Network Working Group                                         B. Sterman
Internet-Draft                                           Kayote Networks
Expires: April 17, 2006                                    D. Sadolevsky
                                                          SecureOL, Inc.
                                                             D. Schwartz
                                                         Kayote Networks
                                                             D. Williams
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                                 W. Beck
                                                     Deutsche Telekom AG
                                                        October 14, 2005


               RADIUS Extension for Digest Authentication
                  draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-06.txt

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document defines an extension to the RADIUS protocol to enable



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   support of Digest Authentication, for use with HTTP-style protocols
   like SIP and HTTP.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.3.1.  Scenario 1, RADIUS client chooses nonces . . . . . . .  6
       1.3.2.  Scenario 2, RADIUS server chooses nonces . . . . . . .  7
   2.  Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   3.  Detailed Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.  RADIUS Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2.  RADIUS Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4.  New RADIUS attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.1.  Digest-Response attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.2.  Digest-Realm attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.3.  Digest-Nonce attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.4.  Digest-Response-Auth attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.5.  Digest-Nextnonce attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.6.  Digest-Method attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.7.  Digest-URI attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.8.  Digest-Qop attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.9.  Digest-Algorithm attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.10. Digest-Entity-Body-Hash attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     4.11. Digest-CNonce attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     4.12. Digest-Nonce-Count attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.13. Digest-Username attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.14. Digest-Opaque attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.15. Digest-Auth-Param attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     4.16. Digest-AKA-Auts attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     4.17. Digest-Domain attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     4.18. Digest-Stale attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     4.19. Digest-HA1 attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     4.20. SIP-AOR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   5.  Diameter Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   6.  Table of Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   7.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   10. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   Appendix A.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     A.1.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-05  . . . . . . 31



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     A.2.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-04  . . . . . . 31
     A.3.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-03  . . . . . . 31
     A.4.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-02  . . . . . . 31
     A.5.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-01  . . . . . . 31
     A.6.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-00  . . . . . . 32
     A.7.  Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-04  . . . . . . . . . . 32
     A.8.  Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-03  . . . . . . . . . . 32
     A.9.  Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-02  . . . . . . . . . . 32
     A.10. Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-01  . . . . . . . . . . 33
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 35








































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1.  Introduction

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   The use of normative requirement key words in this document shall
   apply only to RADIUS Client and RADIUS Server implementations that
   include the features described in this document.  This document
   creates no normative requirements for existing implementations.

   HTTP-style protocol
         The term 'HTTP-style' denotes any protocol that uses HTTP-like
         headers and uses HTTP digest authentication as described in
         [RFC2617].  Examples are HTTP and SIP.
   NAS
         Network Access Server, the RADIUS client.
   nonce
         An unpredictable value used to prevent replay attacks.  The
         nonce generator may use cryptographic mechanisms to produce
         nonces it can recognize without maintaining state.
   protection space
         The combination of realm and digest URI, the use of which is
         authorized by the RADIUS server.
   SIP UA
         SIP User Agent, an Internet endpoint that uses the Session
         Initiation Protocol.
   SIP UAS
         SIP User Agent Server, a logical entity that generates a
         response to a SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) request.

1.2.  Motivation

   The HTTP Digest Authentication mechanism, defined in [RFC2617], was
   subsequently adapted to use with SIP in [RFC2543] (obsoleted by
   [RFC3261]).  Due to the limitations and weaknesses of Digest
   Authentication (see [RFC2617], section 4), additional authentication
   and encryption mechanisms are defined in SIP [RFC3261], including TLS
   [RFC2246] and S/MIME [RFC2633].  However, Digest Authentication has
   been widely implemented within SIP clients and to support those
   clients there is a need for support of Digest Authentication within
   AAA protocols such as RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC3588].

   This document defines an extension to the RADIUS protocol to enable
   support of Digest Authentication, for use with SIP, HTTP, and other
   HTTP-style protocols using this authentication method.  Support for



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   Digest mechanisms such as AKA [RFC3310] is also supported.  A
   companion document [I-D.ietf-aaa-diameter-sip-app] defines support
   for Digest Authentication within Diameter.

1.3.  Overview

   HTTP digest is a challenge-response protocol used to authenticate a
   client's request to access some resource on a server.  Figure 1 shows
   a single HTTP digest transaction.





                        HTTP/SIP..
         +------------+  (1)     +------------+
         |            |--------->|            |
         | HTTP-style |  (2)     | HTTP-style |
         | Client     |<---------| server     |
         |            |  (3)     |            |
         |            |--------->|            |
         |            |  (4)     |            |
         |            |<---------|            |
         +------------+          +------------+




   Figure 1: digest operation without RADIUS

   If the client sends a request without any credentials (1), the server
   will reply with an error response (2) containing a nonce.  The client
   creates a cryptographic digest from parts of the request, from the
   nonce it received from the server, and a shared secret.  The client
   re-transmits the request (3) to the server, but now includes the
   digest within the packet.  The server does the same digest
   calculation as the client and compares the result with the digest it
   received in (3).  If the digest values are identical, the server
   grants access to the resource and sends a positive response to the
   client (4).  If the digest values differ, the server sends a negative
   response to the client (4).

   Instead of maintaining a local user database, the server could use
   RADIUS to access a centralized user database.  However, RADIUS
   [RFC2865] does not include support for HTTP digest authentication.
   The RADIUS client can not use the User-Password attribute, since it
   does not receive a password from the HTTP-style client.  The CHAP-
   Challenge and CHAP-Password attributes are also not suitable since



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   the CHAP algorithm is not compatible with HTTP digest.

   This document defines new attributes that enable the RADIUS server to
   perform the digest calculation defined in [RFC2617], providing
   support for Digest Authentication as a native authentication
   mechanism within RADIUS.

   This document defines new attributes that enable the RADIUS server to
   perform the digest calculation defined in [RFC2617].

   The nonces required by the digest algorithm are either generated by
   the RADIUS client or by the RADIUS server.  A mix of nonce generation
   modes is not supported.  This specification assumes that both the
   RADIUS client and server are appropriately configured to generate the
   nonces in either the RADIUS client or the RADIUS server, but not in
   both at the same time.  Implementations, though, do not have the
   means to verify this behavior.

