", "m" or "f"
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
CountryOfCitizenship ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 6 }
CountryOfResidence ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
-- Other name types
-- PersonalData according to this standard
-- OtherName types ("AnotherName" in RFC 2459)
id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 1 }
PersonalDataSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
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attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecords SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }
PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute }
-- Private extensions
-- Biometric info extension
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature)
-- QC Statements Extension
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}
QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF Statement
Statement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
-- This object identifier identifies conformance with syntax and
-- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 1)
END
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A.2 1993 ASN.1 Module
PKIXqualified93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert-93(11) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage,
extendedKeyUsage, privateKeyUsagePeriod, certificatePolicies,
policyMappings, subjectAltName, issuerAltName, basicConstraints,
nameConstraints, policyConstraints, cRLDistributionPoints,
subjectDirectoryAttributes, authorityInfoAccess, GeneralName,
OTHER-NAME
FROM PKIX1Implicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit-93(4)}
id-pkix, AlgorithmIdentifier, ATTRIBUTE, SupportedAttributes,
Extension, EXTENSION, DirectoryString{}, ub-name, id-pe, id-at,
id-at-commonName, id-at-surname, id-at-countryName,
id-at-localityName, id-at-stateOrProvinceName,
id-at-organizationName, id-at-organizationalUnitName,
id-at-givenName, id-at-dnQualifier, pkcs9email, title,
organizationName, organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName,
localityName, countryName, dnQualifier, generationQualifier,
initials, givenName, surname, commonName, name
FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit-93(3)};
-- Object Identifiers
-- Externally defined OIDs
id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 16 }
id-domainComponent OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }
-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC 'OtherName' types
id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 }
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-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Private extensions
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 }
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
-- OtherName types
id-on-personalData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 1 }
-- Personal data attributes
id-pda-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 1 }
id-pda-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 2 }
id-pda-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 3 }
id-pda-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 4 }
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 5 }
id-pda-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 6 }
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
-- Useful types
-- This definition of the Attribute type is compatible with the one
-- in RFC 2459 but allows (due to the parameterization) different
-- attribute sets to be used in different contexts
Attribute {ATTRIBUTE:AttributeSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
type ATTRIBUTE.&id ({AttributeSet}),
values SET OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type ({AttributeSet}{@type}) }
-- Object Sets
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of legal certificate extensions. Note that this set is an
-- extension of the ExtensionSet defined in RFC 2459.
ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= {
authorityKeyIdentifier |
subjectKeyIdentifier |
keyUsage |
extendedKeyUsage |
privateKeyUsagePeriod |
certificatePolicies |
policyMappings |
subjectAltName |
issuerAltName |
basicConstraints |
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nameConstraints |
policyConstraints |
cRLDistributionPoints |
subjectDirectoryAttributes |
authorityInfoAccess |
biometricInfo |
qcStatements, ... }
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in
-- distinguished names. The set may of course be augmented to meet
-- local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may
-- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations, and that
-- this set is an extension of the SupportedAttributeSet in RFC 2459.
SupportedAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {
name | commonName | surname | givenName | initials |
generationQualifier | dnQualifier | countryName | localityName |
stateOrProvinceName | organizationName | organizationalUnitName |
title | pkcs9email | domainComponent | postalAddress | pseudonym,
... -- For future extensions -- }
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in
-- personalData objects. The set may be augmented to meet local
-- requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may prevent
-- interoperability with conforming implementations.
PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {
countryName | givenName | surname | pseudonym | dnQualifier |
dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth | gender | postalAddress |
countryOfCitizenship | countryOfResidence, ... }
-- Attributes
-- postalAddress from X.520
postalAddress ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString { 30 }
ID id-at-postalAddress }
-- domainComponent from RFC 2247
domainComponent ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX IA5String
ID id-domainComponent }
dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
ID id-pda-dateOfBirth }
placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
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WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
ID id-pda-placeOfBirth }
pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
ID id-pda-pseudonym }
gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))
ID id-pda-gender }
countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }
countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfResidence }
-- OtherName types
personalData OTHER-NAME ::= {
PersonalDataSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-on-personalData }
PersonalDataSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataRecords SEQUENCE OF PersonalDataRecord }
PersonalDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {
registrationAuthority GeneralName OPTIONAL,
attributeSemantics OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
personalDataAttributes SEQUENCE SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF Attribute
{{PersonalDataAttributeSet}} }
-- Private extensions
-- Biometric info extension
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
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typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL,
... -- For future extensions -- }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)
-- QC Statements Extension
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QcStatementsSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
QcStatementsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF QcStatement
QcStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
OID &id
[PARMS &Type] }
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
-- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 1)
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs.
