QUIC J. Iyengar, Ed.
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Standards Track M. Thomson, Ed.
Expires: September 14, 2017 Mozilla
March 13, 2017
QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport
draft-ietf-quic-transport-02
Abstract
This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. This
document describes connection establishment, packet format,
multiplexing and reliability. Accompanying documents describe the
cryptographic handshake and loss detection.
Note to Readers
Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group
mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic .
Working Group information can be found at https://github.com/quicwg ;
source code and issues list for this draft can be found at
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/transport .
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. A QUIC Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Low-Latency Connection Establishment . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Stream Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Rich Signaling for Congestion Control and Loss Recovery . 6
3.4. Stream and Connection Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Authenticated and Encrypted Header and Payload . . . . . 7
3.6. Connection Migration and Resilience to NAT Rebinding . . 7
3.7. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Packet Types and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Long Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Short Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Version Negotiation Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Cleartext Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5. Encrypted Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.6. Public Reset Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.6.1. Public Reset Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.7. Connection ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.8. Packet Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.8.1. Initial Packet Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.9. Handling Packets from Different Versions . . . . . . . . 17
6. Frames and Frame Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Life of a Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1.1. Using Reserved Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.3. Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.3.1. Transport Parameter Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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7.3.2. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT . . . . . . 24
7.3.3. New Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.3.4. Version Negotiation Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.4. Proof of Source Address Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.4.1. Client Address Validation Procedure . . . . . . . . . 27
7.4.2. Address Validation on Session Resumption . . . . . . 28
7.4.3. Address Validation Token Integrity . . . . . . . . . 29
7.5. Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.6. Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Frame Types and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1. STREAM Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.2. ACK Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.2.1. ACK Block Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.2.2. Timestamp Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.2.3. ACK Frames and Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.3. WINDOW_UPDATE Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.4. BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.5. RST_STREAM Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.6. PADDING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.7. PING frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.8. CONNECTION_CLOSE frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.9. GOAWAY Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
9. Packetization and Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.1. Special Considerations for PMTU Discovery . . . . . . . . 44
10. Streams: QUIC's Data Structuring Abstraction . . . . . . . . 45
10.1. Life of a Stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.1.1. idle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.1.2. open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.1.3. half-closed (local) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.1.4. half-closed (remote) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.1.5. closed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.2. Stream Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.3. Stream Concurrency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.4. Sending and Receiving Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10.5. Stream Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
11. Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
11.1. Edge Cases and Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1.1. Mid-stream RST_STREAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1.2. Response to a RST_STREAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1.3. Offset Increment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11.1.4. BLOCKED frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
12. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
12.1. Connection Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
12.2. Stream Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
12.3. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
13. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
13.1. Spoofed ACK Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
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14.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 61
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
15.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01: . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00: . . . . . . . . . . . 66
C.3. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01: . . . . 67
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1. Introduction
QUIC is a multiplexed and secure transport protocol that runs on top
of UDP. QUIC aims to provide a flexible set of features that allow
it to be a general-purpose transport for multiple applications.
QUIC implements techniques learned from experience with TCP, SCTP and
other transport protocols. Using UDP as the substrate, QUIC seeks to
be compatible with legacy clients and middleboxes. QUIC
authenticates all of its headers and encrypts most of the data it
exchanges, including its signaling. This allows the protocol to
evolve without incurring a dependency on upgrades to middleboxes.
This document describes the core QUIC protocol, including the
conceptual design, wire format, and mechanisms of the QUIC protocol
for connection establishment, stream multiplexing, stream and
connection-level flow control, and data reliability.
Accompanying documents describe QUIC's loss detection and congestion
control [QUIC-RECOVERY], and the use of TLS 1.3 for key negotiation
[QUIC-TLS].
2. Conventions and Definitions
The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this
document. It's not shouting; when they are capitalized, they have
the special meaning defined in [RFC2119].
Definitions of terms that are used in this document:
Client: The endpoint initiating a QUIC connection.
Server: The endpoint accepting incoming QUIC connections.
Endpoint: The client or server end of a connection.
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Stream: A logical, bi-directional channel of ordered bytes within a
QUIC connection.
Connection: A conversation between two QUIC endpoints with a single
encryption context that multiplexes streams within it.
Connection ID: The identifier for a QUIC connection.
QUIC packet: A well-formed UDP payload that can be parsed by a QUIC
receiver. QUIC packet size in this document refers to the UDP
payload size.
2.1. Notational Conventions
Packet and frame diagrams use the format described in [RFC2360]
Section 3.1, with the following additional conventions:
[x] Indicates that x is optional
{x} Indicates that x is encrypted
x (A) Indicates that x is A bits long
x (A/B/C) ... Indicates that x is one of A, B, or C bits long
x (*) ... Indicates that x is variable-length
3. A QUIC Overview
This section briefly describes QUIC's key mechanisms and benefits.
Key strengths of QUIC include:
o Low-latency connection establishment
o Multiplexing without head-of-line blocking
o Authenticated and encrypted header and payload
o Rich signaling for congestion control and loss recovery
o Stream and connection flow control
o Connection migration and resilience to NAT rebinding
o Version negotiation
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3.1. Low-Latency Connection Establishment
QUIC relies on a combined cryptographic and transport handshake for
setting up a secure transport connection. QUIC connections are
expected to commonly use 0-RTT handshakes, meaning that for most QUIC
connections, data can be sent immediately following the client
handshake packet, without waiting for a reply from the server. QUIC
provides a dedicated stream (Stream ID 1) to be used for performing
the cryptographic handshake and QUIC options negotiation. The format
of the QUIC options and parameters used during negotiation are
described in this document, but the handshake protocol that runs on
Stream ID 1 is described in the accompanying cryptographic handshake
draft [QUIC-TLS].
3.2. Stream Multiplexing
When application messages are transported over TCP, independent
application messages can suffer from head-of-line blocking. When an
application multiplexes many streams atop TCP's single-bytestream
abstraction, a loss of a TCP segment results in blocking of all
subsequent segments until a retransmission arrives, irrespective of
the application streams that are encapsulated in subsequent segments.
QUIC ensures that lost packets carrying data for an individual stream
only impact that specific stream. Data received on other streams can
continue to be reassembled and delivered to the application.
3.3. Rich Signaling for Congestion Control and Loss Recovery
QUIC's packet framing and acknowledgments carry rich information that
help both congestion control and loss recovery in fundamental ways.
Each QUIC packet carries a new packet number, including those
carrying retransmitted data. This obviates the need for a separate
mechanism to distinguish acknowledgments for retransmissions from
those for original transmissions, avoiding TCP's retransmission
ambiguity problem. QUIC acknowledgments also explicitly encode the
delay between the receipt of a packet and its acknowledgment being
sent, and together with the monotonically-increasing packet numbers,
this allows for precise network roundtrip-time (RTT) calculation.
QUIC's ACK frames support up to 256 ACK blocks, so QUIC is more
resilient to reordering than TCP with SACK support, as well as able
to keep more bytes on the wire when there is reordering or loss.
3.4. Stream and Connection Flow Control
QUIC implements stream- and connection-level flow control, closely
following HTTP/2's flow control mechanisms. At a high level, a QUIC
receiver advertises the absolute byte offset within each stream up to
which the receiver is willing to receive data. As data is sent,
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received, and delivered on a particular stream, the receiver sends
WINDOW_UPDATE frames that increase the advertised offset limit for
that stream, allowing the peer to send more data on that stream. In
addition to this stream-level flow control, QUIC implements
connection-level flow control to limit the aggregate buffer that a
QUIC receiver is willing to allocate to all streams on a connection.
Connection-level flow control works in the same way as stream-level
flow control, but the bytes delivered and highest received offset are
all aggregates across all streams.
3.5. Authenticated and Encrypted Header and Payload
TCP headers appear in plaintext on the wire and are not
authenticated, causing a plethora of injection and header
manipulation issues for TCP, such as receive-window manipulation and
sequence-number overwriting. While some of these are mechanisms used
by middleboxes to improve TCP performance, others are active attacks.
Even "performance-enhancing" middleboxes that routinely interpose on
the transport state machine end up limiting the evolvability of the
transport protocol, as has been observed in the design of MPTCP
[RFC6824] and in its subsequent deployability issues.
Generally, QUIC packets are always authenticated and the payload is
typically fully encrypted. The parts of the packet header which are
not encrypted are still authenticated by the receiver, so as to
thwart any packet injection or manipulation by third parties. Some
early handshake packets, such as the Version Negotiation packet, are
not encrypted, but information sent in these unencrypted handshake
packets is later verified as part of cryptographic processing.
PUBLIC_RESET packets that reset a connection are currently not
authenticated.
3.6. Connection Migration and Resilience to NAT Rebinding
QUIC connections are identified by a 64-bit Connection ID, randomly
generated by the client. QUIC's consistent connection ID allows
connections to survive changes to the client's IP and port, such as
those caused by NAT rebindings or by the client changing network
connectivity to a new address. QUIC provides automatic cryptographic
verification of a rebound client, since the client continues to use
the same session key for encrypting and decrypting packets. The
consistent connection ID can be used to allow migration of the
connection to a new server IP address as well, since the Connection
ID remains consistent across changes in the client's and the server's
network addresses.
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3.7. Version Negotiation
QUIC version negotiation allows for multiple versions of the protocol
to be deployed and used concurrently. Version negotiation is
described in Section 7.1.
4. Versions
QUIC versions are identified using a 32-bit value.
The version 0x00000000 is reserved to represent an invalid version.
This version of the specification is identified by the number
0x00000001.
Versions with the most significant 16 bits of the version number
cleared are reserved for use in future IETF consensus documents.
Versions that follow the pattern 0x?a?a?a?a are reserved for use in
forcing version negotiation to be exercised. That is, any version
number where the low four bits of all octets is 1010 (in binary). A
client or server MAY advertise support for any of these reserved
versions.
Reserved version numbers will probably never represent a real
protocol; a client MAY use one of these version numbers with the
expectation that the server will initiate version negotiation; a
server MAY advertise support for one of these versions and can expect
that clients ignore the value.
[[RFC editor: please remove the remainder of this section before
publication.]]
The version number for the final version of this specification
(0x00000001), is reserved for the version of the protocol that is
published as an RFC.
Version numbers used to identify IETF drafts are created by adding
the draft number to 0xff000000. For example, draft-ietf-quic-
transport-13 would be identified as 0xff00000D.
Implementors are encouraged to register version numbers of QUIC that
they are using for private experimentation on the github wiki [4].
5. Packet Types and Formats
We first describe QUIC's packet types and their formats, since some
are referenced in subsequent mechanisms.
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All numeric values are encoded in network byte order (that is, big-
endian) and all field sizes are in bits. When discussing individual
bits of fields, the least significant bit is referred to as bit 0.
Hexadecimal notation is used for describing the value of fields.
Any QUIC packet has either a long or a short header, as indicated by
the Header Form bit. Long headers are expected to be used early in
the connection before version negotiation and establishment of 1-RTT
keys, and for public resets. Short headers are minimal version-
specific headers, which can be used after version negotiation and
1-RTT keys are established.
5.1. Long Header
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1| Type (7) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Connection ID (64) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Long Header Format
Long headers are used for packets that are sent prior to the
completion of version negotiation and establishment of 1-RTT keys.
Once both conditions are met, a sender SHOULD switch to sending
short-form headers. While inefficient, long headers MAY be used for
packets encrypted with 1-RTT keys. The long form allows for special
packets, such as the Version Negotiation and the Public Reset packets
to be represented in this uniform fixed-length packet format. A long
header contains the following fields:
Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of the first octet is
set to 1 for long headers and 0 for short headers.
Long Packet Type: The remaining seven bits of first octet of a long
packet is the packet type. This field can indicate one of 128
packet types. The types specified for this version are listed in
Table 1.
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Connection ID: Octets 1 through 8 contain the connection ID.
Section 5.7 describes the use of this field in more detail.
Packet Number: Octets 9 to 12 contain the packet number. {{packet-
numbers} describes the use of packet numbers.
Version: Octets 13 to 16 contain the selected protocol version.
This field indicates which version of QUIC is in use and
determines how the rest of the protocol fields are interpreted.
Payload: Octets from 17 onwards (the rest of QUIC packet) are the
payload of the packet.
