Internet Draft                           C. Adams (Entrust Technologies)
PKIX Working Group                                         P. Cain (BBN)
expires in six months                                   D. Pinkas (Bull)
                                    R. Zuccherato (Entrust Technologies)
                                                               June 2000

               Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                          Time Stamp Protocol (TSP)
                   <draft-ietf-pkix-time-stamp-08.txt>


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

A time stamping service allows to prove that a datum existed before
a particular time and can be used by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) as
one component in building reliable non-repudiation services (see
[ISONR]). This document describes the format of a request sent to a
Time Stamping Authority (TSA) and of the response that is returned.
An example of how to prove that a digital signature was generated
during the validity period of a public key certificate is given
in an annex.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.  Introduction

In order to associate a datum with a particular point in time, a
Time Stamp Authority (TSA) may need to be used.  This Trusted Third
Party provides a "proof-of-existence" for this particular datum at an
instant in time.



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The TSA's role is to time stamp a datum to establish evidence
indicating the time at which the datum existed.  This can then be
used, for example, to verify that a digital signature was applied to
a message before the corresponding certificate was revoked thus
allowing a revoked public key certificate to be used for verifying
signatures created prior to the time of revocation. This is an
important public key infrastructure operation.  The TSA can also be
used to indicate the time of submission when a deadline is critical,
or to indicate the time of transaction for entries in a log.  An
exhaustive list of possible uses of a TSA is beyond the scope of
this document.

2. The TSA

The TSA is a TTP that creates time stamp tokens in order to indicate
that a datum existed at a particular point in time.

For the remainder of this document a "valid request" shall mean one
that can be decoded correctly, is of the form specified in Section 2.4,
and is from a supported TSA subscriber.

2.1. Requirements of the TSA

The TSA is REQUIRED:

     1.  to use a trustworthy source of time.

     2.  to include a trustworthy time value for each time stamp token.

     3.  to include a unique integer for each newly generated time
         stamp token.

     4.  to produce a time stamp token upon receiving a valid request
         from the requester, when it is possible.

     5.  to include within each time stamp token an identifier to
         uniquely indicate the security policy under which the token
         was created.

     6.  to only time stamp a hash representation of the datum, i.e.
         a data imprint associated with a one-way collision resistant
         hash-function OID.

     7.  to examine the OID of the one-way collision resistant hash-
         function and to verify that the hash value length is
         consistent with the hash algorithm.

     8.  not to examine the imprint being time stamped in any way
         (other than to check its length, as specified in the previous
         bullet).

     9.  not to include any identification of the requesting entity in
         the time stamp tokens.

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     10. to sign each time stamp token using a key generated
         exclusively for this purpose and have this property of the
         key indicated on the corresponding certificate.

     11. to include additional information in the time stamp token,
         if asked by the requester using the extensions field, only
         for the extensions that are supported by the TSA. If this is
         not possible, the TSA SHALL respond with an error message.

2.2. TSA Transactions

As the first message of this mechanism, the requesting entity requests
a time stamp token by sending a request (which is or includes a
TimeStampReq, as defined below) to the Time Stamping Authority.  As
the second message, the Time Stamping Authority responds by sending a
response (which is or includes a TimeStampResp, as defined below) to
the requesting entity.

Upon receiving the response (which is or includes a TimeStampResp,
as defined below), the requesting entity SHALL verify the status error
returned in the response and if no error is present it SHALL verify the
various fields contained in the TimeStampToken and the validity of the
digital signature of the TimeStampToken. In particular, it SHALL verify
that what was time stamped corresponds to what was requested to be
time stamped.  The requester SHALL verify that the TimeStampToken
contains the correct certificate identifier of the TSA, the correct
data imprint and the correct hash algorithm OID.  It SHALL then verify
the timeliness of the response by verifying either the time included
in the response against a local trusted time reference, if one is
available, or the value of the nonce (large random number with a
high probability that it is generated by the client only once)
included in the response against the value included in the request.
For more details, about replay attack detection see the security
considerations section (item 6). If any of the verifications above
fails, the TimeStampToken SHALL be rejected.