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {
qcStatement-1, ... -- For future extensions -- }
END
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B. A Note on Attributes
This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the
subject field of issued certificates and in the personalData
alternative name. In the interest of conformity, they have been
defined here using the ASN.1 ATTRIBUTE definition from RFC 2459,
which is sufficient for the purposes of this document, but greatly
simplified in comparison with ISO/ITU's definition. A complete
definition of these new attributes (including mathing rules), along
with object classes to support them in LDAP-accessible directories,
can be found in [PKCS 9].
C. Example Certificate
This section contains the ASN.1 structure and a hex dump of a 817
byte version 3 qualified certificate. The certificate contains the
following information:
1. The serial number is 1
2. The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algo-
rithm
3. The issuer's distinguished name is O=GMD - Forschungszentrum
Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
4. The subject's distinguished name is CN=Petra M. Gloeckner,
O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
5. The certificate was issued on July 6, 1999 and will expire on
July 6, 2000
6. The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key
7. The certificate includes a critical key usage extension
exclusively indicating non-repudiation
8. The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier
indicating the practices and procedures undertaken by the
issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1). The certificate
policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust, Germany. It
is required to be set in a certificate conformant to the
german digital signature law.
9. The certificate includes one subject alternative name - a
PersonalData structure (object identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.1)
in the OtherName sub-field containing the following
attributes:
Registered by: municpality@seeheim.de
surname: Gloeckner
given name: Petra
date of birth: October, 14th 1971 (object identifier
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.1)
place of birth: Darmstadt (object identifier
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.2)
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country of citizenship:DE (object identifier
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.5)
gender: female (object identifier
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.9.4)
10. The certificate includes a qualified statement (object
identifier 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3) indicating a maximum reliance
limit of DM 5000,-. Therefore the monetary value has been used
which has been defined by ISO (object identifier
1.2.840.10052.1.1):
currency: 280 (=DEM)
amount: 5
exponent: 3
C.1 ASN.1 Structure
SEQUENCE length = 813 {
SEQUENCE length = 666 {
[0] (constructed) length = 3 {
INTEGER 2
}
INTEGER 1
SEQUENCE length = 9 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.14.3.2.sha1WithRSASignature(29)
NULL
}
SEQUENCE length = 72 {
SET length = 11 {
SEQUENCE length = 9 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.countryName(6)
PrintableString "DE"
}
}
SET length = 57 {
SEQUENCE length = 55 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.organizationName(10)
PrintableString "GMD - Forschungszentrum
Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
}
}
SEQUENCE length = 30 {
UTCTime "990706153122Z"
UTCTime "000706153122Z"
}
SEQUENCE length = 101 {