The following packet types are defined:
+------+-------------------------------+-------------+
| Type | Name | Section |
+------+-------------------------------+-------------+
| 01 | Version Negotiation | Section 5.3 |
| | | |
| 02 | Client Cleartext | Section 5.4 |
| | | |
| 03 | Non-Final Server Cleartext | Section 5.4 |
| | | |
| 04 | Final Server Cleartext | Section 5.4 |
| | | |
| 05 | 0-RTT Encrypted | Section 5.5 |
| | | |
| 06 | 1-RTT Encrypted (key phase 0) | Section 5.5 |
| | | |
| 07 | 1-RTT Encrypted (key phase 1) | Section 5.5 |
| | | |
| 08 | Public Reset | Section 5.6 |
+------+-------------------------------+-------------+
Table 1: Long Header Packet Types
The header form, packet type, connection ID, packet number and
version fields of a long header packet are version-independent. The
types of packets defined in Table 1 are version-specific. See
Section 5.9 for details on how packets from different versions of
QUIC are interpreted.
(TODO: Should the list of packet types be version-independent?)
The interpretation of the fields and the payload are specific to a
version and packet type. Type-specific semantics for this version
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are described in Section 5.3, Section 5.6, Section 5.4, and
Section 5.5.
5.2. Short Header
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0|C|K| Type (5)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ [Connection ID (64)] +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (8/16/32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Encrypted Payload (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Short Header Format
The short header can be used after the version and 1-RTT keys are
negotiated. This header form has the following fields:
Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of the first octet of a
packet is the header form. This bit is set to 0 for the short
header.
Connection ID Flag: The second bit (0x40) of the first octet
indicates whether the Connection ID field is present. If set to
1, then the Connection ID field is present; if set to 0, the
Connection ID field is omitted.
Key Phase Bit: The third bit (0x20) of the first octet indicates the
key phase, which allows a recipient of a packet to identify the
packet protection keys that are used to protect the packet. See
[QUIC-TLS] for details.
Short Packet Type: The remaining 5 bits of the first octet include
one of 32 packet types. Table 2 lists the types that are defined
for short packets.
Connection ID: If the Connection ID Flag is set, a connection ID
occupies octets 1 through 8 of the packet. See Section 5.7 for
more details.
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Packet Number: The length of the packet number field depends on the
packet type. This field can be 1, 2 or 4 octets long depending on
the short packet type.
Encrypted Payload: Packets with a short header always include a
1-RTT protected payload.
The packet type in a short header currently determines only the size
of the packet number field. Additional types can be used to signal
the presence of other fields.
+------+--------------------+
| Type | Packet Number Size |
+------+--------------------+
| 01 | 1 octet |
| | |
| 02 | 2 octets |
| | |
| 03 | 4 octets |
+------+--------------------+
Table 2: Short Header Packet Types
The header form, connection ID flag and connection ID of a short
header packet are version-independent. The remaining fields are
specific to the selected QUIC version. See Section 5.9 for details
on how packets from different versions of QUIC are interpreted.
5.3. Version Negotiation Packet
A Version Negotiation packet is sent only by servers and is a
response to a client packet of an unsupported version. It uses a
long header and contains:
o Octet 0: 0x81
o Octets 1-8: Connection ID (echoed)
o Octets 9-12: Packet Number (echoed)
o Octets 13-16: Version (echoed)
o Octets 17+: Payload
The payload of the Version Negotiation packet is a list of 32-bit
versions which the server supports, as shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Supported Version 1 (32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Supported Version 2 (32)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Supported Version N (32)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Version Negotiation Packet
See Section 7.1 for a description of the version negotiation process.
5.4. Cleartext Packets
Cleartext packets are sent during the handshake prior to key
negotiation. A Client Cleartext packet contains:
o Octet 0: 0x82
o Octets 1-8: Connection ID (initial)
o Octets 9-12: Packet number
o Octets 13-16: Version
o Octets 17+: Payload
Non-Final Server Cleartext packets contain:
o Octet 0: 0x83
o Octets 1-8: Connection ID (echoed)
o Octets 9-12: Packet Number
o Octets 13-16: Version
o Octets 17+: Payload
Final Server Cleartext packets contains:
o Octet 0: 0x84
o Octets 1-8: Connection ID (final)
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o Octets 9-12: Packet Number
o Octets 13-16: Version
o Octets 17+: Payload
The client MUST choose a random 64-bit value and use it as the
initial Connection ID in all packets until the server replies with
the final Connection ID. The server echoes the client's Connection
ID in Non-Final Server Cleartext packets. The first Final Server
Cleartext and all subsequent packets MUST use the final Connection
ID, as described in Section 5.7.
The payload of a Cleartext packet consists of a sequence of frames,
as described in Section 6.
(TODO: Add hash before frames.)
5.5. Encrypted Packets
Packets encrypted with either 0-RTT or 1-RTT keys may be sent with
long headers. Different packet types explicitly indicate the
encryption level for ease of decryption. These packets contain:
o Octet 0: 0x85, 0x86 or 0x87
o Octets 1-8: Connection ID (initial or final)
o Octets 9-12: Packet Number
o Octets 13-16: Version
o Octets 17+: Encrypted Payload
A first octet of 0x85 indicates a 0-RTT packet. After the 1-RTT keys
are established, key phases are used by the QUIC packet protection to
identify the correct packet protection keys. The initial key phase
is 0. See [QUIC-TLS] for more details.
The encrypted payload is both authenticated and encrypted using
packet protection keys. [QUIC-TLS] describes packet protection in
detail. After decryption, the plaintext consists of a sequence of
frames, as described in Section 6.
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5.6. Public Reset Packet
A Public Reset packet is only sent by servers and is used to abruptly
terminate communications. Public Reset is provided as an option of
last resort for a server that does not have access to the state of a
connection. This is intended for use by a server that has lost state
(for example, through a crash or outage). A server that wishes to
communicate a fatal connection error MUST use a CONNECTION_CLOSE
frame if it has sufficient state to do so.
A Public Reset packet contains:
o Octet 0: 0x88
o Octets 1-8: Echoed data (octets 1-8 of received packet)
o Octets 9-12: Echoed data (octets 9-12 of received packet)
o Octets 13-16: Version
o Octets 17+: Public Reset Proof
For a client that sends a connection ID on every packet, the
Connection ID field is simply an echo of the initial Connection ID,
and the Packet Number field includes an echo of the client's packet
number (and, depending on the client's packet number length, 0, 2, or
3 additional octets from the client's packet).
A Public Reset packet sent by a server indicates that it does not
have the state necessary to continue with a connection. In this
case, the server will include the fields that prove that it
originally participated in the connection (see Section 5.6.1 for
details).
Upon receipt of a Public Reset packet that contains a valid proof, a
client MUST tear down state associated with the connection. The
client MUST then cease sending packets on the connection and SHOULD
discard any subsequent packets that arrive. A Public Reset that does
not contain a valid proof MUST be ignored.
5.6.1. Public Reset Proof
TODO: Details to be added.
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5.7. Connection ID
QUIC connections are identified by their 64-bit Connection ID. All
long headers contain a Connection ID. Short headers indicate the
presence of a Connection ID using the CONNECTION_ID flag. When
present, the Connection ID is in the same location in all packet
headers, making it straightforward for middleboxes, such as load
balancers, to locate and use it.
When a connection is initiated, the client MUST choose a random value
and use it as the initial Connection ID until the final value is
available. The initial Connection ID is a suggestion to the server.
The server echoes this value in all packets until the handshake is
successful (see [QUIC-TLS]). On a successful handshake, the server
MUST select the final Connection ID for the connection and use it in
Final Server Cleartext packets. This final Connection ID MAY be the
one proposed by the client or MAY be a new server-selected value.
All subsequent packets from the server MUST contain this value. On
handshake completion, the client MUST switch to using the final
Connection ID for all subsequent packets.
Thus, all Client Cleartext packets, 0-RTT Encrypted packets, and Non-
Final Server Cleartext packets MUST use the client's randomly-
generated initial Connection ID. Final Server Cleartext packets,
1-RTT Encrypted packets, and all short-header packets MUST use the
final Connection ID.
5.8. Packet Numbers
The packet number is a 64-bit unsigned number and is used as part of
a cryptographic nonce for packet encryption. Each endpoint maintains
a separate packet number for sending and receiving. The packet
number for sending MUST increase by at least one after sending any
packet.
A QUIC endpoint MUST NOT reuse a packet number within the same
connection (that is, under the same cryptographic keys). If the
packet number for sending reaches 2^64 - 1, the sender MUST close the
connection by sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with the error code
QUIC_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LIMIT_REACHED (connection termination is
described in Section 7.6.)
To reduce the number of bits required to represent the packet number
over the wire, only the least significant bits of the packet number
are transmitted over the wire, up to 32 bits. The actual packet
number for each packet is reconstructed at the receiver based on the
largest packet number received on a successfully authenticated
packet.
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A packet number is decoded by finding the packet number value that is
closest to the next expected packet. The next expected packet is the
highest received packet number plus one. For example, if the highest
successfully authenticated packet had a packet number of 0xaa82f30e,
then a packet containing a 16-bit value of 0x1f94 will be decoded as
0xaa831f94.
The sender MUST use a packet number size able to represent more than
twice as large a range than the difference between the largest
acknowledged packet and packet number being sent. A peer receiving
the packet will then correctly decode the packet number, unless the
packet is delayed in transit such that it arrives after many higher-
numbered packets have been received. An endpoint MAY use a larger
packet number size to safeguard against such reordering.
As a result, the size of the packet number encoding is at least one
more than the base 2 logarithm of the number of contiguous
unacknowledged packet numbers, including the new packet.
For example, if an endpoint has received an acknowledgment for packet
0x6afa2f, sending a packet with a number of 0x6b4264 requires a
16-bit or larger packet number encoding; whereas a 32-bit packet
number is needed to send a packet with a number of 0x6bc107.
5.8.1. Initial Packet Number
The initial value for packet number MUST be a 31-bit random number.
That is, the value is selected from an uniform random distribution
between 0 and 2^31-1. [RFC4086] provides guidance on the generation
of random values.
The first set of packets sent by an endpoint MUST include the low
32-bits of the packet number. Once any packet has been acknowledged,
subsequent packets can use a shorter packet number encoding.
5.9. Handling Packets from Different Versions
Between different versions the following things are guaranteed to
remain constant:
o the location of the header form flag,
o the location of the Connection ID flag in short headers,
o the location and size of the Connection ID field in both header
forms,
o the location and size of the Version field in long headers, and
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o the location and size of the Packet Number field in long headers.
Implementations MUST assume that an unsupported version uses an
unknown packet format. All other fields MUST be ignored when
processing a packet that contains an unsupported version.
6. Frames and Frame Types
The payload of cleartext packets and the plaintext after decryption
of encrypted payloads consists of a sequence of frames, as shown in
Figure 4.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Frame 1 (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Frame 2 (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Frame N (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Contents of Encrypted Payload
Encrypted payloads MUST contain at least one frame, and MAY contain
multiple frames and multiple frame types.
Frames MUST fit within a single QUIC packet and MUST NOT span a QUIC
packet boundary. Each frame begins with a Frame Type byte,
indicating its type, followed by additional type-dependent fields:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type (8) | Type-Dependent Fields (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Generic Frame Layout
Frame types are listed in Table 3. Note that the Frame Type byte in
STREAM and ACK frames is used to carry other frame-specific flags.
For all other frames, the Frame Type byte simply identifies the
frame. These frames are explained in more detail as they are
referenced later in the document.
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+------------------+------------------+-------------+
| Type-field value | Frame type | Definition |
+------------------+------------------+-------------+
| 0x00 | PADDING | Section 8.6 |
| | | |
| 0x01 | RST_STREAM | Section 8.5 |
| | | |
| 0x02 | CONNECTION_CLOSE | Section 8.8 |
| | | |
| 0x03 | GOAWAY | Section 8.9 |
| | | |
| 0x04 | WINDOW_UPDATE | Section 8.3 |
| | | |
| 0x05 | BLOCKED | Section 8.4 |
| | | |
| 0x07 | PING | Section 8.7 |
| | | |
| 0x40 - 0x7f | ACK | Section 8.2 |
| | | |
| 0x80 - 0xff | STREAM | Section 8.1 |
+------------------+------------------+-------------+
Table 3: Frame Types
7. Life of a Connection
A QUIC connection is a single conversation between two QUIC
endpoints. QUIC's connection establishment intertwines version
negotiation with the cryptographic and transport handshakes to reduce
connection establishment latency, as described in Section 7.2. Once
established, a connection may migrate to a different IP or port at
either endpoint, due to NAT rebinding or mobility, as described in
Section 7.5. Finally a connection may be terminated by either
endpoint, as described in Section 7.6.
