Network Working Group J. Schaad
Internet-Draft Soaring Hawk Consulting
Expires: September 26, 2010 March 25, 2010
Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) Updates
draft-ietf-pkix-rfc5272-bis-00.txt
Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax for CMC, a
Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS). This document updates RFC 5272 and RFC 5274.
Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 26, 2010.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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described in the BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Updates to RFC 5272 - Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) . 3
2.1. New Section 1.3. Changes Since RFC 5272 . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Replace Section 6.3. Linking Identity and POP
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Replace Section 6.3.3. Renewal and Rekey Messages . . . . 4
2.4. New Section 6.20 RA Identity Proof Witness control . . . . 4
2.5. New Section 6.21 Change Subject Name Control . . . . . . . 6
2.6. New Section 8. Certificate Requirements . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.1. New Section 8.1. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6.2. New Section 8.2. Subject Information Access . . . . . 8
3. Updates to RFC 5724 - Certificate Management Message over
CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Update to Section 4.2 Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Editorial Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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1. Introduction
While dealing with the Suite B profile of CMC
[I-D.turner-suiteb-cmc], a number of defencies where noted in the
current base CMC specification. This document has a set of updates
to [RFC5272] to deal with those issues.
1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Updates to RFC 5272 - Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
2.1. New Section 1.3. Changes Since RFC 5272
This section is inserted before the current section 1.3.
The following changes were made in this document.
Addition of a number of new controls:
RA Identity Witness allows for an RA to perform the identity
checking using the identity and shared-secret and then tell any
following servers that the identity check was successfully
performed.
Change Subject Name allows for a client to request a change in
the subject name and subject alternate name fields in a
certificate.
Add Extended Key Usages for CMC.
Define a new Subject Information Access to hold locations to
conteact the CMC server at.
2.2. Replace Section 6.3. Linking Identity and POP Information
In a Full PKI Request, identity information about the client is
carried in the signature of the SignedData containing all of the
certification requests. Proof-of-possession information for key
pairs, however, is carried separately for each PKCS #10 or CRMF
certification request. (For keys capable of generating a digital
signature, the POP is provided by the signature on the PKCS #10 or
CRMF request. For encryption-only keys, the controls described in
Section 6.7 are used.) In order to prevent substitution-style
attacks, the protocol must guarantee that the same entity generated
both the POP and proof-of-identity information.
This section describes three mechanisms for linking identity and POP
information: witness values cryptographically derived from the
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shared-secret (Section 6.3.1), shared-secret/subject distinguished
name (DN) matching (Section 6.3.2), and linking with an existing
certificate (6.3.3). Clients and servers MUST support the witness
value technique. Clients and servers MAY support shared-secret/
subject DN matching or other bilateral techniques of similar
strength. The idea behind the first two mechanisms is to force the
client to sign some data into each certification request that can be
directly associated with the shared-secret; this will defeat attempts
to include certification requests from different entities in a single
Full PKI Request.
2.3. Replace Section 6.3.3. Renewal and Rekey Messages
New section title is "Existing Certificate Linking"
Linking between the POP and an identity is easy when an existing
certificate is used. The client copies all of the naming information
from the existing certificate (name and subject alternative name)
into the new certification request. The POP on the certificate is
then performed by using the new key to sign the identity information.
The identity information is then tied back by signing the POP proof
as part of the PKIData with a certificate that has matching identity
information.
Existing certificate linking can be used in the following
circumstances:
When replacing a certificate by doing a renewal or rekey
certification request.
Use of an existing certificate to get a new certificate. An
example of this would be to get a key establishment certificate
after having gotten a signature certificate.
Use of a third party certificate to get a new certificate from a
CA. An example of this would be to use a certificate and key pair
distributed with a device to prove an identity. This would
require that the CA have an out-of-band channel to map the device
identity to the EE identity.
2.4. New Section 6.20 RA Identity Proof Witness control
Editors Note: The control is to be added to the table of controls in
section 6.
The RA Identity Proof Witness control allows an RA to indicate to
subsequence control processors that all of the identity proof
requirements have been met. This permits the identity proof to be
performed at a location closer to the end-entity. For example, the
identity proof could be done within a department while the CA could
be companywide. The RA would perform the identity proof, and
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potentially other tasks that require the secret to be used, while the
CA would be prevented from knowing the same information. If the
identity proof fails, then the RA returns an error to the client
noting that fact.
