QUIC J. Iyengar, Ed.
Internet-Draft Fastly
Intended status: Standards Track M. Thomson, Ed.
Expires: September 12, 2019 Mozilla
March 11, 2019
QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport
draft-ietf-quic-transport-19
Abstract
This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol.
Accompanying documents describe QUIC's loss detection and congestion
control and the use of TLS for key negotiation.
Note to Readers
Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group
mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic>.
Working Group information can be found at <https://github.com/
quicwg>; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at
<https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/-transport>.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. Stream Types and Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Sending and Receiving Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Stream Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Stream States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Sending Stream States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2. Receiving Stream States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3. Permitted Frame Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4. Bidirectional Stream States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.5. Solicited State Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Data Flow Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. Flow Credit Increments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3. Handling Stream Cancellation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.4. Stream Final Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5. Controlling Concurrency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. Connection ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.1. Issuing Connection IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.2. Consuming and Retiring Connection IDs . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Matching Packets to Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.1. Client Packet Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.2. Server Packet Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3. Life of a QUIC Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1. Sending Version Negotiation Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. Handling Version Negotiation Packets . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2.1. Version Negotiation Between Draft Versions . . . . . 29
6.3. Using Reserved Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1. Example Handshake Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.2. Negotiating Connection IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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7.3. Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.3.1. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT . . . . . . 34
7.3.2. New Transport Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8. Address Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.1. Address Validation During Connection Establishment . . . 35
8.1.1. Address Validation using Retry Packets . . . . . . . 36
8.1.2. Address Validation for Future Connections . . . . . . 37
8.1.3. Address Validation Token Integrity . . . . . . . . . 39
8.2. Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.3. Initiating Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.4. Path Validation Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.5. Successful Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.6. Failed Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
9. Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.1. Probing a New Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9.2. Initiating Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9.3. Responding to Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9.3.1. Peer Address Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9.3.2. On-Path Address Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9.3.3. Off-Path Packet Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9.4. Loss Detection and Congestion Control . . . . . . . . . . 46
9.5. Privacy Implications of Connection Migration . . . . . . 47
9.6. Server's Preferred Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9.6.1. Communicating A Preferred Address . . . . . . . . . . 48
9.6.2. Responding to Connection Migration . . . . . . . . . 49
9.6.3. Interaction of Client Migration and Preferred Address 49
9.7. Use of IPv6 Flow-Label and Migration . . . . . . . . . . 50
10. Connection Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.1. Closing and Draining Connection States . . . . . . . . . 50
10.2. Idle Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.3. Immediate Close . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.4. Stateless Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.4.1. Detecting a Stateless Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
10.4.2. Calculating a Stateless Reset Token . . . . . . . . 56
10.4.3. Looping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
11. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.1. Connection Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11.2. Stream Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12. Packets and Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12.1. Protected Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
12.2. Coalescing Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
12.3. Packet Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
12.4. Frames and Frame Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
13. Packetization and Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
13.1. Packet Processing and Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . 65
13.1.1. Sending ACK Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
13.1.2. ACK Frames and Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . 67
13.2. Retransmission of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
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13.3. Explicit Congestion Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
13.3.1. ECN Counts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13.3.2. ECN Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
14. Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
14.1. Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) . . . . . . . . . 73
14.2. ICMP Packet Too Big Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
14.3. Datagram Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery . . . . . . 74
15. Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
16. Variable-Length Integer Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
17. Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
17.1. Packet Number Encoding and Decoding . . . . . . . . . . 77
17.2. Long Header Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
17.2.1. Version Negotiation Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
17.2.2. Initial Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
17.2.3. 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
17.2.4. Handshake Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
17.2.5. Retry Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
17.3. Short Header Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
18. Transport Parameter Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
18.1. Transport Parameter Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
19. Frame Types and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
19.1. PADDING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
19.2. PING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
19.3. ACK Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
19.3.1. ACK Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
19.3.2. ECN Counts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
19.4. RESET_STREAM Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
19.5. STOP_SENDING Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
19.6. CRYPTO Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
19.7. NEW_TOKEN Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
19.8. STREAM Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
19.9. MAX_DATA Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.10. MAX_STREAM_DATA Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
19.11. MAX_STREAMS Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
19.12. DATA_BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
19.13. STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
19.14. STREAMS_BLOCKED Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
19.15. NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
19.16. RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
19.17. PATH_CHALLENGE Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
19.18. PATH_RESPONSE Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
19.19. CONNECTION_CLOSE Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
19.20. Extension Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
20. Transport Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
20.1. Application Protocol Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
21. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
21.1. Handshake Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
21.2. Amplification Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
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21.3. Optimistic ACK Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
21.4. Slowloris Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
21.5. Stream Fragmentation and Reassembly Attacks . . . . . . 115
21.6. Stream Commitment Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
21.7. Explicit Congestion Notification Attacks . . . . . . . . 116
21.8. Stateless Reset Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
21.9. Version Downgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
22. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
22.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 117
22.2. QUIC Frame Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
22.3. QUIC Transport Error Codes Registry . . . . . . . . . . 119
23. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
23.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
23.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Appendix A. Sample Packet Number Decoding Algorithm . . . . . . 125
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-18 . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-17 . . . . . . . . . . . 126
B.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-16 . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-15 . . . . . . . . . . . 128
B.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-14 . . . . . . . . . . . 128
B.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-13 . . . . . . . . . . . 128
B.7. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-12 . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.8. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-11 . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.9. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-10 . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.10. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-09 . . . . . . . . . . . 131
B.11. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-08 . . . . . . . . . . . 132
B.12. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-07 . . . . . . . . . . . 132
B.13. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-06 . . . . . . . . . . . 133
B.14. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-05 . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.15. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-04 . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.16. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 135
B.17. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 135
B.18. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 136
B.19. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B.20. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01 . . . . . 138
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
1. Introduction
QUIC is a multiplexed and secure general-purpose transport protocol
that provides:
o Stream multiplexing
o Stream and connection-level flow control
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o Low-latency connection establishment
o Connection migration and resilience to NAT rebinding
o Authenticated and encrypted header and payload
QUIC uses UDP as a substrate to avoid requiring changes to legacy
client operating systems and middleboxes. QUIC authenticates all of
its headers and encrypts most of the data it exchanges, including its
signaling, to avoid incurring a dependency on middleboxes.
1.1. Document Structure
This document describes the core QUIC protocol and is structured as
follows.
o Streams are the basic service abstraction that QUIC provides.
* Section 2 describes core concepts related to streams,
* Section 3 provides a reference model for stream states, and
* Section 4 outlines the operation of flow control.
o Connections are the context in which QUIC endpoints communicate.
* Section 5 describes core concepts related to connections,
* Section 6 describes version negotiation,
* Section 7 details the process for establishing connections,
* Section 8 specifies critical denial of service mitigation
mechanisms,
* Section 9 describes how endpoints migrate a connection to a new
network path,
* Section 10 lists the options for terminating an open
connection, and
* Section 11 provides general guidance for error handling.
o Packets and frames are the basic unit used by QUIC to communicate.
* Section 12 describes concepts related to packets and frames,
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* Section 13 defines models for the transmission, retransmission,
and acknowledgement of data, and
* Section 14 specifies rules for managing the size of packets.
o Finally, encoding details of QUIC protocol elements are described
in:
* Section 15 (Versions),
* Section 16 (Integer Encoding),
* Section 17 (Packet Headers),
* Section 18 (Transport Parameters),
* Section 19 (Frames), and
* Section 20 (Errors).
Accompanying documents describe QUIC's loss detection and congestion
control [QUIC-RECOVERY], and the use of TLS for key negotiation
[QUIC-TLS].
This document defines QUIC version 1, which conforms to the protocol
invariants in [QUIC-INVARIANTS].
1.2. Terms and Definitions
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Commonly used terms in the document are described below.
QUIC: The transport protocol described by this document. QUIC is a
name, not an acronym.
QUIC packet: The smallest unit of QUIC that can be encapsulated in a
UDP datagram. Multiple QUIC packets can be encapsulated in a
single UDP datagram.
Endpoint: An entity that can participate in a QUIC connection by
generating, receiving, and processing QUIC packets. There are
only two types of endpoint in QUIC: client and server.
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Client: The endpoint initiating a QUIC connection.
Server: The endpoint accepting incoming QUIC connections.
Connection ID: An opaque identifier that is used to identify a QUIC
connection at an endpoint. Each endpoint sets a value for its
peer to include in packets sent towards the endpoint.
Stream: A unidirectional or bidirectional channel of ordered bytes
within a QUIC connection. A QUIC connection can carry multiple
simultaneous streams.
Application: An entity that uses QUIC to send and receive data.
1.3. Notational Conventions
Packet and frame diagrams in this document use the format described
in Section 3.1 of [RFC2360], with the following additional
conventions:
[x]: Indicates that x is optional
x (A): Indicates that x is A bits long
x (A/B/C) ...: Indicates that x is one of A, B, or C bits long
x (i) ...: Indicates that x uses the variable-length encoding in
Section 16
x (*) ...: Indicates that x is variable-length
2. Streams
Streams in QUIC provide a lightweight, ordered byte-stream
abstraction to an application. An alternative view of QUIC streams
is as an elastic "message" abstraction.
Streams can be created by sending data. Other processes associated
with stream management - ending, cancelling, and managing flow
control - are all designed to impose minimal overheads. For
instance, a single STREAM frame (Section 19.8) can open, carry data
for, and close a stream. Streams can also be long-lived and can last
the entire duration of a connection.
Streams can be created by either endpoint, can concurrently send data
interleaved with other streams, and can be cancelled. QUIC does not
provide any means of ensuring ordering between bytes on different
streams.
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QUIC allows for an arbitrary number of streams to operate
concurrently and for an arbitrary amount of data to be sent on any
stream, subject to flow control constraints (see Section 4) and
stream limits.
2.1. Stream Types and Identifiers
Streams can be unidirectional or bidirectional. Unidirectional
streams carry data in one direction: from the initiator of the stream
to its peer. Bidirectional streams allow for data to be sent in both
directions.
Streams are identified within a connection by a numeric value,
referred to as the stream ID. Stream IDs are unique to a stream. A
QUIC endpoint MUST NOT reuse a stream ID within a connection. Stream
IDs are encoded as variable-length integers (see Section 16).
The least significant bit (0x1) of the stream ID identifies the
initiator of the stream. Client-initiated streams have even-numbered
stream IDs (with the bit set to 0), and server-initiated streams have
odd-numbered stream IDs (with the bit set to 1).
The second least significant bit (0x2) of the stream ID distinguishes
between bidirectional streams (with the bit set to 0) and
unidirectional streams (with the bit set to 1).
The least significant two bits from a stream ID therefore identify a
stream as one of four types, as summarized in Table 1.
+------+----------------------------------+
| Bits | Stream Type |
+------+----------------------------------+
| 0x0 | Client-Initiated, Bidirectional |
| | |
| 0x1 | Server-Initiated, Bidirectional |
| | |
| 0x2 | Client-Initiated, Unidirectional |
| | |
| 0x3 | Server-Initiated, Unidirectional |
+------+----------------------------------+
Table 1: Stream ID Types
Within each type, streams are created with numerically increasing
stream IDs. A stream ID that is used out of order results in all
streams of that type with lower-numbered stream IDs also being
opened.
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The first bidirectional stream opened by the client has a stream ID
of 0.
2.2. Sending and Receiving Data
STREAM frames (Section 19.8) encapsulate data sent by an application.
An endpoint uses the Stream ID and Offset fields in STREAM frames to
place data in order.
Endpoints MUST be able to deliver stream data to an application as an
ordered byte-stream. Delivering an ordered byte-stream requires that
an endpoint buffer any data that is received out of order, up to the
advertised flow control limit.
QUIC makes no specific allowances for delivery of stream data out of
order. However, implementations MAY choose to offer the ability to
deliver data out of order to a receiving application.
An endpoint could receive data for a stream at the same stream offset
multiple times. Data that has already been received can be
discarded. The data at a given offset MUST NOT change if it is sent
multiple times; an endpoint MAY treat receipt of different data at
the same offset within a stream as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Streams are an ordered byte-stream abstraction with no other
structure that is visible to QUIC. STREAM frame boundaries are not
expected to be preserved when data is transmitted, when data is
retransmitted after packet loss, or when data is delivered to the
application at a receiver.
An endpoint MUST NOT send data on any stream without ensuring that it
is within the flow control limits set by its peer. Flow control is
described in detail in Section 4.
2.3. Stream Prioritization
Stream multiplexing can have a significant effect on application
performance if resources allocated to streams are correctly
prioritized.
QUIC does not provide frames for exchanging prioritization
information. Instead it relies on receiving priority information
from the application that uses QUIC.
A QUIC implementation SHOULD provide ways in which an application can
indicate the relative priority of streams. When deciding which
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streams to dedicate resources to, the implementation SHOULD use the
information provided by the application.
3. Stream States
This section describes streams in terms of their send or receive
components. Two state machines are described: one for the streams on
which an endpoint transmits data (Section 3.1), and another for
streams on which an endpoint receives data (Section 3.2).
Unidirectional streams use the applicable state machine directly.
Bidirectional streams use both state machines. For the most part,
the use of these state machines is the same whether the stream is
unidirectional or bidirectional. The conditions for opening a stream
are slightly more complex for a bidirectional stream because the
opening of either send or receive sides causes the stream to open in
both directions.
An endpoint MUST open streams of the same type in increasing order of
stream ID.
Note: These states are largely informative. This document uses
stream states to describe rules for when and how different types
of frames can be sent and the reactions that are expected when
different types of frames are received. Though these state
machines are intended to be useful in implementing QUIC, these
states aren't intended to constrain implementations. An
implementation can define a different state machine as long as its
behavior is consistent with an implementation that implements
these states.
3.1. Sending Stream States
Figure 1 shows the states for the part of a stream that sends data to
a peer.
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o
| Create Stream (Sending)
| Peer Creates Bidirectional Stream
v
+-------+
| Ready | Send RESET_STREAM
| |-----------------------.
+-------+ |
| |
| Send STREAM / |
| STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED |
| |
| Peer Creates |
| Bidirectional Stream |
v |
+-------+ |
| Send | Send RESET_STREAM |
| |---------------------->|
+-------+ |
| |
| Send STREAM + FIN |
v v
+-------+ +-------+
| Data | Send RESET_STREAM | Reset |
| Sent |------------------>| Sent |
+-------+ +-------+
| |
| Recv All ACKs | Recv ACK
v v
+-------+ +-------+
| Data | | Reset |
| Recvd | | Recvd |
+-------+ +-------+
Figure 1: States for Sending Parts of Streams
The sending part of stream that the endpoint initiates (types 0 and 2
for clients, 1 and 3 for servers) is opened by the application. The
"Ready" state represents a newly created stream that is able to
accept data from the application. Stream data might be buffered in
this state in preparation for sending.
Sending the first STREAM or STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frame causes a
sending part of a stream to enter the "Send" state. An
implementation might choose to defer allocating a stream ID to a
stream until it sends the first frame and enters this state, which
can allow for better stream prioritization.
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The sending part of a bidirectional stream initiated by a peer (type
0 for a server, type 1 for a client) enters the "Ready" state then
immediately transitions to the "Send" state if the receiving part
enters the "Recv" state (Section 3.2).
In the "Send" state, an endpoint transmits - and retransmits as
necessary - stream data in STREAM frames. The endpoint respects the
flow control limits set by its peer, and continues to accept and
process MAX_STREAM_DATA frames. An endpoint in the "Send" state
generates STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frames if it is blocked from sending by
stream or connection flow control limits Section 4.1.
After the application indicates that all stream data has been sent
and a STREAM frame containing the FIN bit is sent, the sending part
of the stream enters the "Data Sent" state. From this state, the
endpoint only retransmits stream data as necessary. The endpoint
does not need to check flow control limits or send
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frames for a stream in this state.
MAX_STREAM_DATA frames might be received until the peer receives the
final stream offset. The endpoint can safely ignore any
MAX_STREAM_DATA frames it receives from its peer for a stream in this
state.
Once all stream data has been successfully acknowledged, the sending
part of the stream enters the "Data Recvd" state, which is a terminal
state.
From any of the "Ready", "Send", or "Data Sent" states, an
application can signal that it wishes to abandon transmission of
stream data. Alternatively, an endpoint might receive a STOP_SENDING
frame from its peer. In either case, the endpoint sends a
RESET_STREAM frame, which causes the stream to enter the "Reset Sent"
state.
An endpoint MAY send a RESET_STREAM as the first frame that mentions
a stream; this causes the sending part of that stream to open and
then immediately transition to the "Reset Sent" state.
Once a packet containing a RESET_STREAM has been acknowledged, the
sending part of the stream enters the "Reset Recvd" state, which is a
terminal state.
3.2. Receiving Stream States
Figure 2 shows the states for the part of a stream that receives data
from a peer. The states for a receiving part of a stream mirror only
some of the states of the sending part of the stream at the peer.
The receiving part of a stream does not track states on the sending
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part that cannot be observed, such as the "Ready" state. Instead,
the receiving part of a stream tracks the delivery of data to the
application, some of which cannot be observed by the sender.
o
| Recv STREAM / STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED / RESET_STREAM
| Create Bidirectional Stream (Sending)
| Recv MAX_STREAM_DATA / STOP_SENDING (Bidirectional)
| Create Higher-Numbered Stream
v
+-------+
| Recv | Recv RESET_STREAM
| |-----------------------.
+-------+ |
| |
| Recv STREAM + FIN |
v |
+-------+ |
| Size | Recv RESET_STREAM |
| Known |---------------------->|
+-------+ |
| |
| Recv All Data |
v v
+-------+ Recv RESET_STREAM +-------+
| Data |--- (optional) --->| Reset |
| Recvd | Recv All Data | Recvd |
+-------+<-- (optional) ----+-------+
| |
| App Read All Data | App Read RST
v v
+-------+ +-------+
| Data | | Reset |
| Read | | Read |
+-------+ +-------+
Figure 2: States for Receiving Parts of Streams
The receiving part of a stream initiated by a peer (types 1 and 3 for
a client, or 0 and 2 for a server) is created when the first STREAM,
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED, or RESET_STREAM is received for that stream.
For bidirectional streams initiated by a peer, receipt of a
MAX_STREAM_DATA or STOP_SENDING frame for the sending part of the
stream also creates the receiving part. The initial state for the
receiving part of stream is "Recv".
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The receiving part of a stream enters the "Recv" state when the
sending part of a bidirectional stream initiated by the endpoint
(type 0 for a client, type 1 for a server) enters the "Ready" state.
An endpoint opens a bidirectional stream when a MAX_STREAM_DATA or
STOP_SENDING frame is received from the peer for that stream.
Receiving a MAX_STREAM_DATA frame for an unopened stream indicates
that the remote peer has opened the stream and is providing flow
control credit. Receiving a STOP_SENDING frame for an unopened
stream indicates that the remote peer no longer wishes to receive
data on this stream. Either frame might arrive before a STREAM or
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frame if packets are lost or reordered.
Before creating a stream, all streams of the same type with lower-
numbered stream IDs MUST be created. This ensures that the creation
order for streams is consistent on both endpoints.
In the "Recv" state, the endpoint receives STREAM and
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frames. Incoming data is buffered and can be
reassembled into the correct order for delivery to the application.
As data is consumed by the application and buffer space becomes
available, the endpoint sends MAX_STREAM_DATA frames to allow the
peer to send more data.
When a STREAM frame with a FIN bit is received, the final size of the
stream is known (see Section 4.4). The receiving part of the stream
then enters the "Size Known" state. In this state, the endpoint no
longer needs to send MAX_STREAM_DATA frames, it only receives any
retransmissions of stream data.
Once all data for the stream has been received, the receiving part
enters the "Data Recvd" state. This might happen as a result of
receiving the same STREAM frame that causes the transition to "Size
Known". In this state, the endpoint has all stream data. Any STREAM
or STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frames it receives for the stream can be
discarded.
The "Data Recvd" state persists until stream data has been delivered
to the application. Once stream data has been delivered, the stream
enters the "Data Read" state, which is a terminal state.
Receiving a RESET_STREAM frame in the "Recv" or "Size Known" states
causes the stream to enter the "Reset Recvd" state. This might cause
the delivery of stream data to the application to be interrupted.
It is possible that all stream data is received when a RESET_STREAM
is received (that is, from the "Data Recvd" state). Similarly, it is
possible for remaining stream data to arrive after receiving a
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RESET_STREAM frame (the "Reset Recvd" state). An implementation is
free to manage this situation as it chooses. Sending RESET_STREAM
means that an endpoint cannot guarantee delivery of stream data;
however there is no requirement that stream data not be delivered if
a RESET_STREAM is received. An implementation MAY interrupt delivery
of stream data, discard any data that was not consumed, and signal
the receipt of the RESET_STREAM immediately. Alternatively, the
RESET_STREAM signal might be suppressed or withheld if stream data is
completely received and is buffered to be read by the application.
In the latter case, the receiving part of the stream transitions from
"Reset Recvd" to "Data Recvd".
Once the application has been delivered the signal indicating that
the stream was reset, the receiving part of the stream transitions to
the "Reset Read" state, which is a terminal state.
3.3. Permitted Frame Types
The sender of a stream sends just three frame types that affect the
state of a stream at either sender or receiver: STREAM
(Section 19.8), STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED (Section 19.13), and RESET_STREAM
(Section 19.4).
A sender MUST NOT send any of these frames from a terminal state
("Data Recvd" or "Reset Recvd"). A sender MUST NOT send STREAM or
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED after sending a RESET_STREAM; that is, in the
terminal states and in the "Reset Sent" state. A receiver could
receive any of these three frames in any state, due to the
possibility of delayed delivery of packets carrying them.
The receiver of a stream sends MAX_STREAM_DATA (Section 19.10) and
STOP_SENDING frames (Section 19.5).
The receiver only sends MAX_STREAM_DATA in the "Recv" state. A
receiver can send STOP_SENDING in any state where it has not received
a RESET_STREAM frame; that is states other than "Reset Recvd" or
"Reset Read". However there is little value in sending a
STOP_SENDING frame in the "Data Recvd" state, since all stream data
has been received. A sender could receive either of these two frames
in any state as a result of delayed delivery of packets.
3.4. Bidirectional Stream States
A bidirectional stream is composed of sending and receiving parts.
Implementations may represent states of the bidirectional stream as
composites of sending and receiving stream states. The simplest
model presents the stream as "open" when either sending or receiving
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parts are in a non-terminal state and "closed" when both sending and
receiving streams are in terminal states.
Table 2 shows a more complex mapping of bidirectional stream states
that loosely correspond to the stream states in HTTP/2 [HTTP2]. This
shows that multiple states on sending or receiving parts of streams
are mapped to the same composite state. Note that this is just one
possibility for such a mapping; this mapping requires that data is
acknowledged before the transition to a "closed" or "half-closed"
state.
+-----------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| Sending Part | Receiving Part | Composite State |
+-----------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
| No Stream/Ready | No Stream/Recv *1 | idle |
| | | |
| Ready/Send/Data Sent | Recv/Size Known | open |
| | | |
| Ready/Send/Data Sent | Data Recvd/Data | half-closed |
| | Read | (remote) |
| | | |
| Ready/Send/Data Sent | Reset Recvd/Reset | half-closed |
| | Read | (remote) |
| | | |
| Data Recvd | Recv/Size Known | half-closed (local) |
| | | |
| Reset Sent/Reset | Recv/Size Known | half-closed (local) |
| Recvd | | |
| | | |
| Reset Sent/Reset | Data Recvd/Data | closed |
| Recvd | Read | |
| | | |
| Reset Sent/Reset | Reset Recvd/Reset | closed |
| Recvd | Read | |
| | | |
| Data Recvd | Data Recvd/Data | closed |
| | Read | |
| | | |
| Data Recvd | Reset Recvd/Reset | closed |
| | Read | |
+-----------------------+---------------------+---------------------+
Table 2: Possible Mapping of Stream States to HTTP/2
Note (*1): A stream is considered "idle" if it has not yet been
created, or if the receiving part of the stream is in the "Recv"
state without yet having received any frames.
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3.5. Solicited State Transitions
If an endpoint is no longer interested in the data it is receiving on
a stream, it MAY send a STOP_SENDING frame identifying that stream to
prompt closure of the stream in the opposite direction. This
typically indicates that the receiving application is no longer
reading data it receives from the stream, but it is not a guarantee
that incoming data will be ignored.
STREAM frames received after sending STOP_SENDING are still counted
toward connection and stream flow control, even though these frames
will be discarded upon receipt.
A STOP_SENDING frame requests that the receiving endpoint send a
RESET_STREAM frame. An endpoint that receives a STOP_SENDING frame
MUST send a RESET_STREAM frame if the stream is in the Ready or Send
state. If the stream is in the Data Sent state and any outstanding
data is declared lost, an endpoint SHOULD send a RESET_STREAM frame
in lieu of a retransmission.
An endpoint SHOULD copy the error code from the STOP_SENDING frame to
the RESET_STREAM frame it sends, but MAY use any application error
code. The endpoint that sends a STOP_SENDING frame MAY ignore the
error code carried in any RESET_STREAM frame it receives.
If the STOP_SENDING frame is received on a stream that is already in
the "Data Sent" state, an endpoint that wishes to cease
retransmission of previously-sent STREAM frames on that stream MUST
first send a RESET_STREAM frame.
STOP_SENDING SHOULD only be sent for a stream that has not been reset
by the peer. STOP_SENDING is most useful for streams in the "Recv"
or "Size Known" states.
An endpoint is expected to send another STOP_SENDING frame if a
packet containing a previous STOP_SENDING is lost. However, once
either all stream data or a RESET_STREAM frame has been received for
the stream - that is, the stream is in any state other than "Recv" or
"Size Known" - sending a STOP_SENDING frame is unnecessary.
An endpoint that wishes to terminate both directions of a
bidirectional stream can terminate one direction by sending a
RESET_STREAM, and it can encourage prompt termination in the opposite
direction by sending a STOP_SENDING frame.
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4. Flow Control
It is necessary to limit the amount of data that a receiver could
buffer, to prevent a fast sender from overwhelming a slow receiver,
or to prevent a malicious sender from consuming a large amount of
memory at a receiver. To enable a receiver to limit memory
commitment to a connection and to apply back pressure on the sender,
streams are flow controlled both individually and as an aggregate. A
QUIC receiver controls the maximum amount of data the sender can send
on a stream at any time, as described in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2
Similarly, to limit concurrency within a connection, a QUIC endpoint
controls the maximum cumulative number of streams that its peer can
initiate, as described in Section 4.5.