7.1. Version Negotiation
QUIC's connection establishment begins with version negotiation,
since all communication between the endpoints, including packet and
frame formats, relies on the two endpoints agreeing on a version.
A QUIC connection begins with a client sending a handshake packet.
The details of the handshake mechanisms are described in Section 7.2,
but all of the initial packets sent from the client to the server
MUST use the long header format and MUST specify the version of the
protocol being used.
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When the server receives a packet from a client with the long header
format, it compares the client's version to the versions it supports.
If the version selected by the client is not acceptable to the
server, the server discards the incoming packet and responds with a
Version Negotiation packet (Section 5.3). This includes a list of
versions that the server will accept. A server MUST send a Version
Negotiation packet for every packet that it receives with an
unacceptable version.
If the packet contains a version that is acceptable to the server,
the server proceeds with the handshake (Section 7.2). This commits
the server to the version that the client selected.
When the client receives a Version Negotiation packet from the
server, it should select an acceptable protocol version. If the
server lists an acceptable version, the client selects that version
and reattempts to create a connection using that version. Though the
contents of a packet might not change in response to version
negotiation, a client MUST increase the packet number it uses on
every packet it sends. Packets MUST continue to use long headers and
MUST include the new negotiated protocol version.
The client MUST use the long header format and include its selected
version on all packets until it has 1-RTT keys and it has received a
packet from the server which is not a Version Negotiation packet.
A client MUST NOT change the version it uses unless it is in response
to a Version Negotiation packet from the server. Once a client
receives a packet from the server which is not a Version Negotiation
packet, it MUST ignore Version Negotiation packets on the same
connection.
Version negotiation uses unprotected data. The result of the
negotiation MUST be revalidated as part of the cryptographic
handshake (see Section 7.3.4).
7.1.1. Using Reserved Versions
For a server to use a new version in the future, clients must
correctly handle unsupported versions. To help ensure this, a server
SHOULD include a reserved version (see Section 4) while generating a
Version Negotiation packet.
The design of version negotiation permits a server to avoid
maintaining state for packets that it rejects in this fashion.
However, when the server generates a Version Negotiation packet, it
cannot randomly generate a reserved version number. This is because
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the server is required to include the same value in its transport
parameters (see Section 7.3.4). To avoid the selected version number
changing during connection establishment, the reserved version SHOULD
be generated as a function of values that will be available to the
server when later generating its handshake packets.
A pseudorandom function that takes client address information (IP and
port) and the client selected version as input would ensure that
there is sufficient variability in the values that a server uses.
A client MAY send a packet using a reserved version number. This can
be used to solicit a list of supported versions from a server.
7.2. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake
QUIC relies on a combined cryptographic and transport handshake to
minimize connection establishment latency. QUIC allocates stream 1
for the cryptographic handshake. This version of QUIC uses TLS 1.3
[QUIC-TLS].
QUIC provides this stream with reliable, ordered delivery of data.
In return, the cryptographic handshake provides QUIC with:
o authenticated key exchange, where
* a server is always authenticated,
* a client is optionally authenticated,
* every connection produces distinct and unrelated keys,
* keying material is usable for packet protection for both 0-RTT
and 1-RTT packets, and
* 1-RTT keys have forward secrecy
o authenticated values for the transport parameters of the peer (see
Section 7.3)
o authenticated confirmation of version negotiation (see
Section 7.3.4)
o authenticated negotiation of an application protocol (TLS uses
ALPN [RFC7301] for this purpose)
o for the server, the ability to carry data that provides assurance
that the client can receive packets that are addressed with the
transport address that is claimed by the client (see Section 7.4)
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The initial cryptographic handshake message MUST be sent in a single
packet. Any second attempt that is triggered by address validation
MUST also be sent within a single packet. This avoids having to
reassemble a message from multiple packets. Reassembling messages
requires that a server maintain state prior to establishing a
connection, exposing the server to a denial of service risk.
The first client packet of the cryptographic handshake protocol MUST
fit within a 1280 octet QUIC packet. This includes overheads that
reduce the space available to the cryptographic handshake protocol.
Details of how TLS is integrated with QUIC is provided in more detail
in [QUIC-TLS].
7.3. Transport Parameters
During connection establishment, both endpoints make authenticated
declarations of their transport parameters. These declarations are
made unilaterally by each endpoint. Endpoints are required to comply
with the restrictions implied by these parameters; the description of
each parameter includes rules for its handling.
The format of the transport parameters is the TransportParameters
struct from Figure 6. This is described using the presentation
language from Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
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uint32 QuicVersion;
enum {
stream_fc_offset(0),
connection_fc_offset(1),
concurrent_streams(2),
idle_timeout(3),
truncate_connection_id(4),
(65535)
} TransportParameterId;
struct {
TransportParameterId parameter;
opaque value<0..2^16-1>;
} TransportParameter;
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello:
QuicVersion negotiated_version;
QuicVersion initial_version;
case encrypted_extensions:
QuicVersion supported_versions<2..2^8-4>;
};
TransportParameter parameters<30..2^16-1>;
} TransportParameters;
Figure 6: Definition of TransportParameters
The "extension_data" field of the quic_transport_parameters extension
defined in [QUIC-TLS] contains a TransportParameters value. TLS
encoding rules are therefore used to encode the transport parameters.
QUIC encodes transport parameters into a sequence of octets, which
are then included in the cryptographic handshake. Once the handshake
completes, the transport parameters declared by the peer are
available. Each endpoint validates the value provided by its peer.
In particular, version negotiation MUST be validated (see
Section 7.3.4) before the connection establishment is considered
properly complete.
Definitions for each of the defined transport parameters are included
in Section 7.3.1.
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7.3.1. Transport Parameter Definitions
An endpoint MUST include the following parameters in its encoded
TransportParameters:
stream_fc_offset (0x0000): The initial stream level flow control
offset parameter is encoded as an unsigned 32-bit integer in units
of octets. The sender of this parameter indicates that the flow
control offset for all stream data sent toward it is this value.
connection_fc_offset (0x0001): The connection level flow control
offset parameter contains the initial connection flow control
window encoded as an unsigned 32-bit integer in units of 1024
octets. That is, the value here is multiplied by 1024 to
determine the actual flow control offset. The sender of this
parameter sets the byte offset for connection level flow control
to this value. This is equivalent to sending a WINDOW_UPDATE
(Section 8.3) for the connection immediately after completing the
handshake.
concurrent_streams (0x0002): The maximum number of concurrent
streams parameter is encoded as an unsigned 32-bit integer.
idle_timeout (0x0003): The idle timeout is a value in seconds that
is encoded as an unsigned 16-bit integer. The maximum value is
600 seconds (10 minutes).
An endpoint MAY use the following transport parameters:
truncate_connection_id (0x0004): The truncated connection identifier
parameter indicates that packets sent to the peer can omit the
connection ID. This can be used by an endpoint where the 5-tuple
is sufficient to identify a connection. This parameter is zero
length. Omitting the parameter indicates that the endpoint relies
on the connection ID being present in every packet.
7.3.2. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT
Transport parameters from the server SHOULD be remembered by the
client for use with 0-RTT data. A client that doesn't remember
values from a previous connection can instead assume the following
values: stream_fc_offset (65535), connection_fc_offset (65535),
concurrent_streams (10), idle_timeout (600), truncate_connection_id
(absent).
If assumed values change as a result of completing the handshake, the
client is expected to respect the new values. This introduces some
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potential problems, particularly with respect to transport parameters
that establish limits:
o A client might exceed a newly declared connection or stream flow
control limit with 0-RTT data. If this occurs, the client ceases
transmission as though the flow control limit was reached. Once
WINDOW_UPDATE frames indicating an increase to the affected flow
control offsets is received, the client can recommence sending.
o Similarly, a client might exceed the concurrent stream limit
declared by the server. A client MUST reset any streams that
exceed this limit. A server SHOULD reset any streams it cannot
handle with a code that allows the client to retry any application
action bound to those streams.
A server MAY close a connection if remembered or assumed 0-RTT
transport parameters cannot be supported, using an error code that is
appropriate to the specific condition. For example, a
QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_RECEIVED_TOO_MUCH_DATA might be used to indicate
that exceeding flow control limits caused the error. A client that
has a connection closed due to an error condition SHOULD NOT attempt
0-RTT when attempting to create a new connection.
7.3.3. New Transport Parameters
New transport parameters can be used to negotiate new protocol
behavior. An endpoint MUST ignore transport parameters that it does
not support. Absence of a transport parameter therefore disables any
optional protocol feature that is negotiated using the parameter.
The definition of a transport parameter SHOULD include a default
value that a client can use when establishing a new connection. If
no default is specified, the value can be assumed to be absent when
attempting 0-RTT.
New transport parameters can be registered according to the rules in
Section 14.1.
7.3.4. Version Negotiation Validation
The transport parameters include three fields that encode version
information. These retroactively authenticate the version
negotiation (see Section 7.1) that is performed prior to the
cryptographic handshake.
The cryptographic handshake provides integrity protection for the
negotiated version as part of the transport parameters (see
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Section 7.3). As a result, modification of version negotiation
packets by an attacker can be detected.
The client includes two fields in the transport parameters:
o The negotiated_version is the version that was finally selected
for use. This MUST be identical to the value that is on the
packet that carries the ClientHello. A server that receives a
negotiated_version that does not match the version of QUIC that is
in use MUST terminate the connection with a
QUIC_VERSION_NEGOTIATION_MISMATCH error code.
o The initial_version is the version that the client initially
attempted to use. If the server did not send a version
negotiation packet Section 5.3, this will be identical to the
negotiated_version.
A server that processes all packets in a stateful fashion can
remember how version negotiation was performed and validate the
initial_version value.
A server that does not maintain state for every packet it receives
(i.e., a stateless server) uses a different process. If the initial
and negotiated versions are the same, a stateless server can accept
the value.
If the initial version is different from the negotiated_version, a
stateless server MUST check that it would have sent a version
negotiation packet if it had received a packet with the indicated
initial_version. If a server would have accepted the version
included in the initial_version and the value differs from the value
of negotiated_version, the server MUST terminate the connection with
a QUIC_VERSION_NEGOTIATION_MISMATCH error.
The server includes a list of versions that it would send in any
version negotiation packet (Section 5.3) in supported_versions. This
value is set even if it did not send a version negotiation packet.
The client can validate that the negotiated_version is included in
the supported_versions list and - if version negotiation was
performed - that it would have selected the negotiated version. A
client MUST terminate the connection with a
QUIC_VERSION_NEGOTIATION_MISMATCH error code if the
negotiated_version value is not included in the supported_versions
list. A client MUST terminate with a
QUIC_VERSION_NEGOTIATION_MISMATCH error code if version negotiation
occurred but it would have selected a different version based on the
value of the supported_versions list.
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7.4. Proof of Source Address Ownership
Transport protocols commonly spend a round trip checking that a
client owns the transport address (IP and port) that it claims.
Verifying that a client can receive packets sent to its claimed
transport address protects against spoofing of this information by
malicious clients.
This technique is used primarily to avoid QUIC from being used for
traffic amplification attack. In such an attack, a packet is sent to
a server with spoofed source address information that identifies a
victim. If a server generates more or larger packets in response to
that packet, the attacker can use the server to send more data toward
the victim than it would be able to send on its own.
Several methods are used in QUIC to mitigate this attack. Firstly,
the initial handshake packet from a client is padded to at least 1280
octets. This allows a server to send a similar amount of data
without risking causing an amplication attack toward an unproven
remote address.
A server eventually confirms that a client has received its messages
when the cryptographic handshake successfully completes. This might
be insufficient, either because the server wishes to avoid the
computational cost of completing the handshake, or it might be that
the size of the packets that are sent during the handshake is too
large. This is especially important for 0-RTT, where the server
might wish to provide application data traffic - such as a response
to a request - in response to the data carried in the early data from
the client.
To send additional data prior to completing the cryptographic
handshake, the server then needs to validate that the client owns the
address that it claims.
Source address validation is therefore performed during the
establishment of a connection. TLS provides the tools that support
the feature, but basic validation is performed by the core transport
protocol.
7.4.1. Client Address Validation Procedure
QUIC uses token-based address validation. Any time the server wishes
to validate a client address, it provides the client with a token.
As long as the token cannot be easily guessed (see Section 7.4.3), if
the client is able to return that token, it proves to the server that
it received the token.