SET length = 11 {
SEQUENCE length = 9 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.countryName(6)
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PrintableString "DE"
}
}
SET length = 57 {
SEQUENCE length = 55 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.organizationName(10)
PrintableString "GMD - Forschungszentrum
Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
}
SET length = 27 {
SEQUENCE length = 25 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.4.commonName(3)
PrintableString "Petra M. Gloeckner"
}
}
}
SEQUENCE length = 159 {
SEQUENCE length = 13 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.rsaEncryption(1)
NULL
}
BIT STRING number of bits = 1120
content: 30818902818100ff 0524ce2d11337f8c
ccfb8211faa33088 f53c244ca3155ba5
6ad181f54ab6b1f8 4d1d7298623907f6
3956b392d700bf09 9c6ffeca8ac96622
dcbe2d7ff88f40d8 4f561b34c70e3e6e
32f2aa68e7ed2a21 202ff858fc5f42bf
b25864b2c0e9e8c3 21f66adcbad87a8c
a754fce448e1e507 8906fb8a81b7fe27
9ec35794ca20e502 03010001
}
[3] (constructed) length = 272 {
SEQUENCE length = 268 {
SEQUENCE length = 14 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.29.keyUsage(15)
BOOLEAN TRUE
OCTET STRING length = 4 content: 03020640
}
SEQUENCE length = 18 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.29.certificatePolicies(32)
OCTET STRING length = 11
content: 3009300706052b24 080101
}
SEQUENCE length = 190 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.5.29.subjectAltName(17)
OCTET STRING length = 182
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content: 3081b3a081b00608 2b06010505070801
a081a33081a03081 9d30819a16176d75
6e69636970616c69 7479407365656865
696d2e6465307f30 120603550404310b
1309676c6f65636b 6e6572300e060355
042a310713055065 747261301d06082b
0601050507090131 11180f3139373131
3031343030303030 305a301706082b06
010505070905310b 13094461726d7374
616474301006082b 0601050507090331
0413024445300f06 082b060105050709
043103130146
}
SEQUENCE length = 37 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3
OCTET STRING length = 25
content: 3017301506072a86 48ce440101300a02
0201180201050201 03
}
}
}
}
SEQUENCE length = 9 {
OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.3.14.3.2.sha1WithRSASignature(29)
NULL
}
BIT STRING number of bits = 1024
content: 3858d00a57281748 98923f8968cd8c7f
561a531472a34d1a 189d836d66e42104
ac126ffe52d1f1bc f15c17076df75860
c4ad6fa850d2a6c7 0bfbf6f7816f5a8b
1e74a08ce6db0d81 2e5fdda0a0ece8b1
6ad5e6c2acc225a5 4cfe1965f44706c8
0dd854d82ff80de5 4c03ab63eeb2664c
8326f3d54bf15027 c7bc22c79ebf46c8 }
C.2 Structured hexdump:
0x00000000 T: 30 L: 82 03 2d{
0x00000004 T: 30 L: 82 02 9a{
0x00000008 T: a0 L: 03{
0x0000000a T: 02 L: 01 C: 02
}
0x0000000d T: 02 L: 01 C: 01
0x00000010 T: 30 L: 09{
0x00000012 T: 06 L: 05 C: 2b 0e 03 02 1d
0x00000019 T: 05 L: 00 C:
}
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0x0000001b T: 30 L: 48{
0x0000001d T: 31 L: 0b{
0x0000001f T: 30 L: 09{
0x00000021 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 06
0x00000026 T: 13 L: 02 C: 44 45
}
}
0x0000002a T: 31 L: 39{
0x0000002c T: 30 L: 37{
0x0000002e T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 0a
0x00000033 T: 13 L: 30
C: 47 4d 44 20 2d 20 46 6f
72 73 63 68 75 6e 67 73
7a 65 6e 74 72 75 6d 20
49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74
69 6f 6e 73 74 65 63 68
6e 69 6b 20 47 6d 62 48
}
}
}
0x00000065 T: 30 L: 1e{
0x00000067 T: 17 L: 0d C: 39 39 30 37 30 36 31 35
33 31 32 32 5a
0x00000076 T: 17 L: 0d C: 30 30 30 37 30 36 31 35
33 31 32 32 5a
}
0x00000085 T: 30 L: 65{
0x00000087 T: 31 L: 0b{
0x00000089 T: 30 L: 09{