Then, since the TSA's certificate may have been revoked, the status of
the certificate SHOULD be checked (e.g. by checking the appropriate
CRL) to verify that the certificate is still valid.

Then, the client application SHOULD check the policy field to determine
whether or not the policy under which the token was issued is
acceptable for the application.  The client MAY ignore this field
if that is acceptable for the intended application.

2.3. Identification of the TSA

The TSA MUST sign all time stamp messages with one or more keys
reserved specifically for that purpose.  The corresponding certificate
MUST contain only one instance of the extended key usage field
extension as defined in [RFC2459] Section 4.2.1.13 with KeyPurposeID
having value id-kp-timeStamping. This extension MUST be critical.



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The following object identifier identifies the KeyPurposeID
having value id-kp-timeStamping.

id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
                      identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
                      kp (3) timestamping (8)}

A TSA's certificate MAY contain a Subject Information Access (SIA)
extension [son of RFC2459] in order to convey the method of contacting
the TSA.  The accessMethod field in this extension MUST contain the
OID id-ad-timestamping:

The following object identifier identifies the access descriptors
for timeStamping.

id-ad-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
                      identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
                      ad (48) timestamping (3)}

The value of the accessLocation field defines the transport (e.g. HTTP)
used to access the TSA and may contain other transport dependent
information (e.g. a URL).

2.4. Request and Response Formats

2.4.1. Request Format

A time stamping request is as follows:

TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE  {
     version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
     messageImprint               MessageImprint,
       --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be
       --time stamped
     reqPolicy             PolicyInformation        OPTIONAL,
     nonce                 INTEGER                  OPTIONAL,
     certReq               BOOLEAN                  DEFAULT FALSE,
     extensions            [0] IMPLICIT Extensions  OPTIONAL
}

The version field (currently v1) describes the version of the
TimeStamp request.

The messageImprint field SHALL contain the hash of the datum to be
time stamped.  The hash is represented as an OCTET STRING. Its length
MUST match the length of the hash value for that algorithm (e.g.
20 bytes for SHA-1 or 16 bytes for MD5).

MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE  {
     hashAlgorithm                AlgorithmIdentifier,
     hashedMessage                OCTET STRING  }


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The hash algorithm indicated in the hashAlgorithm field MUST be a known
hash algorithm (one-way and collision resistant).

The reqPolicy field, if included, indicates the policy under which the
TimeStampToken should be provided. PolicyInformation is defined in
Section 4.2.1.5 of [RFC2459].

The nonce, if included, allows to verify the timeliness of the
response when no local clock is available. The nonce is a large random
number with a high probability that the client generates it only
once (e.g. a 64 bit integer). In such a case the same nonce value
shall be included in the response, otherwise the response shall be
rejected.

If the certReq field is present and set to true, the TSA's public
key certificate that is referenced by the ESSCertID attribute in the
response must be provided by the TSA in the certificates field from
the SignedData structure in that response. That field may also contain
other certificates.

If the certReq field is missing, or if the certReq field is present
and set to false then the certificates field from the SignedData
structure must not be present in the response.

The extensions field is a generic way to add additional information to
the request in the future. Extensions is defined in [RFC 2459]. If an
extension, whether it is marked critical or not critical, is used
by a requester but is not recognized by a time stamping server, the
server SHALL not issue a token and SHALL return a failure
(unacceptedExtension).

The time stamp request does not identify the requester, as this
information is not validated by the TSA (See Section 2.1).

In situations where the TSA requires the identity of the requesting
entity, alternate identification /authentication means have to be used
(e.g. CMS encapsulation [CMS] or TLS authentication [RFC2246]).

2.4.2. Response Format

A time stamping response is as follows:

TimeStampResp ::= SEQUENCE  {
         status                  PKIStatusInfo,
         timeStampToken          TimeStampToken     OPTIONAL
}

The status is based on the definition of status in section 3.2.3
of [RFC2510] as follows:

PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
         status        PKIStatus,
         failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
}

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When the Status contains the value zero a Time Stamp Token is
present.

PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
         granted                (0),
         -- When the Status contains the value zero a Time Stamp Token
         -- is present.
         grantedWithMods        (1),
         rejection              (2),
         waiting                (3),
         revocationWarning      (4),
         revocationNotification (5),
         keyUpdateWarning       (6)
         -- Otherwise, the Time Stamp Token is not present
     }

When the Time Stamp Token is not present the failInfo indicates the reason
why the time stamp request was rejected and may be one of the following
values.

PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
    badAlg               (0),
      -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
    badRequest           (2),
      -- transaction not permitted or supported
    badDataFormat        (5),
      -- the data submitted has the wrong format
    timeNotAvailable    (14),
      -- the TSA's time source is not available
    unacceptedPolicy    (15),
      -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
    unacceptedExtension (16),
      -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
    addInfoNotAvailable (17)
      -- the additional information requested could not be understood
      -- or is not available
     }

These are the only values of PKIFailureInfo that are supported.
Compliant servers MUST NOT produce any other values.
Compliant clients MAY ignore any other values.

The statusString field of PKIStatusInfo MAY be used to include reason
text such as "messageImprint field is not correctly formatted".

If the error code returned is different from zero, then the
TimeStampToken is not returned.

A TimeStampToken is as follows. It is defined as a ContentInfo ([CMS])
and SHALL encapsulate a signed data content type.

TimeStampToken ::= ContentInfo
  -- contentType is id-signedData ([CMS])
  -- content is SignedData ([CMS])

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The fields of type EncapsulatedContentInfo of the SignedData construct
have the following meanings:

eContentType is an object identifier that uniquely specifies the content
type. For a time stamping token it is defined as:

id-smime-ct-TSTInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-smime-ct 4}

with:

id-smime-ct           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-smime              OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
                      us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }

eContent is the content itself, carried as an octet string.
The eContent SHALL be the DER-encoded value of TSTInfo.

The time stamp token MUST NOT contain any signatures other than the
signature of the TSA. The certificate identifier (ESSCertID) of the
TSA certificate shall be included as a signerInfo attribute.

TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE  {
     version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
     policy                       PolicyInformation,
     messageImprint               MessageImprint,
       -- MUST have the same value as the similar field in
       -- TimeStampReq
     serialNumber                 INTEGER,
      -- Time Stamps users must be ready to accommodate integers
      -- up to 160 bits.
     genTime                      GeneralizedTime,
     accuracy                     Accuracy             OPTIONAL,
     ordering                     BOOLEAN              DEFAULT FALSE,
     nonce                        INTEGER              OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present if the similar field was present
       -- in TimeStampReq. In that case it must have the same value.
     tsa                          [0] GeneralName      OPTIONAL,
     extensions                   [1] Extensions       OPTIONAL
}

The version field (currently v1) describes the version of the
Timestamp token.

    Conforming timestamping servers MUST be able to provide version 1
    Timestamp tokens. Among the optional fields, only the nonce field
    MUST be supported.

    Conforming timestamping requesters MUST be able to recognize
    version 1 Timestamp tokens with all the optional fields present,
    but are not mandated to understand the semantics of any extension,
    if present.

The policy field MUST indicate the TSA's policy under which the response
was produced. If a similar field was present in the TimeStampReq, then

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it MUST have the same value, otherwise an error (badRequest) MUST be
returned. This policy MAY include the following types of information
(although this list is certainly not exhaustive):

* The conditions under which the time stamp may be used.

* The availability of a time-stamp log, to allow later verification
  that a time-stamp token is authentic.

The messageImprint must have the same value as the similar field in
TimeStampReq, provided that the size of the hash value matches the
expected size of the hash algorithm identified in hashAlgorithm.

The serialNumber field is an integer assigned by the TSA to each
TimeStampToken.  It MUST be unique for each TimeStampToken issued by
a given TSA (i.e., the TSA name and serial number identify a unique
TimeStampToken). It should be noticed that the property must remain
valid even after a possible interruption (e.g. crash) of the service.

genTime is the time at which the timestamp has been created by the
TSA. The ASN.1 GeneralizedTime syntax can include fraction-of-second
details. Such syntax, without the restrictions from [RFC 2459]
Section 4.1.2.5.2, where GeneralizedTime is limited to represent time
with one second, may to be used here. However, when there is no need
to have a precision better than the second, then GeneralizedTime with
a precision limited to one second should be used (as in [RFC 2459]).