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During the processing of the cryptographic handshake messages from a
client, TLS will request that QUIC make a decision about whether to
proceed based on the information it has. TLS will provide QUIC with
any token that was provided by the client. For an initial packet,
QUIC can decide to abort the connection, allow it to proceed, or
request address validation.
If QUIC decides to request address validation, it provides the
cryptographic handshake with a token. The contents of this token are
consumed by the server that generates the token, so there is no need
for a single well-defined format. A token could include information
about the claimed client address (IP and port), a timestamp, and any
other supplementary information the server will need to validate the
token in the future.
The cryptographic handshake is responsible for enacting validation by
sending the address validation token to the client. A legitimate
client will include a copy of the token when it attempts to continue
the handshake. The cryptographic handshake extracts the token then
asks QUIC a second time whether the token is acceptable. In
response, QUIC can either abort the connection or permit it to
proceed.
A connection MAY be accepted without address validation - or with
only limited validation - but a server SHOULD limit the data it sends
toward an unvalidated address. Successful completion of the
cryptographic handshake implicitly provides proof that the client has
received packets from the server.
7.4.2. Address Validation on Session Resumption
A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during
one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection. Address
validation is especially important with 0-RTT because a server
potentially sends a significant amount of data to a client in
response to 0-RTT data.
A different type of token is needed when resuming. Unlike the token
that is created during a handshake, there might be some time between
when the token is created and when the token is subsequently used.
Thus, a resumption token SHOULD include an expiration time. It is
also unlikely that the client port number is the same on two
different connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to
be successful.
This token can be provided to the cryptographic handshake immediately
after establishing a connection. QUIC might also generate an updated
token if significant time passes or the client address changes for
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any reason (see Section 7.5). The cryptographic handshake is
responsible for providing the client with the token. In TLS the
token is included in the ticket that is used for resumption and
0-RTT, which is carried in a NewSessionTicket message.
7.4.3. Address Validation Token Integrity
An address validation token MUST be difficult to guess. Including a
large enough random value in the token would be sufficient, but this
depends on the server remembering the value it sends to clients.
A token-based scheme allows the server to offload any state
associated with validation to the client. For this design to work,
the token MUST be covered by integrity protection against
modification or falsification by clients. Without integrity
protection, malicious clients could generate or guess values for
tokens that would be accepted by the server. Only the server
requires access to the integrity protection key for tokens.
In TLS the address validation token is often bundled with the
information that TLS requires, such as the resumption secret. In
this case, adding integrity protection can be delegated to the
cryptographic handshake protocol, avoiding redundant protection. If
integrity protection is delegated to the cryptographic handshake, an
integrity failure will result in immediate cryptographic handshake
failure. If integrity protection is performed by QUIC, QUIC MUST
abort the connection if the integrity check fails with a
QUIC_ADDRESS_VALIDATION_FAILURE error code.
7.5. Connection Migration
QUIC connections are identified by their 64-bit Connection ID.
QUIC's consistent connection ID allows connections to survive changes
to the client's IP and/or port, such as those caused by client or
server migrating to a new network. QUIC also provides automatic
cryptographic verification of a client which has changed its IP
address because the client continues to use the same session key for
encrypting and decrypting packets.
DISCUSS: Simultaneous migration. Is this reasonable?
TODO: Perhaps move mitigation techniques from Security Considerations
here.
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7.6. Connection Termination
Connections should remain open until they become idle for a pre-
negotiated period of time. A QUIC connection, once established, can
be terminated in one of three ways:
1. Explicit Shutdown: An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame to
initiate a connection termination. An endpoint may send a GOAWAY
frame to the peer prior to a CONNECTION_CLOSE to indicate that
the connection will soon be terminated. A GOAWAY frame signals
to the peer that any active streams will continue to be
processed, but the sender of the GOAWAY will not initiate any
additional streams and will not accept any new incoming streams.
On termination of the active streams, a CONNECTION_CLOSE may be
sent. If an endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame while
unterminated streams are active (no FIN bit or RST_STREAM frames
have been sent or received for one or more streams), then the
peer must assume that the streams were incomplete and were
abnormally terminated.
2. Implicit Shutdown: The default idle timeout for a QUIC connection
is 30 seconds, and is a required parameter in connection
negotiation. The maximum is 10 minutes. If there is no network
activity for the duration of the idle timeout, the connection is
closed. By default a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame will be sent. A
silent close option can be enabled when it is expensive to send
an explicit close, such as mobile networks that must wake up the
radio.
3. Abrupt Shutdown: An endpoint may send a Public Reset packet at
any time during the connection to abruptly terminate an active
connection. A Public Reset packet SHOULD only be used as a final
recourse. Commonly, a public reset is expected to be sent when a
packet on an established connection is received by an endpoint
that is unable decrypt the packet. For instance, if a server
reboots mid-connection and loses any cryptographic state
associated with open connections, and then receives a packet on
an open connection, it should send a Public Reset packet in
return. (TODO: articulate rules around when a public reset
should be sent.)
TODO: Connections that are terminated are added to a TIME_WAIT list
at the server, so as to absorb any straggler packets in the network.
Discuss TIME_WAIT list.
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8. Frame Types and Formats
As described in Section 6, Regular packets contain one or more
frames. We now describe the various QUIC frame types that can be
present in a Regular packet. The use of these frames and various
frame header bits are described in subsequent sections.
8.1. STREAM Frame
STREAM frames implicitly create a stream and carry stream data. The
type byte for a STREAM frame contains embedded flags, and is
formatted as "1FDOOOSS". These bits are parsed as follows:
o The leftmost bit must be set to 1, indicating that this is a
STREAM frame.
o "F" is the FIN bit, which is used for stream termination.
o The "D" bit indicates whether a Data Length field is present in
the STREAM header. When set to 0, this field indicates that the
Stream Data field extends to the end of the packet. When set to
1, this field indicates that Data Length field contains the length
(in bytes) of the Stream Data field. The option to omit the
length should only be used when the packet is a "full-sized"
packet, to avoid the risk of corruption via padding.
o The "OOO" bits encode the length of the Offset header field as 0,
16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56, or 64 bits long.
o The "SS" bits encode the length of the Stream ID header field as
8, 16, 24, or 32 bits. (DISCUSS: Consider making this 8, 16, 32,
64.)
A STREAM frame is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Data Length (16)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (8/16/24/32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Offset (0/16/24/32/40/48/56/64) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream Data (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: STREAM Frame Format
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The STREAM frame contains the following fields:
Data Length: An optional 16-bit unsigned number specifying the
length of the Stream Data field in this STREAM frame. This field
is present when the "D" bit is set to 1.
Stream ID: A variable-sized unsigned ID unique to this stream.
Offset: A variable-sized unsigned number specifying the byte offset
in the stream for the data in this STREAM frame. The first byte
in the stream has an offset of 0. The largest offset delivered on
a stream - the sum of the re-constructed offset and data length -
MUST be less than 2^64.
Stream Data: The bytes from the designated stream to be delivered.
A STREAM frame MUST have either non-zero data length or the FIN bit
set.
Stream multiplexing is achieved by interleaving STREAM frames from
multiple streams into one or more QUIC packets. A single QUIC packet
MAY bundle STREAM frames from multiple streams.
Implementation note: One of the benefits of QUIC is avoidance of
head-of-line blocking across multiple streams. When a packet loss
occurs, only streams with data in that packet are blocked waiting for
a retransmission to be received, while other streams can continue
making progress. Note that when data from multiple streams is
bundled into a single QUIC packet, loss of that packet blocks all
those streams from making progress. An implementation is therefore
advised to bundle as few streams as necessary in outgoing packets
without losing transmission efficiency to underfilled packets.
8.2. ACK Frame
Receivers send ACK frames to inform senders which packets they have
received and processed, as well as which packets are considered
missing. The ACK frame contains between 1 and 256 ACK blocks. ACK
blocks are ranges of acknowledged packets.
To limit ACK blocks to those that have not yet been received by the
sender, the receiver SHOULD track which ACK frames have been
acknowledged by its peer. Once an ACK frame has been acknowledged,
the packets it acknowledges SHOULD not be acknowledged again. To
handle cases where the receiver is only sending ACK frames, and hence
will not receive acknowledgments for its packets, it MAY send a PING
frame at most once per RTT to explicitly request acknowledgment.
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To limit receiver state or the size of ACK frames, a receiver MAY
limit the number of ACK blocks it sends. A receiver can do this even
without receiving acknowledgment of its ACK frames, with the
knowledge this could cause the sender to unnecessarily retransmit
some data.
Unlike TCP SACKs, QUIC ACK blocks are cumulative and therefore
irrevocable. Once a packet has been acknowledged, even if it does
not appear in a future ACK frame, it is assumed to be acknowledged.
QUIC ACK frames contain a timestamp section with up to 255
timestamps. Timestamps enable better congestion control, but are not
required for correct loss recovery, and old timestamps are less
valuable, so it is not guaranteed every timestamp will be received by
the sender. A receiver SHOULD send a timestamp exactly once for each
received packet containing retransmittable frames. A receiver MAY
send timestamps for non-retransmittable packets.
A sender MAY intentionally skip packet numbers to introduce entropy
into the connection, to avoid opportunistic acknowledgement attacks.
The sender MUST close the connection if an unsent packet number is
acknowledged. The format of the ACK frame is efficient at expressing
blocks of missing packets; skipping packet numbers between 1 and 255
effectively provides up to 8 bits of efficient entropy on demand,
which should be adequate protection against most opportunistic
acknowledgement attacks.
The type byte for a ACK frame contains embedded flags, and is
formatted as "01NULLMM". These bits are parsed as follows:
o The first two bits must be set to 01 indicating that this is an
ACK frame.
o The "N" bit indicates whether the frame has more than 1 range of
acknowledged packets (i.e., whether the ACK Block Section contains
a Num Blocks field).
o The "U" bit is unused and MUST be set to zero.
o The two "LL" bits encode the length of the Largest Acknowledged
field as 1, 2, 4, or 6 bytes long.
o The two "MM" bits encode the length of the ACK Block Length fields
as 1, 2, 4, or 6 bytes long.
An ACK frame is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Num Blocks(8)]| NumTS (8) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Largest Acknowledged (8/16/32/48) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Delay (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Block Section (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Timestamp Section (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: ACK Frame Format
The fields in the ACK frame are as follows:
Num Blocks (opt): An optional 8-bit unsigned value specifying the
number of additional ACK blocks (besides the required First ACK
Block) in this ACK frame. Only present if the 'N' flag bit is 1.
Num Timestamps: An unsigned 8-bit number specifying the total number
of <packet number, timestamp> pairs in the Timestamp Section.
Largest Acknowledged: A variable-sized unsigned value representing
the largest packet number the peer is acknowledging in this packet
(typically the largest that the peer has seen thus far.)
ACK Delay: The time from when the largest acknowledged packet, as
indicated in the Largest Acknowledged field, was received by this
peer to when this ACK was sent.
ACK Block Section: Contains one or more blocks of packet numbers
which have been successfully received, see Section 8.2.1.
Timestamp Section: Contains zero or more timestamps reporting
transit delay of received packets. See Section 8.2.2.
8.2.1. ACK Block Section
The ACK Block Section contains between one and 256 blocks of packet
numbers which have been successfully received. If the Num Blocks
field is absent, only the First ACK Block length is present in this
section. Otherwise, the Num Blocks field indicates how many
additional blocks follow the First ACK Block Length field.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| First ACK Block Length (8/16/32/48) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Gap 1 (8)] | [ACK Block 1 Length (8/16/32/48)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Gap 2 (8)] | [ACK Block 2 Length (8/16/32/48)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Gap N (8)] | [ACK Block N Length (8/16/32/48)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: ACK Block Section
The fields in the ACK Block Section are:
First ACK Block Length: An unsigned packet number delta that
indicates the number of contiguous additional packets being
acknowledged starting at the Largest Acknowledged.
Gap To Next Block (opt, repeated): An unsigned number specifying the
number of contiguous missing packets from the end of the previous
ACK block to the start of the next. Repeated "Num Blocks" times.
ACK Block Length (opt, repeated): An unsigned packet number delta
that indicates the number of contiguous packets being acknowledged
starting after the end of the previous gap. Repeated "Num Blocks"
times.