1.3.1.  Scenario 1, RADIUS client chooses nonces





                        HTTP/SIP           RADIUS

               +-----+    (1)    +-----+           +-----+
               |     |==========>|     |           |     |
               |     |    (2)    |     |           |     |
               |     |<==========|     |           |     |
               |     |    (3)    |     |           |     |
               |     |==========>|     |           |     |
               |  A  |           |  B  |    (4)    |  C  |
               |     |           |     |---------->|     |
               |     |           |     |    (5)    |     |
               |     |           |     |<----------|     |
               |     |    (6)    |     |           |     |
               |     |<==========|     |           |     |
               +-----+           +-----+           +-----+

               ====> HTTP/SIP
               ----> RADIUS



   Figure 2: RADIUS client chooses nonces

   The roles played by the entities in this scenario are as follows:



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   A: HTTP client / SIP UA

   B: {HTTP server / HTTP proxy server / SIP proxy server / SIP UAS}
   acting also as a RADIUS NAS (RADIUS client)

   C: RADIUS server

   The relevant order of messages sent in this scenario is as follows:

   A sends B an HTTP/SIP request without authorization header (step 1).
   B challenges A sending an HTTP/SIP "407 / 401 (Proxy) Authorization
   required" response containing a locally generated nonce (step 2).  A
   sends B an HTTP/SIP request with authorization header (step 3).  B
   sends C a RADIUS Access-Request with attributes described in this
   document (step 4).  C responds to B with a RADIUS Access-Accept/
   Access-Reject response (step 5).  If credentials were accepted, B
   receives an Access-Accept response and the message sent from A is
   considered authentic.  If B receives an Access-Reject response,
   however, B then responds to A with a "407 / 401 (Proxy) Authorization
   required" response (step 6).

1.3.2.  Scenario 2, RADIUS server chooses nonces

   While the usage scenario described in Section 1.3.1 minimizes the
   load on the RADIUS server, alternatives are required in some
   situations.  When using AKA [RFC3310] the nonce is partially derived
   from a precomputed authentication vector, which is often stored
   centrally.

   Figure 3 depicts a scenario in which the RADIUS server chooses
   nonces.  In this case entities A and B communicate using HTTP or SIP,
   while entities B and C communicate using RADIUS."



















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                        HTTP/SIP           RADIUS

               +-----+    (1)    +-----+           +-----+
               |     |==========>|     |    (2)    |     |
               |     |           |     |---------->|     |
               |     |           |     |    (3)    |     |
               |     |    (4)    |     |<----------|     |
               |     |<==========|     |           |     |
               |     |    (5)    |     |           |     |
               |     |==========>|     |           |     |
               |  A  |           |  B  |    (6)    |  C  |
               |     |           |     |---------->|     |
               |     |           |     |    (7)    |     |
               |     |           |     |<----------|     |
               |     |    (8)    |     |           |     |
               |     |<==========|     |           |     |
               +-----+           +-----+           +-----+

               ====> HTTP/SIP
               ----> RADIUS



   Figure 3: RADIUS server chooses nonces

   The roles played by the entities in this scenario are as follows:

   A: HTTP client / SIP UA

   B: {HTTP server / HTTP proxy server / SIP proxy server / SIP UAS}
   acting also as a RADIUS NAS

   C: RADIUS server

   The following messages are sent in this scenario:

   A sends B an HTTP/SIP request without an authorization header (step
   1).  B sends an Access-Request packet with the newly defined Digest-
   Method and Digest-URI attributes but without a Digest-Nonce attribute
   to the RADIUS server, C (step 2).  C chooses a nonce and responds
   with an Access-Challenge (step 3).  This Access-Challenge contains
   Digest attributes, from which B takes values to construct an HTTP/SIP
   "(Proxy) Authorization required" response.  The remaining steps are
   identical with scenario 1 (Section 1.3.1): B sends this response to A
   (step 4).  A resends its request with its credentials (step 5).  B
   sends an Access-Request to C (step 6).  C checks the credentials and
   replies with Access-Accept or Access-Reject (step 7).  Dependent on
   the C's result, B processes A's request or rejects it with a "(Proxy)



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   Authorization required" response (step 8).


2.  Interoperability

   An implementation supporting this extension MUST include a Digest-
   Response attribute within an Access-Request packet where Digest
   Authentication is desired.  An Access-Request MUST NOT contain both a
   Digest-Response attribute and another authentication attribute, such
   as User-Password, CHAP-Password, or EAP-Message.

   RADIUS clients and servers MUST support both nonce generation modes.
   As there is no automatic capability exchange, the operator MUST make
   sure that the RADIUS client software uses the correct nonce
   generation mode when accessing a specific RADIUS server:
   o  If the RADIUS server generates nonces, its RADIUS clients MUST NOT
      try to generate nonces.
   o  If the RADIUS server does not generate nonces, its RADIUS clients
      MUST generate nonces locally.
   o  If at least one HTTP-style client requires AKA authentication
      [RFC3310], the RADIUS server MUST generate nonces and its RADIUS
      clients MUST NOT generate nonces locally.
   RADIUS implementations MUST offer respective configuration options.


3.  Detailed Description

3.1.  RADIUS Client Behavior

   The attributes described in this document are sent in cleartext.
   Therefore were a RADIUS client to accept secured connections (https
   or sips) from HTTP-style clients, this could result in information
   intentionally protected by HTTP-style clients being sent in the clear
   during the RADIUS exchange.

   On reception of an HTTP-style request message, the RADIUS client
   checks whether it is authorized to authenticate the request.  Where
   an HTTP-style request traverses several proxies and each of the
   proxies requests to authenticate the HTTP-style client, the request
   at the HTTP-style server may contain multiple credential sets.

   The RADIUS client can use the 'realm' directive in HTTP to determine
   which credentials are applicable.  Where none of the realms are of
   interest, the RADIUS client MUST behave as though no relevant
   credentials were sent.  In all situations the RADIUS client MUST send
   zero or exactly one credential to the RADIUS server.  The RADIUS
   client MUST choose the credential of the (Proxy-)Authorization header
   if the realm directive matches its locally configured realm.