Data sent in CRYPTO frames is not flow controlled in the same way as
stream data. QUIC relies on the cryptographic protocol
implementation to avoid excessive buffering of data, see [QUIC-TLS].
The implementation SHOULD provide an interface to QUIC to tell it
about its buffering limits so that there is not excessive buffering
at multiple layers.
4.1. Data Flow Control
QUIC employs a credit-based flow-control scheme similar to that in
HTTP/2 [HTTP2], where a receiver advertises the number of bytes it is
prepared to receive on a given stream and for the entire connection.
This leads to two levels of data flow control in QUIC:
o Stream flow control, which prevents a single stream from consuming
the entire receive buffer for a connection by limiting the amount
of data that can be sent on any stream.
o Connection flow control, which prevents senders from exceeding a
receiver's buffer capacity for the connection, by limiting the
total bytes of stream data sent in STREAM frames on all streams.
A receiver sets initial credits for all streams by sending transport
parameters during the handshake (Section 7.3). A receiver sends
MAX_STREAM_DATA (Section 19.10) or MAX_DATA (Section 19.9) frames to
the sender to advertise additional credit.
A receiver advertises credit for a stream by sending a
MAX_STREAM_DATA frame with the Stream ID field set appropriately. A
MAX_STREAM_DATA frame indicates the maximum absolute byte offset of a
stream. A receiver could use the current offset of data consumed to
determine the flow control offset to be advertised. A receiver MAY
send MAX_STREAM_DATA frames in multiple packets in order to make sure
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that the sender receives an update before running out of flow control
credit, even if one of the packets is lost.
A receiver advertises credit for a connection by sending a MAX_DATA
frame, which indicates the maximum of the sum of the absolute byte
offsets of all streams. A receiver maintains a cumulative sum of
bytes received on all streams, which is used to check for flow
control violations. A receiver might use a sum of bytes consumed on
all streams to determine the maximum data limit to be advertised.
A receiver can advertise a larger offset by sending MAX_STREAM_DATA
or MAX_DATA frames at any time during the connection. A receiver
cannot renege on an advertisement however. That is, once a receiver
advertises an offset, it MAY advertise a smaller offset, but this has
no effect.
A receiver MUST close the connection with a FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR error
(Section 11) if the sender violates the advertised connection or
stream data limits.
A sender MUST ignore any MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA frames that do
not increase flow control limits.
If a sender runs out of flow control credit, it will be unable to
send new data and is considered blocked. A sender SHOULD send
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frames to indicate it has data to
write but is blocked by flow control limits. These frames are
expected to be sent infrequently in common cases, but they are
considered useful for debugging and monitoring purposes.
A sender sends a single STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frame
only once when it reaches a data limit. A sender SHOULD NOT send
multiple STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frames for the same data
limit, unless the original frame is determined to be lost. Another
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frame can be sent after the data
limit is increased.
4.2. Flow Credit Increments
This document leaves when and how many bytes to advertise in a
MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA frame to implementations, but offers a
few considerations. These frames contribute to connection overhead.
Therefore frequently sending frames with small changes is
undesirable. At the same time, larger increments to limits are
necessary to avoid blocking if updates are less frequent, requiring
larger resource commitments at the receiver. Thus there is a trade-
off between resource commitment and overhead when determining how
large a limit is advertised.
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A receiver can use an autotuning mechanism to tune the frequency and
amount of advertised additional credit based on a round-trip time
estimate and the rate at which the receiving application consumes
data, similar to common TCP implementations. As an optimization,
sending frames related to flow control only when there are other
frames to send or when a peer is blocked ensures that flow control
doesn't cause extra packets to be sent.
If a sender runs out of flow control credit, it will be unable to
send new data and is considered blocked. It is generally considered
best to not let the sender become blocked. To avoid blocking a
sender, and to reasonably account for the possibility of loss, a
receiver should send a MAX_DATA or MAX_STREAM_DATA frame at least two
round trips before it expects the sender to get blocked.
A receiver MUST NOT wait for a STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED
frame before sending MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA, since doing so will
mean that a sender will be blocked for at least an entire round trip,
and potentially for longer if the peer chooses to not send
STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frames.
4.3. Handling Stream Cancellation
Endpoints need to eventually agree on the amount of flow control
credit that has been consumed, to avoid either exceeding flow control
limits or deadlocking.
On receipt of a RESET_STREAM frame, an endpoint will tear down state
for the matching stream and ignore further data arriving on that
stream. If a RESET_STREAM frame is reordered with stream data for
the same stream, the receiver's estimate of the number of bytes
received on that stream can be lower than the sender's estimate of
the number sent. As a result, the two endpoints could disagree on
the number of bytes that count towards connection flow control.
To remedy this issue, a RESET_STREAM frame (Section 19.4) includes
the final size of data sent on the stream. On receiving a
RESET_STREAM frame, a receiver definitively knows how many bytes were
sent on that stream before the RESET_STREAM frame, and the receiver
MUST use the final size of the stream to account for all bytes sent
on the stream in its connection level flow controller.
RESET_STREAM terminates one direction of a stream abruptly. For a
bidirectional stream, RESET_STREAM has no effect on data flow in the
opposite direction. Both endpoints MUST maintain flow control state
for the stream in the unterminated direction until that direction
enters a terminal state, or until one of the endpoints sends
CONNECTION_CLOSE.
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4.4. Stream Final Size
The final size is the amount of flow control credit that is consumed
by a stream. Assuming that every contiguous byte on the stream was
sent once, the final size is the number of bytes sent. More
generally, this is one higher than the largest byte offset sent on
the stream.
For a stream that is reset, the final size is carried explicitly in a
RESET_STREAM frame. Otherwise, the final size is the offset plus the
length of a STREAM frame marked with a FIN flag, or 0 in the case of
incoming unidirectional streams.
An endpoint will know the final size for a stream when the receiving
part of the stream enters the "Size Known" or "Reset Recvd" state
(Section 3).
An endpoint MUST NOT send data on a stream at or beyond the final
size.
Once a final size for a stream is known, it cannot change. If a
RESET_STREAM or STREAM frame is received indicating a change in the
final size for the stream, an endpoint SHOULD respond with a
FINAL_SIZE_ERROR error (see Section 11). A receiver SHOULD treat
receipt of data at or beyond the final size as a FINAL_SIZE_ERROR
error, even after a stream is closed. Generating these errors is not
mandatory, but only because requiring that an endpoint generate these
errors also means that the endpoint needs to maintain the final size
state for closed streams, which could mean a significant state
commitment.
4.5. Controlling Concurrency
An endpoint limits the cumulative number of incoming streams a peer
can open. Only streams with a stream ID less than (max_stream * 4 +
initial_stream_id_for_type) can be opened (see Table 5). Initial
limits are set in the transport parameters (see Section 18.1) and
subsequently limits are advertised using MAX_STREAMS frames
(Section 19.11). Separate limits apply to unidirectional and
bidirectional streams.
Endpoints MUST NOT exceed the limit set by their peer. An endpoint
that receives a STREAM frame with a stream ID exceeding the limit it
has sent MUST treat this as a stream error of type STREAM_LIMIT_ERROR
(Section 11).
A receiver cannot renege on an advertisement. That is, once a
receiver advertises a stream limit using the MAX_STREAMS frame,
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advertising a smaller limit has no effect. A receiver MUST ignore
any MAX_STREAMS frame that does not increase the stream limit.
As with stream and connection flow control, this document leaves when
and how many streams to advertise to a peer via MAX_STREAMS to
implementations. Implementations might choose to increase limits as
streams close to keep the number of streams available to peers
roughly consistent.
An endpoint that is unable to open a new stream due to the peer's
limits SHOULD send a STREAMS_BLOCKED frame (Section 19.14). This
signal is considered useful for debugging. An endpoint MUST NOT wait
to receive this signal before advertising additional credit, since
doing so will mean that the peer will be blocked for at least an
entire round trip, and potentially for longer if the peer chooses to
not send STREAMS_BLOCKED frames.
5. Connections
QUIC's connection establishment combines version negotiation with the
cryptographic and transport handshakes to reduce connection
establishment latency, as described in Section 7. Once established,
a connection may migrate to a different IP or port at either endpoint
as described in Section 9. Finally, a connection may be terminated
by either endpoint, as described in Section 10.
5.1. Connection ID
Each connection possesses a set of connection identifiers, or
connection IDs, each of which can identify the connection.
Connection IDs are independently selected by endpoints; each endpoint
selects the connection IDs that its peer uses.
The primary function of a connection ID is to ensure that changes in
addressing at lower protocol layers (UDP, IP) don't cause packets for
a QUIC connection to be delivered to the wrong endpoint. Each
endpoint selects connection IDs using an implementation-specific (and
perhaps deployment-specific) method which will allow packets with
that connection ID to be routed back to the endpoint and identified
by the endpoint upon receipt.
Connection IDs MUST NOT contain any information that can be used by
an external observer to correlate them with other connection IDs for
the same connection. As a trivial example, this means the same
connection ID MUST NOT be issued more than once on the same
connection.
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Packets with long headers include Source Connection ID and
Destination Connection ID fields. These fields are used to set the
connection IDs for new connections, see Section 7.2 for details.
Packets with short headers (Section 17.3) only include the
Destination Connection ID and omit the explicit length. The length
of the Destination Connection ID field is expected to be known to
endpoints. Endpoints using a load balancer that routes based on
connection ID could agree with the load balancer on a fixed length
for connection IDs, or agree on an encoding scheme. A fixed portion
could encode an explicit length, which allows the entire connection
ID to vary in length and still be used by the load balancer.
A Version Negotiation (Section 17.2.1) packet echoes the connection
IDs selected by the client, both to ensure correct routing toward the
client and to allow the client to validate that the packet is in
response to an Initial packet.
A zero-length connection ID MAY be used when the connection ID is not
needed for routing and the address/port tuple of packets is
sufficient to identify a connection. An endpoint whose peer has
selected a zero-length connection ID MUST continue to use a zero-
length connection ID for the lifetime of the connection and MUST NOT
send packets from any other local address.
When an endpoint has requested a non-zero-length connection ID, it
needs to ensure that the peer has a supply of connection IDs from
which to choose for packets sent to the endpoint. These connection
IDs are supplied by the endpoint using the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame
(Section 19.15).
5.1.1. Issuing Connection IDs
Each Connection ID has an associated sequence number to assist in
deduplicating messages. The initial connection ID issued by an
endpoint is sent in the Source Connection ID field of the long packet
header (Section 17.2) during the handshake. The sequence number of
the initial connection ID is 0. If the preferred_address transport
parameter is sent, the sequence number of the supplied connection ID
is 1.
Additional connection IDs are communicated to the peer using
NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames (Section 19.15). The sequence number on
each newly-issued connection ID MUST increase by 1. The connection
ID randomly selected by the client in the Initial packet and any
connection ID provided by a Retry packet are not assigned sequence
numbers unless a server opts to retain them as its initial connection
ID.
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When an endpoint issues a connection ID, it MUST accept packets that
carry this connection ID for the duration of the connection or until
its peer invalidates the connection ID via a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID
frame (Section 19.16).
Endpoints store received connection IDs for future use. An endpoint
that receives excessive connection IDs MAY discard those it cannot
store without sending a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. An endpoint that
issues connection IDs cannot expect its peer to store and use all
issued connection IDs.
An endpoint SHOULD ensure that its peer has a sufficient number of
available and unused connection IDs. While each endpoint
independently chooses how many connection IDs to issue, endpoints
SHOULD provide and maintain at least eight connection IDs. The
endpoint SHOULD do this by supplying a new connection ID when a
connection ID is retired by its peer or when the endpoint receives a
packet with a previously unused connection ID. However, it MAY limit
the frequency or the total number of connection IDs issued for each
connection to avoid the risk of running out of connection IDs (see
Section 10.4.2).
An endpoint that initiates migration and requires non-zero-length
connection IDs SHOULD ensure that the pool of connection IDs
available to its peer allows the peer to use a new connection ID on
migration, as the peer will close the connection if the pool is
exhausted.
5.1.2. Consuming and Retiring Connection IDs
An endpoint can change the connection ID it uses for a peer to
another available one at any time during the connection. An endpoint
consumes connection IDs in response to a migrating peer, see
Section 9.5 for more.
An endpoint maintains a set of connection IDs received from its peer,
any of which it can use when sending packets. When the endpoint
wishes to remove a connection ID from use, it sends a
RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame to its peer. Sending a
RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame indicates that the connection ID won't be
used again and requests that the peer replace it with a new
connection ID using a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame.
As discussed in Section 9.5, each connection ID MUST be used on
packets sent from only one local address. An endpoint that migrates
away from a local address SHOULD retire all connection IDs used on
that address once it no longer plans to use that address.
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5.2. Matching Packets to Connections
Incoming packets are classified on receipt. Packets can either be
associated with an existing connection, or - for servers -
potentially create a new connection.
Hosts try to associate a packet with an existing connection. If the
packet has a Destination Connection ID corresponding to an existing
connection, QUIC processes that packet accordingly. Note that more
than one connection ID can be associated with a connection; see
Section 5.1.
If the Destination Connection ID is zero length and the packet
matches the address/port tuple of a connection where the host did not
require connection IDs, QUIC processes the packet as part of that
connection. Endpoints SHOULD either reject connection attempts that
use the same addresses as existing connections, or use a non-zero-
length Destination Connection ID so that packets can be correctly
attributed to connections.
Endpoints can send a Stateless Reset (Section 10.4) for any packets
that cannot be attributed to an existing connection. A stateless
reset allows a peer to more quickly identify when a connection
becomes unusable.
Packets that are matched to an existing connection are discarded if
the packets are inconsistent with the state of that connection. For
example, packets are discarded if they indicate a different protocol
version than that of the connection, or if the removal of packet
protection is unsuccessful once the expected keys are available.
Invalid packets without packet protection, such as Initial, Retry, or
Version Negotiation, MAY be discarded. An endpoint MUST generate a
connection error if it commits changes to state before discovering an
error.
5.2.1. Client Packet Handling
Valid packets sent to clients always include a Destination Connection
ID that matches a value the client selects. Clients that choose to
receive zero-length connection IDs can use the address/port tuple to
identify a connection. Packets that don't match an existing
connection are discarded.
Due to packet reordering or loss, clients might receive packets for a
connection that are encrypted with a key it has not yet computed.
Clients MAY drop these packets, or MAY buffer them in anticipation of
later packets that allow it to compute the key.
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If a client receives a packet that has an unsupported version, it
MUST discard that packet.
5.2.2. Server Packet Handling
If a server receives a packet that has an unsupported version, but
the packet is sufficiently large to initiate a new connection for any
version supported by the server, it SHOULD send a Version Negotiation
packet as described in Section 6.1. Servers MAY rate control these
packets to avoid storms of Version Negotiation packets.
The first packet for an unsupported version can use different
semantics and encodings for any version-specific field. In
particular, different packet protection keys might be used for
different versions. Servers that do not support a particular version
are unlikely to be able to decrypt the payload of the packet.
Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to decode or decrypt a packet from an
unknown version, but instead send a Version Negotiation packet,
provided that the packet is sufficiently long.
Servers MUST drop other packets that contain unsupported versions.
Packets with a supported version, or no version field, are matched to
a connection using the connection ID or - for packets with zero-
length connection IDs - the address tuple. If the packet doesn't
match an existing connection, the server continues below.
If the packet is an Initial packet fully conforming with the
specification, the server proceeds with the handshake (Section 7).
This commits the server to the version that the client selected.
If a server isn't currently accepting any new connections, it SHOULD
send an Initial packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with error
code SERVER_BUSY.
If the packet is a 0-RTT packet, the server MAY buffer a limited
number of these packets in anticipation of a late-arriving Initial
Packet. Clients are forbidden from sending Handshake packets prior
to receiving a server response, so servers SHOULD ignore any such
packets.
Servers MUST drop incoming packets under all other circumstances.
5.3. Life of a QUIC Connection
TBD.
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6. Version Negotiation
Version negotiation ensures that client and server agree to a QUIC
version that is mutually supported. A server sends a Version
Negotiation packet in response to each packet that might initiate a
new connection, see Section 5.2 for details.
The size of the first packet sent by a client will determine whether
a server sends a Version Negotiation packet. Clients that support
multiple QUIC versions SHOULD pad the first packet they send to the
largest of the minimum packet sizes across all versions they support.
This ensures that the server responds if there is a mutually
supported version.
6.1. Sending Version Negotiation Packets
If the version selected by the client is not acceptable to the
server, the server responds with a Version Negotiation packet (see
Section 17.2.1). This includes a list of versions that the server
will accept. An endpoint MUST NOT send a Version Negotiation packet
in response to receiving a Version Negotiation packet.
This system allows a server to process packets with unsupported
versions without retaining state. Though either the Initial packet
or the Version Negotiation packet that is sent in response could be
lost, the client will send new packets until it successfully receives
a response or it abandons the connection attempt.
A server MAY limit the number of Version Negotiation packets it
sends. For instance, a server that is able to recognize packets as
0-RTT might choose not to send Version Negotiation packets in
response to 0-RTT packets with the expectation that it will
eventually receive an Initial packet.
6.2. Handling Version Negotiation Packets
When a client receives a Version Negotiation packet, it MUST abandon
the current connection attempt. Version Negotiation packets are
designed to allow future versions of QUIC to negotiate the version in
use between endpoints. Future versions of QUIC might change how
implementations that support multiple versions of QUIC react to
Version Negotiation packets when attempting to establish a connection
using this version. How to perform version negotiation is left as
future work defined by future versions of QUIC. In particular, that
future work will need to ensure robustness against version downgrade
attacks Section 21.9.
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6.2.1. Version Negotiation Between Draft Versions
[[RFC editor: please remove this section before publication.]]
When a draft implementation receives a Version Negotiation packet, it
MAY use it to attempt a new connection with one of the versions
listed in the packet, instead of abandoning the current connection
attempt Section 6.2.
The client MUST check that the Destination and Source Connection ID
fields match the Source and Destination Connection ID fields in a
packet that the client sent. If this check fails, the packet MUST be
discarded.
Once the Version Negotiation packet is determined to be valid, the
client then selects an acceptable protocol version from the list
provided by the server. The client then attempts to create a new
connection using that version. The new connection MUST use a new
random Destination Connection ID different from the one it had
previously sent.
Note that this mechanism does not protect against downgrade attacks
and MUST NOT be used outside of draft implementations.
6.3. Using Reserved Versions
For a server to use a new version in the future, clients must
correctly handle unsupported versions. To help ensure this, a server
SHOULD include a reserved version (see Section 15) while generating a
Version Negotiation packet.
The design of version negotiation permits a server to avoid
maintaining state for packets that it rejects in this fashion.
A client MAY send a packet using a reserved version number. This can
be used to solicit a list of supported versions from a server.
7. Cryptographic and Transport Handshake
QUIC relies on a combined cryptographic and transport handshake to
minimize connection establishment latency. QUIC uses the CRYPTO
frame Section 19.6 to transmit the cryptographic handshake. Version
0x00000001 of QUIC uses TLS as described in [QUIC-TLS]; a different
QUIC version number could indicate that a different cryptographic
handshake protocol is in use.
QUIC provides reliable, ordered delivery of the cryptographic
handshake data. QUIC packet protection is used to encrypt as much of
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the handshake protocol as possible. The cryptographic handshake MUST
provide the following properties:
o authenticated key exchange, where
* a server is always authenticated,
* a client is optionally authenticated,
* every connection produces distinct and unrelated keys,
* keying material is usable for packet protection for both 0-RTT
and 1-RTT packets, and
* 1-RTT keys have forward secrecy
o authenticated values for the transport parameters of the peer (see
Section 7.3)
o authenticated negotiation of an application protocol (TLS uses
ALPN [RFC7301] for this purpose)
The first CRYPTO frame from a client MUST be sent in a single packet.
Any second attempt that is triggered by address validation (see
Section 8.1) MUST also be sent within a single packet. This avoids
having to reassemble a message from multiple packets.
The first client packet of the cryptographic handshake protocol MUST
fit within a 1232 byte QUIC packet payload. This includes overheads
that reduce the space available to the cryptographic handshake
protocol.
An endpoint can verify support for Explicit Congestion Notification
(ECN) in the first packets it sends, as described in Section 13.3.2.
The CRYPTO frame can be sent in different packet number spaces. The
sequence numbers used by CRYPTO frames to ensure ordered delivery of
cryptographic handshake data start from zero in each packet number
space.
Endpoints MUST explicitly negotiate an application protocol. This
avoids situations where there is a disagreement about the protocol
that is in use.
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7.1. Example Handshake Flows
Details of how TLS is integrated with QUIC are provided in
[QUIC-TLS], but some examples are provided here. An extension of
this exchange to support client address validation is shown in
Section 8.1.1.
Once any address validation exchanges are complete, the cryptographic
handshake is used to agree on cryptographic keys. The cryptographic
handshake is carried in Initial (Section 17.2.2) and Handshake
(Section 17.2.4) packets.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the 1-RTT handshake. Each line
shows a QUIC packet with the packet type and packet number shown
first, followed by the frames that are typically contained in those
packets. So, for instance the first packet is of type Initial, with
packet number 0, and contains a CRYPTO frame carrying the
ClientHello.
Note that multiple QUIC packets - even of different encryption levels
- may be coalesced into a single UDP datagram (see Section 12.2), and
so this handshake may consist of as few as 4 UDP datagrams, or any
number more. For instance, the server's first flight contains
packets from the Initial encryption level (obfuscation), the
Handshake level, and "0.5-RTT data" from the server at the 1-RTT
encryption level.
Client Server
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[CH] ->
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[SH] ACK[0]
Handshake[0]: CRYPTO[EE, CERT, CV, FIN]
<- 1-RTT[0]: STREAM[1, "..."]
Initial[1]: ACK[0]
Handshake[0]: CRYPTO[FIN], ACK[0]
1-RTT[0]: STREAM[0, "..."], ACK[0] ->
1-RTT[1]: STREAM[3, "..."], ACK[0]
<- Handshake[1]: ACK[0]
Figure 3: Example 1-RTT Handshake
Figure 4 shows an example of a connection with a 0-RTT handshake and
a single packet of 0-RTT data. Note that as described in
Section 12.3, the server acknowledges 0-RTT data at the 1-RTT
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encryption level, and the client sends 1-RTT packets in the same
packet number space.
Client Server
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[CH]
0-RTT[0]: STREAM[0, "..."] ->
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[SH] ACK[0]
Handshake[0] CRYPTO[EE, FIN]
<- 1-RTT[0]: STREAM[1, "..."] ACK[0]
Initial[1]: ACK[0]
Handshake[0]: CRYPTO[FIN], ACK[0]
1-RTT[1]: STREAM[0, "..."] ACK[0] ->
1-RTT[1]: STREAM[3, "..."], ACK[1]
<- Handshake[1]: ACK[0]
Figure 4: Example 0-RTT Handshake
7.2. Negotiating Connection IDs
A connection ID is used to ensure consistent routing of packets, as
described in Section 5.1. The long header contains two connection
IDs: the Destination Connection ID is chosen by the recipient of the
packet and is used to provide consistent routing; the Source
Connection ID is used to set the Destination Connection ID used by
the peer.
During the handshake, packets with the long header (Section 17.2) are
used to establish the connection ID that each endpoint uses. Each
endpoint uses the Source Connection ID field to specify the
connection ID that is used in the Destination Connection ID field of
packets being sent to them. Upon receiving a packet, each endpoint
sets the Destination Connection ID it sends to match the value of the
Source Connection ID that they receive.
When an Initial packet is sent by a client which has not previously
received a Retry packet from the server, it populates the Destination
Connection ID field with an unpredictable value. This MUST be at
least 8 bytes in length. Until a packet is received from the server,
the client MUST use the same value unless it abandons the connection
attempt and starts a new one. The initial Destination Connection ID
is used to determine packet protection keys for Initial packets.
The client populates the Source Connection ID field with a value of
its choosing and sets the SCIL field to indicate the length.
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The first flight of 0-RTT packets use the same Destination and Source
Connection ID values as the client's first Initial.
The Destination Connection ID field in the server's Initial packet
contains a connection ID that is chosen by the recipient of the
packet (i.e., the client); the Source Connection ID includes the
connection ID that the sender of the packet wishes to use (see
Section 5.1). The server MUST use consistent Source Connection IDs
during the handshake.
On first receiving an Initial or Retry packet from the server, the
client uses the Source Connection ID supplied by the server as the
Destination Connection ID for subsequent packets, including any
subsequent 0-RTT packets. That means that a client might change the
Destination Connection ID twice during connection establishment, once
in response to a Retry and once in response to the first Initial
packet from the server. Once a client has received an Initial packet
from the server, it MUST discard any packet it receives with a
different Source Connection ID.
A client MUST only change the value it sends in the Destination
Connection ID in response to the first packet of each type it
receives from the server (Retry or Initial); a server MUST set its
value based on the Initial packet. Any additional changes are not
permitted; if subsequent packets of those types include a different
Source Connection ID, they MUST be discarded. This avoids problems
that might arise from stateless processing of multiple Initial
packets producing different connection IDs.
The connection ID can change over the lifetime of a connection,
especially in response to connection migration (Section 9), see
Section 5.1.1 for details.
7.3. Transport Parameters
During connection establishment, both endpoints make authenticated
declarations of their transport parameters. These declarations are
made unilaterally by each endpoint. Endpoints are required to comply
with the restrictions implied by these parameters; the description of
each parameter includes rules for its handling.
The encoding of the transport parameters is detailed in Section 18.
QUIC includes the encoded transport parameters in the cryptographic
handshake. Once the handshake completes, the transport parameters
declared by the peer are available. Each endpoint validates the
value provided by its peer.
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Definitions for each of the defined transport parameters are included
in Section 18.1. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a transport
parameter with an invalid value as a connection error of type
TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR. Any given parameter MUST appear at most
once in a given transport parameters extension. An endpoint MUST
treat receipt of duplicate transport parameters as a connection error
of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.
A server MUST include the original_connection_id transport parameter
(Section 18.1) if it sent a Retry packet to enable validation of the
Retry, as described in Section 17.2.5.
7.3.1. Values of Transport Parameters for 0-RTT
A client that attempts to send 0-RTT data MUST remember the transport
parameters used by the server. The transport parameters that the
server advertises during connection establishment apply to all
connections that are resumed using the keying material established
during that handshake. Remembered transport parameters apply to the
new connection until the handshake completes and new transport
parameters from the server can be provided.