8.2.2. Timestamp Section
The Timestamp Section contains between zero and 255 measurements of
packet receive times relative to the beginning of the connection.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Delta LA (8)]|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [First Timestamp (32)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Delta LA 1(8)]| [Time Since Previous 1 (16)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Delta LA 2(8)]| [Time Since Previous 2 (16)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|[Delta LA N(8)]| [Time Since Previous N (16)] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 10: Timestamp Section
The fields in the Timestamp Section are:
Delta Largest Acknowledged (opt): An optional 8-bit unsigned packet
number delta specifying the delta between the largest acknowledged
and the first packet whose timestamp is being reported. In other
words, this first packet number may be computed as (Largest
Acknowledged - Delta Largest Acknowledged.)
First Timestamp (opt): An optional 32-bit unsigned value specifying
the time delta in microseconds, from the beginning of the
connection to the arrival of the packet indicated by Delta Largest
Acknowledged.
Delta Largest Acked 1..N (opt, repeated): This field has the same
semantics and format as "Delta Largest Acknowledged". Repeated
"Num Timestamps - 1" times.
Time Since Previous Timestamp 1..N(opt, repeated): An optional
16-bit unsigned value specifying time delta from the previous
reported timestamp. It is encoded in the same format as the ACK
Delay. Repeated "Num Timestamps - 1" times.
The timestamp section lists packet receipt timestamps ordered by
timestamp.
8.2.2.1. Time Format
DISCUSS_AND_REPLACE: Perhaps make this format simpler.
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The time format used in the ACK frame above is a 16-bit unsigned
float with 11 explicit bits of mantissa and 5 bits of explicit
exponent, specifying time in microseconds. The bit format is loosely
modeled after IEEE 754. For example, 1 microsecond is represented as
0x1, which has an exponent of zero, presented in the 5 high order
bits, and mantissa of 1, presented in the 11 low order bits. When
the explicit exponent is greater than zero, an implicit high-order
12th bit of 1 is assumed in the mantissa. For example, a floating
value of 0x800 has an explicit exponent of 1, as well as an explicit
mantissa of 0, but then has an effective mantissa of 4096 (12th bit
is assumed to be 1). Additionally, the actual exponent is one-less
than the explicit exponent, and the value represents 4096
microseconds. Any values larger than the representable range are
clamped to 0xFFFF.
8.2.3. ACK Frames and Packet Protection
ACK frames that acknowledge protected packets MUST be carried in a
packet that has an equivalent or greater level of packet protection.
Packets that are protected with 1-RTT keys MUST be acknowledged in
packets that are also protected with 1-RTT keys.
A packet that is not protected and claims to acknowledge a packet
number that was sent with packet protection is not valid. An
unprotected packet that carries acknowledgments for protected packets
MUST be discarded in its entirety.
Packets that a client sends with 0-RTT packet protection MUST be
acknowledged by the server in packets protected by 1-RTT keys. This
can mean that the client is unable to use these acknowledgments if
the server cryptographic handshake messages are delayed or lost.
Note that the same limitation applies to other data sent by the
server protected by the 1-RTT keys.
Unprotected packets, such as those that carry the initial
cryptographic handshake messages, MAY be acknowledged in unprotected
packets. Unprotected packets are vulnerable to falsification or
modification. Unprotected packets can be acknowledged along with
protected packets in a protected packet.
An endpoint SHOULD acknowledge packets containing cryptographic
handshake messages in the next unprotected packet that it sends,
unless it is able to acknowledge those packets in later packets
protected by 1-RTT keys. At the completion of the cryptographic
handshake, both peers send unprotected packets containing
cryptographic handshake messages followed by packets protected by
1-RTT keys. An endpoint SHOULD acknowledge the unprotected packets
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that complete the cryptographic handshake in a protected packet,
because its peer is guaranteed to have access to 1-RTT packet
protection keys.
For instance, a server acknowledges a TLS ClientHello in the packet
that carries the TLS ServerHello; similarly, a client can acknowledge
a TLS HelloRetryRequest in the packet containing a second TLS
ClientHello. The complete set of server handshake messages (TLS
ServerHello through to Finished) might be acknowledged by a client in
protected packets, because it is certain that the server is able to
decipher the packet.
8.3. WINDOW_UPDATE Frame
The WINDOW_UPDATE frame (type=0x04) informs the peer of an increase
in an endpoint's flow control receive window for either a single
stream, or the entire connection as a whole.
The frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Flow Control Offset (64) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields in the WINDOW_UPDATE frame are as follows:
Stream ID: ID of the stream whose flow control windows is being
updated, or 0 to specify the connection-level flow control window.
Flow Control Offset: A 64-bit unsigned integer indicating the flow
control offset for the given stream (for a stream ID other than 0)
or the entire connection.
The flow control offset is expressed in units of octets for
individual streams (for stream identifiers other than 0).
The connection-level flow control offset is expressed in units of
1024 octets (for a stream identifier of 0). That is, the connection-
level flow control offset is determined by multiplying the encoded
value by 1024.
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An endpoint accounts for the maximum offset of data that is sent or
received on a stream. Loss or reordering can mean that the maximum
offset is greater than the total size of data received on a stream.
Similarly, receiving STREAM frames might not increase the maximum
offset on a stream. A STREAM frame with a FIN bit set or RST_STREAM
causes the final offset for a stream to be fixed.
The maximum data offset on a stream MUST NOT exceed the stream flow
control offset advertised by the receiver. The sum of the maximum
data offsets of all streams (including closed streams) MUST NOT
exceed the connection flow control offset advertised by the receiver.
An endpoint MUST terminate a connection with a
QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_RECEIVED_TOO_MUCH_DATA error if it receives more
data than the largest flow control offset that it has sent, unless
this is a result of a change in the initial offsets (see
Section 7.3.2).
8.4. BLOCKED Frame
A sender sends a BLOCKED frame (type=0x05) when it is ready to send
data (and has data to send), but is currently flow control blocked.
BLOCKED frames are purely informational frames, but extremely useful
for debugging purposes. A receiver of a BLOCKED frame should simply
discard it (after possibly printing a helpful log message). The
frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The BLOCKED frame contains a single field:
Stream ID: A 32-bit unsigned number indicating the stream which is
flow control blocked. A non-zero Stream ID field specifies the
stream that is flow control blocked. When zero, the Stream ID
field indicates that the connection is flow control blocked.
8.5. RST_STREAM Frame
An endpoint may use a RST_STREAM frame (type=0x01) to abruptly
terminate a stream. The frame is as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Final Offset (64) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are:
Error code: A 32-bit error code which indicates why the stream is
being closed.
Stream ID: The 32-bit Stream ID of the stream being terminated.
Final offset: A 64-bit unsigned integer indicating the absolute byte
offset of the end of data written on this stream by the RST_STREAM
sender.
8.6. PADDING Frame
The PADDING frame (type=0x00) has no semantic value. PADDING frames
can be used to increase the size of a packet. Padding can be used to
increase an initial client packet to the minimum required size, or to
provide protection against traffic analysis for protected packets.
A PADDING frame has no content. That is, a PADDING frame consists of
the single octet that identifies the frame as a PADDING frame.
8.7. PING frame
Endpoints can use PING frames (type=0x07) to verify that their peers
are still alive or to check reachability to the peer. The PING frame
contains no additional fields. The receiver of a PING frame simply
needs to acknowledge the packet containing this frame. The PING
frame SHOULD be used to keep a connection alive when a stream is
open. The default is to send a PING frame after 15 seconds of
quiescence. A PING frame has no additional fields.
8.8. CONNECTION_CLOSE frame
An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (type=0x02) to notify its
peer that the connection is being closed. If there are open streams
that haven't been explicitly closed, they are implicitly closed when
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the connection is closed. (Ideally, a GOAWAY frame would be sent
with enough time that all streams are torn down.) The frame is as
follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reason Phrase Length (16) | [Reason Phrase (*)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields of a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame are as follows:
Error Code: A 32-bit error code which indicates the reason for
closing this connection.
Reason Phrase Length: A 16-bit unsigned number specifying the length
of the reason phrase. This may be zero if the sender chooses to
not give details beyond the Error Code.
Reason Phrase: An optional human-readable explanation for why the
connection was closed.
8.9. GOAWAY Frame
An endpoint uses a GOAWAY frame (type=0x03) to initiate a graceful
shutdown of a connection. The endpoints will continue to use any
active streams, but the sender of the GOAWAY will not initiate or
accept any additional streams beyond those indicated. The GOAWAY
frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Largest Client Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Largest Server Stream ID (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields of a GOAWAY frame are:
Largest Client Stream ID: The highest-numbered, client-initiated
stream on which the endpoint sending the GOAWAY frame either sent
data, or received and delivered data. All higher-numbered,
client-initiated streams (that is, odd-numbered streams) are
implicitly reset by sending or receiving the GOAWAY frame.
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Largest Server Stream ID: The highest-numbered, server-initiated
stream on which the endpoint sending the GOAWAY frame either sent
data, or received and delivered data. All higher-numbered,
server-initiated streams (that is, even-numbered streams) are
implicitly reset by sending or receiving the GOAWAY frame.
A GOAWAY frame indicates that any application layer actions on
streams with higher numbers than those indicated can be safely
retried because no data was exchanged. An endpoint MUST set the
value of the Largest Client or Server Stream ID to be at least as
high as the highest-numbered stream on which it either sent data or
received and delivered data to the application protocol that uses
QUIC.
An endpoint MAY choose a larger stream identifier if it wishes to
allow for a number of streams to be created. This is especially
valuable for peer-initiated streams where packets creating new
streams could be in transit; using a larger stream number allows
those streams to complete.
In addition to initiating a graceful shutdown of a connection, GOAWAY
MAY be sent immediately prior to sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame
that is sent as a result of detecting a fatal error. Higher-numbered
streams than those indicated in the GOAWAY frame can then be retried.
9. Packetization and Reliability
The Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PTMU) is the maximum size of the
entire IP header, UDP header, and UDP payload. The UDP payload
includes the QUIC public header, encrypted payload, and any
authentication fields.
All QUIC packets SHOULD be sized to fit within the estimated PMTU to
avoid IP fragmentation or packet drops. To optimize bandwidth
efficiency, endpoints SHOULD use Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery
([RFC4821]) and MAY use PMTU Discovery ([RFC1191], [RFC1981]) for
detecting the PMTU, setting the PMTU appropriately, and storing the
result of previous PMTU determinations.
In the absence of these mechanisms, QUIC endpoints SHOULD NOT send IP
packets larger than 1280 octets. Assuming the minimum IP header
size, this results in a UDP payload length of 1232 octets for IPv6
and 1252 octets for IPv4.
QUIC endpoints that implement any kind of PMTU discovery SHOULD
maintain an estimate for each combination of local and remote IP
addresses (as each pairing could have a different maximum MTU in the
path).
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QUIC depends on the network path supporting a MTU of at least 1280
octets. This is the IPv6 minimum and therefore also supported by
most modern IPv4 networks. An endpoint MUST NOT reduce their MTU
below this number, even if it receives signals that indicate a
smaller limit might exist.
Clients MUST ensure that the first packet in a connection, and any
retransmissions of those octets, has a total size (including IP and
UDP headers) of at least 1280 bytes. This might require inclusion of
PADDING frames. It is RECOMMENDED that a packet be padded to exactly
1280 octets unless the client has a reasonable assurance that the
PMTU is larger. Sending a packet of this size ensures that the
network path supports an MTU of this size and helps mitigate
amplification attacks caused by server responses toward an unverified
client address.
Servers MUST reject the first plaintext packet received from a client
if it its total size is less than 1280 octets, to mitigate
amplification attacks.
If a QUIC endpoint determines that the PMTU between any pair of local
and remote IP addresses has fallen below 1280 octets, it MUST
immediately cease sending QUIC packets between those IP addresses.
This may result in abrupt termination of the connection if all pairs
are affected. In this case, an endpoint SHOULD send a Public Reset
packet to indicate the failure. The application SHOULD attempt to
use TLS over TCP instead.
A sender bundles one or more frames in a Regular QUIC packet (see
Section 6).
A sender SHOULD minimize per-packet bandwidth and computational costs
by bundling as many frames as possible within a QUIC packet. A
sender MAY wait for a short period of time to bundle multiple frames
before sending a packet that is not maximally packed, to avoid
sending out large numbers of small packets. An implementation may
use heuristics about expected application sending behavior to
determine whether and for how long to wait. This waiting period is
an implementation decision, and an implementation should be careful
to delay conservatively, since any delay is likely to increase
application-visible latency.