The relevant ASN.1 for the RA Identity Proof Witness control is as
follows:
cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }
id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD}
The object defined for this control is a CMC-CONTROL and is named
cmc-raIdentityWitness. The object is added to the object set Cmc-
Control-Set. The control is only permitted to occur in the control
sequence of a PKIData object. It is not permitted to occur in the
control sequence of a PKIRespones. The control is only permitted to
be used by an RA. The control may occur multiple times in a control
sequence.
The control is identified using the object identifier id-cmc-
raIdentityWitness.
The type structure associated with the control is BodyPartPath. The
path contains a sequence of body part identifiers one of the
following items:
Identity Proof control if the RA verified the identity proof in this
control.
Identity Proof Version 2 if the RA verified the identity proof in
this control.
Full PKI Request if the RA performed an out-of-band identity proof
for this request. The request SHOULD NOT contain either Identity
Proof control.
Simple PKI Request if the RA performed an out-of-band identity proof
for this request.
The RA Identity Proof Witness control will frequently be associated
with a Modify Certification Request control which changes the name
fields in the associated certification requests as the RA will
frequently know the actual name to be assigned to the entity
requesting the certificate and the entity will not know the actual
details of the name. (The association would be setup by the operator
at the time the shared secret was generated by the RA.)
When this control is placed in a message, it is RECOMMENDED that the
Control Processed Control be placed in the body sequence as well.
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Using the explicit new control, rather than implicitly relying on the
Control Processed control is important due to the need to explicity
know idenitity proofs have been perform. The new control also allows
an RA to state that out-of-band idenitity proofs have been performed.
2.5. New Section 6.21 Change Subject Name Control
This item is to be added to the table in section 6.
The Client Name Change Request Control is designed for a client to
ask for a change in its name as part of a certificate. This cannot
be done in the simple way of just changing the requested subject name
in the certificate template because of security issues. The name in
the certificate request needs to match the name in the certificate
used to sign the request in order that identity and possession proofs
are correctly applied.
The relevant ASN.1 for the Client Name Change Request control is as
follows:
at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }
id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD}
ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
subject Name,
subjectAlt SubjectAltName
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
COMPONENTS {..., subjectAltPRESENT} )
The control is designed to be used as an ATTRIBUTE object. As such
the control is placed in one of the following two places:
The attributes field in a CertificationRequest.
The controls field of a CertRequest for a CRMF certification
request.
The control is identified by the Object Identifier id-cmc-
changedSubjectName.
The ASN.1 type associated with control is ChangeSubjectName. The
fields of the structure are configured as follows:
subject contains the requested subject name for the new certificate.
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subjectAlt contains the requested subject alternative name for the
new certificate.
At least one of the fields in the sequence MUST be present when
encoding the structure.
When the CA processes this attribute in a certification request it
will do the following:
1. The subject field is copied to the name field of the template if
present. If the subject field is absent, the name field of the
template will be set to a empty sequence.
2. The subjectAlt field is used as the content of a SubjectAltName
extension in the certificate if present. The subjectAltName
extension is removed from the certificate template if the
subjectAlt field is absent.
2.6. New Section 8. Certificate Requirements
This section is to be inserted before the current section 8.
Certificates for servers used in the CMC protocol SHOULD conform with
the profile defined in [RFC5280]. This document defines some
additional items that can appear in CMC server certificates. Section
8.1 defines some additional Extended Key Usage values that can appear
in certificates. Section 8.2 defines a new Subject Information
Access value which allows for a CMC certificate to publish
information on how to contact the services it provides.
2.6.1. New Section 8.1. Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension is used to restrict the use of
a certificate to specific applications. We define three different
EKUs in this document. The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is:
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
The usage description for each of the EKUs is as follows:
CMC Certification Authorities are identified by the id-kp-cmcCA
extended key usage. The certificate may be the same as the CA
certificate or may be different than the CA certificate. If a
different certificate is used, the certificates containing the id-
kp-cmcCA extended key usage SHOULD[anchor11] have the same name as
the certificate used for issuing the certificates. (Using a
separate public key for CMC protocol operations and for issuing
Certificates and CRLs decreases the number of operations for which
the private key would be used.)
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CMC Registration Authorities are identified by the id-kp-cmcRA
extended key usage. This usage is placed into RA certificates.
CMC Archive Servers are identified by the id-kp-cmcArchive extended
key usage. CMC Archive Servers and the associated protocol are to
be defined in a future document.
2.6.2. New Section 8.2. Subject Information Access
The subject information access extension indicates how to access the
information and services for the subject of the certificate. We
define a new value to go into this extension to identify the
different locations that CMC services will be available. If this
value is placed in a certificate, an appropriate extended key usage
defined in section 8.1 MUST be included in the certificate as well.
