RADIUS Extensions Working Group S. Winter
Internet-Draft RESTENA
Intended status: Experimental M. McCauley
Expires: December 19, 2008 OSC
S. Venaas
UNINETT
June 17, 2008
TLS encryption for RADIUS over TCP (RadSec)
draft-ietf-radext-radsec-00
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
This document specifies security on the transport layer (TLS) for the
RADIUS protocol [2] when transmitted over TCP [9]. This enables
dynamic trust relationships between RADIUS servers.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. RADIUS Shared Secret Usage in RadSec . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Comparison of Diameter vs. RadSec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Diameter Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. DNS NAPTR Peer Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Implementation Overview: Radiator . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix C. Implementation Overview: radsecproxy . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Introduction
The RADIUS protocol [2] is a widely deployed authentication and
authorisation protocol. The supplementary RADIUS Accounting
specification [3] also provides accounting mechanisms, thus
delivering a full AAA solution. However, RADIUS is experiencing
several shortcomings, such as its dependency on the unreliable
transport protocol UDP and the lack of security for large parts of
its packet payload.
Several enhancements have been proposed to overcome RADIUS'
limitations. An IETF Standards Track protocol, Diameter [6], has
been designed to provide an AAA protocol that should deprecate
RADIUS. However, given that current implementations of Diameter are
either not freely accessible, or do not provide the flexibility of
current RADIUS deployments, or both, an intermediate solution that is
based on RADIUS but provides mechanisms to overcome many of its
drawbacks has been implemented by several vendors. These
implementations are interoperable and deployed in a world-wide
wireless roaming infrastructure. The protocol is called RadSec.
This document describes version 2 of the RadSec protocol. Version 1
of RadSec is defined in the RadSec whitepaper [10]. The two
currently existing implementations of RadSec version 2 are described
in Appendix B and Appendix C.
The main focus of RadSec is to provide a means to secure the
communication between RADIUS/TCP peers on the transport layer. The
most important use of RadSec lies in roaming environments where
RADIUS packets need to be transferred through different
administrative domains and untrusted, potentially hostile networks.
An example for a world-wide roaming environment that uses RadSec to
secure communication is "eduroam", see [15].
The new features in RadSec obsolete the use of IP addresses and
shared secrets to identify other peers and thus allow the dynamic
establishment of connections to peers that are not previously
configured. The definition of lookup mechanisms is out of scope of
this document, but an implementation of a DNS NAPTR lookup based
mechanism exists and is described as an example lookup mechanism in
Appendix A.
Transitioning from a plain RADIUS infrastructure to a RadSec
infrastructure is very easy, since the RADIUS packet payload is
identical in both protocols. Enabling RadSec can be done on a per-
server basis. Unlike in Diameter, the learning curve for a new
protocol does not exist, which makes it almost trivial for an
experienced RADIUS server administrator to switch to a RadSec-secured
transport for RADIUS packets.
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The security layer does not require any new assignments of codepoints
for the RADIUS protocol. No new attributes are defined and no new
packet codes are used.
1.1. Requirements Language
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[1].
2. Transport Layer Security
2.1. Operation
Once the TCP connection between two RadSec nodes is established, a
TLS session is established. At least TLSv1.1 [7] is used. Both
nodes either mutually present a X.509 certificate which is verified
according to [5] or use a shared key authentication for TLS which
needs to be pre-configured out-of-band prior to the connection
attempt.
The list of Certification Authorities that a node which acts as a
server is willing to accept SHOULD be sent during the Certificate
Request message in the CertificateRequest struct (section 7.4.4 of
[7]). Rationale: If a RadSec node acts as a client and is in
possession of multiple certificates from different CAs (i.e. is part
of multiple roaming consortia) and dynamic discovery is used, and the
dynamic discovery mechanism does not provide sufficient meta
information to identify the server's roaming consortium, then it is
necessary to signal which consortium it is connecting to.
The list of Certification Authorities that a node which acts as a
client is willing to accept can not be signaled within the TLS 1.1
handshake. This makes it impossible to select the right certificate
if a RadSec node which is acting as a server for multiple roaming
consortia (in possession of multiple certificates from different CAs)
is contacted by a client. This situation is likely to change in TLS
1.2, according to [8]. "Trusted CA Indication" as in [8], section 6,
SHOULD be used.