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   If such a (Proxy-)Authorization header is present and contains HTTP
   digest information, the RADIUS client checks the 'nonce' parameter.
   If the RADIUS client generates nonces but did not issue the received
   nonce, it responds with a 401 (Unauthorized) or 407 (Proxy
   Authentication Required) to the HTTP-style client.  In this error
   response, the RADIUS client sends a new nonce.

   If the RADIUS client recognizes the nonce or does not generate
   nonces, it takes the header directives and puts them into a RADIUS
   Access-Request packet.  It puts the 'response' directive into a
   Digest-Response attribute and the realm / nonce / digest-uri / qop /
   algorithm / cnonce / nc / username / opaque directives into the
   respective Digest-Realm / Digest-Nonce / Digest-URI / Digest-Qop /
   Digest-Algorithm / Digest-CNonce / Digest-Nonce-Count / Digest-
   Username / Digest-Opaque attributes.  The request method is put into
   the Digest-Method attribute.  The RADIUS client adds a Message-
   Authenticator attribute, defined in [RFC3579] and sends the Access-
   Request packet to the RADIUS server.

   The RADIUS server processes the packet and responds with an Access-
   Accept or an Access-Reject.

   The RADIUS client constructs an Authentication-Info header:
   o  If the Access-Accept packet contains a Digest-Response-Auth
      attribute, the RADIUS client checks the Digest-Qop attribute:
      *  If the Digest-Qop attribute's value is 'auth' or not specified,
         the RADIUS client puts the Digest-Response-Auth attribute's
         content into the Authentication-Info header's 'rspauth'
         directive of the HTTP-style response.
      *  If the Digest-Qop attribute's value is 'auth-int', the RADIUS
         client ignores the Access-Accept packet and behaves like it had
         received an Access-Reject packet (Digest-Response-Auth can't be
         correct as the RADIUS server does not know the contents of the
         HTTP-style response's body).
   o  If the Access-Accept packet contains a Digest-HA1 attribute, the
      RADIUS client checks the 'qop' and 'algorithm' directives in the
      Authorization header of the HTTP-style request it wants to
      authorize:
      *  If the 'qop' directive is missing or its value is 'auth', the
         RADIUS client ignores the Digest-HA1 attribute.  It does not
         include an Authentication-Info header into its HTTP-style
         response.
      *  If the 'qop' directive's value is 'auth-int' and at least one
         of the following conditions is true, the RADIUS client
         calculates the contents of the HTTP-style response's 'rspauth'
         directive:





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         +  The algorithm directive's value is 'MD5-sess' or 'AKAv1-MD5-
            sess'.
         +  The packets between RADIUS client and RADIUS server are
            protected with IPsec (see Section 9).
         It creates the HTTP-style response message and calculates the
         hash of this message's body.  It uses the result and the
         Digest-URI attribute's value of the corresponding Access-
         Request packet to perform the H(A2) calculation.  It takes the
         Digest-Nonce, Digest-Nonce-Count, Digest-CNonce and Digest-Qop
         values of the corresponding Access-Request and the Digest-HA1
         attribute's value to finish the computation of the 'rspauth'
         value.
   o  If the Access-Accept packet contains neither a Digest-Response-
      Auth nor a Digest-HA1 attribute, the RADIUS client will not create
      an Authentication-Info header for its HTTP-style response.

   The RADIUS server MAY have added a Digest-Nextnonce attribute into an
   Access-Accept packet.  If the RADIUS client discovers this, it puts
   the contents of this attribute into a 'nextnonce' directive.  Now it
   can send an HTTP-style response.

   If the RADIUS client did receive an HTTP-style request without a
   (Proxy-)Authorization header matching its locally configured realm
   value, it obtains a new nonce and sends an error response (401 or
   407) containing a (Proxy-)Authenticate header.

   If the RADIUS client receives an Access-Reject from the RADIUS
   server, it sends an error response to the HTTP-style request it has
   received.  If the RADIUS client does not receive a response, it
   retransmits or fails over to another RADIUS server as described in
   [RFC2865].

   The RADIUS client has three ways to obtain nonces: it generates them
   locally, it has received one in a Digest-Nextnonce attribute of a
   previously received Access-Accept packet, or it asks the RADIUS
   server for one.  To do the latter, it sends an Access-Request
   containing a Digest-Method and a Digest-URI attribute but without a
   Digest-Nonce attribute.  It adds a Message-Authenticator (see
   [RFC3579]) attribute to the Access-Request packet.  The RADIUS server
   chooses a nonce and responds with an Access-Challenge containing a
   Digest-Nonce attribute.

   The RADIUS server can send Digest-Qop, Digest-Algorithm, Digest-
   Realm, Digest-Domain and Digest-Opaque attributes in the Access-
   Challenge carrying the nonce.  If these attributes are present, the
   client MUST use them.

   If the RADIUS client receives an Access-Challenge packet in response



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   to an Access-Request containing a Digest-Nonce attribute, the RADIUS
   server did not accept the nonce.  If a Digest-Stale attribute is
   present in the Access-Challenge and has a value of 'true' (without
   quotes), the RADIUS client sends an error (401 or 407) response
   containing WWW-/Proxy-Authenticate header with the directive 'stale'
   and the digest directives derived from the Digest-* attributes.

3.2.  RADIUS Server Behavior

   If the RADIUS server receives an Access-Request packet with a Digest-
   Method and a Digest-URI attribute but without a Digest-Nonce
   attribute, it chooses a nonce.  It puts the nonce into a Digest-Nonce
   attribute and sends it in an Access-Challenge packet to the RADIUS
   client.  The RADIUS server MUST add Digest-Realm, Message-
   Authenticator (see [RFC3579]), SHOULD add Digest-Algorithm, one or
   more Digest-Qop and MAY add Digest-Domain, Digest-Opaque attributes
   to the Access-Challenge packet.  If the server cannot choose a nonce,
   it replies with an Access-Reject packet.

   If the RADIUS server receives an Access-Request packet containing a
   Digest-Response attribute, it looks for the following attributes:
   Digest-Realm, Digest-Nonce, Digest-Method, Digest-URI, Digest-Qop,
   Digest-Algorithm, Digest-Username.  Depending on the content of
   Digest-Algorithm and Digest-Qop, it looks for Digest-Entity-Body-
   Hash, Digest-CNonce and Digest-AKA-Auts, too.  See [RFC2617] and
   [RFC3310] for details.  If the Digest-Algorithm attribute is missing,
   'MD5' is assumed.  If the RADIUS server has issued a Digest-Opaque
   attribute along with the nonce, the Access-Request MUST have a
   matching Digest-Opaque attribute.