The id-ad-cmc OID is used when the subject offers certification
services using the CMC Protocol. Where the CMC services are
available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation MUST be a
uniformResourceIdentifier. Where the CMC services are available via
electronic mail, accessLocation MUST be an rfc822Name. Where CMC
services are available using TCP/IP, the dNSName or iPAddress name
forms may be used. The semantics of other name forms of
accessLocation (when accessMethod is id-ad-cmc) are not defined by
this specification.
The ASN.1 for this extension is:
id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad TBD }
3. Updates to RFC 5724 - Certificate Management Message over CMS (CMC):
Compliance Requirements
3.1. Update to Section 4.2 Controls
The following lines should be added to the end of Table 1.
RaIdentityWitness N/A MUST (2)
ChangeSubjectName MAY N/A MUST
4. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
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(CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[I-D.turner-suiteb-cmc]
Peck, M. and S. Turner, "Suite B Profile of Certificate
Management over CMS", draft-turner-suiteb-cmc-00 (work in
progress), December 2009.
[I-D.ietf-pkix-new-asn1]
Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for PKIX",
draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1-05 (work in progress),
April 2009.
Editorial Comments
[anchor11] JLS: This maybe should be a MUST
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
An updated 2009 ASN.1 module has been provided as part of this
update. The module contains changes that were made as part of the
re-write to current ASN.1 standards in [I-D.ietf-pkix-new-asn1] as
well as the changes for this document.
EnrollmentMessageSyntax-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechansims(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmc2002-02(53)}
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, Extension{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, KEY-WRAP, KEY-DERIVATION,
MAC-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
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CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralName, CRLReason, ReasonFlags,
CertExtensions
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
Name, id-pkix, PublicKeyAlgorithms, SignatureAlgorithms
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
ContentInfo, IssuerAndSerialNumber, CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
CertReqMsg, PKIPublicationInfo, CertTemplate
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55)}
mda-sha1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)}
kda-PBKDF2, maca-hMAC-SHA1
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) }
mda-sha256
FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs-02(54) } ;
-- CMS Content types defined in this document
CMC-ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-PKIData | ct-PKIResponse, ... }
-- Signature Algorithms defined in this document
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-noSignature }
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-- CMS Unsigned Attributes
CMC-UnsignedAtts ATTRIBUTE ::= { aa-cmc-unsignedData }
--
--
id-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 7} -- CMC controls
id-cct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 12} -- CMC content types
-- This is the content type for a request message in the protocol
ct-PKIData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ PKIData IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIData }
id-cct-PKIData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 2 }
PKIData ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
reqSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
BodyPartID ::= INTEGER(0..4294967295)
TaggedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
attrType CMC-CONTROL.&id({Cmc-Control-Set}),
attrValues SET OF CMC-CONTROL.
&Type({Cmc-Control-Set}{@attrType})
}
Cmc-Control-Set CMC-CONTROL ::= {
cmc-identityProof | cmc-dataReturn | cmc-regInfo |
cmc-responseInfo | cmc-queryPending | cmc-popLinkRandom |
cmc-popLinkWitness | cmc-identification | cmc-transactionId |
cmc-senderNonce | cmc-recipientNonce | cmc-statusInfo |
cmc-addExtensions | cmc-encryptedPOP | cmc-decryptedPOP |
cmc-lraPOPWitness | cmc-getCert | cmc-getCRL |
cmc-revokeRequest | cmc-confirmCertAcceptance |
cmc-statusInfoV2 | cmc-trustedAnchors | cmc-authData |
cmc-batchRequests | cmc-batchResponses | cmc-publishCert |
cmc-modCertTemplate | cmc-controlProcessed |
cmc-identityProofV2 | cmc-popLinkWitnessV2, ...,
cmc-raIdentityWitness }
OTHER-REQUEST ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
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-- We do not define any other requests in this document
-- examples might be attribute certification requests
OtherRequests OTHER-REQUEST ::= {...}
TaggedRequest ::= CHOICE {
tcr [0] TaggedCertificationRequest,
crm [1] CertReqMsg,
orm [2] SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
requestMessageType OTHER-REQUEST.&id({OtherRequests}),
requestMessageValue OTHER-REQUEST.&Type({OtherRequests}
{@.requestMessageType})
}
}
TaggedCertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
certificationRequest CertificationRequest
}
AttributeList ATTRIBUTE ::= {at-extension-req, ...,
at-cmc-changeSubjectName}
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY,
{PublicKeyAlgorithms}},
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
},
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF
AttributeSet{{AttributeList}}
},
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
{SignatureAlgorithms}},
signature BIT STRING
}
TaggedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
contentInfo ContentInfo
}
OTHER-MSG ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
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-- No other messages currently defined
OtherMsgSet OTHER-MSG ::= {...}
OtherMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
otherMsgType OTHER-MSG.&id({OtherMsgSet}),
otherMsgValue OTHER-MSG.&Type({OtherMsgSet}{@otherMsgType}) }
-- This defines the response message in the protocol
ct-PKIResponse CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ PKIResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-cct-PKIResponse }
id-cct-PKIResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cct 3 }
ResponseBody ::= PKIResponse
PKIResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
controlSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedAttribute,
cmsSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedContentInfo,
otherMsgSequence SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF OtherMsg
}
CMC-CONTROL ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING
cmc-identityProof CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProof }
id-cmc-identityProof OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 3}