The syntax is: YYYYMMDDhhmmss[.s...]Z
Example: 19990609001326.34352Z

X.690 | ISO/IEC 8825-1 provides the restrictions for a DER-encoding.

The encoding shall terminate with a "Z". The decimal point element,
if present, shall be the point option ".". The fractional-seconds
elements, if present, shall omit all trailing 0's; if the elements
correspond to 0, they shall be wholly omitted, and the decimal point
element also shall be omitted.

Midnight (GMT) shall be represented in the form: "YYYYMMDD000000Z"
where "YYYYMMDD" represents the day following the midnight in question.
Here are a few examples of valid representations:
    "19920521000000Z"
    "19920622123421Z"
    "19920722132100.3Z"

accuracy represents the time deviation around the UTC time contained in
GeneralizedTime.

Accuracy ::= SEQUENCE {
                 seconds        INTEGER              OPTIONAL,
                 millis     [0] INTEGER  (1..999)    OPTIONAL,
                 micros     [1] INTEGER  (1..999)    OPTIONAL
}


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By adding the accuracy value to the GeneralizedTime, an upper limit
of the time at which the timestamp has been created by the TSA can
be obtained. In the same way, by subtracting the accuracy to the
GeneralizedTime, a lower limit of the time at which the timestamp
has been created by the TSA can be obtained.

accuracy can be decomposed in seconds, milliseconds (between 1-999)
and microseconds (1-999), all expressed as integer.

When the accuracy optional field is not present, then the accuracy
may be available through other means, e.g. the PolicyInformation.

If the ordering field is missing, or if the ordering field is present
and set to false, then the genTime field only indicates the time at
which the timestamp has been created by the TSA. In such a case, the
ordering of Time Stamps tokens issued by the same TSA or different
TSAs is only possible when the difference between the genTime of the
first Time Stamp token and the genTime of the second Time Stamp token
is greater than the sum of the accuracies of the genTime for each Time
Stamp token.

If the ordering field is present and set to true, Time Stamps tokens
from the same TSA can always be ordered by only looking at the genTime
parameter, whatever the accuracy of the genTime is.

The nonce field MUST be present if it was present in the TimeStampReq.
In such a case it MUST equal the value provided in the TimeStampReq
structure.

The purpose of the tsa field is to give an hint in identifying the
name of the TSA.  If present, it MUST correspond to one of the subject
names included in the certificate that is to be used to verify the
token.  However, the actual identification of the entity that signed
the response will always occur through the use of the certificate
identifier (ESSCertID Attribute) which is part of the signerInfo
(See Section 5 of [ESS]).

extensions is a generic way to add additional information in the
future. Extensions is defined in [RFC 2459].

Particular extension field types may be specified in standards or
may be defined and registered by any organization or community.

3. Transports

There is no mandatory transport mechanism for TSA messages in this
document.  The mechanisms described below are optional; additional
optional mechanisms may be defined in the future.

3.1. Time Stamp Protocol Using E-mail

This section specifies a means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages
for the protocol exchanges described in Section 2 and Appendix D via
Internet mail.

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A simple MIME object is specified as follows:

   Content-Type: application/timestamp
   Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

   <<the ASN.1 DER-encoded Time Stamp message, base64-encoded>>

This MIME object can be sent and received using common MIME processing
engines and provides a simple Internet mail transport for Time Stamp
messages.

3.2. File Based Protocol

A file containing a time stamp message MUST contain only the DER
encoding of one TSA message, i.e. there MUST be no extraneous header or
trailer information in the file. Such files can be used to transport
time stamp messages using for example, FTP.

3.3. Socket Based Protocol

The following simple TCP-based protocol is to be used for transport
of TSA messages. This protocol is suitable for cases where an
entity initiates a transaction and can poll to pick up the results.

The protocol basically assumes a listener process on a TSA that
can accept TSA messages on a well-defined port (IP port number 318).