Regular QUIC packets are "containers" of frames; a packet is never
retransmitted whole. How an endpoint handles the loss of the frame
depends on the type of the frame. Some frames are simply
retransmitted, some have their contents moved to new frames, and
others are never retransmitted.
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When a packet is detected as lost, the sender re-sends any frames as
necessary:
o All application data sent in STREAM frames MUST be retransmitted,
unless the endpoint has sent a RST_STREAM for that stream. When
an endpoint sends a RST_STREAM frame, data outstanding on that
stream SHOULD NOT be retransmitted, since subsequent data on this
stream is expected to not be delivered by the receiver.
o ACK and PADDING frames MUST NOT be retransmitted. ACK frames are
cumulative, so new frames containing updated information will be
sent as described in Section 8.2.
o All other frames MUST be retransmitted.
Upon detecting losses, a sender MUST take appropriate congestion
control action. The details of loss detection and congestion control
are described in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
A packet MUST NOT be acknowledged until packet protection has been
successfully removed and all frames contained in the packet have been
processed. For STREAM frames, this means the data has been queued
(but not necessarily delivered to the application). This also means
that any stream state transitions triggered by STREAM or RST_STREAM
frames have occurred. Once the packet has been fully processed, a
receiver acknowledges receipt by sending one or more ACK frames
containing the packet number of the received packet.
To avoid creating an indefinite feedback loop, an endpoint MUST NOT
generate an ACK frame in response to a packet containing only ACK or
PADDING frames.
Strategies and implications of the frequency of generating
acknowledgments are discussed in more detail in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
9.1. Special Considerations for PMTU Discovery
Traditional ICMP-based path MTU discovery in IPv4 ([RFC1191] is
potentially vulnerable to off-path attacks that successfully guess
the IP/port 4-tuple and reduce the MTU to a bandwidth-inefficient
value. TCP connections mitigate this risk by using the (at minimum)
8 bytes of transport header echoed in the ICMP message to validate
the TCP sequence number as valid for the current connection.
However, as QUIC operates over UDP, in IPv4 the echoed information
could consist only of the IP and UDP headers, which usually has
insufficient entropy to mitigate off-path attacks.
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As a result, endpoints that implement PMTUD in IPv4 SHOULD take steps
to mitigate this risk. For instance, an application could:
o Set the IPv4 Don't Fragment (DF) bit on a small proportion of
packets, so that most invalid ICMP messages arrive when there are
no DF packets outstanding, and can therefore be identified as
spurious.
o Store additional information from the IP or UDP headers from DF
packets (for example, the IP ID or UDP checksum) to further
authenticate incoming Datagram Too Big messages.
o Any reduction in PMTU due to a report contained in an ICMP packet
is provisional until QUIC's loss detection algorithm determines
that the packet is actually lost.
10. Streams: QUIC's Data Structuring Abstraction
Streams in QUIC provide a lightweight, ordered, and bidirectional
byte-stream abstraction modeled closely on HTTP/2 streams [RFC7540].
Streams can be created either by the client or the server, can
concurrently send data interleaved with other streams, and can be
cancelled.
Data that is received on a stream is delivered in order within that
stream, but there is no particular delivery order across streams.
Transmit ordering among streams is left to the implementation.
The creation and destruction of streams are expected to have minimal
bandwidth and computational cost. A single STREAM frame may create,
carry data for, and terminate a stream, or a stream may last the
entire duration of a connection.
Streams are individually flow controlled, allowing an endpoint to
limit memory commitment and to apply back pressure.
An alternative view of QUIC streams is as an elastic "message"
abstraction, similar to the way ephemeral streams are used in SST
[SST], which may be a more appealing description for some
applications.
10.1. Life of a Stream
The semantics of QUIC streams is based on HTTP/2 streams, and the
lifecycle of a QUIC stream therefore closely follows that of an
HTTP/2 stream [RFC7540], with some differences to accommodate the
possibility of out-of-order delivery due to the use of multiple
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streams in QUIC. The lifecycle of a QUIC stream is shown in the
following figure and described below.
+--------+
| |
| idle |
| |
+--------+
|
| send data/
| recv data/
| recv higher stream
|
v
+--------+
recv FIN | | send FIN
,---------| open |-----------.
/ | | \
v +--------+ v
+----------+ | +----------+
| half | | | half |
| closed | | send RST/ | closed |
| (remote) | | recv RST | (local) |
+----------+ | +----------+
| | |
| send FIN/ | recv FIN/ |
| send RST/ v send RST/ |
| recv RST +--------+ recv RST |
`------------->| |<---------------'
| closed |
| |
+--------+
send: endpoint sends this frame
recv: endpoint receives this frame
data: application data in a STREAM frame
FIN: FIN flag in a STREAM frame
RST: RST_STREAM frame
Figure 11: Lifecycle of a stream
Note that this diagram shows stream state transitions and the frames
and flags that affect those transitions only. For the purpose of
state transitions, the FIN flag is processed as a separate event to
the frame that bears it; a STREAM frame with the FIN flag set can
cause two state transitions. When the FIN flag is sent on an empty
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STREAM frame, the offset in the STREAM frame MUST be one greater than
the last data byte sent on this stream.
The recipient of a frame which changes stream state will have a
delayed view of the state of a stream while the frame is in transit.
Endpoints do not coordinate the creation of streams; they are created
unilaterally by either endpoint. The negative consequences of a
mismatch in states are limited to the "closed" state after sending
RST_STREAM, where frames might be received for some time after
closing. Endpoints can use acknowledgments to understand the peer's
subjective view of stream state at any given time.
Streams have the following states:
10.1.1. idle
All streams start in the "idle" state.
The following transitions are valid from this state:
Sending or receiving a STREAM frame causes the stream to become
"open". The stream identifier is selected as described in
Section 10.2. The same STREAM frame can also cause a stream to
immediately become "half-closed".
Receiving a STREAM frame on a peer-initiated stream (that is, a
packet sent by a server on an even-numbered stream or a client packet
on an odd-numbered stream) also causes all lower-numbered "idle"
streams in the same direction to become "open". This could occur if
a peer begins sending on streams in a different order to their
creation, or it could happen if packets are lost or reordered in
transit.
Receiving any frame other than STREAM or RST_STREAM on a stream in
this state MUST be treated as a connection error (Section 12) of type
YYYY.
10.1.2. open
A stream in the "open" state may be used by both peers to send frames
of any type. In this state, a sending peer must observe the flow-
control limit advertised by its receiving peer (Section 11).
From this state, either endpoint can send a frame with the FIN flag
set, which causes the stream to transition into one of the "half-
closed" states. An endpoint sending an FIN flag causes the stream
state to become "half-closed (local)". An endpoint receiving a FIN
flag causes the stream state to become "half-closed (remote)" once
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all preceding data has arrived. The receiving endpoint MUST NOT
consider the stream state to have changed until all data has arrived.
Either endpoint can send a RST_STREAM frame from this state, causing
it to transition immediately to "closed".
10.1.3. half-closed (local)
A stream that is in the "half-closed (local)" state MUST NOT be used
for sending STREAM frames; WINDOW_UPDATE and RST_STREAM MAY be sent
in this state.
A stream transitions from this state to "closed" when a STREAM frame
that contains a FIN flag is received and all prior data has arrived,
or when either peer sends a RST_STREAM frame.
An endpoint that closes a stream MUST NOT send data beyond the final
offset that it has chosen, see Section 10.1.5 for details.
An endpoint can receive any type of frame in this state. Providing
flow-control credit using WINDOW_UPDATE frames is necessary to
continue receiving flow-controlled frames. In this state, a receiver
MAY ignore WINDOW_UPDATE frames for this stream, which might arrive
for a short period after a frame bearing the FIN flag is sent.
10.1.4. half-closed (remote)
A stream that is "half-closed (remote)" is no longer being used by
the peer to send any data. In this state, a sender is no longer
obligated to maintain a receiver stream-level flow-control window.
A stream that is in the "half-closed (remote)" state will have a
final offset for received data, see Section 10.1.5 for details.
A stream in this state can be used by the endpoint to send frames of
any type. In this state, the endpoint continues to observe
advertised stream-level and connection-level flow-control limits
(Section 11).
A stream can transition from this state to "closed" by sending a
frame that contains a FIN flag or when either peer sends a RST_STREAM
frame.
10.1.5. closed
The "closed" state is the terminal state.
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An endpoint will learn the final offset of the data it receives on a
stream when it enters the "half-closed (remote)" or "closed" state.
The final offset is carried explicitly in the RST_STREAM frame;
otherwise, the final offset is the offset of the end of the data
carried in STREAM frame marked with a FIN flag.
An endpoint MUST NOT send data on a stream at or beyond the final
offset.
Once a final offset for a stream is known, it cannot change. If a
RST_STREAM or STREAM frame causes the final offset to change for a
stream, an endpoint SHOULD respond with a
QUIC_STREAM_DATA_AFTER_TERMINATION error (see Section 12). A
receiver SHOULD treat receipt of data at or beyond the final offset
as a QUIC_STREAM_DATA_AFTER_TERMINATION error. Generating these
errors is not mandatory, but only because requiring that an endpoint
generate these errors also means that the endpoint needs to maintain
the final offset state for closed streams, which could mean a
significant state commitment.
An endpoint that receives a RST_STREAM frame (and which has not sent
a FIN or a RST_STREAM) MUST immediately respond with a RST_STREAM
frame, and MUST NOT send any more data on the stream. This endpoint
may continue receiving frames for the stream on which a RST_STREAM is
received.
If this state is reached as a result of sending a RST_STREAM frame,
the peer that receives the RST_STREAM frame might have already sent -
or enqueued for sending - frames on the stream that cannot be
withdrawn. An endpoint MUST ignore frames that it receives on closed
streams after it has sent a RST_STREAM frame. An endpoint MAY choose
to limit the period over which it ignores frames and treat frames
that arrive after this time as being in error.
STREAM frames received after sending RST_STREAM are counted toward
the connection and stream flow-control windows. Even though these
frames might be ignored, because they are sent before their sender
receives the RST_STREAM, the sender will consider the frames to count
against its flow-control windows.
In the absence of more specific guidance elsewhere in this document,
implementations SHOULD treat the receipt of a frame that is not
expressly permitted in the description of a state as a connection
error (Section 12). Frames of unknown types are ignored.
(TODO: QUIC_STREAM_NO_ERROR is a special case. Write it up.)
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10.2. Stream Identifiers
Streams are identified by an unsigned 32-bit integer, referred to as
the StreamID. To avoid StreamID collision, clients MUST initiate
streams usinge odd-numbered StreamIDs; streams initiated by the
server MUST use even-numbered StreamIDs.
A StreamID of zero (0x0) is reserved and used for connection-level
flow control frames (Section 11); the StreamID of zero cannot be used
to establish a new stream.
StreamID 1 (0x1) is reserved for the cryptographic handshake.
StreamID 1 MUST NOT be used for application data, and MUST be the
first client-initiated stream.
A QUIC endpoint cannot reuse a StreamID on a given connection.
Streams MUST be created in sequential order. Open streams can be
used in any order. Streams that are used out of order result in
lower-numbered streams in the same direction being counted as open.
All streams, including stream 1, count toward this limit. Thus, a
concurrent stream limit of 0 will cause a connection to be unusable.
Application protocols that use QUIC might require a certain minimum
number of streams to function correctly. If a peer advertises an
concurrent stream limit (concurrent_streams) that is too small for
the selected application protocol to function, an endpoint MUST
terminate the connection with an error of type
QUIC_TOO_MANY_OPEN_STREAMS (Section 12).
10.3. Stream Concurrency
An endpoint limits the number of concurrently active incoming streams
by setting the concurrent stream limit (see Section 7.3.1) in the
transport parameters. The maximum concurrent streams setting is
specific to each endpoint and applies only to the peer that receives
the setting. That is, clients specify the maximum number of
concurrent streams the server can initiate, and servers specify the
maximum number of concurrent streams the client can initiate.
Streams that are in the "open" state or in either of the "half-
closed" states count toward the maximum number of streams that an
endpoint is permitted to open. Streams in any of these three states
count toward the limit advertised in the concurrent stream limit.
A recently closed stream MUST also be considered to count toward this
limit until packets containing all frames required to close the
stream have been acknowledged. For a stream which closed cleanly,
this means all STREAM frames have been acknowledged; for a stream
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which closed abruptly, this means the RST_STREAM frame has been
acknowledged.