   If mandatory attributes are missing, it MUST respond with an Access-
   Reject packet.  If the attributes are present, the RADIUS server
   calculates the digest response as described in [RFC2617].  To look up
   the password, the RADIUS server uses the RADIUS User-Name attribute.
   The RADIUS server MUST check if the user identified by the User-Name
   attribute
   o  is authorized to access the protection space defined by the
      Digest-URI and Digest-Realm attributes,
   o  is authorized to use the URI included in the SIP-AOR attribute, if
      this attribute is present.
   If any of those checks fails, the RADIUS server MUST send an Access-
   Reject.

   Correlation between User-Name and SIP-AOR AVP values is required just
   to avoid that any user can register or misuse a SIP-AOR allocated to
   another user.

   A RADIUS server MUST check if the RADIUS client is authorized to



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   serve users of the realm mentioned in the Digest-Realm attribute.  If
   the RADIUS client is not authorized, the RADIUS server MUST send an
   Access-Reject.  The RADIUS server SHOULD log the event so as to
   notify the operator, and MAY take additional action such as sending
   an Access-Reject in response to all future requests from this client,
   until this behavior is reset by management action.

   All values required for the digest calculation are taken from the
   Digest attributes described in this document.  If the calculated
   digest response equals the value received in the Digest-Response
   attribute, the authentication was successful.  If not, the RADIUS
   server responds with an Access-Reject.

   If the authentication was successful, the RADIUS server adds an
   attribute to the Access-Accept packet which can be used by the RADIUS
   client to construct an Authentication-Info header:
   o  If the Digest-Qop attribute's value is 'auth' or unspecified, the
      RADIUS server SHOULD put a Digest-Response-Auth attribute into the
      Access-Accept packet
   o  If the Digest-Qop attribute's value is 'auth-int' and at least one
      of the following conditions is true, the RADIUS server SHOULD put
      a Digest-HA1 attribute into the Access-Accept packet:
      *  The Digest-Algorithm attribute's value is 'MD5-sess' or 'AKAv1-
         MD5-sess'.
      *  The packets between RADIUS client and RADIUS server are
         protected with IPsec (see Section 9).
   In all other cases, Digest-Response-Auth or Digest-HA1 MUST NOT be
   sent.

   RADIUS servers issuing nonces MAY construct a Digest-Nextnonce
   attribute and add it to the Access-Accept packet.  This is useful to
   limit the lifetime of a nonce and to save a round-trip in future
   requests (see nextnonce discussion in [RFC2617], section 3.2.3).  The
   RADIUS server adds a Message-Authenticator attribute (see [RFC3579])
   and sends the Access-Accept packet to the RADIUS client.

   If the RADIUS server does not accept the nonce received in an Access-
   Request packet but authentication was successful, the RADIUS server
   MUST send an Access-Challenge packet containing a Digest-Stale
   attribute set to 'true' (without quotes).  The RADIUS server MUST add
   Message-Authenticator (see [RFC3579]), Digest-Nonce, Digest-Realm,
   SHOULD add Digest-Algorithm, one or more Digest-Qop and MAY add
   Digest-Domain, Digest-Opaque attributes to the Access-Challenge
   packet.


4.  New RADIUS attributes




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   If not stated otherwise, the attributes have the following format:




   0                   1                   2
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |  Length       | Text ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



4.1.  Digest-Response attribute

   Description
         If this attribute is present in an Access-Request message, a
         RADIUS server implementing this specification MUST treat the
         Access-Request as a request for Digest Authentication.  When a
         RADIUS client receives a (Proxy-)Authorization header, it puts
         the request-digest value into a Digest-Response attribute.
         This attribute (which enables the user to prove possession of
         the password) MUST only be used in Access-Requests.
   Type
         [IANA: use 102 if possible] for Digest-Response.
   Length
         >= 3
   Text
         When using HTTP digest, the text field is 32 octets long and
         contains a hexadecimal representation of 16 octet digest value
         as it was calculated by the authenticated client.  Other digest
         algorithms MAY define different digest lengths.  The text field
         MUST be copied from request-digest of digest-response
         ([RFC2617]) without quotes.

4.2.  Digest-Realm attribute

   Description
         This attribute describes a protection space of the RADIUS
         server.  See [RFC2617] 1.2 for details.  It MUST only be used
         in Access-Request and Access-Challenge packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 103 if possible] for Digest-Realm
   Length







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         >=3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         realm directive (realm-value according to [RFC2617]) without
         quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate.
         In Access-Challenge packets, the RADIUS server puts the
         expected realm value into this attribute.

4.3.  Digest-Nonce attribute

   Description
         This attribute holds a nonce to be used in the HTTP Digest
         calculation.  If the Access-Request had a Digest-Method and a
         Digest-URI but no Digest-Nonce attribute and the RADIUS server
         is configured to choose nonces, it MUST put a Digest-Nonce
         attribute into its Access-Challenge packet.  This attribute
         MUST only be used in Access-Request and Access-Challenge
         packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 104 if possible] for Digest-Nonce
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         nonce directive (nonce-value in [RFC2617]) without quotes from
         the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate.  In Access-
         Challenge packets, the attribute contains the nonce selected by
         the RADIUS server.

4.4.  Digest-Response-Auth attribute

   Description
         This attribute enables the RADIUS server to prove possession of
         the password.  If the previously received Digest-Qop attribute
         was 'auth-int' (without quotes), the RADIUS server MUST send a
         Digest-HA1 attribute instead of a Digest-Response-Auth
         attribute.  The Digest-Response-Auth attribute MUST only be
         used in Access-Accept packets.  The RADIUS client puts the
         attribute value without quotes into the rspauth directive of
         the Authentication-Info header.
   Type
         [IANA: use 105 if possible] for Digest-Response-Auth.
   Length
         >= 3







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   Text
         The RADIUS server calculates a digest according to section
         3.2.3 of [RFC2617] and copies the result into this attribute.
         Other digest algorithms than the one defined in [RFC2617] MAY
         define digest lengths other than 32.