Typically an initiator binds to this port and submits the initial
TSA message. The responder replies with a TSA message and/or with
a reference number to be used later when polling for the actual TSA
message response.

If a number of TSA response messages are to be produced for a given
request (say if a receipt must be sent before the actual token can be
produced) then a new polling reference is also returned.

When the final TSA response message has been picked up by the
initiator then no new polling reference is supplied.

The initiator of a transaction sends a "direct TCP-based TSA message"
to the recipient. The recipient responds with a similar message.

A "direct TCP-based TSA message" consists of:
         length (32-bits), flag (8-bits), value (defined below)

The length field contains the number of octets of the remainder of
the message (i.e., number of octets of "value" plus one).  All 32-bit
values in this protocol are specified to be in network byte order.

    Message name   flag     value
    tsaMsg         '00'H    DER-encoded TSA message
      -- TSA message
    pollRep        '01'H    polling reference (32 bits),
                            time-to-check-back (32 bits)

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      -- poll response where no TSA message response ready; use polling
      -- reference value (and estimated time value) for later polling
    pollReq        '02'H    polling reference (32 bits)
      -- request for a TSA message response to initial message
    negPollRep     '03'H    '00'H
      -- no further polling responses (i.e., transaction complete)
    partialMsgRep  '04'H    next polling reference (32 bits),
                            time-to-check-back (32 bits),
                            DER-encoded TSA message
      -- partial response (receipt) to initial message plus new polling
      -- reference (and estimated time value) to use to get next part of
      -- response
    finalMsgRep    '05'H    DER-encoded TSA message
      -- final (and possibly sole) response to initial message
    errorMsgRep    '06'H    human readable error message
      -- produced when an error is detected (e.g., a polling reference
      -- is received which doesn't exist or is finished with)

The sequence of messages that can occur is:

  a) entity sends tsaMsg and receives one of pollRep, negPollRep,
     partialMsgRep or finalMsgRep in response.
  b) end entity sends pollReq message and receives one of negPollRep,
     partialMsgRep,finalMsgRep or errorMsgRep in response.

The "time-to-check-back" parameter is a 32-bit integer, defined to be
the number of seconds that have elapsed since midnight, January 1,
1970, coordinated universal time.

It provides an estimate of the time that the end entity should send
its next pollReq.

3.4. Time Stamp Protocol via HTTP

This subsection specifies a means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages
for the protocol exchanges described in Section 2 and Appendix D via the
HyperText Transfer Protocol.

A simple MIME object is specified as follows.

Content-Type: application/timestamp

   <<the ASN.1 DER-encoded Time Stamp message>>

This MIME object can be sent and received using common HTTP processing
engines over WWW links and provides a simple browser-server transport
for Time Stamp messages.

Upon receiving a valid request, the server MUST respond with either a
valid response with content type application/timestamp or with an HTTP
error.




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4. Security Considerations

This entire document concerns security considerations.

When designing a TSA service, the following considerations have been
identified that have an impact upon the validity or "trust" in the time
stamp token.

     1. When there is a reason to believe that the TSA can no
        longer be trusted but the TSA private key has not been
        compromised, the authority's certificate SHALL be revoked.
        Thus, at any future time, the tokens signed with the
        corresponding key will not considered as valid.

     2. When the TSA private key has been compromised, then the
        corresponding certificate SHALL be revoked. In this case,
        any token signed by the TSA using that private key cannot
        be trusted anymore.  For this reason, it is imperative that
        the TSA's private key be guarded with proper security and
        controls in order to minimize the possibility of compromise.
        In case the private key does become compromised, an audit
        trail of all tokens generated by the TSA MAY provide a means
        to discriminate between genuine and false backdated tokens.

        A double time stamp from two different TSAs is another way to
        address this issue.

     3. The TSA signing key MUST be of a sufficient length to allow
        for a sufficiently long lifetime.  Even if this is done, the key
        will have a finite lifetime.  Thus, any token signed by the
        TSA SHOULD be time stamped again (if authentic copies of old
        CRLs are available) or notarized (if they aren't) at a later
        date to renew the trust that exists in the TSA's signature.
        Time stamp tokens could also be kept with an Evidence Recording
        Authority to maintain this trust.