When using X.509 certificate validation, peer validation always
includes a check on whether the DNS name or the IP address of the
server that is contacted matches its certificate. When a RadSec peer
establishes a new connection (acts as a client) to another peer, the
following rules of precedence are used during validation:
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o If the client expects a certain fully qualified domain name (FQDN)
and the presented certificate contains both at least one instance
of the subjectAltName field with type dNSName and a Common Name,
then the certificate is considered a match if any one of those
subjectAltName fields matches the expected FQDN. The Common Name
field is not evaluated in this case.
o If the client expects a certain fully qualified domain name (FQDN)
and the presented certificate does not contain any subjectAltName
field with type dNSName, then the certificate is considered a
match if the Common Name field matches the expected FQDN.
o If the client expects a certain IP address and the presented
certificate contains both at least one instance of the
subjectAltName field with type iPAddr and a Common Name, then the
certificate is considered a match if any one of those
subjectAltName fields matches the expected IP address. The Common
Name field is not evaluated in this case.
o If the client expects a certain IP address and the presented
certificate does not contain any subjectAltName field with type
iPAddr, then the certificate is considered a match if the Common
Name field matches the expected IP address.
Further restrictions on the certificate MAY be verified, depending on
the trust fabric of the peering agreement.
If dynamic peer resolution is used, the above verification steps MAY
not be sufficient to ensure that a connecting peer is authorised to
perform user authentications. In these cases, the trust fabric
SHOULD NOT depend on untrusted peer resolution methods like DNS to
identify and authorise nodes. Instead, the operators of the RadSec
infrastructure SHOULD define their own trust model and apply this
model to the certificates after they have passed the standard
validity checks above. Current RadSec implementations offer varying
degrees of versatility for defining criteria which certificates to
accept.
NOTE WELL: None of the current implementations provide configuration
options for using TLS with pre-shared keys. However, the underlying
libraries support it, so support for that should be implementable
easily.
After the TLS session is established, RADIUS packet payloads are
exchanged over the encrypted TLS tunnel. In plain RADIUS, the packet
size can be determined by evaluating the size of the datagram that
arrived. Due to the stream nature of TCP and TLS, this does not hold
true for RadSec packet exchange. Instead, packet boundaries of
RADIUS packets that arrive in the stream are calculated by evaluating
the packet's Length field. Special care MUST be taken on the packet
sender side that the value of the Length field is indeed correct
before sending it over the TLS tunnel, because incorrect packet
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lengths can no longer be detected by a differing datagram boundary.
2.2. Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation
RadSec implementations need not necessarily support all TLS
ciphersuites listed in [7]. Not all TLS ciphersuites are supported by
available TLS tool kits and licenses may be required in some cases.
The existing implementations of RadSec use OpenSSL as cryptographic
backend, which supports all of the ciphersuites listed in the rules
below:
To ensure interoperability, RadSec clients and servers MUST
support the TLS [7] mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite:
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.
In addition, RadSec servers SHOULD support and be able to
negotiate all of the following TLS ciphersuites:
o TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
o TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
In addition, RadSec clients SHOULD support the following
TLS ciphersuites [4]:
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
o TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
Since TLS supports ciphersuite negotiation, peers completing the
TLS negotiation will also have selected a ciphersuite, which
includes encryption and hashing methods.
TLS also supports compression as well as ciphersuite
negotiation. During the RadSec conversation the client and server MAY
negotiate compression. However, a peer MUST continue the
conversation even if the other peer rejects compression.
2.3. RADIUS Shared Secret Usage in RadSec
Within RADIUS [2], a shared secret is used for hiding of attributes
such as User-Password, as well as in computation of the Response
Authenticator. In RADIUS accounting [3], the shared secret is used
in computation of both the Request Authenticator and the Response
Authenticator.
Since in RADIUS a shared secret is used to provide confidentiality
as well as integrity protection and authentication, the use of TLS
ciphers which encrypt the stream payload in RadSec can provide
security services sufficient to substitute for RADIUS application-
layer security. Therefore, where TLS ciphers that provide encryption
are used, it will not be necessary to configure a RADIUS shared
secret.