4.5.  Digest-Nextnonce attribute

   This attribute holds a nonce to be used in the HTTP Digest
   calculation.

   Description
         If the RADIUS server is configured to choose nonces it MAY put
         a Digest-Nextnonce attribute into an Access-Accept packet.  If
         this attribute is present, the RADIUS client MUST put the
         contents of this attribute into the nextnonce directive of an
         Authentication-Info header in its HTTP-style response.  This
         attribute MUST only be used in Access-Accept packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 106 if possible] for Digest-Nextnonce
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         It is recommended that this text be base64 or hexadecimal data.

4.6.  Digest-Method attribute

   Description
         This attribute holds the method value to be used in the HTTP
         Digest calculation.  This attribute MUST only be used in
         Access-Request packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 107 if possible] for Digest-Method
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         request method from the HTTP-style request it wants to
         authenticate.

4.7.  Digest-URI attribute

   Description
         This attribute is used to transport the contents of the digest-
         uri directive or the URI of the HTTP-style request.  It MUST
         only be used in Access-Request packets.





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   Type
         [IANA: use 108 if possible] for Digest-URI
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         If the HTTP-style request has an Authorization header, the
         RADIUS client puts the value of the "uri" directive in the
         (known as "digest-uri-value" in section 3.2.2 of [RFC2617])
         without quotes into this attribute.  If there is no
         Authorization header, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         request URI from the HTTP-style request it wants to
         authenticate.

4.8.  Digest-Qop attribute

   Description
         This attribute holds the Quality of Protection parameter that
         influences the HTTP Digest calculation.  This attribute MUST
         only be used in Access-Request and Access-Challenge packets.  A
         RADIUS client SHOULD insert one of the Digest-Qop attributes it
         has received in a previous Access-Challenge packet.  RADIUS
         servers SHOULD insert at least one Digest-Qop attribute in an
         Access-Challenge packet.  Digest-Qop is optional in order to
         preserve backward compatibility with a minimal implementation
         of [RFC2069].
   Type
         [IANA: use 109 if possible] for Digest-Qop
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         qop directive (qop-value as described in [RFC2617]) without the
         quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate.
         In Access-Challenge packets, the RADIUS server puts a desired
         qop-value into this attribute.  If the RADIUS server supports
         more than one "quality of protection" value, it puts each qop-
         value into a separate Digest-Qop attribute.

4.9.  Digest-Algorithm attribute

   Type
         This attribute holds the algorithm parameter that influences
         the HTTP Digest calculation.  It MUST only be used in Access-
         Request and Access-Challenge packets.  If this attribute is
         missing, "MD5" is assumed.






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   Type
         [IANA: use 110 if possible] for Digest-Algorithm
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         algorithm directive (as described in [RFC2617], section 3.2.1)
         without the quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to
         authenticate.  In Access-Challenge packets, the RADIUS server
         SHOULD put the desired algorithm into this attribute.

4.10.  Digest-Entity-Body-Hash attribute

   Description
         When using the qop level 'auth-int', a hash of the HTTP-style
         message body's contents is required for digest calculation.
         Instead of sending the complete body of the message, only its
         hash value is sent.  This hash value can be used directly in
         the digest calculation.
         The clarifications described in section 22.4 of [RFC2617] about
         the hash of empty entity bodies apply to the Digest-Entity-
         Body-Hash attribute.  This attribute MUST only be sent in
         Access-Request packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 111 if possible] for Digest-Entity-Body-Hash
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         The attribute holds the hexadecimal representation of H(entity-
         body).  This hash is required by certain authentication
         mechanisms, such as HTTP Digest with quality of protection set
         to "auth-int".  RADIUS clients MUST use this attribute to
         transport the hash of the entity body when HTTP Digest is the
         authentication mechanism and the RADIUS server requires to
         verify the integrity of the entity body (e.g., qop parameter
         set to "auth-int").  Extensions to this document may define
         support for authentication mechanisms other than HTTP Digest.

4.11.  Digest-CNonce attribute

   Description
         This attribute holds the client nonce parameter that is used in
         the HTTP Digest calculation.  It MUST only be used in Access-
         Request packets.







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   Type
         [IANA: use 112 if possible] for Digest-CNonce
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         This attribute includes the value of the cnonce-value [RFC2617]
         without quotes, taken from the HTTP-style request.

4.12.  Digest-Nonce-Count attribute

   Description
         This attribute includes the nonce count parameter that is used
         to detect replay attacks.  The attribute MUST only be used in
         Access-Request packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 113 if possible] for Digest-Nonce-Count
   Length
         10
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the nc
         directive (nc-value according to [RFC2617]) without quotes from
         the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate.

4.13.  Digest-Username attribute

   Description
         This attribute holds the user name used in the HTTP digest
         calculation.  The RADIUS server MUST use this attribute only
         for the purposes of calculating the digest.  In order to
         determine the appropriate user credentials, the RADIUS server
         MUST use the User-Name (1) attribute, and MUST NOT use the
         Digest-Username attribute.  This attribute MUST only be used in
         Access-Request packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 114 if possible] for Digest-Username
   Length
         >= 3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         username directive (username-value according to [RFC2617])
         without quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to
         authenticate.

4.14.  Digest-Opaque attribute







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   Description
         This attribute holds the opaque parameter that is passed to the
         HTTP-style client.  The HTTP-style client will pass this value
         back to the server (i.e. the RADIUS client) without
         modification.  This attribute is only used when the RADIUS
         server chooses nonces and MUST only be used in Access-Request
         and Access-Challenge packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 115 if possible] for Digest-Opaque
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         opaque directive (opaque-value according to [RFC2617]) without
         quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate and
         puts it into this attribute.  In Access-Challenge packets, the
         RADIUS server MAY include this attribute.