cmc-dataReturn CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-dataReturn }
id-cmc-dataReturn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 4}
cmc-regInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-regInfo }
id-cmc-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 18}
cmc-responseInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-responseInfo }
id-cmc-responseInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 19}
cmc-queryPending CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-queryPending }
id-cmc-queryPending OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 21}
cmc-popLinkRandom CMC-CONTROL ::=
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{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkRandom }
id-cmc-popLinkRandom OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 22}
cmc-popLinkWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitness }
id-cmc-popLinkWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 23}
-- The following controls have the type UTF8String
cmc-identification CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identification }
id-cmc-identification OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 2}
-- The following controls have the type INTEGER
cmc-transactionId CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ INTEGER IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-transactionId }
id-cmc-transactionId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 5}
-- The following controls have the type OCTET STRING
cmc-senderNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-senderNonce }
id-cmc-senderNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 6}
cmc-recipientNonce CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-recipientNonce }
id-cmc-recipientNonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 7}
-- Used to return status in a response
cmc-statusInfo CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCStatusInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfo }
id-cmc-statusInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 1}
CMCStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo
} OPTIONAL
}
PendInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
pendToken OCTET STRING,
pendTime GeneralizedTime
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}
CMCStatus ::= INTEGER {
success (0),
failed (2),
pending (3),
noSupport (4),
confirmRequired (5),
popRequired (6),
partial (7)
}
CMCFailInfo ::= INTEGER {
badAlg (0),
badMessageCheck (1),
badRequest (2),
badTime (3),
badCertId (4),
unsuportedExt (5),
mustArchiveKeys (6),
badIdentity (7),
popRequired (8),
popFailed (9),
noKeyReuse (10),
internalCAError (11),
tryLater (12),
authDataFail (13)
}
-- Used for RAs to add extensions to certification requests
cmc-addExtensions CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ AddExtensions IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-addExtensions }
id-cmc-addExtensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 8}
AddExtensions ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartID,
certReferences SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID,
extensions SEQUENCE OF Extension{{CertExtensions}}
}
cmc-encryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ EncryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-encryptedPOP }
cmc-decryptedPOP CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ DecryptedPOP IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-decryptedPOP }
id-cmc-encryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 9}
id-cmc-decryptedPOP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 10}
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EncryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
request TaggedRequest,
cms ContentInfo,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
witnessAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{WitnessAlgs}},
witness OCTET STRING
}
POPAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {maca-hMAC-SHA1, ...}
WitnessAlgs DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {mda-sha1, ...}
DecryptedPOP ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
thePOPAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
thePOP OCTET STRING
}
cmc-lraPOPWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ LraPopWitness IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-lraPOPWitness }
id-cmc-lraPOPWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 11}
LraPopWitness ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataBodyid BodyPartID,
bodyIds SEQUENCE OF BodyPartID
}
--
cmc-getCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ GetCert IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCert }
id-cmc-getCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 15}
GetCert ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName GeneralName,
serialNumber INTEGER }
cmc-getCRL CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ GetCRL IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-getCRL }
id-cmc-getCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 16}
GetCRL ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
cRLName GeneralName OPTIONAL,
time GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
reasons ReasonFlags OPTIONAL }
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cmc-revokeRequest CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ RevokeRequest IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-revokeRequest}
id-cmc-revokeRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 17}
RevokeRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
issuerName Name,
serialNumber INTEGER,
reason CRLReason,
invalidityDate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
passphrase OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
comment UTF8String OPTIONAL }
cmc-confirmCertAcceptance CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCCertId IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance }
id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 24}
CMCCertId ::= IssuerAndSerialNumber
-- The following is used to request V3 extensions be added
-- to a certificate
at-extension-req ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE ExtensionReq IDENTIFIED BY id-ExtensionReq }
id-ExtensionReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 14}
ExtensionReq ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
Extension{{CertExtensions}}
-- The following allows Diffie-Hellman Certification Request
-- Messages to be well-formed
sa-noSignature SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-noSignature
VALUE NoSignatureValue
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE required
HASHES { mda-sha1 }
}
id-alg-noSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix id-alg(6) 2}
NoSignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
-- Unauthenticated attribute to carry removable data.