     4. An application using the TSA service SHOULD be concerned
        about the amount of time it is willing to wait for a response.
        A `man-in-the-middle' attack can introduce delays.  Thus, any
        TimeStampResp that takes more than an acceptable period of time
        SHOULD be considered suspect.

     5. If different entities obtain timestamps on the same data object
        using the same hash algorithm, or a single entity obtains
        multiple timestamps on the same object, the generated timestamp
        tokens will include identical message imprints; as a result, an
        observer with access to those timestamp tokens could infer that
        the timestamps may refer to the same underlying data.

     6. Inadvertent or deliberate replays for requests incorporating
        the same hash (algorithm and) value may happen. Inadvertent
        replays occur when more than one copy of the same request
        message gets sent to the TSA because of problems in the
        intervening network elements. Deliberate replays occur when

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        a middleman is replaying legitimate TS responses. In order to
        detect these situations, several techniques may be used. Using
        a nonce always allows to detect replays, and hence its use is
        RECOMMENDED. Another possibility is to use both a local clock
        and a moving time window during which the requester remembers
        all the hashes sent during that time window. When receiving a
        response, the requester ensures both that the time of the
        response is within the time window and that there is only one
        occurrence of the hash value in that time window. If the same
        hash value is present more than once within a time window,
        the requester may either use a nonce, or wait until the time
        window has moved to come back to the case where the same hash
        value appears only once during that time window.

5. Intellectual Property Rights

The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to per-
tain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this
document or the extent to which any license under such rights might
or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made
any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the IETF's
procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-
related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of claims of
rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses
to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a
general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights
by implementors or users of this specification can be obtained from
the IETF Secretariat.

The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.

The following eight (8) United States Patents related to time
stamping, listed in chronological order, are known by the authors
to exist at this time. This may not be an exhaustive list. Other
patents MAY exist or be issued at any time.

Implementers of this protocol SHOULD perform their own patent search
and determine whether or not any encumbrances exist on their
implementation.

Users of this protocol SHOULD perform their own patent search
and determine whether or not any encumbrances exist on the use of
this standard.

# 5,001,752     Public/Key Date-Time Notary Facility
Filing date: October 13, 1989
Issued: March 19, 1991
Inventor: Addison M. Fischer


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# 5,022,080     Electronic Notary
Filing date: April 16, 1989
Issued: June 4, 1991
Inventors: Robert T. Durst, Kevin D. Hunter

# 5,136,643     Public/Key Date-Time Notary Facility
Filing date: December 20, 1990
Issued: August 4, 1992
Inventor:  Addison M. Fischer
Note: This is a continuation of patent # 5,001,752.)

# 5,136,646     Digital Document Time-Stamping with Catenate Certificate
Filing date: August 2, 1990
Issued: August 4, 1992
Inventors: Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc.,

# 5,136,647     Method for Secure Time-Stamping of Digital Documents
Filing date: August 2, 1990
Issued: August 4, 1992
Inventors: Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc.,

# 5,373,561     Method of Extending the Validity of a Cryptographic
Certificate
Filing date: December 21, 1992
Issued: December 13, 1994
Inventors: Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Bell Communications Research, Inc.,

# 5,422,953      Personal Date/Time Notary Device
Filing date: May 5, 1993
Issued: June 6, 1995
Inventor: Addison M. Fischer

# 5,781,629     Digital Document Authentication System
Filing date: February 21, 1997
Issued: July 14, 1998
Inventor: Stuart A. Haber, Wakefield S. Stornetta Jr.
(assignee) Surety Technologies, Inc.,

6. References

[RFC2510] C. Adams, S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
          Infrastructure, Certificate Management Protocols,"
          RFC 2510,March 1999.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
          Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2246] T. Dierks, C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0,"
          RFC 2246, January 1999.



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[ESS]     P. Hoffman, "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
          RFC 2634, June 1999.

[CMS]     R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
          June 1999.

[RFC2459] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public
          Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile," RFC 2459,
          January 1999.