4.15.  Digest-Auth-Param attribute

   Description
         This attribute is a placeholder for future extensions and
         corresponds to the "auth-param" parameter defined in section
         3.2.1 of [RFC2617].  The Digest-Auth-Param is the mechanism
         whereby the RADIUS client and RADIUS server can exchange auth-
         param extension parameters contained within Digest headers that
         are not understood by the RADIUS client and for which there are
         no corresponding stand-alone attributes.
         Unlike the previously listed Digest-* attributes, the Digest-
         Auth-Param contains not only the value, but also the parameter
         name, since the parameter name is unknown to the RADIUS client.
         If the Digest header contains several unknown parameters, then
         the RADIUS implementation MUST repeat this attribute and each
         instance MUST contain one different unknown Digest parameter/
         value combination.  This attribute MUST ONLY be used in Access-
         Request, Access-Challenge, or Access-Accept packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 116 if possible] for Digest-Auth-Param
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         The text consists of the whole parameter, including its name
         and the equal ('=') sign and quotes.

4.16.  Digest-AKA-Auts attribute






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   Description
         This attribute holds the auts parameter that is used in the
         Digest AKA ([RFC3310]) calculation.  It is only used if the
         algorithm of the digest-response denotes a version of AKA
         digest [RFC3310].  This attribute MUST only be used in Access-
         Request packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 117 if possible] for Digest-AKA-Auts
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
         auts directive (auts-param according to section 3.4 of
         [RFC3310]) without quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants
         to authenticate.

4.17.  Digest-Domain attribute

   Description
         When a RADIUS client has asked for a nonce, the RADIUS server
         MAY send one or more Digest-Domain attributes in its Access-
         Challenge packet.  The RADIUS client puts them into the quoted,
         space-separated list of URIs of the 'domain' directive of a
         WWW-Authenticate header.  The URIs in the list define the
         protection space (see [RFC2617], section 3.2.1).  RADIUS
         servers MAY send one or more attributes of this type in Access-
         Challenge packets.  This attribute MUST only be used in Access-
         Challenge packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 118 if possible] for Digest-Domain
   Length
         3
   Text
         This attribute consists of a single URI, that defines a
         protection space.

4.18.  Digest-Stale attribute

   Description
         This attribute is sent by a RADIUS server in order to notify
         the RADIUS client whether it has accepted a nonce.  If the
         nonce presented by the RADIUS client was stale, the value is
         'true' and is 'false' otherwise.  The RADIUS client puts the
         content of this attribute into a 'stale' directive of the WWW-
         Authenticate header in the HTTP-style response to the request
         it wants to authenticate.  The attribute MUST only be used in
         Access-Challenge packets and only if the RADIUS server chooses
         nonces.



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   Type
         [IANA: use 119 if possible] for Digest-Stale
   Length
         3
   Text
         The attribute has either the value 'true' or 'false' (both
         values without quotes).

4.19.  Digest-HA1 attribute

   Description
         This attribute is used to allow the generation of an
         Authentication-Info header, even if the HTTP-style response's
         body is required for the calculation of the rspauth value.  It
         SHOULD be used in Access-Accept packets if the required quality
         of protection ('qop') is 'auth-int'.
         This attribute MUST NOT be sent if the qop parameter was not
         specified or has a value of 'auth' (in this case, use Digest-
         Response-Auth instead).
         The Digest-HA1 attribute MUST only be sent by the RADIUS server
         or processed by the RADIUS client if at least one of the
         following conditions is true:
         +  The Digest-Algorithm attribute's value is 'MD5-sess' or
            'AKAv1-MD5-sess'.
         +  The packets between RADIUS client and RADIUS server are
            protected with IPsec (see Section 9).
         This attribute MUST only be used in Access-Accept packets.
   Type
         [IANA: use 120 if possible] for Digest-HA1
   Length
         >= 3
   Text
         This attribute contains the hexadecimal representation of H(A1)
         as described in [RFC2617], section 3.1.3, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.2.

4.20.  SIP-AOR

   Type
         This attribute is used for the authorization of SIP messages.
         The SIP-AOR attribute identifies the URI the use of which must
         be authenticated and authorized.  The RADIUS server uses this
         attribute to authorize the processing of the SIP request.  The
         SIP-AOR can be derived from, e.g., the To header field in a SIP
         REGISTER request (user under registration), or the From header
         field in other SIP requests.  However, the exact mapping of
         this attribute to SIP can change due to new developments in the
         protocol.  This attribute MUST only be used when the RADIUS
         client wants to authorize SIP users and MUST only be used in



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         Access-Request packets.
   Type
         [IANA:use 121 if possible] for SIP-AOR
   Length
         >=3
   Text
         The syntax of this attribute corresponds either to a SIP URI
         (with the format defined in [RFC3261] or a TEL URI (with the
         format defined in [RFC3966]).
         The SIP-AOR attribute holds the complete URI, including
         parameters and other parts.  It is up to the RADIUS server what
         components of the URI are regarded in the authorization
         decision.


5.  Diameter Compatibility

   This document defines support for Digest Authentication in RADIUS.  A
   companion document "Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
   Application" [I-D.ietf-aaa-diameter-sip-app] defines support for
   Digest Authentication in Diameter, and addresses compatibility issues
   between RADIUS and Diameter.


6.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
   in which kinds of packets, and in what quantity.























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     Req   Accept   Reject   Challenge   #     Attribute
     1     0        0        0           1     User-Name
     1     1        1        1           80    Message-Authenticator
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-Response
     0-1   0        0        1           TBD   Digest-Realm
     0-1   0        0        1           TBD   Digest-Nonce
     0     0-1      0        0           TBD   Digest-Response-Auth
                                               (see Note 1, 2)
     0     0-1      0        0           TBD   Digest-Nextnonce
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-Method
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-URI
     0-1   0        0        1+          TBD   Digest-Qop
     0-1   0        0        0-1         TBD   Digest-Algorithm (see
                                               Note 3)
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-Entity-Body-Hash
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-CNonce
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-Nonce-Count
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-Username
     0-1   0        0        0-1         TBD   Digest-Opaque
     0+    0+       0        0+          TBD   Digest-Auth-Param
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   Digest-AKA-Auts
     0     0        0        0+          TBD   Digest-Domain
     0     0        0        0-1         TBD   Digest-Stale
     0     0-1      0        0           TBD   Digest-HA1 (see Note 1,
                                               2)
     0-1   0        0        0           TBD   SIP-AOR

                                  Table 1





   [Note 1] Digest-HA1 MUST be used instead of Digest-Response-Auth if
      Digest-Qop is 'auth-int'.
   [Note 2] Digest-Response-Auth MUST be used instead of Digest-HA1 if
      Digest-Qop is 'auth'.
   [Note 3] If Digest-Algorithm is missing, 'MD5' is assumed


7.  Example

   This is an example sniffed from the traffic between a softphone (A),
   a Proxy Server (B) and example.com RADIUS server (C).  The
   communication between the Proxy Server and a SIP PSTN gateway is



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   omitted for brevity.  The SIP messages are not shown completely.