Endpoints MUST NOT exceed the limit set by their peer. An endpoint
that receives a STREAM frame that causes its advertised concurrent
stream limit to be exceeded MUST treat this as a stream error of type
QUIC_TOO_MANY_OPEN_STREAMS (Section 12).
10.4. Sending and Receiving Data
Once a stream is created, endpoints may use the stream to send and
receive data. Each endpoint may send a series of STREAM frames
encapsulating data on a stream until the stream is terminated in that
direction. Streams are an ordered byte-stream abstraction, and they
have no other structure within them. STREAM frame boundaries are not
expected to be preserved in retransmissions from the sender or during
delivery to the application at the receiver.
When new data is to be sent on a stream, a sender MUST set the
encapsulating STREAM frame's offset field to the stream offset of the
first byte of this new data. The first byte of data that is sent on
a stream has the stream offset 0. The largest offset delivered on a
stream MUST be less than 2^64. A receiver MUST ensure that received
stream data is delivered to the application as an ordered byte-
stream. Data received out of order MUST be buffered for later
delivery, as long as it is not in violation of the receiver's flow
control limits.
The cryptographic handshake stream, Stream 1, MUST NOT be subject to
congestion control or connection-level flow control, but MUST be
subject to stream-level flow control. An endpoint MUST NOT send data
on any other stream without consulting the congestion controller and
the flow controller.
Flow control is described in detail in Section 11, and congestion
control is described in the companion document [QUIC-RECOVERY].
10.5. Stream Prioritization
Stream multiplexing has a significant effect on application
performance if resources allocated to streams are correctly
prioritized. Experience with other multiplexed protocols, such as
HTTP/2 [RFC7540], shows that effective prioritization strategies have
a significant positive impact on performance.
QUIC does not provide frames for exchanging priotization information.
Instead it relies on receiving priority information from the
application that uses QUIC. Protocols that use QUIC are able to
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define any prioritization scheme that suits their application
semantics. A protocol might define explicit messages for signaling
priority, such as those defined in HTTP/2; it could define rules that
allow an endpoint to determine priority based on context; or it could
leave the determination to the application.
A QUIC implementation SHOULD provide ways in which an application can
indicate the relative priority of streams. When deciding which
streams to dedicate resources to, QUIC SHOULD use the information
provided by the application. Failure to account for priority of
streams can result in suboptimal performance.
Stream priority is most relevant when deciding which stream data will
be transmitted. Often, there will be limits on what can be
transmitted as a result of connection flow control or the current
congestion controller state.
Giving preference to the transmission of its own management frames
ensures that the protocol functions efficiently. That is,
prioritizing frames other than STREAM frames ensures that loss
recovery, congestion control, and flow control operate effectively.
Stream 1 MUST be prioritized over other streams prior to the
completion of the cryptographic handshake. This includes the
retransmission of the second flight of client handshake messages,
that is, the TLS Finished and any client authentication messages.
STREAM frames that are determined to be lost SHOULD be retransmitted
before sending new data, unless application priorities indicate
otherwise. Retransmitting lost STREAM frames can fill in gaps, which
allows the peer to consume already received data and free up flow
control window.
11. Flow Control
It is necessary to limit the amount of data that a sender may have
outstanding at any time, so as to prevent a fast sender from
overwhelming a slow receiver, or to prevent a malicious sender from
consuming significant resources at a receiver. This section
describes QUIC's flow-control mechanisms.
QUIC employs a credit-based flow-control scheme similar to HTTP/2's
flow control [RFC7540]. A receiver advertises the number of octets
it is prepared to receive on a given stream and for the entire
connection. This leads to two levels of flow control in QUIC: (i)
Connection flow control, which prevents senders from exceeding a
receiver's buffer capacity for the connection, and (ii) Stream flow
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control, which prevents a single stream from consuming the entire
receive buffer for a connection.
A receiver sends WINDOW_UPDATE frames to the sender to advertise
additional credit by sending the absolute byte offset in the stream
or in the connection which it is willing to receive.
The initial flow control credit is 65536 bytes for both the stream
and connection flow controllers.
A receiver MAY advertise a larger offset at any point in the
connection by sending a WINDOW_UPDATE frame. A receiver MUST NOT
renege on an advertisement; that is, once a receiver advertises an
offset via a WINDOW_UPDATE frame, it MUST NOT subsequently advertise
a smaller offset. A sender may receive WINDOW_UPDATE frames out of
order; a sender MUST therefore ignore any WINDOW_UPDATE that does not
move the window forward.
A receiver MUST close the connection with a
QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_RECEIVED_TOO_MUCH_DATA error (Section 12) if the
peer violates the advertised stream or connection flow control
windows.
A sender MUST send BLOCKED frames to indicate it has data to write
but is blocked by lack of connection or stream flow control credit.
BLOCKED frames are expected to be sent infrequently in common cases,
but they are considered useful for debugging and monitoring purposes.
A receiver advertises credit for a stream by sending a WINDOW_UPDATE
frame with the StreamID set appropriately. A receiver may use the
current offset of data consumed to determine the flow control offset
to be advertised. A receiver MAY send copies of a WINDOW_UPDATE
frame in multiple packets in order to make sure that the sender
receives it before running out of flow control credit, even if one of
the packets is lost.
Connection flow control is a limit to the total bytes of stream data
sent in STREAM frames on all streams contributing to connection flow
control. A receiver advertises credit for a connection by sending a
WINDOW_UPDATE frame with the StreamID set to zero (0x00). A receiver
maintains a cumulative sum of bytes received on all streams
contributing to connection-level flow control, to check for flow
control violations. A receiver may maintain a cumulative sum of
bytes consumed on all contributing streams to determine the
connection-level flow control offset to be advertised.
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11.1. Edge Cases and Other Considerations
There are some edge cases which must be considered when dealing with
stream and connection level flow control. Given enough time, both
endpoints must agree on flow control state. If one end believes it
can send more than the other end is willing to receive, the
connection will be torn down when too much data arrives. Conversely
if a sender believes it is blocked, while endpoint B expects more
data can be received, then the connection can be in a deadlock, with
the sender waiting for a WINDOW_UPDATE which will never come.
11.1.1. Mid-stream RST_STREAM
On receipt of a RST_STREAM frame, an endpoint will tear down state
for the matching stream and ignore further data arriving on that
stream. This could result in the endpoints getting out of sync,
since the RST_STREAM frame may have arrived out of order and there
may be further bytes in flight. The data sender would have counted
the data against its connection level flow control budget, but a
receiver that has not received these bytes would not know to include
them as well. The receiver must learn the number of bytes that were
sent on the stream to make the same adjustment in its connection flow
controller.
To avoid this de-synchronization, a RST_STREAM sender MUST include
the final byte offset sent on the stream in the RST_STREAM frame. On
receiving a RST_STREAM frame, a receiver definitively knows how many
bytes were sent on that stream before the RST_STREAM frame, and the
receiver MUST use the final offset to account for all bytes sent on
the stream in its connection level flow controller.
11.1.2. Response to a RST_STREAM
Since streams are bidirectional, a sender of a RST_STREAM needs to
know how many bytes the peer has sent on the stream. If an endpoint
receives a RST_STREAM frame and has sent neither a FIN nor a
RST_STREAM, it MUST send a RST_STREAM in response, bearing the offset
of the last byte sent on this stream as the final offset.
11.1.3. Offset Increment
This document leaves when and how many bytes to advertise in a
WINDOW_UPDATE to the implementation, but offers a few considerations.
WINDOW_UPDATE frames constitute overhead, and therefore, sending a
WINDOW_UPDATE with small offset increments is undesirable. At the
same time, sending WINDOW_UPDATES with large offset increments
requires the sender to commit to that amount of buffer.
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Implementations must find the correct tradeoff between these sides to
determine how large an offset increment to send in a WINDOW_UPDATE.
A receiver MAY use an autotuning mechanism to tune the size of the
offset increment to advertise based on a roundtrip time estimate and
the rate at which the receiving application consumes data, similar to
common TCP implementations.
11.1.4. BLOCKED frames
If a sender does not receive a WINDOW_UPDATE frame when it has run
out of flow control credit, the sender will be blocked and MUST send
a BLOCKED frame. A BLOCKED frame is expected to be useful for
debugging at the receiver. A receiver SHOULD NOT wait for a BLOCKED
frame before sending a WINDOW_UPDATE, since doing so will cause at
least one roundtrip of quiescence. For smooth operation of the
congestion controller, it is generally considered best to not let the
sender go into quiescence if avoidable. To avoid blocking a sender,
and to reasonably account for the possibiity of loss, a receiver
should send a WINDOW_UPDATE frame at least two roundtrips before it
expects the sender to get blocked.
12. Error Handling
An endpoint that detects an error SHOULD signal the existence of that
error to its peer. Errors can affect an entire connection (see
Section 12.1), or a single stream (see Section 12.2).
The most appropriate error code (Section 12.3) SHOULD be included in
the frame that signals the error. Where this specification
identifies error conditions, it also identifies the error code that
is used.
Public Reset is not suitable for any error that can be signaled with
a CONNECTION_CLOSE or RST_STREAM frame. Public Reset MUST NOT be
sent by an endpoint that has the state necessary to send a frame on
the connection.
12.1. Connection Errors
Errors that result in the connection being unusable, such as an
obvious violation of protocol semantics or corruption of state that
affects an entire connection, MUST be signaled using a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (Section 8.8). An endpoint MAY close the
connection in this manner, even if the error only affects a single
stream.
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A CONNECTION_CLOSE frame could be sent in a packet that is lost. An
endpoint SHOULD be prepared to retransmit a packet containing a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame if it receives more packets on a terminated
connection. Limiting the number of retransmissions and the time over
which this final packet is sent limits the effort expended on
terminated connections.
An endpoint that chooses not to retransmit packets containing
CONNECTION_CLOSE risks a peer missing the first such packet. The
only mechanism available to an endpoint that continues to receive
data for a terminated connection is to send a Public Reset packet.
12.2. Stream Errors
If the error affects a single stream, but otherwise leaves the
connection in a recoverable state, the endpoint can sent a RST_STREAM
frame (Section 8.5) with an appropriate error code to terminate just
the affected stream.
Stream 1 is critical to the functioning of the entire connection. If
stream 1 is closed with either a RST_STREAM or STREAM frame bearing
the FIN flag, an endpoint MUST generate a connection error of type
QUIC_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM.
Some application protocols make other streams critical to that
protocol. An application protocol does not need to inform the
transport that a stream is critical; it can instead generate
appropriate errors in response to being notified that the critical
stream is closed.
An endpoint MAY send a RST_STREAM frame in the same packet as a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.
12.3. Error Codes
Error codes are 32 bits long, with the first two bits indicating the
source of the error code:
0x00000000-0x3FFFFFFF: Application-specific error codes. Defined by
each application-layer protocol.
0x40000000-0x7FFFFFFF: Reserved for host-local error codes. These
codes MUST NOT be sent to a peer, but MAY be used in API return
codes and logs.
0x80000000-0xBFFFFFFF: QUIC transport error codes, including packet
protection errors. Applicable to all uses of QUIC.
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0xC0000000-0xFFFFFFFF: Cryptographic error codes. Defined by the
cryptographic handshake protocol in use.
This section lists the defined QUIC transport error codes that may be
used in a CONNECTION_CLOSE or RST_STREAM frame. Error codes share a
common code space. Some error codes apply only to either streams or
the entire connection and have no defined semantics in the other
context.
QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR (0x80000001): Connection has reached an invalid
state.
QUIC_STREAM_DATA_AFTER_TERMINATION (0x80000002): There were data
frames after the a fin or reset.
QUIC_INVALID_PACKET_HEADER (0x80000003): Control frame is malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_FRAME_DATA (0x80000004): Frame data is malformed.
QUIC_MULTIPLE_TERMINATION_OFFSETS (0x80000005): Multiple final
offset values were received on the same stream
QUIC_STREAM_CANCELLED (0x80000006): The stream was cancelled
QUIC_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM (0x80000007): A stream that is critical
to the protocol was closed.
QUIC_MISSING_PAYLOAD (0x80000030): The packet contained no payload.
QUIC_INVALID_STREAM_DATA (0x8000002E): STREAM frame data is
malformed.
QUIC_UNENCRYPTED_STREAM_DATA (0x8000003D): Received STREAM frame
data is not encrypted.
QUIC_MAYBE_CORRUPTED_MEMORY (0x80000059): Received a frame which is
likely the result of memory corruption.