[ISONR]   ISO/IEC 10181-5:  Security Frameworks in Open Systems.
          Non-Repudiation Framework. April 1997.

7. Authors' Addresses

Carlisle Adams                        Pat Cain
Entrust Technologies                  BBN
750 Heron Road                        70 Fawcett Street
Ottawa, Ontario                       Cambridge, MA 02138
K1V 1A7                               U.S.A.
CANADA                                pcain@bbn.com
cadams@entrust.com

Denis Pinkas                          Robert Zuccherato
Bull S.A.                             Entrust Technologies
12 rue de Paris                       750 Heron Road
B.P. 59                               Ottawa, Ontario
78231 Le Pecq                         K1V 1A7
FRANCE                                CANADA
Denis.Pinkas@bull.net                 robert.zuccherato@entrust.com

























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APPENDIX A - Signature Timestamp attribute using CMS

One of the major use of time stamping is to time stamp a digital
signature to prove that the digital signature was created before
a given time. Should the corresponding public key certificate be
revoked this allows to know whether the signature was created before
or after the revocation date.

A sensible place to store a time stamp is in a [CMS] structure
as an unsigned attribute.

This appendix defines a Signature Timestamp attribute that may be used
to timestamp a digital signature.

The following object identifier identifies the Signature Timestamp
attribute:

id-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
id-aa (2) id-aa-timeStampToken (14)}


The Signature timestamp attribute value has ASN.1 type
SignatureTimeStampToken:

SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken

The value of messageImprint field within TimeStampToken shall be a hash
of the value of signature field within SignerInfo for the signedData
being timestamped.
























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APPENDIX B - Placing a Signature At a Particular Point in Time

We present an example of a possible use of this general time stamping
service. It places a signature at a particular point in time, from
which the appropriate certificate status information (e.g. CRLs) MUST
be checked.  This application is intended to be used in conjunction
with evidence generated using a digital signature mechanism.

Signatures can only be verified according to a non-repudiation policy.
This policy MAY be implicit or explicit (i.e., indicated in the
evidence provided by the signer). The non-repudiation policy can
specify, among other things, the time period allowed by a signer to
declare the compromise of a signature key used for the generation of
digital signatures. Thus a signature may not be guaranteed to be valid
until the termination of this time period.

To verify a digital signature, the following basic technique may be
used:

A) Time stamping information needs to be obtained soon after the
   signature has been produced (e.g. within a few minutes or hours).

     1) The signature is presented to the Time Stamping Authority (TSA).
        The TSA then returns a TimeStampToken (TST) upon that signature.

     2) The invoker of the service must then verify that the
        TimeStampToken is correct.

B) The validity of the digital signature may then be verified in the
   following way:

     1) the Time stamp itself must be verified and it must be verified
        that it applies to the signature of the signer.

     2) The date/time indicated by the TSA in the Time Stamping Token
        must be retrieved.

     3) The certificate used by the signer must be identified
        and retrieved.

     4) The date/time indicated by the TSA must be inside the validity
        period of the signer's certificate.

     5) The revocation information about that certificate, at the
        date/time of the Time Stamping operation, must be retrieved.

     6) Should the certificate be revoked, then the date/time of
        revocation shall be later than the date/time indicated by
        the TSA

If all these conditions are successful, then the digital signature
shall be declared as valid.


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APPENDIX C MIME Registration

To: ietf-types@iana.org
Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/timestamp

MIME media type name: application

MIME subtype name: timestamp

Required parameters: None

Optional parameters: None

Encoding considerations: binary or Base64

Security considerations: Carries a request for a timestamp and the
response. The response will be cryptographically signed.