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Then, the secret shared between two RadSec peers MAY not
be configured. In this case, the shared secret defaults to "radsec"
(without the quotes). However, if the RadSec nodes negotiated a TLS
cipher that provides integrity assurance only, the connection MUST be
configured with a non-default RADIUS shared secret.
3. Comparison of Diameter vs. RadSec
The feature set in the Diameter Base Protocol is almost a superset of
the features present in RadSec. Sophisticated mechanisms for
keepalive, reliable transmission and payload security exist. The
reason for specifying a short-term intermediate solution as opposed
to using Diameter at the moment are the lack of suitable, publicly
available and versatile implementations.
Typically, RADIUS servers do not only support the RADIUS protocol
itself, but also provide interfaces to a wide variety of backends
(credential stores) to actually verify a user's credentials. In
highly heterogeneous environments like eduroam, where a lot of
different backends are in use by the participating home servers
(OpenLDAP, Novell eDirectory, ActiveDirectory, SQL databases or plain
text files, just to name a few), such versatility is a requirement.
Current Diameter server implementations focus on the validation of a
small set of EAP methods (mostly EAP-SIM and EAP-TLS) and
consequently on a small set of backends to verify these credentials.
A further requirement in environments like eduroam is affordability.
Public institutions like schools and universities often face tight
budgets, and so an open source implementation of Diameter would be
desirable (just as FreeRADIUS is for the RADIUS protocol).
Unfortunately, the few Open Source Software implementations of the
Diameter protocol like OpenDiameter [12] or JDiameter [13] only
provide a set of libraries, but no server at all.
Diameter's ability to resolve peers dynamically is limited to using
either SLPv2 or DNS, whereas RadSec allows arbitrary peer resolution
mechanisms. This greater amount of flexibility can pay off in many
roaming federations. In eduroam's case, a central SAML-based meta
data repository ("eduGAIN-MDS") is in place which is able to provide
peer addresses. Using RadSec it is possible to resolve a peer's
address through such a meta data system, whereas with Diameter it is
not possible to use this repository natively.
4. Diameter Compatibility
Since RadSec is only a new transport profile for RADIUS,
compatibility of RadSec - Diameter vs. RADIUS - Diameter is
identical. The considerations regarding payload size in [9] apply.
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5. Security Considerations
The computational resources to establish a TLS tunnel are
significantly higher than simply sending mostly unencrypted UDP
datagrams. Therefore, clients connecting to a RadSec node will more
easily create high load conditions and a malicious client might
create a Denial-of-Service attack more easily.
In the case of dynamic peer discovery, a RadSec node needs to be able
to accept connections from a large, not previously known, group of
hosts, possibly the whole internet. In this case, the server's
RadSec port can not be protected from unauthorised connection
attempts with measures on the network layer, i.e. access lists and
firewalls. This opens more attack vectors for Distributed Denial of
Service attacks, just like any other service that is supposed to
serve arbitrary clients (like for example web servers).
Some TLS ciphersuites only provide integrity validation of their
payload, and provide no encryption. When such ciphersuites are
negotiated in a RadSec TLS handshake, the only means of protecting
sensitive payload contents is the RADIUS shared secret. If the
RADIUS shared secret is set to the default "radsec" and a non-
encrypting TLS ciphersuite is used, implementations should either
forbid transmitting payload over this connection completely or at
least issue a warning to whatever logging destination is configured
by the administrator.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. The TCP port 2083 was already
previously assigned by IANA for RadSec. The Status-Server packet was
already assigned by IANA for [2].
7. Acknowledgements
RadSec version 1 was first implemented by Open Systems Consultants,
Currumbin Waters, Australia, for their "Radiator" RADIUS server
product.
Funding and input for the development of this Internet Draft was
provided by the European Commission co-funded project "GEANT2" [16]
and further feedback was provided by the TERENA Task Force Mobility
[17].
8. References
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8.1. Informative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
8.2. Normative References
[2] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson, W., and S. Willens, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
June 2000.