0x0000008b T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 06
0x00000090 T: 13 L: 02 C: 44 45
}
}
0x00000094 T: 31 L: 39{
0x00000096 T: 30 L: 37{
0x00000098 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 0a
0x0000009d T: 13 L: 30
C: 47 4d 44 20 2d 20 46 6f
72 73 63 68 75 6e 67 73
7a 65 6e 74 72 75 6d 20
49 6e 66 6f 72 6d 61 74
69 6f 6e 73 74 65 63 68
6e 69 6b 20 47 6d 62 48
}
}
0x000000cf T: 31 L: 1b{
0x000000d1 T: 30 L: 19{
0x000000d3 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 04 03
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0x000000d8 T: 13 L: 12
C: 50 65 74 72 61 20 4d 2e
20 47 6c 6f 65 63 6b 6e
65 72
}
}
}
0x000000ec T: 30 L: 81 9f{
0x000000ef T: 30 L: 0d{
0x000000f1 T: 06 L: 09 C: 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01
01
0x000000fc T: 05 L: 00 C:
}
0x000000fe T: 03 L: 81 8d
C: 00 30 81 89 02 81 81 00
ff 05 24 ce 2d 11 33 7f
8c cc fb 82 11 fa a3 30
88 f5 3c 24 4c a3 15 5b
a5 6a d1 81 f5 4a b6 b1
f8 4d 1d 72 98 62 39 07
f6 39 56 b3 92 d7 00 bf
09 9c 6f fe ca 8a c9 66
22 dc be 2d 7f f8 8f 40
d8 4f 56 1b 34 c7 0e 3e
6e 32 f2 aa 68 e7 ed 2a
21 20 2f f8 58 fc 5f 42
bf b2 58 64 b2 c0 e9 e8
c3 21 f6 6a dc ba d8 7a
8c a7 54 fc e4 48 e1 e5
07 89 06 fb 8a 81 b7 fe
27 9e c3 57 94 ca 20 e5
02 03 01 00 01
}
0x0000018e T: a3 L: 82 01 10{
0x00000192 T: 30 L: 82 01 0c{
0x00000196 T: 30 L: 0e{
0x00000198 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 0f
0x0000019d T: 01 L: 01 C: ff
0x000001a0 T: 04 L: 04 C: 03 02 06 40
}
0x000001a6 T: 30 L: 12{
0x000001a8 T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 20
0x000001ad T: 04 L: 0b
C: 30 09 30 07 06 05 2b 24
08 01 01
}
0x000001ba T: 30 L: 81 be{
0x000001bd T: 06 L: 03 C: 55 1d 11
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0x000001c2 T: 04 L: 81 b6
C: 30 81 b3 a0 81 b0 06 08
2b 06 01 05 05 07 08 01
a0 81 a3 30 81 a0 30 81
9d 30 81 9a 16 17 6d 75
6e 69 63 69 70 61 6c 69
74 79 40 73 65 65 68 65
69 6d 2e 64 65 30 7f 30
12 06 03 55 04 04 31 0b
13 09 67 6c 6f 65 63 6b
6e 65 72 30 0e 06 03 55
04 2a 31 07 13 05 50 65
74 72 61 30 1d 06 08 2b
06 01 05 05 07 09 01 31
11 18 0f 31 39 37 31 31
30 31 34 30 30 30 30 30
30 5a 30 17 06 08 2b 06
01 05 05 07 09 05 31 0b
13 09 44 61 72 6d 73 74
61 64 74 30 10 06 08 2b
06 01 05 05 07 09 03 31
04 13 02 44 45 30 0f 06
08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 09
04 31 03 13 01 46
}
0x0000027b T: 30 L: 25{
0x0000027d T: 06 L: 08
C: 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 03
0x00000287 T: 04 L: 19
C: 30 17 30 15 06 07 2a 86
48 ce 44 01 01 30 0a 02
02 01 18 02 01 05 02 01
03
}
}
}
}
0x000002a2 T: 30 L: 09{
0x000002a4 T: 06 L: 05 C: 2b 0e 03 02 1d
0x000002ab T: 05 L: 00 C:
}
0x000002ad T: 03 L: 81 81 C: 00 38 58 d0 0a 57 28 17
48 98 92 3f 89 68 cd 8c
7f 56 1a 53 14 72 a3 4d
1a 18 9d 83 6d 66 e4 21
04 ac 12 6f fe 52 d1 f1
bc f1 5c 17 07 6d f7 58
60 c4 ad 6f a8 50 d2 a6
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INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999
c7 0b fb f6 f7 81 6f 5a
8b 1e 74 a0 8c e6 db 0d
81 2e 5f dd a0 a0 ec e8
b1 6a d5 e6 c2 ac c2 25
a5 4c fe 19 65 f4 47 06
c8 0d d8 54 d8 2f f8 0d
e5 4c 03 ab 63 ee b2 66
4c 83 26 f3 d5 4b f1 50
27 c7 bc 22 c7 9e bf 46
c8
0x00000331 }
C.3 Hex Dump
0 3082032D 3082029A A0030201 02020101 |0..-0...........|
10 30090605 2B0E0302 1D050030 48310B30 |0...+......0H1.0|
20 09060355 04061302 44453139 30370603 |...U....DE1907..|
30 55040A13 30474D44 202D2046 6F727363 |U...0GMD - Forsc|
40 68756E67 737A656E 7472756D 20496E66 |hungszentrum Inf|
50 6F726D61 74696F6E 73746563 686E696B |ormationstechnik|