Interoperability considerations: None

Published specification: IETF PKIX Working Group Draft on Time Stamp
Protocols

Applications which use this media type: Time Stamp clients

Additional information:

  Magic number(s): None
  File extension(s): .TSA
  Macintosh File Type Code(s): none

Person & email address to contact for further information:
Robert Zuccherato <robert.zuccherato@entrust.com>

Intended usage: COMMON

Author/Change controller:
Robert Zuccherato <robert.zuccherato@entrust.com>
















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Appendix D: ASN.1 Module using 1988 Syntax

  PKIXTSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tsp(13)}

  DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=

  BEGIN

  -- EXPORTS ALL --

  IMPORTS

        Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier
        FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
        dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
        id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}

        GeneralName, PolicyInformation
        FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
        dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
        id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}

        ContentInfo FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax {iso(1)
        member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
        smime(16) modules(0) cms(1)} ;

                       --  Locally defined OIDs  --

-- Authority Information Access for TSA

id-pkix-ad-timestamping  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix-ad 3}
id-pkix-ad               OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 48}
id-pkix                  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
                         identified-organization(3) dod(6)
                         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}

-- eContentType for a time stamping token

id-smime-ct-TSTInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime-ct 4 }
id-smime-ct          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-smime             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
                     us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }

-- 2.4.1

TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE  {
     version                  INTEGER  { v1(1) },
     messageImprint           MessageImprint,
       --a hash algorithm OID and the hash value of the data to be
       --time stamped
     reqPolicy                PolicyInformation      OPTIONAL,
     nonce                    INTEGER                OPTIONAL,
     certReq                  BOOLEAN                DEFAULT FALSE,

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     extensions               [0] IMPLICIT Extensions      OPTIONAL
}

MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE  {
     hashAlgorithm                AlgorithmIdentifier,
     hashedMessage                OCTET STRING  }

-- 2.4.2


TimeStampResp ::= SEQUENCE  {
         status                  PKIStatusInfo,
         timeStampToken          TimeStampToken     OPTIONAL
}

    -- The status is based on the definition of status
    -- in section 3.2.3 of [RFC2510]


PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    status        PKIStatus,
    failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
}

PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
         granted                (0),
         -- When the Status contains the value zero a Time Stamp Token
         -- is present.
         grantedWithMods        (1),
         rejection              (2),
         waiting                (3),
         revocationWarning      (4),
         revocationNotification (5),
         keyUpdateWarning       (6)
         -- Otherwise, the Time Stamp Token is not present
     }

    -- When the Time Stamp Token is not present
    -- failInfo indicates the reason why the
    -- time stamp request was rejected and
    -- may be one of the following values.

PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
    badAlg               (0),
      -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
    badRequest           (2),
      -- transaction not permitted or supported
    badDataFormat        (5),
      -- the data submitted has the wrong format
    timeNotAvailable    (14),
      -- the TSA's time source is not available
    unacceptedPolicy    (15),
      -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.


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    unacceptedExtension (16),
      -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
    addInfoNotAvailable (17)
      -- the additional information requested could not be understood
      -- or is not available
     }


TimeStampToken ::= ContentInfo
     -- contentType is id-signedData as defined in [CMS]
     -- content is SignedData as defined in([CMS])
     -- eContentType within SignedData is id-ct-TSTInfo
     -- eContent within SignedData is TSTInfo

TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE  {
     version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
     policy                       PolicyInformation,
     messageImprint               MessageImprint,
       -- MUST have the same value as the similar field in
       -- TimeStampReq
     serialNumber                 INTEGER,
      -- Time Stamps users must be ready to accommodate integers
      -- up to 160 bits.
     genTime                      GeneralizedTime,
     accuracy                     Accuracy                 OPTIONAL,
     ordering                     BOOLEAN             DEFAULT FALSE,
     nonce                        INTEGER                  OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present if the similar field was present
       -- in TimeStampReq. In that case it must have the same value.
     tsa                          [0] GeneralName          OPTIONAL,
     extensions                   [1] IMPLICIT Extensions  OPTIONAL
}

Accuracy ::= SEQUENCE {
                seconds        INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
                millis     [0] INTEGER  (1..999) OPTIONAL,
                micros     [1] INTEGER  (1..999) OPTIONAL
}

END















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APPENDIX E - Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society 1999. All Rights Reserved.
   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of develop-
   ing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights
   defined in the Internet Standards process shall be followed, or as
   required to translate it into languages other than English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
   document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
   IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
   FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
   LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL
   NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
   OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.






























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