A server can remember the transport parameters that it advertised, or
store an integrity-protected copy of the values in the ticket and
recover the information when accepting 0-RTT data. A server uses the
transport parameters in determining whether to accept 0-RTT data.
A server MAY accept 0-RTT and subsequently provide different values
for transport parameters for use in the new connection. If 0-RTT
data is accepted by the server, the server MUST NOT reduce any limits
or alter any values that might be violated by the client with its
0-RTT data. In particular, a server that accepts 0-RTT data MUST NOT
set values for the following parameters (Section 18.1) that are
smaller than the remembered value of those parameters.
o initial_max_data
o initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local
o initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote
o initial_max_stream_data_uni
o initial_max_streams_bidi
o initial_max_streams_uni
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Omitting or setting a zero value for certain transport parameters can
result in 0-RTT data being enabled, but not usable. The applicable
subset of transport parameters that permit sending of application
data SHOULD be set to non-zero values for 0-RTT. This includes
initial_max_data and either initial_max_streams_bidi and
initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote, or initial_max_streams_uni and
initial_max_stream_data_uni.
The value of the server's previous preferred_address MUST NOT be used
when establishing a new connection; rather, the client should wait to
observe the server's new preferred_address value in the handshake.
A server MUST either reject 0-RTT data or abort a handshake if the
implied values for transport parameters cannot be supported.
7.3.2. New Transport Parameters
New transport parameters can be used to negotiate new protocol
behavior. An endpoint MUST ignore transport parameters that it does
not support. Absence of a transport parameter therefore disables any
optional protocol feature that is negotiated using the parameter.
New transport parameters can be registered according to the rules in
Section 22.1.
8. Address Validation
Address validation is used by QUIC to avoid being used for a traffic
amplification attack. In such an attack, a packet is sent to a
server with spoofed source address information that identifies a
victim. If a server generates more or larger packets in response to
that packet, the attacker can use the server to send more data toward
the victim than it would be able to send on its own.
The primary defense against amplification attack is verifying that an
endpoint is able to receive packets at the transport address that it
claims. Address validation is performed both during connection
establishment (see Section 8.1) and during connection migration (see
Section 8.2).
8.1. Address Validation During Connection Establishment
Connection establishment implicitly provides address validation for
both endpoints. In particular, receipt of a packet protected with
Handshake keys confirms that the client received the Initial packet
from the server. Once the server has successfully processed a
Handshake packet from the client, it can consider the client address
to have been validated.
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Prior to validating the client address, servers MUST NOT send more
than three times as many bytes as the number of bytes they have
received. This limits the magnitude of any amplification attack that
can be mounted using spoofed source addresses. In determining this
limit, servers only count the size of successfully processed packets.
Clients MUST pad UDP datagrams that contain only Initial packets to
at least 1200 bytes. Once a client has received an acknowledgment
for a Handshake packet it MAY send smaller datagrams. Sending padded
datagrams ensures that the server is not overly constrained by the
amplification restriction.
Packet loss, in particular loss of a Handshake packet from the
server, can cause a situation in which the server cannot send when
the client has no data to send and the anti-amplification limit is
reached. In order to avoid this causing a handshake deadlock,
clients SHOULD send a packet upon a crypto retransmission timeout, as
described in [QUIC-RECOVERY]. If the client has no data to
retransmit and does not have Handshake keys, it SHOULD send an
Initial packet in a UDP datagram of at least 1200 bytes. If the
client has Handshake keys, it SHOULD send a Handshake packet.
A server might wish to validate the client address before starting
the cryptographic handshake. QUIC uses a token in the Initial packet
to provide address validation prior to completing the handshake.
This token is delivered to the client during connection establishment
with a Retry packet (see Section 8.1.1) or in a previous connection
using the NEW_TOKEN frame (see Section 8.1.2).
In addition to sending limits imposed prior to address validation,
servers are also constrained in what they can send by the limits set
by the congestion controller. Clients are only constrained by the
congestion controller.
8.1.1. Address Validation using Retry Packets
Upon receiving the client's Initial packet, the server can request
address validation by sending a Retry packet (Section 17.2.5)
containing a token. This token MUST be repeated by the client in all
Initial packets it sends for that connection after it receives the
Retry packet. In response to processing an Initial containing a
token, a server can either abort the connection or permit it to
proceed.
As long as it is not possible for an attacker to generate a valid
token for its own address (see Section 8.1.3) and the client is able
to return that token, it proves to the server that it received the
token.
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A server can also use a Retry packet to defer the state and
processing costs of connection establishment. By giving the client a
different connection ID to use, a server can cause the connection to
be routed to a server instance with more resources available for new
connections.
A flow showing the use of a Retry packet is shown in Figure 5.
Client Server
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[CH] ->
<- Retry+Token
Initial+Token[1]: CRYPTO[CH] ->
Initial[0]: CRYPTO[SH] ACK[1]
Handshake[0]: CRYPTO[EE, CERT, CV, FIN]
<- 1-RTT[0]: STREAM[1, "..."]
Figure 5: Example Handshake with Retry
8.1.2. Address Validation for Future Connections
A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during
one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection. Address
validation is especially important with 0-RTT because a server
potentially sends a significant amount of data to a client in
response to 0-RTT data.
The server uses the NEW_TOKEN frame Section 19.7 to provide the
client with an address validation token that can be used to validate
future connections. The client includes this token in Initial
packets to provide address validation in a future connection. The
client MUST include the token in all Initial packets it sends, unless
a Retry or NEW_TOKEN frame replaces the token with a newer one. The
client MUST NOT use the token provided in a Retry for future
connections. Servers MAY discard any Initial packet that does not
carry the expected token.
Unlike the token that is created for a Retry packet, there might be
some time between when the token is created and when the token is
subsequently used. Thus, a token SHOULD include an expiration time.
The server MAY include either an explicit expiration time or an
issued timestamp and dynamically calculate the expiration time. It
is also unlikely that the client port number is the same on two
different connections; validating the port is therefore unlikely to
be successful.
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A token SHOULD be constructed for the server to easily distinguish it
from tokens that are sent in Retry packets as they are carried in the
same field.
If the client has a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame on a previous
connection to what it believes to be the same server, it SHOULD
include that value in the Token field of its Initial packet.
Including a token might allow the server to validate the client
address without an additional round trip.
A token allows a server to correlate activity between the connection
where the token was issued and any connection where it is used.
Clients that want to break continuity of identity with a server MAY
discard tokens provided using the NEW_TOKEN frame. A token obtained
in a Retry packet MUST be used immediately during the connection
attempt and cannot be used in subsequent connection attempts.
A client SHOULD NOT reuse a token in different connections. Reusing
a token allows connections to be linked by entities on the network
path (see Section 9.5). A client MUST NOT reuse a token if it
believes that its point of network attachment has changed since the
token was last used; that is, if there is a change in its local IP
address or network interface. A client needs to start the connection
process over if it migrates prior to completing the handshake.
When a server receives an Initial packet with an address validation
token, it MUST attempt to validate the token, unless it has already
completed address validation. If the token is invalid then the
server SHOULD proceed as if the client did not have a validated
address, including potentially sending a Retry. If the validation
succeeds, the server SHOULD then allow the handshake to proceed.
Note: The rationale for treating the client as unvalidated rather
than discarding the packet is that the client might have received
the token in a previous connection using the NEW_TOKEN frame, and
if the server has lost state, it might be unable to validate the
token at all, leading to connection failure if the packet is
discarded. A server SHOULD encode tokens provided with NEW_TOKEN
frames and Retry packets differently, and validate the latter more
strictly.
In a stateless design, a server can use encrypted and authenticated
tokens to pass information to clients that the server can later
recover and use to validate a client address. Tokens are not
integrated into the cryptographic handshake and so they are not
authenticated. For instance, a client might be able to reuse a
token. To avoid attacks that exploit this property, a server can
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limit its use of tokens to only the information needed to validate
client addresses.
Attackers could replay tokens to use servers as amplifiers in DDoS
attacks. To protect against such attacks, servers SHOULD ensure that
tokens sent in Retry packets are only accepted for a short time.
Tokens that are provided in NEW_TOKEN frames (see Section 19.7) need
to be valid for longer, but SHOULD NOT be accepted multiple times in
a short period. Servers are encouraged to allow tokens to be used
only once, if possible.
8.1.3. Address Validation Token Integrity
An address validation token MUST be difficult to guess. Including a
large enough random value in the token would be sufficient, but this
depends on the server remembering the value it sends to clients.
A token-based scheme allows the server to offload any state
associated with validation to the client. For this design to work,
the token MUST be covered by integrity protection against
modification or falsification by clients. Without integrity
protection, malicious clients could generate or guess values for
tokens that would be accepted by the server. Only the server
requires access to the integrity protection key for tokens.
There is no need for a single well-defined format for the token
because the server that generates the token also consumes it. A
token could include information about the claimed client address (IP
and port), a timestamp, and any other supplementary information the
server will need to validate the token in the future.
8.2. Path Validation
Path validation is used during connection migration (see Section 9
and Section 9.6) by the migrating endpoint to verify reachability of
a peer from a new local address. In path validation, endpoints test
reachability between a specific local address and a specific peer
address, where an address is the two-tuple of IP address and port.
Path validation tests that packets (PATH_CHALLENGE) can be both sent
to and received (PATH_RESPONSE) from a peer on the path.
Importantly, it validates that the packets received from the
migrating endpoint do not carry a spoofed source address.
Path validation can be used at any time by either endpoint. For
instance, an endpoint might check that a peer is still in possession
of its address after a period of quiescence.
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Path validation is not designed as a NAT traversal mechanism. Though
the mechanism described here might be effective for the creation of
NAT bindings that support NAT traversal, the expectation is that one
or other peer is able to receive packets without first having sent a
packet on that path. Effective NAT traversal needs additional
synchronization mechanisms that are not provided here.
An endpoint MAY bundle PATH_CHALLENGE and PATH_RESPONSE frames that
are used for path validation with other frames. In particular, an
endpoint may pad a packet carrying a PATH_CHALLENGE for PMTU
discovery, or an endpoint may bundle a PATH_RESPONSE with its own
PATH_CHALLENGE.
When probing a new path, an endpoint might want to ensure that its
peer has an unused connection ID available for responses. The
endpoint can send NEW_CONNECTION_ID and PATH_CHALLENGE frames in the
same packet. This ensures that an unused connection ID will be
available to the peer when sending a response.
8.3. Initiating Path Validation
To initiate path validation, an endpoint sends a PATH_CHALLENGE frame
containing a random payload on the path to be validated.
An endpoint MAY send multiple PATH_CHALLENGE frames to guard against
packet loss. An endpoint SHOULD NOT send a PATH_CHALLENGE more
frequently than it would an Initial packet, ensuring that connection
migration is no more load on a new path than establishing a new
connection.
The endpoint MUST use unpredictable data in every PATH_CHALLENGE
frame so that it can associate the peer's response with the
corresponding PATH_CHALLENGE.
8.4. Path Validation Responses
On receiving a PATH_CHALLENGE frame, an endpoint MUST respond
immediately by echoing the data contained in the PATH_CHALLENGE frame
in a PATH_RESPONSE frame.
To ensure that packets can be both sent to and received from the
peer, the PATH_RESPONSE MUST be sent on the same path as the
triggering PATH_CHALLENGE. That is, from the same local address on
which the PATH_CHALLENGE was received, to the same remote address
from which the PATH_CHALLENGE was received.
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8.5. Successful Path Validation
A new address is considered valid when a PATH_RESPONSE frame is
received that meets the following criteria:
o It contains the data that was sent in a previous PATH_CHALLENGE.
Receipt of an acknowledgment for a packet containing a
PATH_CHALLENGE frame is not adequate validation, since the
acknowledgment can be spoofed by a malicious peer.
o It was sent from the same remote address to which the
corresponding PATH_CHALLENGE was sent. If a PATH_RESPONSE frame
is received from a different remote address than the one to which
the PATH_CHALLENGE was sent, path validation is considered to have
failed, even if the data matches that sent in the PATH_CHALLENGE.
o It was received on the same local address from which the
corresponding PATH_CHALLENGE was sent.
Note that receipt on a different local address does not result in
path validation failure, as it might be a result of a forwarded
packet (see Section 9.3.3) or misrouting. It is possible that a
valid PATH_RESPONSE might be received in the future.
8.6. Failed Path Validation
Path validation only fails when the endpoint attempting to validate
the path abandons its attempt to validate the path.
Endpoints SHOULD abandon path validation based on a timer. When
setting this timer, implementations are cautioned that the new path
could have a longer round-trip time than the original. A value of
three times the larger of the current Probe Timeout (PTO) or the
initial timeout (that is, 2*kInitialRtt) as defined in
[QUIC-RECOVERY] is RECOMMENDED. That is:
validation_timeout = max(3*PTO, 6*kInitialRtt)
Note that the endpoint might receive packets containing other frames
on the new path, but a PATH_RESPONSE frame with appropriate data is
required for path validation to succeed.
When an endpoint abandons path validation, it determines that the
path is unusable. This does not necessarily imply a failure of the
connection - endpoints can continue sending packets over other paths
as appropriate. If no paths are available, an endpoint can wait for
a new path to become available or close the connection.
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A path validation might be abandoned for other reasons besides
failure. Primarily, this happens if a connection migration to a new
path is initiated while a path validation on the old path is in
progress.
9. Connection Migration
The use of a connection ID allows connections to survive changes to
endpoint addresses (that is, IP address and/or port), such as those
caused by an endpoint migrating to a new network. This section
describes the process by which an endpoint migrates to a new address.
An endpoint MUST NOT initiate connection migration before the
handshake is finished and the endpoint has 1-RTT keys. The design of
QUIC relies on endpoints retaining a stable address for the duration
of the handshake.
An endpoint also MUST NOT initiate connection migration if the peer
sent the "disable_migration" transport parameter during the
handshake. An endpoint which has sent this transport parameter, but
detects that a peer has nonetheless migrated to a different network
MAY treat this as a connection error of type INVALID_MIGRATION.
Similarly, an endpoint MUST NOT initiate migration if its peer
supplies a zero-length connection ID as packets without a Destination
Connection ID cannot be attributed to a connection based on address
tuple.
Not all changes of peer address are intentional migrations. The peer
could experience NAT rebinding: a change of address due to a
middlebox, usually a NAT, allocating a new outgoing port or even a
new outgoing IP address for a flow. NAT rebinding is not connection
migration as defined in this section, though an endpoint SHOULD
perform path validation (Section 8.2) if it detects a change in the
IP address of its peer.
When an endpoint has no validated path on which to send packets, it
MAY discard connection state. An endpoint capable of connection
migration MAY wait for a new path to become available before
discarding connection state.
This document limits migration of connections to new client
addresses, except as described in Section 9.6. Clients are
responsible for initiating all migrations. Servers do not send non-
probing packets (see Section 9.1) toward a client address until they
see a non-probing packet from that address. If a client receives
packets from an unknown server address, the client MUST discard these
packets.
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9.1. Probing a New Path
An endpoint MAY probe for peer reachability from a new local address
using path validation Section 8.2 prior to migrating the connection
to the new local address. Failure of path validation simply means
that the new path is not usable for this connection. Failure to
validate a path does not cause the connection to end unless there are
no valid alternative paths available.
An endpoint uses a new connection ID for probes sent from a new local
address, see Section 9.5 for further discussion. An endpoint that
uses a new local address needs to ensure that at least one new
connection ID is available at the peer. That can be achieved by
including a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame in the probe.
Receiving a PATH_CHALLENGE frame from a peer indicates that the peer
is probing for reachability on a path. An endpoint sends a
PATH_RESPONSE in response as per Section 8.2.
PATH_CHALLENGE, PATH_RESPONSE, NEW_CONNECTION_ID, and PADDING frames
are "probing frames", and all other frames are "non-probing frames".
A packet containing only probing frames is a "probing packet", and a
packet containing any other frame is a "non-probing packet".
9.2. Initiating Connection Migration
An endpoint can migrate a connection to a new local address by
sending packets containing non-probing frames from that address.
Each endpoint validates its peer's address during connection
establishment. Therefore, a migrating endpoint can send to its peer
knowing that the peer is willing to receive at the peer's current
address. Thus an endpoint can migrate to a new local address without
first validating the peer's address.
When migrating, the new path might not support the endpoint's current
sending rate. Therefore, the endpoint resets its congestion
controller, as described in Section 9.4.
The new path might not have the same ECN capability. Therefore, the
endpoint verifies ECN capability as described in Section 13.3.
Receiving acknowledgments for data sent on the new path serves as
proof of the peer's reachability from the new address. Note that
since acknowledgments may be received on any path, return
reachability on the new path is not established. To establish return
reachability on the new path, an endpoint MAY concurrently initiate
path validation Section 8.2 on the new path.
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9.3. Responding to Connection Migration
Receiving a packet from a new peer address containing a non-probing
frame indicates that the peer has migrated to that address.
In response to such a packet, an endpoint MUST start sending
subsequent packets to the new peer address and MUST initiate path
validation (Section 8.2) to verify the peer's ownership of the
unvalidated address.
An endpoint MAY send data to an unvalidated peer address, but it MUST
protect against potential attacks as described in Section 9.3.1 and
Section 9.3.2. An endpoint MAY skip validation of a peer address if
that address has been seen recently.
An endpoint only changes the address that it sends packets to in
response to the highest-numbered non-probing packet. This ensures
that an endpoint does not send packets to an old peer address in the
case that it receives reordered packets.
After changing the address to which it sends non-probing packets, an
endpoint could abandon any path validation for other addresses.
Receiving a packet from a new peer address might be the result of a
NAT rebinding at the peer.
After verifying a new client address, the server SHOULD send new
address validation tokens (Section 8) to the client.
9.3.1. Peer Address Spoofing
It is possible that a peer is spoofing its source address to cause an
endpoint to send excessive amounts of data to an unwilling host. If
the endpoint sends significantly more data than the spoofing peer,
connection migration might be used to amplify the volume of data that
an attacker can generate toward a victim.
As described in Section 9.3, an endpoint is required to validate a
peer's new address to confirm the peer's possession of the new
address. Until a peer's address is deemed valid, an endpoint MUST
limit the rate at which it sends data to this address. The endpoint
MUST NOT send more than a minimum congestion window's worth of data
per estimated round-trip time (kMinimumWindow, as defined in
[QUIC-RECOVERY]). In the absence of this limit, an endpoint risks
being used for a denial of service attack against an unsuspecting
victim. Note that since the endpoint will not have any round-trip
time measurements to this address, the estimate SHOULD be the default
initial value (see [QUIC-RECOVERY]).
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If an endpoint skips validation of a peer address as described in
Section 9.3, it does not need to limit its sending rate.
9.3.2. On-Path Address Spoofing
An on-path attacker could cause a spurious connection migration by
copying and forwarding a packet with a spoofed address such that it
arrives before the original packet. The packet with the spoofed
address will be seen to come from a migrating connection, and the
original packet will be seen as a duplicate and dropped. After a
spurious migration, validation of the source address will fail
because the entity at the source address does not have the necessary
cryptographic keys to read or respond to the PATH_CHALLENGE frame
that is sent to it even if it wanted to.
To protect the connection from failing due to such a spurious
migration, an endpoint MUST revert to using the last validated peer
address when validation of a new peer address fails.
If an endpoint has no state about the last validated peer address, it
MUST close the connection silently by discarding all connection
state. This results in new packets on the connection being handled
generically. For instance, an endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in
response to any further incoming packets.
Note that receipt of packets with higher packet numbers from the
legitimate peer address will trigger another connection migration.
This will cause the validation of the address of the spurious
migration to be abandoned.
9.3.3. Off-Path Packet Forwarding
An off-path attacker that can observe packets might forward copies of
genuine packets to endpoints. If the copied packet arrives before
the genuine packet, this will appear as a NAT rebinding. Any genuine
packet will be discarded as a duplicate. If the attacker is able to
continue forwarding packets, it might be able to cause migration to a
path via the attacker. This places the attacker on path, giving it
the ability to observe or drop all subsequent packets.
Unlike the attack described in Section 9.3.2, the attacker can ensure
that the new path is successfully validated.
This style of attack relies on the attacker using a path that is
approximately as fast as the direct path between endpoints. The
attack is more reliable if relatively few packets are sent or if
packet loss coincides with the attempted attack.
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A non-probing packet received on the original path that increases the
maximum received packet number will cause the endpoint to move back
to that path. Eliciting packets on this path increases the
likelihood that the attack is unsuccessful. Therefore, mitigation of
this attack relies on triggering the exchange of packets.
In response to an apparent migration, endpoints MUST validate the
previously active path using a PATH_CHALLENGE frame. This induces
the sending of new packets on that path. If the path is no longer
viable, the validation attempt will time out and fail; if the path is
viable, but no longer desired, the validation will succeed, but only
results in probing packets being sent on the path.
An endpoint that receives a PATH_CHALLENGE on an active path SHOULD
send a non-probing packet in response. If the non-probing packet
arrives before any copy made by an attacker, this results in the
connection being migrated back to the original path. Any subsequent
migration to another path restarts this entire process.
This defense is imperfect, but this is not considered a serious
problem. If the path via the attack is reliably faster than the
original path despite multiple attempts to use that original path, it
is not possible to distinguish between attack and an improvement in
routing.
An endpoint could also use heuristics to improve detection of this
style of attack. For instance, NAT rebinding is improbable if
packets were recently received on the old path, similarly rebinding
is rare on IPv6 paths. Endpoints can also look for duplicated
packets. Conversely, a change in connection ID is more likely to
indicate an intentional migration rather than an attack.
9.4. Loss Detection and Congestion Control
The capacity available on the new path might not be the same as the
old path. Packets sent on the old path SHOULD NOT contribute to
congestion control or RTT estimation for the new path.
On confirming a peer's ownership of its new address, an endpoint
SHOULD immediately reset the congestion controller and round-trip
time estimator for the new path.
An endpoint MUST NOT return to the send rate used for the previous
path unless it is reasonably sure that the previous send rate is
valid for the new path. For instance, a change in the client's port
number is likely indicative of a rebinding in a middlebox and not a
complete change in path. This determination likely depends on
heuristics, which could be imperfect; if the new path capacity is
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significantly reduced, ultimately this relies on the congestion
controller responding to congestion signals and reducing send rates
appropriately.
There may be apparent reordering at the receiver when an endpoint
sends data and probes from/to multiple addresses during the migration
period, since the two resulting paths may have different round-trip
times. A receiver of packets on multiple paths will still send ACK
frames covering all received packets.
While multiple paths might be used during connection migration, a
single congestion control context and a single loss recovery context
(as described in [QUIC-RECOVERY]) may be adequate. For instance, an
endpoint might delay switching to a new congestion control context
until it is confirmed that an old path is no longer needed (such as
the case in Section 9.3.3).
A sender can make exceptions for probe packets so that their loss
detection is independent and does not unduly cause the congestion
controller to reduce its sending rate. An endpoint might set a
separate timer when a PATH_CHALLENGE is sent, which is cancelled when
the corresponding PATH_RESPONSE is received. If the timer fires
before the PATH_RESPONSE is received, the endpoint might send a new
PATH_CHALLENGE, and restart the timer for a longer period of time.
9.5. Privacy Implications of Connection Migration
Using a stable connection ID on multiple network paths allows a
passive observer to correlate activity between those paths. An
endpoint that moves between networks might not wish to have their
activity correlated by any entity other than their peer, so different
connection IDs are used when sending from different local addresses,
as discussed in Section 5.1. For this to be effective endpoints need
to ensure that connections IDs they provide cannot be linked by any
other entity.
At any time, endpoints MAY change the Destination Connection ID they
send to a value that has not been used on another path.
An endpoint MUST use a new connection ID if it initiates connection
migration. Using a new connection ID eliminates the use of the
connection ID for linking activity from the same connection on
different networks. Header protection ensures that packet numbers
cannot be used to correlate activity. This does not prevent other
properties of packets, such as timing and size, from being used to
correlate activity.
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Unintentional changes in path without a change in connection ID are
possible. For example, after a period of network inactivity, NAT
rebinding might cause packets to be sent on a new path when the
client resumes sending.
A client might wish to reduce linkability by employing a new
connection ID and source UDP port when sending traffic after a period
of inactivity. Changing the UDP port from which it sends packets at
the same time might cause the packet to appear as a connection
migration. This ensures that the mechanisms that support migration
are exercised even for clients that don't experience NAT rebindings
or genuine migrations. Changing port number can cause a peer to
reset its congestion state (see Section 9.4), so the port SHOULD only
be changed infrequently.
An endpoint that exhausts available connection IDs cannot migrate.
To ensure that migration is possible and packets sent on different
paths cannot be correlated, endpoints SHOULD provide new connection
IDs before peers migrate.
9.6. Server's Preferred Address
QUIC allows servers to accept connections on one IP address and
attempt to transfer these connections to a more preferred address
shortly after the handshake. This is particularly useful when
clients initially connect to an address shared by multiple servers
but would prefer to use a unicast address to ensure connection
stability. This section describes the protocol for migrating a
connection to a preferred server address.
Migrating a connection to a new server address mid-connection is left
for future work. If a client receives packets from a new server
address not indicated by the preferred_address transport parameter,
the client SHOULD discard these packets.
9.6.1. Communicating A Preferred Address
A server conveys a preferred address by including the
preferred_address transport parameter in the TLS handshake.
Servers MAY communicate a preferred address of each address family
(IPv4 and IPv6) to allow clients to pick the one most suited to their
network attachment.
Once the handshake is finished, the client SHOULD select one of the
two server's preferred addresses and initiate path validation (see
Section 8.2) of that address using the connection ID provided in the
preferred_address transport parameter.
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If path validation succeeds, the client SHOULD immediately begin
sending all future packets to the new server address using the new
connection ID and discontinue use of the old server address. If path
validation fails, the client MUST continue sending all future packets
to the server's original IP address.
9.6.2. Responding to Connection Migration
A server might receive a packet addressed to its preferred IP address
at any time after it accepts a connection. If this packet contains a
PATH_CHALLENGE frame, the server sends a PATH_RESPONSE frame as per
Section 8.2. The server MUST send other non-probing frames from its
original address until it receives a non-probing packet from the
client at its preferred address and until the server has validated
the new path.
The server MUST probe on the path toward the client from its
preferred address. This helps to guard against spurious migration
initiated by an attacker.