[3] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[4] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 3268, June 2002.
[5] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley,
R., and T. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
RFC 5280, May 2008.
[6] Calhoun, P., Laughney, J., Arkko, J., Guttman, E., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[7] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[8] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
Extension Definitions", February 2008, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-02.txt>.
[9] Winter, S., "Reliable Transport Profile for RADIUS", July 2008,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-ietf-radext-radius-tcp-00.txt>.
[10] Open System Consultants, "RadSec - a secure, reliable RADIUS
Protocol", May 2005,
<http://www.open.com.au/radiator/radsec-whitepaper.pdf>.
[11] Open System Consultants, "Radiator Radius Server - Installation
and Reference Manual", 2006,
<http://www.open.com.au/radiator/ref.html>.
[12] Open Diameter Project, "Open Diameter", 2006,
<http://www.opendiameter.org/>.
[13] Svenson, E., "JDiameter Project Homepage", 2006,
<https://jdiameter.dev.java.net/>.
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[14] Venaas, S., "radsecproxy Project Homepage", 2007,
<http://software.uninett.no/radsecproxy/>.
[15] Trans-European Research and Education Networking Association,
"eduroam Homepage", 2007, <http://www.eduroam.org/>.
[16] Delivery of Advanced Network Technology to Europe, "European
Commission Information Society and Media: GEANT2", 2008,
<http://www.geant2.net/>.
[17] TERENA, "Trans-European Research and Education Networking
Association", 2008, <http://www.terena.org/>.
Appendix A. DNS NAPTR Peer Discovery
The following text is quoted from the file goodies/dnsroam.cfg in the
Radiator distribution; further documentation of the <AuthBy DNSROAM>
feature in Radiator can be found at [11]. It describes an algorithm
to retrieve the RadSec route information from the global DNS using
NAPTR and SRV records. The input of the algorithm is the realm part
of the user name.
The following algorithm is used to discover a target server from a
Realm using DNS:
1. Look for NAPTR records for the Realm.
2. For each NAPTR found record, examine the Service field and use
that to determine the transport protocol and TLS requirements for
the server. The Service field starts with 'AAA' for insecure and
'AAAS' for TLS secured. The Service field contains '+RADSECS'
for RadSec over SCTP, '+RADSECT' for RadSec over TCP or '+RADIUS'
for RADIUS protocol over UDP. The most common Service field you
will see will be 'AAAS+RADSECT' for TLS secured RadSec over TCP.
3.
A. If the NAPTR has the 'S' flag, look for SRV records for the
name. For each SRV record found, note the Port number and
then look for A and AAAA records corresponding to the name in
the SRV record.
B. If the NAPTR has the 'A' flag, look for a A and AAAA records
for the name.
4. If no NAPTR records are found, look for A and AAAA records based
directly on the realm name. For example, if the realm is
'examplerealm.edu', it looks for records such as
'_radsec._tcp.examplerealm.edu', '_radsec._sctp.examplerealm.edu'
and '_radius._udp.examplerealm.edu',
5. All A and AAAA records found are ordered according to their Order
and Preference fields. The most preferable server address is
used as the target server address, along with any other server
attributes discovered from DNS. If no SRV record was found for
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the address, the DNSROAM configured Port is used.
For example, if the User-Name realm was 'examplerealm.edu', and DNS
contained the following records:
examplerealm.edu. IN NAPTR 50 50 "s" "AAAS+RADSECT" ""
_radsec._tcp.examplerealm.edu.
_radsec._tcp.examplerealm.edu. IN SRV 0 10 2083
radsec.examplerealm.edu.
radsec.examplerealm.edu. IN AAAA 2001::202:44ff:fe0a:f704
Then the target selected would be a RadSec server on port 2083 at
IPv6 address 2001::202:44ff:fe0a:f704. The connection would be made
over TCP/IP, and TLS encryption would be used. This complete
specification of the realm is the most flexible and is recommended.
Appendix B. Implementation Overview: Radiator
Radiator implements the RadSec protocol for proxying requests with
the <Authby RADSEC> and <ServerRADSEC> clauses in the Radiator
configuration file.