   A->B

      INVITE sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0
      From: <sip:12345678@example.com>
      To: <sip:97226491335@example.com>


   B->A

      SIP/2.0 100 Trying


   B->A

      SIP/2.0 407 Proxy Authentication Required
      Proxy-Authenticate: Digest realm="example.com"
           ,nonce="3bada1a0", algorithm="md5"
      Content-Length: 0


   A->B

      ACK sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0


   A->B

      INVITE sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0
      Proxy-Authorization: Digest algorithm="md5",nonce="3bada1a0"
           ,opaque="",realm="example.com"
           ,response="f3ce87e6984557cd0fecc26f3c5e97a4"
           ,uri="sip:97226491335@10.0.69.38",username="12345678"
      From: <sip:12345678@example.com>
      To: <sip:97226491335@example.com>


   B->C

      Code = 1 (Access-Request)
      Attributes:
      NAS-IP-Address = a 0 45 26 (10.0.69.38)
      NAS-Port-Type = 5 (Virtual)
      User-Name = "12345678"
      Digest-Response = "f3ce87e6984557cd0fecc26f3c5e97a4"



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      Digest-Realm = "example.com"
      Digest-Nonce = "3bada1a0"
      Digest-Method = "INVITE"
      Digest-URI = "sip:97226491335@example.com"
      Digest-Algorithm = "md5"
      Digest-Username =  "12345678"
      SIP-AOR =  "sip:12345678@example.com"


   C->B

      Code = 2 (Access-Accept)
      Attributes:
      Digest-Response-Auth =
                      "6303c41b0e2c3e524e413cafe8cce954"


   B->A

      SIP/2.0 180 Ringing


   B->A

      SIP/2.0 200 OK


   A->B

      ACK sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0



   A second example shows the traffic between a web browser (A), web
   server (B) and a RADIUS server (C).



   A->B

      GET /index.html HTTP/1.1


   B->A

      HTTP/1.1 407 Authentication Required
      WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="example.com",
          domain="/index.html",



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          nonce="a3086ac8", algorithm="md5"
      Content-Length: 0


   A->B

      GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
      Authorization: Digest algorithm="md5",nonce="a3086ac8"
           ,opaque="",realm="example.com"
           ,response="f052b68058b2987aba493857ae1ab002"
           ,uri="/index.html",username="12345678"


   B->C

      Code = 1 (Access-Request)
      Attributes:
      NAS-IP-Address = a 0 45 26 (10.0.69.38)
      NAS-Port-Type = 5 (Virtual)
      User-Name = "12345678"
      Digest-Response = "f052b68058b2987aba493857ae1ab002"
      Digest-Realm = "example.com"
      Digest-Nonce = "a3086ac8"
      Digest-Method = "GET"
      Digest-URI = "/index.html""
      Digest-Algorithm = "md5"
      Digest-Username =  "12345678"


   C->B

      Code = 2 (Access-Accept)
      Attributes:
      Digest-Response-Auth =
          "e644aa513effbfe1caff67103ff6433c"


   B->A

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK
      ...

      <html>
      ...







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8.  IANA Considerations

   This document serves as IANA registration request for a number of
   values from the RADIUS attribute type number space:

           +-------------------------+------------------------+
           | placeholder             | value assigned by IANA |
           +-------------------------+------------------------+
           | Digest-Response         | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Realm            | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Nonce            | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Nextnonce        | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Response-Auth    | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Method           | TBD                    |
           | Digest-URI              | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Qop              | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Algorithm        | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Entity-Body-Hash | TBD                    |
           | Digest-CNonce           | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Nonce-Count      | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Username         | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Opaque           | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Auth-Param       | TBD                    |
           | Digest-AKA-Auts         | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Domain           | TBD                    |
           | Digest-Stale            | TBD                    |
           | Digest-HA1              | TBD                    |
           | SIP-AOR                 | TBD                    |
           +-------------------------+------------------------+

                                  Table 2


9.  Security Considerations

   The RADIUS extensions described in this document enable RADIUS to
   transport the data that required to perform a digest calculation.  As
   a result, RADIUS inherits the vulnerabilities of HTTP Digest (see
   [RFC2617], section 4) in addition to RADIUS security vulnerabilities
   described in [RFC2865] Section 8 and [RFC3579] Section 4.

   An attacker compromising a RADIUS client or proxy can carry out man-
   in-the-middle attacks even if the paths between A, B and B, C
   (Figure 2) have been secured with TLS or IPsec.

   The RADIUS server MUST check the Digest-Realm attribute it has
   received from a client.  If the RADIUS client is not authorized to
   serve HTTP-style clients of that realm, it might be compromised.



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   RADIUS clients implementing the extension described in this document
   may authenticate HTTP-style requests received over the Internet.  As
   compared with use of RADIUS to authenticate link layer network
   access, an attacker may find it easier to cover their tracks in such
   a scenario.

   An attacker can attempt a denial of service attack on one or more
   RADIUS servers by sending a large number of HTTP-style requests.  To
   make simple denial of service attacks more difficult, the nonce
   issuer (RADIUS client or server) MUST check if it has generated the
   nonce received from an HTTP-style client.  This SHOULD be done
   statelessly.  For example, a nonce could consist of a
   cryptographically random part and some kind of signature provided by
   the RADIUS client, as described in [RFC2617], section 3.2.1.

   RADIUS servers SHOULD include Digest-Qop and Digest-Algorithm
   attributes in Access-Challenge messages.  A man in the middle can
   modify or remove those attributes in a bidding down attack, causing
   the RADIUS client to use a weaker authentication scheme than
   intended.