Once the server has completed its path validation and has received a
non-probing packet with a new largest packet number on its preferred
address, the server begins sending non-probing packets to the client
exclusively from its preferred IP address. It SHOULD drop packets
for this connection received on the old IP address, but MAY continue
to process delayed packets.
9.6.3. Interaction of Client Migration and Preferred Address
A client might need to perform a connection migration before it has
migrated to the server's preferred address. In this case, the client
SHOULD perform path validation to both the original and preferred
server address from the client's new address concurrently.
If path validation of the server's preferred address succeeds, the
client MUST abandon validation of the original address and migrate to
using the server's preferred address. If path validation of the
server's preferred address fails but validation of the server's
original address succeeds, the client MAY migrate to its new address
and continue sending to the server's original address.
If the connection to the server's preferred address is not from the
same client address, the server MUST protect against potential
attacks as described in Section 9.3.1 and Section 9.3.2. In addition
to intentional simultaneous migration, this might also occur because
the client's access network used a different NAT binding for the
server's preferred address.
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Servers SHOULD initiate path validation to the client's new address
upon receiving a probe packet from a different address. Servers MUST
NOT send more than a minimum congestion window's worth of non-probing
packets to the new address before path validation is complete.
A client that migrates to a new address SHOULD use a preferred
address from the same address family for the server.
9.7. Use of IPv6 Flow-Label and Migration
Endpoints that send data using IPv6 SHOULD apply an IPv6 flow label
in compliance with [RFC6437], unless the local API does not allow
setting IPv6 flow labels.
The IPv6 flow label SHOULD be a pseudo-random function of the source
and destination addresses, source and destination UDP ports, and the
destination CID. The flow label generation MUST be designed to
minimize the chances of linkability with a previously used flow
label, as this would enable correlating activity on multiple paths
(see Section 9.5).
A possible implementation is to compute the flow label as a
cryptographic hash function of the source and destination addresses,
source and destination UDP ports, destination CID, and a local
secret.
10. Connection Termination
An established QUIC connection can be terminated in one of three
ways:
o idle timeout (Section 10.2)
o immediate close (Section 10.3)
o stateless reset (Section 10.4)
An endpoint MAY discard connection state if it does not have a
validated path on which it can send packets (see Section 8.2).
10.1. Closing and Draining Connection States
The closing and draining connection states exist to ensure that
connections close cleanly and that delayed or reordered packets are
properly discarded. These states SHOULD persist for at least three
times the current Probe Timeout (PTO) interval as defined in
[QUIC-RECOVERY].
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An endpoint enters a closing period after initiating an immediate
close (Section 10.3). While closing, an endpoint MUST NOT send
packets unless they contain a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (see
Section 10.3 for details). An endpoint retains only enough
information to generate a packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame
and to identify packets as belonging to the connection. The
endpoint's selected connection ID and the QUIC version are sufficient
information to identify packets for a closing connection; an endpoint
can discard all other connection state. An endpoint MAY retain
packet protection keys for incoming packets to allow it to read and
process a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.
The draining state is entered once an endpoint receives a signal that
its peer is closing or draining. While otherwise identical to the
closing state, an endpoint in the draining state MUST NOT send any
packets. Retaining packet protection keys is unnecessary once a
connection is in the draining state.
An endpoint MAY transition from the closing period to the draining
period if it receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame or stateless reset,
both of which indicate that the peer is also closing or draining.
The draining period SHOULD end when the closing period would have
ended. In other words, the endpoint can use the same end time, but
cease retransmission of the closing packet.
Disposing of connection state prior to the end of the closing or
draining period could cause delayed or reordered packets to be
handled poorly. Endpoints that have some alternative means to ensure
that late-arriving packets on the connection do not create QUIC
state, such as those that are able to close the UDP socket, MAY use
an abbreviated draining period which can allow for faster resource
recovery. Servers that retain an open socket for accepting new
connections SHOULD NOT exit the closing or draining period early.
Once the closing or draining period has ended, an endpoint SHOULD
discard all connection state. This results in new packets on the
connection being handled generically. For instance, an endpoint MAY
send a stateless reset in response to any further incoming packets.
The draining and closing periods do not apply when a stateless reset
(Section 10.4) is sent.
An endpoint is not expected to handle key updates when it is closing
or draining. A key update might prevent the endpoint from moving
from the closing state to draining, but it otherwise has no impact.
While in the closing period, an endpoint could receive packets from a
new source address, indicating a connection migration (Section 9).
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An endpoint in the closing state MUST strictly limit the number of
packets it sends to this new address until the address is validated
(see Section 8.2). A server in the closing state MAY instead choose
to discard packets received from a new source address.
10.2. Idle Timeout
If the idle timeout is enabled, a connection is silently closed and
the state is discarded when it remains idle for longer than both the
advertised idle timeout (see Section 18.1) and three times the
current Probe Timeout (PTO).
Each endpoint advertises its own idle timeout to its peer. An
endpoint restarts any timer it maintains when a packet from its peer
is received and processed successfully. The timer is also restarted
when sending a packet containing frames other than ACK or PADDING (an
ACK-eliciting packet, see [QUIC-RECOVERY]), but only if no other ACK-
eliciting packets have been sent since last receiving a packet.
Restarting when sending packets ensures that connections do not
prematurely time out when initiating new activity.
The value for an idle timeout can be asymmetric. The value
advertised by an endpoint is only used to determine whether the
connection is live at that endpoint. An endpoint that sends packets
near the end of the idle timeout period of a peer risks having those
packets discarded if its peer enters the draining state before the
packets arrive. If a peer could timeout within an Probe Timeout
(PTO, see Section 6.2.2 of [QUIC-RECOVERY]), it is advisable to test
for liveness before sending any data that cannot be retried safely.
Note that it is likely that only applications or application
protocols will know what information can be retried.
10.3. Immediate Close
An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (Section 19.19) to
terminate the connection immediately. A CONNECTION_CLOSE frame
causes all streams to immediately become closed; open streams can be
assumed to be implicitly reset.
After sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, endpoints immediately enter
the closing state. During the closing period, an endpoint that sends
a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame SHOULD respond to any packet that it
receives with another packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. To
minimize the state that an endpoint maintains for a closing
connection, endpoints MAY send the exact same packet. However,
endpoints SHOULD limit the number of packets they generate containing
a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. For instance, an endpoint could
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progressively increase the number of packets that it receives before
sending additional packets or increase the time between packets.
Note: Allowing retransmission of a closing packet contradicts other
advice in this document that recommends the creation of new packet
numbers for every packet. Sending new packet numbers is primarily
of advantage to loss recovery and congestion control, which are
not expected to be relevant for a closed connection.
Retransmitting the final packet requires less state.
New packets from unverified addresses could be used to create an
amplification attack (see Section 8). To avoid this, endpoints MUST
either limit transmission of CONNECTION_CLOSE frames to validated
addresses or drop packets without response if the response would be
more than three times larger than the received packet.
After receiving a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, endpoints enter the
draining state. An endpoint that receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame
MAY send a single packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame before
entering the draining state, using a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame and a
NO_ERROR code if appropriate. An endpoint MUST NOT send further
packets, which could result in a constant exchange of
CONNECTION_CLOSE frames until the closing period on either peer
ended.
An immediate close can be used after an application protocol has
arranged to close a connection. This might be after the application
protocols negotiates a graceful shutdown. The application protocol
exchanges whatever messages that are needed to cause both endpoints
to agree to close the connection, after which the application
requests that the connection be closed. The application protocol can
use an CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with an appropriate error code to
signal closure.
If the connection has been successfully established, endpoints MUST
send any CONNECTION_CLOSE frames in a 1-RTT packet. Prior to
connection establishment a peer might not have 1-RTT keys, so
endpoints SHOULD send CONNECTION_CLOSE frames in a Handshake packet.
If the endpoint does not have Handshake keys, or it is not certain
that the peer has Handshake keys, it MAY send CONNECTION_CLOSE frames
in an Initial packet. If multiple packets are sent, they can be
coalesced (see Section 12.2) to facilitate retransmission.
10.4. Stateless Reset
A stateless reset is provided as an option of last resort for an
endpoint that does not have access to the state of a connection. A
crash or outage might result in peers continuing to send data to an
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endpoint that is unable to properly continue the connection. A
stateless reset is not appropriate for signaling error conditions.
An endpoint that wishes to communicate a fatal connection error MUST
use a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame if it has sufficient state to do so.
To support this process, a token is sent by endpoints. The token is
carried in the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame sent by either peer, and
servers can specify the stateless_reset_token transport parameter
during the handshake (clients cannot because their transport
parameters don't have confidentiality protection). This value is
protected by encryption, so only client and server know this value.
Tokens are invalidated when their associated connection ID is retired
via a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame (Section 19.16).
An endpoint that receives packets that it cannot process sends a
packet in the following layout:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0|1| Unpredictable Bits (182..) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Stateless Reset Token (128) +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Stateless Reset Packet
This design ensures that a stateless reset packet is - to the extent
possible - indistinguishable from a regular packet with a short
header.
A stateless reset uses an entire UDP datagram, starting with the
first two bits of the packet header. The remainder of the first byte
and an arbitrary number of bytes following it that are set to
unpredictable values. The last 16 bytes of the datagram contain a
Stateless Reset Token.
A stateless reset will be interpreted by a recipient as a packet with
a short header. For the packet to appear as valid, the Unpredictable
Bits field needs to include at least 182 bits of data (or 23 bytes,
less the two fixed bits). This is intended to allow for a
Destination Connection ID of the maximum length permitted, with a
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minimal packet number, and payload. The Stateless Reset Token
corresponds to the minimum expansion of the packet protection AEAD.
More unpredictable bytes might be necessary if the endpoint could
have negotiated a packet protection scheme with a larger minimum AEAD
expansion.
An endpoint SHOULD NOT send a stateless reset that is significantly
larger than the packet it receives. Endpoints MUST discard packets
that are too small to be valid QUIC packets. With the set of AEAD
functions defined in [QUIC-TLS], packets that are smaller than 21
bytes are never valid.
An endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in response to a packet with a
long header. This would not be effective if the stateless reset
token was not yet available to a peer. In this QUIC version, packets
with a long header are only used during connection establishment.
Because the stateless reset token is not available until connection
establishment is complete or near completion, ignoring an unknown
packet with a long header might be more effective.
An endpoint cannot determine the Source Connection ID from a packet
with a short header, therefore it cannot set the Destination
Connection ID in the stateless reset packet. The Destination
Connection ID will therefore differ from the value used in previous
packets. A random Destination Connection ID makes the connection ID
appear to be the result of moving to a new connection ID that was
provided using a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame (Section 19.15).
Using a randomized connection ID results in two problems:
o The packet might not reach the peer. If the Destination
Connection ID is critical for routing toward the peer, then this
packet could be incorrectly routed. This might also trigger
another Stateless Reset in response, see Section 10.4.3. A
Stateless Reset that is not correctly routed is an ineffective
error detection and recovery mechanism. In this case, endpoints
will need to rely on other methods - such as timers - to detect
that the connection has failed.
o The randomly generated connection ID can be used by entities other
than the peer to identify this as a potential stateless reset. An
endpoint that occasionally uses different connection IDs might
introduce some uncertainty about this.
Finally, the last 16 bytes of the packet are set to the value of the
Stateless Reset Token.
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This stateless reset design is specific to QUIC version 1. An
endpoint that supports multiple versions of QUIC needs to generate a
stateless reset that will be accepted by peers that support any
version that the endpoint might support (or might have supported
prior to losing state). Designers of new versions of QUIC need to be
aware of this and either reuse this design, or use a portion of the
packet other than the last 16 bytes for carrying data.
10.4.1. Detecting a Stateless Reset
An endpoint detects a potential stateless reset when a incoming
packet with a short header either cannot be associated with a
connection, cannot be decrypted, or is marked as a duplicate packet.
The endpoint then compares the last 16 bytes of the packet with the
Stateless Reset Token provided by its peer, either in a
NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame or the server's transport parameters. If
these values are identical, the endpoint MUST enter the draining
period and not send any further packets on this connection. If the
comparison fails, the packet can be discarded.
10.4.2. Calculating a Stateless Reset Token
The stateless reset token MUST be difficult to guess. In order to
create a Stateless Reset Token, an endpoint could randomly generate
[RFC4086] a secret for every connection that it creates. However,
this presents a coordination problem when there are multiple
instances in a cluster or a storage problem for an endpoint that
might lose state. Stateless reset specifically exists to handle the
case where state is lost, so this approach is suboptimal.
A single static key can be used across all connections to the same
endpoint by generating the proof using a second iteration of a
preimage-resistant function that takes a static key and the
connection ID chosen by the endpoint (see Section 5.1) as input. An
endpoint could use HMAC [RFC2104] (for example, HMAC(static_key,
connection_id)) or HKDF [RFC5869] (for example, using the static key
as input keying material, with the connection ID as salt). The
output of this function is truncated to 16 bytes to produce the
Stateless Reset Token for that connection.
An endpoint that loses state can use the same method to generate a
valid Stateless Reset Token. The connection ID comes from the packet
that the endpoint receives.
This design relies on the peer always sending a connection ID in its
packets so that the endpoint can use the connection ID from a packet
to reset the connection. An endpoint that uses this design MUST
either use the same connection ID length for all connections or
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encode the length of the connection ID such that it can be recovered
without state. In addition, it cannot provide a zero-length
connection ID.
Revealing the Stateless Reset Token allows any entity to terminate
the connection, so a value can only be used once. This method for
choosing the Stateless Reset Token means that the combination of
connection ID and static key cannot occur for another connection. A
denial of service attack is possible if the same connection ID is
used by instances that share a static key, or if an attacker can
cause a packet to be routed to an instance that has no state but the
same static key (see Section 21.8). A connection ID from a
connection that is reset by revealing the Stateless Reset Token
cannot be reused for new connections at nodes that share a static
key.
Note that Stateless Reset packets do not have any cryptographic
protection.
10.4.3. Looping
The design of a Stateless Reset is such that without knowing the
stateless reset token it is indistinguishable from a valid packet.
For instance, if a server sends a Stateless Reset to another server
it might receive another Stateless Reset in response, which could
lead to an infinite exchange.
An endpoint MUST ensure that every Stateless Reset that it sends is
smaller than the packet which triggered it, unless it maintains state
sufficient to prevent looping. In the event of a loop, this results
in packets eventually being too small to trigger a response.
An endpoint can remember the number of Stateless Reset packets that
it has sent and stop generating new Stateless Reset packets once a
limit is reached. Using separate limits for different remote
addresses will ensure that Stateless Reset packets can be used to
close connections when other peers or connections have exhausted
limits.
Reducing the size of a Stateless Reset below the recommended minimum
size of 39 bytes could mean that the packet could reveal to an
observer that it is a Stateless Reset. Conversely, refusing to send
a Stateless Reset in response to a small packet might result in
Stateless Reset not being useful in detecting cases of broken
connections where only very small packets are sent; such failures
might only be detected by other means, such as timers.
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An endpoint can increase the odds that a packet will trigger a
Stateless Reset if it cannot be processed by padding it to at least
40 bytes.
11. Error Handling
An endpoint that detects an error SHOULD signal the existence of that
error to its peer. Both transport-level and application-level errors
can affect an entire connection (see Section 11.1), while only
application-level errors can be isolated to a single stream (see
Section 11.2).
The most appropriate error code (Section 20) SHOULD be included in
the frame that signals the error. Where this specification
identifies error conditions, it also identifies the error code that
is used.
A stateless reset (Section 10.4) is not suitable for any error that
can be signaled with a CONNECTION_CLOSE or RESET_STREAM frame. A
stateless reset MUST NOT be used by an endpoint that has the state
necessary to send a frame on the connection.
11.1. Connection Errors
Errors that result in the connection being unusable, such as an
obvious violation of protocol semantics or corruption of state that
affects an entire connection, MUST be signaled using a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (Section 19.19). An endpoint MAY close the
connection in this manner even if the error only affects a single
stream.
Application protocols can signal application-specific protocol errors
using the application-specific variant of the CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.
Errors that are specific to the transport, including all those
described in this document, are carried the QUIC-specific variant of
the CONNECTION_CLOSE frame.
A CONNECTION_CLOSE frame could be sent in a packet that is lost. An
endpoint SHOULD be prepared to retransmit a packet containing a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame if it receives more packets on a terminated
connection. Limiting the number of retransmissions and the time over
which this final packet is sent limits the effort expended on
terminated connections.
An endpoint that chooses not to retransmit packets containing a
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame risks a peer missing the first such packet.
The only mechanism available to an endpoint that continues to receive
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data for a terminated connection is to use the stateless reset
process (Section 10.4).
An endpoint that receives an invalid CONNECTION_CLOSE frame MUST NOT
signal the existence of the error to its peer.
11.2. Stream Errors
If an application-level error affects a single stream, but otherwise
leaves the connection in a recoverable state, the endpoint can send a
RESET_STREAM frame (Section 19.4) with an appropriate error code to
terminate just the affected stream.
RESET_STREAM MUST be instigated by the protocol using QUIC, either
directly or through the receipt of a STOP_SENDING frame from a peer.
RESET_STREAM carries an application error code. Resetting a stream
without knowledge of the application protocol could cause the
protocol to enter an unrecoverable state. Application protocols
might require certain streams to be reliably delivered in order to
guarantee consistent state between endpoints.
12. Packets and Frames
QUIC endpoints communicate by exchanging packets. Packets have
confidentiality and integrity protection (see Section 12.1) and are
carried in UDP datagrams (see Section 12.2).
This version of QUIC uses the long packet header (see Section 17.2)
during connection establishment. Packets with the long header are
Initial (Section 17.2.2), 0-RTT (Section 17.2.3), Handshake
(Section 17.2.4), and Retry (Section 17.2.5). Version negotiation
uses a version-independent packet with a long header (see
Section 17.2.1).
Packets with the short header (Section 17.3) are designed for minimal
overhead and are used after a connection is established and 1-RTT
keys are available.
12.1. Protected Packets
All QUIC packets except Version Negotiation and Retry packets use
authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) [RFC5116] to
provide confidentiality and integrity protection. Details of packet
protection are found in [QUIC-TLS]; this section includes an overview
of the process.
Initial packets are protected using keys that are statically derived.
This packet protection is not effective confidentiality protection.
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Initial protection only exists to ensure that the sender of the
packet is on the network path. Any entity that receives the Initial
packet from a client can recover the keys necessary to remove packet
protection or to generate packets that will be successfully
authenticated.
All other packets are protected with keys derived from the
cryptographic handshake. The type of the packet from the long header
or key phase from the short header are used to identify which
encryption level - and therefore the keys - that are used. Packets
protected with 0-RTT and 1-RTT keys are expected to have
confidentiality and data origin authentication; the cryptographic
handshake ensures that only the communicating endpoints receive the
corresponding keys.
The packet number field contains a packet number, which has
additional confidentiality protection that is applied after packet
protection is applied (see [QUIC-TLS] for details). The underlying
packet number increases with each packet sent in a given packet
number space, see Section 12.3 for details.
12.2. Coalescing Packets
Initial (Section 17.2.2), 0-RTT (Section 17.2.3), and Handshake
(Section 17.2.4) packets contain a Length field, which determines the
end of the packet. The length includes both the Packet Number and
Payload fields, both of which are confidentiality protected and
initially of unknown length. The length of the Payload field is
learned once header protection is removed.
Using the Length field, a sender can coalesce multiple QUIC packets
into one UDP datagram. This can reduce the number of UDP datagrams
needed to complete the cryptographic handshake and starting sending
data. Receivers MUST be able to process coalesced packets.
Coalescing packets in order of increasing encryption levels (Initial,
0-RTT, Handshake, 1-RTT) makes it more likely the receiver will be
able to process all the packets in a single pass. A packet with a
short header does not include a length, so it can only be the last
packet included in a UDP datagram.
Senders MUST NOT coalesce QUIC packets for different connections into
a single UDP datagram. Receivers SHOULD ignore any subsequent
packets with a different Destination Connection ID than the first
packet in the datagram.
Every QUIC packet that is coalesced into a single UDP datagram is
separate and complete. Though the values of some fields in the
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packet header might be redundant, no fields are omitted. The
receiver of coalesced QUIC packets MUST individually process each
QUIC packet and separately acknowledge them, as if they were received
as the payload of different UDP datagrams. For example, if
decryption fails (because the keys are not available or any other
reason), the receiver MAY either discard or buffer the packet for
later processing and MUST attempt to process the remaining packets.
Retry packets (Section 17.2.5), Version Negotiation packets
(Section 17.2.1), and packets with a short header (Section 17.3) do
not contain a Length field and so cannot be followed by other packets
in the same UDP datagram.
12.3. Packet Numbers
The packet number is an integer in the range 0 to 2^62-1. This
number is used in determining the cryptographic nonce for packet
protection. Each endpoint maintains a separate packet number for
sending and receiving.
Packet numbers are limited to this range because they need to be
representable in whole in the Largest Acknowledged field of an ACK
frame (Section 19.3). When present in a long or short header
however, packet numbers are reduced and encoded in 1 to 4 bytes (see
Section 17.1).
Version Negotiation (Section 17.2.1) and Retry (Section 17.2.5)
packets do not include a packet number.
Packet numbers are divided into 3 spaces in QUIC:
o Initial space: All Initial packets (Section 17.2.2) are in this
space.
o Handshake space: All Handshake packets (Section 17.2.4) are in
this space.
o Application data space: All 0-RTT and 1-RTT encrypted packets
(Section 12.1) are in this space.
As described in [QUIC-TLS], each packet type uses different
protection keys.
Conceptually, a packet number space is the context in which a packet
can be processed and acknowledged. Initial packets can only be sent
with Initial packet protection keys and acknowledged in packets which
are also Initial packets. Similarly, Handshake packets are sent at
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the Handshake encryption level and can only be acknowledged in
Handshake packets.
This enforces cryptographic separation between the data sent in the
different packet sequence number spaces. Packet numbers in each
space start at packet number 0. Subsequent packets sent in the same
packet number space MUST increase the packet number by at least one.
0-RTT and 1-RTT data exist in the same packet number space to make
loss recovery algorithms easier to implement between the two packet
types.
A QUIC endpoint MUST NOT reuse a packet number within the same packet
number space in one connection. If the packet number for sending
reaches 2^62 - 1, the sender MUST close the connection without
sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame or any further packets; an endpoint
MAY send a Stateless Reset (Section 10.4) in response to further
packets that it receives.
A receiver MUST discard a newly unprotected packet unless it is
certain that it has not processed another packet with the same packet
number from the same packet number space. Duplicate suppression MUST
happen after removing packet protection for the reasons described in
Section 9.3 of [QUIC-TLS]. An efficient algorithm for duplicate
suppression can be found in Section 3.4.3 of [RFC4303].
Packet number encoding at a sender and decoding at a receiver are
described in Section 17.1.
12.4. Frames and Frame Types
The payload of QUIC packets, after removing packet protection,
commonly consists of a sequence of frames, as shown in Figure 7.
Version Negotiation, Stateless Reset, and Retry packets do not
contain frames.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Frame 1 (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Frame 2 (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Frame N (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: QUIC Payload
QUIC payloads MUST contain at least one frame, and MAY contain
multiple frames and multiple frame types.
Frames MUST fit within a single QUIC packet and MUST NOT span a QUIC
packet boundary. Each frame begins with a Frame Type, indicating its
type, followed by additional type-dependent fields:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Frame Type (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type-Dependent Fields (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: Generic Frame Layout
The frame types defined in this specification are listed in Table 3.
The Frame Type in STREAM frames is used to carry other frame-specific
flags. For all other frames, the Frame Type field simply identifies
the frame. These frames are explained in more detail in Section 19.
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+-------------+----------------------+---------------+
| Type Value | Frame Type Name | Definition |
+-------------+----------------------+---------------+
| 0x00 | PADDING | Section 19.1 |
| | | |
| 0x01 | PING | Section 19.2 |
| | | |
| 0x02 - 0x03 | ACK | Section 19.3 |
| | | |
| 0x04 | RESET_STREAM | Section 19.4 |
| | | |
| 0x05 | STOP_SENDING | Section 19.5 |
| | | |
| 0x06 | CRYPTO | Section 19.6 |
| | | |
| 0x07 | NEW_TOKEN | Section 19.7 |
| | | |
| 0x08 - 0x0f | STREAM | Section 19.8 |
| | | |
| 0x10 | MAX_DATA | Section 19.9 |
| | | |
| 0x11 | MAX_STREAM_DATA | Section 19.10 |
| | | |
| 0x12 - 0x13 | MAX_STREAMS | Section 19.11 |
| | | |
| 0x14 | DATA_BLOCKED | Section 19.12 |
| | | |
| 0x15 | STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED | Section 19.13 |
| | | |
| 0x16 - 0x17 | STREAMS_BLOCKED | Section 19.14 |
| | | |
| 0x18 | NEW_CONNECTION_ID | Section 19.15 |
| | | |
| 0x19 | RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID | Section 19.16 |
| | | |
| 0x1a | PATH_CHALLENGE | Section 19.17 |
| | | |
| 0x1b | PATH_RESPONSE | Section 19.18 |
| | | |
| 0x1c - 0x1d | CONNECTION_CLOSE | Section 19.19 |
+-------------+----------------------+---------------+
Table 3: Frame Types
All QUIC frames are idempotent in this version of QUIC. That is, a
valid frame does not cause undesirable side effects or errors when
received more than once.
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The Frame Type field uses a variable length integer encoding (see
Section 16) with one exception. To ensure simple and efficient
implementations of frame parsing, a frame type MUST use the shortest
possible encoding. Though a two-, four- or eight-byte encoding of
the frame types defined in this document is possible, the Frame Type
field for these frames is encoded on a single byte. For instance,
though 0x4001 is a legitimate two-byte encoding for a variable-length
integer with a value of 1, PING frames are always encoded as a single
byte with the value 0x01. An endpoint MAY treat the receipt of a
frame type that uses a longer encoding than necessary as a connection
error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
13. Packetization and Reliability
A sender bundles one or more frames in a QUIC packet (see
Section 12.4).
A sender can minimize per-packet bandwidth and computational costs by
bundling as many frames as possible within a QUIC packet. A sender
MAY wait for a short period of time to bundle multiple frames before
sending a packet that is not maximally packed, to avoid sending out
large numbers of small packets. An implementation MAY use knowledge
about application sending behavior or heuristics to determine whether
and for how long to wait. This waiting period is an implementation
decision, and an implementation should be careful to delay
conservatively, since any delay is likely to increase application-
visible latency.