The <AuthBy RADSEC> clause defines a RadSec client, and causes
Radiator to send RADIUS requests to the configured RadSec server
using the RadSec protocol.
The <ServerRADSEC> clause defines a RadSec server, and causes
Radiator to listen on the configured port and address(es) for
connections from <Authby RADSEC> clients. When an <Authby RADSEC>
client connects to a <ServerRADSEC> server, the client sends RADIUS
requests through the stream to the server. The server then services
the request in the same was as if the request had been received from
a conventional UDP RADIUS client.
Radiator is compliant to version 2 of RadSec if the following options
are used:
<AuthBy RADSEC>
* Protocol tcp
* UseTLS
* TLS_CertificateFile
<ServerRADSEC>
* Protocol tcp
* UseTLS
* TLS_RequireClientCert
As of Radiator 3.15, the default shared secret for RadSec connections
is "mysecret" (without quotes). The implementation uses TCP
keepalive socket options, but does not send Status-Server packets.
Once established, TLS connections are kept open throughout the server
instance lifetime.
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Appendix C. Implementation Overview: radsecproxy
The RADIUS proxy named radsecproxy was written in order to allow use
of RadSec in current RADIUS deployments. This is a generic proxy
that supports any number and combination of clients and servers,
supporting RADIUS over UDP and RadSec. The main idea is that it can
be used on the same host as a non-RadSec client or server to ensure
RadSec is used on the wire, however as a generic proxy it can be used
in other circumstances as well.
The configuration file consists of client and server clauses, where
there is one such clause for each client or server. In such a clause
one specifies either "type tls" or "type udp" for RadSec or UDP
transport. For RadSec the default shared secret "mysecret" (without
quotes), the same as Radiator, is used. A secret may be specified by
putting say "secret somesharedsecret" inside a client or server
clause.
In order to use TLS for clients and/or servers, one must also specify
where to locate CA certificates, as well as certificate and key for
the client or server. This is done in a TLS clause. There may be
one or several TLS clauses. A client or server clause may reference
a particular TLS clause, or just use a default one. One use for
multiple TLS clauses may be to present one certificate to clients and
another to servers.
If any RadSec (TLS) clients are configured, the proxy will at startup
listen on port 2083, as assigned by IANA for the OSC RadSec
implementation. An alternative port may be specified. When a client
connects, the client certificate will be verified, including checking
that the configured FQDN or IP address matches what is in the
certificate. Requests coming from a RadSec client are treated
exactly like requests from UDP clients.
The proxy will at startup try to establish a TLS connection to each
(if any) of the configured RadSec (TLS) servers. If it fails to
connect to a server, it will retry regularly. There is some back-off
where it will retry quickly at first, and with longer intervals
later. If a connection to a server goes down it will also start
retrying regularly. When setting up the TLS connection, the server
certificate will be verified, including checking that the configured
FQDN or IP address matches what is in the certificate. Requests are
sent to a RadSec server just like they would to a UDP server.
The proxy supports Status-Server messages. They are only sent to a
server if enabled for that particular server. Status-Server requests
are always responded to.
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This RadSec implementation has been successfully tested together with
Radiator. It is a freely available open-source implementation. For
source code and documentation, see [14].
Authors' Addresses
Stefan Winter
Fondation RESTENA
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
Luxembourg 1359
LUXEMBOURG
Phone: +352 424409 1
Fax: +352 422473
EMail: stefan.winter@restena.lu
URI: http://www.restena.lu.
Mike McCauley
Open Systems Consultants
9 Bulbul Place
Currumbin Waters QLD 4223
AUSTRALIA
Phone: +61 7 5598 7474
Fax: +61 7 5598 7070
EMail: mikem@open.com.au
URI: http://www.open.com.au.
Stig Venaas
UNINETT
Abels gate 5 - Teknobyen
Trondheim 7465
NORWAY
Phone: +47 73 55 79 00
Fax: +47 73 55 79 01
EMail: stig.venaas@uninett.no
URI: http://www.uninett.no.
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using xml2rfc v1.32 (of http://xml.resource.org/) from a source in
RFC-2629 XML format.
Winter, et al. Expires December 19, 2008 [Page 14]