QUIC_INVALID_RST_STREAM_DATA (0x80000006): RST_STREAM frame data is
malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_CONNECTION_CLOSE_DATA (0x80000007): CONNECTION_CLOSE
frame data is malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_GOAWAY_DATA (0x80000008): GOAWAY frame data is
malformed.
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QUIC_INVALID_WINDOW_UPDATE_DATA (0x80000039): WINDOW_UPDATE frame
data is malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_BLOCKED_DATA (0x8000003A): BLOCKED frame data is
malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_PATH_CLOSE_DATA (0x8000004E): PATH_CLOSE frame data is
malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_ACK_DATA (0x80000009): ACK frame data is malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_VERSION_NEGOTIATION_PACKET (0x8000000A): Version
negotiation packet is malformed.
QUIC_INVALID_PUBLIC_RST_PACKET (0x8000000b): Public RST packet is
malformed.
QUIC_DECRYPTION_FAILURE (0x8000000c): There was an error decrypting.
QUIC_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE (0x8000000d): There was an error encrypting.
QUIC_PACKET_TOO_LARGE (0x8000000e): The packet exceeded
kMaxPacketSize.
QUIC_PEER_GOING_AWAY (0x80000010): The peer is going away. May be a
client or server.
QUIC_INVALID_STREAM_ID (0x80000011): A stream ID was invalid.
QUIC_INVALID_PRIORITY (0x80000031): A priority was invalid.
QUIC_TOO_MANY_OPEN_STREAMS (0x80000012): Too many streams already
open.
QUIC_TOO_MANY_AVAILABLE_STREAMS (0x8000004c): The peer created too
many available streams.
QUIC_PUBLIC_RESET (0x80000013): Received public reset for this
connection.
QUIC_INVALID_VERSION (0x80000014): Invalid protocol version.
QUIC_INVALID_HEADER_ID (0x80000016): The Header ID for a stream was
too far from the previous.
QUIC_INVALID_NEGOTIATED_VALUE (0x80000017): Negotiable parameter
received during handshake had invalid value.
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QUIC_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE (0x80000018): There was an error
decompressing data.
QUIC_NETWORK_IDLE_TIMEOUT (0x80000019): The connection timed out due
to no network activity.
QUIC_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT (0x80000043): The connection timed out
waiting for the handshake to complete.
QUIC_ERROR_MIGRATING_ADDRESS (0x8000001a): There was an error
encountered migrating addresses.
QUIC_ERROR_MIGRATING_PORT (0x80000056): There was an error
encountered migrating port only.
QUIC_EMPTY_STREAM_FRAME_NO_FIN (0x80000032): We received a
STREAM_FRAME with no data and no fin flag set.
QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_RECEIVED_TOO_MUCH_DATA (0x8000003b): The peer
received too much data, violating flow control.
QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_SENT_TOO_MUCH_DATA (0x8000003f): The peer sent too
much data, violating flow control.
QUIC_FLOW_CONTROL_INVALID_WINDOW (0x80000040): The peer received an
invalid flow control window.
QUIC_CONNECTION_IP_POOLED (0x8000003e): The connection has been IP
pooled into an existing connection.
QUIC_TOO_MANY_OUTSTANDING_SENT_PACKETS (0x80000044): The connection
has too many outstanding sent packets.
QUIC_TOO_MANY_OUTSTANDING_RECEIVED_PACKETS (0x80000045): The
connection has too many outstanding received packets.
QUIC_CONNECTION_CANCELLED (0x80000046): The QUIC connection has been
cancelled.
QUIC_BAD_PACKET_LOSS_RATE (0x80000047): Disabled QUIC because of
high packet loss rate.
QUIC_PUBLIC_RESETS_POST_HANDSHAKE (0x80000049): Disabled QUIC
because of too many PUBLIC_RESETs post handshake.
QUIC_TIMEOUTS_WITH_OPEN_STREAMS (0x8000004a): Disabled QUIC because
of too many timeouts with streams open.
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QUIC_TOO_MANY_RTOS (0x80000055): QUIC timed out after too many RTOs.
QUIC_ENCRYPTION_LEVEL_INCORRECT (0x8000002c): A packet was received
with the wrong encryption level (i.e. it should have been
encrypted but was not.)
QUIC_VERSION_NEGOTIATION_MISMATCH (0x80000037): This connection
involved a version negotiation which appears to have been tampered
with.
QUIC_IP_ADDRESS_CHANGED (0x80000050): IP address changed causing
connection close.
QUIC_ADDRESS_VALIDATION_FAILURE (0x80000051): Client address
validation failed.
QUIC_TOO_MANY_FRAME_GAPS (0x8000005d): Stream frames arrived too
discontiguously so that stream sequencer buffer maintains too many
gaps.
QUIC_TOO_MANY_SESSIONS_ON_SERVER (0x80000060): Connection closed
because server hit max number of sessions allowed.
13. Security and Privacy Considerations
13.1. Spoofed ACK Attack
An attacker receives an STK from the server and then releases the IP
address on which it received the STK. The attacker may, in the
future, spoof this same address (which now presumably addresses a
different endpoint), and initiate a 0-RTT connection with a server on
the victim's behalf. The attacker then spoofs ACK frames to the
server which cause the server to potentially drown the victim in
data.
There are two possible mitigations to this attack. The simplest one
is that a server can unilaterally create a gap in packet-number
space. In the non-attack scenario, the client will send an ACK frame
with the larger value for largest acknowledged. In the attack
scenario, the attacker could acknowledge a packet in the gap. If the
server sees an acknowledgment for a packet that was never sent, the
connection can be aborted.
The second mitigation is that the server can require that
acknowledgments for sent packets match the encryption level of the
sent packet. This mitigation is useful if the connection has an
ephemeral forward-secure key that is generated and used for every new
connection. If a packet sent is encrypted with a forward-secure key,
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then any acknowledgments that are received for them MUST also be
forward-secure encrypted. Since the attacker will not have the
forward secure key, the attacker will not be able to generate
forward-secure encrypted packets with ACK frames.
14. IANA Considerations
14.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry
IANA [SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Transport Parameters"
under a "QUIC Protocol" heading.
The "QUIC Transport Parameters" registry governs a 16-bit space.
This space is split into two spaces that are governed by different
policies. Values with the first byte in the range 0x00 to 0xfe (in
hexadecimal) are assigned via the Specification Required policy
[RFC5226]. Values with the first byte 0xff are reserved for Private
Use [RFC5226].
Registrations MUST include the following fields:
Value: The numeric value of the assignment (registrations will be
between 0x0000 and 0xfeff).
Parameter Name: A short mnemonic for the parameter.
Specification: A reference to a publicly available specification for
the value.
The nominated expert(s) verify that a specification exists and is
readily accessible. The expert(s) are encouraged to be biased
towards approving registrations unless they are abusive, frivolous,
or actively harmful (not merely aesthetically displeasing, or
architecturally dubious).
The initial contents of this registry are shown in Table 4.
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+--------+------------------------+---------------+
| Value | Parameter Name | Specification |
+--------+------------------------+---------------+
| 0x0000 | stream_fc_offset | Section 7.3.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0001 | connection_fc_offset | Section 7.3.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0002 | concurrent_streams | Section 7.3.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0003 | idle_timeout | Section 7.3.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0004 | truncate_connection_id | Section 7.3.1 |
+--------+------------------------+---------------+
Table 4: Initial QUIC Transport Parameters Entries
15. References
15.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19 (work in progress),
March 2017.
[QUIC-RECOVERY]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control".
[QUIC-TLS]
Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using Transport
Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC".
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 1981, DOI 10.17487/RFC1981, August
1996, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1981>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
15.2. Informative References
[EARLY-DESIGN]
Roskind, J., "QUIC: Multiplexed Transport Over UDP",
December 2013, <https://goo.gl/dMVtFi>.
[RFC2360] Scott, G., "Guide for Internet Standards Writers", BCP 22,
RFC 2360, DOI 10.17487/RFC2360, June 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2360>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
"TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
Addresses", RFC 6824, DOI 10.17487/RFC6824, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6824>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[SST] Ford, B., "Structured Streams: A New Transport
Abstraction", DOI 10.1145/1282427.1282421, ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review Volume 37 Issue 4,
October 2007.
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15.3. URIs
[1] https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/wiki/QUIC-Versions
Appendix A. Contributors
The original authors of this specification were Ryan Hamilton, Jana
Iyengar, Ian Swett, and Alyssa Wilk.
The original design and rationale behind this protocol draw
significantly from work by Jim Roskind [EARLY-DESIGN]. In
alphabetical order, the contributors to the pre-IETF QUIC project at
Google are: Britt Cyr, Jeremy Dorfman, Ryan Hamilton, Jana Iyengar,
Fedor Kouranov, Charles Krasic, Jo Kulik, Adam Langley, Jim Roskind,
Robbie Shade, Satyam Shekhar, Cherie Shi, Ian Swett, Raman Tenneti,
Victor Vasiliev, Antonio Vicente, Patrik Westin, Alyssa Wilk, Dale
Worley, Fan Yang, Dan Zhang, Daniel Ziegler.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
Special thanks are due to the following for helping shape pre-IETF
QUIC and its deployment: Chris Bentzel, Misha Efimov, Roberto Peon,
Alistair Riddoch, Siddharth Vijayakrishnan, and Assar Westerlund.
This document has benefited immensely from various private
discussions and public ones on the quic@ietf.org and proto-
quic@chromium.org mailing lists. Our thanks to all.
Appendix C. Change Log
*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
publication of a final version of this document.
Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp.
C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01:
o Defined short and long packet headers (#40, #148, #361)
o Defined a versioning scheme and stable fields (#51, #361)
o Define reserved version values for "greasing" negotiation (#112,
#278)
o The initial packet number is randomized (#35, #283)
o Narrow the packet number encoding range requirement (#67, #286,
#299, #323, #356)
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o Defined client address validation (#52, #118, #120, #275)
o Define transport parameters as a TLS extension (#122)
o SCUP and COPT parameters are no longer valid (#116, #117)
o Transport parameters for 0-RTT are either remembered from before,
or assume default values (#126)
o The server chooses connection IDs in its final flight (#119, #349,
#361)
o The server echoes the Connection ID and packet number fields when
sending a Version Negotiation packet (#133, #295, #244)
o Definied a minimum packet size for the initial handshake packet
from the client (#69, #136, #139, #164)
o Path MTU Discovery (#64, #106)
o The initial handshake packet from the client needs to fit in a
single packet (#338)
o Forbid acknowledgment of packets containing only ACK and PADDING
(#291)
o Require that frames are processed when packets are acknowledged
(#381, #341)
o Removed the STOP_WAITING frame (#66)
o Don't require retransmission of old timestamps for lost ACK frames
(#308)
o Clarified that frames are not retransmitted, but the information
in them can be (#157, #298)
o Error handling definitions (#335)
o Split error codes into four sections (#74)
o Forbid the use of Public Reset where CONNECTION_CLOSE is possible
(#289)
o Define packet protection rules (#336)
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o Require that stream be entirely delivered or reset, including
acknowledgment of all STREAM frames or the RST_STREAM, before it
closes (#381)
o Remove stream reservation from state machine (#174, #280)
o Only stream 0 does not contributing to connection-level flow
control (#204)
o Stream 1 counts towards the maximum concurrent stream limit (#201,
#282)
o Remove connection-level flow control exclusion for some streams
(except 1) (#246)
o RST_STREAM affects connection-level flow control (#162, #163)
o Flow control accounting uses the maximum data offset on each
stream, rather than bytes received (#378)
o Moved length-determining fields to the start of STREAM and ACK
(#168, #277)
o Added the ability to pad between frames (#158, #276)
o Remove error code and reason phrase from GOAWAY (#352, #355)
o GOAWAY includes a final stream number for both directions (#347)
o Error codes for RST_STREAM and CONNECTION_CLOSE are now at a
consistent offset (#249)
o Defined priority as the responsibility of the application protocol
(#104, #303)
C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00:
o Replaced DIVERSIFICATION_NONCE flag with KEY_PHASE flag
o Defined versioning
o Reworked description of packet and frame layout
o Error code space is divided into regions for each component
o Use big endian for all numeric values
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C.3. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01:
o Adopted as base for draft-ietf-quic-tls.
o Updated authors/editors list.
o Added IANA Considerations section.
o Moved Contributors and Acknowledgments to appendices.
Authors' Addresses
Jana Iyengar (editor)
Google
Email: jri@google.com
Martin Thomson (editor)
Mozilla
Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com
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