Stream multiplexing is achieved by interleaving STREAM frames from
multiple streams into one or more QUIC packets. A single QUIC packet
can include multiple STREAM frames from one or more streams.
One of the benefits of QUIC is avoidance of head-of-line blocking
across multiple streams. When a packet loss occurs, only streams
with data in that packet are blocked waiting for a retransmission to
be received, while other streams can continue making progress. Note
that when data from multiple streams is bundled into a single QUIC
packet, loss of that packet blocks all those streams from making
progress. Implementations are advised to bundle as few streams as
necessary in outgoing packets without losing transmission efficiency
to underfilled packets.
13.1. Packet Processing and Acknowledgment
A packet MUST NOT be acknowledged until packet protection has been
successfully removed and all frames contained in the packet have been
processed. For STREAM frames, this means the data has been enqueued
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in preparation to be received by the application protocol, but it
does not require that data is delivered and consumed.
Once the packet has been fully processed, a receiver acknowledges
receipt by sending one or more ACK frames containing the packet
number of the received packet.
13.1.1. Sending ACK Frames
An endpoint MUST NOT send more than one packet containing only an ACK
frame per received packet that contains frames other than ACK and
PADDING frames. An endpoint MUST NOT send a packet containing only
an ACK frame in response to a packet containing only ACK or PADDING
frames, even if there are packet gaps which precede the received
packet. This prevents an indefinite feedback loop of ACKs. The
endpoint MUST however acknowledge packets containing only ACK or
PADDING frames when sending ACK frames in response to other packets.
Packets containing PADDING frames are considered to be in flight for
congestion control purposes [QUIC-RECOVERY]. Sending only PADDING
frames might cause the sender to become limited by the congestion
controller (as described in [QUIC-RECOVERY]) with no acknowledgments
forthcoming from the receiver. Therefore, a sender SHOULD ensure
that other frames are sent in addition to PADDING frames to elicit
acknowledgments from the receiver.
The receiver's delayed acknowledgment timer SHOULD NOT exceed the
current RTT estimate or the value it indicates in the "max_ack_delay"
transport parameter. This ensures an acknowledgment is sent at least
once per RTT when packets needing acknowledgement are received. The
sender can use the receiver's "max_ack_delay" value in determining
timeouts for timer-based retransmission.
Strategies and implications of the frequency of generating
acknowledgments are discussed in more detail in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
To limit ACK Ranges (see Section 19.3.1) to those that have not yet
been received by the sender, the receiver SHOULD track which ACK
frames have been acknowledged by its peer. The receiver SHOULD
exclude already acknowledged packets from future ACK frames whenever
these packets would unnecessarily contribute to the ACK frame size.
Because ACK frames are not sent in response to ACK-only packets, a
receiver that is only sending ACK frames will only receive
acknowledgements for its packets if the sender includes them in
packets with non-ACK frames. A sender SHOULD bundle ACK frames with
other frames when possible.
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To limit receiver state or the size of ACK frames, a receiver MAY
limit the number of ACK Ranges it sends. A receiver can do this even
without receiving acknowledgment of its ACK frames, with the
knowledge this could cause the sender to unnecessarily retransmit
some data. Standard QUIC [QUIC-RECOVERY] algorithms declare packets
lost after sufficiently newer packets are acknowledged. Therefore,
the receiver SHOULD repeatedly acknowledge newly received packets in
preference to packets received in the past.
An endpoint SHOULD treat receipt of an acknowledgment for a packet it
did not send as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION, if it
is able to detect the condition.
13.1.2. ACK Frames and Packet Protection
ACK frames MUST only be carried in a packet that has the same packet
number space as the packet being ACKed (see Section 12.1). For
instance, packets that are protected with 1-RTT keys MUST be
acknowledged in packets that are also protected with 1-RTT keys.
Packets that a client sends with 0-RTT packet protection MUST be
acknowledged by the server in packets protected by 1-RTT keys. This
can mean that the client is unable to use these acknowledgments if
the server cryptographic handshake messages are delayed or lost.
Note that the same limitation applies to other data sent by the
server protected by the 1-RTT keys.
Endpoints SHOULD send acknowledgments for packets containing CRYPTO
frames with a reduced delay; see Section 6.2.1 of [QUIC-RECOVERY].
13.2. Retransmission of Information
QUIC packets that are determined to be lost are not retransmitted
whole. The same applies to the frames that are contained within lost
packets. Instead, the information that might be carried in frames is
sent again in new frames as needed.
New frames and packets are used to carry information that is
determined to have been lost. In general, information is sent again
when a packet containing that information is determined to be lost
and sending ceases when a packet containing that information is
acknowledged.
o Data sent in CRYPTO frames is retransmitted according to the rules
in [QUIC-RECOVERY], until all data has been acknowledged. Data in
CRYPTO frames for Initial and Handshake packets is discarded when
keys for the corresponding encryption level are discarded.
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o Application data sent in STREAM frames is retransmitted in new
STREAM frames unless the endpoint has sent a RESET_STREAM for that
stream. Once an endpoint sends a RESET_STREAM frame, no further
STREAM frames are needed.
o The most recent set of acknowledgments are sent in ACK frames. An
ACK frame SHOULD contain all unacknowledged acknowledgments, as
described in Section 13.1.1.
o Cancellation of stream transmission, as carried in a RESET_STREAM
frame, is sent until acknowledged or until all stream data is
acknowledged by the peer (that is, either the "Reset Recvd" or
"Data Recvd" state is reached on the sending part of the stream).
The content of a RESET_STREAM frame MUST NOT change when it is
sent again.
o Similarly, a request to cancel stream transmission, as encoded in
a STOP_SENDING frame, is sent until the receiving part of the
stream enters either a "Data Recvd" or "Reset Recvd" state, see
Section 3.5.
o Connection close signals, including packets that contain
CONNECTION_CLOSE frames, are not sent again when packet loss is
detected, but as described in Section 10.
o The current connection maximum data is sent in MAX_DATA frames.
An updated value is sent in a MAX_DATA frame if the packet
containing the most recently sent MAX_DATA frame is declared lost,
or when the endpoint decides to update the limit. Care is
necessary to avoid sending this frame too often as the limit can
increase frequently and cause an unnecessarily large number of
MAX_DATA frames to be sent.
o The current maximum stream data offset is sent in MAX_STREAM_DATA
frames. Like MAX_DATA, an updated value is sent when the packet
containing the most recent MAX_STREAM_DATA frame for a stream is
lost or when the limit is updated, with care taken to prevent the
frame from being sent too often. An endpoint SHOULD stop sending
MAX_STREAM_DATA frames when the receiving part of the stream
enters a "Size Known" state.
o The limit on streams of a given type is sent in MAX_STREAMS
frames. Like MAX_DATA, an updated value is sent when a packet
containing the most recent MAX_STREAMS for a stream type frame is
declared lost or when the limit is updated, with care taken to
prevent the frame from being sent too often.
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o Blocked signals are carried in DATA_BLOCKED, STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED,
and STREAMS_BLOCKED frames. DATA_BLOCKED frames have connection
scope, STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frames have stream scope, and
STREAMS_BLOCKED frames are scoped to a specific stream type. New
frames are sent if packets containing the most recent frame for a
scope is lost, but only while the endpoint is blocked on the
corresponding limit. These frames always include the limit that
is causing blocking at the time that they are transmitted.
o A liveness or path validation check using PATH_CHALLENGE frames is
sent periodically until a matching PATH_RESPONSE frame is received
or until there is no remaining need for liveness or path
validation checking. PATH_CHALLENGE frames include a different
payload each time they are sent.
o Responses to path validation using PATH_RESPONSE frames are sent
just once. A new PATH_CHALLENGE frame will be sent if another
PATH_RESPONSE frame is needed.
o New connection IDs are sent in NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames and
retransmitted if the packet containing them is lost.
Retransmissions of this frame carry the same sequence number
value. Likewise, retired connection IDs are sent in
RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames and retransmitted if the packet
containing them is lost.
o PING and PADDING frames contain no information, so lost PING or
PADDING frames do not require repair.
Endpoints SHOULD prioritize retransmission of data over sending new
data, unless priorities specified by the application indicate
otherwise (see Section 2.3).
Even though a sender is encouraged to assemble frames containing up-
to-date information every time it sends a packet, it is not forbidden
to retransmit copies of frames from lost packets. A receiver MUST
accept packets containing an outdated frame, such as a MAX_DATA frame
carrying a smaller maximum data than one found in an older packet.
Upon detecting losses, a sender MUST take appropriate congestion
control action. The details of loss detection and congestion control
are described in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
13.3. Explicit Congestion Notification
QUIC endpoints can use Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)
[RFC3168] to detect and respond to network congestion. ECN allows a
network node to indicate congestion in the network by setting a
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codepoint in the IP header of a packet instead of dropping it.
Endpoints react to congestion by reducing their sending rate in
response, as described in [QUIC-RECOVERY].
To use ECN, QUIC endpoints first determine whether a path supports
ECN marking and the peer is able to access the ECN codepoint in the
IP header. A network path does not support ECN if ECN marked packets
get dropped or ECN markings are rewritten on the path. An endpoint
verifies the path, both during connection establishment and when
migrating to a new path (see Section 9).
13.3.1. ECN Counts
On receiving a QUIC packet with an ECT or CE codepoint, an ECN-
enabled endpoint that can access the ECN codepoints from the
enclosing IP packet increases the corresponding ECT(0), ECT(1), or CE
count, and includes these counts in subsequent ACK frames (see
Section 13.1 and Section 19.3). Note that this requires being able
to read the ECN codepoints from the enclosing IP packet, which is not
possible on all platforms.
A packet detected by a receiver as a duplicate does not affect the
receiver's local ECN codepoint counts; see (Section 21.7) for
relevant security concerns.
If an endpoint receives a QUIC packet without an ECT or CE codepoint
in the IP packet header, it responds per Section 13.1 with an ACK
frame without increasing any ECN counts. If an endpoint does not
implement ECN support or does not have access to received ECN
codepoints, it does not increase ECN counts.
Coalesced packets (see Section 12.2) mean that several packets can
share the same IP header. The ECN counter for the ECN codepoint
received in the associated IP header are incremented once for each
QUIC packet, not per enclosing IP packet or UDP datagram.
Each packet number space maintains separate acknowledgement state and
separate ECN counts. For example, if one each of an Initial, 0-RTT,
Handshake, and 1-RTT QUIC packet are coalesced, the corresponding
counts for the Initial and Handshake packet number space will be
incremented by one and the counts for the 1-RTT packet number space
will be increased by two.
13.3.2. ECN Verification
Each endpoint independently verifies and enables use of ECN by
setting the IP header ECN codepoint to ECN Capable Transport (ECT)
for the path from it to the other peer. Even if not setting ECN
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codepoints on packets it transmits, the endpoint SHOULD provide
feedback about ECN markings received (if accessible).
To verify both that a path supports ECN and the peer can provide ECN
feedback, an endpoint sets the ECT(0) codepoint in the IP header of
all outgoing packets [RFC8311].
If an ECT codepoint set in the IP header is not corrupted by a
network device, then a received packet contains either the codepoint
sent by the peer or the Congestion Experienced (CE) codepoint set by
a network device that is experiencing congestion.
If a QUIC packet sent with an ECT codepoint is newly acknowledged by
the peer in an ACK frame without ECN feedback, the endpoint stops
setting ECT codepoints in subsequent IP packets, with the expectation
that either the network path or the peer no longer supports ECN.
Network devices that corrupt or apply non-standard ECN markings might
result in reduced throughput or other undesirable side-effects. To
reduce this risk, an endpoint uses the following steps to verify the
counts it receives in an ACK frame.
o The total increase in ECT(0), ECT(1), and CE counts MUST be no
smaller than the total number of QUIC packets sent with an ECT
codepoint that are newly acknowledged in this ACK frame. This
step detects any network remarking from ECT(0), ECT(1), or CE
codepoints to Not-ECT.
o Any increase in either ECT(0) or ECT(1) counts, plus any increase
in the CE count, MUST be no smaller than the number of packets
sent with the corresponding ECT codepoint that are newly
acknowledged in this ACK frame. This step detects any erroneous
network remarking from ECT(0) to ECT(1) (or vice versa).
An endpoint could miss acknowledgements for a packet when ACK frames
are lost. It is therefore possible for the total increase in ECT(0),
ECT(1), and CE counts to be greater than the number of packets
acknowledged in an ACK frame. When this happens, and if verification
succeeds, the local reference counts MUST be increased to match the
counts in the ACK frame.
Processing counts out of order can result in verification failure.
An endpoint SHOULD NOT perform this verification if the ACK frame is
received in a packet with packet number lower than a previously
received ACK frame. Verifying based on ACK frames that arrive out of
order can result in disabling ECN unnecessarily.
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Upon successful verification, an endpoint continues to set ECT
codepoints in subsequent packets with the expectation that the path
is ECN-capable.
If verification fails, then the endpoint ceases setting ECT
codepoints in subsequent IP packets with the expectation that either
the network path or the peer does not support ECN.
If an endpoint sets ECT codepoints on outgoing IP packets and
encounters a retransmission timeout due to the absence of
acknowledgments from the peer (see [QUIC-RECOVERY]), or if an
endpoint has reason to believe that an element on the network path
might be corrupting ECN codepoints, the endpoint MAY cease setting
ECT codepoints in subsequent packets. Doing so allows the connection
to be resilient to network elements that corrupt ECN codepoints in
the IP header or drop packets with ECT or CE codepoints in the IP
header.
14. Packet Size
The QUIC packet size includes the QUIC header and protected payload,
but not the UDP or IP header.
Clients MUST ensure they send the first Initial packet in a single IP
packet. Similarly, the first Initial packet sent after receiving a
Retry packet MUST be sent in a single IP packet.
The payload of a UDP datagram carrying the first Initial packet MUST
be expanded to at least 1200 bytes, by adding PADDING frames to the
Initial packet and/or by combining the Initial packet with a 0-RTT
packet (see Section 12.2). Sending a UDP datagram of this size
ensures that the network path supports a reasonable Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU), and helps reduce the amplitude of
amplification attacks caused by server responses toward an unverified
client address, see Section 8.
The datagram containing the first Initial packet from a client MAY
exceed 1200 bytes if the client believes that the Path Maximum
Transmission Unit (PMTU) supports the size that it chooses.
A server MAY send a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with error code
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION in response to the first Initial packet it
receives from a client if the UDP datagram is smaller than 1200
bytes. It MUST NOT send any other frame type in response, or
otherwise behave as if any part of the offending packet was processed
as valid.
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The server MUST also limit the number of bytes it sends before
validating the address of the client, see Section 8.
14.1. Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU)
The PMTU is the maximum size of the entire IP packet including the IP
header, UDP header, and UDP payload. The UDP payload includes the
QUIC packet header, protected payload, and any authentication fields.
The PMTU can depend upon the current path characteristics.
Therefore, the current largest UDP payload an implementation will
send is referred to as the QUIC maximum packet size.
QUIC depends on a PMTU of at least 1280 bytes. This is the IPv6
minimum size [RFC8200] and is also supported by most modern IPv4
networks. All QUIC packets (except for PMTU probe packets) SHOULD be
sized to fit within the maximum packet size to avoid the packet being
fragmented or dropped [RFC8085].
An endpoint SHOULD use Datagram Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery
([DPLPMTUD]) or implement Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) [RFC1191]
[RFC8201] to determine whether the path to a destination will support
a desired message size without fragmentation.
In the absence of these mechanisms, QUIC endpoints SHOULD NOT send IP
packets larger than 1280 bytes. Assuming the minimum IP header size,
this results in a QUIC maximum packet size of 1232 bytes for IPv6 and
1252 bytes for IPv4. A QUIC implementation MAY be more conservative
in computing the QUIC maximum packet size to allow for unknown tunnel
overheads or IP header options/extensions.
Each pair of local and remote addresses could have a different PMTU.
QUIC implementations that implement any kind of PMTU discovery
therefore SHOULD maintain a maximum packet size for each combination
of local and remote IP addresses.
If a QUIC endpoint determines that the PMTU between any pair of local
and remote IP addresses has fallen below the size needed to support
the smallest allowed maximum packet size, it MUST immediately cease
sending QUIC packets, except for PMTU probe packets, on the affected
path. An endpoint MAY terminate the connection if an alternative
path cannot be found.
14.2. ICMP Packet Too Big Messages
PMTU discovery [RFC1191] [RFC8201] relies on reception of ICMP
messages (e.g., IPv6 Packet Too Big messages) that indicate when a
packet is dropped because it is larger than the local router MTU.
DPLPMTUD can also optionally use these messages. This use of ICMP
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messages is potentially vulnerable to off-path attacks that
successfully guess the addresses used on the path and reduce the PMTU
to a bandwidth-inefficient value.
An endpoint MUST ignore an ICMP message that claims the PMTU has
decreased below 1280 bytes.
The requirements for generating ICMP ([RFC1812], [RFC4443]) state
that the quoted packet should contain as much of the original packet
as possible without exceeding the minimum MTU for the IP version.
The size of the quoted packet can actually be smaller, or the
information unintelligible, as described in Section 1.1 of
[DPLPMTUD].
QUIC endpoints SHOULD validate ICMP messages to protect from off-path
injection as specified in [RFC8201] and Section 5.2 of [RFC8085].
This validation SHOULD use the quoted packet supplied in the payload
of an ICMP message to associate the message with a corresponding
transport connection [DPLPMTUD].
ICMP message validation MUST include matching IP addresses and UDP
ports [RFC8085] and, when possible, connection IDs to an active QUIC
session.
Further validation can also be provided:
o An IPv4 endpoint could set the Don't Fragment (DF) bit on a small
proportion of packets, so that most invalid ICMP messages arrive
when there are no DF packets outstanding, and can therefore be
identified as spurious.
o An endpoint could store additional information from the IP or UDP
headers to use for validation (for example, the IP ID or UDP
checksum).
The endpoint SHOULD ignore all ICMP messages that fail validation.
An endpoint MUST NOT increase PMTU based on ICMP messages. Any
reduction in the QUIC maximum packet size MAY be provisional until
QUIC's loss detection algorithm determines that the quoted packet has
actually been lost.
14.3. Datagram Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery
Section 6.4 of [DPLPMTUD] provides considerations for implementing
Datagram Packetization Layer PMTUD (DPLPMTUD) with QUIC.
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When implementing the algorithm in Section 5.3 of [DPLPMTUD], the
initial value of BASE_PMTU SHOULD be consistent with the minimum QUIC
packet size (1232 bytes for IPv6 and 1252 bytes for IPv4).
PING and PADDING frames can be used to generate PMTU probe packets.
These frames might not be retransmitted if a probe packet containing
them is lost. However, these frames do consume congestion window,
which could delay the transmission of subsequent application data.
A PING frame can be included in a PMTU probe to ensure that a valid
probe is acknowledged.
The considerations for processing ICMP messages in the previous
section also apply if these messages are used by DPLPMTUD.
15. Versions
QUIC versions are identified using a 32-bit unsigned number.
The version 0x00000000 is reserved to represent version negotiation.
This version of the specification is identified by the number
0x00000001.
Other versions of QUIC might have different properties to this
version. The properties of QUIC that are guaranteed to be consistent
across all versions of the protocol are described in
[QUIC-INVARIANTS].
Version 0x00000001 of QUIC uses TLS as a cryptographic handshake
protocol, as described in [QUIC-TLS].
Versions with the most significant 16 bits of the version number
cleared are reserved for use in future IETF consensus documents.
Versions that follow the pattern 0x?a?a?a?a are reserved for use in
forcing version negotiation to be exercised. That is, any version
number where the low four bits of all bytes is 1010 (in binary). A
client or server MAY advertise support for any of these reserved
versions.
Reserved version numbers will probably never represent a real
protocol; a client MAY use one of these version numbers with the
expectation that the server will initiate version negotiation; a
server MAY advertise support for one of these versions and can expect
that clients ignore the value.
[[RFC editor: please remove the remainder of this section before
publication.]]
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The version number for the final version of this specification
(0x00000001), is reserved for the version of the protocol that is
published as an RFC.
Version numbers used to identify IETF drafts are created by adding
the draft number to 0xff000000. For example, draft-ietf-quic-
transport-13 would be identified as 0xff00000D.
Implementors are encouraged to register version numbers of QUIC that
they are using for private experimentation on the GitHub wiki at
<https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/wiki/QUIC-Versions>.
16. Variable-Length Integer Encoding
QUIC packets and frames commonly use a variable-length encoding for
non-negative integer values. This encoding ensures that smaller
integer values need fewer bytes to encode.
The QUIC variable-length integer encoding reserves the two most
significant bits of the first byte to encode the base 2 logarithm of
the integer encoding length in bytes. The integer value is encoded
on the remaining bits, in network byte order.
This means that integers are encoded on 1, 2, 4, or 8 bytes and can
encode 6, 14, 30, or 62 bit values respectively. Table 4 summarizes
the encoding properties.
+------+--------+-------------+-----------------------+
| 2Bit | Length | Usable Bits | Range |
+------+--------+-------------+-----------------------+
| 00 | 1 | 6 | 0-63 |
| | | | |
| 01 | 2 | 14 | 0-16383 |
| | | | |
| 10 | 4 | 30 | 0-1073741823 |
| | | | |
| 11 | 8 | 62 | 0-4611686018427387903 |
+------+--------+-------------+-----------------------+
Table 4: Summary of Integer Encodings
For example, the eight byte sequence c2 19 7c 5e ff 14 e8 8c (in
hexadecimal) decodes to the decimal value 151288809941952652; the
four byte sequence 9d 7f 3e 7d decodes to 494878333; the two byte
sequence 7b bd decodes to 15293; and the single byte 25 decodes to 37
(as does the two byte sequence 40 25).
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Error codes (Section 20) and versions Section 15 are described using
integers, but do not use this encoding.
17. Packet Formats
All numeric values are encoded in network byte order (that is, big-
endian) and all field sizes are in bits. Hexadecimal notation is
used for describing the value of fields.
17.1. Packet Number Encoding and Decoding
Packet numbers are integers in the range 0 to 2^62-1 (Section 12.3).
When present in long or short packet headers, they are encoded in 1
to 4 bytes. The number of bits required to represent the packet
number is reduced by including the least significant bits of the
packet number.
The encoded packet number is protected as described in Section 5.4 of
[QUIC-TLS].
The sender MUST use a packet number size able to represent more than
twice as large a range than the difference between the largest
acknowledged packet and packet number being sent. A peer receiving
the packet will then correctly decode the packet number, unless the
packet is delayed in transit such that it arrives after many higher-
numbered packets have been received. An endpoint SHOULD use a large
enough packet number encoding to allow the packet number to be
recovered even if the packet arrives after packets that are sent
afterwards.
As a result, the size of the packet number encoding is at least one
bit more than the base-2 logarithm of the number of contiguous
unacknowledged packet numbers, including the new packet.
For example, if an endpoint has received an acknowledgment for packet
0xabe8bc, sending a packet with a number of 0xac5c02 requires a
packet number encoding with 16 bits or more; whereas the 24-bit
packet number encoding is needed to send a packet with a number of
0xace8fe.
At a receiver, protection of the packet number is removed prior to
recovering the full packet number. The full packet number is then
reconstructed based on the number of significant bits present, the
value of those bits, and the largest packet number received on a
successfully authenticated packet. Recovering the full packet number
is necessary to successfully remove packet protection.
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Once header protection is removed, the packet number is decoded by
finding the packet number value that is closest to the next expected
packet. The next expected packet is the highest received packet
number plus one. For example, if the highest successfully
authenticated packet had a packet number of 0xa82f30ea, then a packet
containing a 16-bit value of 0x9b32 will be decoded as 0xa82f9b32.
Example pseudo-code for packet number decoding can be found in
Appendix A.
17.2. Long Header Packets
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|1|T T|X X X X|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|DCIL(4)|SCIL(4)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Long Header Packet Format
Long headers are used for packets that are sent prior to the
establishment of 1-RTT keys. Once both conditions are met, a sender
switches to sending packets using the short header (Section 17.3).
The long form allows for special packets - such as the Version
Negotiation packet - to be represented in this uniform fixed-length
packet format. Packets that use the long header contain the
following fields:
Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of byte 0 (the first
byte) is set to 1 for long headers.
Fixed Bit: The next bit (0x40) of byte 0 is set to 1. Packets
containing a zero value for this bit are not valid packets in this
version and MUST be discarded.
Long Packet Type (T): The next two bits (those with a mask of 0x30)
of byte 0 contain a packet type. Packet types are listed in
Table 5.
Type-Specific Bits (X): The lower four bits (those with a mask of
0x0f) of byte 0 are type-specific.
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Version: The QUIC Version is a 32-bit field that follows the first
byte. This field indicates which version of QUIC is in use and
determines how the rest of the protocol fields are interpreted.
DCIL and SCIL: The byte following the version contains the lengths
of the two connection ID fields that follow it. These lengths are
encoded as two 4-bit unsigned integers. The Destination
Connection ID Length (DCIL) field occupies the 4 high bits of the
byte and the Source Connection ID Length (SCIL) field occupies the
4 low bits of the byte. An encoded length of 0 indicates that the
connection ID is also 0 bytes in length. Non-zero encoded lengths
are increased by 3 to get the full length of the connection ID,
producing a length between 4 and 18 bytes inclusive. For example,
an byte with the value 0x50 describes an 8-byte Destination
Connection ID and a zero-length Source Connection ID.
Destination Connection ID: The Destination Connection ID field
follows the connection ID lengths and is either 0 bytes in length
or between 4 and 18 bytes. Section 7.2 describes the use of this
field in more detail.
Source Connection ID: The Source Connection ID field follows the
Destination Connection ID and is either 0 bytes in length or
between 4 and 18 bytes. Section 7.2 describes the use of this
field in more detail.
In this version of QUIC, the following packet types with the long
header are defined:
+------+-----------+----------------+
| Type | Name | Section |
+------+-----------+----------------+
| 0x0 | Initial | Section 17.2.2 |
| | | |
| 0x1 | 0-RTT | Section 17.2.3 |
| | | |
| 0x2 | Handshake | Section 17.2.4 |
| | | |
| 0x3 | Retry | Section 17.2.5 |
+------+-----------+----------------+
Table 5: Long Header Packet Types
The header form bit, connection ID lengths byte, Destination and
Source Connection ID fields, and Version fields of a long header
packet are version-independent. The other fields in the first byte
are version-specific. See [QUIC-INVARIANTS] for details on how
packets from different versions of QUIC are interpreted.