60 20476D62 48301E17 0D393930 37303631 | GmbH0...9907061|
70 35333132 325A170D 30303037 30363135 |53122Z..00070615|
80 33313232 5A306531 0B300906 03550406 |3122Z0e1.0...U..|
90 13024445 31393037 06035504 0A133047 |..DE1907..U...0G|
A0 4D44202D 20466F72 73636875 6E67737A |MD - Forschungsz|
B0 656E7472 756D2049 6E666F72 6D617469 |entrum Informati|
C0 6F6E7374 6563686E 696B2047 6D624831 |onstechnik GmbH1|
D0 1B301906 03550403 13125065 74726120 |.0...U....Petra |
E0 4D2E2047 6C6F6563 6B6E6572 30819F30 |M. Gloeckner0..0|
F0 0D06092A 864886F7 0D010101 05000381 |...*.H..........|
100 8D003081 89028181 00FF0524 CE2D1133 |..0........$.-.3|
110 7F8CCCFB 8211FAA3 3088F53C 244CA315 |........0..<$L..|
120 5BA56AD1 81F54AB6 B1F84D1D 72986239 |[.j...J...M.r.b9|
130 07F63956 B392D700 BF099C6F FECA8AC9 |..9V.......o....|
140 6622DCBE 2D7FF88F 40D84F56 1B34C70E |f"..-...@.OV.4..|
150 3E6E32F2 AA68E7ED 2A21202F F858FC5F |>n2..h..*! /.X._|
160 42BFB258 64B2C0E9 E8C321F6 6ADCBAD8 |B..Xd.....!.j...|
170 7A8CA754 FCE448E1 E5078906 FB8A81B7 |z..T..H.........|
180 FE279EC3 5794CA20 E5020301 0001A382 |.'..W.. ........|
190 01103082 010C300E 0603551D 0F0101FF |..0...0...U.....|
1A0 04040302 06403012 0603551D 20040B30 |.....@0...U. ..0|
1B0 09300706 052B2408 01013081 BE060355 |.0...+$...0....U|
1C0 1D110481 B63081B3 A081B006 082B0601 |.....0.......+..|
1D0 05050708 01A081A3 3081A030 819D3081 |........0..0..0.|
1E0 9A16176D 756E6963 6970616C 69747940 |...municipality@|
1F0 73656568 65696D2E 6465307F 30120603 |seeheim.de0.0...|
200 55040431 0B130967 6C6F6563 6B6E6572 |U..1...gloeckner|
210 300E0603 55042A31 07130550 65747261 |0...U.*1...Petra|
Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 33]
INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999
220 301D0608 2B060105 05070901 3111180F |0...+.......1...|
230 31393731 31303134 30303030 30305A30 |19711014000000Z0|
240 1706082B 06010505 07090531 0B130944 |...+.......1...D|
250 61726D73 74616474 30100608 2B060105 |armstadt0...+...|
260 05070903 31041302 4445300F 06082B06 |....1...DE0...+.|
270 01050507 09043103 13014630 2506082B |......1...F0%..+|
280 06010505 07010304 19301730 1506072A |.........0.0...*|
290 8648CE44 0101300A 02020118 02010502 |.H.D..0.........|
2A0 01033009 06052B0E 03021D05 00038181 |..0...+.........|
2B0 003858D0 0A572817 4898923F 8968CD8C |.8X..W(.H..?.h..|
2C0 7F561A53 1472A34D 1A189D83 6D66E421 |.V.S.r.M....mf.!|
2D0 04AC126F FE52D1F1 BCF15C17 076DF758 |...o.R......m.X|
2E0 60C4AD6F A850D2A6 C70BFBF6 F7816F5A |`..o.P........oZ|
2F0 8B1E74A0 8CE6DB0D 812E5FDD A0A0ECE8 |..t......._.....|
300 B16AD5E6 C2ACC225 A54CFE19 65F44706 |.j.....%.L..e.G.|
310 C80DD854 D82FF80D E54C03AB 63EEB266 |...T./...L..c..f|
320 4C8326F3 D54BF150 27C7BC22 C79EBF46 |L.&..K.P'.."...F|
330 C8 |. |
D. Author's Address
Stefan Santesson
Accurata Systemsaekerhet AB
Slagthuset
S-211 20 Malmoe
Sweden
stefan@accurata.se
Tim Polk
NIST
Building 820, Room 426
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
USA
wpolk@nist.gov
Petra Barzin
SECUDE - Sicherheitstechnologie Informationssysteme GmbH
Landwehrstrasse 50a
D-64293 Darmstadt
Germany
barzin@secude.com
Magnus Nystrom
RSA Laboratories
Box 10704
S-121 29 Stockholm
Sweden
magnus@rsasecurity.com
Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 34]
INTERNET DRAFT Qualified Certificates Profile October 1999
E. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the
ASN.1 modules presented in Appendices A and B may be used in whole or
in part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL
NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Santesson, et. al. Expires: April 2000 [Page 35]