id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2)}
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aa-cmc-unsignedData ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE CMCUnsignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-cmc-unsignedData }
id-aa-cmc-unsignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-aa 34}
CMCUnsignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyPartPath BodyPartPath,
identifier TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id,
content TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
}
-- Replaces CMC Status Info
--
cmc-statusInfoV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCStatusInfoV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-statusInfoV2 }
id-cmc-statusInfoV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 25}
EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
ExtendedFailures EXTENDED-FAILURE-INFO ::= {...}
CMCStatusInfoV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
cMCStatus CMCStatus,
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
BodyPartReference,
statusString UTF8String OPTIONAL,
otherInfo CHOICE {
failInfo CMCFailInfo,
pendInfo PendInfo,
extendedFailInfo [1] SEQUENCE {
failInfoOID TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&id
({ExtendedFailures}),
failInfoValue TYPE-IDENTIFIER.&Type
({ExtendedFailures}
{@.failInfoOID})
}
} OPTIONAL
}
BodyPartReference ::= CHOICE {
bodyPartID BodyPartID,
bodyPartPath BodyPartPath
}
BodyPartPath ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID
-- Allow for distribution of trust anchors
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--
cmc-trustedAnchors CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ PublishTrustAnchors IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-trustedAnchors }
id-cmc-trustedAnchors OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 26}
PublishTrustAnchors ::= SEQUENCE {
seqNumber INTEGER,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{HashAlgorithms}},
anchorHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
}
HashAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
mda-sha1 | mda-sha256, ...
}
cmc-authData CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ AuthPublish IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-authData }
id-cmc-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 27}
AuthPublish ::= BodyPartID
-- These two items use BodyPartList
cmc-batchRequests CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchRequests }
id-cmc-batchRequests OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 28}
cmc-batchResponses CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartList IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-batchResponses }
id-cmc-batchResponses OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 29}
BodyPartList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BodyPartID
cmc-publishCert CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ CMCPublicationInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-publishCert }
id-cmc-publishCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 30}
CMCPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{HashAlgorithms}},
certHashes SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING,
pubInfo PKIPublicationInfo
}
cmc-modCertTemplate CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ ModCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-modCertTemplate }
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id-cmc-modCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 31}
ModCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
pkiDataReference BodyPartPath,
certReferences BodyPartList,
replace BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
certTemplate CertTemplate
}
-- Inform follow-on servers that one or more controls have
-- already been processed
cmc-controlProcessed CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ ControlsProcessed IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-controlProcessed }
id-cmc-controlProcessed OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc 32}
ControlsProcessed ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyList SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF BodyPartReference
}
-- Identity Proof control w/ algorithm agility
cmc-identityProofV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ IdentityProofV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-identityProofV2 }
id-cmc-identityProofV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 33 }
IdentityProofV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
proofAlgID AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
{WitnessAlgs}},
macAlgId AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
witness OCTET STRING
}
cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ PopLinkWitnessV2 IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 }
id-cmc-popLinkWitnessV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-cmc 34 }
PopLinkWitnessV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
keyGenAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{KEY-DERIVATION,
{KeyDevAlgs}},
macAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {POPAlgs}},
witness OCTET STRING
}
KeyDevAlgs KEY-DERIVATION ::= {kda-PBKDF2, ...}
cmc-raIdentityWitness CMC-CONTROL ::=
{ BodyPartPath IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-raIdentityWitness }
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id-cmc-raIdentityWitness OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD}
--
-- Allow for an End-Entity to request a change in name
-- This item is added to RegControlSet in CRMF
--
at-cmc-changeSubjectName ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ ChangeSubjectName IDENTIFIED BY id-cmc-changeSubjectName }
id-cmc-changeSubjectName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-cmc TBD}
ChangeSubjectName ::= SEQUENCE {
subject Name,
subjectAlt SubjectAltName
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., subject PRESENT} |
COMPONENTS {..., subjectAltPRESENT} )
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
id-kp-cmcArchive OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
id-ad-cmc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad TBD }
END
Author's Address
Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
Email: ietf@augustcellars.com
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