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The interpretation of the fields and the payload are specific to a
version and packet type. While type-specific semantics for this
version are described in the following sections, several long-header
packets in this version of QUIC contain these additional fields:
Reserved Bits (R): Two bits (those with a mask of 0x0c) of byte 0
are reserved across multiple packet types. These bits are
protected using header protection (see Section 5.4 of [QUIC-TLS]).
The value included prior to protection MUST be set to 0. An
endpoint MUST treat receipt of a packet that has a non-zero value
for these bits, after removing both packet and header protection,
as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Discarding such
a packet after only removing header protection can expose the
endpoint to attacks (see Section 9.3 of [QUIC-TLS]).
Packet Number Length (P): In packet types which contain a Packet
Number field, the least significant two bits (those with a mask of
0x03) of byte 0 contain the length of the packet number, encoded
as an unsigned, two-bit integer that is one less than the length
of the packet number field in bytes. That is, the length of the
packet number field is the value of this field, plus one. These
bits are protected using header protection (see Section 5.4 of
[QUIC-TLS]).
Length: The length of the remainder of the packet (that is, the
Packet Number and Payload fields) in bytes, encoded as a variable-
length integer (Section 16).
Packet Number: The packet number field is 1 to 4 bytes long. The
packet number has confidentiality protection separate from packet
protection, as described in Section 5.4 of [QUIC-TLS]. The length
of the packet number field is encoded in the Packet Number Length
bits of byte 0 (see above).
17.2.1. Version Negotiation Packet
A Version Negotiation packet is inherently not version-specific.
Upon receipt by a client, it will be identified as a Version
Negotiation packet based on the Version field having a value of 0.
The Version Negotiation packet is a response to a client packet that
contains a version that is not supported by the server, and is only
sent by servers.
The layout of a Version Negotiation packet is:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1| Unused (7) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|DCIL(4)|SCIL(4)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Supported Version 1 (32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Supported Version 2 (32)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Supported Version N (32)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 10: Version Negotiation Packet
The value in the Unused field is selected randomly by the server.
The Version field of a Version Negotiation packet MUST be set to
0x00000000.
The server MUST include the value from the Source Connection ID field
of the packet it receives in the Destination Connection ID field.
The value for Source Connection ID MUST be copied from the
Destination Connection ID of the received packet, which is initially
randomly selected by a client. Echoing both connection IDs gives
clients some assurance that the server received the packet and that
the Version Negotiation packet was not generated by an off-path
attacker.
The remainder of the Version Negotiation packet is a list of 32-bit
versions which the server supports.
A Version Negotiation packet cannot be explicitly acknowledged in an
ACK frame by a client. Receiving another Initial packet implicitly
acknowledges a Version Negotiation packet.
The Version Negotiation packet does not include the Packet Number and
Length fields present in other packets that use the long header form.
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Consequently, a Version Negotiation packet consumes an entire UDP
datagram.
A server MUST NOT send more than one Version Negotiation packet in
response to a single UDP datagram.
See Section 6 for a description of the version negotiation process.
17.2.2. Initial Packet
An Initial packet uses long headers with a type value of 0x0. It
carries the first CRYPTO frames sent by the client and server to
perform key exchange, and carries ACKs in either direction.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|1| 0 |R R|P P|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|DCIL(4)|SCIL(4)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Token Length (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Token (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (8/16/24/32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 11: Initial Packet
The Initial packet contains a long header as well as the Length and
Packet Number fields. The first byte contains the Reserved and
Packet Number Length bits. Between the SCID and Length fields, there
are two additional field specific to the Initial packet.
Token Length: A variable-length integer specifying the length of the
Token field, in bytes. This value is zero if no token is present.
Initial packets sent by the server MUST set the Token Length field
to zero; clients that receive an Initial packet with a non-zero
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Token Length field MUST either discard the packet or generate a
connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Token: The value of the token that was previously provided in a
Retry packet or NEW_TOKEN frame.
Payload: The payload of the packet.
In order to prevent tampering by version-unaware middleboxes, Initial
packets are protected with connection- and version-specific keys
(Initial keys) as described in [QUIC-TLS]. This protection does not
provide confidentiality or integrity against on-path attackers, but
provides some level of protection against off-path attackers.
The client and server use the Initial packet type for any packet that
contains an initial cryptographic handshake message. This includes
all cases where a new packet containing the initial cryptographic
message needs to be created, such as the packets sent after receiving
a Retry packet (Section 17.2.5).
A server sends its first Initial packet in response to a client
Initial. A server may send multiple Initial packets. The
cryptographic key exchange could require multiple round trips or
retransmissions of this data.
The payload of an Initial packet includes a CRYPTO frame (or frames)
containing a cryptographic handshake message, ACK frames, or both.
PADDING and CONNECTION_CLOSE frames are also permitted. An endpoint
that receives an Initial packet containing other frames can either
discard the packet as spurious or treat it as a connection error.
The first packet sent by a client always includes a CRYPTO frame that
contains the entirety of the first cryptographic handshake message.
This packet, and the cryptographic handshake message, MUST fit in a
single UDP datagram (see Section 7). The first CRYPTO frame sent
always begins at an offset of 0 (see Section 7).
Note that if the server sends a HelloRetryRequest, the client will
send a second Initial packet. This Initial packet will continue the
cryptographic handshake and will contain a CRYPTO frame with an
offset matching the size of the CRYPTO frame sent in the first
Initial packet. Cryptographic handshake messages subsequent to the
first do not need to fit within a single UDP datagram.
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17.2.2.1. Abandoning Initial Packets
A client stops both sending and processing Initial packets when it
sends its first Handshake packet. A server stops sending and
processing Initial packets when it receives its first Handshake
packet. Though packets might still be in flight or awaiting
acknowledgment, no further Initial packets need to be exchanged
beyond this point. Initial packet protection keys are discarded (see
Section 4.10 of [QUIC-TLS]) along with any loss recovery and
congestion control state (see Sections 5.3.1.2 and 6.9 of
[QUIC-RECOVERY]).
Any data in CRYPTO frames is discarded - and no longer retransmitted
- when Initial keys are discarded.
17.2.3. 0-RTT
A 0-RTT packet uses long headers with a type value of 0x1, followed
by the Length and Packet Number fields. The first byte contains the
Reserved and Packet Number Length bits. It is used to carry "early"
data from the client to the server as part of the first flight, prior
to handshake completion. As part of the TLS handshake, the server
can accept or reject this early data.
See Section 2.3 of [TLS13] for a discussion of 0-RTT data and its
limitations.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|1| 1 |R R|P P|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|DCIL(4)|SCIL(4)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (8/16/24/32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0-RTT Packet
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Packet numbers for 0-RTT protected packets use the same space as
1-RTT protected packets.
After a client receives a Retry packet, 0-RTT packets are likely to
have been lost or discarded by the server. A client MAY attempt to
resend data in 0-RTT packets after it sends a new Initial packet.
A client MUST NOT reset the packet number it uses for 0-RTT packets.
The keys used to protect 0-RTT packets will not change as a result of
responding to a Retry packet unless the client also regenerates the
cryptographic handshake message. Sending packets with the same
packet number in that case is likely to compromise the packet
protection for all 0-RTT packets because the same key and nonce could
be used to protect different content.
Receiving a Retry packet, especially a Retry that changes the
connection ID used for subsequent packets, indicates a strong
possibility that 0-RTT packets could be lost. A client only receives
acknowledgments for its 0-RTT packets once the handshake is complete.
Consequently, a server might expect 0-RTT packets to start with a
packet number of 0. Therefore, in determining the length of the
packet number encoding for 0-RTT packets, a client MUST assume that
all packets up to the current packet number are in flight, starting
from a packet number of 0. Thus, 0-RTT packets could need to use a
longer packet number encoding.
A client SHOULD instead generate a fresh cryptographic handshake
message and start packet numbers from 0. This ensures that new 0-RTT
packets will not use the same keys, avoiding any risk of key and
nonce reuse; this also prevents 0-RTT packets from previous handshake
attempts from being accepted as part of the connection.
17.2.4. Handshake Packet
A Handshake packet uses long headers with a type value of 0x2,
followed by the Length and Packet Number fields. The first byte
contains the Reserved and Packet Number Length bits. It is used to
carry acknowledgments and cryptographic handshake messages from the
server and client.
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|1| 2 |R R|P P|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|DCIL(4)|SCIL(4)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (8/16/24/32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 12: Handshake Protected Packet
Once a client has received a Handshake packet from a server, it uses
Handshake packets to send subsequent cryptographic handshake messages
and acknowledgments to the server.
The Destination Connection ID field in a Handshake packet contains a
connection ID that is chosen by the recipient of the packet; the
Source Connection ID includes the connection ID that the sender of
the packet wishes to use (see Section 7.2).
Handshake packets are their own packet number space, and thus the
first Handshake packet sent by a server contains a packet number of
0.
The payload of this packet contains CRYPTO frames and could contain
PADDING, or ACK frames. Handshake packets MAY contain
CONNECTION_CLOSE frames. Endpoints MUST treat receipt of Handshake
packets with other frames as a connection error.
Like Initial packets (see Section 17.2.2.1), data in CRYPTO frames at
the Handshake encryption level is discarded - and no longer
retransmitted - when Handshake protection keys are discarded.
17.2.5. Retry Packet
A Retry packet uses a long packet header with a type value of 0x3.
It carries an address validation token created by the server. It is
used by a server that wishes to perform a stateless retry (see
Section 8.1).
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1|1| 3 | ODCIL |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version (32) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|DCIL(4)|SCIL(4)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Original Destination Connection ID (0/32..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Retry Token (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 13: Retry Packet
A Retry packet (shown in Figure 13) does not contain any protected
fields. In addition to the long header, it contains these additional
fields:
ODCIL: The four least-significant bits of the first byte of a Retry
packet are not protected as they are for other packets with the
long header, because Retry packets don't contain a protected
payload. These bits instead encode the length of the Original
Destination Connection ID field. The length uses the same
encoding as the DCIL and SCIL fields.
Original Destination Connection ID: The Original Destination
Connection ID contains the value of the Destination Connection ID
from the Initial packet that this Retry is in response to. The
length of this field is given in ODCIL.
Retry Token: An opaque token that the server can use to validate the
client's address.
The server populates the Destination Connection ID with the
connection ID that the client included in the Source Connection ID of
the Initial packet.
The server includes a connection ID of its choice in the Source
Connection ID field. This value MUST not be equal to the Destination
Connection ID field of the packet sent by the client. The client
MUST use this connection ID in the Destination Connection ID of
subsequent packets that it sends.
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A server MAY send Retry packets in response to Initial and 0-RTT
packets. A server can either discard or buffer 0-RTT packets that it
receives. A server can send multiple Retry packets as it receives
Initial or 0-RTT packets. A server MUST NOT send more than one Retry
packet in response to a single UDP datagram.
A client MUST accept and process at most one Retry packet for each
connection attempt. After the client has received and processed an
Initial or Retry packet from the server, it MUST discard any
subsequent Retry packets that it receives.
Clients MUST discard Retry packets that contain an Original
Destination Connection ID field that does not match the Destination
Connection ID from its Initial packet. This prevents an off-path
attacker from injecting a Retry packet.
The client responds to a Retry packet with an Initial packet that
includes the provided Retry Token to continue connection
establishment.
A client sets the Destination Connection ID field of this Initial
packet to the value from the Source Connection ID in the Retry
packet. Changing Destination Connection ID also results in a change
to the keys used to protect the Initial packet. It also sets the
Token field to the token provided in the Retry. The client MUST NOT
change the Source Connection ID because the server could include the
connection ID as part of its token validation logic (see
Section 8.1.3).
The next Initial packet from the client uses the connection ID and
token values from the Retry packet (see Section 7.2). Aside from
this, the Initial packet sent by the client is subject to the same
restrictions as the first Initial packet. A client can either reuse
the cryptographic handshake message or construct a new one at its
discretion.
A client MAY attempt 0-RTT after receiving a Retry packet by sending
0-RTT packets to the connection ID provided by the server. A client
that sends additional 0-RTT packets without constructing a new
cryptographic handshake message MUST NOT reset the packet number to 0
after a Retry packet, see Section 17.2.3.
A server acknowledges the use of a Retry packet for a connection
using the original_connection_id transport parameter (see
Section 18.1). If the server sends a Retry packet, it MUST include
the value of the Original Destination Connection ID field of the
Retry packet (that is, the Destination Connection ID field from the
client's first Initial packet) in the transport parameter.
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If the client received and processed a Retry packet, it MUST validate
that the original_connection_id transport parameter is present and
correct; otherwise, it MUST validate that the transport parameter is
absent. A client MUST treat a failed validation as a connection
error of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.
A Retry packet does not include a packet number and cannot be
explicitly acknowledged by a client.
17.3. Short Header Packets
This version of QUIC defines a single packet type which uses the
short packet header.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0|1|S|R|R|K|P P|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Connection ID (0..144) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Packet Number (8/16/24/32) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protected Payload (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 14: Short Header Packet Format
The short header can be used after the version and 1-RTT keys are
negotiated. Packets that use the short header contain the following
fields:
Header Form: The most significant bit (0x80) of byte 0 is set to 0
for the short header.
Fixed Bit: The next bit (0x40) of byte 0 is set to 1. Packets
containing a zero value for this bit are not valid packets in this
version and MUST be discarded.
Spin Bit (S): The sixth bit (0x20) of byte 0 is the Latency Spin
Bit, set as described in [SPIN].
Reserved Bits (R): The next two bits (those with a mask of 0x18) of
byte 0 are reserved. These bits are protected using header
protection (see Section 5.4 of [QUIC-TLS]). The value included
prior to protection MUST be set to 0. An endpoint MUST treat
receipt of a packet that has a non-zero value for these bits,
after removing both packet and header protection, as a connection
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error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Discarding such a packet after
only removing header protection can expose the endpoint to attacks
(see Section 9.3 of [QUIC-TLS]).
Key Phase (K): The next bit (0x04) of byte 0 indicates the key
phase, which allows a recipient of a packet to identify the packet
protection keys that are used to protect the packet. See
[QUIC-TLS] for details. This bit is protected using header
protection (see Section 5.4 of [QUIC-TLS]).
Packet Number Length (P): The least significant two bits (those with
a mask of 0x03) of byte 0 contain the length of the packet number,
encoded as an unsigned, two-bit integer that is one less than the
length of the packet number field in bytes. That is, the length
of the packet number field is the value of this field, plus one.
These bits are protected using header protection (see Section 5.4
of [QUIC-TLS]).
Destination Connection ID: The Destination Connection ID is a
connection ID that is chosen by the intended recipient of the
packet. See Section 5.1 for more details.
Packet Number: The packet number field is 1 to 4 bytes long. The
packet number has confidentiality protection separate from packet
protection, as described in Section 5.4 of [QUIC-TLS]. The length
of the packet number field is encoded in Packet Number Length
field. See Section 17.1 for details.
Protected Payload: Packets with a short header always include a
1-RTT protected payload.
The header form bit and the connection ID field of a short header
packet are version-independent. The remaining fields are specific to
the selected QUIC version. See [QUIC-INVARIANTS] for details on how
packets from different versions of QUIC are interpreted.
18. Transport Parameter Encoding
The format of the transport parameters is the TransportParameters
struct from Figure 15. This is described using the presentation
language from Section 3 of [TLS13].
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enum {
original_connection_id(0),
idle_timeout(1),
stateless_reset_token(2),
max_packet_size(3),
initial_max_data(4),
initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local(5),
initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote(6),
initial_max_stream_data_uni(7),
initial_max_streams_bidi(8),
initial_max_streams_uni(9),
ack_delay_exponent(10),
max_ack_delay(11),
disable_migration(12),
preferred_address(13),
(65535)
} TransportParameterId;
struct {
TransportParameterId parameter;
opaque value<0..2^16-1>;
} TransportParameter;
TransportParameter TransportParameters<0..2^16-1>;
Figure 15: Definition of TransportParameters
The "extension_data" field of the quic_transport_parameters extension
defined in [QUIC-TLS] contains a TransportParameters value. TLS
encoding rules are therefore used to describe the encoding of
transport parameters.
QUIC encodes transport parameters into a sequence of bytes, which are
then included in the cryptographic handshake.
18.1. Transport Parameter Definitions
This section details the transport parameters defined in this
document.
Many transport parameters listed here have integer values. Those
transport parameters that are identified as integers use a variable-
length integer encoding (see Section 16) and have a default value of
0 if the transport parameter is absent, unless otherwise stated.
The following transport parameters are defined:
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original_connection_id (0x0000): The value of the Destination
Connection ID field from the first Initial packet sent by the
client. This transport parameter is only sent by a server. A
server MUST include the original_connection_id transport parameter
if it sent a Retry packet.
idle_timeout (0x0001): The idle timeout is a value in milliseconds
that is encoded as an integer, see (Section 10.2). If this
parameter is absent or zero then the idle timeout is disabled.
stateless_reset_token (0x0002): A stateless reset token is used in
verifying a stateless reset, see Section 10.4. This parameter is
a sequence of 16 bytes. This transport parameter is only sent by
a server.
max_packet_size (0x0003): The maximum packet size parameter is an
integer value that limits the size of packets that the endpoint is
willing to receive. This indicates that packets larger than this
limit will be dropped. The default for this parameter is the
maximum permitted UDP payload of 65527. Values below 1200 are
invalid. This limit only applies to protected packets
(Section 12.1).
initial_max_data (0x0004): The initial maximum data parameter is an
integer value that contains the initial value for the maximum
amount of data that can be sent on the connection. This is
equivalent to sending a MAX_DATA (Section 19.9) for the connection
immediately after completing the handshake.
initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local (0x0005): This parameter is an
integer value specifying the initial flow control limit for
locally-initiated bidirectional streams. This limit applies to
newly created bidirectional streams opened by the endpoint that
sends the transport parameter. In client transport parameters,
this applies to streams with an identifier with the least
significant two bits set to 0x0; in server transport parameters,
this applies to streams with the least significant two bits set to
0x1.
initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote (0x0006): This parameter is an
integer value specifying the initial flow control limit for peer-
initiated bidirectional streams. This limit applies to newly
created bidirectional streams opened by the endpoint that receives
the transport parameter. In client transport parameters, this
applies to streams with an identifier with the least significant
two bits set to 0x1; in server transport parameters, this applies
to streams with the least significant two bits set to 0x0.
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initial_max_stream_data_uni (0x0007): This parameter is an integer
value specifying the initial flow control limit for unidirectional
streams. This limit applies to newly created unidirectional
streams opened by the endpoint that receives the transport
parameter. In client transport parameters, this applies to
streams with an identifier with the least significant two bits set
to 0x3; in server transport parameters, this applies to streams
with the least significant two bits set to 0x2.
initial_max_streams_bidi (0x0008): The initial maximum bidirectional
streams parameter is an integer value that contains the initial
maximum number of bidirectional streams the peer may initiate. If
this parameter is absent or zero, the peer cannot open
bidirectional streams until a MAX_STREAMS frame is sent. Setting
this parameter is equivalent to sending a MAX_STREAMS
(Section 19.11) of the corresponding type with the same value.
initial_max_streams_uni (0x0009): The initial maximum unidirectional
streams parameter is an integer value that contains the initial
maximum number of unidirectional streams the peer may initiate.
If this parameter is absent or zero, the peer cannot open
unidirectional streams until a MAX_STREAMS frame is sent. Setting
this parameter is equivalent to sending a MAX_STREAMS
(Section 19.11) of the corresponding type with the same value.
ack_delay_exponent (0x000a): The ACK delay exponent is an integer
value indicating an exponent used to decode the ACK Delay field in
the ACK frame (Section 19.3). If this value is absent, a default
value of 3 is assumed (indicating a multiplier of 8). The default
value is also used for ACK frames that are sent in Initial and
Handshake packets. Values above 20 are invalid.
max_ack_delay (0x000b): The maximum ACK delay is an integer value
indicating the maximum amount of time in milliseconds by which the
endpoint will delay sending acknowledgments. This value SHOULD
include the receiver's expected delays in alarms firing. For
example, if a receiver sets a timer for 5ms and alarms commonly
fire up to 1ms late, then it should send a max_ack_delay of 6ms.
If this value is absent, a default of 25 milliseconds is assumed.
Values of 2^14 or greater are invalid.
disable_migration (0x000c): The disable migration transport
parameter is included if the endpoint does not support connection
migration (Section 9). Peers of an endpoint that sets this
transport parameter MUST NOT send any packets, including probing
packets (Section 9.1), from a local address other than that used
to perform the handshake. This parameter is a zero-length value.
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preferred_address (0x000d): The server's preferred address is used
to effect a change in server address at the end of the handshake,
as described in Section 9.6. The format of this transport
parameter is the PreferredAddress struct shown in Figure 16. This
transport parameter is only sent by a server. Servers MAY choose
to only send a preferred address of one address family by sending
an all-zero address and port (0.0.0.0:0 or ::.0) for the other
family.
struct {
opaque ipv4Address[4];
uint16 ipv4Port;
opaque ipv6Address[16];
uint16 ipv6Port;
opaque connectionId<0..18>;
opaque statelessResetToken[16];
} PreferredAddress;
Figure 16: Preferred Address format
If present, transport parameters that set initial flow control limits
(initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local,
initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote, and initial_max_stream_data_uni)
are equivalent to sending a MAX_STREAM_DATA frame (Section 19.10) on
every stream of the corresponding type immediately after opening. If
the transport parameter is absent, streams of that type start with a
flow control limit of 0.
A client MUST NOT include an original connection ID, a stateless
reset token, or a preferred address. A server MUST treat receipt of
any of these transport parameters as a connection error of type
TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.
19. Frame Types and Formats
As described in Section 12.4, packets contain one or more frames.
This section describes the format and semantics of the core QUIC
frame types.
19.1. PADDING Frame
The PADDING frame (type=0x00) has no semantic value. PADDING frames
can be used to increase the size of a packet. Padding can be used to
increase an initial client packet to the minimum required size, or to
provide protection against traffic analysis for protected packets.
A PADDING frame has no content. That is, a PADDING frame consists of
the single byte that identifies the frame as a PADDING frame.
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19.2. PING Frame
Endpoints can use PING frames (type=0x01) to verify that their peers
are still alive or to check reachability to the peer. The PING frame
contains no additional fields.
The receiver of a PING frame simply needs to acknowledge the packet
containing this frame.
The PING frame can be used to keep a connection alive when an
application or application protocol wishes to prevent the connection
from timing out. An application protocol SHOULD provide guidance
about the conditions under which generating a PING is recommended.
This guidance SHOULD indicate whether it is the client or the server
that is expected to send the PING. Having both endpoints send PING
frames without coordination can produce an excessive number of
packets and poor performance.
A connection will time out if no packets are sent or received for a
period longer than the time specified in the idle_timeout transport
parameter (see Section 10). However, state in middleboxes might time
out earlier than that. Though REQ-5 in [RFC4787] recommends a 2
minute timeout interval, experience shows that sending packets every
15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of middleboxes
from losing state for UDP flows.
19.3. ACK Frames
Receivers send ACK frames (types 0x02 and 0x03) to inform senders of
packets they have received and processed. The ACK frame contains one
or more ACK Ranges. ACK Ranges identify acknowledged packets. If
the frame type is 0x03, ACK frames also contain the sum of QUIC
packets with associated ECN marks received on the connection up until
this point. QUIC implementations MUST properly handle both types
and, if they have enabled ECN for packets they send, they SHOULD use
the information in the ECN section to manage their congestion state.
QUIC acknowledgements are irrevocable. Once acknowledged, a packet
remains acknowledged, even if it does not appear in a future ACK
frame. This is unlike TCP SACKs ([RFC2018]).
It is expected that a sender will reuse the same packet number across
different packet number spaces. ACK frames only acknowledge the
packet numbers that were transmitted by the sender in the same packet
number space of the packet that the ACK was received in.
Version Negotiation and Retry packets cannot be acknowledged because
they do not contain a packet number. Rather than relying on ACK
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frames, these packets are implicitly acknowledged by the next Initial
packet sent by the client.
An ACK frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Largest Acknowledged (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Delay (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Range Count (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| First ACK Range (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Ranges (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [ECN Counts] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 17: ACK Frame Format
ACK frames contain the following fields:
Largest Acknowledged: A variable-length integer representing the
largest packet number the peer is acknowledging; this is usually
the largest packet number that the peer has received prior to
generating the ACK frame. Unlike the packet number in the QUIC
long or short header, the value in an ACK frame is not truncated.
ACK Delay: A variable-length integer including the time in
microseconds that the largest acknowledged packet, as indicated in
the Largest Acknowledged field, was received by this peer to when
this ACK was sent. The value of the ACK Delay field is scaled by
multiplying the encoded value by 2 to the power of the value of
the "ack_delay_exponent" transport parameter set by the sender of
the ACK frame. The "ack_delay_exponent" defaults to 3, or a
multiplier of 8 (see Section 18.1). Scaling in this fashion
allows for a larger range of values with a shorter encoding at the
cost of lower resolution.
ACK Range Count: A variable-length integer specifying the number of
Gap and ACK Range fields in the frame.
First ACK Range: A variable-length integer indicating the number of
contiguous packets preceding the Largest Acknowledged that are
being acknowledged. The First ACK Range is encoded as an ACK
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Range (see Section 19.3.1) starting from the Largest Acknowledged.
That is, the smallest packet acknowledged in the range is
determined by subtracting the First ACK Range value from the
Largest Acknowledged.
ACK Ranges: Contains additional ranges of packets which are
alternately not acknowledged (Gap) and acknowledged (ACK Range),
see Section 19.3.1.
ECN Counts: The three ECN Counts, see Section 19.3.2.
19.3.1. ACK Ranges
The ACK Ranges field consists of alternating Gap and ACK Range values
in descending packet number order. The number of Gap and ACK Range
values is determined by the ACK Range Count field; one of each value
is present for each value in the ACK Range Count field.
ACK Ranges are structured as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Gap (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [ACK Range (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Gap (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [ACK Range (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Gap (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [ACK Range (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 18: ACK Ranges
The fields that form the ACK Ranges are:
Gap (repeated): A variable-length integer indicating the number of
contiguous unacknowledged packets preceding the packet number one
lower than the smallest in the preceding ACK Range.