   The Message-Authenticator attribute, described in [RFC3579] section
   3.2 MUST be included in Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-
   Reject and Access-Accept messages that contain attributes described
   in this specification.

   The Digest-HA1 attribute contains no random components if the
   algorithm is 'MD5' or 'AKAv1-MD5'.  This makes offline dictionary
   attacks easier and enables replay attacks.

   HTTP-style clients can use TLS with server side certificates together
   with HTTP-Digest Authentication.  Instead of TLS, IPsec can be used,
   too.  TLS or IPsec secure the connection while Digest Authentication
   authenticates the user.  The RADIUS transaction can be regarded as
   one leg on the path between the HTTP-style client and the HTTP-style
   server.  To prevent RADIUS from representing the weak link, a RADIUS
   client receiving an HTTP-style request via TLS or IPsec could use an
   equally secure connection to the RADIUS server.  There are several
   ways to achieve this, for example:
   o  the RADIUS client may reject HTTP-style requests received over TLS
      or IPsec
   o  the RADIUS client require that traffic be sent and received over
      IPsec.
   RADIUS over IPsec, if used, MUST conform to the requirements
   described in [RFC3579] section 4.2.






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10.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to acknowledge Kevin Mcdermott (Cisco Systems) /or
   providing comments and experimental implementation.

   Many thanks to all reviewers, especially to Miguel Garcia, Jari
   Arkko, Avi Lior and Jun Wang.


11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC2865]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
              RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC3310]  Niemi, A., Arkko, J., and V. Torvinen, "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication
              and Key Agreement (AKA)", RFC 3310, September 2002.

   [RFC3579]  Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
              Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

   [RFC3966]  Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers",
              RFC 3966, December 2004.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-aaa-diameter-sip-app]
              Garcia-Martin, M., "Diameter Session Initiation Protocol
              (SIP) Application", draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-sip-app-09
              (work in progress), September 2005.




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   [RFC2069]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Leach, P.,
              Luotonen, A., Sink, E., and L. Stewart, "An Extension to
              HTTP : Digest Access Authentication", RFC 2069,
              January 1997.

   [RFC2246]  Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
              RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [RFC2543]  Handley, M., Schulzrinne, H., Schooler, E., and J.
              Rosenberg, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 2543,
              March 1999.

   [RFC2633]  Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
              RFC 2633, June 1999.

   [RFC3588]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
              Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.


Appendix A.  Change Log

   RFC editor: please remove this section prior to RFC publication.

A.1.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-05

   o  Removed interdependency between sips/https and RADIUS connection
      security.

A.2.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-04

   o  Short Diameter compatibility section

A.3.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-03

   o  new 'Interoperability' section, requiring support for both nonce
      generation modes.
   o  removed Diameter migration path section (again)
   o  reference to server behavior in Security Considerations section
   o  fixed text/table mismatch regarding Digest-Domain attributes

A.4.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-02

   o  added Diameter migration path section (again)
   o  various typos

A.5.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-01





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   o  removed Diameter migration path section
   o  Included Digest-URI and Digest-Realm in the authorization
      decision, not just in the digest calculation
   o  RADIUS server must check if a RADIUS client is authorized to serve
      the realm mentioned in Digest-Realm
   o  moved 'Detailed Description' sections in front of 'New RADIUS
      attributes' section
   o  replaced 'IPsec or otherwise secured connection' with IPsec
   o  changed MAY to SHOULD for Digest-Algorithm in Access-Challenge
   o  changed type of Digest-Entity-Body-Hash to text (all other H(..)
      result attributes are hex and text, too)
   o  new abstract
   o  Terminology section changed
   o  'Changes' section as appendix

A.6.  Changes from draft-ietf-radext-digest-auth-00

   o  SIP-AOR attribute added
   o  clarified use of Digest-Qop
   o  attribute overview table added

A.7.  Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-04

   o  clarified usage of Digest-HA1
   o  clarified usage of Digest-Stale (is sent in an Access-Challenge
      now)
   o  clarified allowed attribute usage for message types
   o  changed attribute type to 'Text' where the corresponding Diameter
      AVPs have a UTF8String
   o  added Diameter client - RADIUS server handling

A.8.  Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-03

   o  addressed 'auth-int' issue
   o  New Digest-Nextnonce attribute
   o  revised abstract, motivational section and examples
   o  Access-Challenge instead of 'Access-Accept carrying a Digest-Nonce
      attribute'
   o  shortened SIP messages in example, removed real-world addresses
      and product names

A.9.  Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-02

   o  Relaxed restrictions for Digest-Domain, Digest-Realm, Digest-
      Opaque, Digest-Qop and Digest-Algorithm
   o  Additional security considerations for Digest-Domain, Digest-Qop
      and Digest-Algorithm usage in Access-Accept messages




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A.10.  Changes from draft-sterman-aaa-sip-01

   o  Replaced Sub-attributes with flat attributes
   o  aligned naming with [I-D.ietf-aaa-diameter-sip-app]
   o  Added how a server must treat unknown attributes.
   o  Added a section 'Migration path to Diameter'
   o  Added an optional attribute for support of the digest scheme
      described in informational [RFC3310].
   o  Added a mode of operation where the RADIUS server chooses the
      nonce.  This was required for AKA [RFC3310], but can be useful for
      ordinary Digest Authentication when the qop directive is not used.
      This required the addition of several attributes.







































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Authors' Addresses

   Baruch Sterman
   Kayote Networks
   P.O. Box 1373
   Efrat  90435
   Israel

   Email: baruch@kayote.com


   Daniel Sadolevsky
   SecureOL, Inc.
   Jerusalem Technology Park
   P.O. Box 16120
   Jerusalem  91160
   Israel

   Email: dscreat@dscreat.com


   David  Schwartz
   Kayote Networks
   P.O. Box 1373
   Efrat  90435
   Israel

   Email: david@kayote.com


   David Williams
   Cisco Systems
   7025 Kit Creek Road
   P.O. Box 14987
   Research Triangle Park  NC 27709
   USA

   Email: dwilli@cisco.com


   Wolfgang Beck
   Deutsche Telekom AG
   Am Kavalleriesand 3
   Darmstadt  64295
   Germany

   Email: beckw@t-systems.com




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