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ACK Range (repeated): A variable-length integer indicating the
number of contiguous acknowledged packets preceding the largest
packet number, as determined by the preceding Gap.
Gap and ACK Range value use a relative integer encoding for
efficiency. Though each encoded value is positive, the values are
subtracted, so that each ACK Range describes progressively lower-
numbered packets.
Each ACK Range acknowledges a contiguous range of packets by
indicating the number of acknowledged packets that precede the
largest packet number in that range. A value of zero indicates that
only the largest packet number is acknowledged. Larger ACK Range
values indicate a larger range, with corresponding lower values for
the smallest packet number in the range. Thus, given a largest
packet number for the range, the smallest value is determined by the
formula:
smallest = largest - ack_range
An ACK Range acknowledges all packets between the smallest packet
number and the largest, inclusive.
The largest value for an ACK Range is determined by cumulatively
subtracting the size of all preceding ACK Ranges and Gaps.
Each Gap indicates a range of packets that are not being
acknowledged. The number of packets in the gap is one higher than
the encoded value of the Gap field.
The value of the Gap field establishes the largest packet number
value for the subsequent ACK Range using the following formula:
largest = previous_smallest - gap - 2
If any computed packet number is negative, an endpoint MUST generate
a connection error of type FRAME_ENCODING_ERROR indicating an error
in an ACK frame.
19.3.2. ECN Counts
The ACK frame uses the least significant bit (that is, type 0x03) to
indicate ECN feedback and report receipt of QUIC packets with
associated ECN codepoints of ECT(0), ECT(1), or CE in the packet's IP
header. ECN Counts are only present when the ACK frame type is 0x03.
ECN Counts are only parsed when the ACK frame type is 0x03. There
are 3 ECN counts, as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ECT(0) Count (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ECT(1) Count (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ECN-CE Count (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The three ECN Counts are:
ECT(0) Count: A variable-length integer representing the total
number packets received with the ECT(0) codepoint.
ECT(1) Count: A variable-length integer representing the total
number packets received with the ECT(1) codepoint.
CE Count: A variable-length integer representing the total number
packets received with the CE codepoint.
ECN counts are maintained separately for each packet number space.
19.4. RESET_STREAM Frame
An endpoint uses a RESET_STREAM frame (type=0x04) to abruptly
terminate a stream.
After sending a RESET_STREAM, an endpoint ceases transmission and
retransmission of STREAM frames on the identified stream. A receiver
of RESET_STREAM can discard any data that it already received on that
stream.
An endpoint that receives a RESET_STREAM frame for a send-only stream
MUST terminate the connection with error STREAM_STATE_ERROR.
The RESET_STREAM frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Application Error Code (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Final Size (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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RESET_STREAM frames contain the following fields:
Stream ID: A variable-length integer encoding of the Stream ID of
the stream being terminated.
Application Protocol Error Code: A 16-bit application protocol error
code (see Section 20.1) which indicates why the stream is being
closed.
Final Size: A variable-length integer indicating the final size of
the stream by the RESET_STREAM sender, in unit of bytes.
19.5. STOP_SENDING Frame
An endpoint uses a STOP_SENDING frame (type=0x05) to communicate that
incoming data is being discarded on receipt at application request.
STOP_SENDING requests that a peer cease transmission on a stream.
A STOP_SENDING frame can be sent for streams in the Recv or Size
Known states (see Section 3.1). Receiving a STOP_SENDING frame for a
locally-initiated stream that has not yet been created MUST be
treated as a connection error of type STREAM_STATE_ERROR. An
endpoint that receives a STOP_SENDING frame for a receive-only stream
MUST terminate the connection with error STREAM_STATE_ERROR.
The STOP_SENDING frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Application Error Code (16) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
STOP_SENDING frames contain the following fields:
Stream ID: A variable-length integer carrying the Stream ID of the
stream being ignored.
Application Error Code: A 16-bit, application-specified reason the
sender is ignoring the stream (see Section 20.1).
19.6. CRYPTO Frame
The CRYPTO frame (type=0x06) is used to transmit cryptographic
handshake messages. It can be sent in all packet types. The CRYPTO
frame offers the cryptographic protocol an in-order stream of bytes.
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CRYPTO frames are functionally identical to STREAM frames, except
that they do not bear a stream identifier; they are not flow
controlled; and they do not carry markers for optional offset,
optional length, and the end of the stream.
The CRYPTO frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Offset (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Crypto Data (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 19: CRYPTO Frame Format
CRYPTO frames contain the following fields:
Offset: A variable-length integer specifying the byte offset in the
stream for the data in this CRYPTO frame.
Length: A variable-length integer specifying the length of the
Crypto Data field in this CRYPTO frame.
Crypto Data: The cryptographic message data.
There is a separate flow of cryptographic handshake data in each
encryption level, each of which starts at an offset of 0. This
implies that each encryption level is treated as a separate CRYPTO
stream of data.
Unlike STREAM frames, which include a Stream ID indicating to which
stream the data belongs, the CRYPTO frame carries data for a single
stream per encryption level. The stream does not have an explicit
end, so CRYPTO frames do not have a FIN bit.
19.7. NEW_TOKEN Frame
A server sends a NEW_TOKEN frame (type=0x07) to provide the client
with a token to send in the header of an Initial packet for a future
connection.
The NEW_TOKEN frame is as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Token Length (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Token (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
NEW_TOKEN frames contain the following fields:
Token Length: A variable-length integer specifying the length of the
token in bytes.
Token: An opaque blob that the client may use with a future Initial
packet.
19.8. STREAM Frames
STREAM frames implicitly create a stream and carry stream data. The
STREAM frame takes the form 0b00001XXX (or the set of values from
0x08 to 0x0f). The value of the three low-order bits of the frame
type determine the fields that are present in the frame.
o The OFF bit (0x04) in the frame type is set to indicate that there
is an Offset field present. When set to 1, the Offset field is
present. When set to 0, the Offset field is absent and the Stream
Data starts at an offset of 0 (that is, the frame contains the
first bytes of the stream, or the end of a stream that includes no
data).
o The LEN bit (0x02) in the frame type is set to indicate that there
is a Length field present. If this bit is set to 0, the Length
field is absent and the Stream Data field extends to the end of
the packet. If this bit is set to 1, the Length field is present.
o The FIN bit (0x01) of the frame type is set only on frames that
contain the final size of the stream. Setting this bit indicates
that the frame marks the end of the stream.
An endpoint that receives a STREAM frame for a send-only stream MUST
terminate the connection with error STREAM_STATE_ERROR.
The STREAM frames are as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Offset (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| [Length (i)] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream Data (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 20: STREAM Frame Format
STREAM frames contain the following fields:
Stream ID: A variable-length integer indicating the stream ID of the
stream (see Section 2.1).
Offset: A variable-length integer specifying the byte offset in the
stream for the data in this STREAM frame. This field is present
when the OFF bit is set to 1. When the Offset field is absent,
the offset is 0.
Length: A variable-length integer specifying the length of the
Stream Data field in this STREAM frame. This field is present
when the LEN bit is set to 1. When the LEN bit is set to 0, the
Stream Data field consumes all the remaining bytes in the packet.
Stream Data: The bytes from the designated stream to be delivered.
When a Stream Data field has a length of 0, the offset in the STREAM
frame is the offset of the next byte that would be sent.
The first byte in the stream has an offset of 0. The largest offset
delivered on a stream - the sum of the offset and data length - MUST
be less than 2^62.
19.9. MAX_DATA Frame
The MAX_DATA frame (type=0x10) is used in flow control to inform the
peer of the maximum amount of data that can be sent on the connection
as a whole.
The MAX_DATA frame is as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Maximum Data (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAX_DATA frames contain the following fields:
Maximum Data: A variable-length integer indicating the maximum
amount of data that can be sent on the entire connection, in units
of bytes.
All data sent in STREAM frames counts toward this limit. The sum of
the largest received offsets on all streams - including streams in
terminal states - MUST NOT exceed the value advertised by a receiver.
An endpoint MUST terminate a connection with a FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR
error if it receives more data than the maximum data value that it
has sent, unless this is a result of a change in the initial limits
(see Section 7.3.1).
19.10. MAX_STREAM_DATA Frame
The MAX_STREAM_DATA frame (type=0x11) is used in flow control to
inform a peer of the maximum amount of data that can be sent on a
stream.
A MAX_STREAM_DATA frame can be sent for streams in the Recv state
(see Section 3.1). Receiving a MAX_STREAM_DATA frame for a locally-
initiated stream that has not yet been created MUST be treated as a
connection error of type STREAM_STATE_ERROR. An endpoint that
receives a MAX_STREAM_DATA frame for a receive-only stream MUST
terminate the connection with error STREAM_STATE_ERROR.
The MAX_STREAM_DATA frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Maximum Stream Data (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAX_STREAM_DATA frames contain the following fields:
Stream ID: The stream ID of the stream that is affected encoded as a
variable-length integer.
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Maximum Stream Data: A variable-length integer indicating the
maximum amount of data that can be sent on the identified stream,
in units of bytes.
When counting data toward this limit, an endpoint accounts for the
largest received offset of data that is sent or received on the
stream. Loss or reordering can mean that the largest received offset
on a stream can be greater than the total size of data received on
that stream. Receiving STREAM frames might not increase the largest
received offset.
The data sent on a stream MUST NOT exceed the largest maximum stream
data value advertised by the receiver. An endpoint MUST terminate a
connection with a FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR error if it receives more data
than the largest maximum stream data that it has sent for the
affected stream, unless this is a result of a change in the initial
limits (see Section 7.3.1).
19.11. MAX_STREAMS Frames
The MAX_STREAMS frames (type=0x12 and 0x13) inform the peer of the
cumulative number of streams of a given type it is permitted to open.
A MAX_STREAMS frame with a type of 0x12 applies to bidirectional
streams, and a MAX_STREAMS frame with a type of 0x13 applies to
unidirectional streams.
The MAX_STREAMS frames are as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Maximum Streams (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
MAX_STREAMS frames contain the following fields:
Maximum Streams: A count of the cumulative number of streams of the
corresponding type that can be opened over the lifetime of the
connection.
Loss or reordering can cause a MAX_STREAMS frame to be received which
states a lower stream limit than an endpoint has previously received.
MAX_STREAMS frames which do not increase the stream limit MUST be
ignored.
An endpoint MUST NOT open more streams than permitted by the current
stream limit set by its peer. For instance, a server that receives a
unidirectional stream limit of 3 is permitted to open stream 3, 7,
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and 11, but not stream 15. An endpoint MUST terminate a connection
with a STREAM_LIMIT_ERROR error if a peer opens more streams than was
permitted.
Note that these frames (and the corresponding transport parameters)
do not describe the number of streams that can be opened
concurrently. The limit includes streams that have been closed as
well as those that are open.
19.12. DATA_BLOCKED Frame
A sender SHOULD send a DATA_BLOCKED frame (type=0x14) when it wishes
to send data, but is unable to due to connection-level flow control
(see Section 4). DATA_BLOCKED frames can be used as input to tuning
of flow control algorithms (see Section 4.2).
The DATA_BLOCKED frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data Limit (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
DATA_BLOCKED frames contain the following fields:
Data Limit: A variable-length integer indicating the connection-
level limit at which blocking occurred.
19.13. STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED Frame
A sender SHOULD send a STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frame (type=0x15) when it
wishes to send data, but is unable to due to stream-level flow
control. This frame is analogous to DATA_BLOCKED (Section 19.12).
An endpoint that receives a STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frame for a send-only
stream MUST terminate the connection with error STREAM_STATE_ERROR.
The STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream ID (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream Data Limit (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED frames contain the following fields:
Stream ID: A variable-length integer indicating the stream which is
flow control blocked.
Stream Data Limit: A variable-length integer indicating the offset
of the stream at which the blocking occurred.
19.14. STREAMS_BLOCKED Frames
A sender SHOULD send a STREAMS_BLOCKED frame (type=0x16 or 0x17) when
it wishes to open a stream, but is unable to due to the maximum
stream limit set by its peer (see Section 19.11). A STREAMS_BLOCKED
frame of type 0x16 is used to indicate reaching the bidirectional
stream limit, and a STREAMS_BLOCKED frame of type 0x17 indicates
reaching the unidirectional stream limit.
A STREAMS_BLOCKED frame does not open the stream, but informs the
peer that a new stream was needed and the stream limit prevented the
creation of the stream.
The STREAMS_BLOCKED frames are as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Stream Limit (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
STREAMS_BLOCKED frames contain the following fields:
Stream Limit: A variable-length integer indicating the stream limit
at the time the frame was sent.
19.15. NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frame
An endpoint sends a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame (type=0x18) to provide
its peer with alternative connection IDs that can be used to break
linkability when migrating connections (see Section 9.5).
The NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame is as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length (8) | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Connection ID (32..144) +
| ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Stateless Reset Token (128) +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames contain the following fields:
Sequence Number: The sequence number assigned to the connection ID
by the sender. See Section 5.1.1.
Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer containing the length of the
connection ID. Values less than 4 and greater than 18 are invalid
and MUST be treated as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Connection ID: A connection ID of the specified length.
Stateless Reset Token: A 128-bit value that will be used for a
stateless reset when the associated connection ID is used (see
Section 10.4).
An endpoint MUST NOT send this frame if it currently requires that
its peer send packets with a zero-length Destination Connection ID.
Changing the length of a connection ID to or from zero-length makes
it difficult to identify when the value of the connection ID changed.
An endpoint that is sending packets with a zero-length Destination
Connection ID MUST treat receipt of a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame as a
connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Transmission errors, timeouts and retransmissions might cause the
same NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame to be received multiple times. Receipt
of the same frame multiple times MUST NOT be treated as a connection
error. A receiver can use the sequence number supplied in the
NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame to identify new connection IDs from old ones.
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If an endpoint receives a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame that repeats a
previously issued connection ID with a different Stateless Reset
Token or a different sequence number, or if a sequence number is used
for different connection IDs, the endpoint MAY treat that receipt as
a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
19.16. RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID Frame
An endpoint sends a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame (type=0x19) to
indicate that it will no longer use a connection ID that was issued
by its peer. This may include the connection ID provided during the
handshake. Sending a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame also serves as a
request to the peer to send additional connection IDs for future use
(see Section 5.1). New connection IDs can be delivered to a peer
using the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame (Section 19.15).
Retiring a connection ID invalidates the stateless reset token
associated with that connection ID.
The RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames contain the following fields:
Sequence Number: The sequence number of the connection ID being
retired. See Section 5.1.2.
Receipt of a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame containing a sequence number
greater than any previously sent to the peer MAY be treated as a
connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
The sequence number specified in a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame MUST
NOT refer to the Destination Connection ID field of the packet in
which the frame is contained. The peer MAY treat this as a
connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
An endpoint cannot send this frame if it was provided with a zero-
length connection ID by its peer. An endpoint that provides a zero-
length connection ID MUST treat receipt of a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID
frame as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
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19.17. PATH_CHALLENGE Frame
Endpoints can use PATH_CHALLENGE frames (type=0x1a) to check
reachability to the peer and for path validation during connection
migration.
The PATH_CHALLENGE frames are as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ Data (64) +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PATH_CHALLENGE frames contain the following fields:
Data: This 8-byte field contains arbitrary data.
A PATH_CHALLENGE frame containing 8 bytes that are hard to guess is
sufficient to ensure that it is easier to receive the packet than it
is to guess the value correctly.
The recipient of this frame MUST generate a PATH_RESPONSE frame
(Section 19.18) containing the same Data.
19.18. PATH_RESPONSE Frame
The PATH_RESPONSE frame (type=0x1b) is sent in response to a
PATH_CHALLENGE frame. Its format is identical to the PATH_CHALLENGE
frame (Section 19.17).
If the content of a PATH_RESPONSE frame does not match the content of
a PATH_CHALLENGE frame previously sent by the endpoint, the endpoint
MAY generate a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
19.19. CONNECTION_CLOSE Frames
An endpoint sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame (type=0x1c or 0x1d) to
notify its peer that the connection is being closed. The
CONNECTION_CLOSE with a frame type of 0x1c is used to signal errors
at only the QUIC layer, or the absence of errors (with the NO_ERROR
code). The CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with a type of 0x1d is used to
signal an error with the application that uses QUIC.
If there are open streams that haven't been explicitly closed, they
are implicitly closed when the connection is closed.
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The CONNECTION_CLOSE frames are as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code (16) | [ Frame Type (i) ] ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reason Phrase Length (i) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reason Phrase (*) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
CONNECTION_CLOSE frames contain the following fields:
Error Code: A 16-bit error code which indicates the reason for
closing this connection. A CONNECTION_CLOSE frame of type 0x1c
uses codes from the space defined in Section 20. A
CONNECTION_CLOSE frame of type 0x1d uses codes from the
application protocol error code space, see Section 20.1
Frame Type: A variable-length integer encoding the type of frame
that triggered the error. A value of 0 (equivalent to the mention
of the PADDING frame) is used when the frame type is unknown. The
application-specific variant of CONNECTION_CLOSE (type 0x1d) does
not include this field.
Reason Phrase Length: A variable-length integer specifying the
length of the reason phrase in bytes. Because a CONNECTION_CLOSE
frame cannot be split between packets, any limits on packet size
will also limit the space available for a reason phrase.
Reason Phrase: A human-readable explanation for why the connection
was closed. This can be zero length if the sender chooses to not
give details beyond the Error Code. This SHOULD be a UTF-8
encoded string [RFC3629].
19.20. Extension Frames
QUIC frames do not use a self-describing encoding. An endpoint
therefore needs to understand the syntax of all frames before it can
successfully process a packet. This allows for efficient encoding of
frames, but it means that an endpoint cannot send a frame of a type
that is unknown to its peer.
An extension to QUIC that wishes to use a new type of frame MUST
first ensure that a peer is able to understand the frame. An
endpoint can use a transport parameter to signal its willingness to
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receive one or more extension frame types with the one transport
parameter.
Extension frames MUST be congestion controlled and MUST cause an ACK
frame to be sent. The exception is extension frames that replace or
supplement the ACK frame. Extension frames are not included in flow
control unless specified in the extension.
An IANA registry is used to manage the assignment of frame types, see
Section 22.2.
20. Transport Error Codes
QUIC error codes are 16-bit unsigned integers.
This section lists the defined QUIC transport error codes that may be
used in a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. These errors apply to the entire
connection.
NO_ERROR (0x0): An endpoint uses this with CONNECTION_CLOSE to
signal that the connection is being closed abruptly in the absence
of any error.
INTERNAL_ERROR (0x1): The endpoint encountered an internal error and
cannot continue with the connection.
SERVER_BUSY (0x2): The server is currently busy and does not accept
any new connections.
FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR (0x3): An endpoint received more data than it
permitted in its advertised data limits (see Section 4).
STREAM_LIMIT_ERROR (0x4): An endpoint received a frame for a stream
identifier that exceeded its advertised stream limit for the
corresponding stream type.
STREAM_STATE_ERROR (0x5): An endpoint received a frame for a stream
that was not in a state that permitted that frame (see Section 3).
FINAL_SIZE_ERROR (0x6): An endpoint received a STREAM frame
containing data that exceeded the previously established final
size. Or an endpoint received a STREAM frame or a RESET_STREAM
frame containing a final size that was lower than the size of
stream data that was already received. Or an endpoint received a
STREAM frame or a RESET_STREAM frame containing a different final
size to the one already established.
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FRAME_ENCODING_ERROR (0x7): An endpoint received a frame that was
badly formatted. For instance, a frame of an unknown type, or an
ACK frame that has more acknowledgment ranges than the remainder
of the packet could carry.
TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR (0x8): An endpoint received transport
parameters that were badly formatted, included an invalid value,
was absent even though it is mandatory, was present though it is
forbidden, or is otherwise in error.
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION (0xA): An endpoint detected an error with
protocol compliance that was not covered by more specific error
codes.
INVALID_MIGRATION (0xC): A peer has migrated to a different network
when the endpoint had disabled migration.
CRYPTO_ERROR (0x1XX): The cryptographic handshake failed. A range
of 256 values is reserved for carrying error codes specific to the
cryptographic handshake that is used. Codes for errors occurring
when TLS is used for the crypto handshake are described in
Section 4.8 of [QUIC-TLS].
See Section 22.3 for details of registering new error codes.
20.1. Application Protocol Error Codes
Application protocol error codes are 16-bit unsigned integers, but
the management of application error codes are left to application
protocols. Application protocol error codes are used for the
RESET_STREAM frame (Section 19.4), the STOP_SENDING frame
(Section 19.5), and the CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with a type of 0x1d
(Section 19.19).
21. Security Considerations
21.1. Handshake Denial of Service
As an encrypted and authenticated transport QUIC provides a range of
protections against denial of service. Once the cryptographic
handshake is complete, QUIC endpoints discard most packets that are
not authenticated, greatly limiting the ability of an attacker to
interfere with existing connections.
Once a connection is established QUIC endpoints might accept some
unauthenticated ICMP packets (see Section 14.2), but the use of these
packets is extremely limited. The only other type of packet that an
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endpoint might accept is a stateless reset (Section 10.4) which
relies on the token being kept secret until it is used.
During the creation of a connection, QUIC only provides protection
against attack from off the network path. All QUIC packets contain
proof that the recipient saw a preceding packet from its peer.
The first mechanism used is the source and destination connection
IDs, which are required to match those set by a peer. Except for an
Initial and stateless reset packets, an endpoint only accepts packets
that include a destination connection that matches a connection ID
the endpoint previously chose. This is the only protection offered
for Version Negotiation packets.
The destination connection ID in an Initial packet is selected by a
client to be unpredictable, which serves an additional purpose. The
packets that carry the cryptographic handshake are protected with a
key that is derived from this connection ID and salt specific to the
QUIC version. This allows endpoints to use the same process for
authenticating packets that they receive as they use after the
cryptographic handshake completes. Packets that cannot be
authenticated are discarded. Protecting packets in this fashion
provides a strong assurance that the sender of the packet saw the
Initial packet and understood it.
These protections are not intended to be effective against an
attacker that is able to receive QUIC packets prior to the connection
being established. Such an attacker can potentially send packets
that will be accepted by QUIC endpoints. This version of QUIC
attempts to detect this sort of attack, but it expects that endpoints
will fail to establish a connection rather than recovering. For the
most part, the cryptographic handshake protocol [QUIC-TLS] is
responsible for detecting tampering during the handshake.
Endpoints are permitted to use other methods to detect and attempt to
recover from interference with the handshake. Invalid packets may be
identified and discarded using other methods, but no specific method
is mandated in this document.
21.2. Amplification Attack
An attacker might be able to receive an address validation token
(Section 8) from a server and then release the IP address it used to
acquire that token. At a later time, the attacker may initiate a
0-RTT connection with a server by spoofing this same address, which
might now address a different (victim) endpoint. The attacker can
thus potentially cause the server to send an initial congestion
window's worth of data towards the victim.
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Servers SHOULD provide mitigations for this attack by limiting the
usage and lifetime of address validation tokens (see Section 8.1.2).
21.3. Optimistic ACK Attack
An endpoint that acknowledges packets it has not received might cause
a congestion controller to permit sending at rates beyond what the
network supports. An endpoint MAY skip packet numbers when sending
packets to detect this behavior. An endpoint can then immediately
close the connection with a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION (see Section 10.3).
21.4. Slowloris Attacks
The attacks commonly known as Slowloris [SLOWLORIS] try to keep many
connections to the target endpoint open and hold them open as long as
possible. These attacks can be executed against a QUIC endpoint by
generating the minimum amount of activity necessary to avoid being
closed for inactivity. This might involve sending small amounts of
data, gradually opening flow control windows in order to control the
sender rate, or manufacturing ACK frames that simulate a high loss
rate.
QUIC deployments SHOULD provide mitigations for the Slowloris
attacks, such as increasing the maximum number of clients the server
will allow, limiting the number of connections a single IP address is
allowed to make, imposing restrictions on the minimum transfer speed
a connection is allowed to have, and restricting the length of time
an endpoint is allowed to stay connected.
21.5. Stream Fragmentation and Reassembly Attacks
An adversarial sender might intentionally send fragments of stream
data in order to cause disproportionate receive buffer memory
commitment and/or creation of a large and inefficient data structure.
An adversarial receiver might intentionally not acknowledge packets
containing stream data in order to force the sender to store the
unacknowledged stream data for retransmission.
The attack on receivers is mitigated if flow control windows
correspond to available memory. However, some receivers will over-
commit memory and advertise flow control offsets in the aggregate
that exceed actual available memory. The over-commitment strategy
can lead to better performance when endpoints are well behaved, but
renders endpoints vulnerable to the stream fragmentation attack.
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QUIC deployments SHOULD provide mitigations against stream
fragmentation attacks. Mitigations could consist of avoiding over-
committing memory, limiting the size of tracking data structures,
delaying reassembly of STREAM frames, implementing heuristics based
on the age and duration of reassembly holes, or some combination.
21.6. Stream Commitment Attack
An adversarial endpoint can open lots of streams, exhausting state on
an endpoint. The adversarial endpoint could repeat the process on a
large number of connections, in a manner similar to SYN flooding
attacks in TCP.
Normally, clients will open streams sequentially, as explained in
Section 2.1. However, when several streams are initiated at short
intervals, transmission error may cause STREAM DATA frames opening
streams to be received out of sequence. A receiver is obligated to
open intervening streams if a higher-numbered stream ID is received.
Thus, on a new connection, opening stream 2000001 opens 1 million
streams, as required by the specification.
The number of active streams is limited by the concurrent stream
limit transport parameter, as explained in Section 4.5. If chosen
judiciously, this limit mitigates the effect of the stream commitment
attack. However, setting the limit too low could affect performance
when applications expect to open large number of streams.
21.7. Explicit Congestion Notification Attacks
An on-path attacker could manipulate the value of ECN codepoints in
the IP header to influence the sender's rate. [RFC3168] discusses
manipulations and their effects in more detail.
An on-the-side attacker can duplicate and send packets with modified
ECN codepoints to affect the sender's rate. If duplicate packets are
discarded by a receiver, an off-path attacker will need to race the
duplicate packet against the original to be successful in this
attack. Therefore, QUIC receivers ignore ECN codepoints set in
duplicate packets (see Section 13.3).
21.8. Stateless Reset Oracle
Stateless resets create a possible denial of service attack analogous
to a TCP reset injection. This attack is possible if an attacker is
able to cause a stateless reset token to be generated for a
connection with a selected connection ID. An attacker that can cause
this token to be generated can reset an active connection with the
same connection ID.
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If a packet can be routed to different instances that share a static
key, for example by changing an IP address or port, then an attacker
can cause the server to send a stateless reset. To defend against
this style of denial service, endpoints that share a static key for
stateless reset (see Section 10.4.2) MUST be arranged so that packets
with a given connection ID always arrive at an instance that has
connection state, unless that connection is no longer active.
In the case of a cluster that uses dynamic load balancing, it's
possible that a change in load balancer configuration could happen
while an active instance retains connection state; even if an
instance retains connection state, the change in routing and
resulting stateless reset will result in the connection being
terminated. If there is no chance in the packet being routed to the
correct instance, it is better to send a stateless reset than wait
for connections to time out. However, this is acceptable only if the
routing cannot be influenced by an attacker.
21.9. Version Downgrade
This document defines QUIC Version Negotiation packets Section 6,
which can be used to negotiate the QUIC version used between two
endpoints. However, this document does not specify how this
negotiation will be performed between this version and subsequent
future versions. In particular, Version Negotiation packets do not
contain any mechanism to prevent version downgrade attacks. Future
versions of QUIC that use Version Negotiation packets MUST define a
mechanism that is robust against version downgrade attacks.
22. IANA Considerations
22.1. QUIC Transport Parameter Registry
IANA [SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Transport Parameters"
under a "QUIC Protocol" heading.
The "QUIC Transport Parameters" registry governs a 16-bit space.
This space is split into two spaces that are governed by different
policies. Values with the first byte in the range 0x00 to 0xfe (in
hexadecimal) are assigned via the Specification Required policy
[RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 0xff are reserved for Private
Use [RFC8126].
Registrations MUST include the following fields:
Value: The numeric value of the assignment (registrations will be
between 0x0000 and 0xfeff).
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Parameter Name: A short mnemonic for the parameter.
Specification: A reference to a publicly available specification for
the value.
The nominated expert(s) verify that a specification exists and is
readily accessible. Expert(s) are encouraged to be biased towards
approving registrations unless they are abusive, frivolous, or
actively harmful (not merely aesthetically displeasing, or
architecturally dubious).
The initial contents of this registry are shown in Table 6.
+--------+-------------------------------------+---------------+
| Value | Parameter Name | Specification |
+--------+-------------------------------------+---------------+
| 0x0000 | original_connection_id | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0001 | idle_timeout | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0002 | stateless_reset_token | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0003 | max_packet_size | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0004 | initial_max_data | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0005 | initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0006 | initial_max_stream_data_bidi_remote | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0007 | initial_max_stream_data_uni | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0008 | initial_max_streams_bidi | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x0009 | initial_max_streams_uni | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x000a | ack_delay_exponent | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x000b | max_ack_delay | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x000c | disable_migration | Section 18.1 |
| | | |
| 0x000d | preferred_address | Section 18.1 |
+--------+-------------------------------------+---------------+
Table 6: Initial QUIC Transport Parameters Entries
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22.2. QUIC Frame Type Registry
IANA [SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Frame Types" under a
"QUIC Protocol" heading.
The "QUIC Frame Types" registry governs a 62-bit space. This space
is split into three spaces that are governed by different policies.
Values between 0x00 and 0x3f (in hexadecimal) are assigned via the
Standards Action or IESG Review policies [RFC8126]. Values from 0x40
to 0x3fff operate on the Specification Required policy [RFC8126].
All other values are assigned to Private Use [RFC8126].
Registrations MUST include the following fields:
Value: The numeric value of the assignment (registrations will be
between 0x00 and 0x3fff). A range of values MAY be assigned.
Frame Name: A short mnemonic for the frame type.
Specification: A reference to a publicly available specification for
the value.
The nominated expert(s) verify that a specification exists and is
readily accessible. Specifications for new registrations need to
describe the means by which an endpoint might determine that it can
send the identified type of frame. An accompanying transport
parameter registration (see Section 22.1) is expected for most
registrations. The specification needs to describe the format and
assigned semantics of any fields in the frame.
Expert(s) are encouraged to be biased towards approving registrations
unless they are abusive, frivolous, or actively harmful (not merely
aesthetically displeasing, or architecturally dubious).
The initial contents of this registry are tabulated in Table 3.
22.3. QUIC Transport Error Codes Registry
IANA [SHALL add/has added] a registry for "QUIC Transport Error
Codes" under a "QUIC Protocol" heading.
The "QUIC Transport Error Codes" registry governs a 16-bit space.
This space is split into two spaces that are governed by different
policies. Values with the first byte in the range 0x00 to 0xfe (in
hexadecimal) are assigned via the Specification Required policy
[RFC8126]. Values with the first byte 0xff are reserved for Private
Use [RFC8126].
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Registrations MUST include the following fields:
Value: The numeric value of the assignment (registrations will be
between 0x0000 and 0xfeff).
Code: A short mnemonic for the parameter.
Description: A brief description of the error code semantics, which
MAY be a summary if a specification reference is provided.
Specification: A reference to a publicly available specification for
the value.
The initial contents of this registry are shown in Table 7. Values
from 0xFF00 to 0xFFFF are reserved for Private Use [RFC8126].
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+------+---------------------------+----------------+---------------+
| Valu | Error | Description | Specification |
| e | | | |
+------+---------------------------+----------------+---------------+
| 0x0 | NO_ERROR | No error | Section 20 |
| | | | |
| 0x1 | INTERNAL_ERROR | Implementation | Section 20 |
| | | error | |
| | | | |
| 0x2 | SERVER_BUSY | Server | Section 20 |
| | | currently busy | |
| | | | |
| 0x3 | FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR | Flow control | Section 20 |
| | | error | |
| | | | |
| 0x4 | STREAM_LIMIT_ERROR | Too many | Section 20 |
| | | streams opened | |
| | | | |
| 0x5 | STREAM_STATE_ERROR | Frame received | Section 20 |
| | | in invalid | |
| | | stream state | |
| | | | |
| 0x6 | FINAL_SIZE_ERROR | Change to | Section 20 |
| | | final size | |
| | | | |
| 0x7 | FRAME_ENCODING_ERROR | Frame encoding | Section 20 |
| | | error | |
| | | | |
| 0x8 | TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR | Error in | Section 20 |
| | | transport | |
| | | parameters | |
| | | | |
| 0xA | PROTOCOL_VIOLATION | Generic | Section 20 |
| | | protocol | |
| | | violation | |
| | | | |
| 0xC | INVALID_MIGRATION | Violated | Section 20 |
| | | disabled | |
| | | migration | |
+------+---------------------------+----------------+---------------+
Table 7: Initial QUIC Transport Error Codes Entries
23. References
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23.1. Normative References
[DPLPMTUD]
Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tuexen, M., Ruengeler, I., and
T. Voelker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
Datagram Transports", draft-ietf-tsvwg-datagram-plpmtud-07
(work in progress), February 2019.
[QUIC-RECOVERY]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", draft-ietf-quic-recovery-19 (work
in progress), March 2019.
[QUIC-TLS]
Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using Transport
Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC", draft-ietf-quic-
tls-19 (work in progress), March 2019.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
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[RFC6437] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
"IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>.
[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8201] McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
"Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.
[RFC8311] Black, D., "Relaxing Restrictions on Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) Experimentation", RFC 8311,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8311, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8311>.
[SPIN] Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The QUIC Latency Spin
Bit", draft-ietf-quic-spin-exp-01 (work in progress),
October 2018.
[TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
23.2. Informative References
[EARLY-DESIGN]
Roskind, J., "QUIC: Multiplexed Transport Over UDP",
December 2013, <https://goo.gl/dMVtFi>.
[HTTP2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
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[QUIC-INVARIANTS]
Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC",
draft-ietf-quic-invariants-03 (work in progress), March
2019.
[RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1812>.
[RFC2018] Mathis, M., Mahdavi, J., Floyd, S., and A. Romanow, "TCP
Selective Acknowledgment Options", RFC 2018,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2018, October 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2018>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2360] Scott, G., "Guide for Internet Standards Writers", BCP 22,
RFC 2360, DOI 10.17487/RFC2360, June 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2360>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC4787] Audet, F., Ed. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast
UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, DOI 10.17487/RFC4787, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4787>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
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[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[SLOWLORIS]
RSnake Hansen, R., "Welcome to Slowloris...", June 2009,
<https://web.archive.org/web/20150315054838/
http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/>.
Appendix A. Sample Packet Number Decoding Algorithm
The following pseudo-code shows how an implementation can decode
packet numbers after header protection has been removed.
DecodePacketNumber(largest_pn, truncated_pn, pn_nbits):
expected_pn = largest_pn + 1
pn_win = 1 << pn_nbits
pn_hwin = pn_win / 2
pn_mask = pn_win - 1
// The incoming packet number should be greater than
// expected_pn - pn_hwin and less than or equal to
// expected_pn + pn_hwin
//
// This means we can't just strip the trailing bits from
// expected_pn and add the truncated_pn because that might
// yield a value outside the window.
//
// The following code calculates a candidate value and
// makes sure it's within the packet number window.
candidate_pn = (expected_pn & ~pn_mask) | truncated_pn
if candidate_pn <= expected_pn - pn_hwin:
return candidate_pn + pn_win
// Note the extra check for underflow when candidate_pn
// is near zero.
if candidate_pn > expected_pn + pn_hwin and
candidate_pn > pn_win:
return candidate_pn - pn_win
return candidate_pn
Appendix B. Change Log
*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
publication of a final version of this document.
Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp.
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B.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-18
o Removed version negotation; version negotiation, including
authentication of the result, will be addressed in the next
version of QUIC (#1773, #2313)
o Added discussion of the use of IPv6 flow labels (#2348, #2399)
o A connection ID can't be retired in a packet that uses that
connection ID (#2101, #2420)
o Idle timeout transport parameter is in milliseconds (from seconds)
(#2453, #2454)
o Endpoints are required to use new connnection IDs when they use
new network paths (#2413, #2414)
o Increased the set of permissible frames in 0-RTT (#2344, #2355)
B.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-17
o Stream-related errors now use STREAM_STATE_ERROR (#2305)
o Endpoints discard initial keys as soon as handshake keys are
available (#1951, #2045)
o Expanded conditions for ignoring ICMP packet too big messages
(#2108, #2161)
o Remove rate control from PATH_CHALLENGE/PATH_RESPONSE (#2129,
#2241)
o Endpoints are permitted to discard malformed initial packets
(#2141)
o Clarified ECN implementation and usage requirements (#2156, #2201)
o Disable ECN count verification for packets that arrive out of
order (#2198, #2215)
o Use Probe Timeout (PTO) instead of RTO (#2206, #2238)
o Loosen constraints on retransmission of ACK ranges (#2199, #2245)
o Limit Retry and Version Negotiation to once per datagram (#2259,
#2303)
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o Set a maximum value for max_ack_delay transport parameter (#2282,
#2301)
o Allow server preferred address for both IPv4 and IPv6 (#2122,
#2296)
o Corrected requirements for migration to a preferred address
(#2146, #2349)
o ACK of non-existent packet is illegal (#2298, #2302)
B.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-16
o Stream limits are defined as counts, not maximums (#1850, #1906)
o Require amplification attack defense after closing (#1905, #1911)
o Remove reservation of application error code 0 for STOPPING
(#1804, #1922)
o Renumbered frames (#1945)
o Renumbered transport parameters (#1946)
o Numeric transport parameters are expressed as varints (#1608,
#1947, #1955)
o Reorder the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame (#1952, #1963)
o Rework the first byte (#2006)
* Fix the 0x40 bit
* Change type values for long header
* Add spin bit to short header (#631, #1988)
* Encrypt the remainder of the first byte (#1322)
* Move packet number length to first byte
* Move ODCIL to first byte of retry packets
* Simplify packet number protection (#1575)
o Allow STOP_SENDING to open a remote bidirectional stream (#1797,
#2013)
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o Added mitigation for off-path migration attacks (#1278, #1749,
#2033)
o Don't let the PMTU to drop below 1280 (#2063, #2069)
o Require peers to replace retired connection IDs (#2085)
o Servers are required to ignore Version Negotiation packets (#2088)
o Tokens are repeated in all Initial packets (#2089)
o Clarified how PING frames are sent after loss (#2094)
o Initial keys are discarded once Handshake are available (#1951,
#2045)
o ICMP PTB validation clarifications (#2161, #2109, #2108)
B.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-15
Substantial editorial reorganization; no technical changes.
B.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-14
o Merge ACK and ACK_ECN (#1778, #1801)
o Explicitly communicate max_ack_delay (#981, #1781)
o Validate original connection ID after Retry packets (#1710, #1486,
#1793)
o Idle timeout is optional and has no specified maximum (#1765)
o Update connection ID handling; add RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID type
(#1464, #1468, #1483, #1484, #1486, #1495, #1729, #1742, #1799,
#1821)
o Include a Token in all Initial packets (#1649, #1794)
o Prevent handshake deadlock (#1764, #1824)
B.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-13
o Streams open when higher-numbered streams of the same type open
(#1342, #1549)
o Split initial stream flow control limit into 3 transport
parameters (#1016, #1542)
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o All flow control transport parameters are optional (#1610)
o Removed UNSOLICITED_PATH_RESPONSE error code (#1265, #1539)
o Permit stateless reset in response to any packet (#1348, #1553)
o Recommended defense against stateless reset spoofing (#1386,
#1554)
o Prevent infinite stateless reset exchanges (#1443, #1627)
o Forbid processing of the same packet number twice (#1405, #1624)
o Added a packet number decoding example (#1493)
o More precisely define idle timeout (#1429, #1614, #1652)
o Corrected format of Retry packet and prevented looping (#1492,
#1451, #1448, #1498)
o Permit 0-RTT after receiving Version Negotiation or Retry (#1507,
#1514, #1621)
o Permit Retry in response to 0-RTT (#1547, #1552)
o Looser verification of ECN counters to account for ACK loss
(#1555, #1481, #1565)
o Remove frame type field from APPLICATION_CLOSE (#1508, #1528)
B.7. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-12
o Changes to integration of the TLS handshake (#829, #1018, #1094,
#1165, #1190, #1233, #1242, #1252, #1450, #1458)
* The cryptographic handshake uses CRYPTO frames, not stream 0
* QUIC packet protection is used in place of TLS record
protection
* Separate QUIC packet number spaces are used for the handshake
* Changed Retry to be independent of the cryptographic handshake
* Added NEW_TOKEN frame and Token fields to Initial packet
* Limit the use of HelloRetryRequest to address TLS needs (like
key shares)
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o Enable server to transition connections to a preferred address
(#560, #1251, #1373)
o Added ECN feedback mechanisms and handling; new ACK_ECN frame
(#804, #805, #1372)
o Changed rules and recommendations for use of new connection IDs
(#1258, #1264, #1276, #1280, #1419, #1452, #1453, #1465)
o Added a transport parameter to disable intentional connection
migration (#1271, #1447)
o Packets from different connection ID can't be coalesced (#1287,
#1423)
o Fixed sampling method for packet number encryption; the length
field in long headers includes the packet number field in addition
to the packet payload (#1387, #1389)
o Stateless Reset is now symmetric and subject to size constraints
(#466, #1346)
o Added frame type extension mechanism (#58, #1473)
B.8. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-11
o Enable server to transition connections to a preferred address
(#560, #1251)
o Packet numbers are encrypted (#1174, #1043, #1048, #1034, #850,
#990, #734, #1317, #1267, #1079)
o Packet numbers use a variable-length encoding (#989, #1334)
o STREAM frames can now be empty (#1350)
B.9. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-10
o Swap payload length and packed number fields in long header
(#1294)
o Clarified that CONNECTION_CLOSE is allowed in Handshake packet
(#1274)
o Spin bit reserved (#1283)
o Coalescing multiple QUIC packets in a UDP datagram (#1262, #1285)
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o A more complete connection migration (#1249)
o Refine opportunistic ACK defense text (#305, #1030, #1185)
o A Stateless Reset Token isn't mandatory (#818, #1191)
o Removed implicit stream opening (#896, #1193)
o An empty STREAM frame can be used to open a stream without sending
data (#901, #1194)
o Define stream counts in transport parameters rather than a maximum
stream ID (#1023, #1065)
o STOP_SENDING is now prohibited before streams are used (#1050)
o Recommend including ACK in Retry packets and allow PADDING (#1067,
#882)
o Endpoints now become closing after an idle timeout (#1178, #1179)
o Remove implication that Version Negotiation is sent when a packet
of the wrong version is received (#1197)
B.10. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-09
o Added PATH_CHALLENGE and PATH_RESPONSE frames to replace PING with
Data and PONG frame. Changed ACK frame type from 0x0e to 0x0d.
(#1091, #725, #1086)
o A server can now only send 3 packets without validating the client
address (#38, #1090)
o Delivery order of stream data is no longer strongly specified
(#252, #1070)
o Rework of packet handling and version negotiation (#1038)
o Stream 0 is now exempt from flow control until the handshake
completes (#1074, #725, #825, #1082)
o Improved retransmission rules for all frame types: information is
retransmitted, not packets or frames (#463, #765, #1095, #1053)
o Added an error code for server busy signals (#1137)
o Endpoints now set the connection ID that their peer uses.
Connection IDs are variable length. Removed the
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omit_connection_id transport parameter and the corresponding short
header flag. (#1089, #1052, #1146, #821, #745, #821, #1166, #1151)
B.11. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-08
o Clarified requirements for BLOCKED usage (#65, #924)
o BLOCKED frame now includes reason for blocking (#452, #924, #927,
#928)
o GAP limitation in ACK Frame (#613)
o Improved PMTUD description (#614, #1036)
o Clarified stream state machine (#634, #662, #743, #894)
o Reserved versions don't need to be generated deterministically
(#831, #931)
o You don't always need the draining period (#871)
o Stateless reset clarified as version-specific (#930, #986)
o initial_max_stream_id_x transport parameters are optional (#970,
#971)
o Ack Delay assumes a default value during the handshake (#1007,
#1009)
o Removed transport parameters from NewSessionTicket (#1015)
B.12. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-07
o The long header now has version before packet number (#926, #939)
o Rename and consolidate packet types (#846, #822, #847)
o Packet types are assigned new codepoints and the Connection ID
Flag is inverted (#426, #956)
o Removed type for Version Negotiation and use Version 0 (#963,
#968)
o Streams are split into unidirectional and bidirectional (#643,
#656, #720, #872, #175, #885)
* Stream limits now have separate uni- and bi-directional
transport parameters (#909, #958)
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* Stream limit transport parameters are now optional and default
to 0 (#970, #971)
o The stream state machine has been split into read and write (#634,
#894)
o Employ variable-length integer encodings throughout (#595)
o Improvements to connection close
* Added distinct closing and draining states (#899, #871)
* Draining period can terminate early (#869, #870)
* Clarifications about stateless reset (#889, #890)
o Address validation for connection migration (#161, #732, #878)
o Clearly defined retransmission rules for BLOCKED (#452, #65, #924)
o negotiated_version is sent in server transport parameters (#710,
#959)
o Increased the range over which packet numbers are randomized
(#864, #850, #964)
B.13. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-06
o Replaced FNV-1a with AES-GCM for all "Cleartext" packets (#554)
o Split error code space between application and transport (#485)
o Stateless reset token moved to end (#820)
o 1-RTT-protected long header types removed (#848)
o No acknowledgments during draining period (#852)
o Remove "application close" as a separate close type (#854)
o Remove timestamps from the ACK frame (#841)
o Require transport parameters to only appear once (#792)
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B.14. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-05
o Stateless token is server-only (#726)
o Refactor section on connection termination (#733, #748, #328,
#177)
o Limit size of Version Negotiation packet (#585)
o Clarify when and what to ack (#736)
o Renamed STREAM_ID_NEEDED to STREAM_ID_BLOCKED
o Clarify Keep-alive requirements (#729)
B.15. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-04
o Introduce STOP_SENDING frame, RESET_STREAM only resets in one
direction (#165)
o Removed GOAWAY; application protocols are responsible for graceful
shutdown (#696)
o Reduced the number of error codes (#96, #177, #184, #211)
o Version validation fields can't move or change (#121)
o Removed versions from the transport parameters in a
NewSessionTicket message (#547)
o Clarify the meaning of "bytes in flight" (#550)
o Public reset is now stateless reset and not visible to the path
(#215)
o Reordered bits and fields in STREAM frame (#620)
o Clarifications to the stream state machine (#572, #571)
o Increased the maximum length of the Largest Acknowledged field in
ACK frames to 64 bits (#629)
o truncate_connection_id is renamed to omit_connection_id (#659)
o CONNECTION_CLOSE terminates the connection like TCP RST (#330,
#328)
o Update labels used in HKDF-Expand-Label to match TLS 1.3 (#642)
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B.16. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-03
o Change STREAM and RESET_STREAM layout
o Add MAX_STREAM_ID settings
B.17. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-02
o The size of the initial packet payload has a fixed minimum (#267,
#472)
o Define when Version Negotiation packets are ignored (#284, #294,
#241, #143, #474)
o The 64-bit FNV-1a algorithm is used for integrity protection of
unprotected packets (#167, #480, #481, #517)
o Rework initial packet types to change how the connection ID is
chosen (#482, #442, #493)
o No timestamps are forbidden in unprotected packets (#542, #429)
o Cryptographic handshake is now on stream 0 (#456)
o Remove congestion control exemption for cryptographic handshake
(#248, #476)
o Version 1 of QUIC uses TLS; a new version is needed to use a
different handshake protocol (#516)
o STREAM frames have a reduced number of offset lengths (#543, #430)
o Split some frames into separate connection- and stream- level
frames (#443)
* WINDOW_UPDATE split into MAX_DATA and MAX_STREAM_DATA (#450)
* BLOCKED split to match WINDOW_UPDATE split (#454)
* Define STREAM_ID_NEEDED frame (#455)
o A NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame supports connection migration without
linkability (#232, #491, #496)
o Transport parameters for 0-RTT are retained from a previous
connection (#405, #513, #512)
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* A client in 0-RTT no longer required to reset excess streams
(#425, #479)
o Expanded security considerations (#440, #444, #445, #448)
B.18. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-01
o Defined short and long packet headers (#40, #148, #361)
o Defined a versioning scheme and stable fields (#51, #361)
o Define reserved version values for "greasing" negotiation (#112,
#278)
o The initial packet number is randomized (#35, #283)
o Narrow the packet number encoding range requirement (#67, #286,
#299, #323, #356)
o Defined client address validation (#52, #118, #120, #275)
o Define transport parameters as a TLS extension (#49, #122)
o SCUP and COPT parameters are no longer valid (#116, #117)
o Transport parameters for 0-RTT are either remembered from before,
or assume default values (#126)
o The server chooses connection IDs in its final flight (#119, #349,
#361)
o The server echoes the Connection ID and packet number fields when
sending a Version Negotiation packet (#133, #295, #244)
o Defined a minimum packet size for the initial handshake packet
from the client (#69, #136, #139, #164)
o Path MTU Discovery (#64, #106)
o The initial handshake packet from the client needs to fit in a
single packet (#338)
o Forbid acknowledgment of packets containing only ACK and PADDING
(#291)
o Require that frames are processed when packets are acknowledged
(#381, #341)
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o Removed the STOP_WAITING frame (#66)
o Don't require retransmission of old timestamps for lost ACK frames
(#308)
o Clarified that frames are not retransmitted, but the information
in them can be (#157, #298)
o Error handling definitions (#335)
o Split error codes into four sections (#74)
o Forbid the use of Public Reset where CONNECTION_CLOSE is possible
(#289)
o Define packet protection rules (#336)
o Require that stream be entirely delivered or reset, including
acknowledgment of all STREAM frames or the RESET_STREAM, before it
closes (#381)
o Remove stream reservation from state machine (#174, #280)
o Only stream 1 does not contribute to connection-level flow control
(#204)
o Stream 1 counts towards the maximum concurrent stream limit (#201,
#282)
o Remove connection-level flow control exclusion for some streams
(except 1) (#246)
o RESET_STREAM affects connection-level flow control (#162, #163)
o Flow control accounting uses the maximum data offset on each
stream, rather than bytes received (#378)
o Moved length-determining fields to the start of STREAM and ACK
(#168, #277)
o Added the ability to pad between frames (#158, #276)
o Remove error code and reason phrase from GOAWAY (#352, #355)
o GOAWAY includes a final stream number for both directions (#347)
o Error codes for RESET_STREAM and CONNECTION_CLOSE are now at a
consistent offset (#249)
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o Defined priority as the responsibility of the application protocol
(#104, #303)
B.19. Since draft-ietf-quic-transport-00
o Replaced DIVERSIFICATION_NONCE flag with KEY_PHASE flag
o Defined versioning
o Reworked description of packet and frame layout
o Error code space is divided into regions for each component
o Use big endian for all numeric values
B.20. Since draft-hamilton-quic-transport-protocol-01
o Adopted as base for draft-ietf-quic-tls
o Updated authors/editors list
o Added IANA Considerations section
o Moved Contributors and Acknowledgments to appendices
Acknowledgments
Special thanks are due to the following for helping shape pre-IETF
QUIC and its deployment: Chris Bentzel, Misha Efimov, Roberto Peon,
Alistair Riddoch, Siddharth Vijayakrishnan, and Assar Westerlund.
This document has benefited immensely from various private
discussions and public ones on the quic@ietf.org and proto-
quic@chromium.org mailing lists. Our thanks to all.
Contributors
The original authors of this specification were Ryan Hamilton, Jana
Iyengar, Ian Swett, and Alyssa Wilk.
The original design and rationale behind this protocol draw
significantly from work by Jim Roskind [EARLY-DESIGN]. In
alphabetical order, the contributors to the pre-IETF QUIC project at
Google are: Britt Cyr, Jeremy Dorfman, Ryan Hamilton, Jana Iyengar,
Fedor Kouranov, Charles Krasic, Jo Kulik, Adam Langley, Jim Roskind,
Robbie Shade, Satyam Shekhar, Cherie Shi, Ian Swett, Raman Tenneti,
Victor Vasiliev, Antonio Vicente, Patrik Westin, Alyssa Wilk, Dale
Worley, Fan Yang, Dan Zhang, Daniel Ziegler.
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Authors' Addresses
Jana Iyengar (editor)
Fastly
Email: jri.ietf@gmail.com
Martin Thomson (editor)
Mozilla
Email: mt@lowentropy.net
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